Environmental and Resource Economics 11(3–4): 301–315, 1998.
© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
301
Are Optimal CO2 Emissions Really Optimal?
Four Critical Issues for Economists in the Greenhouse
CHRISTIAN AZAR
Institute of Physical Resource Theory, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg University,
412 96 Göteborg, Sweden (email:
[email protected])
Abstract. Although the greenhouse effect is by many considered as one of the most serious environmental problems, several economic studies of the greenhouse effect, most notably Nordhaus’s
DICE model, suggest that it is optimal to allow the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) to increase
by a factor of three over the next century. Other studies have found that substantial reductions can
be justified on economic grounds. This paper explores into the reasons for these differences and
identifies four (partly overlapping) crucial issues that have to be dealt with when analysing the economics of the greenhouse effect: low-probability but catastrophic events; cost evaluation methods;
the choice of discount rate; the choice of decision criterion. The paper shows that (i) these aspects
are crucial for the policy conclusions drawn from models of the economics of climate change, and
that (ii) ethical choices have to be made for each of these issues. This fact needs wider recognition
since economics is very often perceived as a value neutral tool that can be used to provide policy
makers with “optimal” policies.
Key words: climate change, cost-benefit analysis, decision criterion, discount rate, weight factors
JEL classification: D61, D62, D63
1. Introduction
Layard and Walters (1978) open their textbook Microeconomic Theory by stating
that “economics is making the best of things.” But – the authors continue – already
Hume pointed out two centuries ago that one cannot deduce an “ought” from an
“is.” Any “ought” is intrinsically linked to value judgements in one way or another.
Thus, there is a strong normative component in (welfare) economics.
In order to evaluate whether a project should be carried out, a number of
assumptions have to be made, and some of these might be controversial from
an ethical point of view. This is especially true in the context of long-term environmental problems. This is important to recognise, since our results are often
perceived as if they were free of value judgements. Further, our economic vocabulary, e.g., the concept of optimality, conveys a Plato-inspired world view in which
there exists – in an ontological sense – a best choice to be made, and more research
will reveal what that choice is. This tends to enhance the perception about value
neutrality. Consider, for instance, the economic literature on the question of how
we should respond to climatic change.
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There is much concern that emissions of greenhouse gases will cause severe
climatic changes and subsequent threats to environmental and social sustainability.
Yet, several economic studies, most notably Nordhaus’s pioneering DICE model
(Nordhaus 1994), have concluded that stringent measures to control emissions of
CO2 would be very costly even if the benefits of reducing the emissions (i.e., the
avoided climatic changes) would be taken into account. Nordhaus, for instance,
finds it optimal to allow the emission rates to increase threefold over the next
century. Several other studies find similar results, e.g., Manne et al. (1995) and
Peck and Teisberg (1993).
However, these results have been challenged by a growing number of studies,
e.g., Cline (1992), Azar and Sterner (1996), Roughgarden and Schneider (1998),
Schultz and Kastings (1997) and Hasselman et al. (1997). For instance, Cline finds
that a stabilisation of global emissions at 4 Gton C/yr (30% below the present
rate of fossil carbon emissions) is “justified on economic grounds alone.” This rate
of emissions would be sufficient to keep atmospheric concentrations close to the
present level during the next century.
Thus, there are strong reasons to try and better understand the underlying reasons for these diverging results. Clearly, the divergence can partly be attributed
to choices for parameter values that can be improved with more research (both
within economics, ecology and climate research). However, such improvements
will not suffice to bridge the different results. Rather, they stem – ultimately –
from disagreements on certain key parameters and modelling choices that are value
laden.
Grubb (1993) writes that “it should be recognized that global impact costing
studies inherently involve contentious value judgements, concerning which differing assumptions may completely reverse the conclusions.” Schneider (1997)
stresses the importance of highlighting these value-laden assumptions in order
to ensure that integrated assessment models of climate change (as well as other
environmental problems) “enlighten more than they conceal.”
In this paper, four crucial issues for cost-benefit analyses of climate change are
identified: the treatment of low-probability but catastrophic impacts, valuation of
non-market goods, the discount rate and the choice of decision criterion. They are
discussed in Sections 2 through 5. It is shown that
− ethically controversial assumptions have to be made for each of these aspects,
− the policy conclusions obtained from optimisation models are very sensitive
to these choices, and, finally,
− studies that find that minimal reductions are warranted have made choices
that tend to reduce the importance of the most common arguments in favour
of emission reductions.
Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
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2. Low Probability but Catastrophic Events
Although some features of climate change are virtually certain,1 e.g., that the
natural greenhouse effect will be enhanced with rising CO2 concentrations, impacts
are still very uncertain, in particular at the regional level. In cost-benefit analysis
one may treat this problem in an expected utility framework. This approach
requires knowledge about the probability of different outcomes. But such probabilities are not known, and one is forced to rely on subjective probability
assessments.
2.1.
SENSITIVITY
Several cost-damage studies have dealt with the uncertainties surrounding climate
change (see e.g., Parry (1993), Peck and Teisberg (1993), Nordhaus (1994),
Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1995), Azar and Johansson (1996), Manne (1996), Gjerde
et al. (1997) and Roughgarden and Schneider (1998)).2 These studies find that there
are costs associated with uncertainty, but disagreement exists to what extent this
extra cost is important for the overall policy conclusions. Several studies have concluded that uncertainty plays a minor role for the overall analysis, but this largely
hinges upon the fact that they have focused on probability distributions in a fairly
small interval around the expected damage. One study which has looked at lowprobability catastrophic events is Manne (1996), who has compiled work done for
the Energy Modelling Forum (EMF). Manne concludes that not much near-term
abatement is needed to hedge against the risk of low-probability catastrophes. 3
Other authors, e.g., Tol (1995), Azar and Johansson (1996), Gjerde et al. (1997)
and Roughgarden and Schneider (1998), find that catastrophic surprises may be
very important and substantially alter the policy conclusions obtained (even if the
probability for the surprise is small).
The results of studies that take into account catastrophic surprises are sensitively
dependent upon the assumptions made for the probabilities and the associated
damages, as well as assumptions about the inertia of the energy system, i.e., how
rapidly we could restructure our energy system if climatic change turns out to be
more severe than most policy makers initially expected.
2.2.
VALUE JUDGEMENTS
The studies referred to above are all based on some expected cost approach. But this
approach suffers from two difficult problems: How do we treat problems where the
probability distribution is unknown? And, how do we calculate the costs of global
catastrophic impacts and what is the maximum cost that could hit the global economy? This indeterminacy problem reduces the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis
in the context of global warming (see e.g., Broome 1992; Read 1994). Since there
are no reliable estimates of the probability for catastrophic surprises, the expected
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cost approach depends largely on the analyst’s chosen probability distribution and
almost any emission reduction can be defended.
The severity of risks we should expose our planet to is ultimately an ethical
question that cannot be settled by expected cost approaches or other related economic methods that were developed to deal with uncertainties at a completely
different scale. An alternative to cost-benefit analysis is the “maximin” strategy,
namely to focus on the worst possible outcome and then maximise the welfare
of that outcome. Applied to the greenhouse effect, the strategy implies strong
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in order to reduce the probability that
catastrophic impacts will occur (see e.g., Krause et al. 1992). But this conclusion too, as well as any other, would largely depend on the analysts’ subjective
perception of what is “the worst outcome.”
2.3.
CONCLUSIONS
The risk of global environmental catastrophic surprises is a common argument in
favour of emission reductions, but quantifying the probability for such events is
impossible. Equally difficult would it be to quantify the costs associated with such
surprises. Therefore such impacts are often omitted from CO 2 optimisation models.
Unfortunately, this tends to be forgotten when the results from these models are
presented, and particular emission scenarios are presented as optimal even if one
argument favouring emissions reductions never entered the analysis.
3. Methods for Evaluating Costs
Several authors, e.g., Ayres and Walter (1991), Nordhaus (1991, 1994), Cline
(1992), Titus (1992), Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1995) and Mendelsohn and Neumann (1998) have published comprehensive estimates of the economic costs of
climatic changes. A review of this literature, can be found in IPCC (Pearce et al.
1996). Although progress has been made over the last couple of years, Nordhaus’s
(1994) conclusion that existing costing studies are “extremely tentative” and “in
their infancy” still holds true. First, all studies (except Mendelsohn) have focused
on the costs related to a CO2 -equivalent doubling. Damage for other levels are
included in the analyses using some (arbitrarily) chosen non-linear function in
temperature change. Second, all studies, except those of Tol (1995, 1996), assume
damage functions that are independent of the rate of climatic changes, although
this aspect is expected to be as important as the level of temperature change. Third,
estimates for developing countries are even more uncertain than developing country studies. For instance, Nordhaus and Cline obtain global costs by extrapolating
US damage estimates.
In general, market impacts are rather straightforeward to estimate. For nonmarket impacts, alternative techniques have to be applied,4 and these are controversial. This is important since much concern in the climate change debate is related to
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non-market impacts (in several cost-assessments, such impacts actually dominate
the analysis, see Pearce et al. 1996). For instance, these methods fail to recognise,
or do not accept, the rights of other species than humans (in that they are only
concerned with the value given by humans to these species). The sufferings of an
animal exposed to poisonous chemicals are not taken into account unless a human
is willing to pay for it to end. Further, Jacobs (1991) argues that these methods
also fail to capture the value humans give to such sufferings (and environmental
impacts in general) since they fail to “allow people to judge value collectively, as
citizens, rather than simply individually, as consumers.” Another interesting aspect
of the cost problem that needs further attention is how assumptions about altruism
may change the interpretation of CVM studies (see Johansson 1998).
In this short essay, I focus on just one cost issue: valuation of damages
in developing countries. Only a few authors, e.g., Ayres and Walter (1991),
Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1995), have attempted to explicitly value such costs
(including both market and non-market impacts). Fankhauser and Tol based their
calculations on willingness-to-pay estimates of various impacts, for instance,
increased mortality risks. Since developing countries are poorer, the willingnessto-pay for increased safety is lower in a poor country than in a rich one. Thus, the
value of a statistical life, assigned to a death in a rich country was (assumed to
be) approximately 15 times higher than for a death in a poor country in the study
by Fankhauser (with similar values reported by Tol). These estimates caused much
debate and controversy world-wide, in particular when it became clear that they
would form the basis for the cost-damage chapter in IPCC’s Second Assessment
Report (Pearce et al. 1996).
The critique stemmed from an unease with the use of lower value of a life in
developing countries (as such) and/or from the fact that this way of valuing costs
does not take into account that the utility of a dollar in a poor country is higher than
in a rich. The latter issue can be used as a basis for the introduction of weight factors
for costs that affect the poor countries (which in some cases would “recover” equal
valuation across countries (Azar 1998).
3.1.
SENSITIVITY
The introduction of weight factors may substantially affect the cost-estimate. The
study by Ayres and Walter (1991), e.g., which is a critical assessment of an early
draft of Nordhaus’s cost-estimates, takes the higher marginal utility of income
in developing countries into account when estimating the global costs related to
sea-level rise. They estimate global costs for sea level rise to lie in the range 2.1–
2.4% of world GDP, a cost which is nine times higher than the costs quantified by
Nordhaus (1991). (Nordhaus’s quantified cost-estimate 0.25% of GDP is raised to
1.3% to take into account unquantified items.) Similarly, Azar and Sterner (1996)
estimate global marginal costs of CO2 emissions, under the assumption that costs
in poor countries should be weighted so as to reflect the welfare losses actually
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felt in developing countries. Taking this aspect into account raises costs by a
factor of three (for a logarithmic utility function and a utilitarian welfare function).
For higher degrees of inequality aversion, even higher costs estimates would be
obtained.
It may also be noted that the introduction of weight factors implies that the
required reduction level in developing countries is lowered. Further, although
weight factors may substantially alter the required global emission reductions
at present, the use of weight factors will play a minor role for the “optimised”
emissions once developing countries grow richer in income and emissions (Azar
1998).
3.2.
VALUE JUDGEMENTS
The introduction of weight factors may critically affect the cost estimates and thus
the “optimal” response to climatic change. However, the choice of weight factors
ultimately requires a social welfare function which is, of course, a highly value
laden choice. But, that does not mean that the use of weight factors is more value
laden than leaving them out, since that would also be an ethical choice.
3.3.
CONCLUSIONS
The facts that poor people in poor countries are expected to suffer the most severe
consequences from climate change and that they emit nine times less fossil CO2
than industrialised countries on a per capita basis, are often invoked as arguments
for reducing the emissions in the rich world. But in most economic analyses, the
very fact that people are poor becomes – by the logic of the willingness-to-pay
approach – the reason for giving their expected sufferings lower weight in the cost
analyses.
4. The Choice of Discount Rate
In all investment analysis, the discount rate plays an important role for the profitability assessment. In particular, there has been much controversy over the choice
of discount rate in public projects, e.g., in the construction of hydropower dams in
the US in the sixties. Research into the appropriate choice of discount rate, when
considering tax wedges and risk, has thus become almost a discipline itself (see
e.g., Lind 1982).
4.1.
SENSITIVITY
The cost of reducing CO2 emissions are immediate, whereas the expected benefits
of these reductions will accrue decades and/or even centuries ahead. Because of
this time asymmetry and the long time scales involved, the choice of discount rate
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307
is probably the single most important parameter in cost-benefit analysis of climate
change. Largely, this parameter explains why authors such as Nordhaus (1994) and
Manne et al. (1995) refer to emission increases by a factor of three or so over the
next century as optimal whereas Cline (1992), Azar and Sterner (1996), Hasselman
et al. (1997) and Schultz and Kastings (1997) find that substantial reductions can
be justified.
4.2.
VALUE JUDGEMENTS
So, what value should be assumed for the discount rate? There are essentially two
different roads that can be taken (Arrow et al. 1996):
• The first is generally referred to as descriptive. It focuses on the observed
market interest rate in order to ensure that investments are made in the most
profitable projects.
• The second is often referred to as prescriptive. It emphasises that normative
questions are involved when making trade-offs between consumption today
and in the future. Proponents of this method often base the discount rate on
the social rate of time preference (SRTP). The SRTP is equal to γ g + ρ (the
Ramsey formula) where γ is the negative of the elasticity of marginal utility,
g is the relative per capita growth rate and ρ is the utility discount rate (the
pure rate of time preference).
Also the descriptive approach could employ the Ramsey formula (as, e.g., Nordhaus does) but in that case the utility discount rate, ρ, is chosen so as to equalise
SRTP with the observed market interest rate. Proponents of the prescriptive
approach often make the case that ρ should be very low or even zero, for intergenerational equity reasons (see e.g., Sidgwick 1907; Ramsey 1928; Harrod 1948;
Rawls 1972; Spash and d’Arge 1989; Broome 1992; Cline 1992; Solow 1992; Price
1993; Eriksson 1994; Khanna and Chapman 1996; Azar and Sterner 1996; Rabl
1996; Schultz and Kastings 1997). It is hard to justify, from an ethical point of
view, that the present generation should give lower value to impacts that affect
future generations just because they live in the future. (Note that positive discount
rates may still be justified, if income is assumed to grow over time.)
Both approaches encounter problems. Starting with the descriptive approach,
which purports to pick the discount rate so that it coincides with the intertemporal
trade-offs people actually make, it must be recognised that this is not as easy as
it may first appear. Lind (1995) has pointed out that “we observe some people
borrowing on credit cards at 15–25% and simultaneously investing at after tax
rates of return in the range 1–3%. Which, if either, of these rates reflects these
individual’s rates of time preference?”
Secondly, it may be noted that even a constant discount rate as low as 1%/yr
would not be “compatible” with the concern people express for radioactive waste.
At this rate, even a radioactive leakage that would permanently destroy human
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civilisation (as an extreme example) would only have a present value of 7·10−26
USD (sic!) if it were to happen 10,000 years into the future.5 Thus, one may
conclude that the descriptive approach fails to reflect the concern that many people
express about long-term impacts.
A third difficulty in estimating the discount rate from observable market variables stems from the existence of externalities, such as environmental problems. If
they are large, the social rate of return on capital is distorted but not reflected in
market based interest rates.
A fourth difficulty is that the term “descriptive” largely loses its meaning for
time horizons longer than a couple of decades. Descriptive of what, one may ask?
For longer time horizons, the discount rate set by the descriptive approach becomes
guesswork at best.
This latter difficulty may actually save the descriptive approach from some
of the difficulties mentioned above. The descriptive approach could imply that
the discount rate is set equal to 5% today but falling over time so that it slowly
approaches zero. If so, the far future would still be valued at non-negligible levels.
Studies with falling discount rates include Sterner (1994), Ayres and Axtell (1996)
and Azar and Sterner (1996). Also Nordhaus (1994) assumes the growth rate, and
consequently the discount rate, to decline over time, but since the utility discount
rate is set constant at 3%/year, the value of the future still declines exponentially in
his model.
One may also keep in mind that the descriptive approach only guarantees potential intertemporal efficiency. Assume, for instance, that the discount rate is 10%/yr.
Then, it would not be intertemporally efficient to reduce an emission that would
save us from a damage of 1050 USD the next year if the abatement cost is 1000
USD. The reason, of course, is that another investment could yield 1100 USD.
However, intertemporal efficiency is only potential in that there are no guarantees
that the alternative investment will actually be made. For climate change and other
intergenerational environmental problems, we need to make sure that the initial
investment is reinvested with compound interest for several decades and even centuries. One may doubt that this is likely to happen. Thus, the main argument in
favour of the descriptive approach becomes weaker if very long time horizons are
involved.
But, lowering the discount rate for long-term environmental problems may also
be criticised. First, given a fixed budget for investments, the descriptive approach
is a way of adjudicating between different projects and picking the most profitable
ones. Wallace (1993) writes that “. . . an especially low discount rate would actually
reduce the wealth passed on to future generations by financing projects whose rates
of returns are lower than those for other available investments”. Second, Nordhaus
(1994) and Manne (1995) have pointed out that a lowered discount rate implies
(in optimal growth models) a jump in the savings ratio that is not consistent with
actual savings patterns. Note, however, that these two critiques cannot hold at the
same time. The second objection, for instance, implies that the investment budget
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is not fixed, and therefore all investments with higher rates of return (than the
environmental project) will also be carried out.
In my view, the discount rate should roughly be given by the descriptive
approach when analysing intragenerational trade-offs, whereas the discount rate
should be set equal to the SRTP with a zero utility discount rate, when analysing
intergenerational projects. In reality, intra- and intergenerational issues are not
easily separated, and this points to an area of possible important research. This
could be done within the framework of overlapping generation models (Howarth
1997; Manne 1997).
However, although more research is needed to resolve some of these problems, the fundamental observation that the choice of discount rate is ultimately a
value judgement will not change. Thus, there is no such a thing as an “objectively
correct discount rate.” This is important since the choice of discount rate largely
determines the “optimal” emission path.
4.3.
CONCLUSIONS
Intergenerational concern is one key argument used in favour of emission reductions in the policy debate on greenhouse gas emissions. However, when using the
descriptive approach, as has been most common in the economic literature, this
concern for future generations is not reflected in the analysis.
5. The Choice of Decision Criterion
Cost-benefit analysis is based on the so-called Kaldor criterion, i.e., if total benefits
exceed total costs, then the project should be carried out. In the preceding sections,
I have argued that the concept of costs (and benefits) are not as well-defined as one
is sometimes inclined to think. However, even if we disregard those objections, the
Kaldor criterion is still controversial.
The Kaldor criterion is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for a Pareto
improvement. If a project passes the Kaldor criterion, it offers a potential Pareto
improvement, i.e., it is possible that at least one individual can be made better
off without making any other individual worse off. But compensation cannot be
guaranteed. And if losers are not compensated, then the ethical basis for using the
Kaldor criterion is questionable. For instance, a Kaldor improvement may lead to
a reduction in social welfare if the “improvement” also involves sufficiently large
wealth transfers from the poor to the rich.
5.1.
SENSITIVITY
One way of dealing with this would be to introduce weight factors (as discussed in
Section 3). But a more appropriate valuation of the costs of climate change will not
resolve the ethical dilemmas involved in the policy debate. The reason why climate
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change is considered by many as one of the most serious environmental problems is
probably not that we expect our grandchildren to lose a couple of percent of their
income (which anyhow may be expected to be several times higher than ours).
Instead, there are certain features of global climate change that cause concern –
for example the risk of increased frequency of droughts in some poor regions of
the world, sea level rises inundating small islands, spread of tropical diseases and
specific environmental impacts such as loss of biodiversity. Some people would
consider these consequences as unacceptable. The risk of global catastrophic surprises just adds to this concern. Lind (1995) states that “the typical way in which the
cost-benefit problem is posed obscures the basic choices we should be evaluating.”
Global warming may be a problem where the use of constraints in the analysis
is justified, i.e., where optimisation of costs and benefits may take place, but only
subject to certain constraints on the absolute level and the rate of temperature
change. Work along these lines include Rijsberman and Swart (1990), Azar and
Rodhe (1997) and others. This way of reasoning also underlies the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, which calls for a stabilisation of greenhouse gases
at a concentration that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system. If a low atmospheric stabilisation target is suggested, then the
optimal emission level would be completely different from the results obtained by
some (but not all) cost-benefit analyses. In this sense the “optimal” emission level
is very sensitive to the choice of decision criterion.
5.2.
VALUE JUDGEMENTS
In the context of environmental problems, the use of sustainability constraints has
been suggested by e.g., Markandya and Pearce (1989) and Jacobs (1991). Jacobs
writes that “the interests of future generations are safeguarded directly, by defining
them in environmental terms and making their protection the first stage of the
decision-making procedure.”
The call for constraints not set on strictly economic grounds may be considered
controversial. But it should be remembered that in many other cases, the usefulness
of economic theory is admittedly limited (see Spash 1994; Bingham et al. 1995).
Bingham et al. (1995), for instance, argue that there are many cases where “collective choices must be made before valuation can be made. For example, determining
the efficient use of child labor in the United States was made moot by the collective
decision that child labor – irrespective of potential economic benefits – is morally
unacceptable.”
Still, the use of such constraints is rare in most economic analyses. Sen (1987)
explains: “Under the utilitarian tradition, which dominates neoclassical economic
thinking, no intrinsic importance is attached to the fulfilment or existence of rights.”
A common line of argument is that constraints should not be used in economic
analyses since they ultimately depend upon value judgements. The position is
correct in the sense that the imposition of constraints must be based on value
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311
judgements, yet the conclusion is wrong since the exclusion of constraints does
not make the analysis more value neutral. Excluding constraints is in itself a value
choice!
5.3.
CONCLUSIONS
Concern for human health and environmental impacts forms the basis for most
people’s concern about climatic change. In cost-benefit analysis, these costs are
traded with, for instance, the extra costs car drivers would confront, if large carbon reductions were to take place. But should we really trade basic human needs
with more luxury consumption? Cost-benefit analysis answers yes to this question,
but this is a strong assumption. Thus, by a value-laden assumption, and not by
inevitable economic logic, a central argument for reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases is erased. Spash (1994) concludes that “if rights that protect individuals
from the results of our greenhouse gas emissions are accepted to exist, the scope
for trade-offs usually assumed in economics is drastically reduced.”
6. Some Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed four (partly overlapping) critical issues that one is confronted with when analysing the economics of the greenhouse effect. The way these
four issues, the risk of global environmental catastrophes, cost-evaluation methods,
the discount rate and the decision criterion, are dealt with largely determines the
results obtained from various cost-benefit analyses of global warming. Further, it
is shown that value judgements have to be made when dealing with each of these
four aspects. This deserves more wide-spread recognition since economics is often
perceived as a tool that can be used to provide policy makers with value-neutral
advice. It also needs attention since several standard economic assumptions, that
are fairly reasonable under normal circumstances, tend to discriminate against the
most common argument in favour of emission reduction.
But this does not mean that cost-benefit optimisation models cannot and should
not play any role in climate change policies. The problem only arises if we use
optimisation models as “truth machines” (Schneider 1997). Rather, these models
should be used to explore the implications of various choices for highly value-laden
parameters.
In conclusion, it should be possible to reach agreement on the following two
basic propositions:
• Cost-benefit analysis is not a value-free tool that provide policy makers with
value neutral proposals on different policy alternatives.
• This, in turn, means that we have to be explicit on the value judgements
involved in the assumptions that we make, and analyse the consequences
of different assumptions. Value judgements must be highlighted and not
obscured in seemingly value neutral mathematical and economic language.
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Finally, these conclusions carry important implications for future research on the
economics of climate change. Rather than trying to find the “optimal level of
climate change”, we should try to improve our understanding of a number of issues
related to the realisation of the UNFCCC’s main objective. For instance, we need to
know more about the response of our societies and economies to carbon abatement
policies, technological change and how it may be geared towards more energy
efficient technologies and the improvement and development of renewables, the
inertia of the energy system and the associated infrastructure, the degree of “noregrets” options and the policies that are needed to tap them, and the incentives
that can get developing countries on board, etc. An interesting discussion about
the research needs for some of these issues is provided by Toman (1998) in this
volume.
Acknowledgements
I would also like to thank Robert Ayres, Olof Johansson-Stenman, Peter Read,
Stephen Schneider and Mike Toman for helpful comments. Financial support from
the Swedish Council for Planning and Co-ordination of Research is gratefully
acknowledged.
Notes
1. This is important to keep in mind, since those who support a wait-and-see stance sometimes
stress the uncertainties about climate change so much that they (deliberately?) create the impression that the greenhouse effect itself is in question. The interested reader is referred to Mahlman
(1997) for a concise overview and classification of virtually certain “facts”, virtually certain
projections, probable projections as well as incorrect projections in the context of the climate
change.
2. Uncertainty also plays important roles in other parts of the economics of climate change. For
instance, in the debate about cost-efficient emission reductions towards atmospheric CO2 stabilisation, Wigley et al. (1996) have argued that very little near-term abatement is justified. But this
conclusions has been challenged by Ha-Duong et al. (1997) largely based on the assumption that
there is a certain probability that a low stabilisation target (400 ppm) also needs to be considered.
3. The study assumes that uncertainty is resolved by the year 2020. If the low-probability
catastrophe turns out to be real, then substantial reductions are justified beyond 2020.
4. These techniques can either be based on revealed preferences (e.g., hedonic pricing methods or
the travel cost method) or hypothetical markets (e.g., the contingent valuation method).
5. Here I have assumed that global GDP is 1000 times (to generously allow for economic growth)
its present level and that the human civilisation is valued at that level indefinitely.
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