Royal Australian Navy (Japanese)

Defence Today, Vol10, No.4, pp 2-5

AUSTRALIA’S Navy is changing shape as the big investments of the previous decade produce new surface ships and aircraft. The Navy is moving from being a surface warfare sea control navy to become a power projection navy. In coming years....

Sabretache: The Journal and Proceedings of the Military Historical Society of Australia, 2018

Australian Historical Studies, 2017

2016

Virginia class SSN USS Washington displaying its propulsor system. Prof Ross Babbage recently proposed that Australia acquire this state of the art boat.

Sea Power Centre - Australia, 2022

The announcement in 2021 that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) signalled a significant shift in Australia’s defence policy. For many it seemed as if it was a decision and discussion without precedent, but this is not the case. The question of whether Australia should acquire nuclear-powered submarines was first asked in 1959 during the simpler discussion of whether Australia should acquire submarines at all. Over the years that followed the nuclear propulsion question was raised several times, including in 1965 as the construction program for the RAN’s first four Oberon class submarines was well underway in the UK. This paper will explore these early discussions in Australia about the potential for nuclear propulsion for RAN submarines. This will show how the nuclear propulsion question is far from new and that Australia long ago considered whether the RAN should acquire nuclear powered submarines. This issue is seemingly divorced entirely from questions of whether or not Australia should pursue a civil nuclear industry or obtain nuclear-powered weapons. In light of the recent AUKUS discussion, it is important to realise the historical background behind nuclear propulsion in the RAN and to highlight that the question has been asked before. What follows is a brief examination of the nuclear-powered submarine discussions being held at high level in the 1960s by certain areas of Defence.

Sea Power Centre - Australia, 2022

In October 1959 the Defence Joint Planning Committee agreed to the introduction of a submarine force in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Australia subsequently ordered four Oberon class conventional submarines from the United Kingdom (UK). Along with building the new submarines, the UK would also train Australia’s new submariners to crew the vessels. However, more than just a simple building and training transaction, this represented the end of one chapter, and the start of another in the Royal Navy’s (RN) submarine relationship with the RAN. Since 1949, the RN had based in Australia the RN 4th Submarine Squadron. This paper will examine, briefly, the role of the 4th Submarine Squadron in Australia. It will then look at how the RN helped prepare and train the RAN to establish its new submarine service. It will look at training, personnel exchange, submarine maintenance, and finally the case of HMS Odin and her service with the RAN for three years. To finish, it will look lastly at role and legacy of these activities on the journey of Australia’s submarine capability that followed.

On morning of 1 July 1945 hundreds of warships and vessels from the United States Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Royal Netherlands Navy lay off the coast of Balikpapan, an oil refining centre on Borneo’s south-east coast. This offensive to land the veteran 7th Australian Infantry Division at Balikpapan was the last of a series amphibious operations conducted by the Allies to liberate areas of Dutch and British territory on Borneo. It was the largest amphibious operation conducted by Australian forces during the Second World War. Within an hour some 16,500 troops were ashore and pushing inland, along with nearly 1,000 vehicles. More than 33,000 personnel from the 7th Division and Allied forces were landed in the amphibious assault. Balikpapan is often cited as an example of the expertise achieved by Australian forces in amphibious operations during the war. It was a remarkable development. Four years earlier, the capability of Australia or even the United States to conduct amphibious operations in the South-West Pacific Area was limited if not non-existent. This paper provides a brief outline of the development of amphibious operations in the SWPA during the Second World War.

2015

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