IDE AS
Dont Give White Nationalists
the Post-9/11 Treatment
Pundits are now endorsing a massive counterterrorism
response to white nationalism. That’s not a good idea.
AUG 7, 2019
Max Abrahms
Professor of political science at Northeastern
University
GO NAKAMURA / REUTERS
Many mass shootings spur
pedantic debates about whether
an attack “counts” as an act of
terrorism. But the man who
allegedly shot 22 people dead in
El Paso, Texas, left no doubt.
According to his manifesto,
posted on a favorite politicalextremism website minutes
before the shooting, he was
inspired by other recent white-
nationalist terrorist attacks and
hoped to stem what he called
the Hispanic invasion of
Texas.
The El Paso shooting has
understandably sparked an
overdue debate about what I call
the domestic-terrorism double
standard. As I noted in a 2014
article in
, when
Americans think of terrorism,
they tend to focus on the
international variety, even
though domestic incidents
around the world have
historically made up the lions
share of attacks. This is
certainly the case in the United
States, and yes, I am including
atrocities committed by the Ku
Klux Klan.
This domestic-terrorism double
standard holds even among
professional terrorism
researchers. The three data sets
traditionally employed in
terrorism researchthe Rand
St. Andrews Chronology of
International Terrorist
Incidents, the U.S. Department
of States Patterns of Global
Terrorism, and the International
Terrorism: Attributes of
Terrorist Eventswere
designed for U.S. policy makers
concerned almost exclusively
with international terrorism.
But many are now asking why
Americans since September 11,
2001, have gone ballistic on alQaeda, the Islamic State, and
other international terrorists
with an Islamist bent, while
doing next to nothing to combat
the terrorist next door, who is
typically white and hates
Muslims (not to mention Jews,
Hispanics, blacks, and other
minorities). It has become
trendy for journalists,
professors, presidential
candidates, and security
practitioners not only to call out
the domestic-terrorism double
standard, but to prescribe a
massive, post-9/11-like
counterterrorism response.
The
columnist
Anne Applebaum questioned
the hypocrisy on Twitter: The
question is when we will begin
to speak about domestic, white
supremacist terrorism the same
way we speak about foreign,
jihadi terrorism. Both are
coherent ideologies, spread by
the internet, exacerbated by
extremist politicians. Both
demand a similar response.
The
echoed, Now,
before it grows any stronger,
should be the time to move
against it with the same kind of
concerted international focus of
attention and resources that
were trained on Osama bin
Laden. Now is the time for a
global war on white nationalist
terrorism. The Democratic
presidential candidate Pete
Buttigieg has also drawn direct
parallels between 9/11 and the
El Paso attack: After 9/11, I
joined thousands of other
Americans in signing up to fight
the threat to our nation. Now, in
the face of white-nationalist
terror, our leaders must stand
up to fight this threat to our
national security. The South
Bend, Indiana, mayor tells
audiences that he learned a lot
[in Afghanistan] that sadly will
be applicable here at home,
too. Former CIA and FBI
practitioners are likewise
specifying all sorts of ways the
post-9/11 global War on Terror
can be applied to fighting whitenationalist terrorists, from
tracing the networks of
extremists just like we did
against other terrorist groups
after 9/11 to changing our laws
for us to fight domestic terror
groups
the way we treat
foreign ones. Six former senior
directors for counterterrorism at
the White Houses National
Security Council just released a
joint statement calling on the
government to go after the
Timothy McVeighs as
ferociously as the Osama bin
Ladens. “So can we please start
a war on terrorism at home
now?” the Stanford politicalscience professor Michael
McFaul tweeted after the El
Paso attack.
But hold on. Is 9/11 the best
model for us to aspire to
replicate? Do we really want a
war on terrorism at home? And
what exactly would it look like?
As a Columbia postdoc noted on
Twitter, “In response to 9/11,
we invaded a country that had
nothing to do with it because
they shared an ethnicity with
the attackers. If we treat white
supremacist violence the same
way, the equivalent might be
regime change in Belarus.” For
the sake of consistency, we
could round up some white
suspects, throw them in
Guantánamo Bay, and dust o
the old waterboard. To put an
end to the domestic-terrorism
double standard, we could also
pit local terrorist organizations
against one another as we did in
Syria. Or maybe arm
unrestrained national militaries
to do the dirty work, as has been
our policy in Yemen.
Its laudable to finally call out
white-nationalist terrorism in
the same way as Islamist
terrorism. But we should
prioritize e icacyand sanity
above consistency. The 9/11
prism is problematic not only on
normative grounds, but also on
strategic ones.
Although ISIS luckily imploded,
due to the stupidity of its
leaders, al-Qaeda is as strong
as it has ever been, according
to numerous assessments,
including the most recent one
by the State Department.
In this climate, we run the risk
of bouncing from a longtime
underreaction to a sudden
overreaction to white-
nationalist terrorists. Geraldo
Rivera and Sean Hannity want
the government to place
“active-shooter trained, heavily
armed security personnel every
place innocents are gathered,”
especially on “every oor of
every school.” Talk about
terrorizing children.
Perspective is important,
especially when hysteria is high.
The astrophysicist Neil
deGrasse Tyson got ratioed on
Twitter and ultimately
apologized for pointing out after
the El Paso attack that the
number of terrorism-related
fatalities is still orders of
magnitude fewer than the
number of fatalities from car
accidents, the u, suicide, and
medical errors. The poor timing
of the tweet made it foolish on
an emotional level. But it was
nonetheless factually correct.
The political scientist John
Mueller has published
numerous studies showing that
American deaths from terrorism
pale in comparison to deaths
from countless other tragedies,
and that our massive
counterterrorism investment
has been excessive relative to
the actual threat.
So what is the optimal response
to terrorism? Regardless of the
type of terrorist threat, domestic
or international,
counterterrorism must always
strive to achieve two
crosscutting goals. The first is to
neutralize existing terrorists.
And the second is to do it in way
that doesnt generate new ones
in the process. Whereas
underreaction fails at the
former, overreaction tends to
fail at the latter. The key to
achieving this tricky balance is
to aggressively go after only
legitimate terrorists, lest we
inadvertently spawn future
ones.
To this end, law enforcement
must develop a subtle
understanding of what
constitutes extremism, and a
thick skin. As a term,
is used sloppily to denote both a
persons political goals and the
methods used to achieve them.
Theres an important di erence,
though, between rooting for
extreme ends and using
extreme means to realize them.
Chat rooms are full of people
expressing sundry o ensive
even reprehensiblepolitical
visions. The smart
counterterrorist swallows hard
and leaves them alone. But its
interdiction time the moment
the prospect of violence is even
mentioned as a way forward.