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Boko Haram and Religion in Nigeria

Has Boko Haram developed into a terrorist group as a result of their fanatical religious stands or is it the product of a broader socio-economic context? Content 1- Introduction 3 2- Literature review x a) Primordialists point of view x b) Instrumentalists point of view x c) Moderate constructivists point of view x 3- Theoretical Framework x a) Social identity theory x b) State failure theory x c) Frustration-aggression theory x 4- Nigeria and Boko Haram x a) Nigeria x b) Boko Haram x i. The Structure of the group. x ii. The ideology and aims x iii. The evolution x 5- Origins of violence x Historical Roots of Instability x State Failure x Terrorism and Frustration-aggression theory x 6-Conclusion x 7-Bibliography x Introduction This essay will try to understand the context in which Boko Haram developed and why did they end up using violence. This will be developed in two main parts, the first one setting up the debate about the causes of religious conflict and explaining the theoretical framework used and the second one focusing more specifically on the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The debate about the causes on religious conflict has increasingly gain importance since the end of the Cold War. Religion can be perceived as an independent variable, showing the cultural ties of a state, group or region. It has been argued that conflict therefore arise from the cultural differences between two groups. However some scholars argue that those ‘religious’ conflicts are rarely about religion but are the consequences of an unequal socio-economic context. Religion is just perceived as a tool that leaders or elites can use in order to promote violence and reach their goals. The last group of scholar argues that even if the causes for religious conflicts are mainly socio economic, religion is embedded in a broader structure which defines the way people perceive the world around them. Therefore religion is a variable which can lead to destruction or increase peace but cannot be unlimitedly used for political purposes. In order to explain the causes for the rise Boko Haram, this essay will be based in three different theories. The first one shows that the lack of communal identity in Nigeria due to its construction since its colonisation has affected the way people rely in religion. Religion has always been politicised in Nigeria. This leads to the creation of a structure which is prone to religious conflicts because the main identities are based on ethnic and religious factors rather than on nationalism. The ‘us versus them’ dichotomy is therefore more present on certain state depending on their development. The second theory to explain the rise of Boko Haram will be that the failure of the state increase the contest for state power and legitimacy and allow the creation of groups with different and increasingly extremist ideologies which are attractive because they provide the basic services that the state does not provide. It will be argued that those two theories explain the rise of sectarian but non-specifically violent groups such as Boko Haram before 2009. The frustration-aggression thesis will explain how the group changed its modus operandi to become a terrorist group. It will be argued that the violence that the state used to eliminate the sect and the growing common identity spread by the rise of a global radical Islamic movement affected their perception of the threat and their use of force. In a second part, after a short introduction to the general characteristic of Nigeria and religion in Nigeria, Boko Haram will be analysed, and a difference will be made between Boko Haram before the death of the former leader Yusuf Muhammad in 2009. Boko Haram was seen as an extremist sect fighting against the state but still relatively peaceful. However since the re-emergence of the sect in 2010, the claims, identities and links of the sect have changed and evolved to a more radical terrorist group. The causes which explain the rise of Boko Haram before 2009 will be developed. We will see that the colonial legacy and the evolution of the Nigerian state from feudalism had impact on the creation of identity in Nigeria. This will be used to explain the prevalence of ‘religious’ conflict, which are in fact more political, which allowed the rise of Boko Haram. Nigeria will subsequently be presented as a failed state, with high level of corruption, poor economic distribution, few health care and educational institutions and so on. This will explain how Boko Haram gained legitimacy among the population. Lastly the answer provided by the state and the rise of a spreading identity provided by global radical terrorist groups will be used to explain the radicalization of the group and its turn toward terrorism. Literature review This part will highlight the different explanations for the rise of religious conflicts. During the last decades it has been assumed that religion will become an increasingly marginal aspect of peoples’ lives because religious claims will be compared to the abundance of other options available. The significance of religion as a social force is therefore progressively disappearing of the structure Dawson, Lorne L. (2006), “Privatisation, Globalisation, and Religious Innovation: Giddens’ Theory of Modernity and the Refutation of Secularisation Theory”, p. 105. Many believed that thanks to the development of philosophy, economy, sciences and the global amelioration of live standard, religion will lose its attractiveness. As cited by Marx, religion was considered as 'the opium of people' and would be abolished because it is inherently illusory to real happiness. In his mind, religion is linked with suffering and oppression. Western scholars have been affected by these definitions of religion, and more by the dichotomy they could see between modernisation and religion. It was clear that the Western ideology based on science, would by definition be more rational than any mystic faiths. The promotion of secularisation was seen as a natural and right process, as religion shouldn't interfere in public life. As explain by Weber Weber, M., (2002). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the secularisation theory is based on the idea that western education would led to rationalisation, therefore religious institutions would lose their appeal in the shadow of more rational, western institutions. He claims as example that thanks to the development of capitalism, religious values would be replaced by consumerism and hedonism. Primordialists However in 1996, Samuel Huntington argued that religion is still ‘a central force that mobilizes and motivates people’ Samuel Huntington, (1996) “The clash of civilization ?” in Foreign Affairs p.27. In line with that Berger argued that religion is not in decline but resurgence Berger, P.L. (1993). A Far Glory: The Search for Faith in an Age of Credulity, p.3. It has been explained that because the rapid modernization, people were left “psychologically adrift” and “culturally dislocated” Handelman, H. (2003). The challenge of third world development, p.22. These scholars have been assimilated to the Primordialists movement Samuel Huntington, “The clash of civilization”, 22-49; Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). In their point of view the determinant of the world politics will be the role played by civilisation in which nations would be embedded. Each civilisation is characterised by one religion or cosmology, such as Buddhist, Christian, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Judaist and Taoist civilisations. The idea is that during the Cold War, the major superpowers, by their military capabilities, were suppressing the factors which had a potential to generate conflicts, such as identity, religions, culture etc. Now that the ideological confrontation is over, a new world order is supposed to emerged, in which cultural differences will become a major characteristic of foreign policy behaviour. State interests will be affected by the cultural similarities and differences of their people, creating different domestic and foreign political aims. In turn those states will tend to make alliances with the states with similar cultural and religious traditions in order to protect themselves against those with different ideology and therefore state interests. As each civilisation will create an identity which they will protect against ‘the others’. Because of their ‘destructive identities’ Rosen, D. (2005) “Religion, Identity and Middle East Peace”, 10th Annual Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs, violence will emerge between these civilisations, meanwhile states with similar culture and religion will reinforce each other by settling their dispute . Huntington’s point of view can be summarised as follow: “The West is and will remain for years to come the most powerful civilization. Yet its power relative to that of other civilization is declining. As the West attempts to assert it values and to protect its interests, non-Western societies confront a choice. Some attempt to emulate the West and to join or to “band-wagon” with the West. Other Confucian and Islamic societies attempt to expand their own economic and military power to resist and to “balance” against the West. A central axis of the post-Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture of non-Western civilization” Huntington, Samuel P. (2003), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, p.29 Domestically, religious leaders will fight westernised political elites from power and re-impose religion in their country. In order to achieve that, religious leaders will develop campaigns of conversion to turn their followers into zealous religious, abhorring Western civilisation and its secularism. Soon after, religious institutions that protect and promote religions will be instated nationally. In ethnic-religious fragmented society such as Sudan, Bosnia or Nigeria, communities will confront themselves in a struggle for power. Because of their understanding of the sacred, they will play a zero-sum fight. It will turn that those countries will either fall apart or one of the religious group will dominate the other and exterminate it. In an international context, civil unrests will tempt a third group to intervene, however this intervention would just increase the escalation of violence, and war between states will prevail. Religion is therefore perceived as the main and invariable identity of people, whom will struggle to impose their perception of the world on the structure. Instrumentalists In opposition to this idea, scholars have argued that religion is not the sources of conflict but state failure or socioeconomic context are. This view is represented by Mark Juergensmeyer and Tedd Robert Gurr among others and has been called the Instrumentalists view Mark Juergensmeyer, (1993) The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confront the Secular State; Tedd Robert Gurr (1996) “Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict” in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses t International Conflict. Their argument is that differences in religious beliefs are not the principal cause of conflicts, even if they do not deny that religious movements and organisations are rising. Ted Robert Gurr explains that “the origins and dynamics of ethno political conflict are highly complex. Theories that emphasize the supposedly crucial role of a single factor, such as historical animosities or religious differences, should be avoided. Such factors usually become significant because they are invoked by contemporary ethno political leaders seeking to mobilize support among threatened and disadvantaged peoples, not because religious or historical differences generate a primordial urge to conflict.” Ibid Gurr, (1996), p. 74 In their point of view, the causes of conflicts are link to the inequalities of the socio-economic or political system in or between nations. The radicalisation of religious fighters is not linked to any dogmatic dispute but to the domestic or international conditions, where power and wealth are distributed unequally. About the international system, they believe that interactions will continue to be controlled by the distribution of material capabilities, cultural and religious factors will not affect this. Some empirical evidences confirm their theory; firstly there are few evidences of religious conflicts during time of economic and social prosperity. for example Mahmud A. Faksh shows that the politicisation of religion and its radicalisation happen a lot more often in condition of economic and/or social crisis, or in when a state fail or collapse A. Faksh (1994) “The prospects of Islamic fundamentalism in the post-Gulf war period” International Journal . In this context, people find refuge in religious communities as they are subject to poverty, marginalisation or because they fear for their security. In religion they find security, welfare, recognition and a community where they can reaffirm their beliefs. Political elites are tempted to use this belief in the sacred in order to gain power or wealth. Religious people will automatically feel understood and give their support to those politicians. However it seems that the ability of political leaders to use religious markers to mobilise for collective action is unlimited Anthony D. Smith, (1993) “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism” Survival, p. 53. Because ethnic cleavages of languages, myths, religion exists in every nation, it is easy for political leader to give meaning to those cleavages. They still recognise the impact of religious conviction in political behaviour but argue that the sacred is always mobilised for escalation of conflict but never for its de-escalation. Moderate Constructivists The third explanation comes from the Moderate Constructivists, which is a theory in between the Instrumentalists and Primordialists ones Emmanuel Adler, (1997) ”Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics » European Journal of International Relation, pp. 319-63; Alexander Wendt (1999), Social Theory and International Politics pp. 20-21. . Alexander Wendt explains that social conflicts are embedded in ‘cognitive structures’, which can be nationalism, ethnicity, ideology or religion and are shared understanding, expectations and social knowledge Alexander Wendt, (1994) “Collective Identity Formation and the International State” American Political Science Review , p. 389. These structures created the identity of the people, distinguishing between the self and the others, they therefore highly affect the political or strategic choices. The meanings that we give to the cognitive structures are the key to understand religious conflicts. The Moderate Constructivists theory and the Instrumentalists theory agree on two mains ideas. They firstly both acknowledge the importance of the role of power to explain politics and the existence of egoistic motives and material factors in life. Alexander Wendt explains that “The fact that relations of production and destruction consist of shared ideas not change the fact that they confront actors as objectives social facts with real, objective ‘material’ effects. Inequality and exploitation exist, even if they are constituted by ideas” Alexander Wendt (1999), Social Theory and International Politics, pp. 95. The Moderate Constructivists theory seems more adequate because it acknowledges that power and interest are embedded in a certain understanding even if their reality cannot be denied. The other zone of agreement is the importance of political leaders R. Scoot Appleby (2000), The Ambivalence of the Sacred: religion, Violence and Reconciliation pp. 54-57.. As summarised by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, which comprised scholars of both theoretical denominations, “mass violence results when leaders see it as the only way to achieve their political objectives, and they are able to mobilize groups to carry out their strategy. Without determined leaders, groups may riot but they do not start systematic, sustained campaigns of violence to achieve their goals; and without mobilized groups, leaders are unable to organize a fight” Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, p. 30. . They acknowledge that wars do not happen out of nowhere, but that religion is not the driving force of conflict. For them conflicts happen as the result of strategic action in a certain political context, where the demands will be formulated at the interface of religion and politics. Leaders will appeal to religion to legitimize their choices. However for the Moderate constructivist differ with the Instrumentalists because they think that religion cannot be manipulated infinitely. Religious traditions are inter-subjective structures and depend on discourses and social practice which are inherently linked to the meaning that the agents give them. The interpretation of any argument for conflict in the name of religion is vulnerable to countervailing arguments, if some people advocates violence in the name of God other can rise and dispute this claim by showing the link between God and non-violence. From this debate people choose to get involved in the conflict or not. Religion is therefore considered as an intervening variable; it can make conflicts to be more likely or can serve in peace building by delegitimizing violent acts in the name of the sacred. Theoretical framework Social identity theory In 2012, ethnicity, religion and language remain the bases of personal identity in Nigeria, not nationalism. There is no real national identity in Nigeria as a consequence of the indirect ruling system developed during the colonial legacy. Agbiboa, D. E., “Ethno-religious Conflicts, Religion, and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria” Journal of Black Studies, pp 1-28 In line with the moderate constructivists, I consider that religion is better analysed as a cultural system of meaning. Meaning is defined as “the common characteristic and ultimate unity of theoretical and practical sphere of spirit, of scientific and aesthetic, of legal and social structures” Tillich, P (1969) What is Religion?, p. 57. This adherence to a system of belief can help to develop a sense of belonging and purpose it can lead to intolerance, discrimination and violent actions. ‘Religious conflicts’ have usually non religious courses but are called religion because there are called around the mobilizing and unifying ideology behind it. Intergroup behaviours are explained by the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1985 Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1985). “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, pp. 7-24. Social identity theory identity is a key concept to understand the prevalence of religion in Nigeria. Tajfel and Turner argue that people tend to classify themselves and other into various social categories which in return provide them a structure of self-reference and identity. This social identification has consequences on people’s behavior. It gives the perception of oneness with a group of person, and lead to the creation of in-groups and out-groups. People of the same group will tend to do activities that are congruent with their identity, they will give their support for institution that embody their identity and develop stereotypical perceptions of self and others Ashford and Mael (1989) “Social Identity Theory and the Organisation” in Academy of Management Review .pp.20-99. As Seul argues “No other repositories of cultural meanings have historical offered so much in response to the human need to develop a secure entity [and therefore] religion is often at the core of individual and group identity” Seul, J. R. (1999). “Ours is the way of god: Religion, identity, and intergroup conflict” In Journal of Peace Research, p.158. What is crucial in Turner and Tajful theory is that a person has not one, defined “personal self”, but rather several selves that correspond to widening circles of group membership. A change in their social contexts may trigger an individual to think, feel and act on basis of his personal, family, religious or national “level of self”. State failure theory Nation states exist and have the legitimate use of violence because they provide a decentralized method of delivering services and protection to the person living within the designated parameters of the state. It has the responsibility to attend the basic needs and legitimate demands of their citizens. However in the world system, some states have succeeded and other have failed. In order to measure the failure of the state and prevent the consequences, the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine published every year the lists of states which are likely to fail. This study created a Failed State Index based on “institutional corruption, criminality, the ability of a government to regulate the economy, internal displacement of Citizen, sharp economic decline, group grievances, internal indulgencies, institutional discrimination and alienation and the emigration of the intelligentsia” Foreign Policy (2011) The Failed state Index . When a state is failing or failed, it is unable to provide security, education, health care, infrastructure, employment opportunities, legal framework and so on Rotberg, R., (2002) “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”. The Washington Quarterly, p.87.. Most of the time the citizens, whom are suffering, will stop to rely on the state and try to find an alternative group to protect them (physically and morally). Contestation will rise against the state and develop intra-state conflict. In Nigeria, which is considered as a state on the brink of total collapse, non-state actors, mainly religious, intervene to develop alternative infrastructures. These different infrastructures are sometimes in competition against each other and can develop extremist ideologies against the state. Nigeria failure is related to its history of perpetual ethno regional and religious clashes, bulging poor population, bad governance, endemic élites corruption, poor health care, environmental degradation, decrepit and underdeveloped infrastructure, international criminality and political instability, which create an army of desperate citizens. Frustration-aggression theory The frustration-aggression theory is useful to explain the use of terrorism after 2009. The main idea that when a group is marginalized and is resentful, if there is a strong identity shared among this group, the reaction will be violent and against the source of their marginalization, real or not Gürr, T. R., (1994) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, pp. 347-377. Frustration causes aggression, however when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged properly, the aggressiveness is widened and involve more innocent targets. In Nigeria, the frustration is widespread around the country; however Boko Haram is a group that has been marginalised by several actors. They are marginalized by other religious leaders, criticizing the religious ignorance on which the doctrine is based. Moreover the governor of the Borno State was the violence started used Boko Haram for its election and subsequently marginalised them when he reached power. The first disillusionment came with the implementation of the Sharia law which was supposed to stop the corruption Adibe, J. (2012). “Boko Haram: Symptom of Crisis in Our Nation Building Project”. but the main problem was the extra-judicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf the leader. Since then, the sect is on a revenge mission. Some have argued that frustration increase religiosity. I disagree and think that the believes are not changing with frustration but the means used to express them do. Frustration is high in Nigeria because of severe poverty, unemployment, elite corruption and so on, therefore it is easy to find a common enemy and create an identity, so called religious, around it ibid Adibe, J. (2012). Identities are not independent variables; they are part of the understanding of the structure and can therefore be affected by the structure. The excessive use of violence by the Nigerian State affected the structure of the people and therefore their identity. Some of them started to share the ideology of broader movement as Al Qaeda which developed a global identity based on the idea that they are violently oppressed by the West. Nigeria and Boko Haram Islam and Nigeria Since 9/11, Islam became to be acknowledged by the majority of the Western population; however Islam is the second religion of the world in term of adepts and has been adopted for centuries. Islam was revealed by the message of the prophet Muhammad, which express the total submission to the will of Allah. It is mainly guided by the five pillars which are the belief on Allah, the prayer in Arabic language, fasting, alms giving and pilgrimage to Mecca. Even if peace is central to Islam it's only considered as a means to an end as the fundamental aim of Islam is al-janna (paradise), the ultimate reward. Sects are present in every religion; it can be defined as a group of believers who do not necessarily disbelieved a religion but based their beliefs in certain fundamentals of this religion. They are inherently linked to the dynamics of a religion; by their dynamics they help the continual reinterpretation of the message. Contrary to the openness of the religion, sects tend to isolate its members by providing them with a specific identity. The two mains sects of Islam are the Sunni and Shi'a which are opposed mainly by the origin of their imams and the relation between Islam and the society Danjibo, N. D., (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” Crises in Northern Nigeria” p. 5. Sects have always existed in Nigeria; however few have ever represented a threat to the State. Boko Haram, the subject of this essay, have however assumed this role Nigeria is the most populated African country and it is situated in the north west of Africa. The country is divided in half between Muslims, mostly in the North and Christians in the South. Traditional religions are followed by up to 15% of the population mainly the Yoruba religion. It gained independence in 1960 and since then religion played a fundamental role in the political development of the state. Nigeria is considered as a democracy since 1999; however we will see that it is very limited. Oil reserves brought great revenues but only to a minority of the population, as more than 60 % of the populations live under the poverty line. The inequalities prevail within the country too, as the North has around 70% of its population living under the poverty line. World Bank data see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.04TH.20/countries/NG?display=graph Indeed, despite its huge amount of oil, Nigeria is ranked as one of the most unequal country by the UN, and this phenomenon is stronger in the Northern part of the country. The inequalities are important between the North and the South but within the northern part too were small elite dominates a poorer majority. It appears that nearly three quarters of the population live below the poverty line of 2$/day, with no opportunity for social mobility and progress. The impact of religion on Nigerian politics has always been considered as negative, for example the Maitasine crisis in December 1980 and the Boko Haram crisis since 2009, have raised questions about the role of religion in the Nigerian governance. The region which is more concerned with that is the North, which has been a ‘hotbed’ of religious uprising, mainly for inter-religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians. Another characteristic of religion in Nigeria is the rise of sects; Islam is not considered as a heterogeneous religion in Nigeria because of the development of for example the Izala movement, the Shiite movement, or the Maitasini. Those sects have turned away the teachings of the Sufi brotherhood, alienating themselves from mainstream Islam. In the 1970’s and 1980’s terrorism was mainly led by terrorist organisation or by state which were sponsoring terrorism. However, recently, more and more terrorist groups without real connections claim to act on behalf of Islam. These are often considered as deviants and fanatics, betraying the values and the teaching of Islam and abusing their religion, just as other have used Christianity, Judaism, or other religion to justify their violent behaviour Duruji M.M., & Oviasogie, F. O., (2013) “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security: An Appraisal of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria” Journal of Sustainable Society Vol 2, no.1. Morten Boas argue that even if there is a long tradition of Islamic radicalism in Nigeria, there were usually not part of a more global movements as most of the Nigerian radicalists argue for a purer way of live, living in a communal existence, outside of the society Morten Bøås, (2012) “Violent Islamist uprising in northern Nigeria: from the ‘Taleban’ to Boko HaramII” NOREF Article . It is true that Boko Haram was localized in Nigeria until 2009, however the recent developments showed that they have a great potential from international ramifications. The main differences between the Maitasine, Boko Haram and other ‘religious’ violent group is that Boko Haram violence is clearly directed against the State. Boko Haram Violent events were perpetuated by Boko Haram from July 24 to the 28th in 2009 in six northern states: Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, Gambe, Kano and Katsina. The Boko Haram group mainly composed of young men and women attacked and burned police stations, primary schools, mosques, churches, prison and governmental establishments Cited in Danjibo (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence”. The aims were the symbol of western power and state power; however civilians outside of the group were not aimed. 500 members of the sects were killed by agent of the government during the intervention of the army the 26th of July. It is assumed that in total 1000 to 1400 people were killed during these 4 days. This is when the leader of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yussuf was arrested and extra-judicially killed. Before this huge uprising of violence, Boko Haram’s violence was relatively limited, the main attacks were against particular mosques, mainly because the leader Muhammad Yussuf was in religious disaccord with the preaching of certain imams Issoufou Yahaya (2011) « Boko Haram au Nigéria: le fanatisme religieux comme projet politique » Sphere of Politics. However since the death of Muhammad Yusuf, the group has evolved and now target civilians. Since 2010, the groups have carried at least 24 attacks against police headquarters, religious leaders, prison and civilians. In 2012 the attacks had killed over 900 civilians. This will be developed in a following section. The Structure of the group. The emergence of the Boko Haram highlights the rise of a new kind of violence, based on Taliban like attacks. The exact origin of this group is debated, especially if one follows the media sources. It seems however that the group originated in 1995 under the name of Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra. It then developed under various appellations such as the Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyyah sect and Boko Haram. However even if the organisation of the sect is similar to the Taliban’s one in Afghanistan it appears that there are no formal links between them. In term of organisation, Muhammad Yusuf was the Amir ul-Aam (Commander in Chief), and was assisted by two deputies, respectively Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I &II. Then each State and each Local government where the sect operates has an Amir (Commander/Leader). (DCCN, 2009). After the death of M. Yusuf in 2009, the new leader of the sect, Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected the name of Boko Haram and stating that the name was “Jama’atu Ahlissunnah lidda’awati wal Jihad” which means a group advocating for righteousness and Holy War. Members are mainly disaffected youths, unemployed graduates including former Almajiris. The sect is estimated to have over 280 000 members across Nigeria, Niger republic, Chad and Sudan Duruji M.M., & Oviasogie, F. O., (2013) “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security” . The ideology Boko Haram’s ideology can be linked to the ideology of the Maitastine sect, created in the 80’s and which aim was to destroy the state and bring anarchy. This movement was violently exterminated by the army but its legacy was subsequently politicised by frustrated elites or people without power. The ideology of the sect was shaped by Muhammad Yussuf who was described as a really charismatic leader. However because of his killing and the killing of the main figures of the group it is hard to have good information. Apparently he was a secondary school drop-out, who went to Chad and Niger Republic to study the Qur’an. He is the creator of the sectarian group called Yusufiyya in 2001, which regrouped 280,000 peoples, with an ideology mainly based on the aversion of westernisation and modernization. He became famous by preaching against Islamic scholars—such as Jafar Adam—and the Nigerian political institutions Danjibo, N. D., (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence”. He rejected modern sciences too, for example during a BBC interview in 2009 he claimed that Muslims must reject the belief that the world is a sphere, Darwinism, and that the rain comes from evaporated water, as it is contrary to Islamic values Duruji M.M., & Oviasogie, F. O., (2013) “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security”. Boko means ‘western’ or ‘foreign’ in Housa language and Haram means forbidden in Arabic. The aims were to replace the modern secular state by a tradition Islamic state respecting the Shari’a law because the Umma Mahammadiya (Muslim faithful) and Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic community) cannot be spoiled by any Western influences. At the beginning, the recruits were mainly in poor situation and believed that was the consequence of the government mismanagement of the country. Moreover, the group attracted people as they believed that by dying in fight, they will gain Aljanna (paradise). During the rise of the group, many complains and warning were made by different structures but the Nigerian government did not react, even some members of the government resigned to join the group, as they considered the Nigerian government as corrupted. The evolution The group re-emerged with the lead of Abubakar Shekau or Mallam Sanni Umaru, both claiming the leadership. Some argues that this come back was organised or at least accepted by the elites of the northern state, to regain power after the controversial election of Jonathan Goodluck. This help does not come from ideological background but from the division between the north and south, increasing the power struggle between the elites Morten Bøås, (2012) “Violent Islamist uprising in northern Nigeria”. Access to land, political position exists within state institutions and political parties. It has been argued too that this re-emergence came from a more regional context, with the support of Al-Qaeda & Al-Shabaab in financing, recruiting and training. The evolution of the sect can be seen in analysing its attacks since 2010. Even if the objectives are apparently the same, ‘Boko Haram I’ (until 2009) used a combination of preaching, recruitment and violent resistance against the state. However ‘Boko Haram II’ re-emerged stronger, using a type of strategy called ‘the propaganda of the deed’, signature of the Russian anarchists of the beginning of this century and arguably used by Al-Qaeda in 2001 Sedgwick, M., (2004) “Al Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism” in Terrorism and Political Violence, pp.795-814 . The attempts since 2010 are more violent, more spectacular and aim everyone, even civilians and foreign people. The immediate objective is to show the fragility of the system by attacking the state, which would respond—in association with the Christian population—by repressing the Muslims community. The consequence would be that in the anarchic Nigerian state, Boko Haram would appear as a leader for the repressed Muslim masses. One of the “acting leaders” of Boko Haram since 2009, Mallam Sanni Umaru declared that Boko Haram is just a version of Al-Qaeda and that their aim is now to start a Jihad in Nigeria and to carry bomb attacks. This statement must be analysed in the light of the recent change in strategy (spectacular attacks, aiming at civilians and so on). The origins of Boko Haram Violence Historical roots of the conflict In Nigeria, religion was crucial in the formation of the national identity. During the colonial legacy, a system of unequal alliances with the elites was developed by Lord Lugard who reached power in Northern Nigeria in 1903. Bavan, Collier and Gunning (1992) have argued that he favoured the aristocratic society of the North to the degree that British will not only became agent of development in Nigeria but also defend the feudal system set up Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, “Ethno-religious Conflicts, Religion, and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria”. By maintaining power through indirect ruling, Lord Lugard preserved indigenous culture and native institutions. Tribal identity and religion were therefore preserved. In 1914, in order to facilitate economic exploitation and administration, the British Crown imposed the unification of the different territories now forming Nigeria. The system of indirect ruling was preserved during the whole colonial era and prevailed even after the decolonisation. The Lyttelton constitution in 1954 was set up to relieve any tension derived from the polarizing effect of a quasi federal political structure by giving regions more powers. The subsequent efforts to create a national identity were however limited as religion and identities were strongly embedded in the different regions and already used to legitimate the power of one part against another. Since then, religion is crucial in the formation of a national identity in Nigeria as it is the main characteristic to evaluate the legitimacy of power. Therefore Nigeria developed an unequal structure in which religious identities are embedded and have been used for political contestation. However the rise of violent conflicts associated with these identities are not spread in every regions. Laura Thaut has proven that these destructives identities have been embedded in the structure of the state of Jos North but not in Kauna. She has argued that the successful informal power sharing arrangements which were made in 1976 in Kauna explain the relative prevalence of peace between religious groups and the state. However she shows that in Jos North, the local government, who had advantage in the former local government did not accept power-sharing as it was seen as a political move favouring the Hausa-Fulani. The discourse about the division between Christians, Muslims and the State gained importance and prevailed. Borno state, were Boko Haram originated was one of those states were this dichotomy is still used Thaut, L., (2009) “The Flourishing of Religion and Violence: Power-Sharing & the Volatility of Inter-Religious Violence in Nigeria”. One consequences of the prevalence of the colonial legacy has been seen in the construction of educational institutions. In order to perpetuate the indirect rule, 2 millions of Koranic schools were created in Northern Nigeria by the elites and the colonial administration in 1960. They were created in order to shield the Muslims in the north from being exposed to Western education and culture Morten Bøås, (2012) “Violent Islamist uprising in northern Nigeria” . Nowadays, a big difference is made between the different schools: “makarantan boko” (Western education), “makarantan addini” (religious instruction) and “makarantan allo” (Koranic schools). In the North, Islamic school are often preferred to western education and increase the “Almajeri syndrome”. The Almajeri are the student of Koranic schools, a part of their education is made in the streets where they have to beg in order to earn a living for themselves and their teachers. This generation is more sensible than any to the social vices and can easily be involve in any army which perpetuate violence Danjibo, N. D., (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence”. Some evidences have shown that they get paid to perpetuate violence. Failure of the state The failure of the Nigerian State seems to be one other cause of the rise of Boko Haram. Nigeria is the 5th biggest producer of oil, but the majority of the people do not enjoy the benefits. The majority live with less than a dollar a day and the north it is worst: 67% of north central Nigeria under the poverty line, 71% in north-west and 72% in north-east. Nigeria has been considered a failed state ““from its failure to meet its obligations to its citizens and the general view that state policies are crafted and implemented to advance private interests and the personal accumulation of a narrow band of the national and regional elite fractions” Mu’azu, A., (2011) Understanding the Emerging Trend of Terrorism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram and Similar Groups. Monograph series, 16. Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundation.. The correlation between violence and poverty is more significant than the relation between religion and conflicts to understand the rise of Boko Haram. First of all, one of the reasons for the emergence of this particular sect is its former leader Muhammad Yusuf. He used the general context of crisis to gather thousands of people in a really short amount of time when he broke ties with the mainstream Sunni scholar Duruji M.M., & Oviasogie, F. O., (2013) “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security” . People who were living in absolute poverty seek any opportunity to change their daily life, and the message of a charismatic leader gave them this hope. Moreover Muhammed Yusuf used the general context of Ignorance spread among Northern Nigeria. Even if religion is part of every Nigerian, it seems that people have a profound ignorance of religion. Religious knowledge is not promoted by the government, therefore people try to learn it by themselves, and sometimes develop wrong conclusions about the little they know. This is how the fundamental and deviant teachings of some extremists writer became that important for a lot of youths who truly believe in Islam and want to know understand the truth. However their inability to think critically alienates them from the path of mainstream Sunni Islam, by buying those extreme teachings. Nigeria can still be seen as a superstitious society submerged by ignorance. For example, lot of people explained the attractiveness/importance of Boko Haram by saying that Muhammed Yusuf used magic powers Duruji M.M., & Oviasogie, F. O., (2013) “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security”. It was ‘easy’ to identify to the sect before 2009, because the main message was against the state to get rid of its corruption. Corruption is present in every aspect of the Nigerian state structure, and as it prevail unpunished, we can say that it is part of the structure of the state. The Nigerian democracy is slowly turning into an aristocracy, where small elite of the society is earning vast amount of money, mainly from the export of oil, and witness the decaying of the public and private infrastructures around them without any consideration. The opposition parties represent a decreasing minority and all indicates for the creation of a one-party polity. However in recent years several institutions have been created to counter-act this phenomenon. The main issue is that corruption is institutionalised in the system and a long-time process will be necessary to change it. This gives plenty of time for any revolution. Corruption develops a constant frustration for Nigerian people, mainly for the youth who witness their future limited by the selfishness and the negligence of their leaders. Nigerian leaders have failed to transform the country’s natural resource into economic opportunities. The example of General Sani Abucha, who stole US$ 6 billion from oil and national treasury during its 4,5 yea rs of reign is often cited. Moreover he imposed in 1990’s a brutal power and strategically place his siblings in power. In doing so he destroyed the Sokoto System in the North, destroying centuries of social and political hierarchy of Islamic power Maier, K., (2000) This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis. p.3. Another example is the structural adjustment programme which was set up in the late 1980’s which spread suffering and frustration among the Nigerian who were urged to “tighten their belts” while the government were embezzling in total impunity Mu’azu, A., (2011) Understanding the Emerging Trend of Terrorism in Nigeria. More recently, after the death of the former leader of Boko Haram, the president Yar’Adua ordered the creation of a commission to investigate the reason of the crisis but mainly to investigate the death of the leader. This appears as the continuation of the “Commission Inquiry approach” used by many previous governments, where the rapport is not published to the public, and no judicial implication are held Danjibo, N. D., (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence”. It is important to notice that this crisis happened during a ‘democratic’ regime; however the extra-judicial killings and the absence of rule of law show that the government is just democratic in its name, not in its acts. Few civil societies seek to promote and consolidate democracy and decrease the corruption of the government. However when they do, the tools they can use are limited and often the state reaction is violent. Until 2009, Boko Haram wanted to implement Sharia law in the country to get rid of the corruption not principally for the religious sense. This is why the sect continued to exists and transforms after the implementation of Sharia law in the majority of the Northern State, because corruption was still endemic. This obviously undermined the construction of political and religious structure. Terrorism Lastly the answer provided by the state and the rise of a spreading identity provided by global radical terrorist groups will be used to explain the radicalization of the group and its turn toward terrorism. In 2010 the group reemerged during the attack of a prison to free their former members majorly extra-judicially detained. The groups now claimed links with Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Qaeda in Somalia, which could be true due to the change in the modus operandi of the group. This information must be analyzed carefully because it has been claimed that President Goodluck Jonathan and his government could be increasing the threat in order to receive military and financial help from the West even if in reality the threat is just against the state. The fact that the target are still local and directed to the Nigerian audience does not correspond to the target and audience of both groups cited previously. Moreover it appears that the financing of Boko Haram has been made by Nigerian political or religious leaders, or individuals, not from external sources. In the short term, it is in the interests of Boko Haram and Al Qaeda to claim their links. The main changes between Boko Haram I and Boko Haram II are the modus operandi, targets and claims, which have all been radicalized and associated with the identity of global Islamist radicalism. Before July 2009, the aims were the release of the members, justice for those killed extra-judicially by the army, the withdrawal of government troops from Maiduguri and the imposition of Sharia law to stop corruption. However now they claim that the Christians should be expelled from the states where there is a Muslims majority, and that Jonathan Goodluck converts to Islam Duruji M.M., & Oviasogie, F. O., (2013) “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security”. This evolution comes from the violent repression of the Nigerian army and the extra-judicial killing of Muhammed Yusuf Issoufou Yahaya (2011) « Boko Haram au Nigéria: le fanatisme religieux comme projet politique » Sphere of Politics. The first argument is that the violence started when Governor Sherriff (corrupt and unappreciated governor of Borno), received information that Boko Haram members were constructing bombs. He therefore ordered to dislodge them, which resulted in the death of several members of the sect and the imprisonment of others. The police was present during the funeral of the members killed by the previous attack and a fight started when they wanted to arrest other people for a non-legal way of wearing their helmets. The violence escalated in July 2009 when the army violently repressed the group Danjibo, N. D., (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence”. The army is poorly trained and has no logistic support and they use excessive force against civilians with impunity Roach, M. L. 2012. Boko Haram: Addressing the Threat before It Strikes. Issue brief 3549:1–4, p. 1. Abdulkadir and Salihu argue that the unprofessional use of excessive force by Nigerian police and army highlight the constant Human Right abuse and the waste of human and material resources in Nigeria Abdulkadir, I. and Salihu, M., (2009) “Boko Haram: Clarion Call on the Nigerian Government and Muslims.”. Nigeria’s response to crisis management is often crude and violent, but recently some witnesses reported that the police and the army “[were] killing these people like chickens” Cited in Danjibo (2009) “Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence”. Radicalisation and resentment are increased by the abuses of the army and this lead to more instability in the country. Innocent civilians are bullied by the police, their houses are searched, and they are beaten, arrested and tortured based on suspicion not on proper information. This is done under the control of a Christian President which revives the Muslim Vs Christian ideology now spreading more than even in Northern Nigeria. It is true that there are some external influences in this conflict. Nigerian Muslims have links with the Middle East and Christians have links with the West. In Nigeria, the anti-western ideology and the Iranian revolution of 1989 have affected the development of the religion. In Northern Nigeria, Christian evangelism is more and more perceived as being part of the imperialist agenda of the West Ohadike, D., (1992) “Muslim-Christian Conflict and Political Instability in Nigeria”, in John O. Hunwick, ed. Religion and National Integration in Africa, Islam, Christianity and Politics in the Sudan and Nigeria.. The identity spread by Al Qaeda has attracted the new leader of the sect, whom is now using it to justify his terrorist attacks. Conclusion This essay has highlighted the main causes of Boko Haram’s violence in Nigeria. We have seen that religion is not an independent variable providing a static identity but a more complex variable of the structure which cannot be used unlimitedly by elites and leaders. Boko Haram has emerged as a sect from the failure of the construction of a unified Nigerian State. The colonial legacy has associated religious identity with the inequality in the structure which allowed the British crown and the Nigerian elites to control Nigeria. The construction of Northern Nigeria is the perfect example of how religious identities can be so closely linked with political identity. Every political contestation is now considered as religious in Nigeria. As in a political system, extreme tendencies tend to develop while competing against each other. The failure of the state set up the context in which state services will be provided by individuals or groups with a certain ideology which can be affected by every aspect of their personal life. The rise of sect is spread in Nigeria, but Boko Haram was different because of the charisma of its leader and its power. Until 2009, the sect was anti-governmental but relatively non-violent. However after the escalation of violence linked to the aggressiveness of the army and the death of Muhammed Yusuf, the sect re-emerged with a new identity, closer to Al Qaeda’s. The means to claim their political objectives changed and they became the terrorist group that we know. The state has the principal role in Boko Haram’s violence and has the power and capabilities to calm the situation. The dialogue process proposed by Jonathan Goodluck is a first step in regions where everything has to be built. He may not change the leaders’ point of view, but it will delegitimize the use of violence and show another alternative for many young followers. As a terrorist group Boko Haram success will be based on the radicalization of the people around them. If people can find a reason to be allied with the state, they will, and Boko Haram will progressively disappear. The causes of the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria are complex and would need further investigations. The main point of this essay was to show that religion per se is rarely the cause of so called religious conflicts. I do not deny that religion is an important factor in these conflicts however I assume that religion is not increasing the violent tendencies of people. In the contrary I would argue that religion has a great potential for construction of peace and to focus only on its negative aspect is a mistake which have too often been made by Western scholars. Religious leaders need to rise up and give the example such as the Christian pastor, James Morel Wuye and the Muslim Imam Muhammed Nurayn Ashafa whom after being enemies for years founded the Christian-Muslim Dialogue Forum (MCDF) in 1992. They both turned away from a similar path of violence, after they both realised the great loss and the consequences of war and violence they had suffered. They created a five-day dialogue workshop between young Christian and young Muslims in 2003 which appeared to be a success Haynes, J., (2009) “Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 47, No. 1, 52–75 . This example shows that a skilfully organised dialogue can encourage peace between enemies, even if they had been personally involved. If the government could resolve the human developmental problem, the creation of associations such as the MCDF would be a huge benefit for the whole society and the following generations. 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