The Naga Peace Process: An Audit

Introduction

After almost 16 years of closely guarded and fiercely contested negotiations between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM), a settlement, albeit in the form of an interim arrangement, seems in the offing. For the six decade old Naga National Movement, this ought to be a momentous, if not a paradigmatic occasion. It ought to have tremendous demonstration effect for sustainable resolutions of the conflict systems prevalent in the rest of Northeast India.

For the Government of India (GoI), it could potentially be a showcase of the flexibility of the Constitution, and the viability of the State. Yet, not only have the GoI and the NSCN (IM) kept the negotiations and its expected outcome under close-wraps, but even among the concerned Naga and non-Naga constituencies in Nagaland and the neighboring states, there is palpable a sense of cynicism and apprehension.

This signals clearly towards the changing characteristic of the Naga National Movement; its locus no longer rests merely with the armed groups challenging or resisting the armed might of the Indian State. Like most ethnonational self-determination movements, the Naga national question was an internally contested one and held a diversity of opinions from its very beginning.

But the last two decades have seen a dramatic expansion of the meaning and scope of the national movement. Such changes call for an expanded understanding of the Naga peace process.

It can no longer be captured through the lens of cessation of hostilities between the Indian State and the Naga armed groups, and between the Nagas themselves. There have come forth an increased number of actors suited to negotiating and effecting peace with the Indian State, with their immediate neighbors, as well as within the Nagas themselves. Equally significant, is the transformation of the identity of the movement, from ethnonational sovereignty narrowly defined, to embrace questions of truth, reconciliation, justice, substantive democracy and sustainable development.

The attempted audit is mindful of the fact that it is mistaken to understand the emergent peace process as a zone completely devoid conflict. As Ranabir Samadder explains of such processes, 'a dialogue is essentially a contested conversation. But conflicts play out in different ways in the peace process.' Moreover, underscoring the ubiquity of power politics, he insists that peace as a process grows out of the process of power (Ekachai 2005).

Therefore, for an evaluation of the Naga Peace Process, the examination of the past and current peace-talks and Accords are an important, but not the determining constituent. It demands rather, an audit of the entire gamut of actors and stake-holders in the Naga national question, their intertwined relationships, as well as an evaluation of the socio-political and aocioeconomic impulses that motivate these actors. This is not to disregard the dominant narratives of the Naga conflict trajectory-the landmark events and phases. Not only are they an effective entry point into the peace process, but continue to resonate powerfully with the current generation of Naga national workers and populace. Therefore, the audit would supplement an evaluation of the dominant milestones of the peace process, with an evaluation of the contributions from various other stake-holders.

The audit then, is divided into four parts. The first section examines the current status of the Indo-Naga talks and the status of ceasefire and negotiation with the other armed groups.

Thereafter, the role of the Indian electoral actors in the four states of Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur is considered. Section three concentrates upon the extremely important and emerging actors redefining and steering the Naga Peace Process-the traditional decision-making institutions, civil society organizations and the Church bodies. Thereafter, an attempt is made to take stock of the changed socio-economic and political scenario that motivates these actors and their positions. The role of the Indian State towards the Peace Process is briefly considered, before summarizing the findings of the audit.

II. Indo-Naga Talks and the Armed Groups

The ceasefire and peace talks between the GoI and the NSCN ( has also emerged as the only insurgent/ liberation group to be in agreements with the government's of two sovereign states, India and Myanmar. In the latter, the NSCN (K), has bargained for complete socio-cultural control over the three districts in the Sagaing Division in the Naga Self-Administered Zone, with the promise of more territories being added later (Dholabhai 2012a).

With the Khole Kitovi and the Khaplang factions controlling large areas in Nagaland, and the latter in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, the NSCN (IM) faces an up-hill task in consolidating its influence in the three states. To add to its woes, IM faction faces stiff opposition from the Zeliangrong United Front as well. The ZUF has warned the NSCN (IM) of any interference with the affairs of the Zeliangrong Naga tribes all over Manipur, Assam and Nagaland (Newmai News Network 2012a). Historically the Naga national movement among the Zeliangrong has played out very differently from the Naga National Council (NNC) and NSCN trajectories, and the former have extended only halting and conditional support to the Indo-Naga talks (Thomas 2012 Army are far more controlled than that between the undergrounds themselves. The widespread realization that a final solution will only follow and not precede a lack of internecine bloodshed, has led the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) to take upon itself to bring all the underground factions under a common platform. The resulting Naga Condordant and proposals of a single Naga National Government comprising of all the underground groups and a single taxation system, is, as yet, more in the nature of an enticing possibility, and has not reaped real dividends on the ground.

It is however, clear to all the underground groups of varied strength and influence that the future of the Naga national movement would lay through Indian electoral politics. Thus willynilly, the one section, that, in cohorts with the underground, has developed deeper stakes in the ongoing peace-talks than before is the Nagaland State Government and all the concerned Naga and non-Naga political parties in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The next section of the audit would assess the developments on this front.

III. Electoral Actors in Nagaland, Assam Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur

In the state of Nagaland, electoral politics and its actors have always thrived in a coconstitutive relationship with the underground. The last two decades had seen a gradual drawing of sides as the Nagaland Congress cooperated with the NSCN (IM) and (K) alternately. With the emergence of the Nagaland People's Front (NPF), and its Democratic Alliance for Nagaland (DAN) led government, it is alleged by many that the "Cock Party" is merely front for the NSCN (IM), and its soundest means to try and consolidate its hold over the entire territory of Nagaland (Ravi 2012). Suggestively the Neiphu Rio led NPF has, within the limits of the Indian Constitution, gone furthest to echo the stand of the NSCN (IM). The early and peaceful resolution to the Indo-Naga political problem, with the NPF playing the role of a facilitator is the most important constituent on their manifesto. Simultaneously, it has also started to model itself as the spokesperson of Nagas outside of the state of Nagaland. To this effect, in 2010, it has changed its nomenclature from the Nagaland People's Front, to the Naga People's Front, has expanded into the states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. In the latter, it has managed to win four out of the 11 Assembly seats it had contested on short notice in 2012. While some read the electoral verdict as dismal and as a blow to the canard that all Nagas wish to live together, others see it as a pragmatic calculation on behalf of the Nagas, Kuki's and other Hill communities, who would want to avoid polarization in the interest of everyday peace (Phanjoubam 2012: 16).

In the state of Nagaland, on the other hand, with speculations of an announcement by the With all the three adjoining states opposing any territorial demarcation in their borders, the vague proposal of emotional integration has gained ground at the official level. In the case of Assam, that alleges Nagaland to be illegally in control of 662.4 square kilometers of Assamese territory, the Congress led Government of Tarun Gogoi has given his assent to the emotional integration of Nagas in his state with those of Nagaland and elsewhere (Dholabhai 2012c Thereafter several rounds of tripartite talks have been held between the GoI, State Government and the UNC. With the Center deciding to reserve all initiative in the matter with the State Government, the failure of the talks is a foregone conclusion. Still, as the Naga Student's Federation President Mutsikhoyo Yhobu insists, the mere agitation is the 'first step for the Nagas to administratively separate themselves from the Meitei's' and hopes that it will serve as an example for the Nagas of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh as well (Bose and Manchanda 2011: 57). On the other hand, there are also popular allegations that the UNC and the ANSAM work at the behest of not just the NSCN (IM) but also the NPF and have been coercing the tribal population of the State into toeing the line of Naga integration.

The machinations of the electoral actors in the four states, especially in Nagaland and

Manipur suggest complex and multifaceted implications for the Indo-Naga peace process. With a long history of intrigue, cooptation, defections and corruption behind all of the political parties, it is difficult to separate political opportunism from honest commitment to peace. The fact that any political solution to the Indo-Naga conflict will have to be effected through electoral politics at the Center as well as in the States, makes it imperative that the concerned actors be made an equal participant in the talks. This has been the complaint and demand of electoral actors across the spectrum.

However, because electoral politics among the Nagas in the entire region has always been a lackey to national question and never a true democratic barometer, the latter mantle has gradually come to be held with the extremely vocal and pro-active Naga civil society. These organizations, institutions and communities have been responsible for the most fundamental churning in the Naga peace process. As Dolly Kikon puts it, 'Protracted struggles for right to self-determination show that notions of sovereignty, self-determination and nation not only get interpreted and re-interpreted during the transition of power from one generation to another, but also engineer negotiation processes with centralized governments and redefine priorities of the people ' (2005: 2844). In the Naga case, the national movement has survived and thrived across seven decades only through a gradual redefinition, the substance of which can be located most fully in the sphere of its civil society. This is the concern of the next section of the audit.

IV. Traditional Decision Making Institutions, Churches and Civil Society

The Naga National Movement, from its earliest times has derived its strength from the The Naga Mother's Association (NMA) was born out of a deep rooted desire to prevent generations of young men and women from being sacrificed at the alter of inter-tribal and factional warfare. It emerged rapidly as the most substantial peace-making and peace-keeping urging people to not offer and accept money for votes. Though it did not manage to fully plug the ubiquitous flow of money, the campaign did manage to make a mark (Pangernungba 2013).

Perhaps the most significant of the civil society initiatives is the genesis and work of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR). Founded in 2008 by 18 representatives of organizations like the Naga Hoho, the NPMHR, NMA, NSF, Naga Women's Union (NWU) and NBCC, the FNR has taken upon itself the task of effecting a course correction of the Naga National Movement. Grounding the importance of reconciliation to the movement, Charles Chasie writes, 'We created a Cause, before we could fully become a people. This was alright if it helped us to become a people. And initially, the Cause did accelerate the process of our tribes coming together. But the Cause, for various reasons, soon preceded the process of our becoming a people and seemed to have gone on its own. The building of our nationhood got neglected and even began to slide backwards. What further accentuated this neglect was the explanation that our nationhood was already a fact and that our people would automatically unite and become one, cooperating with each other, once the Cause was achieved. The logical extension of such thinking process is that only a few "traitors" were standing in the way…(Moreover)… In other parts of the world political settlements come about as a result of, directly or indirectly, external pressure. But the geopolitics and dynamics of our situation are different from those other conflict situations and our people cannot hope that the same results can be effected in like manner. In our situation, there is no alternative to reconciliation" (Chasie in Venuh et al. 2004: 135,137). It is ironic to note that while Naga civil society has attempted to build bridges with mainland Indians and between the warring Naga underground groups, it has not been able to do the same with people in the States of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. In the first two states, the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and Arunachal Pradesh Student's Union (APSU), have been militantly opposing any concession made to the Nagas over "their" territories (Misra 2003: 596, Anon. 2007 It is however, important to underscore that the Naga civil society, as indeed the civil societies in the adjoining states do not have wholly independent agenda's. Neither do they work independently of the armed groups and the state governments. Each influences, constrains and supplements the working of the other. On the one hand, such deep connections serve to further embed the durable disorder within the Naga national movement, as seen most clearly by the Naga-Meitei impasse in Manipur. On the other hand, it also holds the potential to break away from the conflict quagmire, as seen in the slow but steady progress of the FNR led reconciliation process. This expansion of the custody of the Naga national movement, and also the Naga-Indo peace process cannot be understood taking stock of the economic and socio-political changes that have been underway among the Nagas in the past few decades. This is the attempt of the next section of the audit.

V. Economic and Socio-political ferment in Naga Society

A largely young population, that has not witnessed firsthand the genocidal treatment of the Indian Army, or the excesses of factional bloodletting is set to receive the baton of the Naga national movement. It is a generation that has grown up wittingly or unwittingly into the market economy introduced by the Indian State. The worldviews of this new "middle class" is different from the deeply communitarian society that was previously predicated upon the jhum economy.

According to Tapan Bose and Rita Manchanda, "..this small but powerful educated professional grouping, which straddles both the traditional tribal institutions and the modern socio-economic structures, is expanding the Naga public sphere and reshaping its politics" (2011: 57).

The process has been underway in several discernable ways: most visibly by being extremely critical of the high-handedness of the Naga armed factions, the rampant taxation and corruption of the underground workers, and each one's exclusive claims to represent the authentic Naga voice. The inherent communitarianism of the Naga tribal polities is now making its presence felt in the mass media and the social media, giving rise to the what some see as a parallel 'Naga Nation on the Net' (Ranganathan and Roy-Chowdhury 2008). Groups such as The Naga Blog (TNB) have emerged as spaces where extremely sensitive issues like tribalism, Naga-Meitei relations, territorial integration, independence, sovereignty, and federalism can be fearlessly discussed by a youth just coming to terms with the uniqueness of Naga history (Parameswaram 2012 (Shimray 2005: 295). Convention (Lotha 2012). There is also much ferment around the expected outcomes of the peace talks, based on under-specified terms like "shared sovereignty" and "non-territorial autonomy". Some like see it as creative way out of the trappings of the Westphalian State. It not only enables the Naga's to be a unique nation among nations, but also opens up an additional layer to the structure of Indian federalism, paving the way for the latter's flexibility and durability (Anon. 2012b). On the other hand, scholars like Yhome and Shadang, citing India's past record at federal devolution see it as a veiled trap. While not discarding the ideas per se, they consider the undergrounds, the FNR, the Hoho and the Churches to be ideologically exhausted, for selling the dictats of the GoI by dressing them up as attractive possibilities (2013).

This last possibility suggests that, for the audit to be comprehensive there is a need for examining the motivations and workings of the Indian State itself.

Skeptics of the peace talks often harp on India's fine-tuned counter-insurgency strategies;

one of them being to tire the opponent out through relentless negotiations, while co-opting a But notwithstanding the foreign policy imperatives, the Indian State's wavering can also be read as the burden of ideological contradictions related to its unfinished nation-building project. At the heart of this conundrum lies the situation in Manipur. In the event that the GoI were to side with the Naga argument, and deny to Imphal its century's old "territorial sovereignty" it would result in taking away from the Indian State its own legitimacy to control its peripheral polities (Yhome and Shadang 2013). It is in this sense that the Indo-Naga Peace Talks present a challenge to the Indian State, as much as it does to the Nagas. For the Nagas, the challenge is to redefine the meaning of self-determination in a way that is compatible with contemporary realities. For India, it is an opportunity to redefine the grounds of its legitimacy as a State-from mere territorial sovereignty to accommodative co-existence with multiple nations and nationalisms.