Alexandre Erler
I'm a philosopher studying the ethical implications of new technologies with the potential to significantly transform society and the human condition (e.g. human enhancement technologies, artificial intelligence, or genome editing). I have also worked on issues in neuroethics and the philosophy of psychiatry (e.g. ethical questions relating to mental disorders like ADHD)
I completed a doctorate in Philosophy at the University of Oxford in 2013. Since then, I have worked as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Montreal (2013-15) and the American College of Thessaloniki (2015-17), and as a Research Assistant Professor in Philosophy and Bioethics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2017-2022). I am currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University in Taipei.
In my doctoral dissertation, I considered the question whether the use of enhancement technologies poses a threat to our authenticity, or to our identity. My answer, in short, was that concerns about authenticity and identity are appropriate in some specific cases (even though appeals to the concept of authenticity are often somewhat vague and call for clearer ethical language), yet that such considerations still don't justify rejecting all enhancement use, even of a radical kind. Some chapters of my dissertation have already appeared as articles in peer-reviewed journals (see my "papers" section).
Besides my broad interests in applied ethics, I am also interested in political philosophy, particularly at its intersection with human rights, geopolitics, and emerging technologies.
Supervisors: Roger Crisp, Guy Kahane, Julian Savulescu
I completed a doctorate in Philosophy at the University of Oxford in 2013. Since then, I have worked as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Montreal (2013-15) and the American College of Thessaloniki (2015-17), and as a Research Assistant Professor in Philosophy and Bioethics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2017-2022). I am currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University in Taipei.
In my doctoral dissertation, I considered the question whether the use of enhancement technologies poses a threat to our authenticity, or to our identity. My answer, in short, was that concerns about authenticity and identity are appropriate in some specific cases (even though appeals to the concept of authenticity are often somewhat vague and call for clearer ethical language), yet that such considerations still don't justify rejecting all enhancement use, even of a radical kind. Some chapters of my dissertation have already appeared as articles in peer-reviewed journals (see my "papers" section).
Besides my broad interests in applied ethics, I am also interested in political philosophy, particularly at its intersection with human rights, geopolitics, and emerging technologies.
Supervisors: Roger Crisp, Guy Kahane, Julian Savulescu
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Peer-reviewed articles by Alexandre Erler
status. I assess the critique, raised by major voices in the bioethics and science communities, according to which such concerns are premature and misleading. I identify the assumptions underlying this skeptical critique, and mention some objections against them, followed by some possible replies. I proceed to argue that the skeptical position is ultimately implausible, because it presupposes an unreasonably high standard of full moral status. My argument appeals to David DeGrazia’s idea of a “borderline person”, and to the need for consistency with existing animal research regulations. I outline the practical implications of my view for the conduct of studies that might result in the development of full moral status in a transplanted animal.
I also discuss some of the ethical implications of animal enhancement (particularly of rodents) below the threshold associated with full moral status. I conclude that far from being premature, further debate on these issues is urgently needed to help clarify the prospects that a neural chimera might attain full moral status in the foreseeable future, and the level of quality of life required to make it acceptable to knowingly create such a being via HBO transplantation.
use personalized Large Language Models (LLMs) or "generative AI" (GenAI) to enhance productivity in academic research.
inducing trauma or “normal” negative affect, has long been
explored in fiction. Today, advances in biomedical science increasingly
promise to turn it into reality. This article discusses
one particular ethical concern about memory erasure, premised
on the value of “truthful living”. After explaining memory erasure
(alongside other forms of memory editing) and reviewing its
current science, I lay out what I call the truthfulness objection.
I then consider two main challenges to it: a skeptical take on
the accuracy of autobiographical memories (which I critique),
and a challenge to the normative force of truthfulness (which I
partly endorse). After highlighting what I take to be the grain
of truth in the objection, I conclude on a cautiously optimistic
note, by highlighting some practical constraints that can be expected
to reduce the threat to truthfulness from memory erasure.
I begin by laying out the TED, the practical implications that tend to be drawn from it, and the justification just sketched for these implications. Using examples drawn from preventive medicine, biomedical technology, and other categories of biomedical interventions, I then go on to challenge both the presupposition of a fundamental dichotomy between treatments and enhancements, and the assumption that enhancements – barring rare exceptions – cannot serve legitimate medical needs. Finally, I consider some ways in which supporters of the TED might try and re-formulate the distinction to blunt the force of my critique. I conclude that such a move cannot fully succeed, and that while the TED does have some degree of normative force, it nevertheless cannot play the role that its advocates expect from it. Seeking to justify a general presumption against enhancements based on the rationale I critique here would mean ignoring their various potential benefits, including medical or therapeutic, and would reflect a prejudice – which I refer to as " treatment fetishism " .
status. I assess the critique, raised by major voices in the bioethics and science communities, according to which such concerns are premature and misleading. I identify the assumptions underlying this skeptical critique, and mention some objections against them, followed by some possible replies. I proceed to argue that the skeptical position is ultimately implausible, because it presupposes an unreasonably high standard of full moral status. My argument appeals to David DeGrazia’s idea of a “borderline person”, and to the need for consistency with existing animal research regulations. I outline the practical implications of my view for the conduct of studies that might result in the development of full moral status in a transplanted animal.
I also discuss some of the ethical implications of animal enhancement (particularly of rodents) below the threshold associated with full moral status. I conclude that far from being premature, further debate on these issues is urgently needed to help clarify the prospects that a neural chimera might attain full moral status in the foreseeable future, and the level of quality of life required to make it acceptable to knowingly create such a being via HBO transplantation.
use personalized Large Language Models (LLMs) or "generative AI" (GenAI) to enhance productivity in academic research.
inducing trauma or “normal” negative affect, has long been
explored in fiction. Today, advances in biomedical science increasingly
promise to turn it into reality. This article discusses
one particular ethical concern about memory erasure, premised
on the value of “truthful living”. After explaining memory erasure
(alongside other forms of memory editing) and reviewing its
current science, I lay out what I call the truthfulness objection.
I then consider two main challenges to it: a skeptical take on
the accuracy of autobiographical memories (which I critique),
and a challenge to the normative force of truthfulness (which I
partly endorse). After highlighting what I take to be the grain
of truth in the objection, I conclude on a cautiously optimistic
note, by highlighting some practical constraints that can be expected
to reduce the threat to truthfulness from memory erasure.
I begin by laying out the TED, the practical implications that tend to be drawn from it, and the justification just sketched for these implications. Using examples drawn from preventive medicine, biomedical technology, and other categories of biomedical interventions, I then go on to challenge both the presupposition of a fundamental dichotomy between treatments and enhancements, and the assumption that enhancements – barring rare exceptions – cannot serve legitimate medical needs. Finally, I consider some ways in which supporters of the TED might try and re-formulate the distinction to blunt the force of my critique. I conclude that such a move cannot fully succeed, and that while the TED does have some degree of normative force, it nevertheless cannot play the role that its advocates expect from it. Seeking to justify a general presumption against enhancements based on the rationale I critique here would mean ignoring their various potential benefits, including medical or therapeutic, and would reflect a prejudice – which I refer to as " treatment fetishism " .
My response is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neuro-interventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure we all find ourselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. That being said, I acknowledge that separate factors, when present, can indeed render such indirect coercion problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, I stress that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement.
(The ideas defended in this chapter were first presented during a panel discussion at the conference “Neuro-Interventions and the Law: Regulating Human Mental Capacity” in Atlanta, September 2014. The chapter itself has now been published in a volume of the same name edited by N. A. Vincent, to be published by Oxford University Press.)
Available at http://www.didiy.eu/blogs/digitally-manufactured-weapons-can-they-be-controlled.
Lien ci-dessus.