La Guerra degli Uscocchi, "Rivista Militare" 4 (2006)

Dubrovnik annals, 2021

The article is dedicated to one of the most serious incidents between the Venetian and Ragusan Republics: the armed conflict between the Venetian galleys and Ragusan armed ship and fortresses in front of Ragusa on 28 July 1630. The first part of the article offers a comprehensive reconstruction of the event itself, represented in very different ways in the Venetian and Ragusan documents. The second part addresses the immediate aftermath of the event, that is, the reactions of the Venetian and Ragusan governments and various diplomatic initiatives that followed. Finally, the third part investigates the significance and long-term consequences of this incident, questioning the established interpretation according to which it was the beginning of the so-called “Lokrum crisis”, a prolonged diplomatic conflict between Venice and Ragusa. The article is largely based on the hitherto unknown documents from the Venetian archive, which not only bring a wealth of new data, but also reveal a serious methodological issue inherent in relying exclusively on Ragusan documents when reconstructing the diplomatic history of the small state. The appendix of the article is the transcription of the report regarding the incident, written by the commander of Venetian forces, Giovanni Battista Grimani.

ULUSLARARASI YILDIRIM BAYEZİD SEMPOZYUMU 27-29 Kasım 2015, BursaAt: Bursa, 2019

Boccaccio 1313-2013 a cura di FRANCESCO CIABATTONI, ELSA FILOSA, KRISTINA OLSON LONGO EDITORE, 2015

a cura di FRANCESCO CIABATTONI, ELSA FILOSA, KRISTINA OLSON LONGO EDITORE RAVENNA Prospettive storiche sulla vita e sulle opere di Boccaccio Historicizing Boccaccio's Life and Work WILLIAM CAFERRO «LE TRE CORONE FIORENTINE» AND WAR WITH THE UBALDINI, 1349-1350

See details on: https://www.academia.edu/83188018/Nuova_Antologia_Militare_Special_Issue_1_2022_Ottoman_Venetian_Wars_Ed_by_Stathis_Birtachas_

Comparative Legal History, 2021

During the Middle Ages, the Republic of Venice gradually gained control over the Adriatic Sea. Leading medieval jurists argued in favour of Venetian maritime jurisdiction based on Roman law arguments and geopolitical realities. However, starting from the end of the fifteenth century, new developments, such as oceangoing navigation, challenged the foundations of the Serenissima’s wealth and power. The 1610s represented a particularly critical conjuncture for Venice, whose dominion over the Adriatic Sea was disputed by powerful actors. In 1609, Hugo Grotius published the famous pamphlet Mare liberum, which advocated the freedom of the sea towards the Indies based on natural law principles. Grotius’ arguments could as well endanger Venetian dominance over the Adriatic Sea. In this context, Paolo Sarpi, consultant of the Venetian government, elaborated a legal-political defence of Venetian dominion over the Adriatic. His ideas should be read as a reaction but not a direct reply to Mare liberum.

The Pact of London, signed on April 26, 1915, represented a milestone for Italy, opening the doors to the intervention in the Great War. At a territorial level, the Pact, agreed alongside the Entente Powers (France, Great Britain and Russia), guaranteed Italy almost total dominion of the Adriatic Sea. Once victory had been reached, hence, Italy would have controlled both Adriatic coasts and its access from the south. After all, the Adriatic Sea had historically involved the Royal Italian Navy as an interpreter and instrument of Italy's foreign policy. Access from the south, through the Otranto Canal, and the Eastern shore, the Dalmatian coast, had traditionally played an important role in the interests of both the Italian government and the Navy itself. The collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the consequent birth of the Kingdom of SHS were crucial factors in the debate on the application of the Pact of London at the Paris Peace Conference. According to the very powerful United States, which was an Associated Power not recognizing the validity of the Pact of London, the disappearance of Austria-Hungary canceled the main naval threat to the Italian coasts, largely emptying the Pact of its strategic significance. Furthermore, in the US eyes, the Kingdom of SHS was a partner, not a rival for Italy. Yet, according to the Royal Italian Navy Chief of Staff, Paolo Thaon di Revel, the new Yugoslavian State could have represented a strategic naval danger in the medium-long term, at least providing its bases to the enemies of Italy. In Revel’s opinion, the strategic aspect of the Adriatic question constituted the greatest interest for Italy at the Peace Conference, more than the application of the principle of self-determination, openly supported - with many contradictions - by the US President, Woodrow Wilson. The position of the Royal Italian Navy evolved during the Peace Conference. Before the impossibility of fully applying the Pact of London and the US diplomatic support to the Kingdom of SHS, the Royal Italian Navy asked for the neutralization of the Dalmatian coast and the prohibition of fortifications (if existing, the dismantlement). Once again, the Navy’s requests were not agreed by the winning Powers. The Italian government reluctantly accepted the Allies’ resoluteness and Thaon di Revel was left with no choice but to resign from the position of Chief of Staff. His successor, Alfredo Acton, unsuccessfully reiterated the very same demands in the next months. In short, the "battle" waged at the Peace Conference by the Royal Italian Navy for the control of the Adriatic Sea was lost. The creation of the new Kingdom of SHS, which would practically control the entire Eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, laid the foundations for the development of a possible future antagonistic maritime power for Italy. Consequently, the victory in the First World War turned out to be a “lost victory” for the Royal Italian Navy, which saw itself deprived of the total dominion of the Adriatic Sea.