Davidson's Philosophy of Communication

Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication Eli Dresner Department of Communication and Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978 Donald Davidson, one of the main figures in 20th-century analytic philosophy, can be justifiably described as a philosopher of communication. In the first part of this paper, a key concept in Davidson’s philosophy—radical interpretation—is presented and explicated. Then, the second part shows how this notion bears upon key issues and problems in communication theory. It is argued that Davidson’s ideas provide support for a constitutive view of communication and that his account of the relation between communication and social convention promotes the unity of communication as a field of research. The final part of the paper discusses the ramifications of radical interpretation for the domain of intercultural communication. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00266.x The phrase philosophy of communication is seldom used in analytic philosophy. There is no analytic philosophy journal with this name and a search through the Philosophers Index, the primary electronic database of analytic philosophy articles, yields only 48 entries incorporating this expression, none of which is a key reference in the field. However, this state of affairs certainly does not indicate disinterest by analytic philosophers in communication, in general, and in linguistic communication in particular. Indeed, I argue that the phrase, philosophy of communication, can be advantageously used by philosophers and communication researchers alike to delineate an important body of work in analytic philosophy. Language is of paramount interest in analytic philosophy and, hence, the philosophy of language is one of its major branches. A central question in the philosophy of language is the question of linguistic meaning: What it is and how our words come to possess it, that is, how to account for words being meaningful. While various answers to this question have been proposed in contemporary philosophical discussion, a significant distinction can be said to exist between so-called internalist accounts of meaning and intersubjective ones. According to the former, meaning can be described as flowing from thought to language, that is, meaning is first assigned to mental entities or states (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 1985; Searle, 1992). According to the internalist view, linguistic meaning is parasitic on the mental states, and speech is assumed to have meaning because it expresses and transmits meaningful thought. Corresponding author: Eli Dresner; e-mail: [email protected] Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 155 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner According to the alternative, intersubjective view, linguistic meaning is constituted through communicative interaction. This conception repudiates the primacy of meaningful thought over meaningful language. Instead, both are viewed as inherently connected and as arising together from intersubjective linguistic communication. It is the work of philosophers in this second camp that I propose be called philosophy of communication. While the emphasis and importance allocated to communication in the work of these philosophers is alien to internalist philosophers of language and linguists, it resonates well with the work and interests of many communication theorists. In particular, as I shall argue below, this work can be used to support and promote constitutive models of communication (Carey, 1989; Craig, 1999; Deetz, 1994). Wittgenstein is a major figure associated with the philosophy of communication camp. Indeed, he is sometimes viewed as its founding father. In his later period, that of the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953), Wittgenstein calls upon us to understand language through its function in life and communication. His oft-quoted slogan, ‘‘Do not ask for the meaning—ask for the use,’’ embodies this outlook. There are strands representing this approach also in the philosophy of W.V. Quine, particularly in his concept of radical translation, which will be discussed later. Brandom (1994, 2000), another contemporary communication-oriented philosopher, accounts for meaning in terms of the intricate commitments and entitlements that the members of a community take upon themselves through linguistic interaction. This not withstanding, the analytic philosopher of communication of the second half of the 20th century is almost without doubt Donald Davidson (1917– 2003). Davidson developed a systematic, unified philosophy that became prominent within analytic philosophy and influential far beyond its borders. At the center of this philosophy stands the view under consideration here, namely, that meaning arises from intersubjective communication. In this article, I present some of Davidson’s main ideas and arguments and demonstrate that his work has relevance to problems and issues that interest the community of communication scholars. The presentation begins with an exposition of radical interpretation, arguably the most fundamental concept in Davidson’s account of meaning. A detailed consideration of how this concept bears upon communication theory follows. Finally, the concept of radical interpretation is applied to the study of intercultural communication. Through such a presentation, I hope to provide the reader unfamiliar with Davidson’s work with an initial entry into his deep and complex system of ideas as well as to demonstrate how these ideas can be further developed and used in the context of communication theory. Radical interpretation ‘‘What is it for words to mean what they do?’’ asks Davidson in the beginning of the introduction to his Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Davidson, 1984, p. xiii). A key assumption underlying his answer is that language is essentially intersubjective 156 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication and, therefore, linguistic meaning must be completely and fully communicable in interpersonal linguistic interaction. Thus, for Davidson, the question could be paraphrased as follows: What does a person need to know in order to understand the utterances of the other? In a successful act of communication, what I know when I understand your words correctly is what your words mean. This approach rejects an account of meaning in terms of connections between linguistic expressions and languageindependent inner states of mind. When I am talking to you, I do not have access to any such connections, nor have I ever had such access to other people’s internal processes. Therefore, when I learned to understand you and other people, I could not have learned to make such connections, but something else. This ‘‘something else’’ must be the meaning of what you say to me and not some inner representations in your mind that you associate with your words. By the same token, Davidson’s approach to linguistic meaning is at odds with the account of meaning in terms of social convention. If I know the right things about your linguistic behavior, then I can understand you, with or without your behavior being in accord with any convention. While convention is highly useful in facilitating linguistic interaction, in that it brings about uniformity of linguistic behavior, it is not essential to linguistic meaning. Thus, the basic setup needed in order to understand linguistic meaning is that of interpersonal linguistic communication. Davidson is not the first to assign conceptual priority to this setup. Among philosophers preceding him in this respect is Quine, Davidson’s teacher and lifelong philosophical conversant and adversary. Quine (1960) proposed the famous radical translation thought experiment in order to capture the essentials of this linguistic situation. In radical translation, a field linguist encounters a person from a linguistically isolated society and attempts to decipher this person’s language. Since the linguist has access neither to a dictionary nor to an informant who speaks both the foreigner’s language and linguist’s, the sole resource for translating the other’s language is overt linguistic behavior. According to Quine, what the linguist can learn about the other person’s language in such a situation, given sufficient time and interaction, is all that can be learned about any person’s linguistic behavior in interpersonal contact. Hence, what the linguist learns in such a situation encapsulates what the other person’s words mean. Davidson makes several important changes in Quine’s radical translation parable in order to adjust it to his own philosophical outlook. Called radical interpretation (Davidson, 1984a), Davidson’s concept incorporates the following main distinctive features: Translation versus interpretation. One main change from Quine’s ideas is implicit in his exchange of the term translation by interpretation. Davidson argues that what the linguist needs to learn about the other person’s utterances should not be conceptualized as a mapping from one language to another, that is, translation. What makes more sense, according to Davidson, is that the linguist seeks to match the foreigner’s utterances, not to expressions in the linguist’s own language, but rather to things in the world, in the environment shared by the linguist and the foreign Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 157 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner speaker, as conceptualized in the linguist’s language. For example, when I understand that another refers to rabbits by use of some word X, I do not associate this word with my own, but rather with, well, rabbits. Admittedly, I use my own word and the concept it expresses to say and think of the object to which the other’s word refers. However, this is not to say that what is established is an interlinguistic connection. Understanding does not primarily involve translation but rather an interpretation that relates words to the world. One objection that can be raised against Davidson’s use of the term interpretation, as well as against Quine’s notion of radical translation, is that it brings this notion ‘‘too close to home,’’ by suggesting that everyday linguistic interaction consists of interpretation (Burge, 1999). Davidson’s critic would argue that interpretation takes place when we read a text or when someone tries to communicate with an alien or futuristically with a machine or an extraterrestrial. Ordinary language use is something of a different order. It is much more transparent and straightforward. As will be elaborated later, Davidson’s answer is that this apparent difference is misleading. John Peters makes a similar point when he discusses possible communication with aliens or machines. He argues that contrary to first appearance, such hypothetical communication will not be essentially different from ordinary, everyday communication in which we are constantly engaged (Peters, 1999, p. 257). Truth and meaning. A second distinctive feature of Davidson’s theory, arising from the first, is his appeal to the notion of truth conditions of sentences as a fundamental building block in his account of meaning (Davidson, 1984b). Once the radical interpreter is described as establishing connections between the other’s utterances and world, it remains to specify such connections and how they are established. Davidson’s answer to this challenge is that the interpreter assigns systematic truth conditions to the speaker’s sentences on the basis of linguistic behavior: the utterances he makes, assents to, and dissents from. Thus, for example, in order to understand the words table or treason in another’s language, it is essential to know when the other would judge such sentences as this is a table or this is a treacherous act as true. The systematic assignment of truth conditions constitutes a basic layer of meaning— roughly, that of literal meaning—that permits the accomplishment of other communicative and semantic purposes, such as metaphor and Gricean implicature. Objections to the major role allocated to the notion of truth in Davidson’s conception have come from various directions. One important source of objection is the so-called deflationary camp that is party to the heated contemporary debate within analytic philosophy about truth. Members of this camp, Horwich (1990), for one, argue that talk about truth is a useful metalinguistic mechanism (e.g., for expressing overall assent as in the statement what you say is true) but that it should not carry any philosophical burden in the explanation of meaning. A related objection is that the notion of literal meaning, usually associated with truth-conditional semantics, is ill-founded and misguided (Fish, 1989). Language and thought. A third major characteristic of Davidson’s radical interpretation is that it also takes into account belief and desire, notions not addressed 158 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication in Quine’s radical translation. What was required from the linguist in Quine’s thought experiment was only an interlinguistic mapping. Moreover, Quine is highly suspicious of everyday talk about belief and contends that this kind of talk is not amenable to rigorous philosophical or scientific analysis. In contrast, Davidson acknowledges the fact that meaning cannot be assigned to the words of another person without making hypotheses about what that person thinks and desires. Therefore, Davidson views linguistic meaning, meaningful thought, and intentional desire as arising together, interconnectedly, from intersubjective communication. Thus, being engaged linguistically with each other is required, according to Davidson, for having intentional mental states. Not surprisingly, this position too has been strongly criticized. Cognitive scientists and many like-minded philosophers view meaningful thought as an internal computational process (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 1985). Therefore, they object to the idea that content is imputed to thought through external interaction. In particular, they object to the idea that speechless creatures cannot have intentional thought, a consequence of the Davidsonian viewpoint. A different internalist camp, of whom Searle (1992) is a main figure, holds that consciousness is the key through which intentional thought needs to be explained and not, again, linguistic interpersonal interaction. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into this debate, discussion will be limited to the following two observations. First, Davidson along with other members of the so-called externalist camp would argue that one could acknowledge the immense complexity and sophistication of nonhuman cognitive processes but still insist that full-fledged objectification and predication, essential to human intentional thought, cannot be justifiably ascribed to speechless creatures. Second, and more important for the purposes of this paper, the incorporation of intentional language, thought, and desire into radical interpretation makes this concept useful and relevant to communication studies. Communication researchers and those in the social sciences in general seek to interpret not only speech but also implicit thought and action. They want to understand what people say in the context of what they think and do. Davidson’s theory allows for such interdependence and contextuality, by making language, thought, and desire three dependent variables. Quine’s views can never be useful in this way because they omit thought and action. Therefore, it is not coincidental that it is Davidson, not Quine, who proceeded from radical interpretation to develop an elaborate theory of action (Davidson, 1980). Finally, it is worth noting here the relation between Davidson’s radical interpretation and Geertz’s application of the notion of interpretation in his anthropological theorizing and fieldwork. Geertz’s (1973) celebrated theoretical thesis is that the subject matter of anthropology is systems of meaning, as manifested in concrete social contexts. He holds that meaning is not ‘‘in the head’’ of social actors but rather in their actions themselves. Therefore, the task of the anthropologist is to provide an interpretation (‘‘thick description’’) of these actions. Now it could be justifiably asked: Does Davidson’s work enrich this notion from the point of view of communication Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 159 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner researchers beyond what is provided to us already by Geertz? The answer to this question, which will be supported and elaborated (albeit implicitly) below, is as follows. There is significant affinity between Davidson’s outlook and both Geertz’ philosophical sources (e.g., the later Wittgenstein) and his own thought. However, Davidson’s detailed philosophical elaboration of the notion of interpretation extends the philosophical foundation of Geertz’s work. Therefore, the former’s philosophy can be used to support, to extend, and to modify the latter’s approach to anthropology. Radical interpretation and communication theory As elaborated above, radical interpretation is a concept applied by Davidson to develop an account of the way meaning, of both language and thought, is constituted intersubjectively. The notion of communication is not employed by Davidson in this account, nor is it his stated goal to explore and explain this notion. However, it is clear that by a shift in perspective, the body of theorizing just reviewed can be construed as a philosophy of communication. The pretheoretic notion that is in need of explanation according to Davidson is linguistic meaning. However, communication can be added to it as another such key pretheoretic concept. If both communication and meaning are taken into consideration, then Davidson’s radical interpretation can be viewed as an account of the interrelations between these two fundamental concepts. In particular, in radical interpretation, communication constitutes meaning; therefore, this concept can serve to support and develop the constitutive approach to communication that has been the focus of much attention in recent years among communication scholars. The constitutive conception of communication is an alternative to the transmission or informational conception, in which communication is understood to be ‘‘a process of sending and receiving messages or transferring information from one mind to another’’ (Craig, 1999, p. 125). In recent years, many communication theorists have been critical of this traditional, conventional view. For example, it was claimed that the philosophical foundations of this conception are empiricist and therefore unsound (Peters, 1999). Also, it is argued that underlying it is a political agenda oriented toward domination and control, rather than participation (Deetz, 1994). Furthermore, the ramifications of the transmission conception for the coherence and viability of communication research as a field are described as dire, for the following reason. If communication consists of the mere transmission of preexisting psychological entities, then the study of communication is parasitic on psychology and lacks self-sufficient explanatory power and significance (Anderson & Baym, 2004; Craig). In contrast, the alternative constitutive or communicational model views ‘‘the interaction process as the site of meaning production’’ (Deetz, 1994, p. 577). The advantages of this alternative approach have been effectively argued: It is a stepping stone to politically proactive and inclusive theory of communication and a useful organizing principle for the discipline of communication (Craig, 1999; Deetz, 1992, 160 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication 1994). It is not my aim here to reproduce or elaborate on the arguments regarding these advantages. Rather, the point I want to make is that Davidson’s philosophy, and the idea of radical interpretation in particular, can strengthen and broaden the philosophical underpinnings of the constitutive conception, as elaborated through the following argument. Anderson and Baym (2004, pp. 601–603) distinguish between three ontological approaches to communication in their survey of philosophical issues in communication. Their foundationalist approach is none other than the transmission conception outlined above. The other two approaches delineated are both variants of the constitutive model. The communicative outlook is the view that ‘‘individuals are primarily linguistic beings who exist within and through dialogue and interaction,’’ (p. 601) and that ‘‘together language/action is foundational for human experience, perception, thought, and behavior’’ (p. 601). The third is the more radical discursive outlook according to which reality itself is constituted semiotically, ‘‘with ontology reduced to ungoverned, unpredictable, and ever-shifting processes of representation’’ (p. 601). This is a plausible subdivision within the constitutive camp. An examination of the philosophical grounding of these two distinct constitutive outlooks reveals that they have different sources of support. The discursive perspective rests on the shoulders of the postmodern movement within philosophy and beyond. From Heidegger to Foucault and Derrida, there exists a vast body of work to which communication researchers of the so-called discursive inclination can appeal. The less radical communicative outlook, on the other hand, needs a different philosophical grounding as continental, postmodern philosophy is not its natural source of support and growth. In this regard, it can be claimed that the analytic tradition of philosophy has a yet unrealized potential. Wittgenstein (1953), of course, is quoted as promoting a ‘‘meaning-as-use’’ approach (Buttny, 1986; Geertz, 1973), and Peirce is sometimes appealed to as well (Deetz, 1994). However, in general, contemporary analytic philosophy is not too often invoked in order to substantiate communicative thinking. (Analytic philosophers such as Searle, Grice, and Austin are certainly reckoned with in communication theory, but they all belong to what was called above the internalist camp in the philosophy of meaning. Therefore, their ideas cannot offer support to the communicative outlook.) It is here that Davidson can be seen to be relevant and important to communication theory. As made clear by the overview in the previous section, Davidson’s work consists of a systematic and detailed account of how meaning arises from intersubjective interaction in a shared environment. As such, this work is a much-needed addition to the conceptual toolkit of constitutive communication theorists of the communicative persuasion, as opposed to the discursive. As an example of the way Davidson’s ideas may come into play in contemporary communication theory, consider its contribution to Ellis’s (1999) account of communication. Ellis holds a constitutive view of communication: ‘‘The meanings and actions of discourse are constructed and achieved in the social interaction’’ (p. 70). Ellis also subscribes to what he calls ‘‘semantic realism’’ (p. 71). This is the view that Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 161 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner the manifest success of linguistic interaction leaves us no choice but to suppose that our words and sentences have stable meaning: ‘‘Just as biology and electricity cannot proceed without the assumptions of genes and electrons, communication cannot proceed without the assumption of meaning’’ (p. 72). Ellis then goes on to draw on Hirsch’s (1967) distinction between meaning and significance. The former is what is usually called literal meaning, while significance is the much more variegated and contextual effect of concrete utterances on specific hearers or readers. Ellis is aware that once meaning is claimed to be constituted through contextual interaction, the door is open for a ‘‘slippery-slope’’ argument that repudiates all stable meaning and rejects the distinction between meaning and significance altogether. He criticizes typical psychologistic arguments against stable, shared meanings, claiming that ‘‘[he has] spent some time establishing the necessity and possibility of meaning because it is elemental to the development of social structure’’ (p. 83). It is here that the Davidsonian outlook is important for Ellis and like-minded communication theorists. Davidson goes beyond merely acknowledging the necessity and possibility of intersubjectively constituted stable meaning. He provides a detailed philosophical account of the way such meaning is constituted and how it is related to a variety of uses of language. An important, informative example is Davidson’s (1984c) analysis of metaphor. Davidson opposes the common view that words have a special, metaphoric meaning. In one example, he notes that it is claimed that a special metaphoric meaning is needed in order to understand the word infant in the saying of ‘‘[a] famous critic [.] that Tolstoy was ‘a great moralizing infant’’’ (p. 248). Such metaphoric expressions are assumed to contribute to and thus change the overall meaning of the words used in them. In criticizing this conventional understanding of metaphor, Davidson’s main complaint is that it misrepresents the way metaphors are actually made and understood. He argues by asking, Is the point of the metaphor made through an ambiguity between the words’ metaphoric and ordinary meanings? Yet there does not seem to be any such ambiguity at play (p. 249). Is the point the novelty of use? No, metaphors are used repeatedly. Is the metaphor simply an implicit introduction of a new meaning to the word? This disagrees with the way metaphors, unlike semantic definitions, affect us. The alternative suggested by Davidson is as follows (p. 247): I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise. Thus, to say that Tolstoy is an infant is to utter a false sentence. However, by stating this falsity, the speaker attempts to cause the listener to think about the Russian author in a new light. The important lesson of the foregoing considerations is that the communicative view of intersubjectively constituted meaning does not necessitate the repudiation of 162 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication the distinction between literal meaning and pragmatic use. Although this view entails a claim that all meaning arises from the use of language in communication, Davidson and others do distinguish between different kinds of use: Some uses constitute literal meaning, while others appeal to it and employ it. Thus, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics that is attractive to many scholars can be retained within the constitutive framework as it provides the stability of language that poststructuralists reject without regressing to the transmission model. The final issue to be considered in this section is the conceptual relation between communication and convention. The discussion of this problem affords a clearer understanding of how Davidson’s ideas are related to those of other thinkers in the constitutive camp and thereby provides a rich view of the importance of his ideas for communication theory. Several philosophers who account for meaning in intersubjective terms appeal to the notion of convention as a key concept in their account. Wittgenstein (1953) in his remarks on the workings of language claims that ‘‘language games,’’ like other games, are constituted through conventional rules. Buttny (1986) elaborates Wittgenstein’s view claiming that meaning is assigned to words through conventional criteria of use, rather than through connections with subjective inner states. Such a view ‘‘provides a useful way to conceive of meaning and to recognize the constitutive dimension of our everyday communicative practices’’ (p. 265). Contemporary philosophers who subscribe to this approach include Michael Dummett and David Lewis. Dummett (1978) contends that the very basic acts of making an assertion and issuing an order, for example, need to rely on a convention in order to be performed. Without a convention, such acts would not be taken by their audiences to have the required properties. Lewis (1975) says that ‘‘[i]t is a platitude—something only a philosopher would dream of denying—that there are conventions of languages’’ (p. 166). As mentioned previously, Davidson challenges this view. While he agrees that ‘‘[c]onvention figures conspicuously in many of our activities, for example in playing tarot, in speaking, and in eating,’’ he makes the important distinction that ‘‘[i]n playing tarot, convention is essential, in eating, it is not’’ (Davidson, 1984d, p. 265). That is, conventions constitute the game of tarot, but they do not so constitute the function of eating. If so, ‘‘What is the case with speech?’’ (p. 265). Davidson’s answer is that it is more like eating than playing tarot. Davidson holds that linguistic acts such as making an assertion cannot rest on convention. For example, there is no convention that distinguishes between a real assertion and an as-if assertion made, for example, in a play, for if there had been one, the actors would have surely used it in order to render their acting more real. Admittedly, there are social conventions that support the as-if status of statements made in a play, but they are not constitutive of this status. (The ambiguity that may arise when an actor shouts, ‘‘Fire!’’ in the middle of a play can attest to that.) Similarly, there are no rule-like conventions that tie the syntactic moods of sentences, such as the declarative mood, to linguistic acts, such as assertions. Again, here too there are conventional connections between the two levels, but they are always Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 163 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner open to contextual breakdowns. Such breakdowns show that, for example, assertion is not constituted conventionally from the syntactic properties of sentences. Rather, it is a matter of contextual interpretation that takes advantage of convention, but does not essentially rely on it. The argument with respect to the content of specific words and sentences is similar. Of course, it is convenient that the members of a given linguistic community all follow the same linguistic conventions. Doing so enables them to have a pretty good idea how other persons’ words should be understood. Also, it is clear that lexical pairings between words and objects, for example, are arbitrary. But all this is not to say that convention is a prerequisite for interpretation. For one thing, understanding can be attained without persons adhering to the same convention. It is sufficient that each party knows how to interpret the different idiolect of the other. Furthermore, it is not an essential condition for communication that the contemporary linguistic behavior of two people engaged in conversation be the same as their behavior of yesterday, in virtue of following some kind of convention. Regularity, albeit a flexible one, is not the issue here. Rather, what is essential is that persons will be mutually understandable on each concrete occasion. This is due to the other person conforming to an interpreter’s prior expectations but also, and more importantly, because the other person can reach implicit local understanding with the interlocutor on the way words should be understood. Communication theorists should be interested in this debate, in general, and in Davidson’s position, in particular, for two reasons. One reason has to do with the unity of the field of communication. Scholars in this field study a variety of phenomena, some of which are clearly not convention based, such as various aspects of nonverbal communication. The view that language is essentially convention based opens up a chasm between these phenomena and language, and undermines the coherence of a discipline that aims to examine both linguistic and nonlinguistic modes of communication. This rationale can be found, in fact, in attacks against the coherence of the field of semiotics (Harman, 1979) and applies, mutatis mutandis, to the domain of communication as well. Davidson’s alternative, on the other hand, offers the field of communication the desired prospect of unity and coherence among seemingly distant branches. The other reason why the debate over the conventionality of language is important to communication theorists concerns the status of the communication perspective versus the sociological one. As noted previously, communication theorists such as Deetz (1994) argue that a constitutive conception of communication allows the discipline of communication to offer self-sufficient, conceptually independent answers to contemporary challenges, be they research, social, or political challenges. This is as opposed to the traditional, transmission conception, which assigns communication an auxiliary role within the psychological perspective. Now a similar argument can be made regarding a conception of linguistic communication according to which language is explained in terms of social convention. Such a conception, too, makes communication an auxiliary, this time to the sociological perspective. Davidson’s outlook, on the other hand, reverses such claims. The basics of linguistic 164 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication communication can and should be explained without appeal to social concepts. If so, then the social and, in particular, social convention can be accounted for through the communication prism. Davidson makes this very same point: ‘‘I suggest, then, that philosophers who make convention a necessary element in language have the matter backwards. The truth is rather that language is a condition for having conventions’’ (Davidson, 1984d, p. 280). Thus, Davidson’s framework can be said to give the communicative perspective priority over both the psychological and the sociological perspectives. This aspect of his thinking provides ultimate support to the characterization of Davidson as a philosopher of communication. Radical interpretation and intercultural communication By its very nature, Davidson’s radical interpretation is a hypothetical situation of intercultural communication. Two people who do not share a common language or culture are faced with the problem of understanding each other. Davidson does not appeal to this situation because he is interested in intercultural communication, though. Rather, his project involves proposing a philosophical theory regarding the nature of linguistic meaning. The radical interpretation parable helps him illustrate this theory and acquire better insight into its consequences. According to the radical interpretation argument, it is clear and explicit that in seeking to understand the other, the interpreter has nothing to go on except her linguistic behavior. Davidson’s claim is that the same holds true for every kind of linguistic interaction. However, communication researchers can reverse Davidson’s reasoning as follows: The connection between intralinguistic and interlinguistic communication need not be taken solely as an illustration of Davidson’s ideas, but rather as an important consequence of these highly influential ideas. That is, a major result of Davidson’s analysis of language is that there is no philosophically significant difference between linguistic communication across borders and within borders, between inter- and intracultural dialogues. Essentially, Davidson tells us, it is all the same. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, on a deep level all persons are engaged in radical interpretation when speaking with a neighbor as with a complete alien. Of course, the differences between inter- and intracultural communication that seem to Davidson to be philosophically insignificant may be still immense from other perspectives. No one can deny that establishing a dialogue with someone who speaks your own language differs greatly from doing so with someone who does not. However, in analyzing various aspects of these admittedly distinct types of situations, it could be beneficial to acknowledge that the differences between them are not underlain by a deep chasm but rather by an essential proximity. Applying this general observation to several issues that arise in the study and teaching of intercultural communication produces the following insights: The constitutive model in intercultural communication. As noted, Davidson’s radical interpretation validates the constitutive model of communication. Therefore, a direct consequence of applying Davidson’s conceptualization to intercultural Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 165 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner communication is that such communication should be conceptualized in constitutive terms, rather than predominantly through the transmission prism. A cursory glance through several contemporary intercultural communication textbooks demonstrates the continuing dominance of the transmission model (Jandt, 2001, pp. 28–32; Rogers & Steinfatt, 1999, pp. 114–16; Samovar & Porter, 1994, pp. 9–10). Indeed, there are good reasons for the appeal of the transmission model in analysis of intercultural communication. Cultural systems constitute meaning. Therefore, even if it is assumed that meaning is constituted intersubjectively at the intracultural level, it seems reasonable to claim that meaning is internal to any given culture. That is, preexisting meaning exists on both cultural sides and what remains to be explained is how meaning is transmitted from one side to the other. Thus, the transmission model seems in this case apt and correct. However, Davidson’ view of linguistic communication requires questioning this seemingly plausible picture for two reasons. First, the intracultural system of meaning is much less cohesive and uniform than the account sketched above suggests. Second, and more importantly, questions about meaning and understanding should always be asked in the context of concrete communicative interaction as this is where meaning is constituted. When applied to intercultural communication, this principle entails the following important consequence. Talk of communication between cultures is misleading. What needs to be understood and accounted for, in the end, are concrete acts of interpretation, in this case, among people coming from different cultural backgrounds. In a sense, Davidson tells us, the very term intercultural communication is misleading, especially when contrasted with the term interpersonal communication. Such juxtaposition suggests that the latter refers to communication between people, while the former refers to communication between whole cultural systems. But the point is that cultural systems themselves do not communicate. Rather, in every case, communication involves concrete people in concrete contexts negotiating meaning and coming to understand each other. Taken together, these two observations provide an alternative picture of intercultural communication that is more accommodating of the constitutive model. In all communication contexts, intra- or intercultural, people seek to make sense of one another’s words. To do so requires them to assume a lot about one another as the more they know about each other, the easier the task. Various tricks and techniques can be applied during interaction to accomplish this feat. Although very significant, cultural differences should not be perceived as altering this communicative setup altogether but rather as giving rise to interpretational problems not dissimilar to those that occur in everyday discourse. Interpretation versus translation and intercultural communication. Davidson’s philosophy, then, recommends a contextual rather than a systemic approach to intercultural communication. However, if it is attempted to apply this recommendation to the actual study and practice of intercultural communication, the following difficulty arises. The very bare facts of the way language is involved in intercultural communication seem to go against this approach. 166 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication Members of different cultures often speak different languages. Therefore, attaining understanding across cultural borders involves translation from one language to another. Our conception of translation, however, is typically systemic and textual rather than contextual. In this regard, it is commonly tied to the written, acontextual word, rather than to the spoken, contextual one. For example, consider the case of the dictionary, undoubtedly a key factor in the practice of translation and therefore also formative of our thinking about translation. The dictionary is an artifact of script and print culture (Ong, 1982). It obviously embodies a systemic view of crosscultural linguistic understanding and causes us to expect a systemic mapping from one language to another. In the case of the translation of texts, rather than words, the situation is more involved. It is much clearer in this case that correct translation depends on context and requires accommodation of cultural differences. However, here, too, the context of actual, concrete communicative interaction is missing. Translation in television and film admittedly involves also spoken words and not only written ones. However, such translation, too, is made outside the context of the give and take of actual communicative interaction. The other side of the same coin is that when people engage in concrete, face-to-face, cross-cultural dialogue, they expect differences in cultural background and possibly differences in body language and nonverbal cues. However, they do not expect a need to overcome a lack of common language as having a common language is a prerequisite for the interaction. It is not an issue that needs to be resolved during the interaction. These basic facts of translation and language support the transmission-oriented view of the linguistic aspects of intercultural communication. Our typical view of translation, as partly shaped by the media we use, almost divorces it from interpretation, in general, and from Davidson’s radical interpretation, in particular. As opposed to radical interpretation, translation is systemic and matches language to language, outside the context of interaction. Translation does not involve interpretation because it is outside interaction. Similarly, interpretation does not involve translation because it requires a common language. The translation-oriented view of linguistic intercultural communication develops easily due to the conception of intercultural communication influenced by the concept of translation. As an illustration of this point, consider the title of Hall’s (1959) classic book on intercultural communication, The Silent Language. Why silent language? Because when people and, in particular, representatives of the American government travel abroad, ordinary, verbal language is already taken care of through training and language learning. However, ‘‘[i]n addition to what we say with our verbal language we are constantly communicating our real feelings in our silent language—the language of behavior. Sometimes this is correctly interpreted by other nationalities, but more often it is not’’ (p. 15). Thus, as captured in the book’s title, the nonverbal aspects of intercultural communication get primary attention because they are viewed as those that need to be negotiated through interaction, to be interpreted. The verbal aspects of such communication are a matter of translation and the term interpretation is not applied to them. Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 167 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner One way to capture the implications of Davidson’s radical interpretation to intercultural communication is as follows. Think in contextual, interpretational terms not only about the nonverbal aspects of cross-cultural dialogue, as Hall suggests, but also about the linguistic aspects. This provides a better understanding of linguistic intercultural communication and, as a byproduct, a more unified picture of intercultural communication in which the concept of interpretation is central. The following two concrete examples illustrate how the Davidsonian perspective can be applied in terms of intercultural communication research agendas. First, simultaneous translation has rich research potential that has not been sufficiently tapped, to the best of my knowledge. As opposed to the types of translation considered above, simultaneous translation is embedded in interaction. Simultaneous translators are neither committed to nor interested in systemic mappings between languages, or even between written texts. Their job is to create localized, contextual understanding. Therefore, interpretive problems and solutions that remain implicit when people from different linguistic backgrounds interact can possibly surface as explicit issues for simultaneous translators. Therefore, there is much to be understood from both theory and practice of such a form of translation. The globalization of English and, in particular, the emergence of new, distinct Englishes is a second example. Crystal (1997) discusses various aspects of this fascinating development: its origin, trajectory, and cultural implications, but not the one aspect of most relevance in this discussion. According to Crystal, different Englishes are similar to dialects though they are geographically and culturally much more distant (p. 133). Therefore, when speakers of different Englishes interact, there is contextual, communicative interaction, but only a partially a common language. This is nearly an exception to the aforementioned generalization that a common language is a presupposed condition of interaction. Hence, processes of interpretive meaning negotiation may be relatively overt and explicit in such contexts and therefore amenable to observation and research. Admittedly, Crystal (1997, p. 137) envisions the formation of what he calls World Standard Spoken English that will be used by people speaking different Englishes, as well as other languages, in order to communicate with each other and thus obviate the need for contextual interpretation among speakers of distinct Englishes. However, I argue that nevertheless, at present, and probably in the foreseeable future, observing the interaction between, for example, speakers of Indian, Nigerian, American, and British Englishes can be beneficial for cross-cultural communication researchers. Interpersonal and intercultural understanding. As already noted above, the application of radical interpretation in the conceptualization of communication processes creates affinity between intracultural, interpersonal linguistic interaction and crosscultural interaction. This affinity raises the possibility of applying ideas and methods from one of the spheres to another. As an example, consider a recent analysis relating major themes in traditional rhetorical thinking to the Davidsonian framework (Yarbrough, 2004) and how it applies to the intercultural context. 168 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication Yarbrough’s point of departure is Davidson’s (1986) article, ‘‘A nice derangement of epitaphs.’’ Here, Davidson addresses an important question in relation to his disengagement of interpretation from convention: If indeed interpretation consists in local, aconventional negotiation of meaning, then how is it that conventionally agreed upon language plays such an important role in everyday linguistic interaction? Davidson’s answer is as follows: Every interpretation situation of a linguistic nature is approached by two or more participants with what he calls prior theories concerning the others’ utterances. These prior theories are based on the linguistic conventions to which the other is expected to adhere as well as on other pieces of knowledge that each interpreter may have about the interlocutor. However, the key point in Davidson’s argument is that these prior theories might be misguided. They might not be in accord with the use of words by the other person. For this reason, prior theories are not used themselves in interpretation but rather serve as the starting point for the creation of ‘‘passing theories’’ of interpretation. Passing theories are contextual. They are created during and used in a concrete interaction as well as negotiated between and shared by speaker and interpreter. How is the move from prior theory to passing theory made in each specific context? Davidson stresses that such a move is not a matter of convention, nor can rigorous rules be stated according to which it is performed. Rather, it is ‘‘a mysterious process by which a speaker or hearer uses what he knows in advance plus present data to produce a passing theory’’ (1986, p. 446). As Yarbrough notes, it seems that ‘‘in Davidson’s view, we have now come pretty much to the end of what we can say about discourse competence’’ (2004, p. 75). Here, Yarbrough makes his fruitful contribution. He says that rhetorical processes, as analyzed and conceptualized since Aristotle, are the very processes that lead from prior theories to passing theories. Therefore, classical and neoclassical rhetorical theory can help resolve and understand what Davidson suffices to call a mystery. Stated succinctly, the argument unfolds as follows: (a) rhetorical persuasion gives rise to contextual, discursive understanding that is equivalent to an agreement on a passing theory and (b) in turn, persuasion is accomplished, according to Aristotle, through an inventive use of topics in the construction of enthymemes. So the rhetorical study of the heuristics of persuasion addresses the very gap that Davidson leaves unfilled. Although couched in intralinguistic terms, Yarbrough’s analysis can be applied to the domain of intercultural communication. Indeed, recent studies apply rhetorical conceptualization to account for intercultural communication processes. Lee (1994), for example, looks at the way humor is interpreted in intra- versus intercultural contexts and uses rhetorical concepts in order to state the different conversational rules that should be applied in the two cases. For example, Lee claims that background information that makes a certain statement funny should not be made explicit in an intracultural interaction. To do so reveals the joke. But in an intercultural setup, the implicit enthymeme, the rationale behind the joke, needs to be made explicit or even to be turned into an outright syllogism in order to retain interpretability (p. 377). Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association 169 Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication E. Dresner This example shows that scholars of intercultural communication did not have to wait for Davidson in order to bring rhetoric to bear upon their subject of study. However, the Davidsonian framework places such an application in a wider, more robust theoretical context. Language is not a seamless conduit in some cases and a barrier in others. In all cases, using it successfully requires an arsenal of techniques that may be of use both at home and abroad. Conclusions The foregoing provided a brief insight into the philosophy of Donald Davidson, one of the major figures in 20th-century analytic philosophy. Of course, due to space limitations, not all the ideas and arguments in Davidson’s work that are of importance to communication theory were presented here. Among those not discussed are the principle of charity (Davidson, 1984a) and the notion of triangulation (Davidson, 2001), two concepts through which Davidson substantiates and develops radical interpretation. An assessment of the implications of these concepts to communication studies will be taken up elsewhere. However, I believe the overview presented in this paper is sufficient to support the characterization of Davidson as a philosopher of communication. As was shown more than once above, Davidson’s work is of foundational nature. He grapples with the deepest of questions concerning meaning and language and, in doing so, his work has direct relevance to a variety of concrete and tangible issues and problems pertaining to the practice and understanding of communication. Moreover, Davidson’s philosophy was shown to offer unifying or bridging principles that can be insightfully applied to key issues and problems in the domain of communication. One example is the connection between interpersonal and intercultural communication. Here it was claimed that, according to Davidson’s philosophy, these are deeply related and therefore can be used to shed light on each other. Another example is the connection between linguistic and nonverbal communication. Davidson’s views as regards language and convention bring these kinds of communication closer to one another. Thus, Davidson’s perspective provides much needed support for the unity and coherence of communication as a concept and as a field of research, a goal that is acknowledged by many communication theorists as important and pressing (Beniger, 1993; Craig, 1999; Dance, 1970; Murphy, 1991; Peters, 1986). Finally, Davidson’s thinking, as reviewed here, demonstrates the interplay between epistemic and normative values that characterizes substantial theorizing in the social sciences (Craig, 1993). That is, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that Davidson’s outlook yields practical implications, for example, in regard to the way intercultural communication should be approached. The philosophical analysis that Davidson offers us is therefore not only descriptive of language, communication, and thought, but also prescriptive in regard to the practice of communication. I submit that the practical extensions of Davidson’s ideas serve, too, as further justification for interest in his philosophy of communication. 170 Communication Theory 16 (2006) 155–172 ª 2006 International Communication Association E. Dresner Davidson’s Philosophy of Communication Acknowledgments I am grateful to Donald Ellis and to the referees of Communication Theory for their comments. References Anderson, J., & Baym, G. (2004). Philosophies and philosophic issues in communication 1995–2004. Journal of Communication, 54, 589–615. Beniger, J. (1993). Communication—Embrace the subject, not the field. Journal of Communication, 43(3), 18–25. Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Burge, T. (1999). Comprehension and interpretation. In L. Hahn (Ed.), The philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 229–250). Chicago: Open Court. Buttny, R. (1986). 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