HEIDEGGER ON GOD

MODULE: HRS4802 NAME: GEORGINA GIORKO STUDENT NUMBER: 44971893 ASSIGNMENT NUMBER: 01 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 2. HOW IS METAPHYSICS ONTOTHEOLOGICAL IN NATURE 3. WHAT IS ONTO-THEOLOGY AND HOW IS IT DETRIMENTAL TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD 4. CALCULATIVE AND REPRESENTATIONAL THINKING 5. SCIENCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD 6. TECHNOLOGY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD 7. MODERN ONTO-THEOLOGY 8. PRE-MODERN ONTO-THEOLOGY 9. CONCLUSION 10. PLAGERISM DECLARATION 11. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 Introduction In the first chapter of his book, Westphal aims to prove the existence of God by denouncing the way in which philosophers have spoken about The All- Highest. He pays reference to Heidegger’s criticism of the onto-theological nature of philosophy, which according to Heidegger, is calculative and representational. Calculative because human beings, as subjects, use the objects that we represent through our lens of understanding, to make the world and the Unknown (God) comprehensible and operational (calculative), for our own purposes. Accordingly, if Westphal can show that the All-Highest has been “spoken about” in an incorrect- onto-theological, manner; with a “rationalist demand for total intelligibility” (TST; 5) then the mystery of the Divine is still open. Postmodernism is an ambiguous philosophical movement that emphasises the preservation of alterity. Westphal explains this in the sense of keeping the subject (humanity as individuals or in particular groups) from reducing the object (God, nature, existence) from its own representations and purposes. The human inclination to diminish ‘things’, phenomena and nomena in an epistemic manner. This is the crux of Westphal’s argument. What is onto- theology and how is it detrimental to the understanding of god? To understand why Heidegger, as well as Westphal, object to onto-theological thought, one must first be able to define the term and to understand it in the context of metaphysical discourse. Metaphysics, ontology and theology are tools that philosophers use to understand the existence of God or to understand the human condition. Heidegger was the man who coined the term onto-theology and so I think it fair, as does Westphal, to use his definition of the word. Heidegger uses the word ontotheology as a name for a “dual approach to metaphysics beginning with Aristotle” (TST; 3). Metaphysics represents things “in a twofold manner: in the first place, the totality of beings as such with an eye to their most universal traits …but at the same time also the totality of beings as such in a sense of the highest and therefore divine being”. Westphal indicates that the former is onto-theology whilst the latter is theology. A summary of Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology shows that he feels that this tool is far from helpful: “it represents the forgetfulness, or oblivion, or withdrawal of being in favour of a preoccupation with beings” (TST; 5). How is Metaphysics onto-theological in nature? By definition, metaphysics means the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time, and space (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/metaphysics). Metaphysics thinks of the being of beings in the unity of all there is “of what is most general” and in unity of the “Allhighest” (TST; 4). Ontology and theology however endeavour to show an understanding of beings as they are and “account for them within the whole”. According to my understanding this means, that metaphysics sees beings inextricably linked to the All-Highest. Whilst ontology and theology focuses on beings and how they fit in to the whole of existence. Therefore, metaphysics, according to Heidegger, has an onto-theological nature. Westphal defines metaphysics “as the question about beings as such and as a whole. The wholeness of this whole is the unity of all beings that unifies as the generative ground” (TST; 3). Within this definition is the argument that metaphysics is onto-theological. It is precisely because of 2 this correlation that it is important to Heidegger’s argument. If metaphysics too, does not question the unknowable but rather places beings before being, then it too is a poor tool to use in the quest for the understanding of God. Although this may be seen as purely semantics, very “wordy” for those of us who are not great philosophers, it does make sense that if you are going to study “first principals” then how can that notion possibly see beings as inextricably linked to God? Surely, we are making assumptions on something that is beyond our range of perception? Calculative and representational thinking. Heidegger’s main objection to onto-theology is that it is representational and calculative. My understanding of this is as follows: Humans as subjects, view “things” or objects within the scope of our ability to understand. Like a torch shines in the dark, illuminating certain objects. We then represent these objects in a certain manner. Once we have represented them we are then inclined to use them for our own purpose in a “calculative fashion”. The problem with this is that there may be ‘objects’ that are beyond or outside of our scope of intellectual capacity, we ignore this. 1As the light from the torch illuminates some objects it also keeps other objects hidden from view. Instead of realising that the torch is not illuminating the ‘entire picture’ we insist on making sense of being and beings within our limited range of awareness , using ontotheological discourse to pigeon- hole a possibility that is beyond mere words. Westphal accepts Heidegger’s assessment of onto-theological thought being representational and calculative. He goes further to use the concept to prove how philosophers have ignored the possibility of a Divine Mystery. Science and the understanding of God Westphal goes onto discus how Heidegger in 1929, is concerned with distinguishing a way of thinking that its “inadequate to the highest task of thought from a truly authentic mode of thinking” (TST; 6). In the context of 1929, Westphal identifies this contrast between science and metaphysics. Westphal indicates that Heidegger describes the scientific “quest for objectivity” as calculative and representational. Science relies on empirical evidence, logic and reason to understand “being”, whilst Heidegger says this is, in actuality, a concern with beings, not being. Science is unconcerned with the “Nothingness”, the nothingness that is the background to our experience as beings, the nothingness that according to Heidegger and Westphal is beyond words or reason. This is the nothingness that Metaphysics seeks to explain. Heidegger and Westphal in this way are critical of science’s ability to understand or to represent God. Metaphysics is transcendent; it is “the human movement beyond beings to the nothing that essentially belongs to them”. The truth of science “is merely the truth about beings. Metaphysics is the history of this truth” (Westphal cited in WM/1943 258). In keeping with postmodernism’s ambiguous nature, it seems to me that Westphal and Heidegger object to sciences claims of knowledge of being through these modes (empirical evidence, logic and reason). Surely, they cannot explain what they cannot even begin to comprehend. Darwin developed the theory of evolution, which explains the origins of all beings. Here we can note that although this is surely an excellent concept, it falls short of disproving the existence of God. Yes animal and human have evolved through time, and certainly in my opinion (as Darwin’s) did not originate in the Garden of Eden. Nevertheless, this still does not prove there is no Higher Being. Although I object to the thought of a 1 When I say ‘we’ I mean the philosophers that Heidegger makes reference to. 3 personal God (these are wild claims based on faith), Darwin’s theory cannot disprove this belief that many people hold. Augustus Comte, the father of positivism considered the world through humanities senses. What we can see, hear, feel and smell is real. That which can be tested and re-tested is the truth. However, who is to say that there is not a “being” that cannot be perceived through empirical evidence? Just as years ago, we were unaware of the existence of bacteria, we could not observe them, touch them, hear or smell them, and yet they still existed. They were just outside of our ability to comprehend. Using this argument, I go on to theorise that there is a possibility that there is some sort of “Being” that is outside of our ability to comprehend with our senses. Maybe one day, as with the discovery of bacteria, we will be able to understand this mystery. Even if that day never comes, it still does not prove that the Unknowable is not present. Heidegger would probably argue with my idea, as he sees the mystery of the divine as most definitely beyond human ability to explore cognitively. Technology and the understanding of God Heidegger: “calculative thinking is thought in the service of technology”. Westphal’s critique of Heidegger’s thoughts on modern technology put forth the idea that technology is not merely the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the machine age, but also an “attitude”. This attitude is seen as a negative one where the entire world, with its inhabitants, flora and fauna, is at our (humanities) disposal. Westphal goes on to show that although Heidegger has a blatantly negative attitude towards technology, it should not be attacked as “work of the devil”. It has its place in society. What Heidegger seems most concerned with is that technology threatens to become the only thinking, to become the sole criterion by which we operate” (Westphal cited in DT 46, 53-56, EPTT 379; OM 100)”. Once again, Westphal reinforces Heidegger’s argument for the existence of God by debunking the worth of technology in its ability to make sense of the unfathomable, the Supreme Being or All- Highest. Heidegger calls for a counter revolutionary strain of thought, whereby technology does not become the new metaphysics. This “resistance movement” is a thinking that lets itself be claimed by being” (Westphal cited in LH 194; cf.199,204, 209,236). Human dignity consists in ‘being called by being” (Westphal cited in LH 221)The thought that “listens to being” and lets itself be presided over by being (Westphal cited in LH 196) knows that we are for the sake of being, that it and not we is essential (Westphal cited in WNGD;LH 213). Westphal insists, contrary to Heidegger’s note on the subject, that ‘being’ (in the previous quote) can be replaced with the word God. In 2018 with technology at its peak, millions of people are glued to their devices. “Communications regulator Ofcom said UK adults spend an average of eight hours and 41 minutes a day on media devices, compared with the average night's sleep of eight hours and 21 minutes” (http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28677674). Is this not the attitude that Heidegger speaks of? Technology being the primary method by which we understand being. Has technology replaced the ultimacy of the Divine? In the context of Heidegger’s argument, I would postulate that instead of leaving “space” for “being” for the “enigmatic”, humanity is placing technology in the primary position. I propose that this is the representational and calculative thinking that Heidegger objects to. Modern onto-theology Westphal goes on to extend his argument by touching on the thoughts of some great philosophers. More aptly, he follows Heidegger’s critique of these great philosophers. 4 Originally, metaphysics came from Ancient Greece, where the supersensible world was primary and original and the sensible world was a derivative and secondary. For Nietzsche and Marx it is the other way around. The sensible world came first and the supersensible world was just a by-product of this. Here the subject- humanity- becomes the highest subjectto which all else derives, its meaning. For Nietzsche, science has explained the origins of man and there is no more need for the belief in God. God is dead. Science and the study of the natural world have become the Subjects around which all else is understood. Marx also puts a subject in place of the Un-known, God. For him the “very material Subject is human production and reproduction” (TST; 12). This human dominance over the practical world must include the theoretical world as well. It is exactly this “theoretical mastery of the world in science and metaphysics that Heidegger calls representational thinking” (TST; 14). Heidegger sees Descartes and Kant as guilty of placing humanity as the main subject around which all else is realized in relation to. Descartes theorised “I think therefore I am”. Westphal agrees with Heidegger that Descartes is placing humanity as the essence or hypokeimenon. Heidegger shows hostility to this subject/object ontology. He uses words such as “insurrection” and “assault” of a “tyrant”. Here “humanity places everything in relation to itself” (Westphal cited in OM 87). Westphal is also critical of this “humanistic hubris”, in fact, he almost has a tone of warning that placing humanity as the subject allows, “That particular being [who gives the measure] draw up the guidelines for all beings” (Westphal cited in AWP 128, 134). In essence, science can explain to a certain degree how the world works, however it cannot explain that which is not revealed. Therefore, it seems that Heidegger is more than reticent to trust the God of philosophers, especially the modern ones here mentioned. But what of the premodern philosophers? Premodern onto-theology places the “Most Valuable Player and Chief Executive Officer” in the realm of the supersensible. Not in the realm of Man. Surely, with their elevating of the supersensible over the sensible, is in accordance with Westphal and Heidegger’s argument. However, Westphal argues that maybe the difference between the subject in premodern and modern onto-theology is not as different as it seems. If premodern onto-theology seeks to make knowledge of the Divine intelligible to humankind, then this too is a type of reduction of the mystery of the All-Highest to which Westphal and Heidegger are opposed. Premodern onto-theology The trend of placing humanity as the highest subject was not unique to the philosophers we have discussed so far. In fact, Westphal goes on to explain how Heidegger sees this as starting with Plato and Aristotle. Although they were not as blatant as Descartes/Kant and Nietzsche/Marx in their humanistic hubris, their use of logic has a calculative effect. Calculative because we “encounter beings as actualities in a calculative business- like way, but also scientifically and by way of philosophy, with explanations and proofs…As if it were already decided that the truth of being lets itself at all be established in causes and explanatory grounds …( Westphal cited in LH 198-99). Heidegger sees a strong link between science and metaphysics. The truth of science “is merely the truth about beings. Metaphysics is the history of this truth” (Westphal cited in WM/1943 258) Metaphysics are the “most basic paradigms” in which the sciences operate. Here the philosopher understands the link between science and metaphysics as calculative, ‘but the seeds for this development were 5 sown in Ancient Greece” (TST pg. 7) All four philosophers transcendentalize the Subject so “as to neutralize the empirical evidence against its divinity”. Conclusion “Has not God let the wisdom of this world become foolishness?” (I cor. 1:20). Heidegger is determined in his assessment that philosophy has become foolishness. He goes so far as to say that the greatest threat to God is not atheism, (or Nietzsche’s statement that God is Dead) but rather those with faith who insist on minimising the Divine to purely (reason or faith led) mortal understanding. In fact, he says, “god-less thinking is more open to Him than ontotheo-logic would like to admit” (Westphal cited in ID 60, 72). Westphal explains that Heidegger is in no way attacking Christianity or is god-less himself in any way2. What he is attacking is the way in which onto-theology has made God into an “epistemological value” (TST 22). This places God below that of reason and the ‘subject’. Reason or Man becomethe All-Highest rather than the mystery of God. Heidegger is committed to the notion of thinking of god as a holy mystery. Heidegger articulates that we understand and represent our world within our specific view of understanding, we cannot expect, or attempt to understand that which is beyond our frame of comprehension. Onto-theology is bad philosophy as it consistently (in differing ways) diminishes that which is holy and beyond our grasp. Onto-theology is discourse on that which is inexplicable through language. Heidegger instead calls for meditative thinking, which he equates with “releasement” and “openness to the mystery”. “Whereas subjects represent objects within a horizon of understanding, there is a thinking that asks about what lets the horizon be and recognises that it will escape the realm of representation” (Westphal cited in DT 55, 63-68). Westphal indicates that when humanity strives for ‘answers’ as to what the divine is or how it ‘fits in’ with our being, whether it be through reason or subjectivity, we take the transcendental and make it mundane. It is in this way that Heidegger goes about proving the existence of God. By latching onto Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology, Westphal goes a short way in proving the existence of the Divine by disproving or discrediting the ontotheological manner in which the concept is approached. My feeling is that Heidegger does not actually go about proving the existence of God. He does however criticised the discourse of respected philosophers, showing that language is inadequate for the task of revealing, that which is unrevealed. In addition, by placing science, technology and man as the main subject before what is undisclosed is representational and calculative. Heidegger does not seem to insist that there is a God, he instead says that the mystery of the Divine should be left as is: a mystery; because as humans we are not able, by any means, able to truly represent God. It is for this reason I view Heidegger as agnostic. Belief is a dangerous word. Beliefs are definite and immovable. I see this as a cause for much suffering in the world. If however, we forget the words “I believe” we open ourselves to possibilities. Possibilities are not stringent ideals that are likely to oppress or create pain. 2 I disagree with Westphal in saying that Heidegger is not “god-less in any way”, and will touch on this in my conclusion. 6 Possibility is feasibly the space that Heidegger wanted left open, and it is this idea that I respect. Plagiarism declaration 08 MARCH 2018 “I GEORGINA GIORKO declare that this assignment is my own work and that all sources quoted have been acknowledged by appropriate references”. Bibliography TST: Westphal, Merold. Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: on God and the Soul. Indiana Univ. Press, 2004. MWP: “My way to Phenomenology.” In Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann.2nd expanded Ed. New York: New American Library, 1975 WM/1943: Untitled postscript to what is Metaphysics/1929 in Kaufmann DT: Discourse on Thinking. Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freud. New York: Harper & Row, 1966 EPTT: “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” In Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. OM: “Over coming Metaphysics” in The End of Philosophy. Trans. Joann Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1973 LH: “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. WNGD: “The Word of Nietzsche:God is Dead” in The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977 AWP: “The Age of the World Picture” in The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977 7 ID: 1969 Identity and Difference. Trans. Joann Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 8