Rice in the Ruzizi Valley, DRC

Rice production in the Ruzizi Valley FOR INTERNAL CIRCULATION ONLY Roger Blench Bukavu, Monday, 20 May 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1 3. Agronomy of rice production ..................................................................................................................... 2 4. Economics of rice production..................................................................................................................... 2 5. Land ownership........................................................................................................................................... 4 6. Environmental issues .................................................................................................................................. 5 7. Some conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 5 References ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 EXCHANGE RATES May 2013, 1 US$ = 900 Francs Congolais Both currencies are used in DRC, and some sorts of product, such as land rents, are typically priced in US$, so these are quoted in the text 1. Introduction The Ruzizi Valley, South of Bukavu in the extreme East of the DRC is dominated by rice production. Rice is presumably not very old as it is an Asiatic crop, and was probably introduced in the 1920s. The rice is irrigated and the valley is potentially extremely productive, but in reality, yields are low. Only the high prices for rice beyond the border of the DRC probably keep production viable. The Ruzizi Valley is in DRC, but its direct neighbours are Rwanda and Burundi, small but densely populated nations with largely homogeneous populations. Neither has mineral resources, and both are forced to depend on well-organised agriculture to survive. As a result, viable irrigated rice production in this part of the DRC is intertwined with the administrative and economic system of the neighbouring countries. Remarkably, there is a publication from the 1980s describing rice marketing in the Ruzizi Valley (Thaholokya et al. 1983). Although of historical interest it is scarcely relevant to the situation thirty years later. This short paper1 is an attempt to describe the realities of rice production in a country where agricultural extension and indeed any notion of assistance to farmers is lacking. The Ruzizi Valley is part of a broader initiative, the DRC Rice Project, combining a commercial company, Bralima [part of the Heineken group], the Schokland Fund and the NGO EUCORD. The objective is provide a reliable supply of rice grains to the brewery for beer production, but also to create jobs and incomes and thus enhance social stability. In the Ruzizi Valley, this has been based around the rehabilitation of an old Chinese hydro system, dating from the period prior to Independence. Whether the results have been quite as beneficial as suggested on the website is open to doubt, but there is no doubt that some things have changed for the better and Bralima claims to be sourcing 87% local rice in beer production, from 16% in 2008. It should be noted that this is not the only type of rice produced in the Kivu Province. North of Goma, dry ‘mountain’ rice is produced as a a field crop. This is grown on the rich volcanic soils, and is relatively productive for dry rice. Although it is eaten in the household, demand on the market is very low and bags often lie at the depot unsold. This reflects the global situation, where dry rice is in low demand because of its poor digestibility. In Southeast Asia, where these cultivars originate, dry rice is hardly traded on the global market. A feature of the whole region is high and inflated prices for almost all goods and services. Chronic insecurity has meant that the political economy of the region has been dominated by the conflict between a UN Peacekeeping force and fairly vicious and constantly changing ‘rebel militias’. There is little doubt that these militias are driven mainly by a desire to access the rich mineral resources of the region, including coltan and cassiterite, rather than ideology. The most profitable local enterprise is clearly not farming, but artisanal mining, and younger men typically leave the household to engage in this, despite being dangerous and damaging to the health. Buyers await just across the international border, and the apparent boom, visible in towns like Bukavu and Goma, is clearly partly fuelled by the income from mining. However, the massive UN presence has also created an economic micro-climate, whereby both indiscriminate spending by foreign troops and administrators as well as the relative ease with which grants are available to NGOs, has pushed up prices and stimulated migration to the towns. Bukavu, for example, has grown from just 50,000 inhabitants after Independence to nearly 800,000 today. Infrastructure in the town is far from being able to cope with such a massive influx, leading to pollution and expensive private solutions to utilities, including numerous generators. At the same time, the opportunity to extract ‘taxes’ from nascent commercial enterprise is correspondingly attractive, and there is an ongoing war of attrition between the operation of the free market (which involves smuggling agricultural inputs and produce across the border to Rwanda) and government officials either enforcing the law or enriching themselves, according to individual perspectives. A striking reflection of this is that maize produced in the region is transported across the border to Rwanda and milled before being re-imported to DRC for sale on the market. Entrepreneurs have so little faith in being allowed to set up a business without constant harassment that this highly inefficient system is allowed to persist. The security situation has an important consequence for economic development, as constant fear of raids by the militias means that it is difficult for farmers to have an incentive to invest in the long term, either for 1 Based on interviews in Bukavu in May 2013. 1 environmental protection or infrastructure development. Practically speaking, if there is a danger of the crop being stolen just before or during harvest, or the area coming under militia control and access to inputs across the border being cut, the farmers need to be fairly opportunistic in respect of farming. It probably for this reason that there has been little community investment in apparently beneficial activities such as clearing irrigation channels or improving roads. Map 1. The Ruzizi Vallet The Ruzizi river is 117 kilometres (73 mi) long and flows from Lake Kivu to Lake Tanganyika, descending from about 1,500 metres to about 770 metres above sea level (Map 1). The steepest gradients occur over the first 40 kilometres (25 mi), where hydroelectric dams have been built. Further downstream, the Ruzizi Plain, on the floor of the Western Rift Valley, has only gentle hills, and the river flows into Lake Tanganyika through a delta, with one or two small channels splitting off from the main channel. The Ruzizi is a young river, formed about 10,000 years ago when vulcanism associated with continental rifting created the Virunga Mountains. The mountains blocked Lake Kivu's former outlet to the watershed of the Nile and instead forced the lake overflow south down the Ruzizi and the watershed of the Congo. Reed swamps are common along the lower main stem of the river and its tributaries. Near the mouth, the riparian swamps are up to 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) wide. The swamps' total area in Burundi has been estimated at 12,000 hectares (30,000 acres) with reeds varying in height from 2 to 4 metres (6.6 to 13 ft), depending on the degree of inundation. Residents use the reeds for thatching and other domestic purposes. Further from the river, much of the lower river valley consists of grassland, heavily grazed by cattle. 3. Agronomy of rice production The rice in use is Asiatic rice, and the predominant seed in use is saved seed, a variety known as Iron, which was introduced by the Chinese in the 1950s. The production system is Asiatic paddy, based on transplanting. Most farmers can only get a single crop per year, although those closer to the source, where water flow is more reliable, can harvest two or even three times annually. The system depends heavily on chemical fertilizers, fungicides and insecticides. The brewing company has introduced seeds of other varieties, including Jasmine and Nerica, which are typical long-grain rice. So far these are only in small quantities, and it remains to be seen how successful they are, and whether a market will develop for improved seeds. Land preparation is carried out by tractors, using animal traction [ox-ploughs] or by hand. Tractors are owned by private entrepreneurs and are relatively expensive, at $120 per hectare. Hence a producer has to be relatively sure of making a good profit to risk calling in a tractor. Ox-ploughs are confined to certain areas, where the former Chinese irrigation project used to function. The Chinese brought in the ploughs and helped train oxen. Although this system, which is sustainable, has remained in place, it has never spread. Hand labour, using hoes, is probably most common. Even where tractors are used, much of the subsequent labour has to be completed by hand. All other activities, including land levelling, channel clearing, transplanting, harvest and threshing are carried out by hand. Because many of the farmers are not living directly next to the fields, a system of contrôle des champs has been instituted, whereby individuals are paid to oversee the fields, to ensure no problems arise. Birds feeding on the crops are a problem in the last two months to maturity, and children or young adults must be paid as bird-scarers. 4. Economics of rice production According to Bralima, they currently buy about 200 tonnes of rice per year, whereas production in the Valley is more like 5-600 tonnes. Selling to Bralima is the best option, as they pay a premium on rice delivered to their depot in Bukavu, whereas prices on the open market on distinctly lower. Much of the rice goes across the border with buyers from Rwanda, and circumnavigates whatever customs is supposed to 2 operate. Insecurity means that there is no incentive to store rice to take advantage of market fluctuations, as stored rice in the village will become a target for thieves or militias. Although there are numerous farm households, many do not cultivate the land full time, but bring in Burundais labour, as demographic pressure and poverty in Burundi means that individuals will work for much lower rates than Congolais. Moreover, continued insecurity combined with the lure of artisanal mining have resulted in the fragmentation of farm households. The production system has been largely monetarised, and it is therefore possible to calculate production costs with some accuracy. For a farmer to produce and make a profit, costs which have to be taken into consideration are shown in Table 1 [2013 prices]. Table 1. Costs of rice production per hectare in the Ruzizi Valley Activity Hire of land Seeds Fertiliser NPK Fertiliser urea Insecticide Fungicide Tractor Levelling Channel maintenance Transplanting Weeding Fertilizer application Field inspection @ $20 per month Bird-scaring Harvest, threshing, bagging Transport to drying Storage at the depot Drying Dehusking Transport to Bukavu Total FC 96000 128000 112000 192000 10000 90000 6000 126000 84000 Sale Dehusked rice @ $55 per 50 kg bag Profit US$ 100 55 221 276 36 72 120 107 142 124 213 11 100 60 480 100 5 7 140 93 2465 4620 2155 In terms of annual income in DRC, and in terms of the daily rate for labour, this profit is quite substantial. However, it cannot be emphasised how many uncertainties attend rice production, including inadequate water, uncertain access to inputs and civil insecurity. Nonetheless, these are not a sufficient deterrent to discourage production. However, from an ethical standpoint, the dependence on cheap labour from Burundi makes it problematic to encourage. Table 2 gives examples of the range in variation of prices and costs and the basic assumptions on which these figures are calculated. A typical rice plot of one hectare is divided into 16 carreaux [squares] of 25 m2 and these are the units used to calculate costs of labour and other inputs. Labour may be household labour, but hired labour is usually brought in. All labour rates are subject to some negotiation subject to the relative state of the fields and the work involved in the task. Harvesting costs in particular is judged by visual inspection of yields. 3 Table 2. Notes on costs of rice production Activity Hire of land Seeds Fertiliser NPK Fertiliser urea Insecticide Fungicide Tractor Levelling Channel maintenance Transplanting Weeding Fertilizer application Field inspection Bird-scaring Harvest, threshing, bagging Transport to drying Storage at the depot Drying Dehusking Transport to Bukavu Comments The range of fees for hiring land is $90-120. $100 is taken as an average figure Many farm households depend on saved seeds A typical application is 160 kg. per hectare and a 50 kg sack costs $69 A typical application is 200 kg. per hectare and a 50 kg sack costs $69 Cypermethrine from Rwanda is $12 per litre and 3 litres are required. The preferred option is Ridomyl, which is $8 per kg. At a dilution rate of 50g per 20 litres this uses 9 kg. per hectare. Ditan M45 (which is easier to obtain) is $6 a kg. but requires more, probably 12kg per hectare. Either way the cost is $72 per hectare Optional, as many farm households use animal traction or hand labour Labour @ FC 6000 per square Labour @ FC 8000 per square Labour @ FC 7000 per square Labour @ FC 12,000 per square Labour @ FC 10,000 per hectare Five months @ $20 per month Two months @ $30 per month. Done by children but contract is with their parents. Labour @ $40 per square Carried on bicycles, sixty sacks of 70-80 kg @ FC 1500 per trip $5 irrespective of quantity 3 weeks @ FC 2000 per week Charged @ FC 20-40 per kg. for 4200 kg. Some farmers sell in the market at $38 per sack, but delivering the crop to the brewery direct is far more profitable. However, the brewery cannot take all the rice produced 5. Land ownership A surprising feature of land tenure in this area is the ownership of very large farms by individuals, leading to highly unequal access to land. The principle of inheritance that operates is that land is divided among the sons on the death of the head of household. However, in the pre-colonial era, royal families were the owners of larger farms, usually because of high levels of polygyny and thus significant numbers of mouths to feed. As land became commercialised, the temptation to turn part of these holdings into cash pushed them to sell off holdings and these were scooped up by richer or more foresighted farmers. As a consequence, many of the rice farmers in the valley hire the land they cultivate. The contracts are simple annual cash contracts, with the lessee paying prior to working the land. The amount paid varies slightly according to the relationship between the owner and the farmer, but sample prices for 2013 was $90-120 per hectare. The rent also varies by access to water; as maintenance of the irrigation canals deteriorates, the desirability of plots falls and some go out of use when they are not expected to receive water. Land is usually owned on a household basis, but the monetarisation of tenure has meant that it is possible for women to own and work land as individuals. If they do, they are entitled to keep all the proceeds for their own use. A perennial issue is the rights of migrant herders. Although the farmers in the valley own some cattle, many more are owned by seasonal and permanent cattle-grazers. These seem to be of multiple origins, from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda and beyond, as well as a small number of local herders. These herders consider they have rights to water their cattle at the rivers and graze the pastures along the banks. The 4 former environment of reeds was an attractive pasture, and their disappearance under rice paddies is a source of some aggravation. Needless to say, this leads to conflicts between the rice-farmers and the herders, with complaints of cattle entering the fields and damage to crops. The procedure for conflict resolution in such cases is to bring the matter before the local chief, which usually results in fine for the herder. 6. Environmental issues The Ruzizi Valley is an old anthropic landscape and was long ago denuded of native tree species. The reeds which are described in older sources have been cleared in many places for rice paddies. The destruction of habitat for hippos and crocodiles has presumably had an important impact on aquatic biodiversity, but this has not been quantified. Heavy application of fertiliser and insecticides and consequent runoff into the water has created quite serious environmental problems for those downstream. Salinisation of the soil is reported, especially near the former sugar-cane plantations, but no remedial action is in progress. Remarkably, there is a relatively simple solution to reverse some of these trends. The rice residues which are presently sold to Rwandais poultry feed mills could be part of an exchange relationship with herders, whereby the cattle eat the rice residues and drop manure on the fields, thus restoring their fertility and reducing dependence on chemical fertilisers. The build-up of such exchange relationships (which are common elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa would have the additional benefit of reducing conflict between the two groups. 7. Some conclusions From the data presented it is evident that; a) Irrigated rice production in the Ruzizi Valley of the DRC is highly monetarised and dominated by wealthier farmers b) It would not be viable without substantial cross-border trade with neighbouring countries, for input supply and sale of the surplus c) It depends heavily on the exploitation of migrant workers from Burundi who will work for low wage rates d) Even so, yields are low and could be increased by a few simple interventions, including improved varieties and better water management e) Without maintenance of the irrigation system, water supply is likely to gradually deteriorate with predictable consequences for rice yields. At present neither government nor commercial enterprises have shown any interest in reversing this It is not clear whether donor agencies should be involved in the region with the present land tenure and labour situation. Nonetheless, it is clearly region with great potential, and at the same time susceptible to ecological damage. References Thaholokya, K. S., Williams, F. W., & Ames, G. C. 1983. Rice marketing in the Ruzizi Valley of Zaire. Special Publication-University of Georgia, Agriculture Experiment Stations. 5