How could Luftwaffe destroy RAF in the Battle of Britain.docx

This essay will provide the reader with a critical analysis of not only the generally accepted theories, but some of the more contentious issues that arise when determining why in fact the Luftwaffe failed in their quest for air superiority over Britain, in prelude to invasion that never came. Of particular importance one will

Historians usually consider that if the Germans had carried out Operation Sea Lion and invaded Britain in 1940, the invasion would have been defeated by the Royal Navy. This belief is supported by a wargame conducted by the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1974. However, if the Germans had carried out the invasion correctly it could have been successful as bombing and landings on the south coast of England would have meant the British would lose the benefits of radar. RAF Fighter Command operating without radar would not be able to provide adequate air cover for Royal Navy ships in the English Channel. Without adequate air cover the Royal Navy will be forced out of the English Channel by attacks from the Luftwaffe as warships in World War 2 cannot survive under constant air attack.

Air Power Review, 2015

Seventy-five years after the Battle of Britain, the conventional wisdom remains that the Battle was won by the innovation of the ‘Dowding system’, which integrated radar and eight-gun fighters, and the skill and courage of the RAF's fighter pilots. This article examines the design of the London Air Defence Area in 1917-18, the formation of the Home Defence Air Force in 1922-23 and the reorientation of Britain’s air defences to face Germany in 1934 to demonstrate that Britain continuously developed strategic air defence from 1922 to 1940 because of the alignment of both political imperative, defence strategy and the RAF's institutional air defence expertise. While successive Chiefs of the Air Staff favoured strategic bombing, the RAF, formed in 1918 to prevent German raids on London, had many air defence experts and advocates. Therefore, while strategic bombing was largely unproven and its impact exaggerated, air defence was based on lessons from the First World War, and increasingly on science, operational research and operational evaluation. Furthermore successive British governments, not just Chamberlain's, pursued a deliberate defensive strategy, recognising Britain’s strategic vulnerability to the bomber and public anxiety, while seeking to use Britain’s technical, industrial and air strength in a long war and avoiding a bloody continental commitment. This combination ensured victory in the Battle of Britain but also contributed to the Fall of France, without which the Battle of Britain would not have been fought.

Social Science Research Network, 2021

This paper looks at how the army's interpretation of tactical air power during the Battle of France in 1940 impacted on its subsequent development in Britain until 1943.

2012

"The failure of Operation Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially been attributed to the failure of the RAF to provide the bomber support needed to support the landings. This fallacious argument, based on hindsight and a lack of understanding of the RAF’s capabilities at this point in the war, requires revision. This article examines the doctrinal and operational context of the RAF forces involved in Jubilee. Prewar combined operations doctrine stated that the key role for air power was the maintenance of air superiority. The absence of heavy bombers at Dieppe did not doom the operation. The RAF contributed significantly to the operation by seeking to battle the Luftwaffe in the manner that it did during Jubilee, and as such, it provided the most appropriate protection that it could for the assault forces."

The RUSI Journal

The German invasion of Crete in 1941 and subsequent loss of the airfield at Maleme led, almost immediately, to the acceptance of a narrative that suggested significant RAF failure. Criticism, reinforced by the New Zealand official history, bemoaned the lack of fighter aircraft cover and questioned the fighting prowess of RAF ground crew. This article examines the New Zealand commanders’ errors of judgment, which resulted in inappropriate positioning of their soldiers to face the main thrust of the German attack, and argues that RAF airmen became convenient scapegoats for the failings of others. Further, Winston Churchill’s motives in questioning the ability and willingness of airmen to defend airbases are analysed, as is the ensuing political maelstrom, which led to knee jerk reactions and unnecessary reorganisation of RAF ground defence training.

War in History, 2019

This article investigates the work conducted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the development of tactical air power in the interwar period. It analyses the RAF’s theoretical doctrinal thinking during the period along with exercises conducted on a joint Service basis to further develop these ideas in practice. It will argue that, rather than neglecting tactical air power during this period as is the accepted view, much good theoretical work was done that formed a theoretical and intellectual basis for the further development of tactical air power in the light of operational experience during the Second World War.

The Second World War Military Operations Research Group, 2013