Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Revolution

RESEARCH PAPER Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Revolution Tariq Hammoud | February 2013 Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Revolution Series: Research Paper Tariq Hammoud | February 2013 Copyright © 2013 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. ____________________________ The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities - to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. 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Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies PO Box 10277 Street No. 826, Zone 66 Doha, Qatar Tel.: +974 44199777 | Fax: +974 44831651 www.dohainstitute.org Table of Contents Introduction 1 Historical Context 1 Categories of Palestinian Refugees in Syria 2 Statistics and Figures 4 Palestinians during the Syrian Revolution 6 The Nature of the Revolution 6 A Chronology of Palestinian Involvement in the Events in Syria 7 Deraa 7 The Militarization of the Deraa Camp 10 Lattaqiya 12 The Yarmuk Camp and the Damascus Bombing 13 The Palestinian Political Stance vis-à-vis the Events in Syria 15 The Palestinian Coordination Committees of the Syrian Revolution 18 Palestinian Fatalities during the Events in Syria 25 Palestinians in Syria and the Experience of Repeated Displacement 30 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Jordan 30 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Lebanon 32 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Turkey 33 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Gaza 33 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to other countries 34 Summary 34 Conclusion 35 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION Introduction Relying on statistics collected in the field, this study examines the involvement of Palestinians in the Syrian Revolution. Politically, this issue has generated heated debates among observers due to its sensitive nature and its implications for both the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition forces. After briefly considering the status of Palestinian refugees in Syria from a human, historical, and legal perspective, this study seeks to offer a comprehensive analysis of their involvement, with focus on its political dimension. The findings are based on the field surveys and interviews conducted by the author, in addition to press reports emerging from the Palestinian camps in Syria. References to social media sources such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are purposely minimized given the overwhelming amount of information provided and the doubts on its reliability. This, in spite of fact that the Syrian Revolution has turned social media into the prime source for information, given the tight security restrictions placed on traditional media. Events on the ground are beyond the scope of this paper with the focus being on the role of Palestinians within the Syrian events in Deraa, Lattaqiya, and the Yarmuk refugee camp in Damascus. Arguably, these developments represent critical turning points in the evolution of the Palestinian scene in Syria. The events in other refugee camps in the country are treated in less detail, due to the similarity of their context with the above refugee camps. Historical Context At the social and popular levels, Palestinian-Syrian relations represent an exceptional case in Palestine’s immediate neighborhood. The relationship is woven through historical, social, economic, and geographical ties between the two peoples. Historically Syria and Palestine have been closely intertwined given the interconnectedness of the eastern Mediterranean region and Palestine being a natural southern extension of the Syrian area. The lack of geographical barriers separating Palestine, Syria and Lebanon has inevitably led to a shared history. Families that carry the same name and lineage were forced to live in different countries after the erection of the Sykes-Picot borders in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite these movements social customs and traditions have remained similar, in particular between northern Palestine and southern Syria. As a result, Syria and Lebanon became natural destinations for refugees from 1 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES northern Palestine in 1948. 55 percent of Palestinian refugees in Syria originate from the city and district of Safad, while 27 percent originate from the city and district of Tiberias, both located along the Syrian border.1 Neighborly and familial relations on both sides of the border have contributed to Palestinian migration toward Syria. As a result of the two countries’ similar social and geographical environments, Palestinian refugees were dispersed across many Syrian regions during the first five years of Palestinian exile, in accordance with the refugees’ economic needs and opportunities. The Palestinian bedouin tribes that originated from the plains of Safad, Tiberias and Nazareth settled in the Golan area, known for its grazing lands, fitting for the bedouin lifestyle which depends on raising cattle and trading its products. Damascus and its countryside became the preferred destination for the people from the city of Safad, as it suited their industrial, artisanal, and commercial occupations. Lattaqiya to the north became a refuge for the people of Haifa and Tantoura, who were accustomed to the life of seafaring and fishing. Camps such as those in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, on the other hand, were created without taking economic and social factors into consideration. Historically, large numbers of Palestinian refugees were transported by train from Lebanon to Syria. Palestinians were unaware of their final destination, until they were deposited in camps in northern Syria. The location of these camps right near the train tracks remains a witness to the circumstances in which they were formed. These population transfers may have been part of plans by successive military governments to permanently resettle Palestinians in Syria, as a political price paid to Israel in exchange for the regimes’ stability.2 Categories of Palestinian Refugees in Syria3 Palestinian refugees were distributed in 13 camps from the north to the south of Syria, and all situated west of the Aleppo-Damascus-Deraa road. UNRWA acknowledges only 1 Survey conducted by al-Awdah (the Palestinian Center for Return), the Thabit Organization, and the Wajib Coalition in the camps of Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon, for the 60 th anniversary of the founding of the UNRWA in 2009. 2 For further information, see Radwan Ziadeh, Peace within Reach: Syrian-Israeli Negotiations (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2005), 57, 71. 3 From a college textbook about Palestinian refugees in Syria compiled by Tareq Hammoud, and assigned for reading by the Refugee Studies Academy. 2 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION nine of these camps while the other four are viewed as official refugee camps only by the Syrian government, since they were built after the creation of the UN agency and began their operations without its supervision.4 There are also over twenty residential concentrations of Palestinians outside the camps, most of which are situated in and around the city of Damascus. Based on the date of expulsion from Palestine and its circumstances, Palestinian refugees in Syria can be legally divided into five categories. These are the following: 1- The 1948 category: This is the largest group among Palestinian refugees, representing 85% of their total numbers in Syria. Their legal situation is favorable, as they fall under the famous law 260 of 1956, which made Palestinians equal to Syrian citizens in terms of rights and obligations, except for the right of voting and running for elections.5 Palestinian males who descend from this group are called up upon reaching the age of 19 for military service for one year and a half, having been for two years and a half a decade ago. 6 The same law allows these refugees to occupy government positions up to the rank of General Director. 2- The 1956 category: This is a special category that mainly includes the residents of the villages of Akrad al-Baqara and al-Ghanama, who were expelled by the 4 Practically speaking, the UNRWA acknowledges ten camps, as it considers the two camps in Deraa (AlAideen and Tawarii) as a single camp, despite the fact that they were created at different times. The first was built in 1950 and the second in 1967, but they are now connected. The most important of the four other camps is Yarmuk, which is the second largest Palestinian refugee camp after al-Baqa in Jordan, the Raml Camp in Lattaqiya and the Handarat (Ain al-Tall) Camp near Aleppo. In practice, there is no difference between the camps acknowledged by the UNRWA and those that are not, except in terms of the sanitary services provided by either the UNRWA or the government. The difference between the two categories is mostly intangible, and political at times. 5 Law 260 decreed that Palestinians residing in the Syrian Arab Republic are to be treated as Syrians in all cases pertaining to the rights of employment, work, commerce, and military service, while maintaining their original nationality. 6 Palestinian military service recruits served within the formations of the Syrian Army until 1964, when Palestinians began performing their military service in the ranks of the Palestinian Liberation Army, one of the institutions of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The Syrian Army reserves the right to include recruits within its ranks. The Palestinian Liberation Army follows the military rules and regulations of the Syrian Army, and its brigades are affiliated with Syrian Army divisions, in accordance with their geographic locations. 3 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Israeli occupation in 1956. At the time, there were around 2,000 of these refugees. Since refugees of this category are registered in the list of the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR), they are subjected to the same rules as the first category except that they are not required to do military service, and can only take government jobs based on temporary work contracts. 3- The 1967 category: This includes Palestinian refugees who came to Syria following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The majority of these refugees originated from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those who carried Egyptian travel documents were treated by Syrian law as foreigners, while those carrying Jordanian passports were considered Arab nationals.7 4- The 1970-1971 category: This category finds itself in a complex legal situation due to the fact that the majority of these refugees lost their legal papers after being forced to take refuge in Syria following the bloody “Black September” events in Jordan in 1970-1971. These events consisted of an armed confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanian regime. The majority of these refugees possess expired Jordanian passports, which they cannot renew for security reasons. They receive basic education and health services from UNRWA, but face major difficulties in entering the job market due to their legal situation. This also makes the majority of Palestinians in this category unable to travel or move outside Syria. 5- The 2006 category: These are Palestinians who fled from Iraq after 2003. The Syrian government allowed a number of them to enter Syria in 2006; other waves of immigration followed, with some individuals entering legally and others not. The lists of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) count between 4,000 and 5,000 refugees in this category. This group endures a complex legal and security situation and is deprived of basic civil rights, greatly resembling the 1970 category. Statistics and Figures The General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees is the official government body responsible for Palestinian refugees on the civil and bureaucratic level. It is affiliated 7 Dozens of individuals in this category have been able to gain the privileges of the 1956 refugees by registering in the list of the General Authority for of Palestine Arab Refugees due to personal relations. 4 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, and it supervises the management of the camps on the municipal level, while also supervising the work of UNRWA. The Commission was founded in 1949 under Law 450. It was originally affiliated with the Interior Ministry, before being transferred to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. Since 1963, it has been managed by a Palestinian Director-General who is appointed by the Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Baath Party. UNRWA and GAPAR statistics for the number of Palestinian refugees in Syria represent the lower estimate of this figure. In addition, the records of the UNRWA differ from the GAPAR’s figures. Many refugees are registered with the Authority but not with UNRWA, which is due to the more limited definition of “refugee” used by UNRWA.8 The GAPAR’s definition is close to that of UNRWA, but with a broader margin. In 1956, the GAPAR added the Palestinians of the villages of Akrad al-Baqqara and al-Ghanama to its list of refugees. It also included the families of 1967 refugees on an individual basis, while it applied the Syrian Law on Arab nationals to the refugees holding valid and expired Jordanian passports and the Law on foreign nationals to those refugees with an Egyptian travel document. In its most recent statistics, released in early 2012, UNRWA stated that the number of Palestinian refugees in Syria registered in its lists had reached a total of 487,000, while the GAPAR estimated this number at 494,819, up to August 18, 2012.9 The original number of Palestinians who took refuge in Syria in 1948 did not exceed 90,000. Seventy five percent of Palestinian refugees in Syria are concentrated in Damascus and its countryside, while the rest reside in the governorates of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Deraa, and Lattaqiya. Around half of the refugees live in the camps, and the other half inhabits neighborhoods inside the main cities.10 Palestinians in Syria enjoy the most favorable legal position of all the host countries, which explains their large numbers in the country. Syrian customs and traditions resemble those of the Palestinians to the point where it is extremely difficult to The UNRWA defines a Palestine refugee as any person whose “normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” This definition also extends to the families of these persons, according to the UNRWA official website. http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=87. 9 See the official UNRWA website, www.unrwa.org/atemplate.php?id=100; and the official website of the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees, www.gapar.net/at/statistics.html 10 Al-Awda Center survey, for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the UNRWA in 2009.op.cit. 8 5 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES distinguish a Palestinian neighborhood from a Syrian one. Palestinians and Syrians have been intermixing and intermarrying for over sixty years. Due to the fact that the state provides the camps with services, the term “camp” has become more of a symbolic designation for the state of refuge endured by the Palestinians. This is not to overlook the difficult circumstances of the camps in terms of living conditions and their high density. Due to the extensive social and economic interactions between Syrians and Palestinians, a large number of educated Palestinians are active in numerous domains. In 2005, over 100 Palestinian lecturers were registered in the University of Damascus alone, including graduate students, doctors, and professors.11 Many Palestinians have assumed crucial and senior posts in the state,12 while Palestinian businessmen and industrialists have a strong presence in the Syrian labor market.13 Palestinians during the Syrian Revolution The Nature of the Revolution The Arab revolts that began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya, and Yemen have witnessed similar triggers in terms of the motivations behind popular uprisings: observers have agreed that the motives of the revolutions were entirely domestic and social, while the political and foreign policy aspects were supporting factors and not at the base of the movement. This was clearly reflected in the slogans that were raised by the protesters, as well as the weak presence of the Palestinian cause among their demands. This situation has bestowed a local and social character to the revolutions. Some states had justified their repressive domestic policies through the demands of national security and the need to protect the Palestinian cause, the “central cause of the (Arab) nation,” which in fact turned these state slogans into empty theoretical concepts. Deraa, which witnessed the first manifestations of the Syrian popular uprising, following limited attempts in Damascus, offered a fitting demonstration of the motives behind these revolutions. The people of Deraa rose up because local children were arrested Tariq Hammoud, “Educated Palestinians in Syria: A Field Survey”, paper presented at the Conference on the Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees, University of Damascus, December 12-14, 2005. 12 Brigadier Mahmud Azzam and Brigadier Hazem al-Khadra, both Palestinians, successively commanded the Syrian Air Force throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Ibid. 13 The Awad Amora Industrial Group Aluminum and Asia Apparel, both famous brands in the Syrian market, are Palestinian. 11 6 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION and tortured for writing slogans on the walls of their school, a move that angered the tribal society of Deraa to the point where they turned to the streets to protest against the regime. At first, the confrontation was limited to the city of Deraa, but the violent state repression galvanized many parts of Syrian society throughout the country and reawakened accumulated frustrations as to the Syrian domestic situation over four decades. In short, the Syrian revolution is an internal social revolution, which arose for purely domestic reasons. The single external factor, consisting in the relationship with the Palestinian cause and Syria’s position at the center of the regional forces defying Israel’s policies— previously a point of strength for the regime—only played a role in delaying the revolution in Syria compared to other countries. In terms of public liberties and the level of political activism allowed, Syria is the most repressive regime in the region. The regime has also failed miserably in exploiting its political and Arab nationalist history when dealing with developments in the Syrian street. In fact, Syrian security surprisingly did not take advantage of this foreign policy record, and refrained from adopting peaceful political measures that could have satisfied some of the demands of the street. These demands were in fact very modest at the beginning of the events, and were represented in the petition of the Deraa people presented to President Bashar al-Assad at the time.14 A Chronology of Palestinian Involvement in the Events in Syria Deraa The spark for the Syrian uprising occurred on March 18, 2011 with a demonstration launched from the Omari Mosque in Deraa following the Friday prayer. The protest was a condemnation of the arrest of 11 children from the neighborhood of Deraa al-Balad and of the insult received by a delegation of Deraa public figures when they visited the head of the Political Security Branch, General Atif Najeeb, in order to resolve the issue. Due to its proximity to their neighborhoods as well as its regional stature, the mosque is frequented by many Palestinians (at the time however this was not considered a significant factor). As events developed and violent repression was used against the protesters, dozens of people were killed when the security forces broke into the Omari Mosque in order to disperse the sit-in. The intensity of the protests escalated to the 14 The petition was published in the Syrian daily newspaper al-Watan, March 21, 2011. 7 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES point where thousands of protesters from Deraa torched a number of official buildings on Monday, March 21. The most notable of those public buildings was the provincial courthouse, which is located 200 meters from the Palestinian camp. 15 This prompted the security agencies charged with quelling the protests in Deraa to declare that the camp and its residents were responsible for that day’s events. This was repeated by the pro-regime newspaper al-Watan, which published a long report on the events in Deraa the following day, accusing the Palestinians of inciting “acts of sabotage” and claiming that “there were only very few people from Deraa [in the demonstrations]”.16 Subsequently, a meeting was held between local Palestinian officials from the camp and the security leadership headed by Brigadier Hisham Bakhtiar who strongly reprimanded the camp’s officials, who were also members of the Baath Party.17 Contrary to their habit, however, the authorities did not release the names of the individuals who were wanted by security services following the events. The number of Palestinian protesters that day exceeded 15,000, while the number of residents of the Palestinian camp, including men, women, children, and the elderly, stands at no more than 10,000.18 This systematic accusation of Palestinians is familiar for refugees, and rang an alarm bell for them from the onset of the crisis. Palestinians quickly realized that they were the weakest link in the social fabric surrounding them and that Syrian authorities would afford them no special consideration due to their political situation. While Palestinians were trying to set straight the accusations directed against them in Deraa and in Damascus, the protests expanded and moved into the southern Raml neighborhood of Lattaqiya which – unfortunately for the Palestinians – is nearby the Palestinian camp of al-Raml. Protests in the area led to the torching and assault of a number of public buildings as well as the Baath Party headquarters, which made the narrative that The Palestinian refugee camp of Deraa is less than 300 meters away from the governorate’s center. Al-Watan, March 22, 2011. Al-Watan is the only private daily newspaper in Syria. It is financed by Rami Makhlouf, a businessman with close economic and familial ties to the ruling regime, and the paper covers Syrian events from a perspective similar to that of the official newspapers. 17 This is according to the testimonial of one of the members of the Palestinian delegation that visited the security leadership. Hisham Bakhtiar was the head of the National Security Office until his assassination in the explosion that targeted the “crisis cell” in Damascus on July 18, 2012. 18 This author was in Deraa that day and was able to observe and estimate the numbers of protesters, most of whom came from the Syrian Balad and Mahatta neighborhoods. For the number of Palestinian refugees residing in the Deraa Camp, see the official website of the UNRWA, http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=145. 15 16 8 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION Palestinians were responsible for the events more credible. This idea was expressed by Buthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to President Assad, who made an accusation at a press conference on March 26, 2011 that Palestinian groups from the Raml Camp had “sabotaged commercial stores and begun the project of sedition.” This was the first statement by a high Syrian official directly accusing Palestinians. It prompted a number of Palestinian leaders in Damascus to contact Shaaban to stress the neutrality of the camp and to condemn her statements. The official position vis-à-vis the Palestinians may be interpreted in a number of ways:    It constitutes an attempt on the part of the security organs to blame the crisis temporarily on a non-Syrian actor, intended to be used until they were able to quash the protest movement, which was still in its infancy. It exploits the fact that a number of the members of the extremist Fath al-Islam organization came from Syria’s Palestinian community in 2007, and especially from the Deraa region.19 This made the accusation appear credible to outside public opinion, especially since security services in Deraa had repeatedly stressed that reality. This provided a fitting scenario to cover up the failure of the security agencies in quelling the protests, despite the deadly blows directed at the demonstrators in the Umari Mosque in Deraa in the early days of the uprising. Accusing Palestinians can be a convenient method to justify their failure in front of the political leadership. Nevertheless, the narrative implicating Palestinians in the events of Deraa and Lattaqiya did not hold for very long, as the protest movement spread to other Syrian cities and regions with no Palestinian presence, before finally engulfing the whole country. This was the first phase of Palestinian involvement in the events in Syria. The second phase began with the regime’s invasion of the Deraa governorate at the end of April 2011 and the siege imposed on the city, mainly on the neighborhood of Deraa al-Balad, viewed as the bastion of the revolution. This siege led to the complete isolation of 19 The leaders of the extremist Fath al-Islam organization included three Palestinians from Deraa, including the organization’s spokesman, Abu Saleem Taha. 9 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Deraa, with no food, water, supplies, communications, or electricity entering the city.20 At that point, a number of Palestinians from the Deraa Camp, which is separated from Deraa al-Balad by a Syrian neighborhood and a rugged valley, volunteered to make the valley into a humanitarian passage for food supplies and the transportation of the wounded into a field hospital that was hastily set up in the camp with very primitive equipment. During these events, several names gained a fame that continues to this day in the Deraa governorate. Such example is Mousa al-Taffouri, known for smuggling supplies into the besieged neighborhood, who was summarily executed in the Deraa alBalad neighborhood after being captured by the security forces. Despite the humanitarian support provided by the camp residents toward the besieged people of Deraa, the regime forces situated their checkpoints on the outskirts of the camp without entering it, except for the arrest of several young men after the military invasion of the governorate. The regime’s decision not to overrun the camp as it invaded the Deraa governorate could be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize the camp and to avoid the creation of a new enemy front, especially after the security services’ claims that Palestinians were behind the troubles succeeded in creating an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust among Palestinians. Thus, the regime wished to avoid a repeat of the same mistake and to erase that accusation from the memory of the camp’s residents. The field hospital in Deraa expanded its work, becoming the largest in the governorate until it was destroyed in late May 2012, after a heavy bombardment of the camp following the formation of the first armed group within it. The Militarization of the Deraa Camp An intense debate arose among the revolutionaries in Deraa regarding the use of creating an armed group in the camp to support the neighborhood of Tareeq al-Sadd and the camp of Syrian refugees from the Golan, which borders the Palestinian camp. Others argued that it was more valuable to preserve the humanitarian role of the camp, especially in terms of treating the wounded, given the escalation of the regime’s 20 The neighborhood of Deraa al-Balad is supplied with drinking water from springs located in the village of Muzayrib, 11 kilometers from Deraa, which is two-thirds Palestinian. The locals eventually stormed the water pumping facility, expelled the security detail sent by the regular army, and operated the pump in order to fully supply the neighborhood of Deraa al-Balad, after several days of it being deprived of water. 10 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION violence in the governorate. Eventually, those calling for militarization had the upper hand, and an armed group was formed in the camp under the name “Battalion of the Martyr Tahir al-Sayasna,” named after the first Palestinian victim to have died in the camp. The army’s abstention to bomb the field hospital throughout that period can be explained by two main factors. Firstly, this is due to the political and national sensitivities elicited by the Palestinian camps, whose bombardment would strip the regime of its most important political card in the form of support for Palestine, and which forms the basis of its “conspiracy” narrative. Secondly, the regime wanted to keep the camp’s residents from entering the fray of the armed confrontation with the regime, since many of them have extensive military experience accumulated during the civil war in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the formation of an armed group inside the camp did eventually open the floodgates. The camp was continuously bombed for two and a half months, the majority of its population was displaced, and was finally invaded by regime forces in late July 2012 after 70 percent of the camp was fully or partially destroyed. As the regime bombed the Palestinian camp in Deraa, negotiations were being made between the regime and the Free Syrian Army just days after the beginning of the shelling of the camp. A regime representative met with three leaders of Free Syrian Army groups inside the camp, and negotiations took place in the presence of a Hamas representative as a neutral observer, upon the request of the Free Syrian Army. 21 The negotiations resulted in a document that was signed by all participants decreeing that the Free Syrian Army would withdraw from the camp, in exchange for the Syrian Arab Army refraining from shelling or invading the camp in any way, and committing to spare the camp from military confrontation. As a good will initiative on the part of the Free Syrian Army, it executed its withdrawal within hours of signing of the document, and prior the regime’s official response to the agreement, which was expected within 24 hours.22 Over the next 24 hours, the shelling of the camp was indeed halted, but the 21 These negotiations were undertaken at the request of the regime, but it refused to send any political figures to the negotiation sessions in fear for their safety. Rather a pro-regime Palestinian official was sent, affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, which is led by Ahmad Jibril. 22 The regime’s representative did not have the authority to accept or reject any proposals; his role was limited to transmitting the demands and proposals to Syrian leaders. 11 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES regime’s response to the agreement was apparent a day later when it restarted the shelling of the camp, which was then entirely empty of residents or armed groups. 23 Based on the outcome of these negotiations, it could be argued that the regime intended to use the negotiations to test the effect of the destruction of the Free Syrian Army’s largest and most important field hospital, which was located inside the Palestinian camp. The regime thus benefited from the withdrawal of the FSA, paying no political price, even before it responded to the signed agreement. The agreement reflected a strong urge among the opposition to return to the previous state, prior to the militarization of the camp, but the regime prevented this possibility. The continuation of the shelling of the camp and the displacement of its population led to a serious humanitarian crisis, in addition to the death of a number of Palestinians. This incited anger, prompting members of the Palestinian Liberation Army to secede from their units, with some joining the FSA in the area.24 The most important of these defections involved Major Colonel Qahtan Shabata from the Deraa Camp, the leader of the 422nd Battalion of the Palestinian Liberation Army’s Qadisiya Brigade, who joined the leadership of the military council in Deraa and took charge of the defense of the camp with a group of FSA fighters. Shabata and his men continued the fight until they moved their headquarters to the town of al-Muzayrib.25 Shabata was killed in a clash with regime forces in the border town of Zaizoun, while supporting a FSA group that was attempting to help a number of families escape across the border to Jordan. 26 Lattaqiya Following the outbreak of protests in Deraa and Lattaqiya, Palestinians were officially accused of being behind the troubles. In the first months of the revolution, events developed in the Sakanturi neighborhood of Lattaqiya, in the Raml al-Janubi area, to 23 The details of the negotiations given here are based on the testimonial of an individual who participated in the talks 24 The military service within the Palestinian Liberation Army is mandatory to Palestinian youth in Syria, however, this army had at this time not yet participated in any field action against the rebels. 25 Two-thirds of al-Muzayrib’s population is Palestinian. The plains around the town were used by the FSA, whose units withdrew from the Deraa Camp after they ran out of ammunition and the regime’s army began to advance into the camp. 26 In the same clash, Qasim al-Rammah, a Palestinian who led a FSA unit in the Muzayrib region, was also killed. This occurred two days after an intense confrontation with the regular forces in Muzayrib. 12 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION the point where in August 2011 the regime decided to bomb the neighborhood and to execute the largest military operation since Deraa. The regime sent a warning to the residents of the Raml refugee camp ordering them to leave the area within three hours, saying that parts of the camp might be hit during the operation in the neighboring district. In fact the camp was expected to become an inevitable escape route for the rebels fleeing Sakanturi. Indeed, thousands of residents evacuated the camp, and the camp’s sports complex was used as a shelter for the displaced population. Contrary to the news broadcast at the time which claimed that the camp was intensely bombed from gunboats, the shelling was actually concentrated on the neighboring district, and the camp was only exposed to intermittent shelling along its outskirts once it suspected that an individual or a group belonging to the opposition had entered the camp. This led to the death of three people from the camp, but no serious destruction took place, except for some homes that were hit with machine gun fire.27 The Yarmuk Camp and the Damascus Bombing On the morning of July 11, 2012, Palestinians awoke to tragic news: 16 bodies were found strewn in the street in one of the villages of Idlib, belonging to young recruits from the Palestinian Liberation Army who had been kidnapped on the Aleppo-Hama highway two weeks before while returning home from the training center where they performed their military service. The news shocked Palestinians, particularly those in Aleppo where the victims were from. Responsibility for the murders was never determined as the regime and the opposition exchanged accusations.28 These Palestinian recruits were kidnapped by a group that communicated for more than two weeks with official Palestinian authorities, represented by the Palestinian Liberation Army. However, no specific demands were made and no actual negotiations took place. It also appears that communications were going through a third party. In addition to their death, the bodies of 14 out of 16 soldiers were found. The body of the bus driver 27 This author had the opportunity to inspect the damage to the camp after the end of the shelling in August, 2011. 28 The leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Army as well as the regime accused armed gangs of committing the crime (see al-Khaleej, July 12, 2012, for the Palestinian Liberation Army’s statement; and Brigadier Tariq al-Khadra’s statement in the SANA news agency, July 13, 2012). The opposition, meanwhile, accused the regime, claiming that the recruits had defected and were then arrested; see alSharq al-Awsat, July 12, 2012, and the statement of the Syrian National Council regarding the incident, July 12, 2012. 13 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES who had been transporting them was found two days after the murder of the young soldiers following the bombing of the UN International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA), which targeted a regular army checkpoint at Aleppo’s southern entrance. This attack was claimed at the time by an opposition group calling itself Suqur al-Sham and the charred body of the driver was transported to the Nairab camp.29 Finally, an incident took place several days after a clash between the Palestinian Nairab Camp and the Syrian village of al-Nairab, which began as a squabble between two children in school and quickly developed into a political confrontation that led to the death of five young men (three Palestinians and two Syrians). The residents of alNairab suddenly accused the Palestinians of supporting the Syrian regime, despite the lack of any statements or positions to that effect. After the incident, a reconciliation committee composed of representatives from the two parties ruled that the dispute should be ended with an agreement to support the revolution and to marginalize “trouble makers” on both sides, with the agreement of the victims’ families. The narration of this incident carries no intention to place the blame on a specific party, but to merely pose questions about a bloody incident in a governorate that was, until that time, one of the furthest removed from the violence. On July 13, 2012, demonstrators came out of all the mosques of the Damascus Yarmuk Camp following the Friday prayers. These protests condemning the massacre of the Palestinian Liberation Army recruits in Aleppo were all executed peacefully, except for one in Palestine Street, which borders the Tadamon neighborhood, and which has a concentrated presence of FSA units. Security forces opened fire on the demonstration, killing four Palestinians, which led to the intervention of armed men from the Tadamon neighborhood, leading to a day-long clash inside the camp that left more dead and wounded. These events took place at a very delicate time, as violence spread the following day to the neighborhoods bordering the camp, including al-Hajar al-Aswad, al-Tadamon, and al-Qadam. This prompted hundreds of families from these neighborhoods to take refuge inside the Yarmuk Camp, which witnessed less military activity than the surrounding districts. Meanwhile, the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Jihad al-Makdissi, alluded 29 Suqur al-Sham (Damascus hawks) is one of the FSA formations that are active in the Idlib region. The group took responsibility for the UN International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas ICARDA bombing in a YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsQNkjgC5F4. 14 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION on his Facebook page to “foreign guests who do not respect the courtesies of hospitality,” requesting them to “move to the oases of Arab democracy”.30 Since that day and throughout the events in Damascus following the bombing of the National Security Office and the assassination of the “Crisis Cell,” the Yarmuk Camp has been providing humanitarian aid to the thousands of displaced families that have taken refuge in it. For this, the camp has paid a heavy toll, with daily deaths and injuries, as well as numerous arrests. The number of dead has exceeded 140, three-quarters of whom died in the months immediately following these events.31 The camp still suffers from sniper fire targeting its main streets and intersections, in particular those leading to the neighborhoods of Tadamon, al-Hajar al-Aswad, Yalda, and Babila. The Palestinian Political Stance vis-à-vis the Events in Syria The Syrian case represents the most complex and sensitive Arab revolution regarding the Palestinian political position, both for Palestinian factions allied with the Syrian regime and those opposed to it. As a result, the positions of the main Palestinian factions are similar, especially those of Fatah and Hamas. As the revolution in Syria progressed so has the Palestinian position toward the events in Syria, which has witnessed different shifts in its stance. For the first two weeks after the beginning of the events in mid-March, 2011, and until the release of Hamas’ first statement regarding the events on April 2, 2011, there was complete silence from the Palestinian side. Until that date, no Palestinian faction on either side of the political divide (that is, the factions of the Palestine Liberation The following text was published on Jihad al-Makdissi’s personal Facebook page: “The most difficult thing to experience is to have a guest in your country that is being treated with the utmost respect and dignity, only to find that some of them do not respect the courtesies of hospitality. A Syrian opposition member, or a lost armed Syrian, would be God’s judgment and there is nothing to be done about that; the guest, on the other hand (some of them) must follow the courtesies of hospitality, and if they cannot, then they should move to the oases of democracy in Arab countries … (this is my personal opinion, and I ask that no insults be directed and no nationalities be mentioned)”. 31 Unpublished statistic prepared by the Workgroup for Palestinians in Syria. 30 15 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Organization and those in the Alliance of Palestinian Factions 32) made a statement regarding the situation in Syria.33 Neutrality was the next political stance from Palestinians, one that extended from April 2, 2011 until Hamas’ exit from Syria in February 2012. The statements co-authored by different Palestinian factions during this time agreed on the position of neutrality, and addressed the situation in Syria with a unified discourse oriented toward the Syrian leadership and the Syrian people alike.34 Nevertheless, this period saw individual statements by some factions which adopted the regime’s line, especially during media appearances of the officials of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (Ahmad Jibril).35 The PLO factions, which did not enjoy good relations with the Syrian regime due to their stance on the peace process, showed neutrality. On the other hand, some statements published by the Alliance adopted an outwardly neutral position but with a rhetoric that resembled that of the regime. This can be seen for example in the Alliance’s statement regarding the regime’s shelling of the Raml Camp in Lattaqiya in August 2011. It said that “UNRWA’s statement has condemned the reports claiming that the camp was shelled and that its population was displaced,” while in fact UNRWA’s statement had expressed concerns, after reports claimed that there were victims among the Palestinian refugees in Lattaqiya due to the military operations. This shows a difference between the statement of the Alliance and the discourse of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, which stressed the importance of sparing the camp any events that might endanger the lives of refugees.36 It later 32 In the wake of the Oslo Accords, eight factions including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah al-Intifada, alTahrir Front, al-Saeqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Revolutionary Communist Party formed a coalition against the agreement brokered in Norway. 33 Groups with the Palestine Liberation Organization include Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, the Struggle Front (Samir Ghosha), the Fida Movement, the Palestine Liberation Front (Abu al-Abbas), and the People’s Party. 34 See the statements of the PLO and Alliance during this period, especially those condemning the Damascus and Aleppo bombings. 35 In an interview on the television program Liqaa Khass with Ahmad Jibril, on al-Alam channel, August 26, 2011, available on YouTube: http://www.alalam.ir/news/664674 36 The UNRWA issued a statement expressing concern over reports claiming that there were deaths among Palestinian refugees in the camp; in contrast, the Secretary of the Alliance firmly denied that any military operations took place within the camp. See “The Authority Demands Measures and the Factions in Damascus View the UNRWA Position as ‘Claims,’” al-Khaleej (Al-Shariqa, UAE), August, 16, 2011; “Activists Affirm the Continuation of the Bombardment of the Raml Camp in Lattaqiya, and the Palestinian Factions in Damascus Deny these Claims,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), August 17, 2011. 16 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION transpired that the Alliance statement had been issued by its Secretariat without a prior meeting and without informing the main factions in the Alliance, notably Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.37 As previously mentioned, the camp was in fact not exposed to damage on the scale reported in the press at the time. Palestinian’s clear position started developing at a later stage. This came about gradually, beginning with Hamas’ exit from Syria, reflecting the political separation between the regime and Hamas, as well as the rejection of the regime’s behavior by the largest Palestinian movement in Syria. And yet, Hamas did not adopt a new discourse on Syria. A discord then emerged within the Palestinian Alliance. The leadership of the Alliance began to lean toward the pro-regime factions, in particular the PFLP-GC and alSaiqa, given the vacuum left by Hamas’ exit from Syria and the position of the Islamic Jihad, which preferred to listen than to speak during meetings. At the time, the meetings of the Alliance were distinguished by the following characteristics:    The rise of pro-regime prevalence during the meetings, due to the leading role of the PFLP-GC in organizing and directing them. The neutrality adopted in the statements issued by the Alliance. This was particularly remarkable given the rising anger of Palestinians toward the events impacting refugees in Deraa, which could not be justified by the proregime factions. The absence of Hamas from the Alliance in spite of a nominal presence of its delegates. These delegates only spoke to register their rejection of any ideas that might lead to the adoption of a collective position that would be seen as favoring one party over the other. The PLO factions in Syria maintained their collective position of neutrality, despite occasional statements on the part of some of their officials that were harshly critical of the regime. This is understandable given the long years of frosty relations between the PLO factions and the regime. 37 This was verified in a phone interview with the office of the Secretary Khalid Abd al-Majeed, who explained that it was habitual for the Alliance to issue such statements in this way whenever events and developments called for it. Even if this were true, it still would not apply to controversial events such as the shelling of the camp. 17 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Subsequently, the positions of the various Palestinian factions became clearer, and even more so after the bombardment of the Deraa Camp. The most radical pro-regime positions came from the PFLP-GC; when the majority of Alliance factions rejected the PFLP’s request to form “security committees” in the camps under the pretext of protecting them from gunmen, the PFLP decided to form these committees on its own and to shoulder the responsibility alone, to use the terms of its Secretary General Ahmad Jibril.38 There were also many meetings that grouped the factions of the PLO and the factions of the Alliance (without Hamas), notably the meeting that resulted in a statement calling for the necessity of distancing the camps from the conflict, and reiterating the proposal for the creation of “security committees”.39 Generally speaking, all Palestinian political factions adopted a neutral stance, which was based on acknowledging the right of the Syrian people to make legitimate demands, as was expressed in the majority of statements, but without making a rupture with the regime. This position was the subject of controversy in the ranks of the revolutionaries, who, like the regime, held a narrow view regarding the political stances on their cause, and who would firmly reject all approaches that did not adopt a clear and strong position in their favor, regardless of the circumstances. The Palestinian Coordination Committees of the Syrian Revolution The Palestinian political position is not limited to the positions of the political factions, especially given the growing gap between the factions and the street. This tension reached its epitome during the funeral of Palestinian martyrs on June 6, 2011, when crowds chanted simultaneously against the regime and the Palestinian factions, accusing them of being responsible for the June 5 massacre on the Syrian border with the occupied Golan, after calls were made on Facebook for a “return march” to Palestine on May 15, similar to the one organized the preceding year.40 Anger was directed mostly at the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, Speech by Ahmad Jibril, General Secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – the General Command, during the funeral of an official, Ila al-Amam, Issue no. 2420, August 2012. 39 The statement elicited the anger of the pro-revolution Palestinian groups, despite the moderate tone, since the statement came at a time when the Deraa and Yarmuk camps were being subjected to the harshest attacks since the beginning of the events. Subsequently, the pro-revolution Palestinian coordination committees issued several statements on their Facebook pages condemning the statement of the Palestinian factions. 40 On that day, twenty four died by Israeli bullets in the border area of Ain al-Tina. 38 18 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION which is seen by Palestinians as the closest faction to the Syrian regime. Angry mourners besieged the headquarters of the PFLP-GC in the Yarmuk Camp (the Khalsa Building), with Ahmad Jibril and Dr. Talal Naji inside. The building was burnt and five people died, three of whom were bodyguards of Jibril, in addition to the PFLP-GC head of the Syrian branch, Abu al-Abid Nasir, who was killed in a gruesome manner.41 Syrian security forces and an armed group affiliated with the PFLP-GC were able to save the PFLP-GC leadership from death. This incident left a tense atmosphere in the Yarmuk Camp, considered the capital of the Palestinian diaspora. The tension was between supporters of the revolution – represented by the street and with no specific affiliations – and supporters of the regime, represented by the PFLP-GC. It also transpired that there were youth groups within the camps who did not belong to the dominant factions and who began flirting with the idea of forming “revolutionary coordination committees,” a phenomenon that was taking root in all revolutionary Syrian neighborhoods. However, the camps did not witness the creation of effective coordination committees similar to those in other Syrian neighborhoods, whose tasks went beyond organizing anti-regime protests to providing aid and assuming media and political responsibilities in the rebel districts. The majority of the committees and other pro-revolution organizations in the camp were no more than a media façade, some of which simply consisted of a Facebook page. Nevertheless, a minority of the pro-revolution activities developed into mobilization efforts, such as organizing protests, filming them, and broadcasting them on the internet. Outside of these efforts, all Palestinian support for the Syrian revolution came through individuals or youth groups who worked within Syrian coordination committees. On the other hand, an important number of Palestinian supporters of the Syrian revolution decided to join the humanitarian and aid efforts, believing that they, as Palestinians, should be limited to this role due to their special circumstances as a minority and their political specificity. They argued that if Palestinians were to be targeted, they would probably pay a much higher price than ordinary Syrians due to 41 Abu al-Abd Nasir was stabbed repeatedly by a group of men who captured him while he was approaching them to calm them down; when he was brought to the hospital, he was suffering from more than fifty stab wounds. One of the building’s guards was burned to death inside his guard cabin. The author personally witnessed these events. 19 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES their vulnerability.42 This idea was reinforced with the displacement of tens of thousands of Syrian families into the Palestinian camps in search of security, which made the support and lodging of these families the prime responsibility of the Palestinian pro-revolution youth. Several factors influence the Palestinian position and role played in Syria. Palestinians carry a strong historical memory from previous Arab crises, starting with the war of 1970-1971 in Jordan, and ending with the tragedy of the Palestinians of Iraq, whose scars and repercussions remain to this day. In addition, Palestinians are not indifferent to the position of the Syrian regime in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially with the regime’s record in supporting the Palestinian cause, both in terms of its political support and its sheltering of the factions of the Palestinian resistance. Another factor is the vulnerability of the Palestinian community in Syria, and the fact that it can be negatively affected by any hasty positions taken to support either side, particularly during the early phase of the events. Undeniably, internal Palestinian disputes play a role, as well as the fear that such disputes might escalate during the potential state of chaos that could engulf the camps. This concern was reflected in the similar positions adopted by both Fatah and Hamas during the crisis. The influential Palestinians positions toward the Syrian situation are dictated by three factions: that of Fatah, Hamas, and the PFLP-GC, with the majority of the other Palestinian factions aligning themselves behind one of these three camps. Fatah Fatah has a weak official institutional presence in Syria due to the historic rivalry between Fatah and the Syrian government, which began with the confrontation between Yasser Arafat and Hafiz al-Assad during the civil war in Lebanon. In spite of this, the history of discord did not prompt Fatah to take an anti-regime or a prorevolution stance. In fact, Fatah participated in the meetings held by the PLO factions in Syria, and the PLO’s statements on Syria largely conformed to Fatah’s view. Fatah decided to take a neutral position and not to support the regime due to the vulnerability 42 This was the position taken at a meeting between youth groups on Skype in the Yarmuk Camp; various viewpoints were expressed, but most agreed on the principle of supporting the revolution through humanitarian effort, and that field activism should take place through Syrian organizations, without adopting a specifically Palestinian identity. 20 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION of the Palestinian presence in Syria and out of fear that Palestinian disputes could escalate into an explosion. At the same time, Fatah did not support the revolution, in accordance with its general stance, which is not enthusiastic of any of the Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. As a result, the statements released by Fatah were largely neutral, particularly those issued by the regional office in Syria, in what is perhaps the closest political position to be adopted by both Fatah and Hamas since the flare-up of the Palestinian discord following the 2005 legislative elections. Fatah stuck to this position even during the bloodiest moments of the crisis, as was observed in the statement of the Palestinian Presidency following the Yarmuk Camp massacre on August 2, 2012, and which demanded, in tandem with Hamas, the distancing of the camps from the conflict.43 The Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah, did not issue any statements directly accusing the Syrian regime of responsibility for the massacre, except for the statements of Yasir Abd Rabbuh, who is in charge of the media department of the Palestinian Authority, but is not a member of Fatah.44 On the other hand, Fatah and the political cadres close to the movement ceaselessly attacked Ahmad Jibril, accusing him of responsibility for making the Palestinians into a party in the Syrian conflict. 45 These attacks, however, were related to an internal Palestinian discord with old historical roots. Official Palestinian media outlets have generally abstained from criticizing the Syrian President or commenting on the events in Syria.46 Hamas Hamas’ position is the most delicate one, and arguably the most difficult and controversial one on the Palestinian scene. The Syrian regime offered Hamas a refuge 43 On the statement of the Palestinian Presidency and the demand to keep the camps neutral, see the Palestinian News and Information Agency (WAFA), August 3, 2012. 44 For Yasir Abd Rabbuh’s statements, see Reuters, August 3, 2012. Abd Rabbuh is also known for his personal enmity toward the Syrian regime since the 1989 secession that he led within the ranks of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in Damascus. 45 For the statement of the political department of the PLO accusing Jibril of implicating the Palestinians in the struggle through his arming of the camps, see Maan News Agency, August 4, 2012. 46 On the Palestinian Authority’s issuing of instructions to the government-owned media outlets in Ramallah to avoid discussing the news from Syria, see al-Hayat (London), July 15, 2012; however, the PA denied these reports a day later; see “The Authority Denies Issuing Instructions to the Media,” al-Quds al-Arabi (London), July 16, 2012. 21 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES at a time when the entire world closed its doors to the movement. Furthermore, the Syrian regime has provided considerable aid to Hamas in its media, political, and perhaps military, activism. What is more, the relationship between the regime and Hamas was at its peak in the years preceding the crisis. Still, Hamas’ position on the Syrian conflict went through several stages, from silence to explicit neutrality to the effective condemnation of the regime’s practices, when the movement decided to exit Syria. This stance reached the point where Khalid Mashal clearly stated, during the convention of the Turkish Justice and Development Party in Ankara on September 30, 2012, that Hamas stood on the side of the revolution of the Syrian people. Many viewed this statement as the final break between the movement and the Syrian regime, which had been avoided for over a year and a half. Generally speaking, however, Hamas’ stance (as the largest Palestinian faction in Syria) contributed to delaying the expression of the radical positions of some groups that support the regime, especially within the Alliance, which was effectively led by Hamas. Hamas’ position, with that of Fatah, contributed to creating the Palestinian political neutrality during the Syrian crisis. Still, Hamas was exposed to harsh criticisms from both camps in Syria, unlike Fatah. Given the weight of the movement in the Syrian street, the neutral position of Hamas was not well received by the Syrian regime, which viewed it as an act of ingratitude. Similarly, Hamas was attacked by the Syrian opposition, which viewed its position as an abandonment of the revolutionary principles that it is expected to represent, as a movement of national liberation.47 Hamas’ vision for a solution in Syria went through two main stages. In the first stage, the priorities of the movement consisted in finding a political solution to the events, especially in the early days. It was proposed that Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas, should mediate with the protesting groups in Deraa and in Douma, due to the popularity of Mashaal in the Syrian street and especially in those regions. Mashaal agreed to do this only if he received reassurance from President Bashar al-Assad that the demands of the protesters would be met. Al-Assad had been boycotting Mashaal since the early weeks of the crisis after Mashaal rejected his request to respond to Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who supported the revolution from the beginning and who 47 This irony was not lost on the media of both sides, especially on social-networking websites. The leadership of the Syrian opposition attacked Hamas’ stances, accusing it of betraying its revolutionary background, while pro-regime figures also criticized Hamas and described it as ungrateful. 22 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION used his Friday sermons to incite actions against the Syrian regime.48 As a result, the mediation proposal was never implemented.49 Subsequently, there were other attempts to resolve the situation politically, led by different factions of the larger “resistance camp,” in particular Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon, and these initiatives continued until the late stages of the crisis.50 These attempts were unsuccessful due to several reasons: the absence of guarantees on the part of the regime, the inability for protesters to produce a unified forum to speak on behalf of the Syrian revolution, and the simple fact that it became too late for a negotiated solution. This was especially true during the later phases when the rate of daily killings increased sharply, making the idea of discussions toward a political solution moot and futile. In the second stage, Hamas became convinced that it was difficult to find a political resolution to the crisis, which was expressed through its decision to withdraw its leaders from Syria. This episode ended with Khaled Mashaal’s refusal to meet with President Assad, upon the President’s request, on January 14, 2012. Mashaal had met with Ali Mamluk, the head of Syrian intelligence, who transmitted the President’s request to Mashaal, but Mashaal refused to meet with Assad and left Damascus definitively on January 17.51 Several factors can help explain Mashaal’s rejection to meet with Assad. Hamas’ believes that the regime has nothing to offer toward resolving the crisis except for the “security solution,” whose machine of death was ceaselessly at work. Thus, the meeting would have taken place for the simple purpose of media exploitation, with the regime attempting to market the conspiracy narrative among public opinion. In addition, Hamas desires to improve its political position by expressing its rejection of the regime’s practices toward the Syrian people. Ultimately, this constituted a retort to the President’s boycott of Hamas since the beginning of the crisis. See “Mashaal and Hamas, the Journey of a Lifetime: Mashaal and the Syrian Crisis,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), September 9, 2011. 49 See Sami Kulaib, “Hamas and Syria: a Distance but not a Discord,” As-Safir (Beirut), August 2, 2012. 50 See Qasim Qaseer, “A Delegation from Hamas Meets Nasrallah in Order to Formulate an Initiative Toward the Syrian Crisis,” As-Safir (Beirut), August 2, 2012. 51 See Muhammad al-Najjar, “Mashaal Avoided Meeting with Assad Prior to Leaving Damascus,” alJazeera (Amman), February 9, 2012. 48 23 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES This period ended with Mashaal’s speech in Ankara where he announced that Hamas was supporting the revolution. By that stage, Hamas was utterly convinced of the futility of political initiatives. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – the General Command The PFLP-GC is the Palestinian faction that is closest to the policies of the Assad regime. It is a paradox why the PFLP-GC is seen by the Syrian regime as more dependable that any other Palestinian organization, including al-Saiqa, which is the military arm of the Palestinian branch of the Baath party, and which is under the complete control of the Syrian regime. This may have to do with the historical alignments within the Baath party, such as the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War. Al-Saiqa was created by Salah Jdeed, Hafez al-Assad’s main competitor within the party, who was excluded and imprisoned by Assad when he reached power in 1970 as part of the so-called “Corrective Movement” in the Baath party. The position of the PFLP-GC has a certain degree of importance in Syria. Despite the weak and symbolic presence of the organization inside Palestine, its presence in Syria is the strongest and largest in comparison to its presence in other countries, in addition to the fact that it possesses considerable military resources and experience. Thus, the stance of the PFLP-GC has a direct impact on the course of events in Syria. The PFLP-GC has adopted two simultaneous positions since the beginning of the events: individually it asserted the truth of the regime’s narrative, which can be seen in its statements and media but when taking collective stances with other Palestinian factions, the organization stuck to the position of neutrality.52 Many rumors spread at the beginning of the crisis claiming that elements of the PFLP-GC were involved in suppressing Syrian protesters along with Syrian security forces; these rumors, however, were untrue. They likely resulted from the statements and the stances of the organization’s leadership opposing the Syrian revolution, in addition to its military readiness around its offices on Fridays following the attack on its headquarters. These rumors were strengthened by the fact that Syrian security forces often stopped by the positions of the PFLP-GC, particularly in the Yarmuk Camp, and used them as a location 52 The widely popular al-Quds Radio, which is affiliated with the PFLP-GC, is the only licensed political radio station in Syria apart from the government media; since the beginning of the crisis, the station has mirrored the regime’s narrative. 24 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION to rest their troops. However, there is no proof that the PFLP-GC participated in regime repression in that early phase. Two important junctures prompted the PFLP-GC to sense a looming danger and to definitively end its neutrality and take position on the regime’s side. The first was the incident of the Khalsa building in the Yarmuk Camp, when the PFLP headquarters was besieged and torched. The second incident was that of the kidnapping and murder of the Palestinian Liberation Army recruits, and the events that followed in Yarmuk Camp. These two events forced the PFLP-GC to review its stance – which had consisted of supporting the media narrative of the regime – and to take practical steps such as the creation of the armed security committees within the camps, despite the opposition of the other Palestinian factions and their refusal to participate in these committees. The Syrian revolutionaries viewed these security committees as another facet of the regime, especially in the Yarmuk Camp. The position of the PFLP-GC was based on two main considerations. Unlike Hamas, the PFLP has no alternatives if the regime were to fall; the Syrian regime represented the sole wager of Ahmad Jibril’s organization and it could not afford its collapse. Secondly, the Syrian regime sponsored the PFLP-GC since its founding and provided great support to it, including financial support; such aid had stopped flowing from all donors except for Iran and Hezbollah.53 These were the most notable stances adopted by the main Palestinian actors. The other Palestinian factions merely mirrored or reiterated the positions of the above organizations in accordance with their perspectives and alliances. Palestinian Fatalities during the Events in Syria Since the early events in Deraa, the number of Palestinian fatalities has been increasing and has reached, as of December 31, 2012, 851 dead documented by name as well as location and time of death.54 In addition to these, a number of Palestinian fatalities were not registered due to the security situation of their families or to the lack of an 53 Despite the fact that the Islamic Jihad Movement faces similar financial constraints, its position does not resemble that of the PFLP-GC, which may be due to the real popularity of the Islamic Jihad inside Palestine, which provides it with an important guarantee in case its alliance with the regime collapses. 54 This figure includes the 27 Palestinian who were killed on the border with the Golan Heights. These statistics have been documented by the Working Group for the Palestinians of Syria (London) until the date of December 31, 2012. 25 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES agency documenting all the Palestinian victims. More thorough statistics may thus be found in a field survey that was conducted by the author from the beginning of the events, based on reports from the areas inhabited by Palestinians. The first of the Palestinian fatality was Wissam al-Ghoul from the Deraa Camp, who was killed on March 23, 2011 while attempting to help injured people in the Deraa alMahatta district, making him the 65th victim of the Syrian Revolution. The following facts and figures are relevant. The number of documented Palestinian fatalities (851) represents 1.77percent of the total number of registered Syrian fatalities, which exceeds the percentage of camps’ population out of the total population (1.2percent).55 On the other hand, Palestinian refugees make up 2.1percent of the total Syrian population, which is somewhat closer to the percentage of Palestinian fatalities out of the total number of those killed throughout the events. Over three quarters of Palestinian victims died during the last five months of the survey, compared to 60percent of Syrian fatalities who died during the same time period. Damascus and its countryside had the largest share of Palestinian fatalities, since they host 75percent percent of the Palestinians in Syria, followed by the Deraa governorate. The Yarmuk Camp, which houses a quarter of all Palestinian refugees in Syria, registered the largest number of Palestinian fatalities, followed by the Deraa Camp, which houses no more than 2percent of the total number of Palestinian refugees in Syria. The greatest percentage of those killed died due to bombardment, followed by those dying from gunshot during a demonstration or a clash, and those who fell to sniper fire. A portion of the fatalities were killed in field executions. Generally speaking, these facts can be interpreted as follows. The Palestinian popular position is close to the Syrian popular position, which is proven by the comparable percentages of dead among Syrians and Palestinians, as well as comparable locations and circumstances of death. Similarly, the numbers of Palestinian and Syrian victims rose simultaneously and at a similar rate during the past few months. The percentage of Palestinian victims thus ends the debate over the Palestinian position as with or against the regime. These figures are more significant than official statements and political communiqués, and better reflect the situation on the ground. These figures 55 See the database of the Martyrs of the Syrian Revolution: www.Syrianshuhada.com. It must be noted that this website does not record the names of all Palestinian martyrs because it relies on the statements and reports of the revolutionary coordination committees, which are usually outside the camps. 26 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION show the interconnection between the two peoples, which have lived together for over six decades. Graph 1: The chronological distribution of Palestinian fatalities in Syria 144 141 144 100 97 70 30 28 16 7 1 5 4 13 12 1 3 4 4 13 7 5 Source: Graph drawn by the author based on field statistics and a list of names of victims prepared by the author and a network of correspondents affiliated with the Workgroup for the Palestinians of Syria.56 The graphs in this study were prepared based on a detailed list of martyrs’ names, compiled through field monitoring conducted in areas of Palestinian presence in Syria, which were organized by the author who instituted a network of volunteers. The work was then continued by the Working Group for the Palestinians of Syria through its correspondents who live in all Palestinian camps and areas. The Working Group is a Palestinian organization founded in London in early October 2012 by a number of Palestinian and Arab figures as well as various human rights groups, with the aim of following the Palestinian dossier in Syria through documentation and the media. The Working Group acts through a network of correspondents in Syria who are distributed among 46 residential areas representing all the Palestinian concentrations in Syria, within and outside the camps. 56 27 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Graph 2: The distribution of Palestinian fatalities in Syrian governorates 422 179 93 37 31 27 19 19 16 3 Source: Graph drawn by the author based on the list of names of Palestinian victims in the Syrian revolution until December 31, 2012. 28 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION Graph 3: The distribution of Palestinian fatalities in the Palestinian camps and neighborhoods in Syria 313 60 38 23 23 17 11 8 6 6 6 3 2 4 1 1 Source: Graph drawn by the author based the list of the names of the Palestinian victims in the Syrian revolution until December 31, 2012. 29 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Graph 4: The cause of death of Palestinians in Syria 263 196 133 115 55 27 14 13 16 7 5 2 2 1 1 1 Source: Graph drawn by the author based the list of the names of the Palestinian victims in the Syrian revolution until December 31, 2012. Palestinians in Syria and the Experience of Repeated Displacement Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Jordan Palestinians took refuge in Syria in 1948, and their numbers at the time stood at 90,000. A large portion of these decided to live in the southern part of the Golan Heights, near Palestine. However, these Palestinians were to experience repeated displacement: they were forcibly displaced into Syria after the 1967 War, when the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights expelled much of its Syrian and Palestinian population. Today, such forced displacement is repeating itself in different forms. Starting in the early days of the events and the escalation of violence in Deraa, many 30 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION Palestinian families residing in the Deraa al-Balad neighborhood left the country toward Jordan along with their Syrian neighbors. Since Palestinians need a visa to enter Jordan, some of the displaced Palestinians passed into the country through illegal points of entry. With the worsening of the situation in Deraa and other parts of Syria, thousands of Syrian families arrived in Jordan along with a number of Palestinian families, who were separated from the camps of the Syrian refugees in Jordan and were subjected to special measures by the Jordanian authorities, which refused to apply the Takfeel system to the displaced Palestinians in Jordan.57 The Takfeel system allowed Jordanian individuals to guarantee and thus provide a visa to Syrians in exchange for money. The Palestinians who fled from Syria to Jordan were thus confronted with yet another hurdle, for not only were they excluded from the Takfeel system, but they were also threatened with being deported back into Syria.58 Furthermore, the Jordanian authorities discussed the possibility of re-deporting the Palestinians arriving from Syria toward the Palestinian occupied territories or any other third country, if large numbers began flowing into Jordan.59 Indeed, Jordanian authorities did deport a number of families carrying Egyptian travel documents to the Gaza Strip via Egypt, but these moves were met with reservations on the part of Egyptian authorities.60 Despite many calls by humanitarian and legal organizations demanding that Palestinians fleeing Syria be given the status as refugees that is afforded to them by international law, the Jordanian Interior Ministry issued a memorandum affirming the adoption of special measures toward Palestinians.61 The Jordanian authorities instituted the “ Takfeel” (sponsorship) system for the Syrian refugees who crossed the border and entered the refugee camps in Jordan illegally. The system allowed any Jordanian citizen to “sponsor” a Syrian family in exchange for a symbolic sum of money, permitting the Syrians to freely travel within the Hashemite Kingdom. Palestinians from Syria, however, were deprived from this right. 58 See the Human Rights Watch report on the conditions of Palestinian refugees who fled from Syria to Jordan, on the HRW website (Geneva), July 4, 2012: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/04/jordan-biassyrian-border 59 See “Jordan Discusses the Redeportation of Palestinians if Large, Uncontrollable Inflows Begin Entering the Country,” Dunia al-Watan website, September 23, 2012. 60 See “Egyptian Diplomat Saying That the Transport of Palestinian Refugee Families from Jordan to the Gaza Strip Requires Careful Security Planning,” United Press International (Amman), September 1, 2012: http://arabic.upi.com/News/2012/08/30/UPI-56051346325729./ 61 See “The Memorandum of the Jordanian Interior Ministry Regarding the Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees from Syria from the ‘Takfeel’ System,” al-Arab al-Yawm, July 25, 2012. 57 31 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Palestinian refugees from Syria to Jordan are still housed in the Hawsh al-Bashabsha and Cyber City camps, which do not provide the minimal requirements for humane living.62 Recently, the Jordanian authorities have permitted families newly arriving in Jordan to enter the Zaatri Camp; the number of those families has reached 420 according to some press reports, while official statistics speak of only 160 families.63 The difference in figures is mainly due to the fact that many Palestinian families that sought refuge in Jordan forged their identity documents to present fake Syrian documents, in order to be treated like Syrian refugees. Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Lebanon Hundreds of Palestinian families fled to Lebanon through the Masna border crossing. Most of these families settled in the Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps with relatives and friends, while some families temporarily rented homes. The number of Palestinian families in Lebanon’s camps reached 2,370 by September 24, 2012.64 This number is likely to be lower than the real figure, because it is limited to the families residing in the camps, while a number of Palestinian families found lodging in Lebanese neighborhoods. Due to the absence of a clear policy toward refugees in Lebanon, where they are not as carefully counted as in Turkey and Jordan, it is impossible to determine the real number of Palestinians in Lebanon except through figures given by the Lebanese border authorities. Palestinian families taking refuge in Lebanon have faced a number of problems, the most notable of which were the following. Firstly, they were unable to remain in the homes of friends and relatives in the camps due to the poor means of the host families and the long duration of the crisis. In addition, the vast majority of families were poor, and local and international official bodies needed to provide them with their basic rights were missing. Housing for families 62 See the Amnesty International report on the subject published on July 24, 2012, prepared by Nur al- Bazzaz, member of the Syria research team in Amnesty International, “Trapped – Palestinian refugees from Syria talk to Amnesty International”, http://livewire.amnesty.org/2012/07/23/trapped-on-syriasborder/ 63 See Baraa al-Halabi, “The Coordinator of the Working Group for Palestinians in Syria: Constraints and the Security Situation Make Relief Efforts Difficult,” al-Mustabqal (Beirut), October 6, 2012. 64 No official statistics exist for Palestinian refugees outside the camps. These figures are based on an internal report for the popular committees of the PLO, which oversee the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the Office of Refugee Affairs in Hamas; see Laji.net, September 24, 2012: http://www.lajinet.net/arabic/Default.asp?ContentID=11297&menuID=20. 32 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION was generally unavailable, unlike in Turkey and Jordan; families therefore relied on charitable organizations and popular committees inside the camps. Finally, all refugee families face a legal problem regarding the length of their legal stay in Lebanon, which is set at 28 days, as the Lebanese government considers the entry of these Palestinians to be regular visits, not the result of an emergency. A memorandum was issued by the Lebanese General Security in mid-September 2012 waiving the fines for those who exceeded their visa limits, for one month only.65 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Turkey Due to the fact that 90 percent of Palestinian refugees reside in Damascus and its southern suburbs, the natural migration movement is usually toward Lebanon and Jordan. The number of Palestinian refugee families in Turkish camps therefore does not exceed ten, most of which arrived in Turkey in August 2011, when the Raml Camp of Lattaqiya was bombarded. On the other hand, there were Palestinian families that arrived in Turkey from Syria through airports with a valid visa; these are residing in Turkey without being registered in the refugee lists. Recently, human trafficking through Turkey has become a flourishing industry, with Palestinians being the main customers, since unlike Syrians they can only enter Turkey with a valid visa. Turkey is their intermediate stopover before being smuggled into Europe. They often pay huge sums to reach Europe through Turkey, sometimes exceeding 12,000 euros.66 At times, the migrants even pay with their own lives, as was the case with passengers on a boat transporting Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi emigrants to Cyprus and which sank on the way.67 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to Gaza Many families have reached the Gaza Strip through the Cairo Airport, the majority of which are holders of Egyptian travel documents or Palestinian passports issued in See “The Lebanese General Security exempts the Palestinians Who Took Refuge from Syria in Lebanon from delay fines for a Month,” al-Quds News Agency (Beirut), September 17, 2012: http://www.alqudsnews.net/i/14134. 66 This information is based on three interviews conducted in Istanbul by the author with Palestinians who had fled from Syria to Turkey and are now waiting to be smuggled into Europe, conducted on September 14, 2012, September 21, 2012 and October 10, 2012. 67 See “Syrians Escape the Bullets of Assad by Air, Land, and Sea,” al-Arab (Qatar), September 6, 2012. 65 33 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Gaza.68 The majority of these families were originally residents of the Gaza Strip, but had moved to Syria many years ago. Other families went to Gaza since it was the only refuge available to them. In total, around 105 Palestinians arrived in Gaza from Syria. 69 Palestinian Refugees from Syria to other countries Given the current bleak reality in Syria, leaving Syria has become an obsession for every Palestinian, dreaming of leaving in search of a setting with a modicum of security and safety. Arguably, due to the difficulty Palestinians face in obtaining a visa for any country, their suffering exceeds that of average Syrian citizens in this regard. As a result, a number of Palestinian families have arrived in Libya, while others were able to reach Scandinavia and other European countries. The majority of these have arrived through illegal means in order to apply for humanitarian asylum. There are no clear figures on this topic due to the difficulties of collecting statistics and the fact that no official bodies have taken on the task. Summary The findings in this analysis can be summarized as follows;     Since the start of the events, Palestinians in Syria have been at the heart of the Syrian crisis, whether through their political or field humanitarian presence. Palestinians have been affected by the events in Syria but remain unable to influence them. The proportion of Palestinian fatalities compared to Syrian fatalities shows a strong social cohesion between the two groups, and reflects a popular Palestinian political stance that is in accord with the sentiments of the Syrian street. A gap is clear between the position of Palestinian activists vis-à-vis the revolution and that of the Palestinian political leadership – the street tends to be See “Tens of Palestinians from Syria Arrive in Gaza,” Quds Press Agency, July 23, 2012: http://www.qudspress.com/?p=129035. 69 See “The Arrival of 105 Palestinians into Gaza from Syria,” al-Khaleej (Al-Shariqa), July 24, 2012. 68 34 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION   dominated by emotional factors, while politicians calculate the rational interests in any given situation. The Palestinian presence in Syria is not influential at the demographic level, but is influential at the political level due to the importance of the Palestinian cause for both sides of the conflict. The suffering of Palestinian refugees who have fled Syria to surrounding countries exceeds that of Syrian refugees due to legal hurdles and political difficulties. Conclusion Throughout the past decades, Palestinian-Syrian relations have gone through several phases. The Syrian state has always maintained a long arm within the Palestinian community through developing alliances and nurturing pro-Syrian factions, or through the exploitation of the Palestinian presence in Syria. This background may explain the sensitivity of this relationship, with the Syrian regime drawing a large part of its legitimacy from its political support of the Palestinian cause, in accordance with its foreign policy agendas. While the Syrian revolution has attacked Syria’s alliances with Iran and Hezbollah on the level of foreign policy, it has not extended the same negative view to the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian community has thus found itself in the throes of a difficult choice in terms of foreign policy. It is difficult to deny the role of the Syrian regime in supporting the Palestinian cause and Palestinian rights, at the same time it is impossible to deny the lack of Syrian people’s rights to freedom and to social justice. With the regime’s adoption of a security solution to the crisis in the street, the Palestinian community found itself marching in tandem with the Syrian people, which has also received and embraced the Palestinians since the 1948 Nakba. Furthermore, given the injustices that Palestinians have faced throughout their recent history, and the fact that their demanding of their rights was always faced with repression and murder, it was nearimpossible for the Palestinians – a people undergoing a national liberation struggle – to support the regime in its current form. This has led the Palestinian community in Syria to pay a heavy price, which was no less than the price paid by the Syrian people in its quest to earn its freedom and dignity. 35