The Round Table The Shifting Tides of Pacific Regionalism

The Round Table The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs ISSN: 0035-8533 (Print) 1474-029X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20 The Shifting Tides of Pacific Regionalism Tim Bryar & Anna Naupa To cite this article: Tim Bryar & Anna Naupa (2017) The Shifting Tides of Pacific Regionalism, The Round Table, 106:2, 155-164, DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2017.1296712 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2017.1296712 Published online: 18 Apr 2017. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ctrt20 Download by: [University of Sydney Library] Date: 18 April 2017, At: 14:05 The Round Table, 2017 Vol. 106, no. 2, 155–164 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2017.1296712 The Shifting Tides of Paciic Regionalism Tim Bryar and Anna Naupa Paciic Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The current state of Paciic regionalism is faced with a range of external and internal factors that are acting to reshape the region and which call for a rethinking of Paciic regionalism. Within this context a range of new and in some cases reinvigorated groupings of political actors have emerged, seeking to inluence and shape the region. Interpretations of this plurality of political groupings difer, with some authors seeing it as a direct challenge to the previously existing regional order, while others argue it signals a return to a foundational Paciic voice in regional politics. This article suggests that the present plurality is more than resituating a ‘Paciic voice’ and is not necessarily a challenge to the existing order. Rather, the Paciic’s experience mirrors global trends in the evolution of regionalism as a practice, in which network diplomacy or coalition-building across the plethora of actors will become a predominant feature of new regionalism. Further, the authors argue that the Framework for Paciic Regionalism provides the platform for efectively navigating this new context through facilitating the politics of networks and coalitions to drive the shared interests of the region, and presents a shared platform to test paradigm-shifting ideas. Paciic; regionalism; diplomacy; Framework for Paciic Regionalism; australia; new Zealand; Paciic voice; self-determination Introduction [R]egionalism must be about improving the lives of the people of the Paciic … Regionalism cannot be pursued for its own sake. here must be some tangible beneit that it brings about. If regionalism is not doing this, then the strategy must be thoroughly evaluated. (Paciic Islands Forum Secretary General, Meg Taylor, DBE, 2015) For almost ive decades, the independent countries of the Paciic have addressed common interests through a variety of regional and, increasingly, sub-regional approaches. However, the current state of Paciic regionalism is faced with a range of external and internal factors that are reshaping the region and which call for a rethinking of Paciic regionalism. he direction such rethinking takes depends on where we focus our gaze and what we perceive the drivers of new forms of regionalism to be. For some, the current context in which a multiplicity of regional bodies are emerging – both political and technical, both regional and sub-regional – as well as new and shiting relations with external actors, is 21st century Paciic regionalism. Within this thinking, there is also a view that while the CONTACT Tim bryar [email protected]; anna naupa © 2017 Paciic Islands Forum Secretariat [email protected] 156 T. BRYAR AND A. NAUPA plural architecture may be new, its purpose and beneits are seen in a return to some kind of ‘original’ Paciic regionalism grounded in a singular ‘Paciic voice’ (e.g. Fry and Tarte, 2015). Yet another perspective views the current contestation over Paciic regionalism as a call to review the membership of key Paciic institutions (e.g. Tavola, 2015). We argue that the present plurality is more than resituating a ‘Paciic voice’. Rather, the Paciic’s experience mirrors global trends in the evolution of regionalism as a practice, in which network diplomacy or coalition-building across the plethora of actors will become a predominant feature of new regionalism. he Framework for Paciic Regionalism provides the platform for efectively navigating this new context through facilitating the politics of networks and coalitions to drive the shared interests of the region, and presents a shared platform to test paradigm-shiting ideas. It is in this context that this article explores where we have been, where we are at, and opportunities for charting where we could go. It begins by examining the diferent waves of Paciic regionalism since the founding of the Forum in 1971. he next section explores various factors driving the need to rethink Paciic regionalism and ofers a broader perspective for making sense of the present and identifying possibilities for rethinking regionalism. hrough the lens of the Framework for Paciic Regionalism the paper concludes by examining challenges and opportunities for delivering a truly paradigm-shiting Paciic regionalism that can meet the contemporary political and development challenges facing the Paciic. The First Wave: Self-Determination In terms of a political grouping, Paciic regionalism began with the establishment of the Forum in 1971. While Paciic Island leaders had long been meeting under the auspices of the South Paciic Commission (now the Paciic Community), the restriction on political discussion was increasingly untenable (Johnstone and Powles, 2012). At its core, therefore, was the desire to have a platform for regional political dialogue, which increasingly became a platform driven by the value of self-determination as decolonisation spread across the Paciic. In these early years, the six founding countries (Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand and Samoa) were soon joined by newly independent island states, reaching the full complement of 16 independent Forum members by 1980, when the youngest nation, Vanuatu, joined. At the time, colonies on the cusp of independence were aforded status to take part in regional dialogue with a nod to their imminent changing political status. he Forum’s membership arrangements were designed accordingly. he key characteristics of this irst wave of regionalism were a commitment to regional diplomacy and joint diplomatic eforts to advance common interests and take the Paciic voice to the world (Fry and Tarte, 2015). Such eforts focused on key priorities of the time, such as the law of the sea, nuclear testing, trade and the ongoing decolonisation of Paciic Island countries. The Second Wave: Regional Economic Integration As Fry and Tarte (2015) argue, in the mid-1990s through to the 2000s the focus of Paciic regionalism shited to regional integration and a new regional economic order along neoliberal lines. hey argue further that Australia was the interlocutor of the global neoliberal agenda in the region, but Morgan (2015) points out that Paciic Island governments themselves had a desire for closer economic integration in order to remain competitive THE ROUND TABLE 157 in a liberalised global marketplace. Similarly, newly independent Paciic Island states increasingly sought international legitimation through membership of global bodies that also encouraged neoliberal economics, such as the United Nations and the World Bank.1 herefore, it seems rather than necessarily being the interlocutors of a new regional economic order along neoliberal lines, Australia and New Zealand interests were to ensure they would remain a part of the new Paciic regionalism that was seeking to engage with the global economic order. For example, Morgan (2015) argues that Australia and New Zealand pressed hard to ensure they were included in any new regional free trade agreement, and Fry (1981) had earlier claimed that Australia provided funding for regional cooperation as a means of maintaining a favourable strategic position in the region. here is little evidence, then, to indicate that the absence of Australia and/or New Zealand would have prevented the Paciic from experiencing this second wave of regionalism. his is an important point as we relect on the ‘third wave’ or ‘new’ Paciic regionalism and the possibilities that it holds. A Third Wave of Paciic Regionalism? Nonetheless, Fry and Tarte (2015) describe this shit from the irst to the second wave of Paciic regionalism as moving the Forum away from its founding objectives, muting the interests of island states. In response, they suggest that the newly emerging ‘Paciic diplomacy’ – ostensibly the third wave – of the present reclaims these lost objectives of a Paciic voice. As they argue, the new Paciic diplomacy is evidenced by an array of new ‘Paciic-controlled institutions’ (Fry and Tarte, 2015, p. 7). We return to this issue later, but for now it is pertinent to point out that the position of this article is that the next wave of Paciic regionalism will relect more than simply a binary of ‘old and new’ drivers centred on the volume of a Paciic voice. Rather, the new wave of Paciic regionalism will be driven by political facilitation of the right coalitions and networks to address the persistent shared regional challenges that the previous waves of regionalism did not successfully address. To help relect on whether or not the Paciic is experiencing or transitioning to a third wave of Paciic regionalism it is pertinent to consider shits in regionalism in other parts of the world which closely mirror the shits in Paciic regionalism described above. he irst global wave of regionalism is deined as an inward-looking era of groups of nation states asserting authority over a deined region, similar to the self-determination drivers in the Paciic, and was a particular preoccupation of the Cold War era, fuelled by decolonisation around the globe. he second wave, which became known as ‘open regionalism’ or ‘new regionalism’, refers to an outward-looking period where regions sought to situate themselves strategically in the global politico-economic architecture. In this wave, regions are viewed as an extension of the global political agenda, which in turn was primarily determined by a small number of global political and corporate powers led by the US (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012). he synergies with the changes in Paciic regionalism are obvious here. Some now argue that the ‘third wave’ of regionalism has emerged in response to the failures of so-called ‘open regionalism’ exempliied by the recent global inancial, food and fuel crises (e.g. Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Bishop, 2015). he development challenges that have emerged from the irst and, particularly, the second waves of regionalism ‘call into question the basic viability of entire societies – or more accurately, those marginalised people and groups within them who have few escape routes from the most debilitating economic, social, political or environmental efects – and undermine the very basis on which any 158 T. BRYAR AND A. NAUPA meaningful process of development might be based’ (Bishop, 2015, p. 2). Not surprisingly then, a major feature of this third wave is an expansion of the referent away from globalised neoliberal models of development. For example, in Latin America Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012, p. 8) suggest that ‘open regionalism’ is now giving way to ‘a rich variety of forms of regionalism(s) that are moving beyond the issue of trade and inance, contesting the wisdom of neoliberal, market-led integration, and relocating the focus of regionalism as an extension of domestic rather than global politics’. hey argue that although this shit is unfolding in a mantle of abeyance and contestation to the US-led established model of ‘open regionalism’ that prevailed in the 1990s, nevertheless, new regionalist projects are emerging as something more than a context-dependent, ad hoc reaction to the collapse of neoliberalism (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012). If the global third wave of regionalism is characterised by an extension of domestic politics to the world, we can also see its Paciic manifestation in a shiting focus to a broader range of concerns beyond economic integration, particularly climate change, the Paciic Oceanscape, and sustainable development. Furthermore, as with other regions, contemporary Paciic regionalism is characterised by a plurality of political bodies in addition to the Forum. A core part of this shit is the movement away from state-centric regionalism to non-state-centric/multi-level/deep regionalism where the nation state competes alongside a plethora of other actors and interests in pursuing the creation of public goods. his is echoed in the contemporary Paciic regional landscape and the current preoccupation in forging a new Paciic regionalism that efectively responds to the most pressing shared issues. Indeed, parallels can be drawn between this inclusive, purposeful and engaged regionalism emphasised by the Framework for Paciic Regionalism and those states that have made signiicant development gains in recent times (e.g. China, Singapore, Brazil, or Mauritius). Such states actively sought to construct and sculpt the context in which their entrepreneurs, businesspeople and economic institutions are engaging in the world rather than remaining passive participants in the rapidly changing global order (Bishop, 2015). hese many similarities between global shits in regionalism and what is happening in the Paciic signal a shit to ‘deepening regionalism’, where networks and coalitions – across issues, actors and geopolitical contexts – will drive the politics of the region and provide opportunities for learning and sharing while at the same time holding on to what is unique to the region. However, as the following section suggests, this shit should not be interpreted simply as a reclaiming of a lost ‘Paciic voice’. Making Sense of the Current Context here are a number of factors possibly driving the need to ‘rethink’ Paciic regionalism in the 21st century, including shits in geopolitical power, poor development progress in the region, expanded membership of the Paciic Islands Forum to include French Polynesia and New Caledonia in September 2016 and cracks appearing within European Union regional integration, which has been the ot touted ‘model of regionalism’. A useful way to conceptualise these issues in the context of regionalism is the framework for assessing regional integration ofered by Lombaerde (2006). he framework consists of six categories: (i) actors; (ii) structural factors (e.g. the oten recognised structural constraints facing small island states); (iii) institutionalisation (e.g. treaties, agreements, or arrangements on common policies); (iv) implementation; (v) efects or outcomes; and (vi) interdependence (markets, migration of people, etc.). In summary, the actors and structural factors are the building blocks of regionalism, institutionalisation and implementation are the steps taken THE ROUND TABLE 159 Figure 1. Framing of contemporary Paciic regionalism. for deepening regionalism, and efects and interdependence are the results of regional integration. Perhaps an alternative way to visualise this framework for the purpose of the Paciic is to imagine these three factors as a fale (see Figure 1): (i) the base of the fale consists of the drivers of regionalism (actors and structural factors); (ii) the pillars rising from the base and supporting the roof are the governance and inancing of regionalism (implementation and institutionalisation); and (iii) the roof of the fale represents the efects or outcomes of regionalism. he following sections make use of this conceptualisation of regionalism as being multifaceted in order to rethink the current context of Paciic regionalism. The Drivers of Paciic Regionalism ‘Drivers’ refer to the factors that substantially inluence the motivation for deepening regionalism, which include actors and structural factors. Regarding actors, much recent academic and media discourse has suggested that a new Paciic regionalism is driven by membership debates (e.g. Tavola, 2015, Manoa, 2015). his perspective promotes a state-centric conceptualisation of regionalism that suggests a resurgence of the ‘irst wave’ of regionalism driven by a desire to deine a geopolitical region and to reclaim some sense of a ‘Paciic voice’. For example, although Fry and Tarte (2015) make a link to the neoliberalism of the second wave they nonetheless locate the core of the disenfranchisement with this wave of Paciic regionalism in Australia and New Zealand’s membership of key regional organisations. For example, in explaining how the emergence of the new political agenda in the region cannot be reduced to explanations based on Fiji’s suspension from the Forum or the increasing presence of China, each of the four alternative explanations centres on an imaginary ‘Paciic voice’ that is being thwarted by Australia and New Zealand. To support this claim, they cite: (i) the involvement of Australia and New Zealand in Forum deliberations which maintains, or reintroduces previously existing colonial hierarchies; (ii) the presence of Australia and New Zealand creates challenges for Paciic Island states seeking to use southern global coalitions to advocate for the ‘Paciic voice’; and (iii) the Australian and New Zealand-led second wave of regionalism that emphasised a neoliberal economic agenda at the expense of the ‘Paciic voice’. As an alternative, Tavola (2015, p. 33) suggests that a new regional architecture without Australia and New Zealand enables a more strategic link to the UN for Paciic Islands states. Furthermore, one could argue that the question of 160 T. BRYAR AND A. NAUPA membership and desire for greater autonomy is perhaps a driving force behind the increase in sub-regionalism and the emergence of alternative regional bodies. Regarding structural factors, another potential driver is the shiting global geopolitical landscape. he rise of China has seen an increased inluence in the region, as well as perhaps serving as the motivation behind the US repivot (O’Keefe, 2015, p. 126). However, such driving forces could also be understood from the perspective of structural factors, most notably the fact that the Paciic region is geographically situated between the two global giants. As Holtz et al. (2016, p. 3) wrote, ‘Politically, the Paciic is the border between East and West. It is probably the line of conlict of the 21st Century’. Other structural drivers of Paciic regionalism are the oten cited structural constraints facing the Paciic Islands region. Indeed, the Forum leaders’ common understanding of Paciic regionalism as stated in the Framework for Paciic Regionalism speciically notes the purpose of ‘overcoming common constraints’. Such constraints include high costs, poor transport services, distance from external markets, and exposure to frequent environmental disasters. It seems that previous approaches to overcoming these constraints have had limited or mixed success and such constraints are therefore part of the reason for the call for game-changing or paradigm-shiting solutions. For example, a key inding of the Paciic Plan Review (2013) was that Paciic regionalism needed more robust debate to drive genuinely game-changing results in terms of mitigating the region’s vulnerabilities and dependencies, which will otherwise hamper its social, economic and environmental well-being. Governance and Financing In September 2015, Forum leaders tasked the Forum Secretariat with undertaking an analysis of governance and inancing options for the pursuit of Paciic regionalism, in collaboration with member states, the Council of Regional Organisations in the Paciic and its member agencies. here are two central questions to be addressed. First, how do Forum member states link their regional priorities, determined at the highest level, to the governance of their regional organisations? Second, how do Forum member states collectively ensure inancing of the regional agenda? his latter question opens opportunities for Forum members to consider appropriate coalitions and networks that will drive solutions and respond to development challenges, such as possibilities for establishing a Forum core and expanding and contracting as necessary in relation to certain issues to comprise a ‘Forum plus friends’ coalition. It also opens conversations about efectiveness in the design of membership-based organisations to ‘solve problems’ that require efective collective action for a solution, as advocated by the 2013 Paciic Plan Review (Beattie, 2013). he issue of regional governance also includes the way particular political-economic agendas shape regional and national policies. Indeed, this is the dimension expressed by Fry and Tarte (2015) regarding the apparent imposition of a neoliberal agenda during the second wave of Paciic regionalism. hat is, governance in the second wave relected the establishment of a regional political-economic agenda leading to particular arrangements on policy coordination and integration in line with neoliberal capitalist principles. As discussed earlier, particular crises emerging from this global agenda have led to some regional groupings seeking an alternative form of political and economic governance, such as the Bolivarian Alliance in Latin America (Riggirozzi and Tussi, 2012), or the push for a green or blue economy in the Paciic. THE ROUND TABLE 161 The Outcomes of Paciic Regionalism he 2015 Millennium Development Goals Tracking Report (PIFS, 2015) indicates that the results for the Paciic region were, at best, mixed. Only one country, the Cook Islands, achieved all eight goals, while one failed to achieve any. he rest had mixed success. Furthermore, the Forum Secretariat recently summarised the outcomes of 27 diferent ‘state of the Paciic’ or Asia-Paciic reports undertaken in the last ive years, which revealed that economic growth in the region is volatile and weak and where growth is occurring it is not equitable or inclusive. As such, the current approach to economic growth in the region appears not to be providing a suicient basis for inclusive and sustainable development. Furthermore, there is increasing movement of people, particularly from rural to urban areas, driven by, as well as resulting in, socio-economic disparities. he impacts of climate change will not only lead to greater movement, but also particularly afect already vulnerable Paciic cities. While one certainly could not lay the blame for this state of afairs on Paciic regionalism, there is nonetheless an urgent need across the region for innovative approaches to promoting more balanced, resilient and inclusive models of development, and for reassessing the role that both state and non-state actors play in addressing these concerns. A key aspect of pursuing deeper regionalism is of course promoting particular forms of interdependence, such as market integration, political integration and the mobility of people in the region. Part of the explanation for why regionalism has oten failed to deliver desired outcomes is that regional integration has not been suiciently implemented. For example, one reason for the volatile economic growth in the region may be because the region’s markets are not efectively integrated. However, in line with global shits in regionalism, additional challenges remain for the Paciic to envisage other forms of integration that can beneit the region, particularly in terms of overcoming, or indeed reframing, common vulnerabilities and constraints. he vessel day scheme instituted by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), under which vessel owners can purchase and trade days ishing at sea, is a good example of innovative forms of integration for the beneit of Paciic Island countries beyond ixed geographically deined groupings. As former PNA Chief Executive Oicer Dr Transform Aqorau explains, ‘A grouping of countries coming together to form their own region to serve their own purpose should not be characterised by the size of the group, but by the purpose of their cooperative arrangement and the objectives which they wish to pursue’ (Aqorau, 2016). Re-Thinking the Present With this more comprehensive understanding of the components of Paciic regionalism we can begin to rethink the current state of Paciic regionalism. For example, it is argued here that a view of the current state of regionalism focused solely on membership (i.e. actors) displaces the unmet needs of the current development paradigm and the region’s vulnerabilities on to speciic actors. In this context, the search for innovative, paradigm-shiting policy options is limited by debates over ixed institutions and memberships. Additionally, emphasising the inclusion of particular actors as a threat to Paciic regionalism distracts the discourse from engaging in the politics of these actors’ networks, which the Framework for Paciic Regionalism facilitates, and underlies a new Paciic regionalism. 162 T. BRYAR AND A. NAUPA herefore, rather than an emphasis on membership as the cause of the apparent failure of the second wave of regionalism, we argue that the emphasis is more accurately placed on the failure in delivering development outcomes sought by the Paciic (that is, the outcomes of regionalism), given that this legacy of development challenges will need to be efectively addressed by subsequent waves of Paciic regionalism, in whatever forms they take. From the position of failed development outcomes, we can ask a number of questions based on the framework outlined above. Is it particular actors hindering the region’s attainment of these development objectives or is it the development paradigm itself? What impact has fragmented regional governance and inancing had on the progression of these objectives? Is it some combination of actors, failed paradigms and fragmented regional governance? Development diplomacy has long played a key role throughout all waves of Paciic regionalism, particularly in terms of serving the developing island states’ interests (Tavola, 2015). he new Paciic diplomacy will continue to be inluenced by these development aspirations, and more equally across all actors in the context of the post-2015 development agenda. Such diplomacy plays out on a number of stages – whether through the Paciic Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) grouping within the UN architecture or through regional or quasi-regional summitries, such as the Forum’s own Smaller Islands States grouping – where a ixed diplomatic group will not necessarily yield the most strategic outcomes for the Paciic’s development interests. he Paciic’s unmet development goals of yesteryear suggest that a new Paciic regionalism will need to provide opportunities for transforming the underlying model of development, as well as designing the right set of political relations to respond to the failures. Such a policy-centric driver of regionalism will require a broader conceptualisation of the part that actors and their networks and coalitions play in addressing speciic challenges. A Platform for Converging Interests In seeking a truly paradigm-shiting new Paciic regionalism, the Forum’s visionary Framework for Paciic Regionalism presents a platform for identifying, contesting and reining game-changing political interventions that bridge interests and resources across the actor–policy spectrum. It facilitates the engagement of multiple actors in regional agenda-setting while retaining a strategic gaze on achieving the four objectives of the framework through deepening regionalism: (1) sustainable development that combines economic, social and cultural development in ways that improve livelihoods and well-being and use the environment sustainably; (2) economic growth that is inclusive and equitable; (3) strengthened governance, legal, inancial and administrative systems; and (4) security that ensures stable and safe human, environmental and political conditions for all. Discussions about membership may be a necessary aspect of a maturing dialogue about Paciic regionalism (Tavola, 2015, p. 36), but this cannot be the end point. his new Paciic regionalism is about more than who the actors are in the region and increasingly about investing political energy in testing innovative, game-changing solutions to tackle the region’s contemporary challenges. A new Paciic regionalism will ideally aspire to move beyond regional identity politics and lit the strategic gaze to focus on facilitating a platform that harnesses political will – in our region’s interests – from those identiied as within the region, as well as beyond. It will involve driving the right relationships and managing the politics of networks and THE ROUND TABLE 163 coalitions to pursue the shared interests of the region, and retaining a shared platform to test paradigm-shiting ideas. A new regionalism will build beyond shared political and colonial histories towards a shared future, and ensure that the Paciic’s political currency, domestically and abroad, is optimised. In an increasingly complex global architecture, and within the delicate political dance of global powers, there is a plurality of political bodies in which a reimagining of Paciic regionalism must be strategically situated. Such plurality augurs a shit from the politics between nation states to the politics of networks and coalitions, inclusive of nation states. A luidity of alliances will be a likely common feature in the search for efective regionalism, and suggests a shit from a structural view of multilateralism (i.e. a focus on multilateral institutions as platforms for dialogue between nations) advocated by the US in the post-Cold War era to a new and emerging non-state-centric view of plural political relations. Regular calls to reform the UN, for example, highlight the growing global pressure to rethink formalised political arrangements and networks. A new Paciic regionalism must draw strength from plural networks, and will be facilitated through the Framework for Paciic Regionalism. In this environment, both sub-regionalism and expanded coalitions are a source of strength and advantage in addressing the Paciic’s vision for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity. Conclusion he Paciic region as a political bloc is poised to take of on a new wave of regionalism, one that breaks free from debates over institutions and membership in search of a more inclusive, agile and transformative Paciic regionalism. he success of any new Paciic regionalism will be measured by both its achievements against a shared policy agenda and its ability to be agile in forming appropriate networks for delivering this agenda. Indeed, Paciic Island leaders have recognised that Paciic regionalism now, and into the future, must be adaptable, innovative, inclusive, and most importantly, it must positively afect the lives of our people. It has been argued here that the Framework for Paciic Regionalism is the platform to facilitate a game-changing and agile Paciic regionalism. To echo Paciic Islands Forum Secretary General Meg Taylor (2015), regionalism must be about improving the lives of the people of the Paciic. Importantly though, the temptation to be resisted is viewing the Framework for Paciic Regionalism as a development plan or agenda. Rather, it expresses the political ambition of Paciic Island Forum leaders to navigate the Paciic through the global and regional geopolitical forces that afect our region’s ability to achieve a development impact for its people. his paper has argued that underpinning this political ambition must be a more agile Paciic diplomacy to enable our countries to navigate complex geopolitics and deal with a plethora of regional actors, to address persistent development challenges. his agility will emphasise mobilising actors, networks and resources around common issues, using political leverage where it makes sense – whether across issues, actors and geopolitical context, and whether it be at the regional or sub-regional level. he Framework for Paciic Regionalism provides the space for a political agility that actively engages with civil society and the private sector to address issues proactively. herefore, the newly emerging wave of regionalism maintains a people-centred lens and Paciic control of a regional agenda, it fosters wider political engagement, and it manoeuvres creatively through and around structures with 164 T. BRYAR AND A. NAUPA the common goal of improving the lives of our Paciic peoples. he challenge will be in fostering greater political appetite to test diferent development paradigms and ideologies to ind solutions to the region’s most pressing needs. Note 1. Notwithstanding movements within nations to explore alternative development models (including within the Melanesian Spearhead Group, led by Vanuatu, through work on Alternative Indicators of Development). References Aqorau, T. (2016) Dr. Transform: Why PNA is Succeeding, and the Look of Future Fisheries Management, http://www.pnatuna.com/node/362 Beattie, A. (2013) he Governance of Priorities, Financing and Performance in the Delivery of Public Goods by International and Regional Membership Organisations. For the Independent Review of the Paciic Plan. Suva: Paciic Islands Forum Secretariat. Bishop, M. (2015) Caribbean development in the midst of new regional and global dynamics. 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