Astrology and Pseudoscience

privatewww.essex.ac.uk

2006

Recent developments in science -particularly quantum theory -have been taken by some astrologers to herald a paradigm shift which would make it possible to validate and explain astrology as a science. The suggestion is made that this case is currently unconvincing. The realist (or foundationalist) model is considered as a philosophical tradition, with particular reference to Descartes. It is proposed that this tradition underpins much of the sceptical case against astrology (illustrated by reference to the work of Dean, Ertel, Kelly, Mather and Smit); but that its claims to provide a comprehensively explanatory model have been undermined by modern science. Two models of astrology -as an empirical science, and as divination -are considered. It is submitted for the reader's consideration that, by undermining the realist/foundationalist model, modern science (as defined in this paper) does make a contribution to the understanding of astrology; but that this is more supportive of astrology as a divinatory art than as a hard science.

2012

This is my MA thesis written in 2012 for the Central European University (Budapest, Hungary).

When I received the list of participants in this course and realized that I had been asked to speak to philosophical colleagues I thought, after some hesitation and consolation, that you would probably prefer me to speak about those problems which interests me most, and about those developments with which I am most intimately acquainted. I therefore decided to do what I have never done before: to give you a report on my own work in the philosophy of science, since the autumn 1919 when I first begin to grapple with the problem, "When should a theory be ranked as scientific?" or "Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?" The problem which troubled me at the time was neither, "When is a theory true?" nor "When is a theory acceptable?" my problem was different. I wished to distinguish between science and pseudo-science; knowing very well that science often errs, and that pseudoscience may happen to stumble on the truth. I knew, of course, the most widely accepted answer to my problem: that science is distinguished from pseudoscience—or from "metaphysics"—by its empirical method, which is essentially inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment. But this did not satisfy me. On the contrary, I often formulated my problem as one of distinguishing between a genuinely empirical method and a non-empirical or even pseudo-empirical method — that is to say, a method which, although it appeals to observation and experiment, nevertheless does not come up to scientific standards. The latter method may be exemplified by astrology, with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation — on horoscopes and on biographies. But as it was not the example of astrology which lead me to my problem, I should perhaps briefly describe the atmosphere in which my problem arose and the examples by which it was stimulated. After the collapse of the Austrian empire there had been a revolution in Austria: the air was full of revolutionary slogans and ideas, and new and often wild theories. Among the theories which interested me Einstein's theory of relativity was no doubt by far the most important. The three others were Marx's theory of history, Freud's psychoanalysis , and Alfred Adler's so-called "individual psychology." There was a lot of popular nonsense talked about these theories, and especially about relativity (as still happens even today), but I was fortunate in those who introduced me to the study of this theory. We all—the small circle of students to which I belong—were thrilled with the result of Eddington's eclipse observations which in 1919 brought the first important confirmation of Einstein's theory of gravitation. It was a great experience for us, and one which had a lasting influence on my intellectual development. The three other theories I have mentioned were also widely discussed among students at the time. I myself happened to come into personal contact with Alfred Adler, and even to cooperate with him in his social work among the children and young people in the working-class districts of Vienna where he had established social guidance clinics. It was the summer of 1919 that I began to feel more and more dissatisfied with these three theories—the Marxist theory of history, psychoanalysis , and individual psychology; and I began to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status. My problem perhaps first took the simple form, "What is wrong with Marxism, psychoanalysis , and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?" To make this contrast clear I should explain that few of us at the time would have said that we believed in the truth of Einstein's theory of gravitation. This shows that it was not my doubting the truth of those three other theories which bothered me, but something else. Yet neither was it that I nearly felt mathematical physics to be more exact than sociological or psychological type of theory. Thus what worried me was neither the problem of truth, at that stage at least, nor the problem of exactness or measurability. It was rather that I felt that these other three theories, though posing as science, had in fact more in common with primitive myths than with science; that they resembled astrology rather than

An online search questioning “is Astrology a science” will produce a long list of articles dismissing Astrology as a pseudoscience lacking any connection to science that has been tested repeatedly and failing all the tests carries no predictive capability. Nothing could be further from the truth. In this text I will comment on some of the history of Astrology and its link to modern Astronomy and Celestial Mechanics, how it relates to the Scientific Method used in all science research today and provide a model for the physics of Astrology using Conventional Science’s Electromagnetic Wave Physics to illustrate the way that the celestial bodies and our bodies are interrelated.

2020

This thesis discusses and gives philosophical context to claims regarding the truth-status of astrology-specifically, horoscopic astrology. These truth-claims, and reasons for them, are sourced from advocates and critics of astrology and are taken from extant literature and interviews recorded for the thesis. Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 The Aim, Background and Originality of this Thesis This thesis is an investigation of claims regarding the truth-status of astrology. These claims typically come from advocates of astrology and critics of astrology. The terms 'astrology', 'advocates of astrology' and 'critics of astrology' are defined in the next section; 'truth' receives an initial definition in section 1.7, and is further discussed and characterised throughout this thesis. The enquiry presented here has grown out of my book Astrology in the Year Zero, in particular my contention that any evaluation of astrology 'will be based on one's view of issues such as: what is real; how we acquire knowledge; and how our knowledge relates to reality. In other words, philosophical issues which are as old as philosophy itself.' 1 The implications of that suggestion are pursued in this thesis, in the context of Western philosophy. The period in which this thesis has been researched and written has coincided with considerable academic investigation into different facets of astrology; in the time since I began work on the thesis in 2003, PhD theses that deal to some extent with contemporary astrology have been completed by (in chronological order) Nicholas

2015

Academia Letters

Astrology (with alchemy) was the bridge between Aristotelian science and modern science, preserving the general Aristotelian framework, but opening the road to a science of the 'individuals'; beyond the classical science of the 'universals';. In Dante's Divina Commedia we can find also the beginning of an 'astral science'; which introduced the idea of science as a 'system'.

In this paper, I draw attention to a revolution in the metaphysical commitments of Western astrology. Although I do not wish to promote astrology, I propose a rational route to this revolution. But there is a strong argument, from a Popperian perspective, that my proposal fails to establish rationality. I then consider whether we should say that astrology is either false or unfalsifiable, drawing attention to some surprising findings from schizophrenia research. Also, in a footnote I present "Tompkins' paradox."