Causal Reasoning by Denise Cummins
People consider alternative causes when deciding whether a cause is responsible for an effect (di... more People consider alternative causes when deciding whether a cause is responsible for an effect (diagnostic inference) but appear to neglect them when deciding whether an effect will occur (predictive inference). Five experiments were conducted to test a 2-part explanation of this phenomenon: namely, (a) that people interpret standard predictive queries as requests to estimate the probability of the effect in the presence of the cause alone, which renders alternative causes irrelevant, and (b) that the impact of disablers (inhibitory causes) on predictive judgments is underestimated, and this underestimation is wrongly interpreted as cause neglect. Experiment 1 showed that standard predictive queries are frequently interpreted as requests to estimate the likelihood of E given C alone. In Experiment 2, a causal Bayes network overestimated predictive inference when it was queried in the standard way, but this overestimation diminished when predictive inference was queried using an alternative wording. In Experiment 3, participants judged alternative causes to be relevant to diagnostic inference and both disablers and alternative causes to be relevant to predictive inference. In Experiment 4, disablers greatly overshadowed alternative causes in predictive judgments, but their impact on diagnostic judgments was negligible. In Experiment 5, the order of disabler retrieval influenced causal judgments. Taken together, these results indicate that human causal inference cannot be adequately modeled unless the manner in which knowledge is retrieved and applied is taken into consideration. Causal inference is a fundamental and ubiquitous component of cognition. We use it continually to make sense of events in our lives, such as figuring out why our car did not start, or deciding whether we will lose weight by adopting a new exercise regimen. It constitutes the foundation of cognition and perception, binding together our conceptual categories, imposing structures on perceived events, and guiding our decision making. Reasoning from cause to effect (as in deciding whether exercise leads to weight loss) is called predictive inference. Reasoning from effect to cause (as in deciding whether one lost weight because one exercised) is called diagnostic inference. Normatively, alternative causes play a crucial role in both types of judgment. The greater the number, strength, and probability of alternatives causes for an effect, the more likely it is to occur, and the more likely it is that another cause may have been responsible for the effect rather than the one under consideration. Weight loss can be caused by many things other than exercising; hence, they should be considered when determining the likelihood that a person will lose weight even if the only thing we know for sure is that the person is exercising. Recently, Fernbach and colleagues (Fernbach, Darlow, & Slo-man, 2010, 2011a, 2011b) have shown that diagnostic inference is well captured by a normative probabilistic model that includes explicit parameters for the strength of a named cause and alternative causes, but predictive inference is best captured by a model that includes only the strength of the named cause. On the basis of this, they have argued that people do indeed consider alternative causes when making diagnostic judgments but routinely fail to consider such causes when making predictive judgments. They consider alternative cause neglect to be a bias in human predictive inference. The goal in the work presented here is to test two alternative explanations of this apparent alternative cause neglect in predictive inference. The first is a pragmatic explanation: People frequently interpret standard predictive queries as requests to estimate the probability that the cause alone can bring about the effect rather than the probability that the cause and/or others may bring about the effect. Because this common interpretation renders alternative causes irrelevant, people do not seek or consider them. The implication of this explanation is that when predictive inference is properly queried, consideration of alternative causes will be found to impact it. The second explanation is that the impact of disablers on pre-dictive judgments is underestimated by probabilistic models of causal inference, and this underestimation is wrongly interpreted as alternative cause neglect. Disablers are factors that can prevent an effect from occurring in the presence of a true cause, such as icy streets disabling a brake's power to bring a moving car to a halt or improper diet negating the impact of strong exercise on weight
Causal inference is a fundamental component of cognition and perception. Probabilistic theories o... more Causal inference is a fundamental component of cognition and perception. Probabilistic theories of causal judgment (most notably causal Bayes networks) derive causal judgments using metrics that integrate contingency information. But human estimates typically diverge from these normative predictions. This is because human causal power judgments are typically strongly influenced by beliefs concerning underlying causal mechanisms, and because of the way knowledge is retrieved from human memory during the judgment process. Neuroimaging studies indicate that the brain distinguishes causal events from mere covariation, and also distinguishes between perceived and inferred causality. Areas involved in error prediction are also activated, implying automatic activation of possible exception cases during causal decision-making.
Causal reasoning is the engine of scientific reasoning, the foundation of social policy-making, a... more Causal reasoning is the engine of scientific reasoning, the foundation of social policy-making, and the core process by which we make sense of events in our lives. We use causal reasoning to decide which factor produced an event in question, which manipulations will bring desired events about, and which will prevent undesired ones from occurring. The work presented here presents a model based on a framework proposed by Cummins (1995, 1997, 1998) in which activation of semantic memory components temper the inference process in order to produce sound reasoning. These components include plausibility of the purported cause-effect relationship, knowledge concerning alternative causes that could produce an effect under consideration, and knowledge concerning factors that could prevent or disable a true causal connection. Philosopher John Mackie (1974) called causation " the cement of the universe ". Causation constitutes the structural foundation of the physical and social worlds, binding events together in predictable and interpretable ways. It should come as no surprise, then, that causal reasoning is a fundamental component of higher cognition. We use it to make sense of events in our everyday lives as wide-ranging as why our car didn't start to why wars exist. Historically, the majority of research on causal inference in psychology focused on how humans (and non-human animals) determine which factors produced a given event, a process called causal attribution (
Evidence is presented that implicates two factors in deductive reasoning about causality. The fac... more Evidence is presented that implicates two factors in deductive reasoning about causality. The factors
are alternative causes and disabling conditions (factors that prevent effects from occurring in
the presence of viable causes). A causal analysis is presented in which these factors impact on judgments
concerning causal necessity and sufficiency, which in turn determine deductive entailment relations.
In Experiment 1, these factors were found to impact causal deductive judgments more
strongly than did logical form. In Experiment 2, causal deductive judgments were found to vary as a
function of familiarity with a particular causal relationship: The more familiar the causal relationship,
the less willing reasoners were to accept conclusions based on them.
Fairley and Manktelow (1997) have mistaken an error of presentation for an error of substance. My... more Fairley and Manktelow (1997) have mistaken an error of presentation for an error of substance. My causal theory
remains the same: Causal reasoning scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not an effect will occur in the presence of a viable cause trigger consideration of disabling conditions—that is, factors that could prevent the effect from occurring in the presence of a viable cause. Scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not a particular cause has produced an observed effect trigger consideration of possible alternative causes. The data reported by Cummins (1995) and Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist (1991) are consistent with this theoretical analysis.
An experiment was conducted to investigate the relative contributions of syntactic form and conte... more An experiment was conducted to investigate the relative contributions of syntactic form and content to conditional reasoning. The content domain chosen was that of causation. Conditional statements that described causal relationships (if (cause>, then (effect>) were embedded in simple arguments whose entailments are governed by the rules-oftruth-functional logic (i.e., modus ponens, modus tollens, denying the antecedent, and affirming the consequent). The causal statements differed in terms ofthe number of alternative causes and disabling conditions that characterized the causal relationship. (A disabling condition is an event that prevents an effect from occurring even though a relevant cause is present.) Subjects were required to judge whether or not each argument's conclusion could be accepted. Judgments were found to vary systematically with the number of alternative causes and disabling conditions. Conclusions of arguments based on conditionals with few alternative causes or disabling conditionswerefoun~d:tobe-rnore accept~ able than cdnclusions based on those with many.
Moral Reasoning by Denise Cummins
Although standard ethical views categorize intentional torture as morally wrong, the ticking time... more Although standard ethical views categorize intentional torture as morally wrong, the ticking time bomb (TTB) scenario is frequently offered as a legitimate counter-example that justifies the use of torture. In this scenario, a bomb has been placed in a city by a terrorist, and the only way to defuse the bomb in time is to torture a terrorist in custody for information. TTB scenarios appeal to a utilitarian “greater good” justification, yet critics maintain that the utilitarian structure depends on a questionable set of hidden assumptions. Three experiments were conducted to investigate endorsement of torture when these hidden assumptions were violated. In Experiment 1, results indicated that endorsement varied as a function of the success likelihood of torture and
its alternatives. In Experiment 2, people found torture to be more acceptable, less wrong, and more obligatory when the suspect in custody was described as a “terrorist” than when he was described simply as an individual, and when he was described as
culpable as opposed to innocent. These results are more consistent with retributive justice than utilitarian “greater good” concerns. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that utilitarian decision profiles were not associated with lower levels of empathic
concern but were instead associated with personal distress and the ability to transpose oneself into a fictitious character's experience. Across the three experiments, deontologists were more likely to reject torture than utilitarians.
According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid, affec... more According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid, affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision time is increased in order to resolve the conflict. Violations of deontological principles pro-scribing the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm are presumed to elicit negative affect which biases judgments early in the decision-making process.This model was tested in three experiments. Moral dilemmas were classified using (a) decision time and consensus as measures of system conflict and (b) the aforementioned deontological criteria. In Experiment 1, decision time was either unlimited or reduced.The dilemmas asked whether it was appropriate to take a morally questionable action to produce a " greater good " outcome. Limiting decision time reduced the proportion of utilitarian (" yes ") decisions, but contrary to the model's predictions, (a) vignettes that involved more deontological violations logged faster decision times, and (b) violation of deontological principles was not predictive of decisional conflict profiles. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that time pressure simply makes people more like to say " no. " Participants made a first decision under time constraints and a second decision under no time constraints. One group was asked whether it was appropriate to take the morally questionable action while a second group was asked whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the action. The results repli-cated that of Experiment 1 regardless of whether " yes " or " no " constituted a utilitarian decision. In Experiment 3, participants rated the pleasantness of positive visual stimuli prior to making a decision. Contrary to the model's predictions, the number of deonto-logical decisions increased in the positive affect rating group compared to a group that engaged in a cognitive task or a control group that engaged in neither task. These results are consistent with the view that early moral judgments are influenced by affect. But they are inconsistent with the view that (a) violation of deontological principles are predictive of differences in early, affect-based judgment or that (b) engaging in tasks that are inconsistent with the negative emotional responses elicited by such violations diminishes their impact.
Morality has long been considered an inherent quality, an internal moral compass that is unswayed... more Morality has long been considered an inherent quality, an internal moral compass that is unswayed by the actions of those around us. The Solomon Asch paradigm was employed to gauge whether moral decision making is subject to conformity under social pressure as other types of decision making have been shown to be. Participants made decisions about moral dilemmas either alone or in a group of confederates posing as peers. On a majority of trials confederates rendered decisions that were contrary to judgments typically elicited by the dilemmas. The results showed a pronounced effect of conformity: Compared to the control condition, permissible actions were deemed less permissible when confederates found them objectionable, and impermissible actions were judged more permissible if confederates judged them so.
Social Norms and Evolutionary Psychology by Denise Cummins
Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science, 2019
A theory proposed by Denise D. Cummins that interprets specific social cognitive functions as ada... more A theory proposed by Denise D. Cummins that interprets specific social cognitive functions as adaptations to the exigencies of living in a dominance (or status) hierarchy.
A social structure in which some individuals have priority of access to resources relative to oth... more A social structure in which some individuals have priority of access to resources relative to others.
Status hierarchies are ubiquitous in the societies of human and nonhuman animals. These hierarchi... more Status hierarchies are ubiquitous in the societies of human and nonhuman animals. These hierarchies constitute social norms that constrain behavior of individuals depending on their rank, dictating what is permitted or obligated in social interactions. They emerge as a result of individual differences in traits that impact access to resources, with higher-ranking individuals gaining priority of access to resources in competitive situations. Some of these traits that contribute to status acquisition and maintenance are physical in nature, such as size, age, and gender. Others pertain to social skills and cognition, such as skill at forming alliances based on reciprocal obligations, persuasion through oratory, or manipulation of beliefs through deception.
Reasoning about truth depends on executive functions that are applied broadly across domains and ... more Reasoning about truth depends on executive functions that are applied broadly across domains and develop slowly over the course of brain maturation and development. In contrast, deontic reasoning appears to benefit from specialized cognitive architecture that develops quite quickly in childhood to facilitate cognizing the social world.
Thriving in a complex social environment depends crucially on deontic reasoning. Humans and other... more Thriving in a complex social environment depends crucially on deontic reasoning. Humans and other social animals appear to be biologically
prepared to rapidly learn what is permitted and what is forbidden in a social group, and readily detect transgressions of social norms and contracts.
They also readily form alliances based on reciprocal obligations, and monitor transactional imbalances. These basic social cognitive functions
are, in a very real sense, what the social brain evolved to do.
An individual’s access to resources depends not simply on the availability of resources in the en... more An individual’s access to resources depends not simply on the availability of resources in the environment but also upon the individual’s place within the social group. Individuals are more likely to share resources with kin than non-kin. They are also more likely to share resources with non-related individuals if those individuals have shared resources with them in the past (reciprocal altruism). In competitive situations, some individuals achieve priority of access to resources, and are referred to as high-status or high-ranking individuals. Lower-ranking individuals improve access to resources by forming alliances with high-ranking individuals. In some species,
lower-ranking individuals also increase their access to resources by engaging in deception.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2007
Research in experimental economics suggests that decision making in strategic interactions is oft... more Research in experimental economics suggests that decision making in strategic interactions is often guided by a concern for fairness. However, experimental economics studies routinely place participants of equal social status and no prior social history in anonymous interactions, a context that would tend to foster the adoption of an egalitarian fairness norm. Extensive research in anthropology and psychology suggests that social norms, including fairness norms, are relationship-specific, raising doubts about whether the concern for egalitarian fairness observed in the experimental economics literature would generalize to a wider range of social relations. In this paper we focus on an alternative social norm characteristic of hierarchical relationships: noblesse oblige-the obligation of high-ranking individuals to act honorably and beneficently towards subordinates. In a series of five experiments, we show that the norm of noblesse oblige predicts tolerance of free riding better than individual self-interest does.
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Causal Reasoning by Denise Cummins
are alternative causes and disabling conditions (factors that prevent effects from occurring in
the presence of viable causes). A causal analysis is presented in which these factors impact on judgments
concerning causal necessity and sufficiency, which in turn determine deductive entailment relations.
In Experiment 1, these factors were found to impact causal deductive judgments more
strongly than did logical form. In Experiment 2, causal deductive judgments were found to vary as a
function of familiarity with a particular causal relationship: The more familiar the causal relationship,
the less willing reasoners were to accept conclusions based on them.
remains the same: Causal reasoning scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not an effect will occur in the presence of a viable cause trigger consideration of disabling conditions—that is, factors that could prevent the effect from occurring in the presence of a viable cause. Scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not a particular cause has produced an observed effect trigger consideration of possible alternative causes. The data reported by Cummins (1995) and Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist (1991) are consistent with this theoretical analysis.
Moral Reasoning by Denise Cummins
its alternatives. In Experiment 2, people found torture to be more acceptable, less wrong, and more obligatory when the suspect in custody was described as a “terrorist” than when he was described simply as an individual, and when he was described as
culpable as opposed to innocent. These results are more consistent with retributive justice than utilitarian “greater good” concerns. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that utilitarian decision profiles were not associated with lower levels of empathic
concern but were instead associated with personal distress and the ability to transpose oneself into a fictitious character's experience. Across the three experiments, deontologists were more likely to reject torture than utilitarians.
Social Norms and Evolutionary Psychology by Denise Cummins
prepared to rapidly learn what is permitted and what is forbidden in a social group, and readily detect transgressions of social norms and contracts.
They also readily form alliances based on reciprocal obligations, and monitor transactional imbalances. These basic social cognitive functions
are, in a very real sense, what the social brain evolved to do.
lower-ranking individuals also increase their access to resources by engaging in deception.
are alternative causes and disabling conditions (factors that prevent effects from occurring in
the presence of viable causes). A causal analysis is presented in which these factors impact on judgments
concerning causal necessity and sufficiency, which in turn determine deductive entailment relations.
In Experiment 1, these factors were found to impact causal deductive judgments more
strongly than did logical form. In Experiment 2, causal deductive judgments were found to vary as a
function of familiarity with a particular causal relationship: The more familiar the causal relationship,
the less willing reasoners were to accept conclusions based on them.
remains the same: Causal reasoning scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not an effect will occur in the presence of a viable cause trigger consideration of disabling conditions—that is, factors that could prevent the effect from occurring in the presence of a viable cause. Scenarios that require the reasoner to decide whether or not a particular cause has produced an observed effect trigger consideration of possible alternative causes. The data reported by Cummins (1995) and Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist (1991) are consistent with this theoretical analysis.
its alternatives. In Experiment 2, people found torture to be more acceptable, less wrong, and more obligatory when the suspect in custody was described as a “terrorist” than when he was described simply as an individual, and when he was described as
culpable as opposed to innocent. These results are more consistent with retributive justice than utilitarian “greater good” concerns. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that utilitarian decision profiles were not associated with lower levels of empathic
concern but were instead associated with personal distress and the ability to transpose oneself into a fictitious character's experience. Across the three experiments, deontologists were more likely to reject torture than utilitarians.
prepared to rapidly learn what is permitted and what is forbidden in a social group, and readily detect transgressions of social norms and contracts.
They also readily form alliances based on reciprocal obligations, and monitor transactional imbalances. These basic social cognitive functions
are, in a very real sense, what the social brain evolved to do.
lower-ranking individuals also increase their access to resources by engaging in deception.
2011 94–114) attempted to replicate the deontic reasoning advantage among preschoolers reported by Cummins (Memory & Cognition 24 1996 823–829) and by Harris and Nuñez (Child
Development. 67 1996 572–1591). Dack and Astington argued that
the apparent deontic advantage reported by these studies was in
fact an artifact due to a methodological confound, namely, inclusion of an authority in the deontic condition only. Removing this confound attenuated the effect in young children but had no effect on the reasoning of 7-year-olds and adults. Thus, removing reference to authority ‘‘explains away’’ young children’s apparent precocity at this type of reasoning. But this explanation rests on (a)
a misunderstanding of norms as targets of deontic reasoning and
(b) conclusions based on a sample size that was too small to detect the effect in young children.
to reason about deontic concepts, such as what is permitted, obligated, or prohibited. Despite this, very little is known about the development of deontic reasoning. Two experiments were conducted that contrasted children’s reasoning performance on deontic and indicative reasoning tasks (i.e., the reduced array selection version of the Wason card selection task). Like adults, children as young as 3 years of age were found to adopt a violation-detecting strategy more often when reasoning about
the deontic case than when reasoning about the indicative case. These results indicate that violation detection emerges as an effective deontic reasoning very early in human development.
that anything that increases the probability that a repetition will receive full processing, or conversely, anything that decreases the probability that the item will be recognized as a repetition,
should improve memorability of the item. The present set of experiments tested this prediction by manipulating the surface structure of repeated sentences. On the basis of previous research, it was assumed that memory for surface structure of sentences decays rapidly, and hence can contribute to initial identification of repetitions only at short spacings. Because this manipulation should hinder recognition of repetitions as repetitions, it was expected to induce full processing
of massed repetitions, and thus facilitate recall of these items. This prediction was supported. When sentences were repeated verbatim (Experiment 1) or by the same speaker (Experiment 2),
the typical spacing effect was obtained. However, when the surface structure or speaker changed at time of repetition, massed repetitions were recalled nearly as well (Experiment 1) or as well (Experiment 2) as their spaced counterparts.
In The Evolution of Mind, outstanding figures on the cutting edge of evolutionary psychology follow clues provided by current neuroscientific evidence to illuminate many puzzling questions of human cognitive evolution. With contributions from psychologists, ethologists, anthropologists, and philosophers, the book offers a broad range of approaches to explore the mysteries of the minds evolution--from investigating the biological functions of human cognition to drawing comparisons between human and animal cognitive abilities. This interdisciplinary work presents a comparative and evolutionary perspective on a wide variety of topics, including mental algorithms for reasoning about contingencies, quantities, social norms, and the minds of others; social play and communicative abilities; thought and language, and the role of Darwin's theory of natural selection in evolutionary psychology. Written in a highly readable style, The Evolution of Mind will appeal to a broad range of researchers and students and help set the agenda for the field for years to come.
Seven Powerful Ideas That Changed the World
1. Thinking can be automated so machines can do it, and insight is just subconscious thought.
2. You understand something best when you realize that "this is like that".
3. Some facts entail others, some don't.
4. To find out what's true, you should try to find out what's false.
5. To decide what causes what, you need to think of alternatives.
6. Making smart choices means figuring out what is mostly likely to get you what you most want--and realizing everyone else is doing the same thing.
7. Doing the right thing means doing what's best for everyone--while not crossing certain important lines.
After reading this book, you will know how the best and the brightest thinkers decide, argue, solve problems, and tell right from wrong.