Terrorism in Nigeria; The Case of the Boko Haram

Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: THE CASE OF THE BOKO HARAM Introduction Right from the dawn of modern society, the use of terror or violence has served various purposes for individuals, groups, and states. Its use may be for self-defence or to secure compliance to one s desire. Just as the use of terror is not fundamentally new, so does the idea of terrorism. 1 In recent times, however, the scourge of terrorism is gaining unprecedented concern among individuals, organizations, and states. Terrorism is spreading like wildfire across every part of the world, and its impact reverberates beyond the location of the actual incident. Thus, the growing incidence of terrorism has become a fundamental security concern to states. Efforts at combating it have equally assumed pronounced vigour and have opened new vistas. The acts of terrorism perpetrated by the extremist Islamic sect, known as Boko Haram (BH), are widely perceived as the greatest security challenge to Nigeria currently. I will therefore concentrate on the BH for at least two principal reasons. First, the sect existence and activities are well known than its breakaway faction, the Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (or Ansaru), which roughly translates as "Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa". Second, and as a corollary to the above, its violent exploits have earned it the official designation as a terrorist group in Nigeria, the US and Canada. For nearly a decade the group received very little attention from local and international media and scholars, even when it intermittently launched loosely coordinated hit-and-run attacks on police posts in remote parts of Borno and Yobe states, north-eastern Nigeria, between 2003 and 2004. The group attracted worldwide attention in July 2009, when it staged a violent anti-government uprising that killed over 800 people including civilians, group s members, and security personnel. The revolt attracted one of the heaviest and ruthless security crackdowns in Nigerian history. The five-day revolt ended only when BH s charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was captured and subsequently executed by the police while in custody. The events that occurred in 2009 are important for understanding the current phase of BH, particularly the cause of its grievance against the Nigerian government. The group felt that the killing of Yusuf under police custody was unjust and extrajudicial, and vied to avenge the death of their leader and other members who perished through 1 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 police shooting during the 2009 uprising. To this end, over the past years, the group s tactics have evolved from poorly planned open confrontations with state security forces to increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, ambush, drive-by shootings and suicide bombings.2 Its attacks have focused mainly on security and law enforcement agents police, soldiers, civil defence and prison warders, among others. Civilians, critical public infrastructure, community and religious leaders, politicians, centres of worship, markets, public schools, hospitals, tertiary institutions, media houses and other civilian targets that have nothing to do with the government have also been targeted. The insurgency, which started as a national crisis gained international character following four important developments. First, the alleged declaration in March 2010 by the BH, that it is joining Al Qaeda to avenge the murder of some of its members and leaders in a series of explosions across Nigeria.3 Second, the suicide attack at the United Nations building in Abuja, on 26 August 2011, demonstrated its tendency to target foreign interests in Nigeria. Third, the designation of three of its leaders Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi Abubakar as global terrorists by the US State Department on 21 June 2012, representing the international dimension of the group. Fourth, the 19 February 2013 kidnapping of seven members of a French family Moulin-Fournier family in Dabanga, northern Cameroon, by the BH. This presentation therefore is an analysis of BH terrorist activities in Nigeria. It focuses on, among other critical issues, its evolution and ideology; organisation and transformation; mode of recruitment and radicalisation; sources of funding; and operational tactics. It also highlights the various kinetic and non-kinetic counterterrorism measures adopted by the Nigerian government. It ends with some recommendations for strengthening responses to the crisis in Nigeria. Understanding the Boko Haram The exact date of BH emergence is mired in controversy. One can discern three major contending, though not completely exclusive, accounts of the historical root of the BH. The first or remotest account traces its origin to the Maitatsine uprisings of the early 1980s, inspired by Cameroonian dissident preacher Muhammadu Marwa. This account, which is common to the works of scholars focusing on Islamic revivalism in northern Nigeria, presents the BH as the latest incarnation of the Maitatsine, given that it shared with the Maitatsine the same ideological opposition to modernization and 2 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 abhorrence of anything perceived as Western.4 More so, it is claimed that Mohammed Yusuf s biological father was an active member of Maitasine group.5 The second or remote account traces its historical root to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlulsunna wal jama ahhijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maduigiri, Borno State.6 This account, which is popular with security and intelligence operatives in Nigeria, maintains that the sect operated as a non-violent movement until when Abubakar Lawan left to pursue further studies in Saudi Arabia. Mohammed Yusuf assumed leadership of the sect in 2002, shortly afterwards. The third or recent account of its emergence traces its origin to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as the leader of the group. This account, which is very common with the media, attaches special attention to the sect s exploits beginning from 2002 when it was referred to as the Nigerian Taliban .7 Notwithstanding the various accounts, the key to understanding the challenge posed by the BH lies on the life and death of Mohammed Yusuf. To be sure, since its emergence, the group has metamorphosed under various names like the Nigerian Taliban, Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah sect, BH and lately as Jama atu Ahlissunnah Lidda awati wal Jihad. Its metamorphosis over the years will be discussed in greater details later in the presentation. Boko Haram s Ideological Premise According to Sani, the ideology of the sect is premised on the orthodox Islamic teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which treats anything western as completely un-Islamic. 8 Such teachings forbid watching cinema, indecent dressing, attending mixed schools, and married women working in the same office with men, among others. The sect views western influence and model of democracy as having negative influence on Islamic society. It abhors conventional banking system, taxation, jurisprudence, civil service and western education as infidel or inimical with the tenets of Islam. It is this rejection of these [Western] institutions that earned the group its popular name Boko Haram, literally meaning Western education is forbidden . The term Boko Haram is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko, meaning book , and the Arabic word Haram, which means forbidden. A statement released in August 2009, by a self-identified interim leader of the sect, Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected the common media reference to the group as BH: BH does not in any way mean 'Western Education is a sin' as the infidel media continue to portray us. BH actually means 'Western Civilisation' is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression 3 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education. 9 He insisted that the group be called by its real name--Jama atu Ahlissunnah Lidda awati wal Jihad, meaning a "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". This new name signalled a corresponding shift in the programme of the group and a distinct radicalization, suggesting the community of the people of the Sunna who fight for the cause [of Islam] by means of jihad according to the method of the Salaf .10 By this name, the BH claims in a sense to be the supreme authority on the definitions of both Sunna and Islam , excluding all those who did not meet their own (rather narrow) definitions of the terms. In addition, the group s position has gone from advocating emigration to advocating jihad, jihad being defined as an armed struggle against the enemies of Islam.11 As Loimeier further noted, the reference to the salaf, the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, is a clear indication that BH propagated a rather narrow interpretation of the term jihad namely, the kind of armed struggle against (Meccan and Arab) unbelievers as fought by the followers of the prophet.12 Its ideology is therefore rooted in Salafi jihadism and its actions driven by Takfirism. Salafism seeks to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practiced by the pious ancestors , that is Muhammad and the early Islamic community. Salafi jihadism focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change. Under Shekau, BH Salafi Jihadi ideological strain is further intoxicated by Takfirism. The idea of Takfirism is derived from the Arabic word takfir pronouncing an action or an individual un-Islamic. Takfirism classifies all non-practising Muslims as kafirs (infidels) and calls upon its adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, settle in isolated communities and fight all Muslim infidels.13 The BH adherents see all those who did not subscribe to its strict interpretation of Islam as kuffar (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or fasiqun (wrong-doers), 14 making such individual or group legitimate target of attack by its members. Its core objective is to replace the secular Nigerian state with a strict Islamic Sharia law, applicable throughout the entire country. A member of the sect once stated that their mission is to cleanse the [Nigerian] system which is polluted by Western 4 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 education and spread Sharia all over the country .15 He also intimated that they are motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian state is a cesspit of social vices, thus the best thing for a devout Muslim to do is to migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society free of political corruption and moral deprivation .16 To conform to their Islamic dogmatic preaching, BH members are alleged to wear long beards, red or black headscarves and reject the use of certain modern (purportedly Western) goods, such as wristwatches and safety helmets.17 In contrast however, they do not abhor or refuse to use of goods such as motorcycles, cars, cellular phones, AK47 guns, and other technological product of Western civilization, which have aided their violent operations. Nature of Membership BH draws its members mainly from disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and former Almajiris, mostly from but not limited to northern Nigeria. Members have also come from neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Sudan. Former Almajiris form the bulk of its foot soldiers. The Almajiri here refers to children who in pursuit of high knowledge and Islamic purity leave their homes to take up residency with a senior or an elderly Islamic scholar. It is a popular and ancient Islamic practice whereby children are sent to live and study under renowned Islamic teachers in cities in northern Nigerian, such as Kaduna, Kano, Maiduguri and Zaria, among others. 18 Sometimes this is voluntary, but in most cases children are forced into Almajiri by abject poverty or orphanage. A survey conducted in 2011 by a 16-member Ministerial Committee on Madrasah education (Almajiri education) headed by Professor Shehu Galandanci has indicated that there are more than 9.5 million Almajiris in Nigeria. A region-by-region breakdown indicates the following: North-West zone hosts 4,903,000; North-east zone 2,657,767; North-central zone 1,133,288; South-west zone 809,317; South-east zone 3,327; and South-south zone 18,500.19 These Almajiris live and study in appalling social and economic conditions. They are often cramped into shacks or makeshift homes with little or no food or drinking water, forcing them to roam the streets begging for alms. Given their social and religious status, they are extremely vulnerable to religious extremism and financial influences. The sect s membership also includes some wealthy, educated and influential people. For instance, it is alleged that Alhaji Buji Foi, an ex-commissioner in Borno State; Kadiru 5 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Atiku, a former university lecturer; and Bunu Wakil, a very rich Borno-based contractor, are members of BH.20 The exact strength of BH is not known, but one analyst gave an outrageous of figure of between 280,000 and 1.5 million. 21 Although some Chadians and Cameroonians are part of the group, an estimated eighty percent of its members are believed to be of Kanuri tribe.22 Mode of Recruitment The BH employs various methods or modes in its recruitment drive. The methods or modes adopted have changed over time in response to the internal dynamics (such as leadership change) and external environment (crackdown by government) the group is faced with. These include recruitment through voluntary fellowship, birth, infection, forceful contagion, jail break, abduction, and enticement. I should add that its mode of recruiting and radicalising members for suicide terrorism, often take the form of the funnel method. A brief explanation is apposite at this juncture. The foremost members of the group joined out of their own volition. These are mainly young people (Nigerians and foreigners mainly Nigeriens and Chadians) who were attracted by the preaching of late Mohammed Yusuf, and voluntarily joined the group. They were subsequently indoctrinated by BH ideologues. Some current members were children of those who constituted the original followers of the sect. It is on record that members of the group were encouraged to marry among themselves, and the wives of members who lost their lives naturally or during clashes with security forces are known to be re-married to other BH members. The act of re-marrying the wives of their dead members may be to preserve the group s purity, cohesion, and possibly, continuity. In the infection method, BH scouts infiltrate the society and try to befriend their targets. Upon establishment of rapport, these susceptible individuals are further lured through assistance with start-up funds for small businesses before being fully integrated into the group. Some experienced BH scouts also approach and recruit young, impressionable Muslim devotees during prayer sessions at mosques in northern Nigeria.23 New recruits are often supported with rented apartments or stipends. The BH also launches prison-breaks to liberate detained members as well as recruit from prison escapees. Examples of such jailbreaks include the 22 March 2013 attack at Ganye prison, Adamawa State, where several prisoners were reportedly freed; the 24 June 2012 attack on Damaturu prison, Yobe State, where over 40 inmates were freed; the 17 February 2012 attack on Koton Karfe Prison, Kogi State, leading to the 6 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 escape of over 93 inmates; and the 7 September 2010 Bauchi Prison break, Bauchi State during which over 700 inmates were freed. Convicts or suspects of serious crimes such as murder and armed robbery are more willing to join the BH once they escape during jailbreaks. They prove useful as special units used for bank robbery to generate funds for the sect. Forced contagion is another mode the BH has used in recruiting members, especially since the escalation of the conflicts in 2011. By forced contagion, we mean a situation where an individual who is not originally a member of the group is compelled to join the group on the grounds that the individual is closely connected to one of their members, either by consanguinity (blood relation) or propinquity (close friend or associate) and has known so much about the sect (members, secretes or operations) that it is considered inimical to their own interest for the person not to be part of them. The confession of a detained BH member, Malam Bukar Modu, offers an insight into the mode of forceful contagion. He revealed that about a year before his arrest in October 2013, he was recruited into the sect by his cousin who had been hiding his gun in their compound in Maiduguri. At that time, his Cousin who is convinced that Modu knew all his secrets compelled him to join the group. He gave him two options: to either join the sect or be killed. Modu received an ``express training on the handling of AK 47 rifle as soon as he joined the sect.24 Another method the BH has adopted in recruitment is through abduction. Aware of the depleting of its fighters due to increased military crackdown, the BH began forceful recruitment of youths and women from vulnerable villages. While the young men abducted are forced to join the group mainly as fighters, abducted women are often forced into marriage with BH members. Fearing that some of its members who did not willfully join the group may abscond, BH commanders usually conduct roll-calls on a daily basis to prevent anybody from bolting. Those caught attempting to abscond are usually killed. While there is no evidence of female fighters among the sect as of date, it is possible that they may still be radicalised into taking combative or suicide operations in the future. For now, the BH has recruited women (sometimes wives of members) as arms couriers. The women hide AK 47 rifles on their backs covered with their veils (himar) or conceal IEDs on their backs as if they were carrying their babies.25 They receive between N5, 000 and N 50,000 ($30 and $312), depending on the mission and the location for the delivery of the guns and IEDs. 7 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 The sect has also used financial inducement or enticement to recruit vulnerable children that serve as spies, informants, and arms conveyers, among others. Recently, some children arrested by security agents (aged between nine and 15 years) revealed how BH operatives paid each of them N5, 000 (about $30 USD) to set schools in Yobe and Borno states on fire and also spy on soldiers. According to one of them We were taken to Damaturu. We watched out for the soldiers at their unit and reported back to them. We were reporting when soldiers were at ease or enjoying themselves and when they were off guard and we were paid for doing that .26 Suffice it to say that such children are not usually absorbed into the main fold of the BH but to help perform these criminal activities unsuspected of them. There is however growing concern that some children are being lured into combat by cash handouts offered by BH commanders. Mode of Radicalisation Radicalisation of BH members is achieved through two principal instruments: psychic conversion/brainwashing and violent compulsion. BH ideologues radicalise the members through psychic conversion and brainwashing. Once introduced to the group, members are denied the option of wilful disengagement. Those that have attempted to leave the group were murdered by other members. 27 The way BH ideologues selects members for suicide missions remain unclear to security agents and analysts. There exists conflicting accounts on how suicide operative are selected. The first account holds that suicide operatives are selected by Boko Haram leaders and who the lot falls upon must carry out the mission. On 1 February 2012, a detained BH spokesman, by the pseudonym Abu Qaqa, revealed to his interrogators that suicide bombers were chosen by their leader Muhammad Abubakar Shekau and once a person was chosen, he had no option but to carry out the assignment or face the death penalty.28 According to him, No suicide bomber of the group volunteers. They are usually handpicked. Once you are handpicked, it is death either way; if you refuse, you would be killed on the orders of the leadership .29 A contrasting account claims that suicide operatives are not compelled into undertaking such acts, instead they wilfully volunteer for the operation. In a telephone interview with reporters on 13 February 2012, a self-identified new spokesman of the sect, Abu Qaqa II , debunked the assertion made by the detained Abu Qaqa I that the sect handpicks or compels its members to carry out suicide missions.30 Abu Qaqa II instead queried that how can you force somebody who will gladly wave at his people with a smile before embarking on a suicide mission? 8 31 The claims by Abu Qaqa II on Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 willingness on the part of the suicide bombers perhaps was referring to the picture of a smiling Mohammad Manga, the BH operative that mounted the first suicide vehicleborne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on 16 June 2011 at the Police Headquarters in the Federal Capital city, Abuja.32 Although it is unclear which version of the claims on how the BH selects a suicide bomber is authentic, it is however obvious that suicide terrorism has become a dangerous weapon in the sect s operational repertoire. What is well known, however, is that such training and radicalisation takes places in terrorist camps such as the Sambisa Forest in Nigeria. The group is also known to use the internet for the propagation of its activities and enhance its radicalisation and circulation of extremist ideologies, with a view to recruiting persons who are sympathetic to its cause. Boko Haram s Sources of Funding Like other terrorist groups, BH sustains its operations through diverse sources of funding. The BH has developed such amazing capacity for financial adaptability that it continuously seeks out schemes to fund its operations in response to crackdown by the government. Some of the known financing streams of the BH include membership dues, engagement in legitimate business, donation, external funding, bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion. The payment of membership dues was the basic source of funding for the sect, particularly at its early stages. Before Mohammed Yusuf was killed, members had to pay a daily levy of 100 Naira to their leader.33 The known members then were predominantly peasant farmers, traders, road-side car washers, and commercial motorcycle riders or okadas. Some of the okadas were believed to be owned by Yusuf himself, who collected daily returns from them. Okadas became a central part of BH not only as a source of revenue but also for mounting operations, especially blazing attacks. However since the death of Yusuf, the activities of the sect have become more secretive making it difficult for researchers to investigate the kind of economic activities they are engaged in to generate funds and whether members still pay dues and the significance of such dues to the group s sustainability. However, a top military officer has revealed that the BH members now engage in legitimate economic livelihoods such as selling of GSM recharge cards in some cities in northeastern Nigeria to generate funds which are then remitted to the group for funding its activities. For instance, about 31 BH members were arrested in Jimeta, Yola, Adamawa State, in mid-2013, who were alleged to be involved in such business to generated funds to the group.34 9 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Donation from politicians, government officials and other individuals or organisations within Nigeria constitute another important source of funding. Donation to a terrorist group like BH is not new but what has been the most controversial aspect of BH funding have been the implications of politicians and some in government. This came to the fore on 21 November 2011, when state security operatives arrested, and subsequently arraigned a serving Senator representing Borno South Senatorial District, Mohammed Ali Ndume, before an Abuja High Court, for ties with and sponsorship of the BH.35 In addition, on 5 January 2011, security operatives arrested one Mr Alhaji Bunu Wakil and 91 other persons. Alhaji Bunu Wakil, who is a contractor and an indigene of Borno State, was alleged to be a major financier of the Islamic sect.36 The sect also receives external financial assistance for its operations. In 2007, for instance, (late) Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun, were tried for terrorism-related offences. Mohammed Damagun was arraigned in a federal high court in Abuja on three charges, including belonging to the Nigerian Taliban and receiving a total of US$300 000 from Al Qaeda, with the intent that the said money will be used in the execution of acts of terrorism .37 He was also alleged to have sent three young men Nura Umar, Abdul Aziz Hamza and Mohammed Ibrahim alongside 14 of their companions to receive training at the Ummul Qurah camp in Mauritania. Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on five charges, among which included receiving monies from Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, especially Americans living in Nigeria. 38 During an exclusive interview in January 2012, a spokesman for the sect, Abu Qaqa, told the Guardian Newspaper that BH members were spiritual followers of Al Qaeda and the late Osama bin Laden, and that their leader Muhammad Abubakar Shekau had met al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August 2011 and was able to obtain from Al Qaeda whatever financial and technical support the movement needed. 39 more concrete evidence in this regard emerged recently during the trial at the Federal High Court in Abuja of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, alias Kabiru Sokoto, who masterminded 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger State. A prosecution witness informed the court that Sokoto included in his statement details of funding received by the insurgents from an Islamic group, Musilimi Yaa'maa, based in Algeria and how the funds led to the fragmentation of Boko Haram, following disagreements over the sharing of the money .40 Armed bank robbery or attack on bank bullion vans is another source of BH funding. For example, Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, had confirmed that the BH raises 10 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 money for its operations through bank robbery. To be sure, not all bank robberies are carried out by BH. A feature of BH robberies is the deployment of several of its militants (around 15-60) who target the bank vaults or the bullion van using explosives and rocket propelled grenades. Examples of such attacks include the raid on a branch of First bank at Gwanye area of Adamawa state on 22 March 2013; attack on branches of Ecobank and First Bank in the Birnin Gwari area of Kaduna state on 1 January 2013; raid on branches of Intercontinental Bank Plc and Guaranty Trust Bank Plc in the town of Azare of Bauchi State on 4 December 2011; and attack on Unity Bank of Nigeria Plc, Alkaleri branch in Bauchi State, on 18 July 2011. Millions of naira was stolen and several policemen killed during these raids.41 According to Sokoto, the loot is usually shared among five groups: the less privileged, widows of those that died in the Jihad, Zakat, those that brought in the money and to the leadership for use in prosecuting the Jihad. 42 The robbery gangs do not pilfer on their loot; they bring it intact to Shekau through a BH commander designated for that purpose. They hold unalloyed belief in their spiritual leader, Shekau. Thus, they gladly take whatever share he doles out to them believing that it is sinful to use such stolen money until their leader spiritually purifies or launders it for their own use.43 This shows the level of indoctrination as well as loyalty that pervade the sect. To further corroborate Sokoto s statement, in November 2011, an arrested member of a robbery gang, Sheriff Shettima, confessed that his gang was responsible for some robbery operations in Borno State to raise funds for the BH. He claimed that his gang robbed First Bank Nigeria Plc, Damboa branch, where they killed a policeman and stole 21 million Naira, on 12 October 2011. 44 This explains the sharp rise in bank robbery in Nigeria in recent years. For example, about 100 bank installations were attacked in 2011, and over 30 of these were attributed to BH.45 As security agencies tighten the noose on the known BH funding sources, analysts are suggesting that the sect may turn to other rewarding financial criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, illicit trafficking in drugs and narcotics, arms smuggling and offering protection rackets for criminal networks to raise funds for its operations.46 True to this speculation, the sect began in mid-2012 to engage in kidnapping for ransom to fund its operation. For example, on 19 February 2013, the BH kidnapped a French family of seven (including four children) in Cameroon and then transported them to Nigeria, where they were freed on 18 April 2013 after allegedly collecting $3.15 million as ransom.47 11 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 The BH also engages in extortion and other schemes to raise funds for its operations. It is alleged that the group has compelled traders and residents in places under its control to pay levies, which it has used for its sustainability and operations. They also generate huge amount of money from wealthy individuals and politicians who they intimidate to pay them security or protection fee. Their tactics involved identifying such rich persons and sending them messages demanding that they pay a stipulated amount of money or risk being killed by them. In one such ugly incident that ended disastrously, a Commissioner of Police in Kano State was killed by Boko Haram operatives who came to collect the money.48 Boko Haram Violent Evolution and Metamorphosis Although the movement had incubated in North-eastern Nigeria for so many years, its transformation into an armed violent group could be traced to events leading up to the 2003 general elections in Nigeria. Shortly after the original founder of the sect, Abubakar Lawan, left for further studies in Saudi Arabia, a committee of clerics appointed Mohammad Yusuf as their leader in 2002.49 Afterwards, Mohammad Yusuf ousted the clerics who appointed him on allegations of corruption and failure to properly interpret the teaching of the Qura an. In its early years, the group under Yusuf s spiritual leadership and command strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualise and radicalise the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state .50 His preaching attracted unemployed youths from Yobe and Borno states, and even from neigbouring countries such as Niger and Chad. It is around this time that the group became known as the Yusufiyya movement. As his followership expanded, the group became very attractive to politicians in the build up to the 2003 general elections.51 At the eve of the 2003 general elections, politicians who sought to outsmart their opponents in the North East states used several youth groups and militias floated or funded by them as political thugs. Ahead of the polls, youths belonging to the Yusufiyya movement as well as others operating under titles as Yan Kalare in Gombe and Sara Suka in Bauchi were armed with sophisticated weapons by political leaders contesting gubernatorial elections in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states.52 In Yobe State, for instance, the Yusufiyya movement was invited to the State during the build-up to the 2003 elections in the wake of Sharia implementation in some northern states. Due to the fact that the election never took the shape that those that invited them thought it would, the group decided to ditch its 12 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 upshot . The then state government subsequently gave it the ultimatum to immediately quit .53 In Borno State, however, it was reported that Ali Modu Sherif, employed the services of young men belonging to the ECOMOG and Yusufiyya movement during the 2003 election to snatch Borno State from then Governor Mala Kachalla. According to Monguno, Ali Modu Sherif promised the group strict implementation of Sharia, 50 million naira reward, 50 motorcycles and the office of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs in exchange for their support .54 The group then provided Sheriff with the name of Alhaji Buji Foi as their candidate for the position of the Commissioner for Islamic Affiars. After becoming governor Sheriff created a Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed Alhaji Buji Foi, who was Yusufiyya s national secretary, as its first Commissioner.55 Shortly after the election, there was breakdown in the relation between Governor Sheriff and the Mohammed Yusuf-led group over issues of strict implementation of the Sharia, although there could be other personal reasons behind their parting ways. Consequently, Mohammed Yusuf pressured Alhaji Buji Foi to resign from Sheriff s cabinet and most other staff of the Religious Affairs Ministry brought by Foi. As the relationship deteriorated, Mohammed Yusuf became more vocal and rebellious in his preaching against the government.56 Meanwhile, the practice of arming youths, mainly unemployed, for electoral violence and subsequently dumping them after elections is a well-established electioneering habit of most Nigerian politicians. In this connection, Ojo has rightly noted that South-East politicians used Bakassi Boys and members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); the South- South politicians used the Egbesu Boys as well as members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) to deal with their political opponents. The political elite in the SouthWest used different factions of the Oodua Peoples Congress, remnants of the old Agbekoya Movement, members of the Road Transport Workers Union as well as street urchins known as Area Boys to deal with their perceived political opponents.57 This in a sense explains the politicisation of terror and subsequent terrorisation of politics in Nigeria. It is not surprising therefore that to influence or win elections Northern politicians used various groups such as Yan Sara-Suka in Bauchi, Yan Kalare in Gombe, Yan Daba and Yan daukan amarya in Kano and ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe states. In 13 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Adamawa State, the political thugs are known as Damagun Boys and Shinko Boys. In Taraba State, they are called Bani Israila .58 Typical of Nigerian politicians, the northern youths and militia that were armed by politicians during the 2003 elections were eventually discarded by their sponsors after the election, since they could not continue funding them. With no visible means of legitimate livelihood and frustrated over their fate in the aftermath of the elections, some of these disillusioned youth and militias in northern Nigeria became very susceptible to the radical brand of Islam preached at the time by Mohammed Yusuf.59 Mohammed Yusuf s mosque complex, the Ibn Taimiyya Masjid, named after the medieval Islamic scholar who virulently condemned Shia, Sufis, and the ruling Sunni elite, was both a staging post of his virulent attack on government and headquarters of his movement. By naming his mosque after one of the Islamic scholars most often cited by Salafi jihadists, Yusuf signalled his hostility to the ruling Muslim elite as well as to traditional Nigerian Islam .60 He ratcheted his strident call for jihad to restore what he considered the pristine Islam of the early Islamic community as well as began the construction of an alternative society. The group also managed farmlands and engaged in micro-financing, and Yusuf functioned as chief adjudicator of this miniature statewithin-a-state.61 Yusuf subsequently redefined the doctrine of the sect around an ideology that abhors western education and tenets of western science. He centred his aspersion and innuendos on the failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites trained at secular schools) who have acquired Western education and are currently in positions of power. In the sect s view therefore the system represented by the yan boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore unIslamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness .62 To avoid the morally deprived society, the group established a base called Afghanistan in Kanamma village in northern Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of Niger around 2003. 63 Subsequently, the movement first took up arms against state establishment when on 24 December 2003 it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma, Yobe State. Members occupied the two buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan s Taliban movement over the camps. A joint operation of soldiers and police dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members .64 On 31 December 2003 the group left the village and dispersed into other northern states after inscribing the word Taliban on a 14 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 captured vehicle.65 With these developments, the sect became known as the Nigerian Taliban, which was used in a derogatory sense by the local people who despised the ideology and teachings of the sect. Hence, the Nigerian media started to call the followers of Muhammad Yusuf Nigerian Taliban , a label that was quickly adopted by Western media.66 Yusuf s radical ideology however generated friction between himself and other moderate northern-based Islamic scholars like the late Ja far Mahmud Adam, Sheik Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir. In particular, bitter theological disputes characterized the confrontation between Ja far Mahmud Adam and Muhammad Yusuf between 2004 and 2007 the year of Ja far Mahmud Adam s death.67 Ja far Adam criticized Muhammad Yusuf s theological positions as ignorant and stupid , and as dangerous for the political ambitions of Muslims in Nigeria. Contrary to Yusuf s position, Ja far Adam advocated the importance of Western and secular education for Muslims, noting that only the conscious adoption of Western and secular boko education would eventually enable Muslims to effectively fight the Western enemy .68 The dispute notwithstanding, Yusuf s charismatic skills endeared him to many young Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although Yusuf preached a simple, ascetic form of life for his followers, he enjoyed Western luxuries, including a Mercedes and imported delicacies.69 A charismatic leader, Yusuf denied that the world is round or that rain is caused by evaporated water. We believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain, Yusuf told the BBC in a 2009 interview. The activities of his group became more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, who constituted the sect s members, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the group. By disassociating from the large society, members became more indoctrinated by the ideologues who inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies. On 21 September 2004 members attacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition. It maintained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe States until the famous July 2009 anti-government uprising in Nigeria. The remote cause of the July 2009 revolt could be traced to the fatal shooting of members of the sect on 11 June 2009, by men of the Operation Flush. Some members of the sect who rode on motorbike on their way to a cemetery to bury four of their members that died in a motor accident were intercepted by a patrol team of Operation Flush. The 15 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 affected members were temporarily detained for not wearing crash helmet, as stipulated in the State traffic law. Other sect members were very infuriated with the interception, which they interpreted as a provocation given that they were in a funeral procession. The resultant altercation between the sect members and security forces led to the shooting and killing of some of their members by men of the Operation Flush. Reacting to this event, Mohammed Yusuf, though absent at the time, made a pronouncement through his well circulated Friday sermon in Maiduguri to retaliate the shooting of his men, boasting that his group would be prepared to confront all security agencies in the State as well as government which he described as the enemies of Islam .70 The security operatives later received a tipoff that the sect was planning to strike from their base in Dutse-Tanshi in Buachi State. When security operatives stormed the place, nine members of the group were arrested while items used in local production of bombs were recovered .71 In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station on 26 July. This attack was the curtain raiser for a wave of unrest that manifested in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe States. The revolt ended on 30 July 2009, when their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured in a goat pen in his residence in Maiduguri. After few hours in police custody, Yusuf was murdered extra judicially by the Police; although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape. Over 800 persons, mainly the sect s members, were killed during the revolt, and hundreds of its members were also arrested and detained for formal trial. The way the 2009 revolt was repressed by the Nigerian State proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of BH violent attacks. Following the 2009 riot and the death of Yusuf, the sect went underground and re-strategised in two ways. First was the adoption of Yusuf s hard-line top deputy, AbuMohammad Abubakari bn Mohammad al-Shakwi (a.k.a. Abubakar Shekau), alias Darul Tawheed , as the sect s new spiritual leader. Abubakar Shekau inherited, if not modified, the organisational structure of the BH. Under Shekau, the sect maintains a loose command-and-control structure, which allows several of its cells to operate autonomously (Figure 1). Abubakar Shekau now heads the Shura Consultative Council that authorises coordinated and sophisticated attacks by various cells of the sect. The Shura Council is BH s apex council and highest decision-making organ and all cells of the organization are represented in the council.72 16 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Figure 1: Hypothetical Organisational Structure of the Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau Source.73 Under Shekau leadership, the BH operates in some sort of cells and specialised units that are interlinked, but generally, the cells take directives from one commander. The loose or dispersed nature of its cells has made it difficult for security agents to get reliable information from arrested members that could help in the capture or killing of Abubakar Shekau.74 Second was the redefinition of its tactics, which involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run tactics and adding new flexible violent tactics such as bombings, targeted assassinations, ambush, and drive-by shootings. As part of this new tactical shift, the new leadership is unsurprisingly using martyrdom videos of the July 2009 revolt to radicalise its members.75 They had issued several radical messages in leaflets, You Tube, audio and video-tapes to the media, stating their intention to wage war on secular authorities and seeking revenge on those it considers as enemies . 17 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 In March 2010, for instance, the sect declared that, it is joining Al Qaeda to avenge the murder of some of its members and leaders in a series of explosions across Nigeria .76 Members of the sect later regrouped and launched a coordinated attack on Bauchi prison on 7 September 2010, freeing 700 inmates of the prison, of which 150 were their members.77 Over five people a civilian a soldier, a policeman, two prison warders and were killed during the attack. Since the July 2009 revolt, the sect is increasingly using sophisticated methods of attacks. It has mounted a series of attacks on diverse targets such as the state security personnel, community and religious leaders, politicians, churches, mosques, the United Nations building, and media houses, among others. Exact casualty figures of attacks since the July 2009 anti-government uprising are hard to come by. A recent article claims that violence linked to the group s insurgency has resulted in an estimated 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 2013. 78 Most of the attacks occurred in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State. In addition, the group has claimed responsibility for several attacks in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (See Figure 2). The attack in Baga, Borno State, near the border with Chad, on 29 April 2013 left some 2,000 homes reportedly destroyed and 185 people killed - including civilians, members of the security forces and attackers.79 It has been mounting low-scale attacks since then, restricted mostly to Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Although the sect has concentrated most of its attacks mainly in northern Nigeria, analysts however fear that it is likely to extend these attacks to the Christian dominated South as a result of tougher security conditions in these northern states. The raid and arrests in Lagos of suspected members of the BH further substantiate this fear. On 21 March 2013, security operatives acting on a tip-off raided a BH hideout in Aromire Street, Ijora, Lagos State. Suspected BH members were arrested, and items recovered included, among others, AK-47 rifles, cartridges, daggers and a bomb kept in a cooler and hidden inside the ceiling of one of the rooms that belong to one Ibrahim Musa. Musa, an illegal immigrant from Chad, is believed to be the leader of the cell.80 18 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Figure 2: Locations of the BH s attacks and suicide bombings in Nigeria; July 2009 December 2013 Source: Author s analysis Attacks by the BH have killed mostly civilians, including women and children. There are also other inestimable costs to the nation, such as discouraging local and foreign investments, disruption of social and academic activities, destruction of property and internal displacement of persons. Their activities have equally undermined religious and ethnic harmony in Nigeria. For instance, suicide bombings on churches by the sect have precipitated reprisal attacks on Muslims faithful by Christian youths in Kaduna and Plateau states. Other consequences are the fracturing of family structure (creating widows, widowers and orphans) and damage to the country s image, among others. In the next section, attempt is made to describe the major tactics that the BH has adopted in inflicting death, destruction and terror in northern Nigeria. Trends and Modes of BH s Violent Tactics 19 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 As earlier noted, the July 2009 revolt marked a pivotal turning point in the evolution of BH s operational tactics of confronting the Nigerian state. Since then, the group has perfected the hit-and-run tactics with both flexible and sophisticated operations. The choice of any of the tactics to employ usually depends on the context, chosen target and objective to be accomplished. The major tactics used by BH are further elaborated subsequently. (a) Open Armed Confrontation This refers to a bold and gallantry operation involving appreciable number (40-100) of selected BH militants engaging security forces in direct or face-to-face gun fight that usually lasts for hours. It involves the deployment of large number of members to mount surprise attacks on security establishments (stations, barracks or prison) or soft civilian targets (markets and churches) where there is usually large number of forces or people who can overpower its operatives if it adopts any other means. Sometimes, members chant Allahu Akbar as they approach their target of assault. Open armed confrontation is a key operational tactics the BH has perfected since the July 2009 revolt. This is at best a modification of its traditional tactics of hit-and-run . A close observation of the application of this method reveals at least three important elements. First is the precision in timing, which gives the sect the advantage over its targets that are usually unprepared for such surprise attack. Second is disguised dressing or appearance, usually involving its members wearing stolen or illegally imported police or army uniforms to make it difficult for security forces and even citizens to separate them from genuine security forces. Against the backdrop of its impersonation of security personnel, concerns have been raised over possible collusion between certain military units or commanders and the sect.81 The third element is the coordinated and combined use of sophisticated gun attacks and bombings to cause serious confusion among security forces. When it chooses to add suicide bombing in such coordinated open armed confrontation, the death toll and destruction is usually high. For instance, a wave of coordinated gun, bombings and suicide attacks waged by the sect on 20 January 2012 in the city of Kano, Kano state, resulted in the death of at least 185 police and residents. (b) Targeted Assassination Targeted assassination is a tactics that the sect adopts when it is after an individual or persons listed as an enemy . The usual approach entails the assigned operatives trailing the target to a place where he or she is most vulnerable. There they 20 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 will employ the element of surprise to successfully execute the operation. They usually use cars or motorbikes in going after such targets, and shoot at a very close range (usually at the head, chest or abdomen) to ensure that the chances of the victim surviving is very slim. How the target is assassinated is also well calculated to perpetuate fear and intimidation. For example, many of those assassinated are always killed in horrific and gruesome manners by damaging body parts or removing internal organs of the individuals. In executing targeted assassination, the weapon of choice has been AK 47 and other sophisticated firearms usually hidden under their robes. In this way, the sect has been able to kill several civilians, politicians, Islamic clerics, security agents, and community leaders that were outspoken against its ideology or activities. It is also the preferred mode for killing those who may have given security agents vital information about their members, hideouts or planned operations. As a result, many people are afraid of providing information to the security forces, and this compounds the challenge security forces face in eliminating the sect from the communities they operate. (c) Drive-by-Shooting Drive-by-Shooting is a method that is very similar to targeted assassination in that some of the targets killed in the past have been executed by operatives riding on motorbikes. It became a common tactics after the July 2009 revolt. By mid-October 2010, no fewer than 21 people, including a top politician, have been killed by suspected members of the sect, riding on motorbikes .82 It is a flexible method often adopted when operating in a built-up area or to kill target(s) that operate largely in the city centre. The utility of this method is that the target can as well be shot at a very close range and the killers can easily manoeuver their way out of the city without being apprehended by security officers or residents. (d) Bombings Bombings staged by the BH primarily involve the use of IEDs. Although it is difficult to state the exact first incident of IED attack by the sect, it is a tactic that gained prominence after the July 2009 revolt. Such IEDs are configured in ways that they can be detonated when thrown or set off through a timer or a remote control. Usually, the sect selects a particular place to plant the IED where it will have maximum effect upon explosion. It has been planted along roads or rail lines or deposited in bags or containers that are left behind in public places such as churches, drinking joints, motor parks or bus stops. 21 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 When the IEDs by the sect are not meant to be used in suicide bombing mission, the contraption is usually linked to a remote control (a cellular phone or a device that emits radiation), which gives the operator the latitude to choose when to set off the device to achieve maximum effect. The sizes of the IEDs range from small contraptions stuffed into used household cans such as coca-cola cans, to large containers such as drums fitted into the boot of a car. On 15 March 2012, the US Joint IED Defeat Organization revealed that Nigeria witnessed a nearly fourfold jump in the number of IEDs attacks in 2011. 83 According to the source, Nigeria recorded 196 bomb incidents in 2011, compared with 52 incidents in 2010. In the last four years, security agents in Nigeria have discovered, seized or destroyed houses used as factory for the production of IEDs in Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau and Yobe states, among others. The operational sophistication that BH has acquired in constructing IEDs is one of the main reasons why security experts believe the group is receiving foreign support in the area of training and acquisition of explosives, possibly from AQIM. The IEDS are usually constructed using powerful explosive substances such as Trinitrotoluene (TNT), Pentaerythritol (PETN), and Ammonia Nitrate (fertilizers), among others. The use of IEDs is one of the biggest challenges that security forces face in their battle against the sect. Due to the frequent occurrences of IED incidents, security agencies have developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) for dealing with bomb incidents including investigation and bomb disposal. Yet, each bomb incident is unique and poses challenges that make such trade extremely dangerous. An IED can sometimes be so easy to defuse or detonate but for those who have acquired geo-physical and chemical expertise in manufacturing IEDs, such contraptions put together by them may be very difficult to defuse, therefore, utmost caution is required.84 (e) Suicide Terrorism (Bombing) Particularly worrisome of the violent tactics of the BH is the adoption of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism refers to a form of extremely committed violence carried out by someone who is intent on, or deceived into taking his or her own life alongside killing or destroying the chosen target, in furtherance of a political, religious or ideological goal. Seen in this light, the terrorist is fully aware that if he or she does not die, the planned attack will not be implemented. Thus for the perpetrator, death is a precondition for the success of the mission.85 The dimension of suicide terrorism adopted by the sect is suicide bombing, which refers to any politically, religiously or ideologically motivated violent attack perpetrated 22 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 by a self-aware individual(s) who actively and purposely causes his or her own death through blowing himself or herself up along with the chosen target.86As of writing, the sect has relied mainly on vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), twice on body borne improvised explosive device (BBIED) and once each on motorcycle borne improvised explosive device (MBIED) and Tricycle borne improvised explosive device (TBIED) in its suicide bombings. Before the first case of suicide bombing in Nigeria, I had warned that: The use of suicide bombing and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) would likely be the sect s future weapon of choice, as security agents tighten the noose on them. Such a tactical switch will require few hands to cause more destruction than coordinated open armed confrontation which is its traditional operational tactics .87 The first suicide attack in Nigeria occurred on 16 June 2011, when BH operatives attacked the Police Headquarters in Abuja. Between June 2011 and April 2013, the sect has staged at least 30 suicide attacks in northern Nigeria, with Borno state witnessing the highest number of attacks.88 While quite a few of these suicide attacks have failed, some have been partially successful, and majority have been largely successful when assessed on the basis of the number of lives lost, property damaged and the international visibility they received. Its diverse target of suicide attacks include security establishments (stations and barracks), international organisation, churches, mosques, and media houses, among others. It is believed that some of the cars used in suicide bombings were stolen. No fewer than 500 persons have been killed in suicide bombings mounted by the sect between June 2011 and March 2013.89 Four factors could account for the adoption of suicide terrorism by BH, namely; the emergence of a more radical and hard-line leadership of the sect in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt; the increased counterinsurgency measures put in place by the government to curtail its traditional tactics of open armed confrontation or placement of IEDs; improved funding from various sources within and outside Nigeria; and more importantly, its bond with foreign terror groups, leading to increased fanatic indoctrination of its members by experienced ideologues skilled in evoking visions of martyrdom to radicalize recruits. It is claimed that one of the incentives used to radicalize potential suicide bombers is the promise that 70 members of their family shall marry them 72 virgins in paradise . 90 23 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 (f) Kidnapping/Abduction As noted earlier, kidnapping is one of the violent tactics of the BH. However, it is mainly used as a means of generating funds. Both the Ansaru and BH have kidnapped Westerners as part of their terrorist activities. However, it is important to note the parallels to Ansaru in the use of kidnappings. For instance, Ansaru kidnapped seven foreigners on 16 February 2013, and executed them on 9 March 2013. The BH then kidnapped a French family of seven (including four children) in Cameroon on 19 February 2013, and then transported them to Nigeria, where they were freed on 18 April 2013 after allegedly collecting $3.15 million as ransom.91 In May 2013, Nigerian security forces raised alarm that the BH is adopting kidnapping for ransom as a survival strategy for terrorism financing. Although the BH had relied on kidnapping for generating funds to finance its survival and operation, there is growing evidence that it has turned to forceful abduction of people, especially children and young boys, to replenish its fighters being killed in battle with security forces. Night Raid A recent violent tactics that the BH has added to its modus operandi is the execution of night raid during which victim s throat are slashed, especially since the imposition of the state of emergency. The imposition of the state of emergency underpinned two critical factors that may account for this violent tactics. First is that it curtailed the ability of the group to plan and mount audacious daylight attacks. Second, the massive presence of security forces gave some courageous youths in Borno and Yobe States (who are incensed by the lingering crises that had crippled social and economic activities in both states), the opportunity to organised themselves into vigilante groups, popularly known as the Civilian JTF . The Civilian JTFs are crudely armed volunteer youth vigilante groups that have been arresting the BH members and handing them over to security agents or at times killing them extra-judicially. The spontaneous emergence of youth vigilante groups in most communities in Borno and Yobe States has meant that some known BH members were apprehended or killed by these quasi security forces. In response to the emergence of various youth vigilante movements committed to combating the BH members, the insurgents decided to launch a manhunt for their hunters. In a statement e-mailed to some Maiduguri-based journalists, Abu Zinnira, a self-acclaimed spokesman of the BH declared that: We have established that youths in Borno and Yobe States are now against our course. They have connived with security 24 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 operatives and are actively supporting the government of Nigeria in its war against us. We have also resolved to fight back .92 Given its curtailed capacity for daylight attacks and coupled with the activities of the Civilian JTFs, the BH resorted to roadside ambushing, but more especially to night raiding, during which they slash the throat of their victims or target. For instance, the BH fighters that attacked Dumba in mid-September 2013 and Banki (Borno State) on 15 January 2014 slit their victims throats. This gruesome mode of killing victims are usually deployed against captured security personnel, defenceless local residents and members of the Civilian JTF . Arguably this latest mode of vicious attacks marks another milestone in the group s violent evolution and offer vital insights into how its contact with established terrorist groups may have influenced its modus operandi. It will be recalled that throat cutting was a favoured method of Algerian insurgents because of its strong symbolism; it is how animals are slaughtered. As Hill has rightly noted, by increasingly re-enacting what has already happened in Algeria, BH appears to be committing itself to a similar path to that taken by AQIM and its direct forbearers the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 93 It is not surprising that BH spiritual leader, Abubakar Shekau, had in January 2012 enthused that I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill - the way I enjoy killing chickens and rams . In the next section, attempt is made to highlight how the Nigerian government has responded to BH tactical evolution. Counter-Terrorism Operations by the Nigerian Government The foregoing analysis clearly shows that the modus operandi of the BH has continuously evolved over time. These tactical changes are reflections of the sect s changing organisational structure and operational maturity. The dynamics of its operational tactics have also necessitated the adoption of several measures by the Nigerian government to contain its threat. Some of the prominent measures are discussed briefly. Legislative and Prosecutorial Before the July 2009 revolt, the Nigerian government has been foot-dragging on its effort to enact a comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation. However, the ramping up of violence by BH in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt played a critical role in the enactment of Nigeria s first anti-terrorism legislation. An important external factor that also contributed in this regard was the pressure from the US on the Nigerian government to expedite actions towards adopting comprehensive anti- terrorism legislation in the 25 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 aftermath of the failed Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The young Abdulmutallab who had been trained in Yemen by AQAP, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route to Detroit s Metropolitan Airport on 25 December 2009. Against the backdrop of Abdulmutallab s exploit and the growing acts of terror perpetrated by the BH, President Goodluck Jonathan wrote to the National Assembly thrice (between January 2010 and February 2011), urging it to pass the anti-terrorism bill in order to restore the confidence of the international community in the country s commitment to the fight against terrorism. On February 2011, the Senate passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011 and sent it to the House of Representative for concurrence, before transmission to the President. Upon receipt of the Act, President Jonathan signed it into law on 3 June 2011 as Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011.94 Given some observed legislative deficits, the TPA 2011 (Amendment), its subsequent amendment in 2013 was to broaden the scope of its application. Section 1A was introduced into the Act which deals with the national coordinating bodies in counter terrorism offences and designates specific institutions and vests specific powers and functions. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is designated the coordinating body for all security and enforcement agencies. In addition, the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) was empowered to ensure conformity of Nigeria s counter-terrorism laws and policies with international standards and UN conventions, as well as maintain international co-operation. The amendments of Section 26-29 of the TPA 2011 further introduced Section 28. This Section permits relevant law enforcement or security officials to detain suspected terrorist for a period not exceeding 48 hours without having access to any person or medical officer. The designation of ONSA as the national coordinating body was to allow for the much needed synergy in information sharing among the various security agencies. Some arrested BH members have been successfully tried and convicted against the provisions of this legislation. For example, on 15 November 2013, a Federal High Court in Abuja sentenced Mustapha Umar, a self-confessed BH member, to life imprisonment for the 26 April 2012 bombing of SOJ Plaza in Kaduna State, in violation of the provisions of the TPA 2011. Three persons lost their lives in the bomb attack in the premises of SOJ Plaza, which is occupied by ThisDay Newspaper, The Moment Newspaper and The Sun Newspaper.95 Similarly, Kabiru Sokoto, the BH kingpin, was on 26 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 20 December 2013 sentenced to life imprisonment by an Abuja Federal High Court for his role in terrorist activities, including the December 25, 2011 bombing of St. Theresa s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on count one of the charge, in line with the provisions of section 15(2) of EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004, and 10 years imprisonment on count two, as stipulated by section 7(1) of the TPA 2011.96 Deployment of Military Joint Task Force(s) The deployment of a Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in July 2011 with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, to counter the sect s growing terrorist potentials is a prominent dimension of the counter BH operations. The JTF, counterterrorism operations known as Operation Restore Order (JTORO), comprised the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Police and the State Security Services. The JTORO has registered successes in the form of arrest and killing of BH top commanders or strategists, as well as footsoldiers. The extension of the range of attacks by the informed the declaration of a state of emergency in 15 local governments across four states in the North in January 2012, by President Goodluck Jonathan. By July 2012 when the state of emergency ceased, the security crisis had not been addressed. The JTFs offensive against the sect had been partly successfully. The JTF have recorded some successes in the area of arrest and detention of its members, decapitation of BH strategists and commanders, degradation of the frequency and success rate of suicide bombings, identification and demolition of their armoury and bomb-making factories, and robust partnership with the Civilian JTF. The deployment of military forces, however, has suffered setbacks such as harsh criticism from enraged local population over its excesses, deficits in intelligence gathering, lack of elite support of military deployment, and alleged extremist infiltration of security agencies. In May 2013, President Jonathan again declared a state of emergency in the three most affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The conduct of personnel of JTFs, especially the military, in combating the BH often gives rise to criticism and public outcry over alleged excesses and violations of human rights. According to Hussiani, the personnel of the JTFs, especially the military in Maiduguri, have lost touch with the people. Most of the personnel are not resident in Maiduguri and are not conversant with the culture of the people. They tend to treat most residents as members of the BH .97 Allegations of unprofessional conduct such as this 27 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 by the security forces need to be seriously addressed to ensure healthy civil-military relations. Following a strategic review of the military operations in the North East, the government approved the insertion of a division of the Nigerian Army into the operational theatre. The 7 Division which became operational on 22 August 2013, continues to conduct counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations with a more agile and robust posture to meet the full spectrum of asymmetric warfare challenges , according to the immediate past Chief of Army Staff.98 The use of modern detection gadget by the JTF has significantly reduced the frequency and territorial reach of BH attacks, but has failed to put an end to the insurgency. The military surge initially reduced the frequency of attacks in major towns and cities in the north, prompting the military to claim that its offensive in the northeast has put BH in disarray, but the recent spate of vicious and gruesome attacks on remote villages typifies BH s tactical adaptability. If the military approach is to be successful in the future, efforts must be made to address some of the critical deficits like poor intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing. Closure of Borders and Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Given the discovery that BH moves weapons and fighters in and out of Nigeria through Nigeria s porous international borders in the north, the Federal Government on 31 December 2011 closed down sections of its borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroun. The move was to check the influx of illegal immigrants, especially at a time when some of those arrested for alleged involvement in BH violent activities had been identified as illegal immigrants. Nigeria s international borders are notoriously porous due to poor policing. Nigeria s Minister of Interior, Abba Moro, recently revealed that there are 84 regular borders and over 1,487 irregular routes to the country. 99 The existence of several irregular entry points in Nigeria permits easy inflow of weapons and illegal aliens into the country. In view of this, analysts argued that BH activities could already be spreading across Nigeria s borders and that it could possibly already be conducting some of its activities in neighbouring countries such as training recruits, and planning and executing terrorist acts .100 Consequently, the Nigerian government also clamp downed on illegal immigrants, repatriating about 11,000 of them as of 28 February 2012.101 The decision to close the borders was made to further contain the influx of illegal aliens and smuggling of arms into the country. In spite of the closure of borders, BH operatives and other arms 28 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 traffickers have proven ingenuous in devising strategies of bringing in more sophisticated weapons into the country. This has raised concerns over the effectiveness of border closure as a measure to contain the BH threat. Capacity Building of Security Forces In response to the growing audacity of the sect, the Nigeria government has scaled up training in counter terrorism (CoT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations for state security forces. In March 2012, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen. Onyeabo Ihejirika, stated that 2,000 soldiers were being trained in Jaji and Kachia on CoT operations in order to wage the war against terror.102 Training in forensic analysis has also been expanded in the training curricula of the Armed Forces and other security agencies. There is also increased training in special reconnaissance, close quarter combat, urban warfare, amphibious operation, demolition and explosive breaching, information management, tactical communication, and civil/military-relations.103 These trainings are taking place both within and outside Nigeria. Increased training in CoT and COIN has helped improve the capacity of security forces in decapitation of BH strategists and commanders, degradation of the frequency and success rate of suicide bombings and identification and demolition of their bomb making factors .104 Author s tracking of BH attacks which show reduction in the rate of suicide bombings tends to corroborate these claims. These successes notwithstanding, there is the need for enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing among security and military forces to better anticipate and neutralise BH attacks, irrespective of the tactics they would wish to adopt. Equipment and Surveillance Programme Another measure by the government involves the acquisition and installation of technical and surveillance equipment to aid in combating the BH, such as closed circuit television (CCTVs), identification equipment for post-bomb blast investigation, and military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden explosives and other weapons, among others. For instance, the installation of CCTVs in major cities and around critical infrastructure under the National Public Security Communication System (NPSCS) project is to leverage on electronic intelligence to support efforts at thwarting terrorist acts. It is envisaged that the NPSCS could also be used to monitor elections as well as disaster management and control. The installation of the CCTVs, especially in Abuja, is being handled by a Chinese firm, ZTE Corporation. 29 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Criticisms however have trailed the installation, operational standard and reliability of these facilities in combating terrorism. It is alleged, for instance, that most of the CCTVs installed in Abuja are not working because the materials used were substandard compared to those used by the same firm in Ghana, Senegal, Morocco and Malaysia. In addition, there is very little assistance that these surveillance gadgets can offer unless it is used to augment prior intelligence gathered through human sources and relayed to security operatives on the field to prevent, deter and neutralise terrorist attacks. To be effective, therefore, there should be an operational mechanism connecting the surveillance gadgets, the officers in the situation room and field officers to be able to generate and act on real time intelligence. Foreign Collaboration and International Cooperation The government has also embraced bilateral and multilateral engagements to increase its capacity to combat BH s terrorist activities. These include collaborations with the United Nations, the European Union, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the US, France, South Korea and Israel, among others, geared towards ensuring that terrorist organisations do not establish strong footholds in Nigeria. For an example, Nigeria established a collaborative framework with the United Nations known as the Integrated Assistance on Counter- Terrorism (I-ACT), under the aegis of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Although details of these collaborative efforts are not made public, they cover areas like intelligence sharing, capacity building of security forces and equipment support programme. In furtherance of the external engagements, the Nigerian government in February 2012 also established two new defence intelligence missions in Niger and Mali. This is to also ensure that security agencies maintain effective tab on the activities of AQIM, alleged to be assisting the BH in training and arms. There was also the resuscitation of the near moribund Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) earlier established in September 1988 as a joint operation made up of soldiers from Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to ensure security within their common borders and engender international cooperation. The MJTF operation commenced in July 1988 after a tripartite agreement was reached by the Heads of State of the three countries. The mandate of the MJTF was however expanded and reinvigorated in April 2012 at the 14th Summit of Lake Chad Basin Commission in Ndjamena to include the fight against the activities of BH terrorists.105 The MJTF has been battling the BH insurgents, especially in the Lake Chad area. The confrontation between the MJTF and BH militants 30 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 in Baga, Borno State, on April 2013, left no fewer than 2,000 homes reportedly destroyed, over 185 people killed and tens of hundreds of displaced victims. While the MJTF had recorded some successes, observers are of the view that it can do more if Cameroon can cooperate fully with Nigeria on this matter. Special Education Intervention: Building of Almajiri Model Schools The government has recently recognised the point that high illiteracy could be a key contributor to people s vulnerability to recruitment into violent and terrorist groups. Consequently, the Nigerian government has made improving both access and quality of education a key priority in relation to its intervention programmes aimed at rolling back the expansion of terrorism. Nigeria s Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, contends that President Jonathan s administration s policy now is to get 10.6 million out-of-school children back in-school, and improve the quality of education and access, including vocational training, at all levels. For example, the construction of 124 schools for the almajiri, in northern Nigeria is ongoing to ensure that these out-of-school children, who have been a major supplier of manpower to the BH sect, are educated and liberated from the clutches of terrorist activities .106 Denied of parental care, they form the majority of recruits of extremists, desperate politicians and disreputable Islamic teachers. The government is aware that the Almajiri system has remained an important and a cheap source of recruiting membership for the BH and has come up with the Integrated Almajiri Scheme of formal education to distance these children from selfish politicians and religious zealots. Also, Islamic clerics have been asked to register their Islamic schools for proper documentation and recognition by government. This will help monitor such Islamic schools, and prevent the propagation of extremist views or distortion or religious teaching by some radical teachers. Establishment of the Dialogue Committee Against the backdrop and escalation of BH attacks, many commentators and opinion leaders have argued that the crisis cannot be resolved through military means alone. Some have suggested that the use of dialogue will be useful in addressing the insurgency in the region, just as it helped in addressing the militancy in the Niger Delta. The argument often put forward is that there may be some BH fighters who are tired of fighting, and could embrace such opportunity if offered by the government. Thus, on 17 April 2013 the Federal Government set up a Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. The setting up of the 26-member 31 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Committee was sequel to the report of the technical committee to review fresh modalities for addressing security challenges in the northern part of Nigeria. The terms of reference of the Committee include developing a framework for granting amnesty to the sect members; setting up of a framework through which disarmament could take place within a 60-day time frame; the development of a comprehensive victims support programme, and the development of mechanisms to address the underlying causes of insurgencies that will help to prevent future occurrences. 107 The setting up of the Committee led to differing opinions as to the necessity to dialogue with the sect ending the insurgency. Suffice it to say that the re-orienting of the BH into a deeply radicalised movement under Shekau gives little cause for optimism that dialogue will bear fruit. However, the setting up of the dialogue Committee is largely seen as a response by the government to the yearnings of some opinion leaders of northern extraction who believe that dialogue is vital in bringing the crisis to an end. It is in line with this thinking that President Jonathan in January 2013 approved the release of over 165 persons apprehended in the course of CoT operations in three states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) in the North-East. The suspects were those earlier recommended for release by the Joint Investigation Team set up by the Defence Headquarters in 2013. Of the number, 157 are from facilities in Borno, nine from Yobe and one from Adamawa. More suspects in this category are also to benefit in the present exercise. The suspects will be released to their respective state governments. 108 It will be recalled that the Defence Headquarters had released all women and children arrested in the three states in connection with terrorism on a similar directive from the President in May 2013. This approach is in furtherance of the Federal Government s position in response to requests by the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Reconciliation. Articulation of a Draft National Counter-Terrorism Strategy It is pertinent to note that the Nigerian government is developing a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) to serve as a comprehensive blueprint for combating violent extremism and terrorism in the country. The draft NACTEST which is to be coordinated by the National Security Adviser is anchored on five principles, namely: forestall (stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorists); secure (strengthen protection capacity against terrorist attacks); identify (pre-emption through detection, early warning and ensuring that terrorist acts are properly investigated); prepare (mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks by building resilience and redundancies to ensure continuity of business); and implement (framework for the mobilisation of a 32 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 coordinated cross-government effort). It is hoped that when adopted, the NACTEST will offer a more informed strategic direction in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. Recommendations The measures adopted by the Nigerian government to address the threat of terrorism, especially neutralizing the BH, has recorded modest successes such as the arrest of some of its members, leaders and strategists. However, its evolving violent tactics remain a major challenge to security forces deployed to fight the dreaded sect. Factors that contribute to the outbreak and sustenance of terrorism are multi-faceted, suggesting that a counter terrorism strategy that will be efficacious should also be multidimensional. The following measures, among others, would help in improving the counter BH operations of the Nigerian government. Address the Underlying Drivers of Extremism: There is the need to undertake broad socio economic and political reforms to urgently address the underlying drivers of extremism and violent behaviours, such as chronic poverty, pervasive corruption, unemployment, and socio-economic and political exclusion that provide hospitable environment for radicalism. Poverty indeed is not a singular factor in radicalisation, but the tendency to produce suicide bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery and joblessness than the one in which basic needs of food, education, health, housing and sanitation are met for the majority of the people .109 Hence, the Nigerian government must embark on effective poverty alleviation and human capital development programmes to create jobs and alleviate poverty among its teeming youth who are most vulnerable to be easily recruited and radicalized for violent extremism and terrorism. Improve Anti-Corruption Campaign: In its drive to recruit members, the sect presents a narrative that is receptive to most Muslim youth, given widespread public corruption and the dire socio-economic situation in Nigeria. Pervasive malfeasance, especially in the public sector, provides a key referent around which the BH ideologues have framed their anti-secular ideology. It catalyses BH s appeal to impoverished, alienated, jobless northern Muslims. The Nigerian government therefore must demonstrate strong commitment in the fight against corruption by repositioning institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission to wage a more vigorous fight against corruption. This will contribute to resolving the BH challenge in two ways. First it will help neutralise and deconstruct the appeal of BH s violent ideology 33 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 by denying its ideologues societal referents for radicalising frustrated individuals. Second, money recovered from convicts will add to funds available for undertaking rehabilitation of willing BH adherents as well as infrastructural development. Mount a Countering Violent Extremism Programme: The Nigerian government needs to initiate a countering ideological support for violent extremism and terrorism (CISVET) programme, collaborating with the media, civil society groups and moderate Islamic scholars to help counter the spread and receptivity of BH s ideology. Such a robust deradicalisation initiative will focus on three key dimensions. The first will involve the use of Hausa Service aired by international (BBC, VOA, RFI, CRI, and Radio Deutsche Welle, among others) and national media listened to by many northerners to send short and precise messages of peace and verses in the Koran that debunk some of the unfounded and misleading arguments of BH ideologues. Reputed and sound Islamic scholars will play a key role in this regard. The second intervention will target the rehabilitation and reformation of arrested jihadists. Experts on countering violent extremism (CVE), operatives of the SSS and CSOs, among others, will be useful in this area. The third dimension will be an information operation via media and online platforms targeted at the sect to (a) counter the narratives of its recruitment and radicalisation and (b) exploit internal division within the sect to get more members to renounce violence. Greater Intelligence Gathering and Sharing: There is the need to strengthen intelligence gathering and sharing among security agencies in other to dismantle the sect s supportive infrastructure money, training, weapons, explosives, motivation and operational strategies, among others. It will also require tightening the regulations on production, importation, transportation, storage, and use of explosive materials in the country. The creation of an Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) that builds up proper records of information with a system of easy retrieval by the various security agencies is critical in this respect. The Office of the National Security Adviser in collaboration with the security agencies need to develop a robust and comprehensive BH Attack Database (BAD) to serve as a warehouse for generating useful threat and trend analyses critical for training, planning, and policy purposes. To be effective, the government should guide against acts that could undermine good working relationships with foreign intelligence services or international trust on her intelligence and security establishments. The conduct of comprehensive and thorough inquest to ensure that its agencies have not been infiltrated by extremist sympathisers is imperative. 34 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Crackdown on Terrorist Sponsors: It needs to take concrete steps against those providing supportive infrastructure to the sect, by making public their names and initiating legal actions against them, to gain more public support. As the Punch rightly noted in a recent editorial, much of the work of the security agencies in curbing the insurgency is being undermined by divisive politics among the elite .110 It is important for the Government to investigate and prosecute all those using BH to further their political interests. Aso Rock must summon the political will necessary by authorising the security agencies to rein in politicians at the centre of the crisis in the North-East. Failure to do this will only guarantee continued politicisation of terrorism and the terrorisation of politics in Nigeria. Regional Counter-Terrorism Diplomacy: There is increasing evidence that foreign fighters or jihadists are actively participating in BH s deadly attacks. Some of the insurgents were recruited from neighbouring countries such as Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroon, and even Mali. Thus, the government needs to deepen engagements with foreign countries, especially Chad and Cameroon, in joint counterterrorism operations to deny terrorists recruitment and training grounds, access to weapons, arms and funds, and safe haven for those fleeing arrest. Enhance Surveillance and Border Control: Security agencies should increase surveillance routine at the borders as well as around all vulnerable targets (buildings and infrastructure), using high-tech security monitoring gadgets. Stepping up situation awareness or surveillance is vitally important to effectively interdict potential terrorists who equally adopt mobile, progressive and sophisticated surveillance methods to plan suicide missions. This will also entail meticulous recruitment and proper equipping of undercover agents to help infiltrate the ranks of BH cells in Nigeria. Attention should also be on building capacity for pre-emptive arrest of adherents and thwarting of potential plots through a robust surveillance plan. More so, the nation s security agencies should undertake a robust Potential Terrorist Tracking System (PTTS) that documents and vets how, when and where persons (Nigerians) suspected of extremist tendencies are travelling to and returning from, and for what purpose. All persons entering and leaving Nigeria must be comprehensively documented and all foreign funding of religious activities (particularly religious scholarships) thoroughly scrutinised. Deepen Security Situation awareness: The Nigerian government, especially the National Orientation Agency, should partner with civil society organisations and the organised private sector deepen on-going anti-terror campaign and public enlightenment 35 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 programmes that inculcate the habit and practice of security consciousness and situation awareness on the citizens. Situation awareness is the act or habit of recognizing a threat at an early stage and taking measures to avoid it.111 Such habit is effective in allowing people to see potential threats before and as to the appropriate authorities for prompt response. they develop and to report same Training and Refresher Courses for Security Forces: In acting decisively to defeat the BH, state security forces must invest on wining over the hearts and minds of the local population by avoiding committing human right violations. Any action that is capable of hurting the people must be avoided at all times, and when such does happen, government must demonstrate the will to ensure that victims are compensated or injustice redressed in a very transparent manner. In that way, members of the public will be more willing to supply useful information to security agencies. This will entail further professionalising state security forces, particularly the police and the soldiers, through targeted and specialised training and refresher courses to ensure they effectively protect human rights, including during CoT and COIN operations. Conclusion The growing sophistication of BH s operational tactics is a strong indication that it has established and is consolidating its ties with transnational jihadists. Initially, BH's capabilities were limited to hit-and-run attacks. Since 2010, the sect has evolved into a more flexible, dynamic and decentralised organisation, capable of changing and combing tactics as well as expanding or reordering target selection. BH s growing audacity is generating apprehension over possible Somalisation of Nigeria if the threat is not tackled effectively. As a short-term measure, the Nigerian government needs to urgently implementation a robust strategy targeted at decimating the tripod of terrorist sustainability - ideology, recruitment and funding. In a sense, government must undertake a comprehensive approach that deconstructs the appeal of BH ideology, deny it opportunities for recruitment and radicalisation, and cut off its financial lifeline, especially its political sponsorship . This quick-fix strategy holds the potential of achieving peace in the short-term while long-term measures aimed at addressing the drivers of terrorism in Nigeria take root. 36 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 Notes Given the importance of clarity and definition in this regard, for the purposes of this presentation, terrorism had been defined as the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts. Their demands or expectations may be for a change in status quo in terms of the political, economic, ideological, religious or social order within the affected state or for a change in the (in) actions or policies of the affected state in relation to its interaction with other group or states. 1 2 FC Onuoha, Boko Haram s tactical evolution, African Defence Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, (2012), p. 28. The Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Africa Periodical Review, http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Periodical_ Review_March_2010_No.2.pdf, 2 March 2010, p. 14 3 See for instance, A. Adesoji, The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 45, No. 2, (2010), pp.95-108; M.O. Sodipo, Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria , Africa Security Brief, No 26, (2013). 4 5 S. M. Niworu, Boko Haram Sect: Terrorists or a Manifestation of the Failed Nigerian State, Journal of Politics and Law; Vol. 6, No. 2 (2013) p.247 See for instance, J. Taiwo, and M. Olugbode, M. Boko Haram leader killed, Thisday, 31 July 2009, p.4; and T. Adisa, Boko Haram exposed, How sect was formed, Training details, Why it is changing tactics , Tribune, 12 February 2012. 6 F. Chothia, Who are Nigeria s Boko Haram Islamists? BBC, 11 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501; Y. Ndege and A. Essa, The rise of Nigeria s Boko Haram, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/201397155225146644.html [accessed 8 January 2014] 7 S. Sani, Boko Haram: History, ideas and revolt, The Constitution, Vol.11, No. 4, (2011), p.27. 8 Nigeria: Boko Haram resurrects, declares total jihad, 14 August 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200908140646.html [accessed 8 September 2012] 9 Vanguard, R. Loimeier, Boko Haram: The Development of a militant religious movement in Nigeria, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 47, Nos, 2-3, (2012), p. 152. 10 11 Ibid 37 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 12 Ibid S.S Shahzad, Takfirism: A messianic deology , Le Monde diplomatique, 3 July 2007, http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/03takfirism [Accessed 4 July 2012]. 13 14 Da wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, Boko Haram Tragedy: Frequently asked questions. Minna: DCCN, 2009, p.14. A. Hazzad, A Nigeria clashes kill over 50 in Northeastern city, Reuters, 26 July 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE56P24N20090726 [accessed 3 August 2009] 15 O Akanji, The politics of combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria. In: W Okumu, and A. Botha, (eds.), Domestic terrorism in Africa: defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p.60 16 17 A. Jimos, Nigeria: Boko Haram on a revenge mission, Vanguard, 2 April 2011. Africa Insight, Almajiris Street children and sectarian conflicts in Northern Nigeria, Vol 1 No.3, (2010), p. 7. 18 West Plateau Initiative for Development and Advancement of the Natives PIDAN (2013) Effects of the Jos/Plateau Conflicts and Crises, and their Implications on Nigeria s National Security: The PIDAN Perspective, I Jos: PIDAN, p. 313. 19 20 A. Agbo, Bin Laden s men in Nigeria, Tell, 16 March 2011, p.49 B. J. Adele, Boko Haram and democracy in Nigeria s Fourth Republic The Constitution, Vol. 11, No. 4, (2011), p.64 21 Report of the Senate Joint Committee on Defence and Army, Police Affairs and National Security and Intelligence on Loss of many Lives and the Destruction of Several Houses, Cars and Motorcycles in Baga Town, Kukawa Local Government, Borno State, March 2013, p.13 22 Interview with Hussaini Monguno, a Borno resident who had in the past been approached by BH recruiters while in a Mosque in Maiduguri, conducted on board Ethiopia Airways, Abuja-Addis Ababa, 27 April 2013. 23 News Agency of Nigeria, Boko Haram Members are only armed bandits, says captured member , 26 October 2013, http://www.nanngronline.com/section/defencesecurity/boko-haram-members-areonly-armed-bandits-says-captured-member 24 See for instance, FC Onuoha, Porous Borders and Boko Haram s Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria , Report, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, (September 2013). 25 J. Alechenu, Boko Haram pain us N5,000 each to burn Schools Punch, 1 June 2013. 26 Kid Suspects , Interview with a senior security official who have interrogated arrested BH members in Bauchi and Borno States, 12 April 2013, Abuja. 27 38 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 The detained Abu Qaqa I had in the past answered different names like Mohammed Shuaibu, Mohammed Bello, Abu Tiamiya, and Abdulrahman Abdullahi. He adopted Abu Dardaa and later Abu Qaqa, after he was set free during a jail break at Bauchi prison on September 2010. Also note that Abu Qaqa is the pseudo name used by spokesman of the sect. 28 Abu Qaqa I, quoted in Alli, Y. (2012a) How bombers are Chose, by Boko Haram suspect , The Nation, 9 February, http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/36248-how-bombers-arechosen-by-boko-haram-suspect.html 29 Abu Qaqa II was later allegedly killed on 14 April 2012 by his colleagues on the instruction of the leader of the sect, Abubakar Shekau, for attempting to defect from the sect after being trailed intensively by security agents. Abu Qaqa II is the pseudo name of Mohammed Anwal Kontagora, who took over from Abu Qaqa I. 30 Abu Qaqa II, quoted in Orintunsin, J., and Joseph, A (2012) Boko Haram threatens GSM providers as IBB denies sponsoring sect , The Nation, 14 February, http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/36764-boko-haramthreatens-gsm-providers-as-ibb-denies-sponsoring-sect.html 31 32 The picture of a smiling Mohammad Manga adorned the cover page of Blueprint Newspaper. For details see Salkida, A. (2011) Revealed! The Suicide Bomber , Blueprint, 26 June, p.1 33 F.C Onuoha, Combating the financing of Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria, African Journal for the Preventing and Combating of Terrorism, Vol. 2, No.1 (2012) p.113 Intervention by Gen KO Ogundele during the interactive session on the lecture on Terrorism: The Case of the Boko Haram in Nigeria , by Freedom C Onuoha, delivered to Participants of the National Defence College Course 22, 11 February 2014. 34 I. Abonyi, Boko Haram: Senator Ali Ndume charged to court. Thisday, 22 November 2011. 35 H. Idris, H. Boko Haram financier, 91 others in Police net, Daily Trust, 1 January 2011. 36 37 A. Agbo, 2011, p.49 38 F.C Onuoha, Combating the financing of Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria (2012) p.115 M. Mark, Boko Haram vows to fight until Nigeria establishes Sharia Law, The Guardian, 27 January 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/27/bokoharam-nigeria-sharia-law [accessed 17 February 2012] 39 T. Soniyi, M. Bello, & Y. Akinsuyi, (2013) Kabir Sokoto trial: Sharing of funds split Boko Haram , Thisday, 10 May 2013, p.7. 40 41 A. Adepegba, Police arraign seven terror suspects for bank robbery, Punch, 39 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 22 February 2013, http://www.punchng.com/news/police-arraign-seven-terrorsuspects-for-bank-robbery/[accessed 22 April 2013] Y. Alli, Kabiru Sokoto names Boko Haram s leaders, The Nation,14 February 2012, http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/36766-kabiru-sokotonames-boko-haram%E2%80%99s-leaders.html [accessed 18 February 2012] 42 Interview with a senior security official who have interrogated arrested BH members in Bauchi and Borno States, 12 April 2013, Abuja. 43 J. Bwala, Boko Haram wraps bombs as Sallah gifts... Nigerian Tribune, 3 November http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/30668-boko-haram2011 wraps-bombs-as-sallah-gifts-police-arrest-bomb-makers-recover-bombs-guns [accessed 10 December 2011] 44 45Thisday, p.6 Boko Haram, armed robbers attack 100 bank branches, 10 December 2011, C.N Okereke, and V.E Omughelli, Financing the Boko Haram: Some informed projections, African Journal for the Preventing and Combating of Terrorism, Vol. 2, No.1, (2012) pp. 169-179. 46 T. Cocks, Nigerian Islamists got $3.15 million to free French Hostages: Document , Reuters, 26 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/us-francehostages-idUSBRE93P10320130426 47 Interview with very senior military officer recently posted to the National Defence College as a Directing Staff, 6 February 2014. 48 See, among others, J. Taiwo and M. Olugbode, Boko Haram leader killed, Thisday, 31 July 2009, 4; and S. Sani, (2011), p.24. 49 Isa, M. K. Militant Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria. In Okumu, W. & Ikelegbe, A (eds.) Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa, Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2010, p. 333 50 51 Interview with Hussaini Monguno, 27 April 2013. See, among others, Patrick, W. Boko Haram: FG s white paper fingers Borno politicians , 30 April 2013, http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/04/boko-haram-fgswhite-paper-fingers-borno-politicians/, [Accessed 12 May 2013]; Idris, H. & Adebayo, I. Boko Haram: Now, senator Sheriff, Zana clash on the truth Sunday Trust, 28 October 2012, http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php/top-stories/11845-boko-haram-nowsenators-sheriff-zanna-clash-on-the-truth [Accessed 4 October 2012]; Ohia, I. Boko Haram killing: What was gov Sheriff s role? , Desert herald, 18 August 2009. 52 Ohia, I. Boko Haram killing: What was gov Sheriff s role? , Desert herald, 18 August 2009,p.3. 53 54 Interview with Hussaini Monguno, 27 April 2013. 40 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 , Idris, H. & Adebayo, I. Boko Haram: Now, senator Sheriff, Zana clash on the truth Sunday Trust, 28 October 2012 55 56 Interview with Hussaini Monguno, 27 April 2013. 57 Ojo, J. Arming jobless youths to win elections , Punch, 15 May 2013. 58 Ibid; p.25 Patrick, W. Boko Haram: FG s white paper fingers Borno politicians , 30 April 2013, http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/04/boko-haram-fgs-white-paper-fingers-bornopoliticians/, [Accessed 12 August 2009]. 59 Tanchum, M. Al-Qa ida s West African advance: Nigeria s Boko Haram, Mali s Touareg, and the spread of Salafi Jihadism , Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 6(2), (2012), p.79. 60 61 62 63 64 Tanchum, (2012), Op. cit. Isa, M. K. (2010), p.332. Awofadeji, S. 150 killed in Bauchi religious crisis , Thisday, 27 July 2009, p.8. Suleiman, T. Terrorism unsettles the north , Tell, 26 February 2007, p.25. 65 Morgan, A. Exclusive: Islamists on the rampage in Nigeria , Family Security Matters, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.3855/pub_detail.asp , 2009, [Accessed 12 August 2009]. Loimeier, R. Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria , Africa Spectrum, 47(2-3), (2012), p.150. 66 67 68 Ibid Ibid; p.149. Onuoha, F. C. Boko Haram s tactical evolution , African Defence Forum, 4(4), (2012d), p.27. 69 70 Sani, S. Boko Haram: History, ideas and revolt , The Constitution, 11(4); (2011), p.29. Ohia, I. Boko Haram killing: What was gov Sheriff s role? , Desert herald, 18 August 2009,p.6. 71 N. Marama, We re yet to decide on amnesty p.5. 72 Boko Haram , Vanguard, 8 April, F.C Onuoha, (Un)willing to die: Boko Haram and suicide terrorism in Nigeria, Report, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 24 December 2012, p.3 73 74 75 Interview with some senior security officials, 3 March 2013, Abuja. A. Jimos, (2011) op cit. 41 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 76The Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Periodical Review, 2 March 2010, p.14 D. Smith, More than 700 inmates escape during attack on Nigerian prison, Guardian, 8 September 2010,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/08/muslimextremists-escape-nigeria-prison [accessed 13 April 2013] 77 78 N. Odeh, The Enigma called Shekau , Tell, 3 February 2014, p.22. 79 T. Olanrewaju & U. Ukpong, Massacre of 185: Tension in Borno border towns, Sun, 23 April 2013 http://sunnewsonline.com/new/cover/massacre-of-185-tension-inborno-border-towns/[accessed 26 April 2013] S. Utebor, and E Akinkuotu, 100 soldiers storm terror suspect s hideouts in Lagos, Punch, 22 March 2013, http://www.punchng.com/news/100-soldiers-storm-terrorsuspects-hideouts-in-lagos/[accessed 26 March 2013] 80 J. Hill, Worsening Violence in Northern Nigeria reveals echoes of Algeria and AQIM, Africanargument, 9 October 2013, http://africanarguments.org/2013/10/09/worsening-violence-in-northern-nigeriareveals-echoes-of-algeria-and-aqim-by-jonathan-hill/ 81 82F.C Onuoha, The audacity of the Boko Haram: Background analysis and emerging trend , Security Journal, advanced online publication, 13 June 2011; doi: 10.1057/sj.2011.15, p.144. J. Straziuso , African AQ-Linked groups using advanced IEDs, The Associated Press, 15 March 2012, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-militaryjieddo-african-al-qaida-linked-groups-using-advanced-ieds-031512w/ [accessed 18 March 2012] 83 J. Ajani, The world of improvised explosive devices, IEDs, Vanguard, 15 April 2010, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/the-world-of-improvised-explosive-devicesieds-the-business-of-detecting-and-detonating-bombs/ [accessed 20 April 2012] 84 See among others T. O'Connor, Varieties of suicidal terrorism, Megalinks in Criminal Justice, 3 August 2011 http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3400/3400lect05.htm; [accessed 10 June 2012] R. Gunaranta, Suicide terrorism: A global threat , Jane s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2002, p52; B. Ganor, Suicide attacks in Israel, in International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference, Herzliyya, Israel: ICT, 2001, p.140 85 Y. Schweitzer, Suicide terrorism: Development and main characteristics, in International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference Herzliyya, Israel: ICT., 2001 p.78 86 87 88 89 F.C Onuoha, The audacity of the Boko Haram (13 June 2011) p.147. Author s diary; the author keeps a record of reported suicide attacks by the sect. Ibid. 42 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 PMNews, boko Haram: Bombers promised 72 Virgins in Heaven , 6 December 2012, http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/12/06/boko-haram-bombers-promised-72-virginsin-heaven/ 90 T. Cocks, Nigerian Islamists got $3.15 million to free French Hostages: Document , Reuters, 26 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/us-francehostages-idUSBRE93P10320130426 91 M. Olugbode, 22 Killed in Renewed Boko Haram Attacks in Maiduguri , Thisday, 19 June 2013, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/22-killed-in-renewed-boko-haram-attacks-inmaiduguri/150856/ 92 J. Hill, Worsening Violence in Northern Nigeria reveals echoes of Algeria and AQIM, Africanargument, 9 October 2013, http://africanarguments.org/2013/10/09/worsening-violence-in-northern-nigeriareveals-echoes-of-algeria-and-aqim-by-jonathan-hill/ 93 I.T Sampson, & F.C Onuoha, Forcing the horse to drink or making it realize its thirst ? Understanding the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation (ATL) in Nigeria, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, Nos 3-4, (2011), pp.33 - 49. 94 T. Soniyi, Bomber of THISDAY Office Gets Life Jail , Thisday, 16 November 2013, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/bomber-of-thisday-office-gets-life-jail/164481/ 95 P. Ihuoma, Kabiru Sokoto bags life imprisonment for terrorism , Punch, 20 December 2013 http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-kingpin-kabiru-sokoto-jailed-forlife/ 96 97 Interview with Hussaini Monguno, 27 April 2013. 98 S. Iroegbu, Terrorism: Ihejirika Consults Top Army Commanders , Thisday, 5 October 2013, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/terrorism-ihejirika-consults-toparmy-commanders/160746/ A. Ogbu, FG Uncovers 1,497 illegal migration routes into Nigeria , Thisday, 15 March 2012, p.6 99 100 U Salifu, Border porosity and Boko Haram as a regional threat , ISS Today, 28 May 2012, http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1489 [accessed 10 June 2012] Vanguard, Nigeria repatriates 11,000 foreigners over terror fears, Vanguard, 27 February 2012, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/nigeria-repatriates-5000foreigners-over-terror-fears/ [accessed 1 March 2012] 101 102K. Omonobi, 2,000 soldiers on counter terrorism training Ihejirika , Vanguard, 14 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/03/2000-soldiers-on-counterMarch 2012 terrorism-training-ihejirika/ [accessed 19 March 2012] 43 Dr Freedom C Onuoha, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Case of the Boko Haram , lecture delivered a the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS), George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany,14 March 2014 M. Musa, Nigeria: Understanding JTFs Operation Restore Order in Borno State , Daily Trust, 2 April 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201204020163.html [accessed 8 April 2012] 103 104 Telephone interview with a senior military officer and Directing Staff at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, 27 April 2013, Abuja. Y Alli, Blame Boko Haram for Baga killings DHQ, The Nation, 28 April 2008, http://thenationonlineng.net/new/news/blame-boko-haram-for-baga-killings-dhq/, [accessed 28 April 2013]. 105 N. Okonjo-Iweala, Securing Development: Challenges of Economic Inclusion , Survival, vol. 55 no. 4, August September 2013, p.126. 106 R Abalti, Jonathan Announces 26-Man Amnesty Committee for Boko Haram , The Guardian 18 April 13. 107 F. Soriwei, Jonathan orders release of 165 terror suspects, Punch, 10 January 2014, http://www.punchng.com/news/jonathan-orders-release-of-165-terrorsuspects/[accessed 12 January 2014]. 108 109 S. Komalafe, Boko Haram: A crisis in search of strategy, Thisday, 25 January 2012, p.56. Punch, Undermining terror war with politics Editorial, 2 February 2014, http://www.punchng.com/editorial/undermining-terror-war-with-politics/ 110 S. Stewart, Situational awareness: How every citizen can help make a nation safe, Stratfor, 11 August, 2011. 111 44