Japan and the Atomic Bomb

Japan and the Atomic Bomb Emily Gibson History 10613 31 March 2015 Japan and the Atomic Bomb From 1939-1945, the world found itself in a time of total warfare, and our great country, the United States of America, found itself in a quandary. As World War II continued and the amount of lives lost, both American and those of our allies, continued to increase, our country was pressured to create a weapon that would terminate the war and we fulfilled that purpose beyond expectations. The atomic bomb, as the new weapon was dubbed, was equivalent to the explosive power of 20,000 tons of TNT and gave our great nation a power greater than any had possessed before. It resulted in our country being faced with a terrible choice: to use the atomic bomb on Japan in order to end the war, or to refrain from direct use of the bomb against Japan and instead use it only as a demonstration of our newly acquired power? After a thorough evaluation of all papers and existing documents pertaining to the atomic bomb, I came to the conclusion that the best decision would be to use a non-combat demonstration of the bomb, followed by an ultimatum to Japan, which if they did not accept, we would be forced to use the bomb to bring about their ultimate destruction. I also recommended informing the rest of the world of American possession of the bomb. Though the American public still desired retribution for the events at Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and other atrocities committed by Japan, and the use of the bomb would lessen the loss of American lives, I believed that America should not mirror Japan’s barbaric actions, since that would cause the United States to also face losing public support around the world, and worsen already shaky relations with Russia by using the atomic bomb unannounced. Since the beginning of the war, the Japanese were a vicious and savage foe. On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese demonstrated this attribute by attacking a U.S. naval base located at Pearl Harbor that resulted in the loss of many fine young men and women. The attack came “without warning and without a declaration of war,” The White House, Correspondence Between Tsukasa Nitoguri and Harry S. Truman, 1958. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO, 1965. illustrating the Japanese’s ability to commit atrocious acts of war. This caused the decision of whether to drop the atomic bomb on Japan to be increasingly difficult, because Pearl Harbor was not Japan’s only act of savagery. The Bataan Death March, where an estimated 10,000 war prisoners were killed while being transferred to a concentration camp, was just another of the acts of rape, maim, medical experimenting and other brutal methods practiced by Japan. The American public cried for retaliation against Japan’s inhumane acts of violence, for the people of our country had not forgotten the brutality Japan unleashed, and craved that we return the feelings of pain and loss that we experienced. The wishes of the American public greatly influenced our decision regarding the atomic bomb, however I did still stand by my earlier recommendation to stay our hand, as our nation had evidence through the Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard that “the Japanese government [might have been] searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender.” Manhattan Engineer District Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; reproduced in Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan Project (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 162 and in Martin Shewrin, A World Destroyed (New York: Knopf, 1975), 308. I knew it would be a much better option for our country if we refrained from using the atomic bomb until we had no other choice, and instead allowed Japan to surrender with dignity, which is an act that would have correctly represented our countries morality. Though I stood strong in my opinion that we would benefit best from a non-combat demonstration of our powerful weapon, I could not fail to acknowledge that there were a few benefits to using the atomic bomb on Japan. First of all, and what I saw as most important, as we planned a land invasion of Japan, it was calculated that the assault would have resulted in two hundred and fifty thousand young American soldiers being ultimately slaughtered. The White House. Harry S. Truman to Roman Bohnen, 1946. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO 1965. The use of the bomb would not require American losses, though it would result in the loss of many civilian lives, including women and children. Japan had not sympathized towards civilian losses, and though they themselves may have been beasts, our great nation should not have retaliated in the same manner. The White House. Harry S. Truman to Richard Russell, 1945. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO 1965. We had always been known to take the moral high ground, and the atomic bomb was retaliating on the same level of savagery as Japan has shown earlier in the war. The atomic bomb had the potential to “be an affective method of warfare” but we failed to “seriously consider the moral responsibilities which [were] involved.” Leo Szilard et al., A Petition to the President of the United States. The Truman Library, 1945. Japan should have received an ultimatum to surrender, and a warning that if they did not accept, their country would see the continuation of the conventional bombing until they surrendered to all terms and conditions US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: the Conferences at Québec, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 492-493. and “expect a rain of ruin from the air.” The White House, Immediate Release, 1945. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO, 1965. Though I saw the “opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use,” A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J. R. Oppenheimer, and E. Fermi, "Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons," June 16, 1945, Manhattan Engineer District Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; reproduced in Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan Project (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 149-150. I did not think the amount of benefits outweighed the innumerable consequences. Another great controversy our country faced in the construction of the weapon was the idea of whether to inform the rest of the world of our calamitous creation and its effects, or whether to keep the bomb a secret. I suggested that we uphold our reputation of trustworthiness, and inform both our Allies and neutral countries about our creation, which I felt would result in or moral position being greatly strengthened. Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, 1945. Washington, DC: GPO, 1965. I understand that a great amount of American lives were saved by the use of this destructive force, but the advantages were “outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and repulsion” “Political and Social Problems,” June 11, 1945, Manhattan Engineering District Papers, National Archives, Washington D.C. from the rest of the world in reaction to our decision. The use of the atomic bomb needed to be addressed as a “long-range national policy rather than of military expediency.” “Political and Social Problems,” When we chose to keep the bomb a secret, it jeopardized our position in peacetime talks, caused a loss of trust and respect from the world’s greatest nations, and “[prejudiced] the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.” “Political and Social Problems,” During the war, our nation upheld its honor and integrity, and we unfortunately let such a grave decision effect the way in which the rest of the world viewed our country. I felt as if the use of the bomb hindered our voice being heard during the peace talks. Also, participating in the regulation of such weapons as the atomic bomb was too great a cost for our nation to afford, even if it did bring a quicker end to the war. Lastly, I knew I had to stress the importance of Russia being informed of our development of the atomic bomb. I believed that Russia should have been notified of our success in creating the bomb before any other allied nation as it would have been more beneficial to the future stability of our country. The relations between our country and Russia were already tense, and I felt that keeping the secret of the atomic bomb from them would only worsen the relations between our nations, a relationship that did not need any more strain. To me, there were three glaring reasons that I believed Russia should be informed prior to any demonstration of the atomic bomb: firstly, Russia themselves had many gifted scientists whose expertise would result in the ultimate creation of an atomic bomb. Secondly, leakage of our Manhattan Project was inevitable, as Russia had many spies planted in our midst. Thirdly, the Germans had also been attempting to create a similar weapon, and their advancements were open to the Russians. Franklin D Roosevelt Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; reproduced in Michael B Stoff, Jonathan F Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 64-65. If our country used the weapon in our war against Japan, the “temptation [was] strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time.” Henry L. Stimson, Memorandum for the President, 11 September, 1945, “Proposed Actions for Control of Atomic Bombs,” Harry S Truman Papers, PSF: General File, Folder: Atomic Bomb, Box 112, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. Our nation needed to consider the other consequences of the atomic bomb and not think solely about the conclusion of the great and terrible war. Using the bomb without prior warning to Russia has resulted in what has become known as the Cold War. I felt as if I had presented our great president with enough points to support my position of a non-combat demonstration of the atomic bomb, and was confident that our nation would make the correct decision. However, on August 6th, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb the world had ever seen, and our nation saw all of the retaliations we feared, and also many we did not even see coming. I understand that the blows Japan dealt throughout the war were great, blows that we still feel decades later, but our decision to drop the bomb only lowered ourselves to Japan’s standards. It was not worth the sacrifice of our great standing and reputation in the world, our position in the peace talks, and an unparalleled arms race, just to save American lives, and bring a quicker end to the war even though I realize these benefits are extremely important. Lastly, the worsening of ties with Russia was not worth the above-mentioned benefits, as our nation now finds itself in an arms race with Russia, and I am not sure who will win. It is with great regret when I remember the president’s decision, and now our nation continues to reap the results, even though the war itself ended many years ago. Bibliography A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J. R. Oppenheimer, and E. Fermi, "Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons," June 16, 1945, Manhattan Engineer District Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; reproduced in Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan Project (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 149-150. Franklin D Roosevelt Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; reproduced in Michael B Stoff, Jonathan F Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 64-65. Henry L. Stimson, Memorandum for the President, 11 September, 1945, “Proposed Actions for Control of Atomic Bombs,” Harry S Truman Papers, PSF: General File, Folder: Atomic Bomb, Box 112, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. Leo Szilard et al., A Petition to the President of the United States. The Truman Library, 1945. Manhattan Engineer District Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; reproduced in Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, The Manhattan Project (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 162 and in Martin Shewrin, A World Destroyed (New York: Knopf, 1975), 308. Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, 1945. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO, 1965. “Political and Social Problems,” June 11, 1945, Manhattan Engineering District Papers, National Archives, Washington D.C. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: the Conferences at Québec, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 492-493. The White House, Correspondence Between Tsukasa Nitoguri and Harry S. Truman, 1958. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO, 1965. The White House. Harry S. Truman to Richard Russell, 1945. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO 1965. The White House. Harry S. Truman to Roman Bohnen, 1946. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO 1965. The White House, Immediate Release, 1945. The Truman Library. Washington, DC: GPO, 1965. 9 Gibson