The Navigational Instruments from the HMS St George

The Navigational Instruments from the HMS St George A Thesis By Daniel Peter Dalicsek Maritime Archaeology Programme University of Southern Denmark Master of Arts March 2016 “Navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse” Pompey the Great 2 i. Abstract i. Abstrakt 3 ii. Acknowledgements 4 Table of Contents i. Abstract ....................................................................................................3 ii. Acknowledgements ...................................................................................4 List of Figures ..................................................................................................8 List of Tables ...................................................................................................8 1. Introduction ..............................................................................................9 1.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 9 1.1. Summary ........................................................................................................................ 10 1.2. Literary Review ............................................................................................................... 11 1.3. Nautical Navigation in General ........................................................................................ 13 1.4. Archaeological Site Formation processes.......................................................................... 16 1.4.1. The Integration of Historical and Archaeological Data concerning a Historic Wreck Site: The Kennemerland ...................................................................................................... 18 1.4.2. Cultural site formation Processes in Maritime Archaeology: Disaster Response, salvage and Muckelroy 30 years on ..................................................................................... 20 1.4.3. Toward the Identification of Formation Processes ................................................. 22 2. History of the HMS St George ..................................................................24 2.1. The Second Rate Ship-of-the-Line .................................................................................... 24 2.2. Operational History of the HMS St George ....................................................................... 26 2.3. Historical Background to the Baltic Campaign .................................................................. 29 2.4. The Last Voyage .............................................................................................................. 31 2.5. The Rest of the Convoy .................................................................................................... 39 2.6. Reactions in England ....................................................................................................... 40 2.7. The Wreck ....................................................................................................................... 41 2.7.1. Salvage ................................................................................................................ 41 2.7.2. Archaeology ......................................................................................................... 42 2.8. Site Formation – Continuous or Discontinuous Site .......................................................... 44 2.9. Preservation.................................................................................................................... 45 3. Collection ................................................................................................47 3.1. Excavation Methodology ................................................................................................. 47 5 3.2. Museum access ............................................................................................................... 51 3.3. R-transforms ................................................................................................................... 52 3.4. Catalogue ........................................................................................................................ 53 3.5. Recording methodology .................................................................................................. 53 3.6. The Recording aspects as per the National Maritime Museum .......................................... 54 3.6.1. Identification ....................................................................................................... 54 3.6.2. Origin, Maker and Date ........................................................................................ 55 3.6.3. Inscriptions and Markings ..................................................................................... 55 3.6.4. Graduation........................................................................................................... 55 3.6.5. Dimensions .......................................................................................................... 55 3.6.6. Description .......................................................................................................... 55 3.6.7. Photography ........................................................................................................ 56 3.7. The collection .................................................................................................................. 56 4. Discussion ...............................................................................................60 4.1. Rules on Navigation in the Royal Navy ............................................................................. 60 4.2. Spatial Analysis ............................................................................................................... 63 4.3. The Instruments of Navigation Onboard .......................................................................... 65 4.3.1. The Compass ........................................................................................................ 65 4.3.2. The Sounding Lead ............................................................................................... 66 4.3.3. Navigation, caping and timekeeping during the last voyage onboard the HMS St George 68 4.3.4. The Log ................................................................................................................ 69 4.3.5. Celestial Navigation and Instruments .................................................................... 70 4.3.6. Protractors, Parallel rulers, Rulers, Gunter Scales .................................................. 73 4.3.7. Hourglasses .......................................................................................................... 75 4.3.8. Chronometer, Longitude, Timekeeping ................................................................. 76 4.3.9. The Telescope ...................................................................................................... 77 4.3.10. Slate boards and pencils ....................................................................................... 78 4.3.11. Traverse Board ..................................................................................................... 79 4.3.12. Charts .................................................................................................................. 79 4.3.13. Dividers ............................................................................................................... 81 4.3.14. Rutters ................................................................................................................. 81 4.4. Social Status .................................................................................................................... 82 4.5. Comparative Analysis ...................................................................................................... 84 6 5. Conclusion ..............................................................................................88 6. Further Research .....................................................................................91 Bibliography ..................................................................................................93 Sources .........................................................................................................95 Online resources ...........................................................................................95 Further Reading ............................................................................................96 Appendices ................................................................................................. 100 Appendix I – Catalogue ..........................................................................................................101 Appendix II – Catalogue list ....................................................................................................180 7 List of Figures Cover Image Selection of navigational instruments from the HMS St George Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 1 The St George with other Vessels - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich a) Figure 2 Muckelroy's Flow Chart, Muckelroy (1976), p.282 Figure 3 Gibbs' Flow Chart, Gibbs (2006), p.16 Figure 4 Plans of the HMS St George - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich b) Figure 5 The Battle of Copenhagen - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich c) Figure 6 The HMS St George under Jury Rig in 1797 outside Lisbon - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich d) Figure 7 The St George in tow by the Defence - oil pai ti g y Poul “i di g, © De “to e Da ske Figure 8 Recording sheet Figure 9 The midshipmen's berth – National Maritime Museum, Greenwich e) Figure 10 7546x0153 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 11 Sounding Lead and Line - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich f) Figure 12 Heaving the Lead - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich g) Figure 13 Log with reel and line - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich h) Figure 14 Use of the octant - Association Meridienne Nantes Figure 15 6000x3172 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 16 6000x0951 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 17 6000DF - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 18 Gunter scale - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich i) Figure 19 Hourglass from HMS Invincible - Bingeman (2010), Figure 158, p.99 Figure 20 6000x3202 – Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 22 6000x3284 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Figure 21 Pre-marked deck slate - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich j) Figure 23 Traverse board - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich k) Figure 24 A Chart over the North Sea from 1854 - Daniel Crouch Rare Books Figure 25 Divider from the Kennemerland - Muckelroy (1978), Figure 3.30, p.121 Figure 26 Thomas Masterman Hardyman, former captain of the St George, holding a telescope, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich l) 9 19 21 25 28 35 36 54 64 65 67 68 69 71 72 74 74 75 75 77 78 78 79 80 81 83 List of Tables Table 1 Leach's 5-stages-system, Gibbs (2006), p.7 .............................................................................. 20 Table 2 Quantitative comparison between whole objects and parts ................................................... 45 Table 3 - Royal Navy Lead Weights after Bennett 1987, p.28 ............................................................... 67 Table 4 - Weight of Leads from the HMS St George.............................................................................. 67 8 1. Introduction 1.1. Introduction The HMS St George was a second rate ship-of-the-line of the Royal Navy. She sank together with the HMS Defence on Christmas Eve in 1811 off the Danish west coast with nearly all hands onboard. She had a long and distinguished career in the Royal Navy from her launch in 1785. Her fateful last voyage that led to her grounding has been the subject of several master thesis and research publications before. A museum, the Strandingsmuseum in Thorsminde is dedicated to her story and the large archaeological collection that was recovered since the 1970s. Figure 1 The St George with other Vessels - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich a) This thesis will investigate the navigational instruments in the collection at the museum and through them provide a view into the culture of navigation and life onboard a ship-of-theline of the Georgian Royal Navy. These objects have not been researched at the museum before and this thesis presents the most complete list of the objects to date. Navigational instruments in general are scarce in the archaeological record, and we are very lucky to have such a large collection from the St George and in such good condition. The research of these instruments is especially important, because navigation reached a state after continuous 9 improvements at the start of the nineteenth century that was to remain unchanged in principle over the next 100 years. Following previous theses, this paper will also apply site formation processes theory to the wreck of the HMS St George to gain a new insight into the wrecking process that lead to one of the Royal Navy’s greatest catastrophes. The scientific questions to be answered throughout the thesis guided the research for the thesis as much as the research guided the formation of the questions. After reviewing the history of the ship in previous publications, the author decided to revisit the topic. With a critical approach, the author will investigate the history of the ship for site formation processes as well as how an analysis of the story of the last voyage can be used to look at the collection of navigational instruments. The first scientific question was therefore: How can Gibbs’ site formation process be applied to the history of the wrecking of the HMS St George? And by looking at the history of the last voyage and the operational history, what do we know about navigation onboard the St George? The second scientific question was then to compare those results from the previous question and to present the collection of navigational instruments analytically: What navigational instruments have been transferred into the archaeological record and how does what is in the collection compare to what should be there? The last question that has guided my research is the most overarching one and combines the previous in a sense: By looking at the collection of navigational instruments from the wreck of the HMS St George, what can we learn about the navigators onboard? The author aims to answer these questions neither one-by-one nor in a definite manner, but throughout the thesis. 1.1. Summary The first chapter of this thesis provides both an introduction to the topic and the study, as well as a review of the literature concerning the HMS St George, navigation and the Napoleonic Royal Navy. In separate segments, a general outline of navigation and the main theoretical framework to underwater site formation processes will be introduced. 10 The second chapter presents the operational history and the history of the last voyage of the St George as well as the afterlife of the wreck with regard to Gibbs’ site formation processes theory. In the third chapter the author concerns itself with the collection of the navigational instruments from the HMS St George. The chapter presents the artefacts’ recovery and their recording process. Chapter four discusses the collection of navigational instruments and their use. Furthermore an analysis of navigation and navigators onboard the St George, and in the Royal Navy at the time, is presented. The findings of the thesis are presented and summarized in the fifth chapter. A following chapter presents possibilities for further research of the navigational instruments at the Strandingsmuseum in Thorsminde. 1.2. Literary Review Some of the topics in this thesis have been covered in detail by innumerable books, journals and articles. The Royal Navy and the history of navigations are such subjects, where the existing literature fills libraries. The history of the Royal Navy and its ships is a field of expertise of many maritime historians and it is difficult to single out works in a so widely researched field. The Napoleonic Wars and the Georgian navy, especially due to the persona of Lord Nelson, are also very popular, so there is no definite work. In terms of original sources, log books and accounts as well as court martial papers have been preserved that relate to the St George. They also offer a view into navigation in the Royal Navy at the time. For this thesis I have used The Regulations and Instructions Realting to His Majesty’s Service at Sea from 1808. It provides a clear outline of the roles for crew members onboard a British warship like the St George and is easy to understand. Two books are very helpful to get a general overview of life onboard at the time; Goodwin’s Men O’ War from 2003 and the older A Brief History of Fighting Ships by Davies. They both introduce ships, fighting tactics and life onboard as well as providing an introduction to the historic events. Winfield and Goodwin provide both biographies of ships and their plans and layout. Nautical navigation has been investigated and written about from various viewpoints; scientific, historical and practical. Beside the works mentioned above, Muckelroy’s Maritime 11 Archaeology offers a description of navigation onboard ships. Mörzer-Bruyns’ book, published by the National Maritime Museum, presents the sextant and octant collection from Greenwich. Along with it the author, one of the world’s leading experts in the field, provides an excellent, concise and basic introduction to navigation and the use of navigational instruments. Bennett in his book The Divided Circle summarizes nautical navigation’s history and the usage of instruments as well. Although Blake’s 2004 book focuses on the sea chart, it reviews the general trends in nautical navigation as well. Daumas is considered with instruments and makers and offers a detailed history of the developments during the centuries up to the St George’s time of service. There are easily accessible primary sources for navigation from the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth century, both practical and scientific. I was more concerned with the practical. A read of works such as Seamanship, Both in Theory, Practice (1795), Nouveau Traité de Navigation (1792), The New Practical Navigator (1796), The Seaman’s Sure Guide, or, Navigator’s Pocket Remembrancer (1783), The Young SeaOfficer’s Assistant (1773) or The New Seaman’s Guide or Coaster’s Companion (1809) gives a good impression of the skills and knowledge essential to contemporary navigators. There have been six theses about various aspects of the St George collection. The theses all describe the operational history, but have genuine inaccuracies in dates and other details. None of them assesses the works they base their description on critically. Nonetheless, they provide a good introduction, but I have deviated from their approach in this thesis. Lonegran involved site formation processes into his study of the footwear, which provided valuable inspiration for this thesis. Teisen was the excavator of the St George and published the only report on the excavations. It is after the initial 1983 season and was only published internally and in Danish as the report of the Danish National Museum’s Department for Marine Archaeology from the diving excavation. Teisen later published a shorter paper in Bound’s Excavating Ships of War. Both give a general overview of the type of finds from the wreck and describe the excavations’ methodology, as well as the standard description of the St George’s history. Palle Uhd Jepsen published a book in Danish in time for the opening of the Strandingsmuseum where he gives the most detailed history of the St George and the Defence and investigates the primary sources. He is however not concerned with archaeology. Admiral Saumarez’s letters have been published by Ryan in 1964 and were very important to clarify certain details during the writing of the thesis. Ryan has also published the story of the St George and the Defence in Mariner’s Mirror in 1968, again citing important primary sources. 12 The archaeological theory behind site formation processes is explained below in detail. The author followed the papers cited by Lonegran, but this thesis relies more heavily on Gibbs. Muckelroy and Schiffer are extremely important though, to understand Gibbs’ theorem. For a general review of archaeological theories Trigger’s A History of Archaeological Thought still serves as the best concise work. 1.3. Nautical Navigation in General Navigation in seafaring is one of the most basic elements, along with boatbuilding and sailing techniques. It is the planning of the journey ahead, keeping track of the track travelled and thus determining one’s position in relation to other known positions, the port of departure and of arrival or dangers along the journey for example. Throughout the ages, navigation became more and more a science than just a skill set of seamen, although it retained those characteristics. It also became more instrumentalized, reaching the point of autonomous vessels, or self-driving cars on land, today. The origins for navigation in St George’s years of service therefore lie as much in astronomy as seafaring. Ancient Greek and Roman astronomy was highly developed and they had an accurate understanding of the movement of celestial objects. They sailed throughout the Mediterranean and Europe. Predating them, the Egyptian sailors covered great distances along the African coast and ventured over the sea to the Arabian Peninsula. In the early medieval age, the Norse-Viking adventurers travelling for trade and warfare were among the most skilled sailors in Europe. They did not have the same precise mathematical knowledge as the ancient civilisations, but used celestial objects to navigate nonetheless. The Sun, the Moon and Polaris are known to everyone, even if they have never set foot on a boat. In the cloudy weather of the North Sea and the North Atlantic, determining the height of the Sun can be difficult. Scientific debate surrounds the question of the Vikings’ ‘sunstone’, but if indeed true, it would be a very specific early navigational instrument. They would have used it to determine their latitude when crossing the North Sea. The Vikings were able to navigate accurately over large distances of open sea, reaching the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Greenland and eventually North America. Although they could navigate to these places, the discoveries were made by chance; being blown off course or mistakes in navigation. 13 Another culture of skilled navigators was that of the Arabic seafarers. They overtook a lot of the trade routes from the Egyptians and travelled both the Mediterranean and, for the development of navigation more importantly, the Indian Ocean. Much of the Greek and Roman knowledge in astronomy was translated into Arabic and continued to be studied in their schools. Their astronomical instrument making qualities during the early Middle Ages and into the first centuries of the second millennium were also superior to their European counterparts. The last group of seafarers that need to be mentioned in connection with navigation were the Polynesian voyagers. Their methods are the reason for a lot of debate. They were able to cover the largest distances across the ocean with remarkable accuracy and map out the island known to them in detail. What seems to be the most incredible about their technique is how good they were at dead-reckoning; holding a course without any reference points. They also used the stars to navigate at night and had a practical understanding of their movements. So why were instruments needed in the first place? Sailing on the open ocean and close to shore are very different things, especially in terms of navigation; planning the track ahead. The first activity is called coastal sailing or pilotage, when sailing within sight of land. This most basic navigation is also called ‘caping’, sailing from cape to cape. It requires less instruments or navigation by the stars, as the capes are kept in sight. What is important is the local knowledge and genuine experience in avoiding the dangers. To account for the tides, keep a lookout for reefs and sandbanks and keep track of currents needs little aid and responsibility lies with the mariner in charge. The biggest danger in coastal sailing is what eventually caused the sinking of the St George; a lee shore. A lee shore is when a vessel is to the windward of the coast and onshore winds, or currents as well, carry her towards it. ‘Caping’ also extended the maritime world onto the land; ‘aids to navigation’ or ‘navigational aids’ are beacons and other markers to signal dangers and positions to ships sailing along. Early examples are Greco-Roman lighthouses or marker stones and beacons in Medieval Europe. Anchoring was also a more frequent task when sailing along the coast. It was necessary in times of storms, fog, adverse currents or at night. There are however instruments, that developed for navigating along the coast. These include the sounding lead, the charts of coastlines, ‘rutters’ or ‘routiers’ describing the coast as one sails along and telescopes; to observe the coast. These instruments will be discussed below. Local and detailed knowledge of a particular stretch of the coast could be crucial and led to the development of the profession of the pilot. 14 Before ocean-crossing open water sailing started in Europe, the most important question was that of latitude. Latitude is the distance from the equator, parallel lines dividing the Earth into 90° North and South. The problem was solved and an established method developed by 1500. Using this knowledge, the Portuguese seafarers could accomplish their exploration along the African coastline. They were sailing along a roughly straight north-tosouth track. When they reached the desired latitude, they would turn eastwards until they made landfall, they just needed to keep a safe distance from the shore while sailing. As ocean-crossing voyages came about, the problem of longitude arose and dominated the scientific-navigational development for the next roughly three centuries. Atlantic crossings in terms of seamanship brought with them an increased importance of dead reckoning. Without a reference point for weeks upon a time, mariners had to be even more skilled in keeping on track and estimating their speed and course over ground, including leeway. This was in no way anything new; it was only the importance that rose exponentially. At the same time, navigating the oceans brought with it hydrographic exploration: ocean currents became more understood and used. Surface currents, like along the Norwegian coast or in the Kattegat, were previously seen as independent local phenomena. After 1500 currents like the Gulf Stream or the North Atlantic Drift gave them a more global characteristic and included them in open water navigation. The charting of foreign waters, coasts and harbours and thanks to Mercator’s new projection, charts became more accurate. The study of magnetism also emerged and influenced the development of the compass fundamentally. Continuous astronomical discoveries ensured more possibilities for seafarers to navigate at night. Of course pilotage and coastal navigation lost nothing of their importance and remained an important part of ocean crossing voyages. When ships arrived, at the coast of Africa or the Americas or back in the Old World, safe landing was necessary and ships often carried pilots according to their destination. The most important question in navigation that was solved in the eighteenth century was the longitude problem. By the mid-1760s, several methods for establishing the geographic position of a point were known. The question was how the longitude could be determined, even on land. The first method uses the lunar eclipses. However, these do not occur nearly often enough or can be observed due to the weather to be used for practical navigation. The second method was discovered by Galileo Galilei. He observed, that the moons of Jupiter pass in front of it so often and with such regularity, that they could act as the foundation for a method of timekeeping. The downside to this ingenious method is again the 15 practical application in the marine environment. The transits could at the time not be observed from the rocking deck of a ship in potentially covered skies. The last method by the mideighteenth century and before the invention of chronometer was the lunar distance technique. It relies on measuring the angle between the Moon and fixed stars on the night sky. The results, compared with the published tables should provide the navigator or astronomer with their position. Again, applicability was the question. The positions of the fixed stars were not accurately known, nor were the laws regarding the Moon’s movements exact enough. The instruments to observe and measure lacked the precision, too and their original astronomical large-scale versions could not be deployed on a sailing ship. The solution to the longitude question came about with the invention of the marine chronometer. The British Board of Longitude was set up in 1714 with the mission to develop a method to find the longitude at sea. As none of the above techniques fulfilled the requirements due to being unreliable, they could not claim the Board’s Longitude Prize of £20,000. At the same time, the Board did fund other achievements and promising projects. John Harrison produced his first chronometer in 1735. After several improvements, he successfully submitted his famous H4 chronometer to the Board of Longitude in1761. However, although the H4 did run precisely at sea, it had a great disadvantage, along with contemporary foreign chronometers: its production was slow and costly. Only after John Arnold’ and Thomas Earnshaw’s work, both English watchmakers, did chronometers become widespread. They received their prizes from the Board of Longitude in 1805. This short history already shows how in nautical navigation science, craftsmanship and practical seamanship were intertwined. This relationship was expressed in the instruments as well as the navigators and will be discussed further below. 1.4. Archaeological Site Formation processes In his 2010 master’s thesis in maritime archaeology on A Collection of Archaeological Footwear from the HMS St. George, Martin Lonergan examined his topic “for the affects of formation processes.”1 He deliberately focused his attempt on the individual objects in the footwear collection, instead of the approaches of his inspirations; the papers by Muckelroy, Gibbs as well as Schiffer. Those authors developing the theories on formation processes always considered the whole site as their subject. Lonergan tries to analyse the artefacts for both cultural and natural formation processes, but before and without scientific analysis for 1 Lonergan 2010, p.65 16 natural transformations2. He considers the wear and tear of the footwear in regard to the cultural formation processes and as such something that has occurred before the wrecking of the St George and affecting the objects from their construction onwards. He then draws conclusions from the various cultural formation processes affecting the shoes and boots for life onboard the St George. In this he follows Schiffer’s original approach of ‘behavioural archaeology’, researching the “‘correlates’, which relate material objects or spatial relations in archaeological contexts to specific types of human behaviour.”3 In contrast to Lonergan, I would like to apply Gibbs’ and Muckelroy’s shipwreck site formation processes to the St George as a whole as well as the navigational instruments in the collection of artefacts. I will implement Gibbs’, Muckelroy’s and Schiffer’s theories to write the operational history of the St George, and especially the immediate history leading up to the wreckage. Previous theses have not looked at the history and the process of the wrecking critically, but have simply accepted the previously written account. Neither have other publications on the topic investigated the ‘process of wrecking’ in regard to the archaeological data. Similarly to Lonergan’s thesis topic, the navigational instruments can be analysed for foremost cultural formation processes and Schiffer’s correlates. We will however extend the application of Muckelroy’s and Gibbs’ flow charts and theories to review the methodology of the excavation and the archaeological research of the navigational instruments. Chapter 2.8. of this thesis will apply the aforementioned theories to examine the HMS St George as a continuous or discontinuous site, and 2.9. will review the survival of navigational instruments within the shipwreck as a result of site formation processes. In this chapter the author will summarize, review and explain Muckelroy’s, Gibbs’ and Schiffer’s influential works and single out the main points that will then be applied, along with other convincing arguments, to the shipwreck of the HMS St George. It is important to note, that the wreck of the St George was discovered and subsequently excavated in the same decade as these theories arose and were developed. This might offer an explanation to the excavation’s methodology or rather lack of, and the lack of in depth research done on the archaeological material. Beside terrestrial archaeologists, thanks to the work of Keith Muckelroy in the 1970s, maritime archaeologists have also been much concerned with site formation processes. Keith Muckelroy published his paper The Integration of Historical and Archaeological Data concerning a Historic Wreck Site: The Kennemerland in 1976, while still excavating the 2 3 Lonergan 2010, p.72 Trigger 1989, p.359 17 Kennemerland site. In 1978, he continued to search for a way on how to incorporate site formation processes into archaeological interpretation in his book Maritime Archaeology. A major development in Muckelroy’s theoretical framework came with Martin Gibbs, who reviewed it in his published paper Cultural site formation Processes in Maritime Archaeology: Disaster Response, salvage and Muckelroy 30 years on. At the same time, Michael Schiffer pioneered the theory of ‘behavioural archaeology’ in 1976. He published his paper Toward the Identification of Formation Processes in 1983, while being editor of the series Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory. In 1987 Schiffer published Formation processes of the archaeological record. 1.4.1. The Integration of Historical and Archaeological Data concerning a Historic Wreck Site: The Kennemerland The real trigger for Muckelroy to develop his theory was the excavation of the seventeenth century Dutch East Indiaman Kennemerland. The merchant ship wrecked in the Out Skerries in the Shetland Islands. He criticised the use of historical data in close connection with archaeological data. Not that either of them would have been ignored in favour of the other, but that “reports […] have generally presented the [two different classes of] information in separate sections, with a minimum of cross-referencing.”4 Muckelroy identified five main processes through which the material culture of the ship; the empty hull and her contents, came to be the collection recovered by the archaeologists and the subject of study. These processes are the ‘Process of Wrecking’, ‘Salvage Operations’, ‘Disintegration of Perishables’, ‘Sea-bed Movement’ and ‘Characteristics of Excavation’5. Each of these processes transformed the ship and her contents over time. The assemblage of the material culture of the ship is displayed by Muckelroy as a system, within which these processes take place. The system of processes is in addition affected by one more input other than the ship; ‘material subsequently deposited on site’6. Furthermore, Muckelroy introduces ‘extracting filters’ or ‘outputs’. These are the ‘filters’ that reduce the material assemblage: ‘material which floated away’, ‘material salvaged’ and ‘material which disintegrated’7. The last factors he introduces into this equation that leads to the ‘observed sea-bed distribution’ are ‘scrambling devices’. In Muckelroy’s case study, he considers the motion of the water as a scrambling device, re-arranging the objects and occasionally re-grouping them. He classifies salvage operations and sea-bed 4 Muckelroy 1976, p.280 Muckelroy 1976, p.282 6 Muckelroy 1976, p.283 7 Muckelroy 1976, p.283 5 18 movements only as having acted as operators in one way; ‘extracting filters’ or ‘scrambling devices’ respectively8. The author disagrees with this and will reflect on the issue below. Figure 2 Muckelroy's Flow Chart, Muckelroy (1976), p.282 Muckelroy’s system and flow-chart are fundamental to the study of site formation processes on shipwreck sites and built the base for Gibbs’ article 30 years later. In 1978 Muckelroy published his book, Maritime Archaeology. Here he revisits his paper and of course explains his system in greater length and detail. He goes into greater depth considering wreck sites and their environment, describing the effects of eleven environmental site attributes. He is also more detailed about the wrecking process as a scrambling device. In Chapter 5 of the book he starts describing the process of wrecking “[f]rom the moment of impact”9. In a following chapter he distinguishes between ‘continuous’ and ‘discontinuous sites’. ‘Continuous sites’ are such where “artefact distributions are not 8 9 Muckelroy 1976, p.283 Muckelroy 1978, p.169 19 interrupted by sterile areas”10. ‘Discontinuous sites’ are “where the ship has broken up over a considerable distance”11.12 1.4.2. Cultural site formation Processes in Maritime Archaeology: Disaster Response, salvage and Muckelroy 30 years on Gibbs’ article reflects on the theoretical framework laid down by Muckelroy 30 years before. He examines how effective his theories were in those three decades and how far they became common practice and implemented into excavations and research. In his article, there is a strong awareness that followers of Muckelroy, and the author believes Muckelroy himself in his paper, have “focused on the environmental aspects over any human elements.” 13 This is also visible in Schiffer’s paper. A major accomplishment of Gibbs, especially when looking at the case of the HMS St George, is expanding Muckelroy’s ‘process of wrecking’ further back along the timeline of the ship’s history. With a focus on this first part of the ‘system’, Gibbs tries to logically explain and empirically analyse disaster. He coins the term ‘catastrophic shipwreck’, defining it as “an unintentional vessel loss through collision, foundering, explosion, structural defects, or any other process during what can be considered a crisis event.”14 The other category of shipwrecks would be those “intentionally deposited or abandoned”15. Gibbs is looking for the person in a disaster, for the behavioural response to the crisis. He uses Leach’s 5-stages-system to describe the cultural and natural processes of a disaster: 1. Pre-impact stage—the period before the disaster event. 1.1. Threat phase—when the possibility of disaster is identified. 1.2. Warning phase—when the disaster is imminent. 2. Impact stage—during the disaster ‘event’ and immediately afterwards. 3. Recoil stage—commencing when the immediate threat to life has receded. 4. Rescue stage—when the person or group is removed from danger. 5. Post-trauma stage—medium- to long-term responses to the disaster. Table 1 Leach's 5-stages-system, Gibbs (2006), p.7 The other main addition of Gibbs’ article to Muckelroy’s system is in the field of salvage operations. He distinguishes between ‘opportunistic’ and ‘systematic salvage operations’. ‘Opportunistic salvage’ depended on the ease of access to the wreck, and so did 10 Muckelroy 1978, p.182 Muckelroy 1978, p.196 12 Whether the St George fits either of these definitions is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.8 13 Gibbs 2006, p.4 14 Gibbs 2006, p.7 15 Gibbs 2006, p.7 11 20 the materials removed. ‘Opportunistic salvage’ targets easily accessible and recoverable parts of the ship’s material culture and “could occur sporadically and repeatedly over a long period”16. Systematic salvage would be conducted by professionals with a planned aim and understanding of the material culture. Gibbs criticises the scientific field for not researching the “archaeological evidence for the general priorities, processes and mechanics of wreck salvage.”17 However, even when he critically reviews and summarises the possibility of such research, he does not argue with Muckelroy’s definite statement that salvage operations “have only operated in one way”18; extracting. The author of this thesis would argue that both opportunistic and systematic salvage operations can be ‘scrambling devices’. It only depends on the salvors’ professionalism, methods and regard for items other than their target. Figure 3 Gibbs' Flow Chart, Gibbs (2006), p.16 16 Gibbs 2006, p.14 Gibbs 2006, p.14 18 Muckelroy 1976, p.283 17 21 1.4.3. Toward the Identification of Formation Processes Michael B. Schiffer’s article is very different as he does not describe his theory in relation to something as specific as shipwrecks, but is more general and holds terrestrial archaeology in its focus. That is the reason behind its great influence as well. His aim is to research formation processes of specific deposits. In the decades before Muckelroy’s article processual archaeologists of the trend ‘New Archaeology’19 were trying to extract “from archaeological remains as much social and behavioural information as possible.”20 For Schiffer ‘deposits’ and ‘remains’ are both artefacts and the sites. Maritime archaeologists have to bear in mind that in a violent catastrophe of a shipwreck, the artefact can lose its immediate spatial context on the ship. So this part of the site formation process acts already as a scrambling device, and the effects can be different on the site (i.e. the ship) and the artefact (i.e. the individual objects). This does not annul looking at artefact positions even in the most catastrophic shipwrecks, like the St George. In 1983, Schiffer missed the “enthusiasm in the new archaeology for directly interpreting archaeological patterns behaviourally” 21. In 2006, Gibbs is doing just that, as he tries to explain crisis, the pure chaos, and set a theory for it. Schiffers article is at length concerned with the different ways in which materials get transformed or distorted: “formally, spatially, quantitatively, and relationally.” 22 A universal truth in Schiffer’s theory is his description of simple properties of artefacts and how they are affected in site formation processes. He describes size, density, shape, use-life factors, damage, etc23. As complex properties of artefacts, Schiffer mentions artefact quantity, diversity, artefact density of deposits and measures of disorganisation among others 24. His measure of disorganisation is difficult to apply to shipwrecks, as ships were such a selfcontained and closed entity and society that everything within them is interrelated. In a very processual archaeologist way, he describes the Completeness Index (CI) and the Fragmentation Index (FI)25. Although these could be applied to shipwrecks, it is difficult. The HMS St George especially falls into what Schiffer calls “most severe sampling problems”26. For Schiffer’s theory on site formation processes, he describes further ‘other properties of deposits’ that are again difficult to apply to a shipwreck. 19 Trigger 1989, pp.296-298 Schiffer 1983, p.675 21 Schiffer 1983, p.676 22 Schiffer 1983, p.677 23 Schiffer 1983, pp.679-684 24 Schiffer 1983, pp.684-689 25 Schiffer 1983, p.686 26 Schiffer 1983, p.687 20 22 In the following chapter this thesis will describe the operational history of the St George and its last voyage with regard to the above theories. We will relate the available information from documentary sources to the archaeological evidence. From the theoretical frameworks introduced in this chapter, Gibbs’ is the latest and most directly applicable to shipwrecks. Therefore the author will use his approach for the most part, but Muckelroy’s and Schiffer’s original thoughts on site formation processes should be kept in mind. 23 2. History of the HMS St George Previous master theses at the University of Southern Denmark have described the operational history and the last voyage of the St George in more or less detail at the beginning of the works. In a similar fashion Teisen described the history of the ship in his 1983 excavation report and in the 1998 publication. Uhd Jepsen is solely concerned with the history of the St George, and of the HMS Defence. The career of the St George can be reconstructed from original Admiralty sources and there are several publications that have done so. The author relies in this chapter foremost on Goodwin27 and Winfield28. However, none provide a concise, but detailed story and several momentums in the final voyage are incorrectly described, especially in the theses. We will therefore reproduce a compiled history of the St George and her last voyage and try to avoid their mistakes. Lonegran has tested the collection of footwear from the St George against site formation processes. However, he missed the important point of middle range theory in Muckelroy’s and Gibbs’ papers to research a collection with a wider, broader view. Furthermore, Lonegran, Karadimos and Montgomery ignored a fundamental warning in Muckelroy’s seminal paper. The St George is a wreck where “considerable documentary evidence is available, in addition to the archaeological data recovered.”29 Still in their thesis they presented these two classes of information with little reference to the relationship between them and in strongly separated sections. 2.1. The Second Rate Ship-of-the-Line The HMS St George was a 98-gun second rate warship of the Royal Navy. It was completed on the 14th of October 1785 in the naval dockyard in Portsmouth. The St George was one of a number of ships built according to the design of HMS Duke, which was launched in 177730. The second rate ships along with the first rate and third rate warships were also called ‘a ship-of-the-line’ or ‘a line-of-battle ship’. The rating system was used to denote a ship’s size and, in connection with that, her number of guns, that is her fighting capacity. Similarly, the ‘rate’ of a ship also determined the number of the crew, including men of the 27 Goodwin 2002, pp.202-205 Winfield 2005, pp.20-21 29 Muckelroy 1976, p.280 30 Goodwin 2002, p.202 28 24 lower decks, midshipmen, non-commissioned and commissioned officers. The rate of pay and pension for the men also depended on the ‘rate’ of the ship they served on.31 First and second rates were three-deckers, compared to third and fourth rates, which carried guns on only two decks. The second rate three-decker was a more economic option to the largest first rates, thus it was only slightly smaller. This type of ship only served in the British Royal Navy, none of the other European navies built them in considerable number 32. The HMS St George was only 9 ft (2.9 metres) shorter than the famous first rate, the HMS Victory33. The complements of first and second rates were not that far apart neither; some 850 men. The HMS St George belonged to the Duke-class, because she was built after HMS Duke’s plans. First and second rates being nearly equally expensive and important assets to the Royal Navy, we are right to consider them equally well equipped in terms of navigational equipment. Figure 4 Plans of the HMS St George - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich b) These largest ships-of-the-line had a poor performance in terms of sailing. Their high structure provided a large surface for the wind to push sideways and the ships were infamous for giving too much leeway. They were all full rigged ships; carrying square sails on all three masts. This is the first point where Gibbs’ theory can be applied. It is this basic disadvantage of a ship-of-the-line that would fall into the ‘pre-voyage long-range aspect’. It is part of “the collection, organization and evaluation of information that might ultimately contribute to the planning and execution of a voyage … potentially […] years in advance of a specific departure.”34 31 Davies 2006, p.23 Lavery 2003, p.179 33 Winfield 2005, p.2 & p.20 34 Gibbs 2006, p.8 32 25 2.2. Operational History of the HMS St George The HMS St George was ordered and its keel laid down in 1774. After the launch in 1785, the HMS St George was commissioned on the 8th of October 1787, but still incomplete in December of the same year. No captain was appointed at the time of her launch and Lieutenant Scory Barker only stayed with the ship for two months in 178735. The next commissioning of the ship is then in 1790 under Captain Sir George Collier as a reaction to the Spanish Armament the previous year. The ship was only fully completed and fitted in this year. The first time the ship set to sail for actual service only came in 1791. In September it was ordered on guard duty at Plymouth36. A frequent rotation of captains followed until 1793, however this was not unusual in the Royal Navy. On the 1st of February 1793 John Gell was raised to the rank of ‘Rear-Admiral of the Blue’, the most junior rank of admirals. He made the HMS St George his flagship, where the ship has been under Rear-Admiral Sir Richard King’s flag37. After a brief command of Captain William Kelly, who was appointed captain on the 14th of February and lasted only a week, Captain Thomas Foley followed as captain of the HMS St George. Captain Foley was already an experienced sailor and captain at the time and was to command the ship for the following three years. At the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War, the HMS St George’s armament, along with a number of other ships’, was increased from 90 to 98 guns38. She sailed for the Mediterranean to join Hood’s fleet at Toulon in April 1793. On the way the St George captured a 20-gun French privateer, the General Dumourier and her prize, the Spanish St Jago off Cape Finisterre on the 14th of April. She escorted the captured ships back to Portsmouth and got underway to the Mediterranean again. In October, the admiral was able to take the French ship Modeste at Genoa. The same autumn, the HMS St George took part in the siege of Toulon. Rear-Admiral Gell was however to retire from active duty due to ill health and left for England overland at the start of 179439. Gell was replaced by Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker and the St George remained in the Mediterranean. She took part in the Battle of Genoa and the Battle of the Hyères Islands in 1795. She underwent repairs in Spezzia Bay in Italy. Captain Shuldham Peard took command in January 1796 and the ship was ordered to Lisbon, Portugal. Her mission was to escort a 35 Winfield 2005, p.20 Winfield 2005, p.20 37 The Literary Panorama, Volume 1, 1807, London, p.1385 38 Goodwin 2002, p.202 39 The Literary Panorama, Volume 1, 1807, London, p.1385 36 26 convoy from the city to Brazil. However, on the day of the departure for a convoy the following year, in January 1797, HMS St George collided with a Portuguese frigate and was grounded on one of the Catchop Shoals40. How exactly the collision occurred is not known, but navigating the Tagus river and the entrance between the North and South Catchop Shoals was difficult and could be dangerous. She was refloated and repaired in Lisbon. The same year the St George was at Cádiz and two sailors from the ship incited a mutiny, but were swiftly executed41. She remained in England until 1799, being re-commissioned for Channel service and re-fitted at Chatham during 1798. The St George then sailed for the Mediterranean, but returned the same year to serve in the Channel in 180042. The ship continued to change captains and flag admirals during the years and came under the command of Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy in February 1801. She was to serve as the flagship of Vice-Admiral Horation Nelson, who hoisted his flag on the St George on the 12th of February 180143. The two were to serve in these roles at the Battle of Trafalgar onboard HMS Victory. The fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March under Admiral Sir Hyde Parker. At the Battle of Copenhagen, on the 2nd of April, Nelson changed his flagship to HMS Elephant for two reasons. After Nelson personally oversaw the sounding of the waters outside Copenhagen, the smaller HMS Elephant was a better choice, as it had a shallower draft and was more manoeuvrable in the restricted waters around the city. The other reason was the ship’s state. Nelson wrote of the St George, that “she is so completely uncomfortable”44 and that it was “in a truly wretched state”45. She remained with Admiral Parker, her earlier flag admiral, in reserve and committed little to nothing to the battle. Nelson returned to the St George as his flagship after the battle. 40 Goodwin 2002, p.202 Brenton 1838, pp.364 42 Winfield 2005, p.20 43 Winfield 2005, p.20 44 Pope 1972, p.165 45 Pope 1972, p.165 41 27 Figure 5 The Battle of Copenhagen - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich c) At the end of the year, the HMS St George set sail for Jamaica under Captain Lennox Thompson. The ship returned to Portsmouth only in 1803, already commanded by Captain William Granville Lobb. Repairs begun on the now 18-year-old ship, but were halted when she was commissioned for duty on the Leeward Islands in the Caribbean. The St George was soon back in Portsmouth, only three months after being commissioned, and the repairs were completed by September 1805. The repairs cost £ 42,853, ca.80% of the original costs for the St George. The following years the HMS St George spent on Channel service as the flagship of the various admirals and under a number of captains46. In the spring of 1809 the vessel was ordered for service in the Baltic as the flagship of Rear-Admiral Francis Pickmore. She returned to Portsmouth for the winter, as she was to two years later, and was refitted at the cost of £ 12,10247. We do not know what this refitting entailed, but this is the second large-scale refitting since two important patents in 1802: Massey’s mechanical log and mechanical sounder. The science of magnetism and magnetic variation’s influence on compasses was also advancing at the time, so the fitting with any new version is possible. 46 47 Winfield 2005, p.20 Winfield 2005, p.21 28 Captain Daniel Oliver Guion was appointed to the HMS St George in April 1810, as he sought employment after serving in the Irish Sea Fencibles until March. 48 At the same time the ship became the flagship of Rear-Admiral Robert Carthew Reynolds. They were to remain the last commander and flag officer of the HMS St George. The ship was ordered for Baltic service that year again and probably returned to stay in Portsmouth over the winter49. This is the start of the long-term aspects of the pre-impact threat phase as defined by Gibbs. Guion did not have prior experience in sailing the route from England to the Baltic and back. It is not to say that he was not an excellent sailor who navigated the treacherous coasts of Ireland where tides and a lee shore pose an equally large threat as at Jutland. I wish to note this momentum, as a potential ‘threat’, even though I believe Guion’s experience was not an actor in the ‘process of wrecking’. 2.3. Historical Background to the Baltic Campaign The naval campaign in the Baltic during the Napoleonic Wars is important to review in order to understand the mission of the St George before it sank. The first major event of armed conflict in the Baltic for the British warships was the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801. However it was not the first confrontation between the Baltic states and Britain. In 1794, Denmark-Norway and Sweden already agreed to a pact of armed neutrality and Danish commanders of convoys were instructed not to allow any other navy’s ships to board and search their vessels50. After diplomatic tensions, the Russian Tsar confiscated British goods and ships under the British flag in Russian ports in 179851. As Britain continued its aggressive policy for the dominance, the League of Armed Neutrality between Russia, Sweden, Prussia and Denmark was revived in 1800. As a reaction, the British Prime Minister William Pitt ordered an embargo of these countries’ goods. The Danish pilots were instructed, and threatened with treason and the death penalty, not to aid the British ships52. The surveys of the Kattegat and other Danish waters were also kept as a state secret. To actively break the closure of continental ports to British ships, the First Battle of Copenhagen followed. As a result of the Danish defeat, the pact for armed neutrality was practically over and Britain continued to trade with Sweden and out of other Baltic ports. For Denmark, the following 48 ADM 1/1857/29 Goodwin 2002, p.204 50 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.9 51 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.10 52 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.10 49 29 period is often called the English Wars. Britain’s dominance on the seas was greatly strengthened by the victory at Trafalgar in 1805. The only territory, where the Royal Navy did not enjoy the strongest position was the Eastern Mediterranean, but here Russia was in control and they were allied with the British53. Denmark tried to balance its neutral position, but after 1806 when Napoleon declared a Continental Blockade, there was no place left for neutrality. After the Treaty at Tilsit in 1807, Russia was officially allied with Napoleon and the Danish fleet could fall into his hands. To prevent the French from strengthening their fleet and replace their losses at Trafalgar with Danish ships, the British attacked Copenhagen in August 1807. They confiscated the Danish navy and bombarded the city. To replace the lost navy and disturb British trade, the Danes introduced a large amount of gunboats. These oared boats could attack convoys passing through the Sound or the Great Belt and were armed enough to successfully confront smaller British navy vessels. The Royal Navy captured the island of Anholt in the Kattegat in 1809 and took charge of the lighthouse to ensure the safety of navigation for their ships 54. The next year was strategically important for Denmark-Norway, Sweden and the British. Sweden desired the separation of Denmark and Norway. In 1809 it suffered military defeat from Russia in Finland and the king was overthrown. The new king abided by the country’s pro-French political tide and declared war on Britain in 1810. The same year, Danish ships could not deliver the crucial grain supplies to Norway as a result of the British control over the water, helping the Swedish political cause. Therefore, despite the declaration of war, Sweden did not act hostile to Britain. By 1811 the large ships-of-the-line, like the St George, saw little action, as no navy was able to oppose the British. No force could even be assembled to face the large British warships55. However, the Royal Navy’s fleet under Admiral James Saumarez in the Baltic was important to keep the trade routes open and “denied the use of that sea to Napoleon when finally he turned on Russia.”56 The Baltic trade was especially important to Britain in the war. They needed to deny Napoleon the quick transport of grain supplies over the sea and to maintain their fleet, they needed the necessary goods from the Baltic; oak, pine, tar, iron, copper, etc57. The HMS St George was serving in the Baltic to maintain the British dominance and on her fateful return to England, she was escorting one of these important convoys. 53 Davies 2002, p.169 James 1859, p.431 55 Davies 2002, p.180 56 Davies 2002, p.180 57 Teisen 1998, p.258 54 30 2.4. The Last Voyage Admiral Saumarez was an experienced sailor of the Royal Navy and as such fully aware of the dangers the North Sea could pose during the winter. In 1811, most of the Baltic was dominated by the British navy, but Danish gunboats and privateers still posed a threat in the western parts, Kattegat and the Sleeve. This made the armed escorting of merchant convoys to the North Sea and Britain necessary. At the end of the sailing and campaign season, the Royal Navy ships were also to return to England, as they had no base in the Baltic. Strategically, their position was not threatened by leaving, as the eastern ports remained iced in until the spring. Admiral Saumarez consulted with the representatives of the British merchants in the Baltic, William and Philip Emes, about the date for the departure of the last convoy. Guided by his experiences, he proposed the 1st of October. The merchants however argued that ships from distant ports might not arrive on time and the 1st November was agreed on58. In terms of navigation, a journey during the winter months could be perilous. Thick fog could hide the skies and make celestial navigation impossible. The fog and the short daylight in Danish waters, where sailing markers and shore lights were missing, made coastal navigation nearly as impossible. Dropping anchor for the night or until the fog cleared made vessels an easy prey for the opportunistic privateers. Hanö Bay, on the coast of Blekinge province in southwest Sweden, was the agreed meeting point for the ships bound for Britain. Admiral Saumarez made sure in advance, that the Swedes would not interfere with the gathering of the British convoy. Nonetheless, the instructions were that if they did and the small harbour of Matvik was not open, the convoy could set sail earlier59. A small detachment of Royal Marines was also stationed on Hanö Island. It was indeed a large gathering of ships; 129 merchantmen60 and 8 of his Majesty’s ships: Rear-Admiral Reynolds’ flagship, the St George, as the largest, the 74-gun ships-ofthe-line Defence and Hero, a smaller ship-of-the-line; the Dictator of 64-guns, and the gunbrigs Rose, Bellette and Urgent. The Cressy was to join them later, as it was anchored outside Rostock. The moment of departure from Hanö Bay is important for the process of wrecking. The pre-impact threat phase starts here. Previous publications noted at this point in their 58 Saumarez, Ryan 1968, pp.170-171, p.195 Saumarez, Ryan 1968, p.170 60 Teisen notes 130 (1998) and 120-230 (1983), after the first failed attempts to set sail, only 120 arrived at the anchorage off Lolland 59 31 recollection of the last voyage as well, how the decision for the ‘late’ date of departure came about. In fact when the date was set, the first threat arose. It was the wrong choice of date for sailing and the wrong response from the merchants to well known conditions and seasonal restrictions. In Hanö Bay another pre-impact threat arose and was only partially mitigated. In a letter from Dashwood to Saumarez, written onboard the HMS Pyramus in Matvik harbour and dated the 21st of November, he notes: Admiral Reynolds’ convoy’s ships “are all entirely without a single bower anchor or cable … All their masters are necessarily absent, some at Carlshamn and others at Carlscrona, to endeavour to get their wants supplied, but which, I fancy, will be found very difficult. I understand it will take 16 or 18 days to bring anchors and cables from Carlscrona … There are not above 10 at Carlshamn, and ‘tis very doubtgul whether so many can be purchased at Carlscrona.”61 So when the ship left the Swedish coast, “the equipage suitable to overcome potential threat[s]”62 was in fact insufficient. The disaster could have been mitigated differently or maybe avoided, had they have had the proper anchors onboard. This detail also influences the archaeological record; what anchors could be at the site? Two anchors were recovered and one of them was clearly identified as having been made in Plymouth and restored “with a replica wooden stock of Admiralty long-shank pattern.”63 However, this might not be representative of the majority of anchors onboard. This raises the question, as to what the input, the ship that came into the archaeological record was like. This is the first clear difference between a glorious second rate that sails in the line of battle and what we research as the HMS St George. The ship has been through at least three major overhauls and was at this point even significantly different to what left England in the spring of 1811. To summarize, the long-term aspects of the pre-impact threat phase were a) an admittedly late departure in the sailing season and b) improper equipment to overcome a potential threat. Conditions seemed fair to depart on the 29th of October, but they worsened during the day. Admiral Reynolds sat sail as ordered on the 1st of November, but strong winds coming 61 Saumarez, Ryan 1968, p.204 Gibbs 2006, Table 2, p.9 63 Teisen 1998, p.263 62 32 from the South forced him back. The ships were not able to leave their anchorage off the Swedish coast until the 9th of November, a major setback to the planned departure. They sailed to the entrance of the Danish waters and anchored on the 10th of November north of the landmass Darss, south of Møn Island. The convoy encountered a gale at Bornholm and already some merchant vessels were lost. The wind only died down and changed direction during the 11th and the convoy sailed the next morning, only to drop anchor east of Fehmarn, around Nysted on the same day. The following days were spent at anchor and the calm weather enabled dispersing supplies among the ships. On the 15th of November the weather picked up and the fleet sought shelter south of the Danish island of Lolland, over a sandbank called Rødsand. To seek shelter at Rødsand was the short term aspect of the threat phase. As the storm hit at night, the distinction between this aspect and the warning phase is very fine. However, when anchoring, only the possibility of disaster was identified and danger only became imminent thereafter, as follows below. In contrast to the previous days’ favourable weather, the wind rose to gale force during the night. Several merchant vessels foundered and came off their anchors. One such vessel struck the HMS St George as she was trying to veer out cable. To do this “two watches were called to give the ship cable, and shortly afterwards all hands were summoned”64. The other ship cut the St George’s anchor cable and went down herself. It is obvious that the positions we have for the convoy, are all in relation to known coastal markers and places. Therefore we can conclude that even more than by instruments, they were navigating using these references and the old ‘lead-and-line’ technique. They had a pilot onboard, who of course would navigate in this way. When the accident occurred at night the records support this: “Our own danger was imminent: we found only fourteen fathoms though we had anchored at twenty. […] On trying the lead, we found only eight fathoms.”65 After the collision with the merchant vessel, the St George made desperate attempts to stop drifting towards the shore. As the crew were called on deck and hove anchors, their efforts were in vain. The captain ordered the masts to be struck to lighten the vessel. This did not work, and the St George struck the sandbank, losing her rudder. 64 65 The Naval Chronicle: Volume 27, p.114 Teisen 1998, p.260 33 The struggle of the night is the warning phase before the impact. All of the captain’s orders, as described by William Galey, correspond to Gibbs’ theory as ‘over-activity’. Gibbs genuinely credits the cutting of the masts to the impact stage66, those hours of struggle until dawn on the St George. The decision to lighten the vessel was made, so the ship would come as close to shore as possible and the crew could be saved onto land. They were horrified to ind they grounded four miles from the shore. In the narrative the impact stage consists of the cutting of the masts, the heaving out of anchors and Captain Guion’s decision to remain onboard and not abandon the vessel. The recoil stage follows, with the St George being refloated, getting a Pakenham-type rudder and being towed to Gothenburg by the Cressy. The next morning brought the convoy’s state to light: “I must now inform you, that out of 120 sail which went from Hano [sic] with us, we could only muster 75 on the 21st of November, so that at least 45 must have been lost.”67 The St George was in a terrible state and it was clear she had to be towed to Gothenburg for repairs by one of the other man-of-war after it was refloated: “… all her masts gone, except the Bowsprit with the Signal of Distress hoisted upon a small spar”68. Although the St George lost her rudder and grounded, she was not taking on any water and no hands were lost. The Cressy also supplied a Pakenham-type rudder to the St George. They arrived on the 2nd of December69 and the combined fleet gathered there. 66 Gibbs 2006, p.12 The Naval Chronicle 27, p.114 68 The Naval Chronicle 27, p.114 69 Jepse a d Teise uote Galey Vinga (p.63), but Saumarez writes 72 (p.205) 67 o gly, iti g , Jepse also otes ships a i i g i 34 Figure 6 The HMS St George under Jury Rig in 1797 outside Lisbon - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich d) The above events do not only form a discrete wrecking process with eventual refloating. I would argue that they in themselves are also the short term aspects of the preimpact stage threat phase for the final wrecking. The events and the resulting state of the St George led to “changes to course, increased awareness for lookouts [and] preparation … of equipment”70 with regard to the homeward leg of the voyage. Furthermore, the jury-rigging of the ship is a modification of the vessel to overcome the potential threat. The threat in this case for the St George was simply a change in wind direction to the East-Northeast. In terms of the analysis of the behavioural aspects, it is also useful to regard the journey after leaving Vinga Sound as the warning phase, because the seamen and the officers were uneasy about the St George and more alert and cautious. With this argumentation, we also need to draw a new line in Gibbs’ flow-chart diagram, as the ‘input’, the ship’s material culture, was now modified after the pre-impact threat phase through the short term strategies; the loss of rudder, the jury rigging, the loss of anchors and preparations to sail in tow. Despite that these are always considered as modifications or alien to the ship, they are what makes up the input into the archaeological record. Admiral Saumarez, onboard the HMS Victory, had his doubts about the St George and whether she could make the trip back to England. Due to the weather, the departure was delayed and this situation left enough time to set up a jury rig on the St George. Captain Guion and Admiral Reynolds convinced Saumarez of the ship’s seaworthiness and the fleet sat sail from Vinga on the 17th of December. Reynolds probably did not change his flagship to 70 Gibbs 2006, p.9 35 a better ship, because that would have disproved his point towards Saumarez. The Cressy and the Defence were instructed to remain with the St George in case she needed assistance, while the Victory led another division. Figure 7 The St George in tow by the Defence - oil painting by Poul Sinding, © Den Store Danske As the ships had very different sailing abilities and were in different state, they separated on the 19th of December in worsening weather conditions. On the 20th, Admiral Reynolds gave the command to wear the ship and sail back to Vinga Sound. As they arrived back on the Swedish coast at the Salö beacon, well north of Vinga, the winds changed again to the northeast; ideal for a direct passage to England. The ships set out again, but this time the St George was not in tow. When they left the Sleeve and got around Skagen, the signs of the disaster arose. The Pakenham rudder was not functioning well, a gale was rising in the northwest and the current was pushing the ships towards the Jutland coast. On the evening of the 23rd of December, the hopeless situation of the St George was clear and Captain Pater on the Cressy decided to wear his ship and leave the flagship. The Defence, obeying the Royal Navy’s strict rules, decided to stay with Admiral Reynolds. Captain Guion was desperately trying to wear his ship around and the starboard anchor was let go to help the manoeuvre. As Captain Pater, he realised he cannot clear the Sleeve. Unfortunately, the anchor’s hawser snagged under the temporary rudder and tore it away. The 36 Defence and the St George got separated during the night. The Defence was drifting less and kept to the windward of the St George, thus she hit the shore further north and earlier. A gunshot from the Defence was heard onboard the St George between 5 and 6 o’clock and not much later, in the early hours of the 24th of December, the St George struck as well.71 The process of wrecking now arrived at the start of the impact stage with the vessel grounding. The major warning phase lasted for the whole voyage from Vinga Sound. The return to the Swedish coast and subsequently the departure have only contributed to the alert behaviour of the crew, only highlighting the threat of disaster. Guion’s last efforts to clear the Sleeve or wear the ship were again radical changes to course and desperate attempts to stop or slow the vessel72. The intervention from external sources, mentioned by Gibbs73, did not take place, as the other ships were unable to assist the St George. The warning phase; with the problems with the rudder, then its complete loss and the lack of anchors, corresponds well with the threat phase and the escalation represented in Gibbs’ flow-chart. For a closer look at the men onboard at the time of the wrecking we have to look at their role. Each of them had a berth and when we think of them, we like to think of each of them having an assigned place. It is easy to forget, that beside the battle stations and sailing stations, there were duty stations, harbour stations, abandon ships, fire and man overboard stations for each crew member. The sinking of the Defence and the St George was too chaotic for this strict organisation to be kept up, but one should bear in mind, that there was a plan. The Defence was quickly beaten to pieces by the waves and only 6 of her crew of 560 made it to shore alive. One of them in such a bad condition that he died later. The St George sank into the sand quickly and her lower decks filled with water, forcing the men up on deck. In an effort to lighten the vessel, they cut away the masts. When cutting the mizzen mast’s shrouds, the sailors only had their knives instead of axes. When the structure fell, it carried with it a part of the poop deck and those on it. By the morning, the crew of the St George was decimated from the cold water and the wind as well as the waves washing men off the wreck. One huge wave is estimated to have carried away and drowned several hundred of the sailors and marines onboard. Only one of the ship’s long-boats, the yawl, remained and fourteen men attempted to make it to shore, but were unsuccessful in the surf. To cover themselves against the sea, those fit enough stacked the dead and unconscious and hid behind them. Their ordeal continued throughout the day as Danish locals and a 71 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.76 Gibbs 2006, p.10 73 Gibbs 2006, p.10 72 37 Norwegian salvage crew watched helplessly from the shore.74 Admiral Reynolds died around 3:30 in the morning of the 25th.75 Twelve of the ca. 865-strong complement made it to shore on pieces of wreckage and a makeshift raft, but had to be helped off as they were so exhausted. Over 500 of the bodies of the drowned were washed ashore southward along the coast and buried in churchyards as well as in mass graves in the sand dunes. These dunes were then called ‘dead-men’s-hills’ and held a place in local folklore for decades. With only eighteen survivors, the loss of the two vessels together accounted for around 1,400 dead.76 “The impact stage represented the phase when life was in immediate danger.”77 Gibbs, citing Leach, puts this phase as lasting up to hours in a high intensity catastrophe.78 The St George’s catastrophe, although not that of the Defence, is an extreme example, where the victims’ ordeal lasted for over a day! The grounding did not come as a surprise, but it was so violent and the ship took on water so quickly, that any “pre-impact awareness and preparedness”79 was useless. Gibbs argues at length, how panic breaks out on the ship during the impact phase and that “strangely aberrant behaviour”80 from the people involved is a regular occurrence. The accounts of the HMS St George do not note a case like this, nor do they record any incompetent behaviour of the officers. The crew seems to have accepted their fate and organisation was kept up when stacking the bodies of the dead to form a shelter from the elements. Attempts to reach the shore were made and with approval from the officers and so in keeping with the normal chain of command. Gibbs states the obvious, that “heavy items would sink directly”81, but again the St George is an exception, when an 18-pounder gun still on its carriage washed up on shore! The calm behaviour of the crew during the impact stage can maybe be explained by hypothermia. For site formation theory, the nature of the impact was catastrophic and the decision was made to abandon the vessel. As Denmark at the time was at war with England, the survivors were officially to be considered prisoners of war. In the coastal towns, where the locals took them in, this mattered nothing. These communities were used to ships wrecking and the survivors were first and foremost fellow seafarers to them. They were provided with food and shelter and fresh warm 74 Teisen 1998, p.261 Naval Chronicle Volume 28, p.130 76 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.79 77 Gibbs 2006, p.11 78 Gibbs 2006, p.11 79 Gibbs 2006, p.11 80 Gibbs 2006, p.12 81 Gibbs 2006, p.12 75 38 clothes. Word was sent to the herredsfogeden (‘the sheriff’), F. K. Schønau, who was nearby to deal with the wrecking of a Norwegian bark.82 The local officials and militiamen on the beach cared for collection of flotsam that came up on the beach. On the 25th of December, the captain of the local militia conducted the questioning of the Defence’s survivors. This was repeated by Schønau in January.83 Two of the six survivors turned out to be American sailors pressed into the Royal Navy, who wished not to return to England.84 All the survivors noted, how well they have been treated by the enemy. The survivors also identified some of the bodies that washed up on the shore, among them Captain Atkins’. Among the survivors of the St George was also an American, William Watson. Their questioning took place on the 28th of December. Danish newspaper also widely reported the accounts of the tragedy.85 The shipwrecked sailors, now prisoners of war treated well and only needed to spend little time in Denmark. They were returned to England in exchange for twice as many Danish prisoners, many of them from the area where St George and Defence wrecked. The body of Captain Atkins was returned as well. The Danish infantry commander, General Carl von Tellenquist wrote a heartfelt letter to the British governor Maurice, expressing his compassion about “the sorrowful incident”86. It was evidently clear, that the St George cannot be refloated and as such, the postdepositional recoil stage with ‘survivor salvage’ was minor and mostly limited to body recovery. Similarly, as absolutely no rescue could be attempted during the depositional impact phase, the rescue stage is also undistinguishable in the process of the disaster. Gibbs mentions “the reality of impending return to the normal social world”87 as part of the rescue stage. The wishes of the American sailors not to be returned to England and the focus on the recovery of the officers’ bodies exemplify this well. 2.5. The Rest of the Convoy The HMS St George and the HMS Defence were unfortunately not the only ships lost in the storm during the crossing. The HMS Hero, a third rate, went down on the Texel coast. The HMS Grasshopper, a Cruizer-class brig-sloop, was in company of the Hero and only escaped 82 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.79 Uhd Jeosen 1993, p.79 84 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.80 85 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.80 86 Gilly 1851, p.179 87 Gibbs 2006, p.13 83 39 running aground on Haaks Sand by sailing into Texel and surrendering to the Batavian government. Their story is more closely related to this thesis’ topic as the loss was due to a failure in navigation. The issue of their sinking and capture was raised in the Naval Chronicle the following year and was the subject of a discussion in the House of Commons. There was no blame on the navigators and their capabilities, but rather the lack of instruments onboard. An unknown number of the merchant ships of the initial convoy from Hanö were also lost. The records from the HMS Victory, that made the crossing in bad weather and arrived at the Suffolk coast around the time the St George wrecked. However, many ships in company estimated their position to be much further due West, an apparently typical mistake made en route from the Baltic to England. The strong current pushing eastwards and the man-of-war’s proneness to give leeway account for this miscalculation. The bad North Sea weather at the time also rendered checking their latitude and longitude impossible sometimes. 2.6. Reactions in England Together with the loss of the Hero and the merchant vessels, some 2000 British seafarers were lost in the storm. When Admiral Saumarez reported his arrival at Spithead, he made a note to the Admiralty, that he was “uneasy about the St George”88. When news arrived, the British public as well as the Admiralty was shocked. Numerous newspapers reported on the accident. The British parliament did not deal with the issue in depth. On the 17th of January, Lord Yorke, then First Lord of the Admiralty answered a question concerning the issue of the tragedies and credited the loss of the Hero and the Grasshopper solely to a mistake in navigation, without blaming any individual89. When the survivors from the St George and the Defence returned home, they were questioned and had to testify in front of a court martial, but of course no blame was put on them. 88 89 Ryan 1964, p.128, italics added Ryan 1964, p.131 40 2.7. The Wreck 2.7.1. Salvage The salvage of both wrecks began immediately after their grounding. As written above, the locals began collecting the parts and objects that washed up on the shore in a more or less organised manner. No doubt, as the sea settled, the salvage crew and maybe some locals helped themselves to valuable items. An 18 pounder gun from the St George washed up on the shore, still on its carriage. Further guns that were lifted were too heavy to be moved off the beach and lay there a decade later. The St George was quickly filled with sand and sank into the bottom. Not much of the HMS Defence remained, only the bottom of her once great hull. The next recorded salvage came in 1876 “when a local salvage firm with a helmetdiver salvaged six small guns”90 and other objects. More substantial salvage operations were carried out in 1904. Then, 48 guns were recovered from the wreck and sold off to be melted down. According to the diver’s, Laurids Trillingsgård, report at the time, “the two upper gun decks had been lost to natural decay.”91 Another diver diving later on the site probably only recovered smaller items. In 1940-41, another local salvage company removed metal artefacts of value; copper bolts and guns. They also tried to use dynamite on the bow of the ship, but it supposedly caused less than expected damage.92 In 1970, divers from the local area re-discovered the wreck of the St George. At the time, “[o]nly the fore part of the lower gun deck was showing above the sand.“ 93 The first of two anchors was lifted from near the wreck. Although these expeditionary dives are considered as the start of archaeology on the site, they, especially with the lifting of the anchor, very much resemble the salvage operations in their nature. 90 Teisen 1998, p.262 Teisen 1998, p.262 92 Teisen 1998, p.263 93 Teisen 1998, p.263 91 41 2.7.2. Archaeology In 1980, the real archaeology began after the wreck became more exposed. Heavy storms caused a shift in the sand and the lower gun deck was uncovered and the wreck stood 1-4 metres above the bottom. The divers were able to swim freely in and around the wreck and a first sketch was produced. The Danish National Museum’s Department of Marine Archaeology, based in Roskilde at the time, also inspected the wreck later in 1980. The wreck was endangered more by the natural forces, than by the possibility of looting. It lies in only 12 metres of water and the tidal movements, currents and storms could cause wave motion causing serious damage to the wreck. Continuous water movement could also carry a lot of sediment with it, basically sand-blasting the wreck. Unfortunately, a hurricane force storm in 1981 did just that, and tore away the aft half of the lower gun deck. The start of the scientific excavations was delayed due to several aspects. First of all, the wreck had to be exposed and remain exposed. Secondly, Visibility around the wreck is also limited, seldom over 1 metre and often nothing at all. The fieldwork commenced in 1983. The two main aims were: To record the wreck in the most possible detail that would allow the Department of Marine Archaeology to monitor the natural decay, and to recover objects that were “threatened by either loss or decay.”94 The team consisted of maritime archaeologists and a diving conservator from the Danish National Museum as well as commercial divers from a salvage company and local sports divers. This certainly played a role in the outspoken focus on quick item recovery. This is not to say that it was not logical to do so in order to protect the items, but some information may have been lost and objects that were not easy to recover overseen. Broken pieces might also have been left behind. The excavations lasted until 1986, but a report was only published after the 1983 season. In 1993 another anchor, similar in size to the one raised in 1970, was lifted. As a result of the large amount of artefacts recovered, a museum dedicated to the wreck(s) was founded and the Strandingsmuseum St. George opened in 1992. In the post-disaster stage, Leach explores the psychological impact of the catastrophe on the survivors and the stress.95 In the case of the St George and the Defence, the effects on the locals and the Norwegian salvage crew standing by helplessly and seeing hundreds of men perish, must have been as shocking and devastating as for the survivors enduring the tragedy onboard. Gibbs presents the primary accounts and reports of the incident as produced during 94 95 Teisen 1998, p.264 Gibbs 2006, p.13 42 this period immediately after the disaster. In the case of the HMS St George, as it was a Royal Navy ship and in the case of any other naval vessel, the court martial papers are as or even more important and more extensive. The wreckage and its goods are of course distributed over a wide area. In the case of the St George the two special cases for archaeology are the rudder and the bodies of the drowned sailors. The rudder was deposited on the Rødsand banks when it broke off. The bodies were washed ashore along the coast due to the longs, shallow coastal geography. For site formation theory, they shall still be considered as parts of the wreck; especially because the rudder is now in the museum at Thorsminde. This point is further elaborated in Site Formation – Continuous or Discontinuous Site. Gibbs divides salvage operations into two categories; opportunistic and systematic. In the case of the St George neither during opportunistic nor during systematic salvage operations did the salvors have “a direct link to the vessel”96. There were also no legal questions, as the countries were at war and the St George and the Defence were Royal Navy ships. Although in most cases, as Gibbs writes, early salvage operations were opportunistic, the St George might be an exception. The new owner of the vessel, the Danish crown, was controlling all and any operations and the Norwegian salvage crew were professionals. It is true, that at the St George the two types of salvage took place “in several cycles and in either order”97. The wreck also serves as a great example for the changing economic value it can hold for salvors. Two guns salvaged immediately after the disaster “were still on the beach ten years later.”98 As a result of the coordinated handling of the disaster by the herredsfogeden, there is no archaeological material record of a ‘salvage camp site’. However, the Jutland coast could well hold salvage or survivor sites from wrecks similar to Tororu Island99. Opportunistic or illegal salvage by the locals was difficult, because the wreck is so protected by the sediment which makes access impossible. On the other hand, systematic salvage also depended on the opportunity that the wreck was exposed. The wreck got and gets exposed irregularly and infrequently, so in the initial phase after a storm uncovering the wreck some material might have washed up on shore and was salvaged unnoticed. The salvage operations until 1970 were all ‘systematic salvage’ and the 1970 recovery of the anchor would be ‘opportunistic salvage’. The salvage, the c-transforms, and the exposure of the wreck, ntransforms, are very closely connected at the St George. The n-transforms determined “what 96 Gibbs 2006, p.14 Gibbs 2006, p.15 98 Teisen 1998, p.262 99 Gibbs 2006, p.15 97 43 was available to the salvors at any given time”100. Also, any salvage operation that stripped the St George of structural elements increased the chance of large parts of the wreck detaching before being covered by sediment or immediately the next time it became exposed. Gibbs argues that salvage law codified in regard to the ship’s material culture “the range of acceptable responses and responsibilities, such as through naval or company regulations and directions”101. The treatment of the deceased sailors’ and officer’s bodies, the prisoners of war and the correspondence from General Carl von Tellenquist constitute another category of post-disaster aspects that were codified through military traditions and the local’s perception of a shared fate with sailors. Gibbs discusses how a wreck could become of importance to the local community. Whether this was the case of the St George requires further research. The burials and bodies along the coast in the sand dunes certainly are a part of local folklore, but there are also many more wrecks in the region. The opening of the museum has increased the St George’s importance for the locals. It is a major tourist attraction in the small community of Thorsminde, drawing visitors into the 200-odd village. It is also an authority and centre for maritime archaeology, as this and other theses and studies attest. 2.8. Site Formation – Continuous or Discontinuous Site In his 1978 book, Keith Muckelroy describes and defines continuous and discontinuous sites at length. He states that “[t]here is no necessary connection between this distinction in types of site, adopted for purely methodological reasons, and the classification proposed”102 by him. The author would like to draw attention to how the site of the HMS St George is in neither of these categories as defined per Muckelroy. When defining ‘continuous sites’, Muckelroy says in regard to artefact distribution, that it is not “interrupted by sterile areas”103. Considering the rudder of the ship laid ca. 300 km away, that is a very large sterile area. Similarly, any objects that may be found outside of the still remaining wreckage; along the shore or in the surrounding seabed, would create a sterile area between them and the wreck. Another important aspect of discontinuous sites is that the “ship has broken up over considerable distance”, without the scatter relating to a single nucleus. In the case of the St George, there is a single nucleus, the remains up to the lower 100 Gibbs 2006, p.15 Gibbs 2006, p.16 102 Muckelroy 1978, p.183 103 Muckelroy 1978, p.182 101 44 gun-deck. With this ship, only those elements of the material culture have been transferred into the archaeological record that where assimilated into the seabed there. Immediately after the impact stage, the HMS St George was probably a clearly discontinuous site, but because of N-transforms; notably the movements on and of the seabed, it was transformed into a continuous site. “The loss of any defining structure within which to consider the remains” 104 is a defining point for discontinuous sites. Again, the St George proves to be a continuous site as there is a defining structure remaining. The wreckage has been breaking up layer by layer, deck by deck and what had been exposed had been carried away. Therefore the continuous site remains, and the discontinuous site occurs only occasionally. Archaeologists need to try and access the exposed wreck before it forms into a discontinuous site and before it is continuous again, after extraction. As a result, we can see how the wreck site of the HMS St George is an exceptional case, displaying qualities of both continuous and discontinuous sites. 2.9. Preservation By looking at the collection, it becomes obvious that some of the instruments that have been preserved, are in excellent condition. Three of the four more or less complete octants are nearly in usable condition now, after their restoration. This is also the only category with a large amount of individual parts. There are no partial protractors. Although we have telescope parts and broken parallel rulers, the ratios are still very good for whole vs. parts. Compass Lead Log Octant Parallel ruler Protractor Ruler Slate board Slate pencil Telescope Whole 1 10 0 4 4 2 0 1 6 2 Part 0 0 1 28 3 0 3 1 1 2 Table 2 Quantitative comparison between whole objects and parts 104 Muckelroy 1978, p.196 45 So why is there such a good ratio for the preservation of navigational instruments on the wreck? The ship wreck of the HMS St George is famous for good preservation of individual artefacts altogether. This is partially the reason behind the fascination of objectfocused commercial and recreational divers and an object-focused excavation methodology. This preservation is remarkable in the leather shoe collection and other textiles as well as rigging blocks, weapons and surgeon’s tools. There does not seem to be a strong correlation between the object’s material and preservation. In the case of the navigational instruments, leather as well as wood, brass, glass, ivory and lead has been preserved in mint condition. The St George sank upright and filled quickly with water. The ship’s hull has not yet been wholly investigated, but if the keel split on impact, she may well have filled with water simply from the bottom up. Sinking then quickly into the sandy sea bottom and retaining the deck structure, the objects had ideal conditions to be preserved and sheltered from N-transforms, unless unearthed and exposed to wave and current motion. This exposure to the battering North Sea is the main cause then of the loss of instruments from the decks down to the lower gun deck. Considering the sinking of the ship, sand probably entered with the waves as well. Waves over such a soft sandy seabed usually carry a lot more sediment than elsewhere. Therefore as the waves broke over the ship, she filled with sand even before sinking into the seabed. The strong undercurrent caused by the waves could also remove sediment from around the hull, burying it even more quickly. Waves could also turn the vessel facing more into the waves, thereby protecting the objects from the direct forces of impact. So while the wrecking process was violent for the sailors onboard and the onlookers, for the material culture being transferred into the archaeological record, it could be less destructive and disturbing. 46 3. Collection 3.1. Excavation Methodology The collection of navigational instruments from the HMS St George is under the care of the Strandingsmuseum St George, Thorsminde. The museum opened in 1992. Before the main body of excavations, sports divers from the club ‘Delfinen’ from nearby Holstebro dove on the wreck and salvaged objects. During the 1980s the excavations were under Ringkjøbing Museum, with the help of the National Museum of Denmark’s Department of Marine Archaeology in Roskilde. In two seasons during 1996 and 1997 the Strandingmuseum staff, maritime archaeologists from the National Museum of Denmark and commercial divers revisited the wreck site. Although the author does not consider the recovery of various objects until 1983 as archaeology, the actors at the time did. Therefore we should note how their findings got transferred into the archaeological collection. Local recreational divers started visiting the wreck during the 1960s already and it was probably never forgotten by local fishermen and divers. During the 1970s the diving club Delfinen contacted the maritime archaeologists at the Roskilde Viking Ship Museum who organised meeting and workshops to instruct the members in the latest techniques of excavating underwater. The objects, including the anchor, were only categorically listed and given a find number after the 1983 season. These were marked RIM 6000xA onwards, with RIM 6000x followed by a letter and then two letters. The above system was first continued into the 1983 excavations and then changed during the documentation into another system as follows. Both systems were conceived by Michel Teisen who was then working for the Royal Danish Naval Museum (Orlogsmuseet) and the National Museum in the Department of Marine Archaeology. We believe the confusing situation is becoming clear to the reader. For the recording of the wreck, a metal wire with distance markings every meter was spanned fore-and-aft along the centreline of the vessel. As the wire ran close to the level where the lower gun deck is still present, these areas are the most carefully recorded with only minor imperfections. Unfortunately, the navigational instruments had been recovered by the archaeologists from the orlop deck and thus with less accuracy. The recording system worked in the following way. Every place on the shipwreck was defined by the distance from the inside edge of the stempost along the central wire and the 47 distance at right angle from the wire to port side or starboard side respectively. For example the telescope with leather cover (ID Number 6000x3202) got the number “38 B 2”. That is 38 meters aft, to port side (B stands for the Danish bagbord) and 2 meters distant from the wire. If several objects were found in one place, they received another number separated by a “/” (forward slash), for example 37 S 5/23, which is a part of an octant. Further numbers were added, separated by a space, when objects were found in the same spot and grouped. An example is 37 S 5/45 1, an octant index shade along with 37 S 5/45 2, another index shade. This was done despite Teisen’s description of the system, where it should have been a letter. The coordinates were generally used as the registration numbers, but already in Teisen’s 1983 report, similar objects are grouped under a common number, such as blocks. In this case, the numbering is very misleading with a block having the registration number 03 B 5/6 and its finding place described as 6 B 4. During the 1984 season, only the coordinates were noted and those numbers acted as the registration numbers. During the following seasons, the excavation leader became Jens Aarup Jensen. He introduced a new registration system. Thereby each object received a number in the format RIM 6000x3001 onwards and the coordinates were noted as above. When objects were grouped together, letters were attached onto the number in the way of RIM 6000x3001A. This system remained in place until 1987. During the 1996-97 season a new system was introduced when Jens Aarup Jensen was still in charge. The numbers have now changed to RIM STM 7546x0001 onward, with RIM STM 7546x0300 being the starting number in 1997. Even so, some numbers occur in the format 7546xBL336. There was no evidence found and personal communication with the excavators yielded no explanation, as to why these numbers occur. The coordinates were also not noted during the 1996-97 seasons. Instead, the time of recovery was written (“before lunch”, “around five o’clock”) and the name of the diver who recovered it. This was done with the intention, that the excavators would remember who worked in what area or the dive vessels log would hold this information. Unfortunately, the dive ship’s log book is not consistent enough to correlate with the registration log, so positions for these objects remain unknown. During the 1996-97 seasons, often there was no archaeologist at the site, but only commercial and recreational divers and the excavation ran under the egis of the Strandingsmuseum. Up until 1987, the diving was carried out using SCUBA, but in 1996-97 the divers used surface supply equipment. 48 Figure 8 Original photo of 6000x3172 after being lifted - Strandingsmuseet Photographs were taken on film throughout the excavation and the negative numbers noted during the 1996-97 seasons. Video surveys were also carried out during the 1996-97 season, these are logged in the dive vessel’s log. The bad visibility at the wreck determined much of how the excavation was and could be carried out. Divers could rarely see further than half a meter and often even the measuring tape was difficult to make out, according to Teisen. Therefore, the basic shape of the ship had to be constantly corrected as well, not to mention smaller details in the site plan. The method of recording was chosen over triangulation for the specific advantage of speed. In the difficult and restrictive conditions, especially the unpredictable weather changes, it was valued higher to cover areas of the wreck in less time and recover artefacts. Triangulation would have taken much longer, thereby risking the loss of artefacts left in place until the next week or the next season. The area is difficult to work in. Heavy surf allows diving only “a few days at a time during the summer”105 months. to secure financial support for the excavations constantly proved to be a problem, with many amateur volunteers and commercial divers untrained in archaeology working on the site. Of course there were not that many trained maritime archaeologists at the time anyway. 105 Teisen 1998, p.264 49 Thorsminde is also not an ideal location, compared to Stockholm for the Vasa excavation. It lies 19 kilometres from the closest train station and is without bus service bar for the summer months. For the excavations, a holiday home was used for storage with no conservation facility. Certain critical questions need to be asked, maybe only with 20-30 years’ hindsight, about the excavation methods. Bad visibility is reported in the single publication as a major problem and always stressed in the discussions about the wreck. However, the dive vessel’s (M/S HONTE) logbook often notes 2-3 metres of visibility and video survey are also carried out in these conditions. The 1996-97 system is obviously fallible and the noted recovery times do not hold archaeological contextual information without the missing piece. They can only be of value for an in depth excavation management analysis. The biggest and most discussed question in connection with the St George excavations is the strong focus on fast object recovery. It can be a lengthy discussion, but arguments both pro and contra should be highlighted here. The wreck lies in only 7-12 metres of water depending on the sediment movement in the area. This means that wave action and current effect it strongly and can carry objects from it. These conditions call for a fast action to collect the objects before they might disappear. The sediment movement can also quickly cover the wreck from the archaeologists, which means what does not get recovered, might disappear for another decade. On the other hand, this hasty recovery can send out the wrong message. It seems rather as an ‘aims justify the means’ case, to recover artefacts by skipping proper documentation. Accepting this as scientific archaeological practice can provide fuel to salvors and most of all treasure hunters who like to hide behind claiming to adhere to scientific standards. It I also possible, that artefact recovery was more the personal focus of the commercial divers and the amateur divers and the necessity to use them overruled the scientific programme. If the objects were left behind, what could have happened? Of course the possibility of losing them as objects would disappear, but they might be recovered without a context. That leads to almost the same end result as what we have now. However, there is also a good chance of objects staying in their spatial context and just being covered up again. That way they would be preserved until the next time the wreck became exposed. All this is written in hindsight and the author does not claim to pass ultimate judgement. Nonetheless, the St George project resembles salvage operations and rescue archaeology at most more than a scientific maritime archaeological excavation. 50 3.2. Museum access In 1977, six years before the first excavation of the HMS St George, Evans wrote about the need for accurate recording in maritime archaeology and “communicating their [archaeologists’] find to their colleagues.” Sadly, the finds from the St George have not been widely circulated. In 1988 a travelling exhibit toured around Denmark with the then recent finds from the excavations. In 1992, the museum dedicated to the wreck opened its doors. The Strandingsmuseum HMS St George is located in Thorsminde and cares for, houses and exhibits the finds from and documents related to the shipwreck, along with other artefacts from other wrecks. It is one of the five museums in Denmark that share the responsibility for underwater cultural heritage since it was redistributed from the National Museum of Denmark. However, it does not stand alone, but is part of the larger group ‘De kulturhistoriske museer i Holstebro Kommune’ (‘The cultural-historical museums in Holstebro district’) and is so directly under Holstebro Museum. Uhd Jepsen’s book on the St George and the Defence was first published in 1985 and a revised edition came out in 1993, but neither mentioned the archaeological finds. Teisen’s report after the short 1983 excavation season is the only actual report on the excavations. The report was also only intended for internal circulation and leaves a lot of questions open. Teisen’s conference paper from 1992 was published in 1998 and is still the only peerreviewed English language publication on the topic.106 At the University of Southern Denmark, six master theses have been written on the archaeology of the St George. While some are good, one of them is unavailable due to copyright reasons and others include gross inaccuracies and mistakes. The Strandingsmuseum is closed at the time of writing this thesis (winter 2015/16) and will re-open in late-2016 or early-2017 when the new museum is completed. In the meantime, the collection from the St George is housed at a storage facility on the outskirts of Holstebro and a small valuable part is housed in Holstebro Museum. The items are difficult to access, as museum staff has to travel from Thorsminde to Holstebro and on-site security has to operate the alarm system. The artefacts are boxed up and grouped under a new arbitrary number system according to the cabinets they were presented in, in the old museum building. 106 The volume has received harsh criticism from Mark Staniforth in Historical Archaeology. Vol 34 No 2 pp. 139., su h as “o e of the a haeology looks o e like olle ti g t ips y lo al spo ts di e s at est a d at o st like lata t goodie hu ts ith little o o a haeologi al o t ol. 51 Many of the documents and available catalogues are in the temporary offices of the museum in Thorsminde. The selection that forms the base of the study of this thesis was made using several sources. A searchable online database exists that is supposed to hold every object in every Danish museum. It can be found under: https://www.kulturarv.dk/mussam/Forside.action. Unfortunately, the database is by now out of date, tedious to use and has serious technical limitations. Its successor is supposed to start up in the first half of 2016. The original excavation documents from 1983-1997 were also transcribed and the results then compiled into the catalogue. The main access problem to the collection was mentioned above. The museum is closed for the time being and the objects are in a remote location storage facility. It will reopen in 2017. Other factors hindered the research as well. The online database of the Danish museums is being updated, but the old system that is still the only one available, in insufficient. The National Maritime Museum holds a large collection of the old charts of Danish waters. However, that part of their collection is also at an off-site storage facility and cannot be accessed. It is not digitised neither. One of the most important documentary sources, The Naval Chronicle, is published by Cambridge Press, but there is no freely available Table of Contents. As such, it cannot be ordered through any Danish Library system. All these obstacles make the research for a master thesis, with limited time frame and resources for the research, difficult and reduce the chances of producing the best possible results. 3.3. R-transforms Maarleveld describes Carman’s invention of L(aw)-transforms. It is an addition to Schiffer’s traditional C(ultural)- and N(atural)-transforms, factors transforming and distorting the archaeological record. L-transforms as a result are legal restrictions and regulations that can shift the focus and access of researchers to the material culture of the past. L-transforms can be laws reducing looting by punishment or lifting protection and enabling it for example. They can aid or make research cumbersome. Apparently the management of collections in museums and archives can have a similar affect as well. The author’s original topic for a master thesis was to be muskets from the Scheurrak 01 wreck in the Netherlands. However, 52 the Lelystad conservation centre got closed down in January 2015 and so months passed to find a feasible topic. Other students working on their topics have had similar experiences from Sweden to Great Britain and probably 99% of researchers have a similar story. It is obvious, that what Muckelroy and Gibbs describe as ‘Observed Seabed Distribution’, is not the final material culture accessible for research. Research aspects, R(esearch)-transforms if you like, follow and only afterwards do we have the material culture that constitutes that basis of our interpretation. 3.4. Catalogue The Catalogue in Appendix I shows the objects from the HMS St George that form part of the collection of navigational instruments. In addition, the lead objects are also included, as they were initially considered navigational instruments, i.e. sounding leads. Where no photograph or drawing was available and none could be produced, it is marked with no photograph. Objects that belong together or were grouped together are catalogued together as well. Where the photographs were not taken by the author, it is noted. The catalogue aims to provide every correct information available and point out any uncertainties. The raw data is presented in a table in Appendix II. 3.5. Recording methodology For the recording of all navigational instruments the method of the collection of navigational instruments from the United Kingdom National Maritime Museum in Greenwich was followed. The catalogue comprises the eight definite sections plus the loose parts and the items are entered in the order of their ID number where available. All the object recordings were conducted following the aspects below. As not all fields were equally relevant or could be completed, beside the identification and the dimensions, the information is contained in the description for the object. A recording sheet (Figure 8) was used for recording. 53 Figure 9 Recording sheet 3.6. The Recording aspects as per the National Maritime Museum 3.6.1. Identification The ID numbers starting with 6000x or 7546x as they are listed at the Strandingsmuseum St George. The old ID numbers are listed as well as incorporated as the find location. The numbers are followed by the type and name for the instrument (for example octant, ruler, parallel ruler, etc.). When applicable, this is followed by a specific name such as that of the inventor or manufacturer (Hadley’s octant, Day and Night telescope). 54 3.6.2. Origin, Maker and Date The place of origin of the maker and his name are given in the description if known, else it is omitted. A proposed maker is only provided in one case (ID number 6000x0987). Dating is provided in the description along with the maker’s name. 3.6.3. Inscriptions and Markings Inscriptions that note the maker are given in the description, along with any intentional markings. 3.6.4. Graduation For all instruments with a graduation, the entire range of the scale is given. For octants, the scale is given in degrees and minutes of arc, and the material of which the scale and vernier were made is also given. The location of the zero of the vernier is recorded (to the right or left or at the centre). The scale is also given for protractors. 3.6.5. Dimensions All dimensions are given in millimetres. For the nautical quadrants, the dimension given is the radius. The radius is measured from the pivot to the bottom of the graduated scale, which is usually a few millimetres less than the radius of the frame. For these instruments, this dimension is also provided in inches, because, since the eighteenth century, the British have often described these as, for example, 6-, 8-, 10-, 12-, or 18-inch octants. For telescopes length overall and diameters similar to cannon recording are given. For parallel rulers the width of individual rulers as well as their maximum extension is given. 3.6.6. Description This includes the main materials of which the object’s body or frame is made. The description includes details of vanes, and of the clamping and tangent screws; details of the 55 adjustment of the glasses, the number of shades and their colours for the octants. Missing parts are reported and the condition of the instrument is remarked upon. 3.6.7. Photography Photography was chosen as the only visual recording method, again following the National Maritime Museum’s example. Drawings, photogrammetry and other 3 dimensional recording methods were considered, but did not prove to yield more information than photographic images. DSLR cameras of the type CANON EOS 400D and SONY A200 were used for recording and images processed in Adobe Photoshop. There was only very limited amount of time for photography. The limited access also made making drawings impossible. 3.7. The collection The artefacts were selected based on what objects were used in navigation at the time, as there has only been a limited classification of these artefacts before. Some parts were noted as a part of an instrument by the excavators and their judgement was accepted without criticism. This was foremost because many of these objects could not be located and thoroughly reviewed. There are 70 items on the list altogether, of which only not all, but many were accessible by the author. They were grouped by object type into eleven categories: compass, leads, log-line, octants, parallel rulers, protractors, rulers, slate boards, slate pencils and telescopes. The artefacts were recovered during different excavation seasons and therefore they have ID numbers in different systems with or without coordinates. It is almost certain, that an object appears twice in the list under different ID numbers, but because the records, the catalogues and the physical objects were not accessible at the same time, this could not be proven or disproven. One brass bowl of a compass was found during the 1996 excavations. It is mentioned intact and has been preserved in excellent condition, including the decorated compass card and the glass cover. One object has been recorded as an hourglass or marine sandglass and further glass sherds associated with it. Upon examination, the glass sherds proved to be certainly not parts 56 of an hourglass. The other object could not be located, but is also probably an initial misidentification by the excavators. A large part of the whole collection is formed by the leads. Four of them have been viewed and photographed and the image of a further one is in the online database. Four stem from the 1983-84 excavation season and one from the later 1980s excavations. There are also four leads noted in the coordinate system, but they could not be paired to the later ID numbering, so it is possible they are doubles and we only have six lead weights in the collection. The one weight recovered during the 1990s also has a handle and had an incomprehensible note (“skive” = slice) written beside it on the excavation documents. This item has not been seen and is very probably a different type of lead weight than sounding leads. None of the leads I heavy enough or regular enough to be a sounding lead anyway and all were dismissed as navigational instruments. A wooden object has been identified by the excavators as a handle from a reel for a logline. The object could not be located, but it is an important addition to the collection as the log formed a most fundamental part of navigation. It’s noted dimensions are not entirely clear, but reels were not exactly specified, except for the markings of the line, and were often manufactured onboard. The tree type is not documented neither. The largest part of the collection is made up of instruments for the measurement of the angles of celestial objects; namely octants. Four more or less complete octants were recovered. No sextants were found, although the sextant had been developed for decades by the time of the wrecking. Three octants show extremely good preservation, even before conservation and are in nearly usable condition. All four have their index arms preserved and three have the index shades in place, with the broken octant having only the index shades’ frames. Each octant has the sight vane attached as well, but other parts; the back sight vane, index mirror, tangent or clamping screws or the horizon glasses adjustment mechanism are not preserved for each objects. The surviving vernier scales are made of ivory and the frames of teak. The broken octant’s frame is probably of a different wood. All frames are of the plain pattern, with the crossbar arched down, opposite the graded scale. It is here that the importance for good documentation becomes obvious. We have no information about the surrounding conditions the finds were recovered from (covered by sediment, exposed, covered by other objects, etc), which could explain the difference between the N-transforms affecting the three well-preserved and the broken octant post deposition. In addition to the four octants, 32 parts of octants were also recovered. Half of these are index shades, grouped in threes or alone. There are no records of any of the parts fitted back together, neither in the 57 excavation nor in the conservation documentation. The other various parts include brass fittings, such as sight vanes or index arm fittings. Without an overview of the physical objects, a minimum number of octants or sextants that correspond to the number of various parts in the archaeological record cannot be accurately estimated. Three complete parallel rulers have been preserved and a further five parts could be listed by the author. However, among the five parts seem to be two numbers that are doublelisted: 7546xBL365 and 7546xBL315 being the same as 7546x0365 and 7546x0315. Again we do not know the exact spatial context as to how they were found. It is highly unlikely, that they would have been in use immediately before the wrecking and as such were probably stowed away in sea chests. They are composite objects of ebony and brass. Both of these materials show good preservation on the wreck. The broken parts could be from one, two or three objects, but an accurate estimate again cannot be made. However they are noted as broken which must have happened upon impact. Broken rulers would not have been kept for any future use. That these are relatively simple objects probably helped their survival in mint condition. Two complete protractors were recovered from the wreck of the St George. Again, an item appears twice in the records, but is most likely one object; a protractor at the location 39 B 5. Protractors were also probably kept in a sea chest, are simple and solid objects that did not break. One complete ruler, one broken ruler and one ruler fragment are included in the collection of navigational instruments. Although these could have been used for other purposes, without having access to the objects they could not be ruled out. The broken and the fragment are noted as wooden rulers, the complete one is of unknown material. Doubleregistration occurs in this category as well with 7546xBL490 possibly being the same as 7546x0490A and B. There are two objects as remains of slate blackboards, one fairly complete example and one broken slate part. They were recovered in different decades of the excavations and are definitely not the same item, but only the more complete example, 7546x1082, could be accessed. It has been preserved in a good condition, but beside being a slate board, shows no other signs of specific use for navigation, such as pre-made markings. To write on the slate boards, slate pencils were used, of which five were recovered loose during the excavations and a small ebony box held another five. Only two are really worn down stumps, the rest completely retain their original cross section and tapering. One of them even bears a maker’s mark as [M]iddleton 162 Strand London 10 and has a brass ferrule. 58 Two nearly complete telescopes were recovered and another two parts. Only one of the parts could be found in the museum’s storage: a brass eyepiece with a sliding cover. The two complete artefacts each seem to be everyday telescopes used during the daytime. One is cylindrical and covered with leather, the other has a tapered wooden barrel. They are both preserved in excellent condition and one bears the maker’s or seller’s mark of Cliffe & Co. London. Another group of navigational objects are original logbooks, both official and personal. Some of them have washed up on the shore. Although they were reviewed along with other archival material, they do not form the focus of this thesis. It is evidently clear, that what has been transferred into the archaeological record is only a fraction of what existed onboard. For the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and midshipmen onboard, there could have been dozens of octants, telescopes and rulers. However, qualitatively this collection is exemplary of the categories of instruments that were necessary for navigation. 59 4. Discussion The aim of this thesis was not only to look at the instruments of navigation, but at the navigator himself. Therefore in this chapter we will discuss the objects in relation to navigation onboard. This context is the greatest advantage of such a collection over a collection like in the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich. In this chapter we will reflect on the development of the instruments that are in the collection and their general role in navigation as well. Furthermore the author will also introduce some navigational instruments that are missing from the St George collection, as will be obvious from the comparative analysis as well. A separate part within this chapter elaborates the navigational instrument’s social connotations. 4.1. Rules on Navigation in the Royal Navy In order to analyse the navigational instruments and the people behind them, it is important to review the rules that governed the life of the men onboard. These regulations set out the roles of the ship’s crew, including the task of navigation. The Georgian Navy was regulated through the Board of the Admiralty manned by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. At the head of the Board was the First Lord of the Admiralty and later the First Sea Lord. The commissioners were in majority admirals of the Royal Navy, although certain positions could be filled by civilians as well. The British Parliament and the sovereign had control over the Navy and the Board through statutes and the cabinet. For the conduct of navigation in the Royal Navy at the time the best source is the ‘Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea’ from 1808. These sets of rules were first published in 1731 and developed into the ‘Queen’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions’ during the nineteenth century. According to the regulations, navigation was the responsibility of the master onboard a ship. Masters were professional sailors, warrant officers with a lot of experience, but did not necessarily have the same formal education like lieutenants and ranked below them. They were also less likely to be of noble birth, but they did have to pass an exam at Trinity House. 60 There could be more than one master, in which case there would be a first, second or third master and master’s mates in addition to specific masters, like the school-master. His crucial role onboard is best summarized in an article in the Regulations: “He [the Master] is, under the command of the Captain, to have the charge of navigating the Ship ; he is to represent to the Captain every possible danger in or near to the Ship's course, and the way to avoid it, and, if it be immediate, to the Lieutenant of the watch. Whenever the Ship is approaching the land or any shoals, he is to be upon deck and to keep a good look-out, always sounding to inform himself of the situation of the Ship.”107 Importantly for the collection from the HMS St George the Regulations in 1808 state, that the Master had to “provide himself with such Charts, nautical Books, and Instruments as are necessary for astronomical observations and all other purposes of Navigation.”108 There is no reference to their quality, to any checks being performed, like in the case of surgeons’ chests or any compensation, as there was for carpenters’ tools. Masters, and any other officer, had to buy their own equipment from their own pockets. There are no accounts from the Royal Navy, where the Board would have provided funds for such a thing. In Section 5 Chapter II Article XVIII of the regulations109, the procedure for dealing with the death of an officer is laid out. There is mention of the deceased officer’s private and official books and papers and clothes, but no other effects are listed specifically. This again let’s us assume, that the navigational instruments were of no specific interest to the navy. Furthermore, it was the master’s duty to look after “the compasses, the hour and other glasses”110 and check and compare them. He was also responsible for the maintenance, fabrication and marking of “log-lines and lead-lines”111. He had to report to the captain of the ship every day at noon with the ship’s coordinates (latitude and longitude), the local compass variation and the ship’s distance from the port of departure or to the port of destination. The master was also participating in instructing and helping to train the midshipmen; the aspiring officers. It was his task to involve them in taking latitude and checking results. When a pilot came onboard and guided the vessel, the master still had to navigate autonomously and report directly to the captain instead of the lieutenant of the watch. 107 ADM7/971, p.190 ADM7/971, p.190 109 ADM7/971, p.191 110 ADM7/971, p.190 111 ADM7/971, p.190 108 61 Our best written sources for navigation from the period, the log-books (or logs) of ships were also kept and written by the masters, the officers only signed off on them. The logs were delivered to the captain every year and a copy for every six months. The receipts for these logs entitled the master for his pay. Most of the log was not concerned with navigation, but with other events in shipboard life (e.g. provisions, other ships, pay). The first instruction for the filling out of the log-book provides a good list of the factors involved in navigation: “The state of the weather, the directions of the wind, the courses steered, and the distances run, with every occurrence relating to the navigating of the Ship ; the setting and velocity of currents and the result of all astronomical observations made to ascertain the situation of the Ship, the variation of the compass, &c. &c.”112 The masters were of course not the only ones responsible for navigation, although seemingly most of the practical doings befell them. The captain was responsible for everything that happened on the ships and for everyone onboard. The captain was responsible for the log book that the master compiled. Together with the master, he was also tasked with the improvement of charts and navigational knowledge. They had to determine the exact coordinates of foreign ports and head lands, note their soundings and improve on the charts that they were using or even make their own charts. This was not only important when the ship travelled abroad, but also in the English Channel and the coasts of the United Kingdom. Interestingly, when a ship sank, the log books were not among the items the captain had “to be particularly attentive to”113 to save. Another big part of navigation onboard fell to the pilots employed. They could be employed for a temporary service or for a more permanent mission. Unlike in merchant vessels, the pilot legally does not take command of a government-owned, such as a naval, ship. Therefore the captain had to keep soundings going while the pilot was navigating close to shore, “whether the Pilot or the Master think this precaution necessary or not”114. Masters had to act as the pilots, without extra pay, for ports in the United Kingdom or other ports that were frequented by Royal Navy ships. If they could not, the pilot’s pay was deducted from theirs. If pilots could not be employed in foreign or enemy waters, again, it were the masters who had to have the knowledge from charts and sailing manuals to conduct safe navigation 112 ADM7/971, p.194 ADM7/971, p.167 114 ADM7/971, p.199 113 62 instead. If they did this well, they could afterwards receive a qualification as pilot for those waters and paid accordingly. Masters could also apply to the captain if they felt the pilot employed is not qualified or capable of navigating safely. The lieutenants were leading the watches and as such oversaw the masters’ work. Lieutenants had to keep track of lee-way and watch over the helmsman. They signed off on the log book and informed the captain of any changes in wind. They held no power over the course steered though. As the lieutenant on watch had to take the latitude every noon and calculate “the distance run for each twenty-four hours, with the latitude and longitude” of the ship, they also must have had the necessary instruments, rules and charts to do so. As the master had to take midshipmen along to teach them about taking the altitude at noon, there was another warrant officer in charge of teaching future officers. He was the school-master, usually only onboard on a ship-of-the-line. They, after having passed the examination at Trinity House, had to teach midshipmen “such branches of the mathematics as may be necessary for them to know”115. School-masters also taught navigation, if the captain allowed it, and were to provide help in astronomy and navigation to the commissioned officers, if they needed it. From the regulations we can see that the captain, the masters, the lieutenants and the midshipmen all had to have their own navigational instruments and sometimes charts. They certainly all had to know how to use those tools and were using them on a daily basis. 4.2. Spatial Analysis Although the excavations’ methodology did not place enough or any emphasis on where the artefacts were recovered from, this information is very important. Many artefacts have coordinates that allow us to take a closer look as to where in the ship they come from and identify their users. All instruments, where we know their coordinates, were found between 33 and 42 metres (108-138 feet) aft from the stempost, and supposedly on the orlop deck. 35 out of the 49 objects were found on the starboard side. This would correspond to the area of the cockpit, where the midshipmen had their lodgings allocated. In case the stern was still damaged from the grounding off Lolland, the masters might need to stay in this area as well. This is unlikely though, as the ship was repaired in Gothenburg. 115 ADM7/971, p.371 63 According to the ‘Regulations and Instructions’ from 1808, if a pilot’s task required him staying onboard permanently, he was to become part of the complement. The captain was responsible for ordering him a berth with a hammock and bedding. He was to receive equal respect as the warrant officers. Swedish pilots were taken onboard the HMS St George, Defence and Cressy when they returned to Salö. They were probably no use in the end, as the ships set out again, but remained onboard. They were probably accommodated in this area as well. Figure 10 The midshipmen's berth – National Maritime Museum, Greenwich e) The orlop deck was generally not a deck for accommodation. As it lay below the waterline, it did not have the chance of fresh air and light, as the gundecks did. However, some special crew members; not the sailors or gun crews, had their berths here. These were the purser, the surgeon and the warrant officers and the occasional pilot. The schoolmaster shared a mess with the midshipmen, as he was to supervise and instruct them onboard. There was a division between midshipmen however. Onboard a second rate like the HMS St George, there could be some 20 midshipmen as captain’s and admiral’s servants, first-class volunteers or cadets. They could be aged below 19 years and in training for passing their lieutenants exam to be commissioned or petty officers from the lower deck appointed after long years of service. Therefore, there was a natural hierarchy according to age and younger midshipmen, usually below 14 years of age, were called ’youngsters’ in contrast to ’oldsters’. The schoolmaster and the youngsters, to be more under the watchful eyes of the officers, were 64 accommodated in the gun room, astern on the lower gun deck. The oldsters were berthed, to receive more privacy maybe, in the after cockpit or the cable tier on the orlop deck, the area where the large portion of the navigational instruments was found. This spatial context points to the instruments having belonged to the midshipmen. This would also mean that the objects remained in situ during the wrecking process. How violent was the wrecking then really? 4.3. The Instruments of Navigation Onboard 4.3.1. The Compass Figure 11 7546x0153 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet The most fundamental framework of navigation are the cardinal direction; North, South, East and West. The compass shows these directions and was therefore the most basic tool of navigation onboard. Compasses started with the lodestone. The special qualities of this naturally-occurring magnetized ore were known since the Antiquity. Compasses from the High Middle Ages until the period of the St George did not change significantly. With the advance of the natural sciences in magnetism, bearings and adjustments for instrument error 65 were improved on. A practical improvement that also highlighted the advanced understanding of magnetic variation followed Mercator’s invention in 1581. The compass-maker Robert Norman published ‘The newe attractive’. He measured the compass needle’s inclination to the horizontal level and invented the dip-circle to adjust it and keep the needle level. At the middle of the eighteenth century, Gowan Knight, a London-based physician designed compasses for the Royal Navy. These were made by the craftsman George Adams. The Admiralty commissioned Knight to systematically examine “compasses in use in the Royal Navy”116 too. The dry compass, in use since the Middle Ages, was only systematically changed to the floating compass during the time too. However, the debate among scientists and instrument makers was ongoing, whether compass bowls should be made of pewter, brass, copper or wood and to be filled with what liquid. Brass was declared as the choice for the British Navy. Ships were also began to be outfitted with several compasses, among them a master compass with a specific location. The compass from onboard is a dry compass with a brass bowl. The compass card is paper on mica and thick glass covers the compass card. We don’t know where the object came from within the wreck, but it is safe to assume, it was not in use on deck during the wreckage. The master and the warrant officers under him were in charge of maintaining the instruments, so this compass might have been a spare or undergoing minor repairs. The compass does not have a broad arrow marking, but they were most probably supplied by the navy. If it was a private object, then why was it not in its chest? It is also very large for a personal affect, especially that pocket compasses were common at the time. 4.3.2. The Sounding Lead The second Astronomer Royal, Edmund Halley summarised a seaman’s essential navigational framework and toolbox as ‘latitude, lead and line’.117 The sounding lead could tell a pilot or any coastal sailor how far off the coast he was or where along the coastline and could warn them of a dangerous course. Besides sounding the depth, the lead with some tallow in a little hollow part at the end would also probe the sea bottom. To the experienced sailor this could indicate approaching the continental shelf, sandbanks or reefs. Nautical 116 117 Bennett 1987, p.142 Blake 2004, p.15 66 charts, rutters and sailing guides also gave an indication of the sea bottom where it was surveyed. Midshipmen helped the officers and mates of the ship take the soundings. It is possible some of the sounding equipment was stored in their mess and berth, if it was stored anywhere else then on deck. The sounding lead was used frequently; every half an hour while the ship was underway and certainly more often in the last fateful hours of the St George. Figure 12 Sounding Lead and Line - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich f) Leads had specified weights and a distinctive hexagonal shape. Various devices for accurate depth sounding were in development in 1811, but these were scientific instruments rather than to be onboard a second rate. Lead Weight Depth Boat 7 lb/3,2 kg n/a Hand 10-14 lb/4,5-6,4 kg up to 20 fathoms (36,6 metres) Deep-sea 14-28 lb/6,4-12,8 kg up to 150 fathoms (274,3 metres) Table 3 - Royal Navy Lead Weights after Bennett 1987, p.28 Object Weight 6000x0914 0,6 lb/278 g 6000x0915 2,2 lb/1016 g 6000x0923 1,7 lb/780 g 6000R 2,8 lb/1262 g 6000x3207B 0,5 lb/203,9 g Table 4 - Weight of Leads from the HMS St George From the Tables 3 and 4 it is clear, that the artefacts recovered from the St George are not sounding leads and thus not navigational instruments. They are too small and do not have the shape or markings for a lead. Sounding leads from other shipwrecks have also mostly retained their shape, so N-transforms would not account for a loss of the eye or the edges. The leads for the longboats, which were occasionally commanded by the midshipmen when 67 launched, could have been stored in their berth, but have not been recovered. The larger leads, for example the deep-sea lead, would probably always be on the quarterdeck. 4.3.3. Navigation, caping and timekeeping during the last voyage onboard the HMS St George The documents from the last voyage of the HMS St George and the Defence give us a good insight into the use and reliance on the lead above anything else. From the sources, Sergeant William Galey’s letter describes the chaotic night of the 15th of November. Despite the horror onboard, they were still able to take soundings. When describing the Great Sound, the depth is a point of reference again: “the deepest water is only seven fathoms”118, showcasing the restricted navigation. In Captain Pater’s account of the night of the 23rd of December, the dependence on the lead becomes obvious. As they were drifting towards the shore, more so than relying on coordinates or dead-reckoning, they hove the lead. From 24 fathoms at 21:30, they went into 20 fathoms 45 minutes later and 15 fathoms by the time they wore the ship119. When sailing close to shore, the lead was the more reliable navigational instrument than charts. The HMS St George and the Defence wrecked, because they were driven onto a dangerous lee shore. Because the shore was so close, their immediate navigational method was ‘pilotage’ or caping. The positions in the documents are all in relation to landmarks, such as “between Moen Island and Dars Head”120 or “the land about Holmes [Hanstholm] bore S.S.W., distance 7 leagues”121. Figure 13 Heaving the Lead - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich g) 118 Naval Chronicle 27, p.113 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.104 120 Saumarez, Ryan 1968, p.208 119 68 Directions could also be more relevant not by the compass, but relative to the ship; „with the land to the southward of Bovenbergen [Bovbjerg] upon their lee beam” 122 or “saw the land on the lee beam, distance eight leagues”123. From the survivors’ accounts, it seems that the captains on all ships were on deck and navigating the vessels, but each warship had a Swedish pilot onboard, too. They were taken onboard on the 21st of December, when the ships arrived back on the coast northeast of Salö124. However, these pilots were probably only qualified for the Swedish coast and not much use on the Jutland coast. 4.3.4. The Log Besides the lead, the line was another basic instrument. It was used to measure the speed of the vessel and help the officers to estimate their position by dead reckoning. Knowing the ship’s speed, heading and accounting for leeway were the basis for dead reckoning. The log was made up of the log-chip, the line and the log-reel. The log-chip (or log-ship) had a lead sheet on the bottom, so it would stay upright when thrown into the water from the stern of the ship. As the line ran out and cleared off the wake, a seaman turned a sandglass, when it ran out, he called for the other seaman to stop the line. The log-line was marked at equal distances (usually 8 fathoms) with knots that were counted after the line was reeled in. Hence the speed measured in “knots” that corresponds to nautical miles/hour. Two sandglasses were used in the Royal Navy for this purpose: the 28-second and the 14second glass, the latter for speeds over 7 knots. The line on the reel was 200 fathoms long. Because of these strict regulations, Figure 14 Log with reel and line - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich h) when these artefacts survive, they can be easily identified. From the St George, we only have a part of a log-reel. The ship’s speed was measured at least every half an hour, so the objects 121 Saumarez, Ryan 1968, p.208 Saumarez, Ryan 1968, p.208 123 Ryan 1964, p.128 124 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.109 122 69 in use were kept on deck. However, they also broke and new ones had to be provided by the master and his mates, who made them themselves. Measuring the ship’s speed was overseen by a midshipman or petty officer, so the reserve log-reels and log-ships could have been stored in their berthing. 4.3.5. Celestial Navigation and Instruments The guidance and reference system for marine navigation has been made up of the celestial objects until recently, when it was replaced by artificial objects in the sky: satellites. This was true for the Polynesians as well as the Europeans. The Sun indicates one’s latitude. The higher its meridian, the closer the observer is to the Equator. Stars on the night sky give a similar indication of one’s position; however more detailed knowledge and astronomical tables or mariner’s astrolabes, that is instruments, are needed to get the results. The basic purpose for all navigational instruments was to measure the angles between two objects, first and foremost between celestial bodies. For the concern of navigational instruments onboard the St George in 1811, we have to review the development of the instruments that lead to the octant. Its origins are to be found in the medieval cross staff. The cross staff is widely credited to Levi ben Gerson (1288-1344). It is made up of a long straight rod made of wood, called the ‘staff’, ‘radius’ or ‘index’. The cross-piece of the instrument has a hole in its centre that fits on the ‘staff’ acting as a rail. This is simply called the ‘cross’ or ‘transversarius’. The viewer held one end of the staff close to the eye while the ‘cross’ could be moved along the ‘staff’. The ‘staff’ could be graduated on all four sides for different scales. To measure the angular distance between two objects, the ‘cross’ is moved so its two ends coincide with the objects (i.e. stars, Sun and the horizon). The cross staff, as other navigational instruments, came from astronomy, but it was easily adjustable for use at sea. Although high-end objects could be produced (from silver for example), the cross staff was generally a cheap and easy to make instrument. It remained in use into the eighteenth century, even while the modern quadrant was introduced. The backstaff was the direct development from the cross staff. The great disadvantage of the cross staff is that the viewer has to be looking directly into the Sun. With the backstaff, this was eliminated. The invention of Captain John Davis was published in his book ‘The Seaman’s Secrets’ in 1585. Davis’ original design was improved on over the following centuries. The staff remained the central element with first a graduated arc at the bottom and a 70 moveable shadow vane on the top, much like the cross. Later the cross was replaced by a graduated arc and a vane to blend out the Sun so it casts its shadow on the shadow vane. The bottom arc had a sighting vane. The backstaff, or also called ‘the Davis quadrant’ enjoyed widespread popularity among seafarers quickly and was the main navigational instrument until the introduction of the octant. The octant superseded the backstaff and other methods in the eighteenth century. Although Isaac Newton developed the idea in 1699, his version was not published until John Hadley published his invention around 1730. The main development was to use a mirror, reflecting one celestial object, while looking at the other point (horizon or star) and bring them into coincidence. The mirror inclination was only half the real angle between the objects, making for a smaller, handier instrument. Moreover did the motion of the ship not affect the coincidence of the reflected image of the Sun or star and the horizon. Bennett describes the workings of the octant perfectly: “The observer adjusts the index arm until he sees the body whose altitude is to be measured, after reflection in both mirrors, in coincidence with the horizon viewed directly, or to use the common expression, ‘he brings the body down to the horizon’. The angle between the two mirrors is measured by the scale and is half the required altitude; for this reason, a scale covering 90° is engraved on an arc of 45°, and the instrument is known alternatively as Hadley’s quadrant or octant.”125 Figure 15 Use of the octant - Association Meridienne Nantes 125 Bennett 1987, p.132 71 The octant became a commercial success right after its invention and was made in workshops all the way through the nineteenth century, despite the sextant’s invention some decades later. The sextant for use at sea was developed following the Admiralty’s need for an instrument to measure angles greater than 90°. The instrument was to be used to measure lunar distances for timekeeping, the tables for which were first widely published in the Nautical Almanac in 1767. Sextants became the precision instruments compared to the everyday octant and were outfitted with all available extras for accuracy, such as telescopic sights, a rigid brass skeleton, vernier scale and a tangent sextant screw. remained primary navigational The a maritime instrument until the eve of GPS. Four more or less complete octants are included among the artefacts from the St George and another 28 parts are noted in the records, not all of which have been located and reviewed. The octants of the midshipmen, as other Figure 16 6000x3172 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet navigational instruments, were private possessions and stored in their berth except when used for the altitude sighting at noon, surveying the coast or during lessons with the schoolmaster. Each octant is handheld, none have attachments for a tripod. Two octants are simple octants and two are Hadley’s octants with a backsight. Where the scale is preserved, it is marked from -3° to 99°, which is the norm. Unusual is the marking to 98° on one of the instruments. Teisen identified Isaac Bradford & Son as the maker of one of the octants, but it is unclear, how. Another octant is marked as having been made by Alexander Wellington and a part is marked by the instrument maker Hebert. None of the three were prominent instrument makers, so we can consider these 72 octants as average. However, they were all based in London and too small to have further shops, which tells us that the instruments were probably purchased in London. Of course they could have been resold in another city, such as Plymouth or Portsmouth. The octants would have been stored in the instruments’ own chests or hanging on the wall, as shown on contemporary illustrations. However, we do not have such detailed information about the conditions in which they were found. We have no proof for any sextants onboard, although they were invented. Of course, some of the loose parts could be from sextants. If they were onboard, they were probably for officers and their berth areas and many artefacts were swept away. If in use, sextants would also have been on deck at night to measure the declination between the stars. Again, this is rather unlikely during the ordeal leading up to the wrecking. There are four groups of three index shades among the separate parts. They each seems to be of similar dimensions and the glasses are the normal colour: one green and two orange; a lighter and a darker. As they are preserved loose and we have no octant limbs where these would be missing, they might have been spare parts. It is true, that index shades easily dislodge in octants. If they were indeed spares, why were so many needed? Octants were precious instruments and although used every day, they were used very purposefully. It is hard to image they would have broken that often. The index shades being replaced frequently would be a C-transform of the octants. None of the parts have wooden pieces attached to them. This is either due to the natural causes or they were spares. The part of an index decorated with a floral motif is broken off and certainly was not a spare. It would genuinely be an oddity to carry spare instrument parts. Instruments were made and sold whole and brought back to instrument makers and shops for repairs and replacements. 4.3.6. Protractors, Parallel rulers, Rulers, Gunter Scales These objects have been grouped here, because they were all used not on deck, but for making calculations with the measurements taken and projecting the results onto the charts. 73 Protractors are instruments to measure angles. The two examples in the collection are made of solid brass, ca. 1 mm thick and are small: 42 and 45 mm in radius. Figure 17 6000x0951 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet These were everyday, personal objects and probably stored in a box along with other smalll instruments. They were probably not only used in navigation, but during the mathematical lessons with the school-master. They are well preserved as they were solid, simple objects. Parallel rulers are composite objects, made of brass and wood. In the case of the St George, the complete artefacts are made of ebony. The complete artefacts are preserved in mint condition, the parts could not be located. Parallel rulers are used, even by today’s mariners, to transfer angles and lines on paper charts. None of the examples in the collection have a scale. The rulers onboard are made of wood, but their scales or more information is unknown. Rulers were used for the same purpose as protractors and could even be fabricated onboard. Objects for the officers and midshipmen to be used on paper and for the carpenter can easily be distinguished, as the carpenter or the boatswain needed more sturdy objects to carry out their tasks. Any of these artefacts may have been used, if the midshipmen drew illustrations into their personal journals, that had to be delivered to the Navy Board at Trinity House prior to the lieutenant’s examination. The plotting of a ship’s progress on the chart Figure 18 6000DF - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet was not the task of the midshipmen, but 74 could have been if the officers wanted to involve and teach them. These objects could also have been used when creating surveys. The objects probably rarely left the mess as the precious paper charts would not have been taken up on deck. A Gunter scale or Gunter rule is a sliding rule based on the logarithmic scale invented by Figure 19 Gunter scale - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich i) Edmund Gunter in 1620. It was widely used for distance calculations in navigation and cheap to produce. Among the important improvements of the eighteenth century was the addition of the ‘cursor’ in 1775. They only lost their importance when digital calculators were invented. Although they were mostly cheap instruments, they could be fabricated in expensive materials for presentation, rather than practical purposes. According to Teisen, examples were found onboard,126 but this may only been a misidentification. None could be located by the author. They would have been made of wood, maybe ebony like the parallel rulers and used for mathematical-astronomical calculations. 4.3.7. Hourglasses Hourglasses or sandglasses were for a long time the only method of keeping track of time onboard. Especially for short time periods, such as 14 seconds or 28 seconds for the log, hourglasses were better than early chronometers. They were also standardised and those for the log had four, while those for keeping time had five spikes. Life onboard was organised by the watches. Various systems existed with two or three watch systems in the Royal Navy, and a four watch system on some merchant ships and some countries. Time was split into 30-minute units, because the sandglass ran for 30 minutes and the bell was sounded accordingly. So the hourglass really was a focal point of shipboard life and of navigation when used for the log. They could not be made onboard and existed as both the ship’s and personal equipment. 126 Figure 20 Hourglass from HMS Invincible - Bingeman (2010), Figure 158, p.99 Teisen 1998, p.267 75 The hourglasses for the log and for keeping time of the watch were kept on deck and were washed away during the wrecking. Two artefacts were originally categorised as parts of an hourglass, but dismissed by the author as being that. 4.3.8. Chronometer, Longitude, Timekeeping The real change from keeping time using the hourglass or astronomy, came with the marine chronometer. Chronometers at the time of the sinking were still a rarity on ships, although a second rate flagship of an admiral like the St George probably carried one. The documents again, give us a hint to timekeeping onboard. The letter from William Galey gives times, that either corresponds to times to change the watch; „until about four o’clock in the afternoon”127 and “at eight o’clock, when two watches went to bed”128, or are approximate times; “About half-past ten o’clock”129. Captain Pater’s account to the Admiralty, certainly based on his log book, names exact times, such as quarter to eleven at night.130 In the wake of the tragedy, there were a lot of letters published in the Naval Chronicle. Among them, a Royal Navy captain wrote about the lack of chronometers, clearly considering them as “instruments to navigate”131. His, anonymous, complaint was mostly that they are too expensive to purchase, “as they cost a hundred pounds each”132, suggesting it was the captains themselves who had to pay for them before. Only a decade after 1811, the Royal Navy did in fact purchase a large amount of chronometers for its ships “to ascertain the longitude at sea”133. Then the practice became for a ship to be fitted with one chronometer, “but if the captain chose to provide a second, the Admiralty would give him a third.” Nothing relating to a chronometer was found on the wreck as the chronometer was probably in the wardroom, the great cabin or on deck and was washed away. 127 The Naval Chronicle Volume 27 1812, p.113 The Naval Chronicle Volume 27 1812, p.113 129 The Naval Chronicle Volume 27 1812, p.113 130 Uhd Jepsen 1993, p.108 131 The Naval Chronicle Volume 27 1812, p.121 132 The Naval Chronicle Volume 27 1812, p.121 133 The Naval Chronicle Volume 27 1812, p.121 128 76 4.3.9. The Telescope Figure 21 6000x3202 – Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet Besides the lead, an inevitable instrument of pilotage and caping was the telescope. The development of telescopes starts with the astronomers of the seventeenth century, similarly to other instruments later adopted for navigation. The early telescopes are connected with such famous names as Johannes Kepler or Christian Huygens. The real development, as with other instruments, came about during the eighteenth century. One of the main differences of telescopes compared to the instruments above is how contemporaries categorised them. My selection of these objects under the heading of ‘navigation’ is of course arbitrary. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the cross staff, backstaff, quadrant, octant and sextant would all be called ‘mathematical instruments’, not ‘astronomical’ or ‘navigational’ per se. Telescopes on the other hand were ‘optical instruments’. The pieces or horology and later barometers or thermometers had categories of their own. This meant different specialists and makers, a topic covered in a later chapter below. The telescopes obviously quickly made the transition from astronomy into other fields of application with little adoption, and no training into their use was necessary. The refracting telescopes or spyglasses became a symbol of the marine navigator as well. Sub-types developed for day and night use, but with continued improvement of the quality of the lenses, the spyglass served unchanged until binoculars took largely over in the twentieth century. Certainly among the more expensive pieces, although affordable to mariners and midshipmen who often came from higher class families, these were only used on deck. They were essential to both coastal navigation and sea battles to see flag signals and enemy actions. According to illustrations they were stored below deck either in sea chests or on the wall, hanging on large L-shaped cup hooks and with the ship, so they would not slide out as she was heeling. 77 The two telescopes from the St George are simple day telescopes and one is unmarked. The other is marked Cliffe & Co London, but nothing could be found out about Cliffe as an optical instrument maker or ship chandler. 4.3.10. Slate boards and pencils These could have been used for a number of various tasks on deck and below. Midshipmen may have created their own log slates when serving under the master or used them during lessons from the schoolmaster; for taking notes or solving problems. As the other objects, they must have been private possessions. The ship had several slate boards to note tasks onboard, especially the log during the watch. These boards were often pre-marked according to standard log-books and kept up on deck. The item in the collection is not marked in any way. Slate pencils could be simple as well as elaborate pieces. From the artefacts in the collection, we have eleven pencils. The most elaborate, made by Middleton, is missing its lead. It was probably a more expensive piece, but it shows that in general makers put some form of their mark on instruments and Figure 22 Pre-marked deck slate - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich j) specialist utensils. Five pencil leads are grouped and were found with a box. Writing utensils had their own box in which they were kept. Pencils were not expensive or unique to navigation and used by everyone onboard who needed or could write or draw something. Figure 23 6000x3284 - Dalicsek/Strandingsmuseet 78 4.3.11. Traverse Board Traverse boards were circular, mostly wooden but sometimes brass, boards. The board was marked as a compass rose and holes were arranged in circles around the centre. The leader of the watch, in the navy the officer or the master, would put pegs into the holes according to the Figure 24 Traverse board - National Maritime Museum, Greenwich k) direction and distance travelled during the watch. The Board would be transferred to the log every day. It was introduced in the sixteenth century, but still in use in the nineteenth. As they were almost constantly on the quarterdeck, those in use were washed away from the St George. Other examples were maybe in the making by the master, his mates or the carpenter, but none have been found. 4.3.12. Charts Nautical charts are different to terrestrial maps. Their production from the thirteenth up until the eighteenth century mostly lied with individual captains rather than specialist professionals. Sea captains in navies or the VOC were instructed to submit their soundings, observations and logs or charts if produced any on voyages. A large step for the use of nautical charts in navigation came with Gerardus Mercator, a geographer and mathematician. He figured out a way how to effectively project the Earth’s round shape onto the twodimensional paper. The Mercator Projection has its shortcomings, because it gets distorted towards the poles, but in 1569 and even today it fulfils the basic requirements of a sailor. It revolutionised charts that before were more suited for coastal navigation. In the eighteenth century, Hydrographic Offices were set up from 1720, starting in France. Denmark had its Hydrographic Office established in 1784 and Great Britain in 1795. From then on, the Hydrographic Office started producing the Admiralty Charts. Although other navigational techniques, such as the description of instruments or new astronomical observations, were publicised and widespread throughout the continent, charts were often seen as state secrets. There is also a clear focus on charting areas of military strategic importance. The Danish west coast, where the St George wrecked, was for example 79 Figure 25 A Chart over the North Sea from 1854 - Daniel Crouch Rare Books much less surveyed than Kattegat or the Great Belt. With the introduction of a governmental institution for hydrography, that was in direct connection with the Admiralty, came the change as well that captains probably did not have to procure their own charts, but were supplied with the most recently updated versions relevant to their mission. Old charts were deemed dangerous and destroyed. No charts survive from the St George, these were mostly printed on delicate paper, so they would disintegrate in the water quickly if they were not encased. Nautical charts are also less straight forward than terrestrial charts, because they did not account for magnetic variation. Therefore the dip of the compass had to be checked to accurately track the ship’s position on the chart especially over long voyages. 80 4.3.13. Dividers Navigational dividers, or chart compasses, are found often on wreck sites, so it is surprising, that none survived from the HMS St George. They were mostly made of brass and were relatively cheap, personal items. They would have Figure 26 Divider from the Kennemerland - Muckelroy (1978), Figure 3.30, p.121 been stored in boxes along with rulers among the personal effects of the officers and midshipmen. 4.3.14. Rutters The earliest documents to aid sailors were not maps and charts, but descriptions of the coastline as one sailed along. These were called ‘rutters’ (from the French ‘routier’). They did not lose their importance with the emergence of charts and survived throughout the centuries. At the time of the sinking of the St George, ‘The New Seaman’s Guide and Coaster’s Companion’ was at its sixteenth edition and today’s pilot and harbour approach guides are very similar. Rutters could be complemented by coastal views; drawings by captains and masters of characteristic points and elevations along the coast. These elevations were sometimes also drawn on charts. Preparing for the voyage, the charts and sailing guides or ‘rutters’ were consulted. This was the duty of both the captain and the masters. Although the sailing guides for the Kattegat can be very detailed, they are not for the west coast of Jutland. There were no important harbours on the Jutland coast. The tides and currents along the coast could be powerful and the shifting sandbanks in the shallow waters made it a dangerous coast. Sailors best avoided it. ‘The New Seaman’s Guide and Coaster’s Companion’ wrote this for the track that the St George ended up on: „In coming from the Skaw, steering W. by S. will carry you close to the Jutland-coast. In the night keep your lead going, and edge away into deeper water.”134 The text changed in the following edition of these sailing directions, possibly due to the St George’s and Defence’s catastrophe as it reflects on a scenario just like theirs: 134 The Ne “ea a s Guide a d Coaste s Co pa io , p. 81 “Avoid foing to the southward of Bovenbergen till you get well to the westward, that you may have it in your power, in case of being dismasted, to bear up for the Sleeve, and to take Norway, Sweden, or the Sound. Turning out of the Sleeve with Westerly winds, keep near the Norway coast, and do not stand to the southward of the edge of the Jutland reef, as the current always sets to the westward on that coast, but does not extend far from the land; and be particularly careful not to stand to the southward of Bovenbergen with a N.W. wind, for fear of getting embayed, and prevented from getting out, by the strong current that sets to the S.E. at the rate of two miles and hour, during strong winds from the N.W. which is the cause of so many ships being lost on that dangerous coast.”135 4.4. Social Status The navigational instruments hold a special value beyond their function as octants, rulers or telescopes. Today, the sextant is an old instrument and not in use as a primary navigational instrument. However, it is a symbol of seafaring and the age of sail, and indeed many mariners still learn and have to learn to use it. Along with probably the telescope and the divider, they have been symbols of mariners and a part of the imagery of naval heroes. The nautical instruments, as mentioned above in Chapter 3, were also a result of science in practical, everyday life. The quality of instruments could also transfer social status from on land on board. For the navigator himself, the instrument was how he found the way and the position in a mental image of the globe. The midshipmen, although not commissioned officers, were still above the ranks of 90% of the ship’s crew! This meant young inexperienced boys commanding grown men who were seasoned sailors. The fact that they were schooled in navigation and otherwise gave these ‘young gentlemen’ part of their authority, beyond the word of the navy’s regulations. It certainly boosted their self-confidence, that there was something they could do and knew, that the common sailor did not. The knowledge they held also made them fit for leading. The navigational instruments were the practical objects to exercise and show this knowledge and in the context knowledge was power, or part of it. The midshipmen were often sons of aristocratic families and after the battles of the Glorious First of June and Trafalgar, the social standing of a Royal Navy officer increased as well. Admirals had a lavish great cabin onboard their flagship and captains lived in generous 135 The Ne “ea a s Guide a d Coaste s Co pa io i ‘ya (1964), pp.128 82 conditions as well. It is not surprising, that every officer or aspiring officer, who was used to an upper class life of excess on land, would carry as much of that onboard as possible. It is often quoted that a ship resembled society in miniature, as well as she had its own social structure.136 The instruments could embody this connection to the society at home. Some instruments were obviously lavish and made of expensive materials, with silver fittings or ivory frames. These most expensive items would rarely, if ever, see the deck of a ship, but when held, showed that despite being in the naval hierarchy, the bearer might be above his Figure 27 Thomas Masterman Hardyman, former captain of the St George, holding a telescope, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich l) commanders in society and wealth. So just as the instrument could be a connection to society on land when on board, it was a connection to the bearer’s identity as a mariner, when ashore. The image of the naval hero would always have a telescope, looking into the distance, or an octant, taking altitude, to identify him as a sailor. At the same time, his status as an officer, a leader and commander was transferred. The non-navy observer knew as well, that the instrument was a tool of the naval officer’s power. Even for merchant mariners the navigational instruments could transfer their identity and invest them with an air of knowledge and being well-travelled. The instruments used for celestial navigation, surveying and charting were the products of the natural sciences; foremost mathematics. Midshipmen were instructed in mathematics by the schoolmaster and contemporary exercise books for the lieutenant’s exam spend a large portion of their content on trigonometry and practical mathematics. Navigation and its practical tools were the meeting point for science and practice. It required scholars to develop the theories of optics and astronomy, craftsmen to make these ideas into material form and seamen to use them. The Longitude Act and the Board of Longitude played a vital role in this connection. The longitude question was a first for where the state funded a group 136 Eriksson (2014), p.107 83 of specialists to find the solution to a scientific problem.137 The board at the same time brought together politics and trade, science and military. The scientific theories were needed for the instrument makers to experiment and the Admiralty was crucial to then test those experiments. The United Kingdom’s Hydrographic Office was established in 1795 and similarly combined scholarly, political-economic and military interests.138 Considering the fine coloured drawings for navigational views, even the fine arts were included. Most navigational instruments and astronomical or hydrographic theories were internationally circulated.139 Although there were some national restrictions, with soundings and charts being considered a national secret as a preparation for times of war, the sciences behind navigation as well as the navigators themselves, had a truly international character. At the time of the HMS St George, Halley’s and most mariner’s traditional ‘lead-and-line and latitude’ trinity was challenged. The new science based navigation and instruments embodied the scientific revolution of the Age of Enlightenment. This new identity of the educated individual was bestowed upon the mariners using the navigational instruments. As archaeologists study the people behind the objects, we need to think about the navigators own perception behind the instrument. How they placed themselves in a relatively new mental concept of the globe. The framework of latitude and longitude was set and they really only knew their place in the world after taking a proper altitude or the chronometer keeping the right time. This sort of reliance certainly created a dependence on and an awe of the object itself. It was the key to their fate. Modern mariners are more often than not looking at their ECDIS and RADAR screens, instead of looking out, and many have become reliant on smartphones with GPS when navigating a foreign city or route. Navigators in the Napoleonic Royal Navy were just as anxious about their position and their instruments. 4.5. Comparative Analysis As navigation instruments were small and delicate objects and often used onboard, there are not many collections of them from shipwrecks. One of the wrecks, that is also a Royal Navy ship, where we do have some navigational instruments is the HMS Invincible. French built in 1744; L’Invincible was the second of the 74-gun type of ships and the first to be captured by the British. She served as 137 Becker (2013), p.13 Becker (2013), p.13 139 Becker (2013), p.250 138 84 HMS Invincible from 1747 until she sank off Portsmouth in 1758. She grounded on the Dean Sand and could be assisted over several days, so men and equipment could be saved140. Due to the low-intensity of the impact, the site formation process for the ship was very different. The boats could be lowered and ‘survivor salvage’ carried out. During the survivor salvage, objects were collected and some lost, that were then excavated during 1980-1991. The preservation of compass parts, hourglasses and log-line and log parts is certainly due to this different site formation process. So is the fact, that apart from an 18-inch sector rule, no mathematical instruments were found; they must have been all saved141. The leads found onboard were heavier and longer than those of the HMS St George, with only two small ones that correspond to the two heavier ones in the St George’s collection. The Invincible’s leads were also more regularly octagonal shaped and had the broad arrow marks of the Royal Navy on them142. The HMS Swift was a 14-gun sloop-of-war that was launched in 1763. She sank in 1770 off the Patagonian coast, Southern Argentina. They were en route to the Falkland Islands to carry out geographical surveys and sought shelter from a gale in the Deseado estuary. The ship struck submerged rocks in the uncharted waters and sank after some of the stores were rescued.143 According to the excavators, the wrecking process has “resulted in a very high archaeological integrity” and “there was little salvage” 144. The excavations are not complete, but the only instruments for navigation are four sand-glasses.145 It is not clear for what time they were calibrated, but there seem to be 14 or 28-second glasses and one a 30minute glass. All are marked with the broad arrow146. The small ones have been found during the excavations and come from the bow of the lower deck. 147 The cable tier in the bow of the orlop deck could have been the berth for the midshipmen and as they were trying to anchor, they might moved some objects onto the lower deck. As the excavations continue, we might have a more comparable collection. The HMS Pandora was built in 1779, but did not survive the St George. She sank returning from its mission to find the HMS Bounty mutineers in 1791. She ran aground and although many of the crew were saved, 31 men drowned. There was salvage effort, except for 140 Bingeman 2010, p.96 Bingeman 2010, p.97 142 Bingeman 2010, p.103 143 Elkin 2007, p.34 144 Elkin 2007, p.35 145 Elkin 2007, p.50 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 141 85 some that might qualify as ‘survivor salvage’. As they later had to cross the sea from the Torres Strait, navigational equipment might have been taken by the survivors. Survivor reports record the depth, 15 fathoms, where the Pandora sank, but no sounding lead was found during the excavations.148 Instead, they have fragments of the glass of a compass, two telescopes, dividers, an incomplete octant and parts of an octant and fragmented sandglasses.149 Again, dividers and sandglasses are missing from the St George collection as are any parts of a compass. However, the good preservation of the telescopes is similar. It seems natural transformation processes make the difference, as one of the telescopes is heavily concreted and the other’s wooden stock is disintegrated. Navigational instruments have also been recovered from the Kennemerland site by Muckelroy, discussed above. There are not many; a pair of chart dividers (see Figure 14) and a fragment of a backstaff.150 Mörzer-Bruyns et al. reported a very complete collection of navigational instruments from the Dutch East-India Company’s (VOC) ship ‘t Vliegend Hart.151 She was launched in 1730 and sank in 1735 in the mouth of the River Scheldt. The excavations recovered 18 pairs of dividers and fragments, parts of two-separate cross staffs, plane scales and several sounding leads.152 The wreck is interesting, because just as the St George, she sank right before the widespread implementation of a new instrument: the octant.153 Its smaller leads are only 200 grams154, close to the St George’s smallest lead. However, VOC leads were often marked. Mörzer-Bruyns et al. note that the VOC issued its navigators with instruments and that beside the master the chief mate, the second and third mates were responsible for navigation.155 The 32-gun frigate Nicholas of the Imperial Russian Navy sank in 1790 at the sea battle of Svensksund, near the modern Finnish city of Kotka. She was equipped with modern navigational instruments, some possibly from England as the Russian court had good relations to England156 (see above about the Baltic campaign). Although the site has been looted, some instruments were recovered. These include a well preserved telescope, parts of a compass, a 148 Campbell, Gesner 1999, pp.88-90 Ibid. 150 Muckelroy 1978, p.118-126 151 Mö ze B uy s, a de Ho st , p. -325 152 Mö ze B uy s, a de Ho st , p. -325 153 Mö ze B uy s, a de Ho st , p. 154 Mö ze B uy s, a de Ho st , p. 155 Mö ze Bruyns, van der Horst 2006, p.320 156 Ericsson 1975, p.65 149 86 bras traverse board, a sector rule and two protractors; one of them in bone. 157 Again a telescope is preserved in good condition and protractors remain. Protractors are simple objects with no individual parts, hence maybe their preservation. The brass traverse board is a rarity; they were mostly made of wood. Lastly, the collection of navigational instruments from the wreck of the Spanish troopship Salvador has to be mentioned, as she sank in 1812, off the coast of Uruguay. The ship was a merchant vessel, not a naval one. Here, two octants were lifted in mint condition as they were covered by sediment158, similar to the St George. The wreckage is also broken up, as is the St George. Both octants were made by known instrument makers in London.159 The collection of navigational instruments in the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich is the largest of its kind in the world. However, they can only act as a reference for identifying instruments as they lack an archaeological context. They were preserved in or donated as part of personal collections. The quality of those instruments is also higher than the average and some certainly have never been used at sea.160 By looking at other collections, we can see the navigational instruments from the wreck of the HMS St George in context. It is obvious, that this collection covers a wide range of instruments, but lacks certain important ones: sandglass, dividers. The reasons for the lack of otherwise common objects must lie with the difference in natural transformation processes, rather than cultural ones. It is also remarkable, that telescopes, when preserved, survived in relatively good condition. Compared with the VOC wreck of the ‘t Vliegend Hart, the St George has less documentation on the navigational equipment to be expected, but that wreck offers an insight into how a large number of instruments were in fact needed to safely navigate a ship. 157 Ericsson 1975, p.67 Nasti 2001, p.280 159 Nasti 2001, p.280 160 Muckelroy 1978, p.119-120 158 87 5. Conclusion This thesis set out to concern itself with the navigational instruments and the culture of navigation onboard the HMS St George. By looking closely at the history of the last voyage of the St George and the Defence and examining the collection of instruments related to navigation it was possible to gain an insight into the navigational methods onboard. The scientific questions that led the study have been successfully answered. As a result of a broad historical archaeological approach, issues that arose during the writing of the thesis could also be answered. The review of the operational history and the history of the last voyage not only yielded new information, but corrected clarified some issues surrounding the wrecking. By relating the St George’s voyage home from Matvik to site formation processes theory, a new approach has been introduced for this wreck. This comprised history is also one of the most detailed ones in English to date and can serve as a basis for further historical research regarding the St George and the Defence and the catastrophy. This thesis found, that in Gibbs’ theory for shipwreck site formation, the St George serves as a good example with the historical and the archaeological data filling out nearly all stages. Especially for the pre-impact stage, the St George’s last voyage is exemplary. The wrecking off Lolland and the subsequent leg sailed up to the point of wrecking provide a more detailed picture than usual. This prolonged pre-impact stage also results in a very different input into the archaeological record. The ship that sank off Thorsminde was not a glorious second rate, but a battered vessel, and the seamen did not drown at their stations fighting the storm, but suffered in the cold waves on deck, hoping for relief. The historical archaeological analysis also showed evidence for the techniques of navigation onboard. The findings point to navigation without using many of the instruments during the last voyage and methods that fall within the category of pilotage or caping. This is not surprising considering the location; the Baltic. It gives us an indication of the variety of tasks required of the masters when crossing the North Sea, or other waters, and when carrying out other operations. The writing of this thesis involved a detailed review of the original documentation from the St George’s excavations and the methodology. The excavation techniques resemble salvage operations and rescue excavations more closely than maritime archaeological methods, although they were overseen by professional archaeologists. There was a declared 88 strong focus on artefact recovery. This was mostly out of fear that objects would get lost if exposed for too long. Time consuming methods, such as in situ drawings and detailed mapping using triangulation were avoided for a pressure of time and bad visibility. Visibility, financial and time constraints were also cited as reasons for little photography. Furthermore, the weather and underwater conditions rendered exact measurements impossible. The strong focus on artefacts caused a nearly total lack of the recording of the ship’s structure. During the 1996-97, commercial divers were nearly the only ones on site and archaeologists were not always overseeing the work. When judging these excavation techniques in hindsight, we need to have consideration for the state of maritime archaeology as a science at the time and that certain practices were not as established as today. Nonetheless, the lack of contextual information is causing questions that cannot be answered and a loss of knowledge. Underfunding is a problem, where excavators sometimes have little influence and the diving conditions cannot be changed at all. However, certain records note good visibility at times. A shift in attention and approach might have led to fewer artefacts, but a more complete picture. Another point of criticism, again without a complete knowledge of the situation and judged in hindsight, is the documentation of the work that was done. The system for the registration of finds has changed several times over and inconsistencies are frequent. Also, the records have not been completely transcribed and digitalised. An overarching publication of the excavations, bar that of the material culture, is also missing, whether in Danish or English. The published master theses are the best and nearly only available sources on the archaeology of the HMS St George. Hopefully the new Danish online database will provide a good resource for the research of the material culture. The thesis has encountered certain access problems, most of all because the Strandingsmuseum in Thorsminde is closed at the moment. However, considering the above problems and systematically organising them has led to the term ‘R(esearch)-transforms’; following the examples of C(ultural)-, N(atural)- and L(egal)transforms. These are factors that affect what of the recovered material culture eventually transfers into the scientific field of maritime archaeology, what of the recovered material can be studied and how. The analytical review of the material collected from the wreck enabled a most complete list of the navigational instruments within. This collection showed a great diversity of objects. Nine different types of objects used at least partially for navigation onboard were identified in the recovered archaeological material. Objects are either complete examples or parts of a compass, a log-reel, an octant, a parallel ruler, a protractor, a ruler, a slate board, a slate pencil or a telescope. Objects originally identified by the excavators as parts of 89 hourglasses or sounding leads could also be dismissed as being these navigational instruments. However, examples of these instruments could still be present in or around the wreck. The catalogued artefacts show a generally good state of preservation, certainly due to natural factors, such as the cold water and being covered by sediments. The cultural transformation factor that they were stored away carefully also contributed to their survival. The detailed analysis on the spatial distribution of the finds, complete with the application of the site formation processes, has revealed new information in the identification of the objects. We can now know with relative certainty, that they have belonged to the more senior midshipmen onboard the St George. It is also probable, that the objects were not stowed away in individual cases, because this was not noted during recovery. They must have hung free or were in sea chests below deck in the private berthing area at the time of the wrecking. The archaeological material holds individual instruments of lesser value, but certain objects survive in multiple numbers, indicating how every officer and warrant officer had his own instrument. The difference between a collection of navigational instruments from an archaeological site and the expected artefacts as represented in museum collections and documentary sources has also been outlined. The study of navigational instruments as cultural artefacts has shown the role these objects played beyond the practical. They indicated social status within the community onboard as well as an identity as a mariner in the society ashore. They endorsed the navigator with the qualities of knowledge, power and elevated him above the common sailor. The objects themselves were a result of the combined efforts of the natural scientists, the skilled craftsmen and the practical seafarers; a true symbol of the Scientific Revolution. 90 6. Further Research Even though the aforementioned theses, and this one now, have been written about the archaeology of the HMS St George and there have been historical publications about her and the Defence, there still is a lot of work to be done. When the new Strandingsmuseum St. George in Thorsminde has been opened and the new Danish museums’ collections’ online database is up and running, everything is as such back to normal. This will provide a better situation in regards to clear access. At that time, this thesis could be revisited to complete the catalogue and clarify what could not be done, also due to time constraints, by the author. The new museum also provides an excellent opportunity to present the navigational instruments to the public. Navigation is not an easy topic, but one that many have some knowledge of and are interested in. The navigational instruments can be presented in a comparison to modern navigational technologies using interactive methods; tablets, mock-ups, replicas and virtual projections. Many maritime museums serve as good examples: Denmark’s Maritime Museum in Helsingør, International Maritime Museum in Hamburg, The National Maritime Museum in Amsterdam or the Nationional Maritime Museum in Greenwich. As the shown in this thesis, the navigational instruments carried great social value onboard and in society ashore. This subject does not fall into the discipline of maritime archaeology. Anthropology, maritime history and art history could however uncover further depths of this little researched topic to provide further knowledge about the dynamics of life and the society onboard. There are further documents in the United Kingdom’s National Archives as well as the Danish archives that relate to the St George’s and the Defence’s tragedy, history and the victims. These still need to be categorically collected, transcribed and translated from Danish to English or vice versa. Not many, but some documents have been washed ashore from the wrecks and have been preserved. It fell outside the scope of this master thesis to deal with these documents and Palle Uhd Jepsen is the foremost authority on the historical research of the ships. Log-books, journals and court martial papers can provide valuable information about navigation for historians as well as about navigational instruments for maritime archaeologists. 91 As mentioned in several chapters in this thesis, the archaeological work does not stop with the recovery of the objects. The finds and the findings have to be made available. A transcript of the historical sources and the excavation documentation have been mentioned above. Excavation reports and a catalogue of materials have to be published. The master theses, after some revisions, could also be compiled into a publication or the topics can be revisited entirely with the aim of a publication in a different format. However, the collection of the material culture, including the exceptional navigational instruments, deserves to be well published and widely known in the field of maritime archaeology. At last, maritime archaeology’s most profitable research method is excavation. After, and only after, the present material has been researched, published and presented, possibly, but not necessarily in this order, excavations of the HMS St George and the HMS Defence should continue. These should be carried out with regard to current trends and have a strong methodological and theoretical framework. Under the leadership of the Strandingsmuseum and in collaboration with the rest of the maritime archaeology society in Denmark a group of trained maritime archaeologists can be assembled to carry out the excavation. This will of course be a subject to many other factors, as excavations always are, but we should strive for the most ideal results. 92 Bibliography                 Becker, Julian (2013), Das britische Board of Longitude 1714-1828, Dr. Kovaĉ, Hamburg Bennett, J.A. (1987), The divided circle: a history of instruments for astronomy, navigation and surveying, Oxford, Phaidon Christie’s Bingeman, John M. (2010), The First HMS Invincible (1747-58), Her Excavations (1980-1991), Oxbow Books, Oxford Brenton, Edward Pelham (1838), Life and Correspondence of John, Earl of St. Vincent, Vol.1, Henry Colburn Publishers, London Campbell, Janet, Gesner, Peter (2000), Illustrated Catalogue of Artefacts from the HMS Pandora, Wrecksite Excavations 1977-1995. Memoirs of the Queensland Museum, Cultural Heritage Series 2(1): pp.53-159, Brisbane Davies, David (2006), A Brief history of Fighting Ships: ships of the line and Napoleonic sea battles 1793-1815, Robinson London, Elkin et al. 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(1974)‚The Dartmouth, a British frigate wrecked off Mull, 1690, International Journal of Nautical Archaeology Vol.3, pp:269-274. Adams, John (1773), The young Sea-Officer’s Assistant, Both in his Examination and Voyage, London Adams, John (Ed.) (2014), Interpreting Shipwrecks ADM 1/5425 Court Martial Papers ADM107/32-33. Lieutenants’ Passing Certificates. 1805. Auer, Jens (2004), Fregatten Mynden: a 17th-century Danish Frigate Found in Northern Germany. The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 33.2: pp.264280 Bettesworth, J. (1783), The Seaman’s Sure Guide or Navigator’s Pocket Remembrancer, London Blake, John (2004), The Sea Chart—an Illustrated History of Nautical Maps and Navigational Charts, London Blake, N. and R. R. Lawrence (1999). The illustrated companion to Nelson's navy. London, Chatham Blakemore, Richard J. (2012), Navigating culture: navigational instruments as cultural artefacts, c. 1550–1650, Journal for Maritime Research Vol. 14, No. 1, May 2012: pp.31–44 Blewitt, Mary (1957), Surveys of the Seas: A brief history of British hydrography, MacGibbon and Kee Cavell, Samantha A. (2006), Playing at Command: Midshipmen and Quarterdeck Boys in the Royal Navy, 1793-1815, Queens University of Technology Clifton, G. (2003), The London Mathematical Instrument Makers and the British Navy, 1700–1850. Pieter van der Merwe (ed.), Science and the French and British Navies, 1700–1850, London, pp.24–33 Clifton, Gloria (2006), ‘Instrument Makers in the London Livery Companies: An Overview’, BSIS, No. 88 Cotter, C. H. (1983), A History of the Navigator’s Sextant. Glasgow. Daumas, M. (1972), Scientific instruments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and their makers, transl. and ed. M. Holbrook. London. Davey, James (2011), The advancement of nautical knowledge: the Hydrographical Office, the Royal Navy and the charting of the Baltic Sea, 1795–1815 96                       Davey, James (2012), Supplied by the enemy: the Royal Navy and the British consular service in the Baltic, 1808–12 ,Historical Research, 05/2012, Vol.85, Nummer 228 Den danske Lods, Generelle oplysninger (2013), 3. udgave, Miljøministeriet, Geodatastyrelsen Dick, Steven J. (1992), Centralizing Navigational Technology in America: The U.S. Navy's Depot of Charts and Instruments, 1830-1842. Technology and Culture, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jul., 1992): pp.467-509 Feldbæk, O. (1980), Denmark and the armed Neutrality 1800-1801, Copenhagen University Institute of Economic History, Copenhagen, Denmark. Forty, Gerald (1986), The Backstaff and the Determination of Latitude at Sea in the Seventeenth Century. Journal of Navigation 39.2: pp.259-268 Forty, Gerald (1986), The backstaff and the determination of latitude at sea in the seventeenth century. Journal of Navigation Vol.39: pp.259–68 Foster, W.A. and Higgs, K.B. (1973), The Kennemerland, 1971. An interim report, International Journal of Nautical Archaeology Vol.2: pp.291-300 Gabrielson, Mark J., Enlightenment in the Darkness: The British Prisoner of War School of Navigation, Givet, France, 1805-1814 Gardiner, Robert (2000), Frigates of the Napoleonic War, Chatham Publishing, London Goddard, Jonathan Charles (2004), The navy surgeon’s chest: surgical instruments of the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic War. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol.97: pp.191-197 Goodwin, P. and M. National Maritime (2003). Nelson's men o' war : the illustrated story of life in Nelson's navy, London, Carlton Gossett, William Patrick (1986). The lost ships of the Royal Navy, 1793-1900, Mansell, London Gould, Richard A. (1983), Shipwreck Anthropology Hall, Christopher D. (2004), Wellington’s navy: sea power and the Peninsular War 1807-1814, London Chatham Publishing Hatfield, M. R. and M. H. Smith (1974), The Influence of Technology on Navigation as an occupation, The Journal of Navigation, Vol.27.4 / October 1974: pp.478-489 Henderson, Graeme (1980), Finds from the wreck of HMS Pandora. The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration 9.3: pp.237-266 Hewson, J.B. (1983), A history of the practice of navigation Jenks Timothy (2006), Naval engagements, Oxford Karadimos , Georgios (2010), The Firearms, Edged Weapons and Parts from the Uniforms on Board HMS St.George Kemp, Peter (Ed.) (1969) History of the Royal Navy, Barker, London Kleij, Piet (1997), Identification of ship’s place of departure with the help of artefacts. Redknap, Mark (Ed.), Artefacts from Wrecks : Dated assemblages from the Late Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution, Oxbow Monograph 84, Oxford Konstam, A. and T. Bryan (2001), British Napoleonic ship-of-the-line, Oxford, Osprey Military 97                       Laplante Jolicoeur, Veronique, (2012), The HMS St. George personal belongings a social historical analysis Lavery, Brian (Ed.) (1998) Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815. Navy Records Society, Vol.138. Brookefield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Lavery, Brian, (1999) Nelson's Navy: Ships, Men and Organization, 17931815,Conway Maritime Press Lewis, Michael (1960), A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815. George Allen & Unwin Lloyd , Christopher (1968), The British seaman, 1200-1860 : A social survey, London, Collins Longridge, C. Nepean (1955), The Anatomy of Nelson’s Ships, Model and Allied Publications Ltd, Hemel Hempstead Martin, Colin J. M. (1997), Ships as integrated artefacts: the archaeological potential. Redknap, Mark (Ed.), Artefacts from Wrecks : Dated assemblages from the Late Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution, Oxbow Monograph 84, Oxford McConnell, Anita (1982). No Sea Too Deep: The History of Oceanographic Instruments. Bristol: Hilger. p. 28. McConnell, Anita (1983), The development of oceanographic instruments. Endeavour Vol.7.1.: pp.25-30 McConnell, Anita (2007), Jesse Ramsden (1735-1800): London's Leading Scientific Instrument Maker, Ashgate Publishing Meyer-Haßfurther, Ingo and Monika, 500 Jahre Navigation : [Navigationsinstrumente vom 15. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert] Montgomery, Paul (2009), The province of Venus and Mars: The material culture of medical practice on the HMS St George Morley, Iain, Renfrew, Colin (2010), The archaeology of measurement, Cambridge University Press Morrison-Low, A.D. (2007), Making Scientific Instruments in the Industrial Revolution, Aldershot Mörzer Bruyns, W. F. J. (2004), The Cross-Staff Ten Years Later. An Update with Recently Found Examples, Bulletin of the Scientific Instrument Society 80: pp.18–23 Montgomery, Paul (2009), The province of Venus and Mars: The material culture of medical practice on the HMS St George Prown, Jules (1982), Mind in matter: an introduction to material culture theory and method. Winterthur Portfolio 17: pp.1–19 Raithby, John (1823), The Statutes Relating to the Admiralty, Navy, Shipping, an Navigation of The United Kingdom, London Randier, Jean (1980), Marine Navigation Instruments, John Murray (Publishers) Ltd Raymond, David J. (2010), The Royal Navy in the Baltic from 1807-1812 Reeves, Nicky (2011), The Greenwich Sextants in Context, Journal for the History of Astronomy, 05/2011 Robinson, A.H.W. (1952), The evolution of the English nautical chart. Journal of Navigation 5: pp.362–74 98            Rodger , N. A. M. (1999), Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century. The Journal of Military History Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jul., 1999):pp.683-703 Rönnby, Johan (2004), The Archaeological Interpretation of shipwrecks. Adams, John (Ed.) Interpreting Shipwrecks, pp.9-24 Silva, João Nuno Borges da (2012), Artillery analysis of HMS St George: A composite/comparative study of the Historical and archaeological background Simms, W.H. (1858), The Sextant and its Applications, London Stimson, Alan, and Christopher Daniel (1977), The cross-staff. Historical development and modern use, London: Harriet Winter Ltd Turner, A.J. (1993), Interpreting the history of scientific instruments. Making instruments count, edited by R.G.W. Anderson, J.A. Bennett, and W.F. Ryan, Aldershot: pp.17–26 Uhd Jepsen, Palle (1987), Kommandør Charles Dudley Pater, Et historisk vidne. Hardsyssels Årbog, Historisk Samfund for Ringkøbing Amt, Vol.21 Webb, Adrian (2014), More than just charts: hydrographic expertise within the Admiralty, 1795–1829 Yuto, Ishibashi (2013), A Place for Managing Government Chronometers': Early Chronometer Service at the Royal Observatory Greenwich Zinner, E. (1957), Astronomische Instrumente des 11. bis 18. Jahrhunderts, Beck, Munich Zwick, Daniel (2004), Conceptual Evolution in Ancient Shipbuilding: An Attempt to Reinvigorate a Shunned Theoretical Framework. Adams, John (Ed.), Interpreting Shipwrecks, pp.46-71 99 Appendices 100 Appendix I – Catalogue 101 The Compass 102 103 ID Number: 7546x0153 Coordinates: n/a A largely intact compass with brass compass bowl and glass cover. It is preserved in mint condition with small bends on the bowl. The compass card is paper on a disk of mica. The glass cover is also intact. No maker’s mark. A small screw for attachment on the bottom of the bowl is still in place. Two bolts on the side are for attachment. Diameter: 170 mm Depth: 70 mm 104 The Leads 105 ID Number: 6000R Coordinates: n/a Conical shaped lead with the eye for attaching the line broken off. This lead is too light for any of the usual sounding lead weights. Dimensions: 100 x 40 mm Weight: 1262 g 106 ID Number: 6000x0914 Coordinates: n/a Lead with an eye for attaching the line broken off on the top. It has a conical shape with a rounded square base. Dimensions: 71 x 24 x 24 mm Weight: 278 g 107 ID Number: 6000x0915 Coordinates: 42 S 6/14 1 Lead with an eye for attaching the line. It has a cylindrical shape. Dimensions: 113 mm x 34 mm Weight: 1016 g 108 ID Number: 6000x0923 Coordinates: 42 S 6/14 Lead with a triangular prism shape. The eye for attaching the line is concreted at the tapered end. Dimensions: 145 mm x 27 mm Weight: 780 g 109 (Photo by Strandingsmuseet Thorsminde) ID Number: 6000x3207B Coordinates: n/a Lead weight without an eye with large cracks. It is tapered, the bottom is square shaped. Dimensions: 27 mm x 27 mm Height: 74 mm Weight: ca. 203,9 g 110 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 5/21 1 Small rectangular lead weight with an eye. Height: 70 mm Thickness: 25 mm 111 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 35 S 6/24 Lead for surveying with an eye. “Bob” Diameter: 23,2 mm 112 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 5/33 4 Triangular shaped lead weight. Height: 150 mm Edge: 30 mm 113 The Log 114 ID Number: 7546x0875A-B or 7546xBL875 Coordinates: n/a Handle and part of the reel for the log-line. Rests of the rolling part of the reel have also survived. Reel diameter: 85 mm Reel thickness: 20 mm Handle length: 65 mm Handle diameter: 31 mm 115 The Octants 116 117 ID Number: 6000x0079_k1 Coordinates: n/a The octant has a wooden frame and limb with a brass index arm and fittings. It had an inlaid marker’s or owner’s plate on the crossbar of unknown material. The scale for the graduated arc was also inlaid, probably in two pieces. Two small regular holes are in the wood, close to where it broke. The tangent screw is missing from the index arm and could have been attached either on the front or back. The vernier from the index arm is missing as well. The octant had three socket shades. The sight vane has two pinholes and swivelling shutter. The scale limb of the octant is broken towards the 90° end. The index arm has three small holes at regular intervals along it. A marking in the shape of a Roman VII is etched into the brass plate that held the index mirror (see detail). The index mirror’s ‘clip’ or ‘clamp’ is adjusted with a tilting screw, and two fastening screws hold it in place. The horizon glass was adjusted by a lever, a milled screw and a worm gear, the mechanism is however lost. The horizon glass is also missing. Three holes on the underside were for its legs to rest on. A hole in the centre of the crossbar was possibly for a pencil. It might have broken into the holes upon impact as the hole is not hollow. Height: 310 mm Index shade frames: 35x35 mm Index glass diameter: 28 mm Limbs: 18 mm wide and 15 mm thick 118 119 * Wellington*London* ID Number: 6000x0986 Coordinates: 34 S 4/4 This is a special type of octant called Hadley’s octant and more similar to the modern sextant. The octant’s frame and limb are made of a ebony with a brass index arm and fittings. The limb of the frame leading towards the 0 degree end is broken below the crossbar. It had an inlaid scaled arc and vernier scale made of ivory. The vernier scale seems to be a replacement, held by two small nails. The inlaid arc is damaged and the part up to 58 degrees is missing. The arc is only graded up to 98 degrees. There is also an inlaid plate on the back of the frame. The inlaid ivory plate on the crossbar bears the marking *Wellington* London * (see detail). Alexander Wellington worked as an optician and mathematical instrument maker at Crown Court, St. Ann's in Soho London from 1784 until 1812. The index glass is missing, but the clamp is still in place. It was adjusted by one screw and a tilting screw and held by two fastening screws. The horizon glass and back horizon glass and back sight are missing. The horizon glass was adjusted by a milled screw and worm gear. The back sigh was adjusted with a lever, wing nut and a milled clamping screw. The sight vane has two pinholes and a swivelling shutter. The octant has three index shades. Two of the screws upon which the instrument rested in its case are preserved on the back side. The crossbar has a spot to hold a pencil, but it is missing. As a memento of the rudimentary early techniques a hardened piece of BlueTac is stuck to the left limb on the underside. Height: 390 mm Width: 320mm 120 121 ID Number: 6000x0987 Coordinates: n/a This is a Hadley’s octant. The octant’s frame and limb are made of a dark wood, probably ebony or teak with a brass index arm, fittings, and a brass stop for the index arm. It also has an inlaid scaled arc made of a single piece of ivory and an ivory vernier scale. The vernier scale is marked with the 0 on the right and up to 20 degrees. The inlaid plate on the crossbar is missing. The inlaid plate on the back of the frame is painted black, probably to match the colour of the frame. This was not usual on the instruments at the time. There is no tangent screw and the clamping screw is located on the back of the index arm. Index-glass adjustment is made by a screw and a tilting screw. Both horizon glasses are adjusted by levers, wing nuts and milled clamping screws. The index and horizon glasses are still in place. The sight vane has two pinholes and a swivelling shutter, whereas the back sight vane has one pinhole. The octant has three index shades, one in green, one in dark and one in light orange.. The inlaid scale is damaged and has a black and white discolouration on the end from the 76 degrees mark upwards. The scale is marked from -3 to 99 degrees. Height: 380mm Width: 320mm 122 123 (Teisen (1998), p.266) ID Number: 6000x3172 Coordinates: 36 B 2 (33 S 8/45 has also been noted in the records, but is probably wrong) The octant has an ebony frame and limb with a brass index arm and fittings. Besides the graduated scale, it also has an inlaid ivory signature plate on the crossbar and a plate the back of the frame. The vernier scale is also made of ivory. The tangent screw is located on the front of the index arm and the clamping is on the back. The octant has three index shades one in green and two in orange (one light and one dark). The sight vane has two pinholes. The index 124 mirror’s ‘clamp’ is adjusted with a tilting screw, and two fastening screws hold it in place. The horizon glass is adjusted by a lever, a milled screw and a worm gear. Both the index mirror and the horizon glass are still in place. On the reverse side, all three screws for the instrument to rest on are in place. On the vernier scale, the 0 is on the right and the scale goes from 0 to 20. The main scale is graded from -3° to 99°. The crossbar has a hole for a pencil, but it is empty. The octant was made by Isaac Bradford & Son of Minories, London, according to Teisen161. Bradford was active in partnership with his brother, John from 1794/5, but he moved his shop to the address 136 Minories in 1808. Teisen also described this as a Hadley’s quadrant, but it is just a normal octant. The instrument has suffered damage since the photograph in the 1998 publication, the brass frame of the index mirrors lost the side parallel to the index arm (compare detail and Teisen’s photograph). Height: 280 mm Width: 245 mm 161 Teisen 1998, p.267 125 ID Number: 6000x0438 Coordinates: n/a This is the horizon glass fitting for an octant. It is less corroded than 6000x0717. It is made of brass, with brass screws still in place, but the horizon glass is missing. Its edges are slightly damaged. Dimensions: 25x30mm 126 ID Number: 6000x0514 Coordinates: n/a This is a broken off end of an index arm. It is made of brass and corroded. Two small holes can be seen for the attachment of the vernier scale and two screw holes for the tangent screw’s mechanism. It is decorated with a flower motif. Dimensions: 60x56 mm 127 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 6000x0561 Coordinates: 35 S 6/19 Octant half-horizon glass. It is unclear, what was meant by the Danish description “halvspejl”. It is made of brass. The object is probably the half-horizon glass/mirror with the cylindrical fitting. The dimensions are transcribed unedited. Height: 62 mm Diameter: 27 mm Mirror: 29x26 mm 128 ID Number: 6000x0696 Coordinates: 37 S 5/45 This is a brass fitting for an octant, maybe an adjustment pat for one of the mirrors. It is slightly corroded and has a dark varnish. Height: 24 mm Diameter: 24 mm Rod diameter: 6 mm Plate thickness: 4 mm 129 ID Number: 6000x0697 Coordinates: 37 S 5/45 2 (wrong registration written on object as 6000x0696, right number probably 697) A brass sighting vane for an octant. It has two pinholes and had a swivelling shutter, now missing. Due to corrosion and conservation, it has a dark varnish. Dimensions: 22,1x33,1 mm ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 5/45 Number 3 Brass ring, belonging to 37 S 5/45 Number2 Diameter: 58 mm Diameter: 40 mm 130 ID Number: 6000x0712 Coordinates: 39 S 5/26 The object is a back sighting vane for an octant. It is made of brass with two pinholes and a screw for a swivelling shutter that is now missing. Dimensions: 22x25,2 mm 131 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 6000x0717 Coordinates: n/a This is the brass fitting for the horizon glass of an octant. It is heavily corroded. Diameter: 25 mm 132 ID Number: 6000x0733 Coordinates: 33 S 8/14 Brass plate with a hole in the centre and four screws. It is a plate for the attachment of the index mirror over the index arm on an octant. Well preserved with all four mirror adjustment screws in place. Outer Diameter: 61 mm Inner Diameter: 11,2 mm 133 ID Number: 6000x0779 Coordinates: 33 S 8/16 1 Three index shades for an octant (or sextant) in their brass frame. One outer glass is green and the opposite outer glass is light orange. The orange glass is broken. The glasses are immobile due to corrosion, but else the object is well preserved. Frame dimensions: 34,4 x 34,8 x 9 mm Glass diameter: 27 mm 134 ID Number: 6000x0780 Coordinates: 33 S 8/16 2 Part of an octant, made of brass, heavily corroded. It has a square hole. Length: 47,2 mm (1984 record) 42 mm (online) Diameter: 17,9 mm (1984 record) 17 mm (online) 135 ID Number: 6000x1771 (There is a note: “same as 6000x0561”, but something else is under 0561) Coordinates: 34 S 4/2 1-3 Three connected index shades for an octant. They are corroded immobile, the two visible glasses are green and orange. Brass frames: 35x35x9mm Glass diameter: 27 mm 136 (Photo by Strandingsmuseet Thorsminde) ID Number: 6000x1792B Coordinates: n/a Brass part of an octant with a spring and a whole through it. It could be part of a worm gear for adjusting the horizon glass. Length: 24 mm Width: 10 mm 137 ID Number: 6000x3290 A-C Coordinates: 34 B 2 Three separate brass index shade fittings s for an octant. The connecting bolt and the glasses are missing, the bolt’s hole is filled with corroded material. Dimensions (frame): 34 mm x 34 mm 138 ID Number: 6000x3291 Coordinates: 34 B 2 Three connected index shades for an octant. They are corroded immobile, the two visible glasses are green and orange. Frames: 35x35x9mm Glass Diameter: 28 mm 139 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 6000x3299 A Coordinates: 34 B 5 An iron pot containing along with other various objects an index shade or index shades for an octant. 140 ID Number: 7546xBL336 Coordinates: n/a Downward arching crossbar for an octant of plain pattern. Ebony wood with a maker’s mark written on inlaid ebony. The mark reads: HEBERT MAKER 66 LEADEN HALL STREET LONDON The ebony is dark due to conservation probably. It has a pencil hole in the middle. The joints that fitted it to the limbs of the octant are intact. Length: 170mm 141 ID Number: n/a Coordinates: n/a This is the index mirror’s frame and part of the index mirror/glass. The index mirror usually had two or three sheets of glass. Only one is preserved. The fitting is brass with two small screw holes to hold the mirror glass in place. Brass fitting: 51x32x9mm Glass: 50x30x3mm 142 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 34 S 4/2 Number 4 Mirror for an octant on a circular plate with a rod/stick. Maybe the index mirror on the index arm? Length: 63 mm Height: 26 mm 143 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 34 S 4/2 Number 5 Possible handle of an octant. Dimensions: 25 mm x 27 mm 144 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 35 S 6/19 (Index?) Mirror from an octant with a stamp-shaped holder. Length: 60,4 mm Diameter: 26,8 mm 145 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 5/45 Number 1 Stamp-like holder for an octant Diameter: 23,9 mm Height: 24,7 mm 146 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 2/2 Number 4 “sigteplade” for an octant; maybe the sighting pinnula or the plate for the index arm. With two screws. Diameter: 27,8 mm – 4,2 mm 147 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 5/23 Round fitting for an octant. Diameter: 25,9 mm Thickness: 5 mm 148 (Drawing by Strandingsmuseet Thorsminde) ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 42 S 6/9 Number 4 Brass cylinder with a hole. Diameter: 17,1 mm Height: 5,3 mm Hole diameter: 3,5 mm 149 (Drawing by Strandingsmuseet Thorsminde) ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 42 S 6/9 Number 5 Brass fitting, probably for an index arm. 150 Parallel Rulers 151 ID Number: 6000x0951 Coordinates: 35 S 5/17 A parallel ruler with brass arms and ebony rulers. It is preserved in mint condition with sharp edges and a parallelogram cross-section. The brass arms have visible scratch marks. Two small brass pins are halfway between the arms’ pins on each ruler and were for handling the ruler when in use. Length (closed): 305 mm Length (max.): 430 mm Width (ruler): 20 mm Width (max.): 94 mm Arms: 83x16 mm Thickness: 5 mm 152 ID Number: 6000x3242 Coordinates: 37 B 2 A parallel ruler made of ebony with 2 brass arms. It is preserved in mint condition with little corrosion on the brass and a clear wooden surface. It has a parallelogram-shaped crosssection. Two small pins are in the middle of each ruler for moving the parallel rulers when using the instrument. Length (closed): 230 mm Length (max.): 320 mm Width (ruler): 20 mm Width (max.): 82 mm Arms: 72x16mm Thickness (rulers): 4 mm 153 ID Number: 6000x5056 Coordinates: n/a This is a parallel ruler, preserved in good condition, although not as well preserved as the other two complete examples. The rulers are made of ebony and the arms are of brass. The arms have a dark varnish due to corrosion and the rudimentary conservation during the 1980s. A splinter is broken off on the inside edge of one of the rulers. Its cross-section was probably a parallelogram, but is evenly rounded at the edges probably due to wear as the broken edge is sharper. Two larger brass pins are in the middle of each ruler for handling the instrument when using it. Length (closed): 380 mm Length (max.): 542 mm Width (ruler): 26 mm Width (max.): 115 mm Arms: 95x15mm 154 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 7546x0315 or 7546xBL315 Coordinates: n/a Half of a parallel ruler made of wood. 155 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 7546x0365 or 7546xBL365 Coordinates: n/a Fragment of a parallel ruler made of wood. 156 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 7546x0485 Coordinates: n/a Brass fitting for a parallel ruler. 157 Protractors 158 ID Number: 6000x3213 Coordinates: 37 B 3 It is a semi-circular brass protractor. The angles are marked with the outside row running from left to right and the inner scale graded right to left. Both scales are marked from 10 degrees to 170 degrees with the number every 10 degrees. The angles over 100° are written out as 110, 120 and so forth on both scales. It has a little cut into the protractor at the centre of the circle. The edges are damaged and there are signs of corrosion, but the instrument has been conserved and restored. Radius: 45 mm 159 ID Number: 6000xDF Coordinates: 39 B 5/30 C Old ID Number: KRR 83040x11 It is a brass protractor in mint condition. It has a cut at the centre of the circle as well and the edges are flattened outwards. The angles are marked with the outside row running from left to right and the inner scale graded right to left. Both scales are marked from 10 degrees to 170 degrees with the number every 10 degrees. The angles over 100° are written out as 110, 120 and so forth only on the inside scale. Radius: 42 mm Thickness: 1 mm 160 Rulers 161 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 7546x0490A-B Coordinates: n/a Wooden ruler, broken with a peg/stick from a box. 162 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 7546x0640 Coordinates: n/a Fragment of a wooden ruler. 163 Slate boards 164 ID Number: 7546x1082 Coordinates: n/a Blackboard made of slate with wooden frame, probably boxwood. It could have been used as a log-board for the watch. It is broken, missing ca. 30 % of the slate board, whereas the frame is well preserved. Length: 437 mm Width: 251 mm 165 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 6000x3316 Coordinates: 35 B 2 A slate plate, possibly part of a blackboard. 166 Slate pencils 167 ID Number: 6000x0443 Coordinates: n/a The stump of a slate pencil. Its ends have been worn off rounded, but it retained its pentagonal shape Length: 33 mm 168 ID Number: 6000x0979 Coordinates: n/a Three complete slate pencils and two broken pieces in an ebony box. The box is made up of 5 parts and a sliding lid. It is made of ebony and shows only slight signs of wear. The complete pencils are flat in cross section and pointed at one end Box length: 100 mm Width: 25 mm Depth: 28 mm Pencils’ length: 80-90-96 mm 169 ID Number: 6000x3133 Coordinates: 39 B 4 It is a pentagonal shaped slate pencil with a pointed end. It is corroded and chipped along the edges that might be original wear. Length: 47mm 170 ID Number: 6000x3223A Coordinates: 36 B 5 A slate pencil with a pointed and a slightly tapered end. It has a pentagonal cross-section. Length: 54 mm 171 ID Number: 6000x3284 Coordinates: 35 B 2 Pencil with a brass ferrule. It is marked with [M]IDDLETON 162 STRAND LONDON 10. The wooden part that held the lead is made up of two parts of different wood that have a different colour. They are held together only by the ferrule. The lead is missing Nicholas Middleton is recorded under this address and has supplied stationary even to the royal household. Length overall: 120 mm Length of wooden part: 90 mm Diameter: 4 mm 172 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 2/19 Stump of a slate pencil. Length: 38 mm Diameter: 3 mm 173 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: n/a Coordinates: 37 S 2/2 Number 9 Slate pencil (uncertain) Length: 33 mm Diameter: 5,8 mm 174 Telescopes 175 ID Number: 6000x3202 Coordinates: 38 B 2 This achromatic telescope has a single brass draw tube and brass fittings that include sliding eyepiece and objective lens covers. It has a wooden, probably mahogany, cylindrical barrel. The telescope had most likely been used for making general observations from the deck of the ship, its objective is too small for it to be effective at night. The barrel of this telescope is covered with leather. The leather is damaged and deteriorated, but is still well preserved. The thread for the stitching is not preserved, but the leather appears to have been glued to the barrel. As a result of the conservation, the lens covers are immobile. Its maker is unknown, but there might be an inscription on the brass draw tube, that is now immobile. Length overall: 519 mm Barrel diameter: 62 mm Diameter at eyepiece: 33 mm Diameter at aperture: 49 mm 176 ID Number: 6000x0429 Coordinates: 37 S 2/25 Eyepiece for an optical instrument, probably a telescope with a sliding cover. The sliding cover still moves. It is made of brass and due to conservation has a dark varnish. The glass is broken. Diameter: 37 mm-14,7 mm 177 ID Number: 7546x0127 Coordinates: n/a This achromatic telescope has a single brass draw tube and brass objective lens cover. As a result of the conservation, the lens cover does not move. The brass draw tube is restored fast in the open position. The tapering barrel of the telescope is made of wood, probably mahogany. It was originally possibly covered with leather. There are no scratch marks from use on the wood’s surface. The objective lens is not large enough for this to be a day and night telescope, but is a general purpose spyglass. An inscription on the draw tube identifies the maker as Cliffe & Co, London (Detail). There could not be found any more information about this workshop or maybe ships’ chandler. Length overall: 727 mm Diameter at eyepiece: 23 mm Diameter at aperture: 62 mm Maximum diameter of barrel: 55 mm Minimum diameter of barrel: 46 mm Diameter of brass fitting between drawtube and barrel: 48 mm Draw tube diameter: 29 mm Maximum diameter of eyepiece: 38 mm 178 NO PHOTOGRAPH ID Number: 7546xBL679 Coordinates: n/a Wooden part for a telescope (?) Diameter: 65 mm 179 Appendix II – Catalogue list ID Number (6000x) Old ID Number (Coordinates) 7546x0153 6000x3195C 6000x3195D 6000x0914 6000x0915 42 S 6/14 1 6000x0923 42 S 6/14 1 6000x3207B 6000R 35 S 6/24 37 S 5/21 1 37 S 5/33 4 7546x0875A 7546x0875B 6000x0079_k1 34 S 4/4 6000x0438 6000x0514 6000x0561 35 S 6/19 (?) 6000x0696 37 S 5/45 6000x0697 6000x0712 39 S 5/26 6000x0717 6000x0733 33 S 8/14 6000x0779 33 S 8/16 1 6000x0780 33 S 8/16 2 6000x0986 34 S 4/5 6000x0987 6000x1771 34 S 4/2 1-3 6000x1792B 6000x3172 36 B 2 6000x3290A 34 B 2 6000x3290B 34 B 2 6000x3290C 34 B 2 6000x3291 34 B 2 6000x3299A 34 B 5 7546xBL336 34 S 4/2 4 34 S 4/2 5 37 S 2/2 4 37 S 5/23 37 S 5/45 1 37 S 5/45 2 37 S 5/45 3 39 S 5/26 42 S 6/9 4 42 S 6/9 5 6000x0951 35 S 5/17 6000x3242 37 B 2 6000x5056 7546x0315 7546x0365 7546x0485 6000x3213 37 B 3 6000DF 39 B 5/30 C 7546x0490A 7546x0490B 7546x0640 6000x3316 35 B 2 7546x1082 6000x0443 6000x0979 6000x3133 39 B 4 6000x3223A 36 B 5 6000x3284 35 B 2 37 S 2/19 37 S 2/2 9 6000x0429 37 S 2/25 6000x3202 38 B 2 7546x0127 7546xBL679 Other ID Number/coordinates Item Compass Hourglass Hourglass Lead Lead Lead Lead ID ? Lead Lead Lead Lead 7546xBL875 Logline 7546xBL875 Logline ID ? Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant 33 S 8/42 Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Octant Parallel ruler Parallel ruler Parallel ruler 7546xBL315 Parallel ruler 7546xBL365 Parallel ruler Parallel ruler Protractor KRR 83040x11 Protractor Ruler Ruler Ruler Slate Slate Slate pencil Slate pencil Slate pencil Slate pencil Slate pencil Slate pencil Slate pencil Telescope Telescope Telescope Telescope Description Compass Hourglass part Hourglass part Lead Lead Lead Lead Lead Lead Lead Lead Logline part Logline part Octant, broken Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant index shade Octant part Octant, Wellington Octant Octant index shade Octant part Bradford octant Octant index shade Octant index shade Octant index shade Octant index shade Octant index shade Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Octant part Parallel ruler Parallel ruler Parallel ruler Parallel ruler part Parallel ruler part Parallel ruler part Protractor Protractor Ruler part Ruler part Ruler part Slate part Blackboard slate Slate pencil Slate pencils in box Slate pencil Slate pencil Slate pencil, Middleton Slate pencil part Slate pencil Telescope part Telescope Telescope, Cliffe & Co Telescope part 180