Weapons of Mass Destruction: A General Discussion

Obama, B.H. (2009). Address to the Nation on the Way FNard in Afghanistan ard Pakslan. Whitehouse, '1. Office of the Press Secretary Washinglon DC: December Pigott, P (2007). Canada in Afghanistan: The War So Fat Tomto: Dundurn Press. Rrshid, A. (2@1). Taliban: The Story of the Atghan Wulords. London: Pan Macmilhn Publbation. - -. (2OOB). Descent into Chaos: How the War Against lslamicExtremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. London: Penguin Publication. the West. London: Nlen Lile - -. QO-121. Pakistan on the Bink: The Future ot Pakistan, Afghilistan Rath, S.K. (201 1). Pakistan's Double Game: Supporting and Opposing Terrorism. World Afiairs: The Journal '15(2). of lnternational lssues. - -. (201 1 ). The Haqqani Network atld Afghilistan's Future' Asian Conflict Beport. 20, Novembets ild December. Rumsfeld, D. (2001). US Stralegy in Afghilistan, S&ret Cable, Depaftment of Defffice. Washington DC: Department of De{ere, october 30. Saleh, A. (2013). Aeleving Pakistan Could Change. Forcign Policy Magnine.lvlarch-April. Shahzad, S.S. (201 1 ). lnslde the a/ Qaeda and the Taliban London: MacMilhn Publication. Singh, M. & Kazai, H.l2111l. tert of Agr@nlst on Stategic Paftnership betw@n the Republic ot lndia and the lslamic Republic of Afghanistil. Ministry of External Affaire, Government of lndia, New Delhi: October 04. Small, A. (2O12, Octobor 3\. China's Afghan Moment. Foreign Policy Magiljno. Stewart, R. (2013). Trying to do tha lmpossib/e. Foreign Policy Magzine. March-April. Sykes, P (1940). A Hlstory of Alghanistan, Vol.l. London: Macl\'lillan and Co. UN. (2001). Agrement on Provisional Arangemmts in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Pemment Government lnstltutions (Bonn Agrffient), 5/2001/1154, Kabul, December 5. Betrieved lrom http://www.unhcrorg,/retworld/docicy3f48r4754.html. UNAMA. (201 1). Afgrhanistan: Annual Bepott 201O: Protectbn of Civilians in Amed Conflid. UN Missior in Kabul. Retrieved lrom http://unama.unmissions.orgy'Portalsy'UNAlVlA/human%2orightv Mar cha/o2OP oCo/o2OAnn ualo/o20Report%2oFinal pdf . Waldman, M. l2O1O). The Sun in the Sl<y: The Rdationship Between Pakistm's lsl and Paper '18, London: Lffdon School of Economics Publication. Afghil lnsurgqts. Discussion Weinbaum, M. {2003). lntorview to the 9/11 Commission on August 12, 2OO3, Author's Coll*tion. Wright, L, (2OOO). The Looming lower. New York: Vintage Books. yousuf M. and Adkin M. (2OO1). Atghffiistan The Bar Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower New York: Casemate Publication. WEAPOIIS OF MASS DESTRUGTIO]'I: A GEIIERAL DISCUSSIOil Laini Soszynski American Military University, USA Laini Sos4tnski is a Graduate Student from Massachusetts, Unlted Stateg with American Miltary She is studying the United States' lntelligence system with an emphasis on Tenoism Studies and a cerlificate of Middle Eastem Studies. Her areas of interest include jihadist tenorist organizations, weapons of mass destruction, and the psychology of terror groups. Universiy ABSTMCT xEYWonDS Taliban, HaqqaniNetwotk, Atghanistan, NofthenNliance, alMa andTqrorism. to possess of weapons of mass destruction, speciflcally chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, is no secret to the United States or any other nation monitoring certain groups. The potential of WMD procurement and use is based largely on the capabilities and motivations of individual groups. Specific discussion in this paper related to the overall potential of terrorist usage of WMD, the results of a chemical attack on a target population, how and why to protect against agroterrorism, and a threat analysis of a biological WMD attack on the United States. Key Words: WMD, chemical, biological, terrorism, agroterrorism Terrorist's desire Terrorist Potential ofWeapons of Mass Destuction Use Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been a target of interest for terrorist organizations for decades. The ultimate power a terrorist group would achieve from demonstrating its WMD capabilities would earn the group the respect, influence, and projection of power needed to continue its campaign while gaining supporters and destroying target populations. Additionally, WMD capabilities of a terrorist organization would deter oppositional forces from attacking the group because of a fear of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) retaliation. The devastation of chemical weapons was originally demonstrated in the trenches of World War l, with the death of thousands of American soldiers due to the enemy usage of these weapons. The ovenryhelming power of nuclear weapons shook the world after America dropped the two atomic warheads on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945, collectively ending the Second World War. lt is not surprising, with such demonstrations, that terrorist organizations are attempiing to obtain or cultivate such weapons for personal usage. Terrorist groups are likely to use weapons of mass destruction because of the prqection of power that comes wiih WMD possession, as well as the influence perceived by potential supporters, deterrence of enemy attack, and the ability to induce political change while defending religious beliefs. Power projection resulting from WMD use revolves around the psychological disarray, economic devastation, and casualty producing capabilities of such a weapon. Successful employment of a weapon of mass destruction on a target population would likely result in a combination of, or all of these factors. lt is important to note that a WMD attack could elicit such an impact even with a relatively small amount of casualties. Psychological impacts are due largely to the fact that primal instinct is fear of contamination or infection from agents that cannot be seen (McComb, 2013). Such agents could be deployed in biological or chemical weapons, infect only a few individuals, and cause mass panic at the prospect of spreading contamination, lf the terrorist organizatron that is deploying such a weapon only intends to cause psychological damage to a population, the weapon needs not be highly sophisticated, but contain dispersal techniques that would infect a target population. A primary example of such WMD usage would be Aum Shinrikyo's sarin-gas attack in 1995, in which the nerve agent was released in Japanese subways, causing 13 deaths and effecting up to 6,252, successfully obtaining its goal of producing an apocalyptic-like response (Aytac, Kibaroglu, 2009). The group also released thousands of liters of anthrax via aerosol sprays mounted to rooftops in Tokyo. Both attacks resulted in mass panic, psychological damage, and the negative economic impact of decontamination teams, hospitalizations, and stopped transportation. Aum Shinrikyo's attacks demonstrated to the terrorist community that WMD use did not need to be ovenivhelmingly casualty producing to make an impact, and in fact only few people needed to be severely impacted to ensure success of an attack in terms of psychological and economic damage. Other groups, such as al Qaeda, intend to use WMD to rally supporters and defend specific religious and political beliefs. Al Qaeda's motivation for WMD obtainment or procurement is of political retaliation against the West, and the defense of lslam (Stone, 2009). Since 1998, Osama bin Laden, founder of al Qaeda, declared it a religious duty io acquire weapons of mass deslruction, issuing a religious fatwah to the jihadist community in the ensuing years (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). The attacks of September 1 1, 2001, brought to light the seriousness of the terror group's assertion of WMD capability. Reviewing the history of the group, it can be noted that al Qaeda had been active in biological and chemical weapon cultivation, recruiting biologisis and chemists in an effort to develop anthrax and ricin dispersal devices, as well as planning radiological "dirty bomb" plots against the United States throughout the late 1990's and early 2000's (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). After the United States' invasion of Afghanistan in an attempt to oust the tenor group, Osama bin Laden stated to the West that "if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons," a clear deterrence factor for the group's protection (Hamid Mir, 20O1). It is clear that there has been tenorist employment of weapons of mass destruction in the past, and terror groups continue to chase such intentions with the recruitment of specially trained individuals, and attempts to obtain nuclear or radiological material, as well as attempts in various biological and chemical agent productions. The motives of individual terror organizations vary but to each organization, definite and valuable consequences will come of WMD obtainment or use against a target population. Chemical Weapon Etfect on a Target Population Chemical weapons use originated in World War I when chlorine gas was used by German troops against the United States and its allies in 1915, demonstrating the incapacitating nature of the weapons with the death of over 5,000 troops (Hilmas, 2008). ln addition to the incapacitating, casualty producing nature of chemical weapons, there was a significant psychological impact on the troops following the initial dispersal of such weapons. Seeing their comrade fall to the devastating effects of the toxic agent produced fear among the troops that at any moment they, too, could fall to the gas. This caused the defending countries to establish protective measure, such as gasmasks, against the chemical weapons, as well as the production of its own, more volatrle and persistent vesicant that could work beyond such protection. After the war ended, the 1 925 general agreement of the Geneva Convention was established, in which all countries agreed that chemical weapons were inhumane and should not be used (Hilmas 2008). Regardless of this agreement, there are still organizations and nations that utilize chemical weapons, whether conventional or improvised, to increase the amount of casualties, promote panic, and establish a show of force. By looking at historical uses of chemical weapons, the prospective effects of chemical weapon use on a targeted population can be analyzed and predicted. Noteworthy chemical weapon employment has occurred both in tenorist attacks as well as attacks on civilians as directed by leaders such as tho President of Syria, Bashar al Assad, and lraqi President Saddam Hussein. Terrorist organizations operate with little or no regard to moral and legal restrictions, allowing unconstrained attacks to be carried out in the name of their religious beliefs or ideological demand ([ucker, 201 1). Politically motivated terrorist groups such as Aum Shinrikyo of Japan have utilized relatively simple improvised chemical devices in the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the subway in Tokyo, demonstrating the economic and psychological effect of chemical weapon use. Jihadist organizations such as al Qaeda and the lslamic State of lraq and the Levant (also known as lSlS, lSlL, or the lslamic State), have threatened the West with such attacks. To date, al Qaeda has validated its ability to build improvised chemical weapons with the planned attacks on the New York City subway system in 2002, although it was cancelled by al Zawahiri due to the need to focus on "something better" flucker, 201 1). ln the wake of the lslamic State's expansion through Syria and lraq, it has become known that the group has access to chlorine weapons stockpiled in areas that they now occupy. ln the event of such an attack on the United States, as the jihadist groups have threatened, it can be expected that mass chaos, casualties, and economic disaster would occur as a result, similar to the reaction of the Japanese following Aum Shinrikyo's attack (McComb, 201 1). A chemical attack on the United States would likely occur in an enclosed area, allowing the agent Iess area to dissipate following its dispersal. Likely targets could be enclosed sports stadiums, subway cars or stations, airports or airplanes, and other frequently populated areas such as concert halls and convention centers. Depending on the size of the device and the amount and type of chemical agent being dispersed, it could be assumed that nearly all people within the immediate area would become symptomatic, with a percentage of them becoming fatally incapacitated. Following the immediate panic, windows and doors will be opened and the chemical would eventually dissipate. ln the aftermath of the attack, there would be significant chaos, media coverage, panic, and psychological damage as the extent of what had happened is realized. Emergency responders will be tasked to the scene, and hundreds or thousands would swarm hospitals with symptoms of the agent. Following the attack, the building and immediate area would have to be secured and decontaminated, and depending on the venue that was attacked, additional negative economic impact could occur as businesses shut down while the decontamination is in motion (Pangi, 2002). ln comparing the 1995 Japanese sarin gas attacks to a similar attack occuning in New York, the Government Accountability Office estimated approximately $34 billion loss and up to 6,000 fatalities, assuming the gas is dispersed effectively (Enders, Olson, 2010). To ensure the United States population ts prepared for a chemical attack, military law enforcement, hazardous materials teams, first responders, and public health officials are all being trained on the specific actions following a chemical incident. Being able to take previous experiences and apply them to potential targets for terrorism allows the United States the ability to train and prepare, as well as monitor and defend against cefiain chemical attacks. Protecting Against Agrotenorism Agroterrorism is defined as "the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability" (Monke, 2007). The threat of agroterrorism was recently revisited following the attacks of September 1 1, 2001, and is considered a threat to the national security of the country. Attacks on farmers' cattle or crop involves the use of biological agents, such as pathogenic viruses or bacteria, to intentionally contaminate the food sources of the animals, or poison the crops to such an extent that they can no longer be harvested for production. Groups like al Qaeda, with goals that include the ultimate disruption of the American economy, could utilize agroterrorism in different areas simultaneously, which would impact the economic balance of the country as well as the means of livelihood for many, severely. Terrorist organizations could be attracted to agroterrorism because of the economic disaster that would follow the overwhelming destruction of crops and cattle, as well as the relative ease of producing such an aftack due to lacking security of farms and the non-transmittable nature of the pathogen used. Protection against such an attack would improve with increased surveillance of farms, strict sanitation measures, and increased education on foreign diseases and protective measures. The United States maintains an agricultural sector of farms, fishing and forestry food and beverage manufacturing, and leather manufacturing, as the third largest of the economy, producing upwards of $780 billion a year (USDA, 2014). lndustries that success directly correlates to the success of the agricultural sector include transportation, restaurants and entertainment, grocery stores, and animal grain production, to name a few. The economic impact of agrotenorism- or an accident involving the infection of feed or livestock- can be seen in two incidents that had occurred in the 2000's. The United Kingdom's agriculture economy came under attack with a foot-and-mouth epidemic, resulting in $21 billion in losses. Additionally, the Netherlands experienced a bout of contaminated animal feed, generating $t billion in losses (Gyles, 2010), The cost of the clean-up of such an attack would include hazardous material crews, disposal of infected crop or animals, recall of all meat that had been processed through that farm, and potential personnel seeking medical attention for fear of contracting the disease. Vulnerabilities of farms to an agroterrorism attack revolve around the loosely secured nature in which they operate, and the heavily overpopulated environments that the cattle live in throughout their lives. Farms within the United States contain anywhere from 4,000 to 10,000 animals at a time, making is significantly more difficutt to recognize a sick animal that may be transmitting an illness to the other animals at the farm (CIAS, 2014). Farmers' ability to monitor these animals individually is inhibited by the crowded conditions, implying that by the time a farmer recognized an illness in the herd, the disease had likely spread to other animals in the herd. Today, the cattle raised for slaughter generally contain a high amount of hormones and have decreased immune systems, making them highly susceptible to infection. ln the event a farmer does recognize a sick animal, the potential of the disease being foreign to the country is high, considering the prospect of a terrorist causing the infection. Because of this, trained veterinarians lack experience in caring for animals with such diseases, delaying the response to the outbreak and allowing i1 to spread (Monke, 2007). Protective measures could be taken in better securing the farms within the country Due to the need for farms to contain large amounts of land, securing the area can be difficult and expensive. A lack of security measures could facilitate terrorist trespassing and infecting the animal or plant population. Additional preparation was considered in the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002. This act outlined speciflcs of agricultural safety and included protection measures involving the Food and Drug Administration's authority, the tightened control of biological agents and toxins, the expanse ol agricultural security activities and upgrades, and increasing criminal penalties for acts against animal enterprises (P.L. 107-188, 2002). The expanded protective measures revolving around the safety of farming within the United States will make the prospect of an agroterrorism attack less likely; however, the reactiveness of those in immediate care of the animals is the primary method of response and protection. ThreatAssessment Biological Weapon of Mass Destruction Biological weapons have been within the capabilities of lslamic.iihadist groups since before the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Groups like al Qaeda have demonstrated not only the capabilities of manufacturing specific biological pathogens such as anthrax and ricin, but also the ability to recruit those with the expertise needed to aid in further developments of such weapons. This threat assessment will be primarily concerned with al Qaeda and its splinter groups, and the potential of a biological weapon of mass destruction attack on the United States. The assessment will evaluate why the group would chose such an agent, the intent of its use, the capabilities to manufacture or obtain such a weapon, and particular targets that the tenorist group may choose based on the estimated successful dispersal of an agent. Al Qaeda, an lslamic jihadist terrorist organization, focuses its efforts around retaliation against the West because of Notth America and Europe's occupation in the Middle East. Since its establishment by Osama bin Laden in 1988, al Qaeda has been relatively successful in obtaining and cultivating biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 , anthrax letters began circulating throughout the United States, indicating that the tenor group had the capability to manufacture the biological agent. The intention of utilizing such an agent was to parallel iis attempts ol obtaining a nuclear weapon, serving as another means to produce similar mass casualties as its leaders began to accept the difficulties of obtaining nuclear material (Mowatt-Larssen, 201 0). Because of ihe demonstration of the weaponized anthrax via the letters sent post-g/] 1, it can be assumed that al Qaeda understands how to manufacture the pathogen. ln addition to this capability, al Qaeda is successful in recruiting biochemists to aid in their production. ln 2001 , Pakistani humanitarian NGO Unna Tameer e Nau (UTN) offered to construct a biological program for al Qaeda, and furthers this professional capability with the recruitment of Yazid Sufaat, a biochemist, who began instructing at al Qaeda's training camps on how to develop biological weapons (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). Biological labs are easy to conceal and maintain, as seen by the many labs found in Europe in2OO2, furthering their attraction to terrorist cells of ai Qaeda. Pathogens not manufactured by the group can also be obtained during natural outbreaks, such as the recent Ebola outbreak in Africa, making it a low-cost, high-efficiency weapon of choice if weaponzed correctly. Using pathogens such as Ebola or smallpox would allow for a natural spread of the disease once the initial infection phase has been completed, ensuring a widespread panic and economic impact as people flood hospitals with symptoms- or imagined symptoms- of the disease. This natural spread of the pathogen elicits more attraction for i1s weaponized use. Based on an assumed intent of the terrorist group, targets of a biological attack would likely be highly populated areas within an enclosed space. Due to the political nature of al Qaeda, government targets could be expected, or conventions, rallies, sports events, schools, or governmental capitals. On the other side of the spectrum, targets could include heavy economic impactors such as airports and other forms of transportation. Methods of dispersal would revolve around the type of pathogen utilized and the target population. Aerosol sprayers, glass vials, or other inconspicuous means of dispersal would allow for maximum personnel infected. Choosing agents such as smallpox, which has a two week incubation period, followed by a two-week symptomatic and contagious period, would allow for those infected spreading the disease to a significant amount of people as they go about their daily lives for that two week period (Cary, 2009). Based on the motives of al Qaeda- retaliation against the West, mass casualties, and a significant economic and political impact- it can be expected that a biological weapon attack will be attempted at some point in the future. The group would likely use agents with a high contagion potential, dispersed in an enclosed area of frequent travel or high political profile of its occupants. Because the group has demonstrated its biological capabilities in the past, and it continues its training, recruitment, and purchase of biological materials and manufacturing, the current status of a biological weapons program is likely still active. Defensive means can be taken in reference to detection capabilities, security measures, and proactive reporting of symptomatic citizens. REFERENCES Cary Scott. 2009. "The Tipping Point: Biological Terrcrism.' JNIEI of Stratqic Seunty. Vol. 2, No. 3. Septemben Access€d April 1 8, 201 5. Aytac, O., Kibaoglu, M. 2009. "Defenc6 against woapons of mass d€struction and t6rrorism." Amslerdam, Nethorlmdsr /OS Press. Accessod April 18, 2015. CEnter for lntegrated Agricultural Systems. 2014. "Largp-scale pastured poltry farmjng in the U.S." January. Accessed April 18, 2015. htlp://M.cias.wisc.edu/large-scale-pastured-poultryJaming-in-the- uY ad Eric Olson. 2010.'lvmsuring the Economic Costs olTerorism." Departmsnt of EconomiG Finace and Legal Studies. University ofAlabama. Accsssed April 15, 2015. Gyf€s, Cartlon. "Agrcterorism." Ths Canadlan Vetsinary Joumal 5'1.4 (2010): 347-348. Print. Accessed April 15,2015. Hamid Mir, 'OsarE Claims He Has Nukes: lf US uses N-ams it will get ffie respons," Dawn, November 10, 2001, Shaba'an 23, '1422. Accessed April 15, 2015. http://w.dawn. com/2oo1l1 1/1o/topl.htm. Hilmas, C., Smart, J., Hill, B. 2008. "History of chemical warfare." Lenhart, K. Ed. Washinglm, DC; Government Printing Offica, Btrdan lnstitute. Accesed Apd 16,2015. Mcoomb, Jonathan M. 2O13. "Closing Pmdora's Box: TfE Thr@t o, Tmrist Usa oI Wepon of l\rass Destruction." Global Security Studies 4, no. 1:71-92. lnternational S*urity & Counts Tffiorism Enders, Walter Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed March '1 4, 2O1 5). Monke. Jim. 2007. 'Agroterrorism: Thrffits and Preparedness." CRS Report for Congress. Resources, Science, and lndustry Divisim. Accessed April 18, 2015. Mowatt-Larssen, Roff. 2010. 'Al Oaeda Weapms oI Mass Destructim Throat: Hype or B6ality?" Harvard Kennedy School, Belfs C€nter for Science and lnternalional Affairs. Accesed April 19, 2015. Pangi, Robyn. 2002. "Consequenco l\ranagement in the 1995 Sein Attacks on the Japanese Subway System." B€ller Center for Scitrce and lntemationalAffaire. Amessed April 18, 2015. Stone, John. 2009. "Al Oaeda, Deterrence, and Weapons of Mffi Destruction." Studies ln Conflict & Terorism 32, no. 9: 763-775. lnternalioml S&urity & Counter Terroism Reference Centet, EBSCOhost (accessed March 14, 201 5). United States Departmant ofAgricuhure. 2014. "AG and Food Smtors and th6 Economy." Novembel Accffised April 17, 2015. http://w.em.usda.gov/data-poducts/ag-md{ood-statisticscharting-the-essentialvag-and-lood-setors-and-the-@onomy.aspx