Power Transition as a Cause of Conflict

Power Transition as a Cause of Conflict By Scofield Yoni Muliru To what extent can one claim that changes or likely changes in the power capabilities of states is the principle cause of international conflict? Abstract This paper looks at whether power transitions are the principle causes of conflict. I use the power transition theory to balance my argument from the point of measuring how true the ingredients of status quo challenge and parity leading to transition in power may lead to war. I use the examples of china and the United States as these have been the most likely candidates of this theory. This theory as seen by scholars, has been used to explain history as seen by scholars after the world wars. In the second part of the paper, I make ten conclusions challenging the premise of the theory and its causal relationships to conflict and war. Some of the proposals are based on the biased application of the theory, presence of peaceful transitions, the divergent wars of conflicts by hegemons, the cost benefit analysis of conflict and war to states and finally the obsolesce of major war as one scholar depict. My argument is that power transitions are not the principle causes of international conflict but they can trigger international conflict and wars. Throughout history, arguments have been made of various nations being formed or destroyed through the process of transfer of power. In fact, the discussion of conflict and presence of war has been attributed to the fact that transition of power creates more challenges that good. Most events have become part of history as a result of the war that followed the transition. The rising powers 1|Page have often come into armed conflict with dominant powers. As an example and for most of the years since World War II the international system had been characterized by ideological rivalry, bipolarity, and a peace among major powers supposedly imposed by the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons and any challenge to this superiority was seen as a probable transition of power that could lead to conflict. Analysts have offered contradictory explanations of these changes, as well as a range of expectations about the future. Some suggest that the current course of international relations is strongly conducive to peace and tranquility, while others claim that an increasing frequency and severity of war is to be expected on the basis of the power transition theory. This debate has gained mileage especially after the end of the cold war as there has been a longer period of peace with one hegemon at the top of the international system. It must be noted however, that the end of the Cold War has created reasons for celebration as well as concern. It is incorrect to suggest, as Fukuyama does, that history is at an end.1 The end of the Cold War did not represent the peaceful acceptance of a capitalist-liberal international order. Nor is it impossible for new challenges to the international order to emerge. The recent power struggles, analysis, rise and decline of nations can be seen as a cause of concern and a prediction to the future. Today there are discussions of the challenge to the hegemon in the international system, from other rising states and the impacts this may have in the long run. The enormous economic success of certain powers, most notably China, India and Brazil, has led to a tilted the debate towards eventual power change or power transition at the top of the international create more shivers that happiness in the face of globalization.2 We live in a word of power transition today and there are various examples to illustrate this fact. Some of these examples is the need to expand the G8 to the G22, the discussion about a reform of the United Nations Security Council to include the interests and global representation as pushed by Africa, the growing literature about the decline of the United States, the increased research interest in the BRIC countries, the talk about Chimerica and Chindia and in general the emergence and rise of new powers all point in this direction. 3 I will use power transition theory to argue that the transition of power always leads to war or the prediction of 1 Francis Fukuyama (2006) Leslie Elliot etal (2014) 3 ibid 2 2|Page instability based on a couple of factors. I will use regional examples and crown the discussion on the debate of China and the United States that has taken more prominence in the recent past. Power transition theory, as originally established by A.F.K Organski.4 Various Authors have made reference to this theory and used it in the definition and predictions for the future. One author mentions that the fundamental cause of wars among states and change in international systems is the uneven growth of power between states.5 Of worth noting is the fact that rising powers drive conflict because the rising power usually does not favor the status quo and attacks the dominant power as part of changing it. The argument here is also based on the fact that since the dominant power organizes the international system in its favor, then the rising power will always be at a disadvantage and in conflict to go against the set system. If indeed a power transition, prolonged parity or at least massive disruptions of power are on their way, then we are entering risky times. The danger is most pressing when a position change takes place as is currently being predicted in the case of US and China and also the pressures caused by the BRIC nations. Power transition theory predicts a situation of war when the rising nation challenges the norms established by the hegemon in the international system and achieves parity to the other. This willingness is commonly understood in terms of satisfaction with the status quo of the international order, or more precisely a lack thereof. A power that is overtaking the former dominant power, or is finding itself in a prolonged period of parity with that power is likely to initiate a war only when it is dissatisfied with this status quo. A description of the international status quo since World War II would focus on the United Nations and its democratic underpinnings, the market-economy orientation of international financial institutions, and the generally defensive objectives of international military organizations. As a democratic, market-oriented country, the United States as the dominant state, established these patterns of interaction in accord with its preferences. Additionally, power transition theory holds that the internal growth of a country determines its power.6 Since growth rates differ across countries, relative power is constantly changing. 4 A.F.K Organski (1968) A.F.K Organski & Jacek Kugler (1980) 6 Douglas Lemke (1997) 5 3|Page Occasionally one country grows so much that it achieves power parity with the international system's dominant state. If the newly rising country is dissatisfied with the international status quo, it will demand changes which will likely be resisted by the dominant state. At a systemic level, the distribution of power is spread unevenly across the world, and is thus uneven between states in any given region. Power transition theory has been used to better understand power dynamics and the likelihood of war in a specific region or internationally. Power transition theory requires a quantifiable definition of power itself to be useful in application to real world cases. In simpler terms, this theory explains the ability of a state to impose on or persuade another state to comply with its will though power transition. Power is achieved through the combination of a state’s population, this population’s economic productivity, and the ability of its government to mobilize the former two effectively and efficiently. Each of these three components is necessary for a state to reach great power status, and therefore, potentially challenge the dominant power. China is seen as a threat to the United States because it seems to be fulfilling all these qualities mentioned. The combination of power parity between challenger and dominant state combined with the challenger's negative evaluation of the status quo provides the necessary condition for war. This war is fought for control of the 'rules of the game', or status quo, of the international system, with the expectation that victory by the challenger will be followed by a restructuring of international diplomatic, economic, and military relations. However, so long as the dominant country is preponderant the Great Power system is at peace. Only when a dissatisfied challenger rises to parity is war among the most powerful countries anticipated by power transition theory. Because the theory suggests that parity and the challenger's dissatisfaction are jointly necessary for war, a weak dissatisfied challenger is not to be feared. Since the end of the Cold War, the debate about the future of Asian security relations has been dominated by the question of a possible armed conflict between the United States and a rising China. Those who raise the prospect of war almost always explicitly or implicitly invoke variants 4|Page of power transition theory to justify their pessimism. Former Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk summed up this perspective: ‘History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.’7 The power transition theory adds that the end of the Cold War provides reason to celebrate, similar to the optimists, but also suggests areas of grave caution and concern requiring attention much like the arguments of the pessimists. Recall that the twin components of power transition theory are relative power differentials and evaluations of the international status quo. Soviet decline means the disappearance of the main competitor to US leadership. This has immediate consequences for expectations about war between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. This has long-term consequences for expectations about war between the United States and a resurgent Russia. Whether China’s rise will be peaceful or violent is a question that animates scholars and statesmen alike. Within the study of international relations, however, competing theoretical perspectives offer different answers to this important question. Scholars who examine the consequences of China’s rise through the lens of power transition theory predict a future of conflict. In reiteration of the variants of power transition theory, conflict is most likely when a rising power, dissatisfied with the status quo, approaches parity with the dominant state in a region or the system and is willing to use force to reshape the system’s rules and institutions. China arguably is not, despite recent experiments with limited economic liberalization, a member of the satisfied coalition of states. Recent Chinese growth rates are very impressive, and suggest that a potential transition to parity between China and the United States within the next few decades is possible. Should such a transition occur without any change in Chinese evaluations of the status quo, war is expected based on power transition theory. Thus, this pacific Great Power prediction of the future of the post-Cold War world is contingent on Chinese growth and attitudes toward the international system's status quo. Therefore, Chinese growth represents only one potential threat to continued Great Power peace, although arguably this is the most realistic threat. 7 Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino (2009) 5|Page Using the power transition theory argument, we look at Europe as another case. Although satisfied today a united Europe would possess the capacity to challenge the United States. Such a contingency assumes dramatic changes in the international order, changes for which no ready explanation comes because it suggests there will never again be a world war. However, such deterrence arguments are based on the assumption that high costs deter conflict. Similarly, a dissatisfied Japan might rise to a position from which it could initiate a war in an attempt to change the status quo. This assumes Japanese growth or US decline that is perhaps not reasonably expected, and also assumes that Japan's current evaluation of the status quo will change.8 In the long term other actors, perhaps India, might rise in power and desire changes that might necessitate war. One might be tempted to argue that all of these scenarios are hopelessly unrealistic due to the presence of nuclear weapons. Surely any dissatisfied challenger contemplating world war with the United States must realize that such a conflict involves a high probability of nuclear escalation and that this potential eliminates the gains that might be achieved by fighting.9 Back at home, Africa’s problems can also be explained with the theory of power transition. The expectations on the continent and around the world were high, as leaders hoped that sub-Saharan African states would “take off” both politically and economically to become viable, independent actors in the world community. However, most independent African states struggled almost immediately under the weight of protracted political and economic crises. Africa’s “first wave” of democratization quickly morphed into a wave of autocracy as African militaries seized power in the mid-1960s, and multiparty systems gave way to authoritarian, one-party regimes. Economic stagnation had set in by the early 1980s, and African states became increasingly dependent on international development assistance, thereby incurring enormous debts. Then, after the end of the Cold war, western powers began to make their aid to Africa conditional on the pursuit of good governance and democratization and this made the African states comply to the will of the specific supporting nation in the form of post-colonialism that has scared the continent to date. In the early 1990s, Africa entered a “second wave” of democratization as autocratic regimes gave way to new, more democratic constitutions and multiparty systems.10 Given Africa’s crisis-prone transition 8 Douglas Lemke (1997) ibid 10 Edmond J. Keller (2007) 9 6|Page from colonialism to independence and power being held at post-independence by external interests, there is still a prediction of war in the future as a result of the current power transition. Some African countries like South Africa and Nigeria, have joined the first growing nations in the world and this is set to change the position of Africa in the international system. The rise of some African states and the need to break away from their colonial systems through capture and management of their resources especially in the case of the natural resources, has led to was at a regional level of power transition. This has further been exacerbated with the quest for power through revision of the permanent membership to the UN Security Council. Through the transition of power is not to the level of parity with the other hegemons in the world, the challenge that African countries is offering to the world system is likely to cause conflict in the region and internationally. In conclusion, I argue that power transition theory is an especially useful tool that can be used to understand the past, interpret the present, and predict the future in the causal relationship between conflict and transition of power. However, we should also agree to the fact that Organski takes note of that this opportunity is not automatically realized.11 We need to identify that the probability of war is also dependent of the friendship between the states and the social, political as well as material.12 This explains the reason why some states will go to war when that parity is seemingly reached and others don’t. In addition, due to these relationships, states also consider the what they 11 12 Lemke and Kugler 1996 Ronald Tammen 2008 7|Page will be losing if they decide to go to war rather than manage their conflict in an amicable manner. This leads to the other side of transition of power that looks at the process of peaceful transition. While the theory has mainly been used by its proponents to explain the outbreaks of war, based on the arguments above, it can be used in cases leading to peaceful transitions. This argument does not water down the basis of the theory but looks at the categories of things that need to be met for the theory to predict war or instability. Satisfied states are pacific states to whom the rules of realist power politics do not apply. We should also note that some transitions have been peaceful, such as the one between the United States and the United Kingdom in the late nineteenth century. 13 However, power transition theory has no deductively consistent theory of war initiation. In consequence, the theory remains less than precise, perhaps even inconsistent, about the circumstances under which major power wars occur. Secondly, major wars in history typically stem from third-party conflicts that escalate and engulf the two most powerful states rather than from head-on confrontations between them as suggested by the power-transition theory. I would also like to state that a common awareness by all parties about the constraints imposed by the others’ domestic politics and realistic policy adjustment in view of these constraints. Although the danger of escalation cannot be overlooked, the parties have also seemed to become increasingly adroit in their communication and coordination to avoid a breakdown of relationship. In addition, standard U.S. analyses, especially those coming from the China threat school, tend to assume that as China becomes stronger, it would adopt a more active and confrontational posture in opposing U.S. interests and resisting American domination. Beijing may decide to deflecting direct U.S. pressure and avoiding a head on collision.14 Evasion, entrapment, and even engagement are hypothesized to represent the more salient aspects of Beijing’s efforts to cope with U.S. hegemony. Based on this argument, the Chinese leaders will not behave in the fashion of a cocky, rash upstart portrayed in some discussions of power transition. 13 14 Ronald Tammen etal (2000) Reinhard Wolf (2004) 8|Page Third, given the prevailing view that international instability originates from a rising, revisionist state, it is unsurprising that much of the discourse in current U.S. commentaries emphasizes efforts either to check China’s power ascent or to reform its regime and society. The proponents of containment appear to face several constraining considerations. Domestic factors tend to be more important sources of national growth than external factors. Moreover, states previously defeated in a war are usually able to resume their prewar growth trajectory in a reasonably short time. In addition, the neighbors of a rising state do not typically form a coalition in order to balance it. This coalition usually results from repeated aggression by a state whose pattern of behavior leaves its neighbors no option but to fight back, or when such behavior exacerbates these neighbors’ security concerns to such an extent that they are energized to abandon their neutrality.15 As for the proponents of engagement, their logic is often based on the hope of influencing a target regime’s values and interests, or to create points of bargaining leverage in order to obtain political compliance or conformity. Forth, satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the world system should be linked more specifically to the benefits a state is receiving from the international system. A state may be dissatisfied with its pay-off under the current system without necessarily raising fundamental objections to its rules. Thus, the idea of anti-status-quo orientation should not be conflated. Power-transition theory proposes that when a dissatisfied state is poised to overtake the hegemon, the danger of systemic war heightens. On the flip side however, the combination of dissatisfaction and rising power is not the basic cause for war. Rather, wars will not pay for any state unless it expects to improve its current benefits from the system. Conflict progressing to war is a cost benefit analysis for any state and not necessarily a direct relationship as power transition theory dictates. Whether or not this expectation is warranted depends on the extent to which its current benefits are less than what its current power assets would entitle it to. The greater this discrepancy, the more a state can expect to gain from going to war. This is clear in the implications including the application of appeasement by a declining hegemon and the decision by a surging latecomer to defer the full adjustment of its benefit share.16 15 16 Steve Chan (2008) Steve Chan (2008) 9|Page Even with more historical cases that can attribute their wars to the power transition theory, there are several other historical cases that show how structural conditions influenced a declining state’s decision to wage a preventive war or, alternatively, to seek accommodation and retrenchment. The historical circumstances surrounding these different responses to relative decline point to the influence of structural conditions in shaping policy choices. Power transitions therefore do not always end in conflict and war. Fifth, whether these processes turn out to be peaceful or violent, however, does not appear to be related to the nature of the overtaking regime or the one being overtaken. Contrary to popular expectation, an authoritarian regime does not necessarily resort to war when faced with the prospect or reality of facing a sharp demotion in its international status. Conversely, even in the absence of an ongoing or impending positional reversal working to its disadvantage, a democracy can attack a weaker adversary by recourse to the logic of preventive war.17 Power-transition theory suggests that wars are caused by a rising latecomer’s challenge to the existing hegemon in a bid to capture the latter’s pre-eminent position in the international system. It seems that a rational challenger would want to postpone such a confrontation in the hope that it will become stronger over time. It may even be able to achieve hegemony without having to incur the costs of waging a war if the earliest world leader accepts its inevitable decline. In contrast to this putative challenger, a hegemon in relative decline would have an incentive to start a preventive war. Assuming that the challenger’s hostility is unalterable and expecting that its own position will suffer a deep and irreversible setback, the dominant but declining power should prefer to fight an earlier rather than a later war. This state’s relative power will only deteriorate further if it postpones an inevitable showdown with the upstart. Seventh, my logic of argument posit that wars tend to be started by a declining but still stronger hegemon, and not by a rising challenger. This attribution is controversial because it reassigns the source of instability from the latecomer to the dominant power. It certainly contradicts the prevailing view that systemic war is more likely to originate from the former than from the latter. This prevailing view therefore departs from rationalist 17 ibid 10 | P a g e explanations of war, and it also contradicts what we know about how people respond to prospective gains and losses in their personal lives.18 Eighth; just as important as the need to be explicit about the nature of national power to be used for monitoring any approaching power transition, one would want to know the identity of those states whose changing status is supposed to affect global peace and stability. Changes involving the relative positions of minor states would not presumably precipitate a transformation of the entire international system. The original formulation of the power-transition theory addresses the relative positions of the world’s two most powerful states or, at most, those three states that are designated as the main contenders in the central system of international relations. It is for this reason that I earlier used the same theory to explain the happenings of the regional issues in Africa. It seems, however, a little odd for this formulation to deny this status to the U.S. before 1945, as Washington’s entry to both World Wars was arguably the most important determinant of these conflicts’ eventual outcome. Indeed, by the 1870s the U.S. had already overtaken the U.K. as the world’s largest economy and the home for its most dynamic industries.19 If the theory’s domain is extended to address the upward or downward mobility of the lesser great powers, I would then have to account for Russia’s economy being recently overtaken by those of Japan, Germany, and China without engendering any threat of a war occurring between these pairs of countries. I would also infer that power transition theory is biased in application and that some power transitions like the Anglo-German case are more dangerous for the world’s peace and stability than the AngloAmerican case. In delving deeper into the propositions of the status quo as a factor of action on the power transition theory, questions are raised on the appropriate indicators for status-quo orientation and democratic governance and how one distinguishes a status-quo power from a revisionist power. These are other terms that come into play when looking on the viability of the theory to predict conflict and war as a result of power transition. Even further, more questions are raised on when the democratic 18 19 Steve Chan (2008) ibid 11 | P a g e nature of an upstart regime supposed to preserve peace, and when is it likely to precipitate war. Ninth, the logic of power transition may be influenced by political and ideational motivations that are not ingredients for conflict. Besides looking for indicators showing the extent to which a country is in or out of step with the international community and the extent to which it is committed to multilateral diplomacy and global norms, there is a difference on how people in different countries perceive the threat to world peace. Whereas it is typically taken for granted in standard American scholarship that the U.S. is a satisfied power committed to the existing international order and the stability of the international system, this view is not supported by the available empirical evidence or by the perceptions of people living in other countries. Rather than seeing China and even the so-called rogue states like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the principal threat to world peace, the public in even those European states traditionally friendly to the U.S. tends to locate the source of this danger in Washington. Finally, the cold war was seen as one of the largest power transition that left the US as the hegemon in the international system. The post-Cold War world as representing a radical departure from the past. With the end of the Cold War a sea-change in international behavior has occurred, the like of which is unprecedented in history. Scholars argue that the world can now be divided into 'zones of peace' and 'zones of turmoil'.20 The former comprise advanced, developed democracies like the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, while the rest of the world falls into the latter type. Within the zones of peace, war is now impossible because democracies do not fight each other. Further, developed states have a preponderance of power and thus need not fear attack from the zones of turmoil. In addition, based 'obsolescence of major war' argument,’ after World War I a dramatic change of opinion about the value of war took place in the developed world.21 Where previously war had been viewed as a necessary evil at worst or as a heroic institution developing men's characters at best, by 1919 it was viewed pretty uniformly as a barbaric, outdated and inefficient way of dealing with conflicts of interest. Evidence is offered by the development of anti-war movements, as well as the subsequent statements and actions of international decisionmakers. Now that the developed world has learned the truth about war, major war is obsolete. As 20 21 Max Singer & Aron Wildavsky (1993) John Mueller (1989) 12 | P a g e soon as the developing world learns this lesson as well, war will be obsolete altogether. This is the final hammer on the nail of the argument that power transitions do not necessarily lead to conflict or war. 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