SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRAETORIAN GUARD
This paper is concerned principally with two questions: first, the
numerical strength of the praetorian cohorts in the second and
third centuries and, second, the length of· service for guardsmen in
the third century. The first question was discussed in 1938 by M. Durry
whose conclusions have been widely, but not universally, accepted as
the standard guide. The aim of Part I of this paper is to challenge
his enumeration and to suggest an alternative. Part II requires no
comment at this juncture.
Part I.
Two literary references give us evidence for the strength of the
early Guard. Both refer to the situation in the first century although
written much later. From Tacitus we learn that Augustus kept 9 cohorts
of praetorians and, later, that Vitellius formed a new Guard of
16 cohorts, each 1000 strong 1 . Corroboration of this figure is apparently provided by Cassius Dio who informs us that Augustus had
l 0,000 praetorians in 10 divisions 2 . Epigraphic evidence confirms that
the Guard was raised from 9 to 12 cohorts by Gaius or Claudius 3 •
Both this and the subsequent Vitellian increase were abandoned by
Vespasian who reverted to 9 cohorts 4 • Domitian subsequently added
one 5 , setting 10 as the figure for the remainder of the Guard's
history 6 . We know, therefore, that Dio was mistaken regarding the
number of cohorts in the Augustan period; was he also wrong
regarding their effective? Durry believed so, claiming that Dio had
attributed to an earlier period the situation before his own eyes in
the early third century A.D. 7 . This is a scarcely credible accident.
The change in effective which Durry adduces had only occurred in
Tac., Ann. IV 5 and Hist. II 93.
Dio LVI 24.6.
' CIL VI 2762-5; V 2513; III 4838 (coh. Xl); V 7003; 7162; 7258; VI 2766-8
(coh. XII). Coh. X inscriptions are confused with those of the later cohors X.
4 CIL XVI 21 (A.D. 76): in cohortibus novem praetoriis.
5 M. DURRY, Les cohortes pri!toriennes, Paris 1938, p. 81.
6 CIL XVI 81 (A.D. 89/134), 98 (150), 135 (208), 155 (254) and 156 (298): in
cohortibus decem.
7 Op. cit., p. 86.
1
2
276
D.L. KENNEDY
PRAETORIAN GUARD
the later years of the second century A.D. 8 when Dio was not only
at Rome, but a senator, and well-placed to know the facts 9 . It is
more likely that Dio, knowing at first hand of the Severan change,
attributed the Antonine situation, well-known to him, to the Augustan
period in origin. Durry believed Dio's effective wrong, but had to
re-interpret Tacitus, too, in order to support his beliefs 10 . The statement
of Tacitus is re-emphasized to read as «non seulement on enrolait
seize cohortes pretoriennes et quatre urbaines, mais encore chacune
devait avoir 1000 hommes » 11 . He therefore concludes cohortes quingenariae in the Julio-Claudian period as the alternative to the new
milliary cohorts of Vitellius. I will return to this point below. The
important point to note now is that by far the likeliest explanation
of Dio is that he was reporting the Guard as it was during his
own early life under the Antonine emperors: ten cohorts, each of
milliary strength.
Durry's interpretation of the literary evidence substantiated his
conclusion about the effective based on the laterculi praetorianorum.
From these he concluded that praetorian cohorts were quingenaria
until 193 A.D., at which time they were raised to milliary strength 12 .
Passerini was unconvinced by Durry's thesis, but his own arguments
have generally been found unconvincing 13 • The most recent statement
on the effective is that by Neumann, who notes the conclusions of
both Durry and Domaszewski 14 in favour of 1000 until Severns and
1500 thereafter 15 .
In order to disentangle the conflicting opinions and the general
uncertainty on the matter, it is necessary to examine the evidence
Below, App. I for possible new dating of the Guard increase.
Dio LXXV 1.4 and 2.4-5.
10 Op. cit., p. 82.
11 Tac., Hist. II 93.
12 Op. cit., p. 84-9. Durry continued to back this conclusion in RE XXII 2 (1954),
col. 1607ff.
13 A. PASSERINI, Le coortie pretorie, Roma 1939, p. 58-67. R.E. SMITH, The Army
Reforms of Septimius Severus, Historia 21 (1972), p. 488 and note, accepts it while
E. BIRLEY, Septimius Severus and the Roman Army, Epigraphische Studien 8 (1969),
p. 64, follows more hesitantly. On the other hand, G. WATSON, The Roman Soldier,
Bristol 1969, p. 16ff., believes in quingenary cohorts, but says that, after Domitian,
«there was no significant change in establishment until ... A.D. 312».
14 Die Rangordnung des romischen Heeres, 2nd edition by B. DossoN, Koln-Graz
1967, p. ix and 20.
15 Der Kleine Pauly 4 (1972), col. l l 16f.
277
adduced by Durry for his conclusions. From the laterculi praetorianorum, Durry calculated that an average of 5 men per century were
discharged each year in the Antonine period and 11 in the Severan
period. By a simple calculation the cohorts were, therefore, quingenary
(5 men x 6 centuries x 16 years service fin an ideal situation l/16th of
the Guard would retire annually)) = 480) and milliary (11 x 6 x 16 =
1056), 'fluctuations' accounting for the imprecision. Before looking
at the individual figures and the premises on which the calculations
are based, it is worth examining the nature of the 'fluctuations'.
It is clear that if ea. 30 men are discharged from each cohort annually,
at least that many, on average, must be enlisted annually to keep
the effective static. The problem is, how many recruits were required
in order for ea. 30 to survive their service for discharge? The question
of mortality rates is a difficult one. We do have some evidence for
calculating mortality rates in the legions and among civilian populations, which may be used as a guide.
Seven dedications to the emperor by the newly discharged soldiers
of individual legions are extant. As far as can be deduced from these
rather less than half the recruits to the legions survived to セ@
discharged 25/6 years later 16 . How can this be applied to the Guard?
First, it should be borne in mind that by virtue of their situation
on the frontiers, the legions would be in action more often and far
sooner than the Guard, which usually only accompanied the emperor
or a member of the imperial family to war 17 . Against this, however,
we may set the clear evidence that the auxilia bore the brunt of minor
campaigns and, perhaps, even of wars 18 . In addition, the Guard was
stationed in Rome which, by all accounts, was an unhealthy city 19 .
8
9
16
J.F. GILLIAM, The Veterans and Praefectus Castrorum of the II Traiana in
157, AJPh 77 (1956), p. 359 n. 3 for a summary of the conclusions.
18 E.g. Tac.,.Ann. I 24; D10 LXXIX 23; 37.4; Herodian VII 11.2 and VIII 5.9.
Tac., Agne. 35 tells us that the auxilia were placed in the front line with
the legions in reserve, « ... victory would be vastly more glorious if it cost no Roman
blood». In the event the battle was won without the legions being engaged. The
auxzlw were more easily recruited and less costly than the citizen legions whose
fortresses were often far behind the limes, where no river formed the frontier.
19
Juvenal, Sat. III for fires, 'muggings', collapsing buildings, poor quality accomodat10n and tension among the inhabitants. Tac., Ann. XV 38-44 for the Neronian
fire. Livy XXXV 9.2-3, XL 28.4 for Tiber flooding. Tac., Hist. II 93 for unhealthiness.
The flooding of the river itself and the narrow winding streets of much of Rome
were sources of disease; plague was by no means uncommon (J.F. GILLIAM, The
Plague under Marcus Aurelius, AJPh 82, 1961, p. 225-251).
aNセ[@
278
D.L. KENNEDY
PRAETORIAN GUARD
Despite the many problems in method and interpretation, the rate
of mortality among civilian populations, discussed below, seems clearly,
as one would have expected, to have been rather higher at Rome
than anywhere else investigated. It should also be borne in mind
that some emperors of the second century, like their third-century
successors, were often absent from Rome on campaign or touring;
elements, at least, of the Guard would accompany them 20 • It would
not be unreasonable, therefore, to assume that life-expectancy in
the Guard was little superior to that in the legions. The difference
in length of service would be, to some extent, negated by earlier
recruitment for the legions (and hence a shorter life-expectancy) and
by .their more active life 21 .
A number of investigations have been made over the last fifty years
into the questions of life-expectancy and mortality in the ancient
world. The most popular method has been via the ages at death
given on epitaphs from various parts of the Empire. Various other
approaches have been attempted: through census data from Egypt
and through physical anthropological studies - determination of
the age at death of the skeletons in burial grounds 2 2 .
There are a great many problems associated with each of these
methods which appear to be insuperable - infant mortality, mortality
among the aged, and the class and status of those commemorated 23 .
The caveats raised by Hopkins and Kajanto 24 do not apply with
the same force to the figures for the younger adult male population.
Since we are dealing here with soldiers who die in service, we may
assume that, given the availability of the corpse, each man was likely
to receive an epitaph from friends/relatives or comanipuli regardless
of wealth or status 2 5 . We can therefore examine the tables prepared
by demographers for information on life-expectancy within the age
brackets which concern us.
Both Hopkins and Kajanto have criticised the tables prepared by
Burns, and both have serious reservations about the value of epitaphic
evidence as a basis for calculating mortality rates. For my purposes
here, they are quoted rather to show trends and for the purposes
of comparison than as reliable absolute statistics. It can be readily
seen from the tables that, first, life-expectancy in Rome was rather
less than in the provinces and approaches closest to that for the
military on the Danube. Second, in the approximate age brackets
within which most praetorians served their contract, over 50 % of
20 E.g. Dio LXXVI 6.6 for the Guard at the battle of Lugdunum. Herodian
VII 11.2, VIII 5.9, for the bulk of the praetorians with Maximinus. Dio LXXIX 23.2
for praetorians with Julia Domna at Antioch; LXXIX 37.4 with Macrinus in Syria.
21 As the imperial guard and an elite force, recruits to it would be men of good
physique and health and thus, almost certainly, young adults. Durry believed that
recruitment to the Guard was from men who had served their tiro stage elsewhere,
«C'est it dater de Trajan que le passage des cohortes urbaines dans les pretoriennes.
sans doute apres trois ans de service, devient la regle ... » (op. cit., p. 245). What
appears to be the principal evidence for this belief is given later in a quotation from
Dositheus: Petente quodam ut militaret, Hadrianus dixit: 'Ubi vis militare?' Illo dicente,
'in praetorio', Hadrianus interrogavit: 'Interim in urbana militia, et si bonus miles Jueris,
tertio stipendio poteris in praetorium transire'. (Sent. Hadr. 2). I have been able to
find little to support the belief in such service being common, never mind the rule.
Durry notes (op. cit., p. 245 n. 3) C!L X 3733; IX 5839 (and 5840) and 5650 as
examples. I have been unable to find any others. On balance, it seems most likely
that, while such transfers were possible, they were rewards and that the point to
be gained from Dositheus was that young, physically immature men were not accepted
for the Guard.
An examination of the 172 praetorians who died in service and whose epitaphs
record their length of service and age at death, allowed the approximate age of
recruitment to be calculated. This can be tabulated as follows.
Number of recruits.
Deduced age of
Average length of
enlistment.
service.
20
18
7.6
121
18-22
8.6
22
23-27
9.7
11
28-32
9.9
Even allowing for the smaller number of examples in the final age group, it can
be seen that, up to a certain point, the older a recruit was at enlistment, the more
chance their was of him surviving to complete his service. In other words, younger
men were less likely to complete their service than those enlisting at a greater age.
279
22 For a concise and very useful recent summary of all these methods, see A.E. SAMUEL
et al., Death and Taxes: Ostraka in the Royal Ontario Museum (American Studies in
Papyrology, 10), Toronto 1971, p. 5-17.
23 Ibid., p. 5-17. I. KAJANTO, On the Average Duration of Life in the Roman Empire,
Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Series B, 153.2 (1968), p. 1-30. Kajanto
concludes that epitaphs do not allow us to calculate life, expectancy since most
reflect the lower middle classes and exclude the masses too poor to afford an epitaph,
and that life-expectancy was much the same throughout the Empire. Cf. HOPKINS,
On the Probable Age Structure of the Roman Population, Population Studies 20 (19661967), p. 263-264, who concludes that life-expectancy at birth in the Empire must
have been at least 20 (to avoid difficulties in population replacement in a static
population) and probably under 30 (to conform to standards in other pre-industrial
societies).
24 HOPKINS, op. cit., p. 263f. See previous note.
25 The reference in P. Gen. Lat. I to a pay stoppage as 'ad signa' has been taken
to refer to a payment to a burial club. Although Mommsen disputed this, there can
be no doubt about the use of the saccus undecimus as a fund for burial (Vegetius II 20).
281
D.L. KENNEDY
PRAETORIAN GUARD
one group of civilians in Rome, who had reached the age of 20,
died before the age of 35; while over 1/3 of European provincials,
reaching the age of 17, died before the age of 37. Despite the caveats
raised regarding the figures, the conclusions may be regarded as
approximately reflecting the pattern of mortality. rates among the
younger adult males in the lower middle classes in Roman society.
Mortality rates among the masses of poorer people was certainly
higher still.
The most recent, and by far the most interesting study has again
been for Egypt. In this case, the conclusions were based on tax
receipts recorded on ostraka 29 . The study involves the use of statistical
methodology and formulae and is therefore difficult for the non-expert
to check 30 . The method seems to me reliable, however, and avoids
the problems involved in epitaphic studies. What these results show
can be summarized in the following figures.
280
Fig. 1 (after Kajanto -
Age
15
20
25
30
35
Males
297
288
264
236
203
Fig. 2 (after Burn - Europe (Central))
Age
17
22
27
32
37
Males
426
357
283
213
171
Fig. 3 (after Burn -
Age
17
22
27
32
37
Rome)
Lambaesis; military)
Males
90.9·
84.9
74.8
61.8
53.4
Fig. 4 (after Burn -
Age
17
22
27
32
37
Danube; military)
Males
284
268
233
187
158
The study based on Egyptian census returns shows that of 148 males
surviving to the age of 20, 76 were dead by the age of 40 (over
50 %) 2 6 . The difficulties involving acceptance of these data were
recognised by the authors, but they agreed that corrections to it were
most likely to increase mortality rates in the early groups 2 7 .
Physical anthropological studies are, as yet, largely untried, and
the results are unreliable if only because the sample is so small.
It is interesting to note, however, that the single study published
gives a male life-expectancy of 42. l years; agreeing broadly with
calculations based on epitaphic evidence 2 8 •
26 M. HoMBERT - CL PREAUX, Recherches sur le recensement dans l'Egypte romaine
(Papyrologica Lugd. Bat., V) Leiden 1952, p. 156-160.
27 A.E. SAMUEL, op. cit., p. 14-17 and M. HOMBERT-CI. PREAUX, op. cit., p. 159-160.
28 J.L. ANGEL, 'The Length of Life in Ancient Greece', Journal of Gerontology
2 (1947), p. 18-24.
Fig. 5 (after Samuel)
Number of persons surviving from pseudo-age 18
Pseudo-age
Money Tax
All Taxes
18
20
25
30
34
35
101
86
56
39
27
26
131
114
78
57
41
40
The 'pseudo-age' at death is the age at which an individual last
appears on an ostrakon, i.e. equal to or greater than his age at death.
The authors state as their conclusion that, « ... beginning from any
particular age, on the average, each member of the population will
live for 14.4 years; expressed differently, it means that a man of 15 can
expect to reach 29 .4 years of age . . . The population is halved roughly
every l 0 years ... » 31 . Fig. 5, above, shows that, beginning at the age
on which most praetorians were inducted, between 2/3 and 3/4 would
have died before reaching the age at which those same soldiers would
have been discharged. The approach has the advantage of eliminating
the incalculable deaths in infancy and childhood by beginning only
with those who have survived to reach the age of 15. The disadvantage
from my view-point is that the sample concerns a rural Egyptian
community whose standard and way of life was far different from
that of praetorian guardsmen.
***
29
3
A.E.
° Cf.
SAMUEL, op. cit., p. 19ff.
JEA 59 (1973), p. 273f. for a review of this work. The reviewer does not
question the figures, but admits that he is in the hands of the statisticians.
31 Op. cit., p. 25ff.
282
D.L. KENNEDY
Several conclusions emerge from all these studies. First, life was
short in the ancient world. The most conservative estimate allows
the tentative conclusion that over one-third of all lower middle class
males, who reached the age of 18, were dead by the age of 35.
Mortality rates in Rome for the same class over the same age range
were more likely to have been considerably higher. Life-expectancy
among the urban and rural masses throughout the Empire will
certainly have been even higher (following the evidence for preindustrial societies) and shortest of all among the mass of poor in
the capital.
A number of factors must be borne in mind when attempting to
apply these data to the Guard. The men chosen for service will,
logically, have been of apparent good health and physique 32 . This
standard will have been at least maintained by the availability of
medical facilities in the army and by the removal of the problem of
seeking food, clothing and shelter; physical fitness will, theoretically,
have been kept high by the rigours of military discipline 33 and
exercise. In these respects, the life-expectancy of praetoriani will have
been increased vis-a-vis the respective classes from which the recruits
originated. On the debit side, the very rigours of discipline and
service, involving sickness and injury, will, to a not inconsiderable
extent, have affected the health of many, and shortened their lifeexpectancy.
It should be clear from the foregoing that any precision on the
question of mortality in the Guard, through demographic studies,
is impossible. The conclusions, however unreliable, can, nevertheless,
be used to provide a guideline. If the conclusions of Samuel were
applicable to the Guard at Rome - namely, that at any given age,
each male could expect a further 14.4. years of life - then well in
excess of I /2 the Guard would have died in service.
These studies are all, however, concerned with death by natural
causes, i.e. not in warfare. The Guard was, of course, an operational
military unit and as such did participate in warfare although normally
only at the side of the emperor or a member of the imperial family.
Consequently, losses in action will have been far lower than among
frontier units 34 . However, the very process of accompanying the
32
33
34
Herodian IV 7.3.
Cf. Tac., Ann. I 17 for legionaries' views of life in the Guard.
Dio LXXVI 6.6 for the Guard in battle.
PRAETORIAN GUARD
283
emperor on journeys would increase the mortality rate because of
the unusual hardships, climate and fatigue - the same factors which
claimed more lives in armies than enemy action up until quite recent
times 35 . A further factor must be taken into account. In order to
arrive at some conclusions about the men being discharged in the
laterculi, it is essential to appreciate that these men represent those
who enlisted in a particular pair of years, less al/ losses to the effective.
Such losses were not merely by death - natural, or in war - but
also from injury or on the grounds of ill health. The soldier who
suffered any serious physical injury or disability was just as much
a loss to the army as a dead soldier. The proportion of dead to
wounded in ancient warfare is liable to have been less than in modern
times when soldiers invalided out of the forces far exceed in number
those killed outright on active service. Since this was because more
wounded would die in ancient times, the effect is the same where
as here, we are dealing with losses to the strength. The actual iッウ・セ@
are of course incalculable but, because of their existence, we should
best think of service-expectancy rather than life-expectancy, of loss-rate
rather than mortality-rate, when assessing the proportion represented
by the laterculi.
To return to Durry's calculations. His loss to the effective strength
from the 500 men supposedly recruited, down to the 480 he calculates
an impossibly low figure. He thus takes
as discharged, is 4 % セ@
virtually no account of losses over the 16/17 years of service. It is clear,
therefore, that his conclusion that each Antonine cohort was quingenary, must be rejected.
I have examined the laterculi available and counted the discharges
per century. The laterculi list by century, and each is divided between
the two groups who enlisted 25 and 26 years earlier, now being
discharged. All the laterculi are badly mutilated, and often the centuries we do have are incomplete. I have compiled my figures on
the basis of (a) complete centuries and (b) incomplete centuries where
a minimum figure can be reached. These counts can be summarized
as follows:
35
For praetorians buried in the provinces, CIL III 5043 5073 5105 5596 6046
'
'
'
'
'
6085; II 2!02.
284
D.L. KENNEDY
PRAETORIAN GUARD
Fig. 6 Laterculi showing those men recruited before AD. 193. Number of
centuries extant shown in brackets. Plus ( +) figures refer to evocat1.
therefore, are more likely to be reliable. The pattern for the two sets
may well suggest that if we had a sample with a greater number of
complete centuries, then the figures for the enlistment years would
tend to approximate more closely 37 . If we apply Durry's calculations
for the effective strength to these, then we arrive at (taking 17 years
as the real length of service in the Antonine Guard) 38 :
6.2 x 17 x 6= 632;
4.54 x 17 x 6= 463;
Mean: 5.295 x 17 x 6 = 540
The same revision is required for the third-century guard.
(a) complete centuries
1
2
CIL, VI, 32515
32516
32518
32519
32520
Total:
(13)
(1)
( 1)
(4)
(24)
(43)
Mean per century:
(181 : 43)
4.209
Both columns:
Mean:
(b) incomplete centuries
46
5
3
18+2
109+8
181+
10
(10)
(2)
(1)
(3)
(20)
(36)
67
11
5
13+ I
124+6
220+
7
(220 : 36)
6.11
(79) 401
(401 : 79) 5.076
3
4
(3) = 27
( 1) = 3
(2) = 6
(I)= 2
(2)=4
(9)=42
(5) = 38
(42: 9)
= 4.66
(3) = 14
(2) = 11
(6) = 25+ 1
(16) = 88+
1
(88: 16)
= 5.5
(25) = 130
(130 : 25) 5.2
A close examination of the actual numbers discharged from individual centuries shows that the figure fluctuates between 0 and 13;
only in 29 of the 79 complete centuries (columns 1 and 2) does
the number fall between 4 and 6 inclusive, i.e. less than 40%. It is
obvious from the above that the mean discharge is highly erratic:
even if we take the mean for the columns in pairs (1&2 and 3&4)
the incomplete centuries still give a higher mean than the complete.
The main problem is that the second to fifth laterculi have far too
few centuries complete to provide a reliable average. These three,
therefore, together with the evidence in columns 3 and 4, must all
be abandoned as too small or incomplete. If we recalculate for 32515
and 32520 only, we get (average only):
1
32515
32520
(13)
(24)
3.538
4.54
2
(10)
(20)
6.7
6.2
Mean= 4.9
Mean= 5.295
Although the two sets of figures here reflect a similar pattern,
they are not close enough to allow us, legitimately, to fix a mean
for the sets. Since 32515 reflects the situation for a smaller sample
of centuries and the means for the two enlistment years are much
further apart, it is justifiable to regard them as less reliable. 32520,
on the other hand, has many more complete centuries, and the means,
36 I have followed Durry in excluding those laterculi referring to periods involving
abnormal warfare. These laterculi are in any case fragmentary and have too few
centuries for accurate calculations.
285
Fig. 7 Laterculi recording men recruited after AD. 193 Annual discharge.
(a) complete centuries
C/L, VI, 32533
32536
32624
32625
32627
32628
32639
32640
(b) incomplete centuries
(4) 40 + 1
(7) 75 + 4
(4) 61
(3)
7+ 1*
(2) 22
(2) = 22
(2) = 27
(5) = 51
(2) = 11 + 2 *
(2) = 8 + 1 *
(I)= 16
(4) = 54
(3) 40 + 1
(3) = 35
(* = Too small a sample to be regarded as normal: not included in the mean).
Total:
(20)247 + 7
(17) = 205 + 3
Mean per century:
12.35
12.06
The samples, though again small, are consistent. Precision on a mean
is impossible, but it seems clear that 12.35 should be regarded as
a minimum. On this basis the Guard would have an effective of
at least 889 (12.35 x 12 x 6) 39 . We have seen how the Guard in
the pre-Severan period was formed in cohorts of 1000 men 40 . The
revised calculations for discharges show that 31.77 men on average
would survive in the Guard to be discharged after 17 years service.
The rate of loss over 17 years would, therefore, be ea. 46 %. In view
of the shorter period of service in the Severan Guard, we would
expect a smaller loss rate: 32.4 % would be 12/17 ths of 46 %, given
a constant death rate. From this, it is calculable that a Severan cohort
37
The discharges do not suggest that, as with cohors XX Palmyrenorum, recruitment
was in every alternate year (Dura Final Report, V. !, p. 36).
38
The practise of discharge in alternate years makes the mean length of service
ea. l7 years rather than 16 in the period before A.D. 193. Cf. Table 2 for 17.9 years
although this includes rounding up.
39
See below, Part II, for this figure of 12 years' service in the Severan Guard.
40 Above p. 2.
286
D.L. KENNEDY
would have a strength of ea. 1315 men (assuming the figure of 889
to represent a loss of 32.4 %). What can we make of units with
an effective of 1315 men? Since all the figures here are approximate
and, in some cases, minimum, we may well have the 1500 strong
cohorts proposed by Domaszewski: the same size, in fact, as the
cohortes urbanae. The gap between 1315 and 1500 is bridgable if
we remember that the figure of 12.35 discharges per century is a
minimum and was probably rather higher. Second, the intensive and
extensive warfare of the third century, often under the emperor's
personal command, will have led to far more casualties among the
Guard than it would have suffered in the Antonine period 41 . It seems
obvious, therefore, that the size of the Guard in the Severan period
was well in excess of 1315 men per cohort.
A straight increase to 1500, to bring it into line with the cohortes
urbanae, is most attractive, giving a body of 15,000 in 10 cohorts 42 .
The most obvious objection to this conclusion is that we have no
evidence to suggest that the castra praetoria was either enlarged or
provided with an annex at any time. On the contrary, it is clear
that the Tiberian barracks provided the ground plan for all susequent
remodellings. This casern was 440 x 380m. (41.2 acres= 16.67 hectares), sufficient for not much more than 6000 men 43 . At the time
of its construction, the Guard had not yet been increased by the
additions of Gaius/Claudius. It still stood at the figure established
by Augustus of 9 praetorian and 3 urban cohorts 44 ; all 12 were
stationed in the new barracks of Tiberius 45 . Because of the area,
it would be reasonable to assume that we were dealing with units
of quingenary size at this stage (12 x 500 = 6000 (+ evocati?]). The
creation of three new praetorian cohorts need not have led to
overcrowding since the urban cohorts could have moved out; all
three urban and three of the praetorian cohorts had formerly been
stationed in billets in Rome sine castris 46 •
41 D.J. BREEZE, The Career Structure below the Centurionate during the Principate,
in Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt II I, Berlin-New York, 1974, p. 439,
claims that increased promotion opportunities will have increased the flow of praetorians
to posts beyond the Guard.
42 Dio LV 24.6 «six thousand in number organised in four divisions ... ». Cf.
H. FREIS, Die Cohortes urbanae, Epigraphische Studien 2 (1967), p. 38-42.
43 M. DURRY, op. cit., p. 47.
44 Tac., Ann. IV 5: ... tres urbanae, novem praetoriae cohortes ....
45 Dio L VII 19. Concentrated by Sejanus to promote discipline.
46 Suet., Aug. 49.
PRAETORIAN GUARD
287
As we have seen above, the literary evidence does not allow us to
reach any effective conclusion on the strength of the first-century
Guard. It may have been milliary from the first 47 or quingenary
raised to milliary by Gaius/Claudius or Vitellius. The sole firm point,
as I have argued, is that the cohorts were certainly milliary under
the Antonine emperors 48 . Then, at least, we should have expected
an increase in the area of the barracks. The explanation for its
non-appearence when the Guard was 1OOO strong comes in a report
of 1876 49 noted by Richmond 50 : the barracks were of more than
one storey. Building upward probably reflects the desire to minimize
the scale of military installations in the Capital. Not only did the
barracks go upwards, but barrack rooms were built within the thickness of the walls of the casern itself 51 . Richmond also noted the
heightening of the outer enclosure wall at various times, one of which
he dates to, possibly, Caracalla; perhaps to overtop the highest
internal building 52 • It should be clear that if the castra praetoria
of only one storey was adequate for ea. 6000 men, then two storeys
were certainly adequate for ten milliary cohorts. It is debatable
whether a two storey barracks, as well as the chambers in the walls
would be sufficient for 15,000 men in the third century. I 「・ャゥカセ@
not, but can see no reason why there should not have been a
third storey too, if only in part. The barracks would thus, in many
ways, have resembled the tenements of Rome and Ostia 53 . Again,
pressure on accomodation may have been relieved with the right of
conubium granted by Septimius to serving soldiers and the growth of
canabae; married soldiers may simply have lived outside the barracks 54.
47
I.A. RICHMOND, PBSR 10 (1927), p. 12.
Above p. 2.
49 Bull. Com. 4 (1876), p. 178.
50 I.A. RICHMOND, op. cit., p. 12.
51
Ibid., p. 13 plus fig. l showing a contubernium in the wall found in the J9th century
52 lb "d
'
.
1 ., P: 14. RIC I, pl. V, no. 88 shows a tall building ('temple') inside the
castrapraetona. Cf M. DURRY, op. cit., p. 50.
53
.
J.E. PACKER, The lnsulae of Imperial Ostia (Memoirs of the American Academy
m Rome: XXXI), 1971, suggests that the barracks of the vigiles at Ostia may have
had a third storey.
54 Th
.
.
e intensive. warfare of the third century, involving the emperors themselves
セオウエ@
have greatly increased the casualty rate in the Guard. The extent of this is
mcalculable, but it should be noted that the 1500-strong cohorts of the third century
are by no means as secure as the Antonine milliary cohorts. A possible alternative
of cohorts 2000 strong is difficult to accept. Alternatively, we may consider the
48
288
D.L. KENNEDY
PRAETORIAN GUARD
Conclusions.
Part II.
•1
.. , . . . . :Manlius Q. f.
Vtl ! エイセャ。オウ@N
(sic)
QセエN@
atti;i. :KV
pient.1SSuno
Giセ@
Cam. I Severns I Alba Pompeia veter. I v. a. XLII m. II
ex セ・ァN@
XXII I Primig. in praet. chor. (sic) VII / in
I 11ussus honesta missione J Q. Mattlius Epaphroditus I
I bene merente fecit et sibi I et suis paterisq. eorum s1.
ュNBセᄋ@
origin suggests an early date for his service. The legion
Ol\e of those which supported Vitellius and this man must,
TQエ・セッイL@
be a transferee of A.D. 69 58 . He was clearly retained by
Vespaaian. The most interesting point to arise from this inscription
it エィ。セN@
。セ@ the time of his discharge, whatever had been the length
セNLOャ・Xゥッョ。イケ@
service, he had served only 15 years as a praetorian.
セᄋ[@
2:X ILS 2036.
1
セャゥヲウ@
I C. f. Rom. I Crescens I militavit leg. IV I annis VIIII I traiectus
mi praetorium I cob. V pr. I militavit attn. III.
Tack of any imperial gentilicia,
The legion (IV Macedonica?)
Vitellius on the Rhine, making
.. 9 • He had served 9 years in the
ffi ·the Guard.
Aセᄋilb@
the inscription is likely to
was one of those which
69 the most likely date of
legion but died after only
2034 add.
C. ZᄋQGMNエ・ョセ@
セN@
In A.D. 69, Vitellius rewarded his army by opening the ranks of
his new Guard to them all, legionaries and auxilia alike. The practice
was abandoned by the Flavians but reverted to by Septimius Severus
following: a milliary cohort was probably ea. 960 strong and a 'doubled' cohort was
actually in the ratio of 6 to 10 (R.W. DAVIES, A Note on a Recently Discovered
Inscription from Carrawburgh, Epigraphische Studien 4 (1967), p. 112-113) giving a
unit of 1600 men. The unit would be unparalleled, but it is worth noting that
Caraca!la formed a Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 men (Dio LXXVII 7 and LXXVIII
18); a Roman unit of this size is unattested and it is possible that the new body
in which he took a great personal interest, and which accompanied him on campaign,
was modelled in size on the existing Guard.
55 Dio LV 24.8.
-f
established recruitment from the legions as the regular method
to the. Guard. I have found 23 inscriptions referring to
. . . . • tlm Guard from the legions. Seven of these are incomplete
information or are mutilated and therefore of no value for
.,......
d y 56 .
セZョエウオ@
セエ⦅L@
From an examination of available demographic studies, I have argued
that the loss rate would have been sufficiently high for the effective
strength of the Guard to have been well in excess of the quingenary
cohorts argued by Durry. No impediment prevented acceptance of
the milliary cohorts which are strongly arguable from the literary
evidence. The Guard of the third century, as the laterculi reveal,
had been augmented and, from calculations based on the increased
discharges and an examination of the likely loss rate, it seems
probable that the new cohorts were of 1500 men each.
If my deductions are correct, then we may see a loss rate over
the period of service of ea. 46 % in the Antonine Guard and ea. 41 %
in the Severan Guard (over a shorter period of service); figures which
are compatible with the substantially higher mortality rates calculated
for ancient societies, as well as with those we would expect in preindustrial societies and with the more prolonged warfare of the
third century.
(I have excluded the evocati from the count in the above calculations: they appear on the laterculi, but in view of Dio's testimony
that they constituted a special corps, it is unlikely that they counted
towards the effective of the centuries ss. They cannot, in any case,
have been particularly numerous and their inclusion, if required,
would increase the figure for discharge means.)
***
セ@
289
C. f. I Qui. Moderatus Antio I milit. in leg. XVI Gal. a. X I
(su:) m. coh. IX pr. I in qua milit. ann. VIII I missus honesta missione I
1
ab セjゥ^ᄋ@
fact. evoc. Aug. I arcitect. (sic) armament. imp. I evoc.
ᄋセャエ。ッ@
Aug. Germ. I[ ....... .
tn Gallica was at Mainz, where it surrendered to Civilis
espasian cashiered it and formed a new one, XVI Flavia.
エセ@
is certainly a transfer from the Vitellian vexillations at
[キセ@
f!!l .• . >
·.
transferred rather late in life and presumably to tap
566, 2758, 2803; VIII 9391; IX 1609; X 532 and AE 1940, 117.
·. SS, op. cit.,. has エ・セー、@。
to date praetorian epitaphs on the basis
セ@ Nセ。・@L
used. I will note
m. Clauss, A.D. 100.180.
.!M. Clauss, c. A.D. 50.
his dates only where they disagree with my own.
290
D.L. KENNEDY
PRAETORIAN GUARD
d'
f ages then he will
his talents. If we allow for the froun . ュァ。セィ@
time セヲ@ his honesta
be
· his l 6- l 8th year o service
.
m of the practice of discharge in alternate years). His
mrssw (ben
ecause
subsequent service was as an evocatus.
(probably) just prior to the battle of Issus when it apparently changed
sides and was rewarded with the titles felix constans, given here 61 .
The most likely occasion for his transfer would be after Issus when
the legion was honoured and replacements for the Guard would have
been required. Thus, at most, Valerianus had completed 5 years in
the legion followed by I 3 in the Guard before being discharged.
The former figure is likely to be too high, however, as a result of
numbers being rounded up. His enlistment would, in this case, have
been some time after 9 January, 190, so that on the discharge date
of 9 January, 206 he had not completed 16 years service.
7. !LS 2037.
ィセカ・N@
,
7 Marfci natio
4. CIL VI 2697.
Aur. Eliaseir. coh. I cammpid?ct?r coh_. I VIIII praet. et in praet. I
I . I v1x.
. an. LX (e)t miliftav1t m leg1one I ann. X
D.
Pan.m. qm
·
l'k I
onian origin make it most I e y
The ゥュセイ。ャ@
gentilicium an
ッエセ・@
third century. His extremely
that this. man was a エイセウィZカ・@
been because of his specialist talents
"d t
Much of his service
long service of 35 years w1
(cf. No. 3, above) as the cohort camp1 oc or.
will have been as an evocatus.
ann. XXV.
fit/
d h p
5 /LS 2044.
. .·
( ·)XIII nat I
·1 h r (sic) I VI pret. (sic) 7 BhclSI stup. sic
.
.
D. m. s. Aur. vセイッ@
m1 . c o .
a rtio Vico Budalia qui (vi)xit an. I XL m.
Pannon. pede S1rmese ー。ァセ@
[ ... ] セ@ I .
. t
(sic) III (or IIII) Aur.
III d. XV mil(i)t. in l(eg10ne) セエオヲョ」・@
(sic) s オセッュ。ョゥーャ@
sui I re ipsius
Iustinus Aur. Florinus Val. I Av1tianus et omnes
.
b. m. f. *milibus.
f
.
third century date is suggested by the incidence o
Once .agam, . a .
.
o note that after three years in a legion,
Aurehus. It is mterestmg t
I .
"ble that his service was
h
d 14 years in the Guard. t is poss1
e serve
. d d his burial by comanipuli suggests.
enrolled comparatively late in
inn e l:gions, he
certainly old enough to have completed is
term of service.
セイュ。エ・ィ|Z[ョウB、@
エセ・@
セ。ウ@
セヲ・@
.
·
t
6 C/L VI 210.
.
!em defensorem I gemo centunae ex vo o
Pro salute dd. nn. Augg. _I h・イセ@
K itoliade stip. XVIII I mi!. coh. X
posuit I L. Domitius Valenanus I_ omo セー@
ex le VI Fer. f. c. I
.
p·
7 FI Caralitani lectus m praetono dd. nn. I . g.
pr. p. v.honesta. m1ss10
. . ne I VII Idus Ianuar. dd. nn. I imp. Antomno 10
missus
Aug. III et I Geta nobilissimo Caes. II cos.
.
.
d 9 J
208 Valerianus had enlisted m legw
Date
anuary,
.
Dur assumes that he
not earlier than 9 January, 190: . ry h d R e6o
the Guard in 193 when Septlmms reac e
om ..
however, was m
. the East and adhered to Pescenmus
60
M. DuRRY, op. cit., 247.
VI Ferr_ata
passed mto
His legion,
N' r until
tge
291
D. m. I C. Maccenio Vibio mi!. coh. I pr. 7 I Primitivi vix. ann. L V mi!.
in leg. X i Gem. ann. VIIII ind. tra(ns)l. in pr. an. I XIIH Ulpia Valentina
c:u{n)iugi / karissimo b. m. f. cura agente I demandatum fratri ex tesltamento
mセ」・ョゥッ@
Crispino I evok. Aug. n.
Vibius' legion was stationed in Pannonia superior in the second century, and his wife's name, 'Ulpia' suggests an original grant of
citizenship by Trajan. The most likely date for a Pannonian to be
transferred is after 193 when recruitment, from the Danubian legions
in particular, became the rule. The inscription does not make it dear
whether he died in service or not, or even if he was an evocatus
like his brother. His service of up to 23 years, however, would
have made him ea. 32 years old on enlistment in the legion if' he
died in service. Even allowing for rounding up of years or for
guessing at his final age, it is most likely that he had long since
セHiイ・、@
by the time of his death. If so, mention of his honesta missio
I?J also omitted and we may legitimately presume that his service as
an evocatus may have been included in the 14 years in the Guard,
without being mentioned. Since he died at a comparatively ripe age
and. was survived by his brother, it is possible that the brother was
Y<i:qnge,r, l!dditional reason for believing that Vibius too was an
・セLNカッ」ァエオウZ@
His service may be reconstructed as follows:
9 years
· kg. X Gemina:
miles praet. :
8/9 years
honesta missio
evocatus:
4/5 years
.; konesta missio.
61
RE XII 2 (1925), col. 1593.
292
D.L. KENNEDY
8. CIL VI 2785.
D. m. I Val. Sarmatio civis Filipopulletanus militabit (sic) in legilone prima
Italica annis I 1111 in pretoria (sic) annis I duo vixit annis XXIIII Sudilcentius
frater Genitus fecit I mimoriam (sic).
PRAETORIAN GUARD
293
II'"•x'C:t.L VI 260 l.
F.,Jtito eq. cor. (sic) VI pr. I natione Trax cives (sic) Filopolpulitanus
• • '1
.XXXV qui I mil. an. XVII sic: in legione I Itialica an. II in cor.
•,(sit) I munifex an. XIIII factus I eq. mil. menses n. X fratri I
Val. Aulusa/nus pret. (sic) incomparabili.
The legion I Jtalica was raised in 67, supported Vitellius, and was
subsequently sent to Novae in Moesia. His Thracian nationality rules
him out as one of the recruits to the newly raised legion, but fits
well with a post-193 transfer. He died soon after.
'nly third century. Bito is one of the many Thracians
lis in the third-century Guard 64. The inscription does
to determine whether he died in service or not. The
9. CIL VI 2673.
[Aur. T]ertio b. f. praef. coh VIII pr. El[qui] vix. ann. XLV dieb. VII mil.
in leg. I [Cl]aud. ann. V inde tra(ns)lat. in pr. I [mi!.] ann. XIIII natione
Pannl[on.?] Aur. Quintus frater et Aur. I { ... Ja soror hered. et Iul. matr. I
[ ... ]onia co(n)iugi (sic) carissimo b. m. I [fece]runt.
Neither of the legiones Claudiae were associated with ViteHius in 69;
both were on the Danube in the second century. His nomen and his
Pannonian origin suggest a transfer in the third century. As can
be demonstrated, most recruits to the Guard were in the bracket
18-22 (possibly even earlier in the legions). If Tertius died in service,
his age at enlistment in the legion must have been at least 26.
It is more likely that he had been discharged 62 - hence, too, his
burial by his wife and not by comanipuli - and that the 5 and 14
should be regarded as 'in his 5th' and 'in his l4th year'. His total
service may thus have been as little as 17 years 63 •
praet.
·· 16 years 10 months.
Aur. Mestro I ex evok. qui mil. in l(egione) I an. VI in cast.
Jl1:lt. vico Bitalcost. I reg. Pautaliense [ ...... ] J q. v. ann. XXXVI
Vitupaus vet. fratri J b. m. fecit.
lllllret•ll'Y· One of the numbers is clearly corrupt. As an ex-evocatus
low. However, 21 years in the Guard is very long.
18181,mbhlble that the service should he emended to Xl. In this
•l*'l!Bli'i; Service would be:
10. !LS 2038.
D. m. s. I Aurelius Vincentius I miles cohrtis (sic) I tertiae praetoriae I centuria
Maximini I militavit in legione I undecima Claudia I annis V I in praetoria
annis I XI vixit XL I civis Trax I memoria fecerunt I cives de rebus 11 ipsius
bene I merenti.
The combination of the imperial gentilicium, the base of legio Xl
in Moesia and the man's Thracian origin, suggests a third-century
date. His age and the place of his burial (Mauretania Caesariensis)
may indicate that he had been discharged. His military service will,
therefore, have been 5 years in the legion and 11 years in the Guard.
Burial by a legal wife implies a discharged soldier or/and a pbst-Severan d<lte.
The M. Aurelius M. f Tertiu[s] of the laterculus CIL VI 32523 a 24, was discharg
too early (9 January, 204) to enable this man to be identified with him.
62
63
ャセエ。@
Ursianus cives Aquileiesis probitus ann. XVIII I in legione X
if. an. V in pretoria (sic) an. Ill! I decissit (sic) an. plus minus
coniux bene (me)renti I Verginio suo (f)ecit Justa I mi!.
tt. (sic)
ailiy ' be a transfer of 193 since he belonged to one of
•.legions in Pannonia superior. The nomen and the Christian
of plus minus suggest a third-century date 65 .
I 2799 listing 19 cives Philippopolitanorum in 227. M. Clauss, ea.
,..,:..:, n plus minus is most common on later Christian epitaphs, although
- ...we.
294
PRAETORIAN GUARD
D.L. KENNEDY
14. CJL VI 37224.
D. m. s. I Val. Patprnianus (sic) millix (sic) coh. X prae(t). 7 Boni qui I vixit
annis XL m. HI I dies (sic) X militavit in le\gione annis XI in praeltoram
(sic) annu (sic) et m. V I natione Pannonica (sic) I pag. Traiani Val. Velrecundus
et Iul. Prislcianus (h)eredes huius I b. m. f.
The inscription is clearly post-Trajanic (line 9) and, since Paternianus(?) is a Pannonian, a post-193 date is most likely. Because of
his age at death and his burial by his heirs rather than comanipuli,
it is probable that he had already been discharged. His total service
was, therefore, 16 years 5 months 66 .
15. !LS 2045.
Val. Tertius militi (sic) I cortie (sic) X pretorie (sic) qui I vixit annis XXXVI
mes. III I dies XV militabit (sic) legilone Mesiaca ann(i)s V inlter lanciarios
annis XI I in pretoria (sic) ann[is .... ] I 7 Salbi[ ......... I ...... .
Since he died at the age of 36 and had already served 16 years
before his promotion to the Guard, it is possible that he died in
service; mutilation at the end of the text prevents us following his
praetorian service. His earlier career, allowing for rounding up of
numbers and for exaggeration, was less than 16 years. He is, however,
a special case as a lanciarius promoted to the Guard. No Moesian
legion supported Vitellius and a cohors X was not formed again until
the late first century. It seems probable that the inscription is thirdcentury67.
16. CJL VI 2672.
D. m. I Aur. Saturnina eq. coh. VIII pr. 7 I Verissimi qui militavit in leg.
selcunda Italica tesserarius an. VI I qui vixit an. XVIU Aur. Optatianus I eq.
fratri benemerenti posuit.
His cognomen and his service in legio JI Jtalica (formed ea. 165)
make his transfer certainly third-century. He only lived to age 28
and patently died in service.
66 By 221 at the latest, discharge was annual rather than biennial allowing
soon after the completion of the contract. C/L XVI 139, 140 (for 221, 2),
143 (224, 5, 6), 147-150 (243, 4, 5, 6), all for January 9, make it clear that
in the third century (No. 6 above attests a discharge on this date in
annual rather than biennial as in the second century.
67 M. Clauss, A.D. 100-180.
discharge
189, 142,
discharge
208) was
295
Conclusions.
· 'fbe most striking conclusion to be drawn from
!sqnat in both 69 and after 193, recruits to the
these inscriptions
Guard from the
ャセゥイウᄋキ・@
not expected to serve, as praetorians, for the balance of
ihef 25 years for which they had originally enlisted (20 years prior to
vエセー。ウゥョIN@
Nor did they have to serve in the Guard for the 16 year
coitfract required of direct recruits between Vespasian and Septimius.
ᄋGヲセゥウ@
fact is clear in No. 3 (and probably No. l) for a ViteBian
ttan:sfer, :and in Nos. 6 and 7 (and almost certainly No. 9), probably
No's:;'. 5, 10 .and 14 and possibly Nos. 11 and 15. The total amount
セ・|GNゥョ」@
is not great, but it is signifcant that not a single inscription
tfijkeS: a discordant note. At the worst, the text on a few stones does
ll,!)t:pennitofcertainty. It is impossible to determine whether Septimius
s・セ@
. knew of the practice adopted by Vespasian towards transferred
セャIエ。ゥ・ウ@
or if he was applying a rule in force for transfers from
セィ・イN「ッ、ゥウL@
e.g. the urban cohorts. The fact remains that Septimius
セᄋ|Xイ。ョエゥァ@
.an important concession to many of his legionary
セゥ、・エUG@
l!enceforward, transferees from the legions enjoyed not only
tl're.hi!J!er pay and prestige of the Guard, but were required to serve
N[HIヲスZャセエ@
balance of 16 years over their service in the legions. They
セ・ャゥァ「N@
for discharge on 9 January following their completion
ッエ。jYセャ@
of 16 years as a soldier 68 .
Q ᄋセᆴョエャオウゥッ@
is of direct relevence to Durry's theory of a doubling
of:rM .Guard. Passerini objected on the grounds that the 11 discharges
Nセイッ[。ョQAャィ@
were not twice the Antonine figure of 5. It is now obvious
period of service is reduced in the third century, then
mir: •.ャIZイ\ゥョ」セエッ@
of the total body retiring annually will increase :
and reduce the contract and the discharge rate will
earlier figure. However, as we have seen, the Guard
Nwセャjoエ^Q\[ZゥG・、@
but increased by, probably, 50%.
jセ」Zャ・ェカオQ@
is too slight for any firm conclusions about the mean
service for transferees to the Guard 69 . Logic
the men chosen for transfer will have completed at least
ᄋャ_セ|」[ZエゥュjN@
The transfer.s of 69 must be ignored since they reflect
situation. Those of post-193 are inconsistent: in all 13 cases
·..ᄋL。ャセNiゥZエイ@
laterculi omit the year of entry into the Guard indicating
a simple matter but varied with the individual.
296
D.L. KENNEDY
we are told or can deduce the period of legionary service. No. 4
is a special case and must be excluded, as should No. 7 which is
probably corrupt. Among the remainder, No. 14 is so much greater
that it too probably reflects an irregular situation. The mean legionary
service of the remaining ten is 4.4 years, giving an average of 12 years
praetorian service before discharge.
Appendix.
Since M. Durry demonstrated an increase in the strength of the
Guard in the late second century, it has been common, for those
who accepted his conclusions, to follow him in attributing the measure
to Septimius Severns 70 . There is abundant evidence for the dismissal
of the old Guard, by Septimius, in 193 and his replacement of it
by a new corps then, and subsequently, drawn from the legions 71 .
It was an easy and perhaps logical step to attribute the increase
to Septimius again in 193. There is, however, no evidence to support
this conclusion. Dio is, of course, in epitome, and we are not entitled
to argue from his silence, or from that imposed upon him by the
epitomator, that the event did not occur in 193. Similarily, we may
draw no conclusions from the silence of the Historia Augusta, Aurelius
Victor and Herodian in their coverage of the events of 193, even when
the account is as full as that in Herodian. There is, however, an
alternative date which is both arguable from the literature and an
attractive occasion.
The only clear evidence for the increase occurring in the second century is, we have seen, derived from the laterculi praetorianorum.
It is from these too, that we derive the termini post et ante quern.
The latest second century laterculus (CIL VI 32520 listing men
discharged in A.D. 160) demonstrates that at the time of recruitment
in A.D. 143-4, the cohorts were still of the smaller size, i.e. milliary.
The earliest laterculus to show an increase (CIL VI 32533) for
A.D. 209 implies a recruitment date to the enlarged cohorts some
70 E. BIRLEY, Septimius Severus and the Roman Army, Epigraphische Studien 8 (1969),
p. 64f.; C.R. WHITTAKER in the notes to the Loeb edition of Herodian, Harvard 1969,
p. 352 (but cf. p. 246 n. l); A.R. BIRLEY, Septimius Severus, London 1971, p. 165
(following E. Birley, above); R.E. SMITH, The Army Reforms of Septimius Severus,
Historia 21 (1972), p. 487f.
71 Dio (Xiph.) LXXV 1.1-2 and 2-4; Herodian II l3 and 14.5; Aur. Viet., Lib.
de Caes. 20.l.
72 Section II above.
PRAETORIAN GUARD
297
QセᄋZW@
years before 72 . The increase, therefore, can be placed between
4':p. 144 and the end of the second century (ea. 193-8). Clearly,
NスL[{セ@
·iS possible and has much to be said for it. In such a broad span
O.ftjme, however, we must at least look for and consider alternatives.
()t}.-e セオ」ィ@
·alternative is available from a passing literary reference.
\ejセ「ャゥ。ョL@
recounting the various plots against Commodus, deals
アセ@
fully with the activities of one Maternus, an ex-soldier, who
ーエゥャZ|セ@
a large band of fellow deserters and criminals 73 . The extent
ッエGィセ」ョウ・アオ@
helium desertorum 74 may have embraced the whole
dfl'J3ti;rI and Spain as Herodian claims; it was certainly wide enough
ttl•lui.ve involved the military intervention of Pescennius Niger, the
ァセケ・Nエュイッヲ@
Aquitania 75 and, possibly, of Clodius Albinus and Septirn1U;s' Severns, governors of Belgica and Lugdunensis respectively 76.
sヲエMャNセGゥウ@
war is certainly historical, albeit obscure 77 , there is a good
セヲ\ャイ@
believing that Herodian, in claiming that Maternus entered
ltaly<'wit:h his followers seeking to assassinate Commodus and seize
bqセ_ウ[イョ。ケ@
be preserving just such an event. The coinage of the
エセ@
セョMャpィエZwゥウ・@
salus 79 , an inscription testifies to special precautions
RQLセBM
confirmation surely of an emergency involving security W'.hUe セッエ「・イ@
refers to an unassignable «victory» so.
account is factual, then his concluding remark on
assumes a greater significance in relation to the augmentation
セᄋゥヲAoョ。エャ@
He tells us that
nセァN@
3.4: «For he was sent to apprehend a body of deserters who
numbers» (D. MAGIE, Loeb edition).
.. , , .. .,.., ..,nn m Loeb edition of Herodian, p. 63 n. 2.
U1 ァセ・。エ@
. an inquest in A.D. 186 (AE 1959, 141 = AE 1956, 90)
of trouble m the unit - possibly confirmed by the title it soon
ans Commoda.
rs much less fantastic in the light of the later, better known
Italy (note 83, below), the Bacaudae in Gaul (Aur Viet
セオエイッーN@
IX 20.3; Oros. VII 25.2; Zon. XII 31. Their. leade;
and _appears on coins as IMP.C.C.AMANDUS P.F.AUG. セqOゥ@
m Egypt (Dio LXXII 4. l-2).
.nQS. 169 & 178.
\i!Y."lii.,a11<:IL,Jides.oGセpZᄋ・L@
NセLQエゥ^ィ@
cit., p. 66f. RIC III, p. 420, nos. 465, 468•-d - con.
on coins usually implies that the reverse is true
.l1rm1svenLous trouble in the army (ef. Dio [Xiph.] LXXIII 10.1 for
298
D.L. KENNEDY
«After his escape from Maternus' plot, Commodus surrounded himself
with a stronger guard H\ーッオセI@
and rarely appeared in public, spending
most of his time avoiding legal and imperial business away in the suburban
districts or on his imperial estates far away from Rome» 81 .
In the context of the latter part of the statement one might be tempted
to believe that nothing more is implied than an increase in the
number of personal bodyguards on duty at doors, in corridors etc.,
to watch against the individual assassin. This seems improbable for
two reasons. First, the plot of Maternus involved the infiltration of
himself and his men into Rome disguised as praetorians. Elsewhere,
we learn that he had a sufficiently large band to have attacked cities
and for them to have been officially recognized 'as enemies and no
longer simply as robbers' 82 . Indeed, Maternus even weighed the
chances of success in a formal confrontation with the garrison at
Commodus' disposal. Presumably, he felt capable of holding Rome
by force after killing Commodus. In the circumstances, Commodus
required, not a few more men in his presence, but a larger army
at his personal disposal in the vicinity of Rome to prevent any
repetition of Maternus' action 83 . Second, Herodian regularly renders
the term praetorianus by oopucpopos 84 , with the Greek 」イッᄉュ\ーオaNセ@
used to translate the concept of a personal bodyguard 8 5 • In the
instance quoted above, however, neither of these are used - the term
being cppoupa. In itself, the change in terminology probably indicates
that the increase was neither in the praetorians alone nor the bodyguards about his person, but rather the guard, in the sense of the
army which he disposed of, at Rome. In fact, the term cppoupa is
regularly used to render praesidium 86 . We should perhaps regard
Herodian I 11.5.
Ibid. I I I. I.
83 That he would have been justified was demonstrated by the career of Bulla
in Italy itself during the reign of Septimius Severns (Dio [Xiph.J LXXVII 10), cf.
Herodian III 13.4 regarding the increased garrison at Rome «which left no external
force competent to be a rival» - surely referring to threats from the provinces.
84 E.g. I 10.6; II I.I; 4.4; 5.1 and 14.5; VIII 7.7 but especially V 4.8 oi cr@µaw<puA.aKi;i; Kai liopuqi6p0l, oui; 81) 1tpatt@p1avoui;. Cf. Dio LY 10.10 !lmipx01 'tfilV
oopuqi6p@v. It is the regular rendering of praetorian elsewhere too, see H.J. MASON,
Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, Toronto 1974, s.v. oopuqi6pe<;.
85 E.g. IV 13.1 and esp. V 4.8 contrasting cr@µaw<puA.aKei; Kai oopu<p6p01. The
term probably refers in most cases to the equites singulares.
86 H.J. MASON, op. cit., p. 98, s.v. <ppoup<i citing Appian, Hann. 33 (137), 6 tfi<;
!lv Min:atµovticp <ppoupai; Tjyeyrov and Diod. Sic. XXII 1.3. Cf. Dio セi@
24. I tro;
o' innt@v 060 wui; upicrwui; tfii; nspi cre <ppoupdi; apxs1v. In Herodtan, <ppoupa
81
82
PRAETORIAN GUARD
299
tile increase, therefore, as involving the entire military body available
imperial security: praetorians, urbanicii, equites singulares and
yigfkfs$ 7 • Michael Speidel has shown that the equites singulares retnail,led at the unchanged figure of I ,OOO during the second and third
;oont\iries8 "', but individual studies have revealed that increases in
セャヲ・ゥカ@
in two of the other three corps did occur in the late
セョ、@
century 89 •
: iA·later passage in the history (III 13.4), however, presents a strong
セ「ェ・ッョN@
Herodian, in the context of Septimius' final years, claims
.. that' the troops in Rome had been quadrupled. This is usually
to mean that Septimius had been the agent of the increase 90 .
. セョエ・イNー、@
NGヲィセエ@
may indeed be translated as «had just been quadrupled» 91 .
. ^サヲセGNw・エ@
true, then the Guard increase is best attributed to Septimius.
Gj[ィ・イセ@
is, buwever, a difficulty in this translation. No-one has yet
ᄋセ@
a;ble to enumerate the troops needed to give this four-fold
NZゥエセM・@
under Septimius. Durry (op. cit., p. 88), lists 11,500 before
.alid'.24,000 after, exclusive of II Parthica. He is followed by Smith
セァZ、」@
aideyn, Allowing for my re-.cakulated size of the Guard,
the figures are 16,500 and 29,000 respectively. We know that there
were Moorish troops in Rome 93 , and there may have been others,
:f(fl'.,
HpャZ|QセPエFL@
セBG@
frequently (II 5.3; III 11.6; IV 4.2). Where the word guard is required in
sense, the usual rendering is \ーオaN。セ@
(III 12.l and 8 - «guards of the
and guards of the emperor's quarters). In IV 1.5, <ppoupti is used in
guard corps - «Both (i.e. Caracalla and Geta) established their own
d (<ppoupa) ... ». Cf. III 5. 7 « Albinus had increased the size of his guard
.». H.l MASON, op. cit., p. 98, s.v. <ppoupapxoi; = praefectus praesidi
Sttat. S.21) or praefectus castrorum (Dio LV 33.2).
0 veralt ·strength of the garrison could have been increased at this time
br more components unchanged.
"'"'"J.n:,i.., Die equites singulares Augusti, Bonn 1965, p. 10-15.
cohortes urbanae, Epigraphische Studien 2 (1967), p. 38-42. M. DURRY,
praetorians, but see now above, Part I. The vigiles are believed,
with the other units in Rome, to have been doubled from 3500
the same period. It is impossible to determine which changes may
ow rather than under Septimius - if indeed any occurred then.
.tbat the praetorian cohorts would have had priority in any list of
ened.
ᄋNセᄏuエョッゥAオウ@
op. cit., p. 385; R.E.
SMITH,
op. cit., p. 487f.; C.R. WHITTAKER,
Herodian, note to III 13.4.
op. Cft., p. 487ff.; E. BIRLE,Y, op. cit., p. 64f.
p. 65 notes equites itemque pedites iuniores Mauri (!LS 1356),
dated to pre-Alexander Severns (Les carrieres, p. 808f.). Cf. Herodian
receiving javelin instruction from Moorish troops at Rome.
300
D.L. KENNEDY
but their numbers will have been far from sufficient to supply the
deficit. Two explanations are possible. First, the statement may be
regarded as rhetorical exaggeration and we need regard it as indicating
no more than the large increase of which we know. Second, Herodian
may be referring not to the reign of Septimius, but, generally, to
the period covered by his History (ea. A.D. 180-238). In this eventuality, quadrupling is possible. By the time at which he was writing,
the emperor, when he was at Rome, brought units of the embryonic
field army with him 94• Even if the large force of Osrh0eni had
been dispersed after their abortive revolt against Maximinus 9 5 , other
troops took their place 96 • In addition, Pupienus kept large numbers
of auxiliaries from the German army at Rome as a counterwight to
the restless praetorians 97 • These cannot have been much inferior in
numbers to their rivals. In the circumstances the troops at Rome
may well have been four times more numerous than at the death
of Marcus 98 • The passage of Herodian need not, therefore, be regarded
as a serious check to my suggestion since it can be plausibly explained
otherwise. The evidence available is insufficient for certainty. It does,
Herodian VII 8.9; VIII 7.7-8; 8.2.
Herodian VII l.9-11 and note 2.
96 Herodian VIII 6.6; 7.8; 8.2; 8.5 and 8.7.
97 Regiments of catafracts and numbers of Parthian mercenaries and deserters
entered Italy in Maximinus' field army along with Orsh6enian archers (Herodian
VIII 1.3).
98 Marcus
Pupienus
Praetorians
10,000
15,000
Urban Cohorts
6,000
2,000
vigiles
7,OOO
3,500
eq. singulares
1,000
1,000
German auxilia
ea. 15,000
alae of catafracts
1,500.(say, 3 alae)
Moors
say, 2,000
say, 1,000
Osrh6eni
Parthians
say, 1,000
16,5000
49,500
There were almost certainly other units attached to the new field army and
the notional figures for the given additions may well be higher. (Cf. SHA, Car. 6.7,
for equites extraordinarii under Caracalla, and Dio LXXIX 5.5 for Scytbians with
Caracalla in Syria.)
Much helpful criticism and advice has been given by Dr. A.K. Bowman, Dr. A.J.
Graham, Professor S.S. Frere and Dr. 0. Murray. l am most grateful to them all,
although the responsibility for the final text is mine.
94
9'
PRAETORIAN GUARD
301
, meet the requirements of the situation. Should we no,t
, consider the possibility that the increase in the Guard
under Commodus (ea. A.D. 187/8)?
D.L.
KENNEDY