A Way of Salvation: Becoming Like God in Nag Hammadi

Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 brill.com/nu A Way of Salvation: Becoming Like God in Nag Hammadi Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta University of Groningen Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies Department of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Origins Oude Boteringestraat 38 9712 GK Groningen, The Netherlands [email protected] Abstract Contrary to general belief, ethical progress as a means to attain the divine and thereby achieve salvation occupies a central place in the Nag Hammadi writings. Plato’s conception of the homoiosis theo or “likeness to god” ijits very well this dynamic view of man, since it optimistically claims the possibility of human development and progress. Plato’s dialogues are far from offering a univocal exposition of how this progress was fulijilled, but later Platonists show a rather systematizing tendency. The present paper provides an overview of the homoiosis theo in the Platonic dialogues and evaluates its appropriation by both Middle Platonism and the world of Gnosis. It also offers an exposition and analysis of those Nag Hammadi writings that may allow a proper understanding of the meaning and goal of the homoiosis theo in this collection of texts. Keywords assimilation/likeness to God, ethics, middle Platonism, Nag Hammadi, Plato Readers acquainted with the so-called Gnostic worldview through the testimony of anti-heretical writers or through manuals of a more or less general character will probably be astonished to ijind in the following pages an assessment of the homoiosis theo or “likeness to god” as a central motif in the Nag Hammadi texts. On the one hand, the likeness to god might be described as an optimistic conception that claims the possibility of human development and progress; on the other, the traditional © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15685276-12341253 72 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 view of Gnosticism presents it as an eminently pessimistic worldview1 that stubbornly refused to interact with reality and claimed the need to depart from this world as soon as possible.2 The latter view, however, mainly proceeds from the biased report of the anti-heretical writers, who transmitted a rather distorted interpretation of Gnostic anthropology, according to which the three predetermined human classes of pneumatikoi, psychikoi, and hylikoi3 ruled out the possibility of change either for the better or the worse.4 This apparently static character is frequently reinforced by handbooks on Gnosticism, which tend to provide a rather intellectualistic approach to the Gnostic telos or “supreme fulijillment” of life, considered as the acquaintance with the divine.5 Indeed, these overviews tend to focus on the epistemological goal of the knowledge of god and the methods of attaining it, obviating in this way the preceding laborious process that makes such knowledge possible, and thus providing a rather static view of Gnostic anthropology. The discovery of the Nag Hammadi manuscripts has, however, dramatically changed our conception of the Gnostic worldview. We now know, for example, that determinism, in spite of the heresiologists,6 did 1) This pessimism transpires, for example, in Jonas’s description (1970:42–47) of the main tenets of Gnosticism. 2) This view is based to some extent on the so-called strong dualism that, according to the traditional and biased interpretation of Gnosticism, characterized Gnostic thought. See Jonas 1970: passim; Chadwick 1967:35–38; Pearson 1990:148–164. 3) On the Gnostic tripartite division of humanity according to the heresiologists, see Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.7.5; Clemens of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto 54.1; Tertullian, Against Valentinians 29; Hippolytus, Ref. 6.31.9; Epiphanius, Panarion 31.23.1–4; cf. Corpus Hermeticum 1.19. 4) Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.6.2–3, provides the classical example of this view: “Animal men, again, are instructed in animal things; such men, namely, as are established by their works, and by a mere faith, while they have not perfect knowledge. We of the Church, they say, are these persons. Wherefore also they maintain that good works are necessary to us, for that otherwise it is impossible we should be saved. But as to themselves, they hold that they shall be entirely and undoubtedly saved, not by means of conduct, but because they are spiritual by nature.” On Irenaeus and his treatment of his opponents, see King 2003a:21–52. 5) Thus, for example, Turner 2001:485–495. 6) In point of fact, Löhr 1992:381–390 at 385, has already pointed out that Plotinus, in his criticism of Gnosticism, did not mention determinism as an important feature of their anthropological views. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 73 not characterize Gnostic anthropology. Rather than being pre-established and static, the Gnostic view of man appears very dynamic, as ethical progress was essential in order to follow the laborious path at the end of which the Gnostic individual could attain the desired fusion with the divinity and, thereby, salvation.7 Admittedly, the results of the important investigations that changed our understanding of Gnostic anthropology have only recently begun to replace older views and to permeate those of a wider public. In general, the biased and prejudiced expositions of the heresiologists obstinately persist beyond the conijined world of specialists. The homoiosis theo or likeness to god, provides us with an excellent occasion to restate some of these new insights. The analysis of its paramount position among Nag Hammadi texts will show both that this corpus provides a parallel to Middle Platonic views on the issue and that accusations of determinism and a lack of ethical concern were simple slanders coming from the Church fathers. This contribution is organized into three sections. The ijirst generally approaches the homoiosis theo in the Platonic dialogues and evaluates its appropriation by both Middle Platonism and the world of Gnosis. The second section offers an exposition of those Nag Hammadi writings that may allow a proper understanding of the meaning and goal of the homoiosis theo in the context of this corpus. The third section offers some closing remarks. Plato’s Conception of the homoiosis theo in Middle Platonism and Gnosis “Becoming god,” “becoming like god,” or “assimilating to god” are the standard translations of Plato’s ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ. In spite of some opinions to the contrary, this idea, of Pre-Socratic provenance,8 plays a central place in Plato’s works. According to the Pythagorean view of life reflected in a famous passage of the Theaetetus, “a man should make all haste to 7) The revision of this approach began with Schottroff 1969:65–97, but was further developed by many other studies: Pagels 1974:35–53; Desjardins 1990; Löhr 1992; Williams 1996:189–212; King 2003a:201–208; Luttikhuizen 2003:203–217 at 203–207; Luttikhuizen 2006:83–86. 8) On the Pre-Socratics, see most recently, Miller 2011:12–42, for the notion in Heraclitus, and 43–77, for Parmenides and Pythagoras. 74 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 escape from earth to heaven; and to escape is to become like god, so far as this is possible.”9 This straightforward and concise deijinition of the goal of human life relies on a number of assumptions, the most obvious of which is the Pythagorean soul-body dualism and its implicit hierarchy: while the former is the true, divine self, the latter is an odious accretion that hinders the fulijillment of the real “I.” The soul is of divine origin and shares with the gods its nature and character, namely immortality and rationality. However, due to it being forced to cope with the body — another assumption of Pythagorean origin — with its material urges and dependence on the external world due to being spellbound by sensory perception, the soul’s pristine divine nature appears to be degraded in the world of change. Human beings should live in accordance with the dictates of man’s highest and only divine element, but due to this unnatural mix and forced communion with the body, which is described in very dark hues as its prison or tomb, the soul is wholly oblivious of its own true origin and lives a life of servitude to it. This is the reason why, when dealing with the process by means of which man becomes god or like god, the texts speak of a “transformation” of the soul. Of course, the soul is originally divine and strictly speaking nothing can alter its nature, but conijined to the body it is denaturalized and needs to regain its pristine condition. Plato’s famous motto, the ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, the “likeness (or assimilation) to god as far as this is possible,” therefore presents this process as a sort of metamorphosis, as a change from the worst to the better that, however, requires man’s ijirm determination to purify his immortal nature from all the pollution proceeding from the mortal side of his being. How is this achieved? The answer depends on which dialogue we look at, since Plato seems to present a far from uniijied and deijinitive view of this process of liberation. In any case, however, the exercise of rationality and the avoidance of everything related to the physical realm seems to be a precondition, since, as the Phaedo puts it,10 “no one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life.” In this sense, philosophy 9) Plato, Theaetetus 176A–B. 10) Plato, Phaedo 82B 10–11. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 75 appears as the means to purify one’s soul from its impurity in order to present it without stain before the gods. Indeed, as is also the case with numerous essential aspects of his philosophy — I am thinking, for example, of his psychology or concept of the soul11 — Plato is far from offering a monolithic exposition of the homoiosis theo.12 In spite of the central place it already occupies in his earlier dialogues, the likeness to god is dealt with differently in various works.13 Alcinous, before proceeding to offer an overview of the different Platonic places dealing with the issue in his Handbook of Platonism, already states that Plato presented the idea in “various forms” (ποικίλως).14 This variety of approaches in Plato’s dialogues may be the reason why later Platonists, in an attempt to systematize this variety of views, even claimed that Plato, following the division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, approached the likeness to god physically in the Timaeus, ethically in the Republic and (epistemo)logically in the Theaetetus.15 However, Plato also dealt with the issue in several other dialogues, such as the Symposium, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus, and in the Laws.16 This is hardly the place to provide a thorough analysis of 11) For a synthesizing overview, see Roig Lanzillotta 2013. For a more extensive treatment, see Robinson 1995, 2002:37–55. 12) In spite of the repeated complaints by scholars regarding the absence of interest in and of studies on the “likeness to God” in Plato, there are, as a matter of fact, several interesting publications on the theme: Merki 1952; Müller 1965:180–193; Roloff 1970; Scheffel 1976:133–139; Sedley 1997:327–339; Annas 1999:52–71; Comoth 1999:69–75; Cooke 1999:37–44; Sedley 1999:309–328; Erler 2002:159–181; Russell 2004:241–260; Armstrong 2004:171–183; Baltzly 2004:297–321; Lavecchia 2006; see, most recently, Miller 2011. 13) Annas 1999:61. 14) Alcinous, Didaskalikos 181.20–21, on which see Dillon 1993:171–176. 15) Thus Stobaeus 2.49.18–22, who, according to some scholars seems to rely on the testimony of Eudorus. Dörrie and Baltes 1996:226–227, Baustein 101.3, have pointed out that this division is clearly artiijicial and has as its only basis the general view that the Theaetetus was a “logical” dialogue, while Timaeus and the Republic were physical and ethical. See on the issue, Dillon 1996:114–137; Sedley 1997:337; Erler 2002:159. That the view might originate in Eudorus, however, has been denied by Moraux 1973:266–271 and by Lévy 1990:50–65. 16) Plato’s homoiosis theo is dealt with in the following dialogues: Symposium 207E–209E; Theaetetus 176B–C; Republic 500B8–D1, 611D–E, 613A7–613B1; Laws 716C1– E2; Phaedo 64A–67E, 81A–84B; Phaedrus 245C–249A; Philebus 28C–30E; Timaeus 41D–47C, 90B6–D7. 76 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 the different characters and nuances of the Platonic passages. A short overview will sufijice to understand the hermeneutical difijiculties faced by later interpreters when approaching Plato’s motif. To begin with, I will refer to Diotima’s speech in the Symposium,17 since this passage was a fundamental one both for Middle Platonism and Gnosticism.18 In it the priestess states that every mortal creature aspires to immortality “as far as this is possible” and that procreation is the means to achieve this. Humans, however, have two modes at their disposal: procreation by means of the body and procreation by means of the soul. Even if the former may provide some kind of immortality — in fact the only one attainable in the realm of mortal corporeality — it is only through higher forms that humans really achieve their goal: the human quest for fame, virtue, and justice and especially the desire to engender moral goodness in others are attempts to reach immortality through man’s most divine part, to wit, the soul. It is in this way that humans come as close as possible to god.19 In contrast, the Republic and the Laws present a more moral approach to the homoiosis.20 Rather than being a means to achieve immortality, the likeness to god means maintaining a life of virtue that follows the pattern of god’s virtue.21 It might be that the difference in focus, when compared with the Symposium, is due to the fact that Plato at that stage of his career did not yet consider immortality as an intrinsic characteristic of the soul.22 The situation is different in the Republic and the Laws. Given that immortality is now inherent to the soul, man’s goal is to become like god as far as this is possible in this life. God is the measure of everything, and by following the divinity, namely by being pure and just, we maintain a life that is beneijicial both for ourselves and for the community. In both works, humans liken themselves to god by being virtuous,23 that is, by acting in and facing the world as they ijind it. 17) See Sedley 1999:310–311. 18) On the influence of this section of Plato’s Symposium on the Nag Hammadi writing called The Expository Treatise on the Soul, see Roig Lanzillotta 2010:401–420. 19) Plato, Symposium 207E–209E. 20) Plato, Republic 500B8–D1, 611D–E, 613A7–613B1; Laws 716C1–E2. 21) In general, see Russell 2004:243–244. 22) See Sedley 1999:310–311. 23) Plato, Republic 613A 8–B 1. On Plato’s homoiosis theo in the Republic see Cooke 1999:37–44. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 77 The Theaetetus and the Phaedo go a step further insofar as they combine the view that humans become assimilated to the divinity by means of virtue, with a rather negative conception of man’s life in the world of movement.24 Virtue is not recommended for the communal good in this world, but rather as an escape from it. According to the Theaetetus, only virtue is exclusively good and does not share the mixture of good and bad that characterizes human life. Since god is virtue par excellence, human beings attain the likeness to god by following a virtuous life and by attempting thereby to leave this life as soon as possible.25 In the Phaedo, Socrates deijines the true virtue of the philosopher, who “practices death” insofar as his dealings with the affairs of the soul and his neglect of those of the body — such as desire and sensory perception — allow him to separate the soul from the body as much as is possible. For Socrates, the true sage regards the body as a prison for the soul and knows that the only escape consists in rejecting everything that has to do with the former and concentrating on the latter.26 Not apatheia, but ataraxia is what characterizes the philosopher’s likeness to god. The “physical” explanation in the Timaeus may provide some clariijication as to why those who want to become assimilated to god should attempt to distance themselves from the world of change.27 Unlike the body, which is characterized by the six rectilinear motions proper to the sublunary world, the soul’s rational thought originally presents a circular motion, like that of the heavens. From the moment of birth, however, the pristine harmony of the soul’s circularity, attuned to the character of the eternal truths proper to it, is under pressure from sensory perception. The rectilinear motions distinctive of the senses and the influx of information conveyed by them tend to corrupt the soul’s original state. Consequently, those who desire to be like god should improve their condition by re-establishing the circular motions of their intellects. As Timaeus puts it: θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία, τὰς οἰκείας ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί· ταύταις 24) 25) 26) 27) See Annas 1999:58–62. Plato, Theaetetus 176A–B. See above, page 74 and note 9. Plato, Phaedo 67C, 83A. On the issue, see Sedley 1997:328–335, 1999:316–319. 78 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 δὴ συνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. And the way of tendance of every part by every man is one — namely, to supply each with its own congenial food and motion; and for the divine part within us the congenial motions are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe. These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe, and thereby making the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this likeness attain ijinally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come.28 David Sedley rightly comments that “the human soul’s capacity to pattern itself after a divine mind is far from accidental, but directly reflects the soul’s own nature and origin and the teleological structure of the world as a whole.”29 In point of fact, according to the Timaeus, the rational human soul was created of the same elements as the world soul, namely sameness, difference, and being, which constitute rational thought. God, being good, ungrudgingly desired that everything would be as good as himself and in order to attain this goal he bestowed the whole cosmos, the human soul included, with intelligence. However, what do we attain when we attune our minds to the mind of god? Human beings achieve happiness only when they recover the godlike state of their rational soul. The homoiosis theo is the process by which man frees his soul from everything mortal in order to attain the unrestrained exercise of his reason and achieve in this way the supreme fulijillment of his life. By doing, so the human soul regains its original divine form and consequently returns to its origin. Given the changing perspectives on the homoiosis theo provided by Plato’s dialogues, it is not striking to ijind certain hesitation in the later tradition as to the way it should be interpreted.30 As has been pointed 28) Plato, Timaeus 90C–D. Translation by Lamb 1925. 29) Sedley 1999:328. On the circularity of thought, see also Laws 898Aff; Aristotle, De anima 406B 26–407B 11. 30) On the interpretation of the homoiosis theo in later (Middle and Neo-)Platonism, see Dörrie 1960:223–225; Chroust 1972; see Belletti 1982 (Philo of Alexandria); Runia L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 79 out, interpreters are divided as to the moral or purely intellectual understanding of the homoiosis.31 Xenocrates,32 and probably Eudorus,33 Stobaeus,34 Philo,35 and Alcinous,36 saw the ideal state achieved by the likeness to god as essentially moral. Aristotle, at the other interpretive extreme, even if recognizing the preparatory value of practical virtue, saw the summit of the assimilation as a purely intellectual enterprise.37 On the basis of the testimony of Plutarch,38 who claimed the epoptic or contemplative character of the culmination of philosophy both for Plato 1986:341–344 (Philo of Alexandria); Becchi 1996 (Plutarch); Commoth 1999 (Origen); Helmig 2005 (Plutarch). 31) Sedley 1997:333–337. 32) Xenocrates fr. 236 Isnardi-Parent (apud Aristotle, Topics 112A36–38, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν. ταὺτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα). As Sedley 1999:322 note 18, rightly surmises, Xenocrates seems to be reinterpreting the etymology of Timaeus 90C. 33) Eudorus, test. 25 Mazzarelli; on which see Dörrie 1944:31–32. See also Dörrie and Baltes 1993:328 note 10. According to these scholars it was probably Eudorus who introduced the assimilation to god as a Platonic telos formula and would be followed in this by numerous later Platonists. 34) Stobaeus 2.49.8–25, in his interpretation, may rely on the testimony of another Platonist of the ijirst century b.c.e., such as Eudorus, since according to the testimony of Cicero, De ijin. 5.26, Antiochus of Ascalon still deijined the telos in a stoic fashion as “living in accordance with man’s nature.” On the moral interpretation of the telos formula, see Dörrie 1944:31–32; Dillon 1996:122–123. 35) Philo, Fug. 63; Opif. 144; On Philo’s use of Plato’s motif see Merki 1952:35–44; Belletti 1982:419–440; Runia 1986:341–343. 36) Alcinous’ moral interpretation of the assimilation to god goes so far as to differentiate between a god possessing virtues, namely the celestial god, and a god who is beyond it, namely the supercelestial one. See Alcinous, Didaskalikos 28; on which see Annas 1999:63–66 and, more recently, Baltzly 2004:300. 37) Aristotle, NE 1177A12–1179A33. 38) Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 382D–E, “But the apperception of the conceptual, the pure, and the simple, shining through the soul like a flash of lightning, affords an opportunity to touch and see it but once. For this reason Plato and Aristotle call this part of philosophy the epoptic or mystic part, inasmuch as those who have passed beyond these conjectural and confused matters of all sorts by means of Reason proceed by leaps and bounds to that primary, simple, and immaterial principle; and when they have somehow attained contact with the pure truth abiding about it, they think that they have the whole of philosophy completely, as it were, within their grasp.” In the case of Plato, the epoptic telos of philosophy was already stated by Timaeus Lokros fr. 83 Marg; on which see Baltes 1972:236, by Plutarch himself in different places 80 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 and Aristotle, Philip Merlan has already stressed that for Aristotle the process of knowledge seems to culminate in an intuitive, non-discursive act of intelligence.39 Support for this view comes from the Eudemian Ethics, which equates the human telos to the unrestrained contemplation of the divinity: θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν.40 So too does the Nicomachean Ethics. After devoting ten books to a description of the human telos as a life of moral virtue, Aristotle asserts in the last paragraphs that the highest human happiness is theoria or contemplation. According to the Philosopher, it is in this act that we are most assimilated to the gods, since in it we are using our most divine element, the intellect.41 Signiijicantly, in this context Aristotle introduces a sentence reminiscent of the Platonic ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, when he afijirms that theoria is that by virtue of which we may achieve, as far as this is possible, immortality (1177B 33, ἑφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν):42 ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλ’ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ· Such a life as this however, will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man’s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.43 (see De def. orac. 422C; Quaest. Conv. 718D–E) and by Justin, Dial. cum Tryph. 2,6; on which see Dörrie and Baltes 1996:252–253. 39) Merlan 1963:30–35. 40) Merlan 1963:34; Ross 1953. 41) NE 1177A12–18. 42) On the issue, see Merlan 1963:34; Sedley 1999:325. 43) Aristotle, NE 1177B27–35. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 81 It is therefore no surprise that Middle Platonists influenced by Aristotle, such as Apuleius44 or Plutarch,45 maintained that the likeness to god was achieved by combining a practical and a theoretical life. The Republic, by the way, was also seen to provide some support for this view, insofar as it endorsed the value of moral virtue, but attributed complete happiness to the godlike state of contemplation alone: Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος — τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν — ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα. Then the other so-called virtues of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit and practice. But the excellence of thought, it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality.46 Interestingly, both of these Middle Platonic interpretations of Plato’s ὁμοῖωσις θεῷ are well attested to in Nag Hammadi writings. On the one hand, some texts offer a mainly moral interpretation of godlikeness and simply focus on the ethical perspective that allows the individual to shun his material being and to concentrate on his divine nature. On the other, several texts of this corpus present an interesting combination of a moral and an intellectualistic conception of the homoiosis theo. In this amalgamation they seem to be following the contemporary Middle Platonic authors who, under the influence of Aristotle, allotted moral virtues a sort of preparatory role in the attainment of the highest intellectual virtue. This combination of practical and theoretical life in the attainment of the likeness to god perfectly suited Gnostic cosmology and anthropology, since it provided an interesting soteriological framework in which assimilation could begin in this life, even though its supreme fulijillment took place after death with the so-called ascent of the soul.47 44) Apuleius, De Platone 2.23, with Dillon 1996:335. 45) Plutarch, De sera num. vind. 550D–E and fragment 143 Sandbach, with Dillon 1996:192–193. 46) Plato, Republic 518D–E. Translation by P. Shorey 1969. 47) See on the issue Luttikhuizen 2006:83–96, especially 95–96. 82 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 The Assimilation to God in Nag Hammadi Texts Given the amalgamation of Pythagorean lore regarding world and man in Plato’s dialogues and the complete absorption of the latter in Gnostic texts, it is no surprise to ijind in Nag Hammadi the same views regarding both human origins and their current condition. In Gnostic cosmology and anthropology, the world and the physical body are conceived of as a prison for the divine spark, which individuals must by all means attempt to liberate from its conijinement. Against the testimony of antiheretical writers, who were fond of attributing to Gnostics a theory of anthropological predestination,48 every human being is endowed with this godly element, but not everyone is aware of it. Those who pay heed to the divine external call, however, after being reminded of their divine origin and destination, are given the chance to progressively detach themselves from the world of change. In this context, Gnostic texts present the same seeming ambiguity we found in Plato’s dialogues: even if man’s nature is undoubtedly divine, when dealing with the need to liberate humans from their current condition, the texts nevertheless speak of “transformation.” “Becoming one from above,” “becoming spiritual,” “becoming male,”49 and “becoming divine”50 are the normal expressions to describe this.51 Of course, the question arises concerning why, if human beings are already divine, a metamorphosis is necessary at all. The answer to this question is that 48) See above note 4. 49) On this expression, see Vogt 1991. See below pages 89 and 95 with note 102. 50) Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) 53.18–19 afijirms “I became divine”; see also 44.18–22. On the issue, see Luttikhuizen 2007:766. 51) See, for example, ApJames (NHC I,2) 6.19–20: “Make yourselves like the son of the Holy Spirit”; 13.13–17: “Once more I reprove you, you who are; become like those who are not, that you may be with those who are not; 16.20–21: “Endeavor earnestly then to make yourselves like them”; GosPhil (NHC II,3) 78.24–79.13: “Now you who live together with the Son of God, love not the world, but love the Lord, in order that those you will bring forth may not resemble the world, but may resemble the Lord”; ApocAdam (NHC V,5) 64.14–15. See also the text of TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 94.19–29 (below, page 90 and note 74). In general, see most recently, Lundhaug 2010. For the Hermetic parallels to this notion see CH 13.3 on the palingenesia or “regeneration,” after which the individual, having left behind every distortion proceeding from his material body, is able to focus on the intellect and, consequently, to assimilate himself to god. On the issue, see Festugière 1967:61–64 and Luck 1991:31–41. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 83 we are still moving within a Platonic worldview. As we saw above, the transformation alluded to in Plato’s dialogues had to do with man’s current condition, namely his mixed nature, combining a divine and immortal nucleus with a mortal and degraded envelope. Gnostic writings describe this anthropological framework by means of an anthropogonical myth that accounts for man’s ontological status. In the same way that human beings are consubstantial with the highest God and, in this sense, possess the divine spark that allows them to liberate themselves from their degraded condition, they also participate in the astral region (or archontic deities) who are responsible for the lower aspects of the human being, namely the soul and the body, the prison in which the spark has been locked up.52 As in Plato’s conception referred to above, oblivion is the ijirst consequence of the contact with the physical world. As a result, the divine spark is numbed under the influence of externality. Given the mixed nature of the human condition, the transformation behind the assimilation to god in Nag Hammadi texts implies, ijirst, paying heed to the external (or internal) call that awakens the divine spark, then negating everything that is material and, ijinally, concentrating on our divine inner nature. Leaving now aside the ijirst step in this process, in the following pages I will focus on the latter two. By focusing on their inner being of divine origin, Gnostics assimilate to God. To do so, individuals must ijirst engage in a laborious process of deconstruction intended to neutralize the obstacles proceeding both from the body and the physical world and from the soul. It is in this context that ethics — also contrary to the black-and-white interpretation of the heresiologists53 — plays a central role.54 In addition to the scintilla animae and the external call, ethics was seen as essential during this life, since it provided the means for the intellect’s unrestrained contemplation of that which is really existent.55 Gnostics saw their life 52) According to King 1995:85–86, the Apocryphon of John provides an account of the mixed nature of the human by describing two ancestral lines, one of continuity uniting Gnostics to the unknowable Father through the line of Man, Adam, and Seth (BG 48.4–49.6) and another of discontinuity, relating them to Sophia and Yaldabaoth, who by means of the counterfeit spirit (NHC II,1: 24.26–31) leads men astray. 53) See Iren., Adv. haer. 1.13.3; 1.6.3–4; 1.25.3. 54) See Wisse 1975:55–86; see also, Rudolph 1990:261–293; Desjardins 1990; Williams 1996; and recently Tite 2009. 55) See TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 113,33–114,6. Translation by Peel and Zandee 1996:248–369. 84 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 as a contest in which they did their best to resist both the external and internal influences that could distract them from their main goal. The Authoritative Teaching (NHC VI,3) provides a nice example of this rather widespread view:56 He, then, the Father, wishing to reveal his wealth and his glory, brought about this great contest in this world, wishing to make the contestants appear, and make all those who contend leave behind the things that had come into being, and despise them with a lofty, incomprehensible knowledge, and flee to the one who exists.57 Consequently, even if not explicitly mentioned, the homoiosis theo pervades numerous texts of the Nag Hammadi corpus.58 As already advanced, Nag Hammadi texts move between two interpretative poles, namely the ethical and epistemological perspectives of the assimilation to god. The Ethical Interpretation of the Assimilation Some texts indeed seem to focus on the ethical side of the process of assimilation. Given that man’s interior is of divine origin, the assimilation seems to consist in neutralizing every single aspect that may pose a threat to the fulijillment of the process of interiorization. All alien influences ought to be shunned in order to be able to focus on one’s divine nucleus. At a certain stage, self-knowledge is achieved, and this knowledge of the self is equated to knowledge of the divine. This interpretation of the homoiosis theo in ethical terms is especially current in those Nag Hammadi texts endorsing standard Platonic anthropological and cosmological dualism, namely a bipartite view of man and of the world. In the same way that Plato opposed ideas to matter, this group of texts simply distinguish spiritual and physical realities, 56) Asceticism and the rejection of the world was a central issue in fact, of which the Acts of Peter and the Twelve Apostles (NHC VI,1) 5.19–6.8 or the GosThom (21b; 58) provide adequate testimony. 57) See also AuthTeach (NHC VI,3) 26.8–26. Translation by MacRae 1979:257–289. 58) We do ijind, however, Coptic attempts to render the transformation implied by the Greek term ὁμοῖωσις, notably the verbs EINE and TONTN, expressing in this context the notion “to become like,” “be like” God. See Siegert 1992, s.v. EINE (50B) “gleichen”; TONTN (237C), “gleichen, angleichen” and SHOPE (322A) “werden.” L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 85 and contrast the inner and true being with the external and material sensible one. The emphasis on the practical side of assimilation seems to be due to the fact that moral virtue allows the individual to focus on that aspect of his being that is closest to God. By means of ethical effort, individuals are, on the one hand, capable of neutralizing appearances that reach them through sensory perception; on the other hand, moral virtue allows them to control everything irrational within the soul, in this way limiting and eliminating possible influences from the passions. Having thus cut off all possible harmful external and internal influences, individuals are now able to concentrate on their real nature. In a passage which recalls Plato’s description of the true virtue of the philosopher in the Phaedo,59 the Sentences of Sextus (NHC XII,1) asserts that only he who pays heed to inner being is really wise: No man who <looks> down upon the earth and upon tables is wise. The philosopher who is an outer body, he is not the one to whom it is ijitting to pay respect, but (the) philosopher according to the inner man.60 According to the dualistic view, standard in these texts, the physical body is an odious accretion, something alien to man’s real nature. Consequently, the likeness to god attainable during this life is equated to taking distance from the tangible world and everything material and to focusing on the man within. This is the only way to recover our original divine nature. Indeed, the Hermetic treatise Asclepius, a version of which is preserved in the Nag Hammadi codices (NHC VI,8),61 states that man has a double nature: one is simple and divine, and the other is material (ὑλικός) and formed out of the four elements. True, due to Stoic influence the Asclepius retains a positive view of the body, but it nevertheless stresses the higher quality of man’s “essential” part by describing it as “divine,” “eternal,” and “substantial”: it is through this part that man ascends to heaven.62 The important ethical dimension of this worldview can be seen in the fact that this attitude positively affects both the individual and 59) 60) 61) 62) See above p. 77 and note 26. SentSextus (NHC XII,1) 34.16–20. Translation by Wisse 1990:295–321. See Dirkse and Parrot 1979:399–451. Asclepius 10 (308.23–309.1 NF). 86 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 community. From an individual perspective, the ethical side of the likeness to god manifests itself as a process of preparation, through which the individual releases the “man within” from the “net of flesh” of the body, as The Interpretation of Knowledge (NHC XI,1) puts it.63 The goal is then to free oneself from the temporary residence in which humanity has been imprisoned by the rulers and authorities, who, in Pauline fashion, seem to govern the lower world of matter.64 From a communal perspective, once the individual has achieved the likeness to god as far as this is possible in this life, he may help others to do so as well. As The Letter of Peter to Philip (NHC VIII,2) asserts, Gnostics have to struggle against the “authorities” in order to “strip off . . . what is corrupted” and free the inner man from his imprisonment. Having achieved this, they must become “illuminators in the midst of mortal men.” Passages like this seem to disprove the alleged solipsistic character of Gnostic idiosyncrasy, as described by Hans Jonas.65 In this sense, Kurt Rudolph66 rightly emphasizes a central passage of the Gospel of Philip (NHC II,3) in which the communal obligations67 of those who ijind freedom through knowledge come to the fore: “But ‘Love builds up’ (1 Co 8:1). In fact, he who is really free, through knowledge, is a slave, because of love for those who have not yet been able to attain to the freedom of knowledge. Knowledge makes them capable of becoming free.”68 63) InterprKnow (NHC XI,1) 6.30–35. For a similar but more general opposition see SentSextus (NHC XII,1) 34.16–20; GosPhil (NHC II,3) 82.30–83.9. For the notion of the body as “net of flesh,” see Aristotle, GA 734A16–20 with Bos 2003:338. 64) InterprKnow (NHC XI,1) 6.26–38. 65) Jonas 1964:170–171. 66) Rudolph 1987:264. 67) EpPetPhil (NHC VIII,2) 137,4–9. This communal perspective has been emphasized by Ménard 1977:44, who refers to GosThom 24, in which the same aspect comes to the fore: “There is light within a man of light, and he lights up the whole world. If he does not shine, he is darkness.” See also Bethge 1997:106. 68) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 77.15–35. Translation by Isenberg 2000:129–215. On the morality of the Gospel of Philip, see Turner 1996:198–205. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 87 The Combination of the Ethical and Epistemological Interpretation of the Assimilation As noted above, however, there is a group of texts in which the homoiosis theo has a marked epistemological character. This approach can be seen in those Nag Hammadi texts, indeed the most numerous, that develop Plato’s basic soul-body bipartition towards a tripartite view, distinguishing intellect, soul, and body. This development has important consequences not only for the anthropological and cosmological background of the texts, but also for the theme we are dealing with. As to the former, the conception of man in this group of texts replaces the soul with the intellect, which assumes the highest position in the human hierarchy. Most importantly, not only is the intellect higher than the soul, but it is also man’s only immortal part: the soul is no longer conceived of as divine and everlasting, as was the case in the previous bipartite anthropological scheme, but clearly as mortal.69 Accordingly, the view on the cosmos is slightly altered, with one region, the astral sphere, being added to the divine and sublunar realms of the bipartite schemes. Thanks to the strict correlation between the cosmological and anthropological schemes70 the different aspects in man are conceived of as belonging to one cosmological region. After death, the body returns to the elements, the soul is given back to the archons who populate the astral region, and the nous or the pneuma speeds to its divine abode. As far as the influence of this new scheme on the theme we are dealing with is concerned, the homoiosis theo experiences an interesting shift, since the practical side leaves room for a more contemplative kind of assimilation. Of course, the ethical aspect still plays a very important role, but it acquires a marked preparatory character. As was also the case in the previous group of texts, the “likeness to god as far as this is attainable during this life” is achieved by controlling, by means of reason, the bodily and psychic accretions and by focusing on man’s only godly element, the intellect. Once freed from the pressure of both, the intellect is able to develop the activity proper to it, which is theoria 69) For the Aristotelian background of this assertion see Bos 2001:57–70, passim and Bos 2003:280. 70) On the issue, see Roig Lanzillotta 2013. 88 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 or contemplation.71 It is at this moment that the individual attains the desired fusion with the divine resulting from this vision. This is the homoiosis theo in the highest degree. I think that the Aristotelian influence mediated by some Middle Platonic authors on this group of texts is not only visible in the tripartite anthropological and cosmological patterns, but also in the auxiliary function of ethical virtue, which allows for the preparatory stage that will open the door to the ijinal completion of the homoiosis theo, namely contemplation. In addition, the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover also lurks behind the epistemological godlikeness. Given that God is conceived of in Aristotelian fashion as a transcendent Intellect or nous beyond the world of discursive knowledge, the assimilation strives to achieve the intuitive and immediate kind of apprehension proper to it. The Ethical Preparation The Treatise on Resurrection (NHC I,4)72 provides us with an interesting example of this combination of the preparatory and deijinitive kinds of assimilation to god. The text predictably focuses on the highest achievement of the spiritual resurrection, which equates to the ascent of the soul by means of which people may recover what “belongs to them.” The “spiritual resurrection, which swallows up the psychic in the same way as the fleshly,” allows the transformation of the soul, by which it recovers its primal divine status.73 However, the assimilation to God taking place now is but the culmination of a laborious process that began much earlier: Rheginus, do not get lost in details, nor live according to the flesh for the sake of harmony. Flee from divisions and bonds, and then you already have resurrection . . . 71) Most of the texts are not explicit as to whether this supreme stage is achieved during this life or after death (see, however, below). Perhaps from their perspective this aspect was not even relevant. What they do explicitly emphasize, however, is the epistemological character of the assimilation. 72) See TreatRes (NHC I,4) 45.39–46.2; Peel 1985:137–215; Peel 1969:48–49, 74–75, 112–13, 148; Layton 1971: 65–66, 71–73, 78, 82–84; GosMary (BG 1) 10.14–16. 73) TreatRes (NHC I,4) 45.40–46.2. Translation by Peel 1985:123–57. On the notion of resurrection, see Ménard 1983:12–20, 65. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 89 Everyone needs to practice ways to be released from this element so as not to wander in error.74 As the Treatise afijirms, the resurrection has already begun. Resurrection, or assimilation, begins in this world by means of searching for the unity lost in the dispersal. The term used to describe it, to wit “practice” (γυμνάζω), emphasizes the ethical character of this work in the process of annihilating every source of distortion: individuals ought to overcome the division and dispersion occasioned by both body and material world. It is this process that enables the desired assimilation to the divine, the resurrection in the strict sense of the word, through which Rheginus may supersede the illusion of appearances: The world is illusion . . . The resurrection is different. It is real, it stands ijirm. It is the revelation of what is, a transformation of things, a transition into newness. Incorruptibility [flows] over corruption, light flows over darkness, swallowing it, fullness ijills what it lacks. These are the symbols and images of the resurrection. This brings goodness.75 Control of body and soul as a preparation for the supreme fulijillment or homoiosis theo also comes to the fore in The Teachings of Silvanus (NHC VII,4). Self-knowledge helps the individual to recognize the mortal parts of his being in order to reject everything that is alien and “become male,” a favorite metaphor pointing to the assimilation to the divine.76 Again, the preparatory ethical process is presented as a contest in which individuals must ijight against robbers who try catch them.77 Struggle and continuous effort will free the mind from the chains of body and soul78 74) TreatRes (NHC I,4) 49.9–16. 75) TreatRes (NHC I,4) 48.27–49.7. 76) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 92.34–93.24. On the expression see above, note 49 and below notes 102. 77) AuthTeach (NHC VI,3) 26.8–26. See supra p. 84 and note 57. See on the notion of the robbers ExSoul (NHC II,6) 127.27. On the Aristotelian background of this motif, see Bos 2003:315–357 on Aristotle’s Protrepticus 10b Ross. 78) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 113.31–114.30: “Then beware, lest somehow you fall into the hands of robbers. Do not allow sleep to your eyes nor drowsiness to your eyelids, that you may be saved like a gazelle from nets, and like a bird from a trap. Fight the great ijight as long as the ijight lasts, while all the powers are staring after you — not only the holy ones, but also all the powers of the Adversary.” 90 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 thus enabling the attainment of the last stage, also described using the well-known metaphor of the bridal chamber, the waiting room, as it were, in which individuals attend the ijinal reunion with the divinity: O obstinate soul, be sober and shake off your drunkenness, which is the work of ignorance. If you are obstinate and live in the body, you dwell in a boorish condition. When you have entered into a bodily birth, you were begotten. [When you were born again] you came to be in the bridal chamber, and you were illuminated in mind.79 At this point, individuals are prepared to start the flight to their origin, to God: “Listen, my son, and do not be slow with your ears. Raise yourself up when you have left your old man behind like an eagle.”80 This very last stage, however, can only be achieved by the intellect, by the highest and only divine element in man, since the “divine mind . . . has come into being in conformity with the image of God. The divine mind has the substance of God.”81 Whether externally or internally induced, divine knowledge is essential to start the process of introspection. The Hermetic Prayer of Thanksgiving (NHC VI,7) therefore praises God for making himself accessible: We rejoice, having been illuminated by Your knowledge. We rejoice because You have shown us Yourself. We rejoice because while we were in (the) body, You have made us divine through Your knowledge.82 Behind this conception we see the old Pre-Socratic principle of “like knows like,” which implies a necessary consubstantiality between the subject and object of knowledge. As the eleventh Hermetic tract emphatically afijirms, “If you do not make yourself like God, you cannot know God, for like can only be known by like.”83 It is the previous ethical process that allows the Gnostic to eschew everything alien from his 79) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 94.19–29. 80) TeachSilv (NHC VII,4) 114.15–19. 81) TeachSilv (NHC VII, 4) 92.23–26. 82) PrThanks (NHC VI,7) 64.16–19. For the Coptic version of the Prayer of Thanksgiving along with the Greek version, preserved in the Papyrus Mimaut, and its Latin version in Asclepius 41b, see Dirkse and Brashler 1979:375–387. 83) CH XII 20. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 91 being, to shun the likeness of the soul and that of the body and to retain only that which makes him divine, to wit the spirit. This principle is clearly stated in the Gospel of Philip: Members of a race usually have associated with those of like race. So spirit mingles with spirit, and thought consorts with thought, and light shares with light. If you are born a human being, it is the human being who will love you. If you become a spirit, it is the spirit which will be joined to you. If you become thought, it is thought which will mingle with you. If you become light, it is the light which will share with you. If you become one of those who belong above, it is those who belong above who will rest upon you.84 As we saw above, human beings are endowed from the beginning with the divine spark and are potentially divine. At the same time, however, they also share the likeness of the lower world. It is up to them to choose one or the other: If you become horse or ass or bull or dog or sheep, or another of the animals which are outside or below, then neither human being nor spirit nor thought nor light will be able to love you. Neither those who belong above nor those who belong within will be able to rest in you, and you have no part in them.85 The Apocryphon of John mythologically describes the contest between man’s true spiritual (or intellectual) nature and his psychic and physical being by presenting it as a contest between the Father and the lower creator god, who ijight, as it were, for the conquest of man.86 The likeness of the Father is counteracted by the Demiurge or lower creator god, who “planted (in Adam) sexual desire . . . that gave birth to a copy from their counterfeit spirit.”87 This counterfeit spirit, agglutinating body and soul, intends to lead men astray, impeding in this way man’s likeness to God.88 Ethics, however, helps humans to supersede their deijicient likeness in order to reach their spiritual nature or likeness of the Father: 84) 85) 86) 87) 88) GosPhil (II,3) 78.27–79.5. GosPhil (II,3) 79.5–13. Luttikhuizen 2006:44, 50–58. ApJohn (BG) 63.5–9. Translation according to Waldstein and Wisse 1995. ApJohn (NHC II,1) 29.23–25. 92 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 Those on whom the Spirit of life will descend and (with whom) he will be with the power, they will be saved and become perfect and be worthy of the greatness and be puriijied in that place from all wickedness and the involvements in evil. Then they have no other care than the incorruption alone, to which they direct their attention from here on, without anger or envy or jealousy or desire and greed of anything. They are not affected by anything except the state of being in the flesh alone, which they bear while looking expectantly for the time when they will be met by the receivers (of the body). Such then are worthy of the imperishable, eternal life and the calling. For they endure everything and bear up under everything, that they may ijinish the good ijight and inherit eternal life.89 Scholars interpret this section as a state of apatheia as an “eradication of passions,”90 but in my view it is better described as one of ataraxia or “imperturbability,” in which the individual, by means of ethical effort, namely metriopatheia or “moderation of the passions,” continuously monitors new threats proceeding from the outside world in order to turn himself inwards. This is clear in the ApJohn, since even if not affected by anything else, individuals still have to cope with their being in the flesh. In all the other texts referred to until now the dynamic character of ethical progress seems to point in the same direction. The state of ataraxia or “imperturbability” attained by means of self-knowledge and the determination to despise everything related to soul and body is not as deijinitive as one could expect from a state of apatheia. Rather, it is under the continuous threat of appearances and passions. In dealing with the world and with appearances, however, the focus on the ijinal destination helps individuals to overcome external threats. In fact, the ijirm determination to achieve the ijinal and higher goal allows Gnostics to re-characterize their value framework: . . . neither are the good good, nor the evil evil, nor is life life, nor death death. This is why each one will dissolve into its original source. But those who are exalted above the world will not be dissolved, for they are eternal.91 What is ethically correct is not established by worldly standards, but rather by a purpose to become assimilated to the divine: everything 89) ApJohn (NHC II,1) 25.23–26.3. 90) King 1995:88. 91) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 53.17–23. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 93 that may be a threat to this development is morally wrong. This aspect also comes to the fore in the Gospel of Mary, when Peter asks the Savior what sin is. He then answers, “There is no such thing as sin; rather you yourselves are what produces sin when you act in accordance with the nature of adultery, which is called ‘sin.’ ”92 This “nature of adultery” refers, according to a rather widespread Gnostic metaphor, to one’s inner core’s interaction with the world of matter, which was conceived of as “unnatural” to such an extent that the Expository Treatise on the Soul (NHC II,6) describes it as prostitution and rape.93 The point is that, as Karen King puts it, “like adultery, sin joins together what should not be mixed: in this case, material and spiritual natures. Attachment to the material world constitutes adulterous consorting against one’s own spiritual nature.”94 The likeness to god, in contrast, helps individuals overcome the shortcomings of their phenomenal being. They achieve this by means of the mind, which, as we saw above, has the substance of God. The Savior therefore afijirms in GosMary that “where the mind is, there is the treasure.”95 The Epistemological Culmination It is precisely due to the adulterous association of the soul with the tangible world96 that likeness to god is necessary. This transformative process will allow individuals, ijirst, to recover their pristine nature in order to participate, once the assimilation has been fulijilled, in the ijinal fusion of like and like. However, in order to do so the metamorphosis must also include, strictly speaking, worldly sorts of cognition, namely discursive thinking. As GosPhil puts it: It is not possible for anyone to see anything of the things that actually exist unless he becomes like them. This is not the way with man in the world: he sees the sun without being a sun; and he sees the heaven and the earth and all other things, but he is not these things. This is quite in keeping with the truth. But you saw 92) GosMary (BG 8502,1) 7.10–16. Translation by Wilson and Parrot 1979:453–471. 93) ExSoul (NHC II,6) 127.18–128.17. On the issue, see Roig Lanzillotta 2010:403–408. 94) King 2003b:50. 95) GosMary (BG 8502,1) 10.15–16. 96) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 61.10–12, “every association which came into being between those unlike one another is adultery.” 94 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 something of that place, and you became those things. You saw the Spirit, you became spirit. You saw Christ, you became Christ. You saw the Father, you shall become Father. So in this place you see everything and do not see yourself, but in that place you do see yourself — and what you see you shall become.97 The ijirst part encourages individuals to supersede a discursive kind of knowledge, which is alluded to by the differentiation between the subject and object of knowledge; the second describes the intuitive and direct apprehension of the really existent. It is at this moment of contemplation that the supreme fulijillment is achieved. The lines separating the subject and object of knowledge are blurred and they fuse into one single supra-rational, intuitive act. It seems clear that behind these views we ijind Middle Platonic discussions both on the nature of God and the ways to access him. Given that God is conceived of as completely transcending the realm of being, knowledge of him cannot be reached through worldly means. The famous Middle Platonic quattuor viae for the knowledge of God, indeed build on human worldly epistemological means with a view to purifying human beings and preparing them for a higher sort of acquaintance with the divine: negation, eminence, analogy, and imitation are the four scholastic ways through which the individual may supersede discursive means of knowledge in order to attain contemplation or direct and intuitive knowledge.98 As a matter of fact, there is a group of texts that tends to obviate the preparatory ethical side of the process of assimilation and directly focus on the higher form of the homoiosis, namely the epistemological path that ijinally leads Gnostics beyond discursivity to an intuitive knowledge of God. Interestingly, these treatises at the same time tend to ignore the external intervention of divine revealers: knowledge of God does not result from revelation, but rather from a process of spiritual ascent for which the experience of a visionary ijigure provides an example.99 Indeed Marsanes (NHC X), Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1), and 97) GosPhil (NHC II,3) 61.20–35. 98) On the use of these four ways, its application and precedents, see Roig Lanzillotta 2007:205–07. For Middle Platonic expositions on the issue, see Alcinous, Didask. 165.14– 34; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 11.11b; Origen, Contra Celsum 7.42. On the issue, see Dörrie 1960:213–214; Dillon 1993:107–110, Turner 2001:481–495. 99) Turner 2001:637. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 95 Allogenes (NHC XI,3) are named after these visionaries, whose ascent is conceived of mainly from a cognitive perspective100 and includes, as John Turner conveniently summarizes, three stages: the ijirst is the “preliminary, earthly stage of discursive cognition that sufijices to distinguish the corporeal . . . realm of becoming from the eternal, changeless realm of incorporeal essences”; then we have the second, “a non-discursive cognition of the realm of pure, incorporeal being induced by an outof-body contemplative ascent to the divine intellect or its equivalent.” The third and ijinal stage is that of a “non-cognitive contemplation of supreme principles that are altogether beyond being in which both the psycho-physical and the intellectual faculties have been abandoned.”101 Of course, the ethical aspect can still be recognized in stage one, since the goal is still avoidance of every distortion proceeding both from body and soul. Man needs to flee from every source of distortion or, according to the metaphor referred to above associating rationality with masculinity and the rest with femininity, from “the madness and the bondage of femaleness and choose for the salvation of maleness.”102 However, the process of liberation from these constrictions seems to be more of an intellectual than a behavioral kind. As Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) puts it: After I parted from the somatic darkness in me and the psychic chaos in mind and the feminine desire . . . in the darkness, I did not use it again. After I found the inijinite part of my matter, then I reproved the dead creation within me and the divine Cosmocrator of the perceptible (world) by preaching powerfully about the All to those with alien parts.103 100) The ascent pattern of these three Nag Hammadi texts has been dealt with by Luttikhuizen 2007:764–770. 101) See Turner 2001:637–692. 102) Zostrianos (VIII,1) 131.5–8. Translation by Sieber 1991:30–225. 103) Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) 1.10–21. This cognitive approach of the ijirst stage is perhaps even clearer in the beginning of Marsanes (NHC X) 4.24–5.21: “For I am he who has understood that which truly exists, whether partially or wholly, according to difference and sameness, that they exist from the beginning in the entire place which is eternal, <i.e.> all those that have come into existence, whether without being or with being, those who are unbegotten, and the divine aeons, together with the angels, and the souls which are without guile, and the soul-garments, the likenesses of the simple ones. And afterwards, they have been mixed with . . . them. But still . . . the entire being . . . which imitates the incorporeal being and the unsubstantial (fem.). Finally the entire deijilement was saved, together with the immortality of the former (fem.). I have deliberated, 96 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 In any case, this ijirst stage allows the second one, in which the visionaries attain non-discursive cognition of the really existent. This phase is essential for the last stage, since it shows the way to the ijinal contemplation of the supreme principles, the stage in which the Unknowable God is reached by means of “ignorant knowledge.” As the revelation of the Luminaries of Allogenes (NHC XI,3) puts it: And when you receive a revelation of him by means of a primary revelation of the Unknown One — the One whom if you should know him, be ignorant of him — and you become afraid in that place, withdraw to the rear because of the activities. And when you become perfect in that place, still yourself. And in accordance with the pattern that indwells you, know likewise that it is this way in all such (matters) after this pattern. And do not further dissipate, so that you may be able to stand, and do not desire to be active, lest you fall in any way from the inactivity in you of the Unknown One. Do not know him, for it is impossible; but if by means of an enlightened thought you should know him, be ignorant of him.104 The superseding of every physical and psychic accretion allows the recovery of the primary intellectual nature of our being. The attainment of the Unknowable One, however, requires that we abandon every activity proper to this intellectual nature as well. Desire to know should also be left behind in order to recover the characteristic inactivity and stillness of the ijirst principle. The ignorant knowledge of the One implies overcoming all single aspects of our phenomenal being, the recovery of the divine pattern dwelling in us, and the passive vision of the One according to that pattern. It is at this moment that the ijinal assimilation to God takes place. Once subject and object fuse in the same passive act they become one single reality. Closing Remarks Independently of the interpretation one gives it, whether ontological or moral, whether physical or epistemological, the Platonic homoiosis and have attained to the boundary of the sense-perceptible world. <I have come to know> part by part the entire place of the incorporeal being, and <I> have come to know the intelligible world. <I have come to know>, when <I> was deliberating, whether in every respect the sense-perceptible world is worthy of being saved entirely.” 104) Allogenes (XI,3) 59.26–60.12. Translation by Turner 1990:192–241. L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 97 theo appears as pure optimism. In spite of the rather negative view of physical life and of the worldly context in which it takes place, the conijidence that human effort may attain the desired liberation from its constrictions is clearly optimistic. In fact, the homoiosis theo is the process through which human beings, aware of their present mortal shortcomings, but also of their pristine divine nature, engage in a personal development that will ijinally change their nature for the better, that will help them to attain divinity as far as this is possible — which, by the way, in the Platonic sense does not mean impossible. Given the variety of approaches to this process in Plato’s dialogues, it is not surprising that Middle Platonists, in their appropriation of the Platonic principle, also interpreted it in diverse ways. Some Middle Platonists clearly adopt an ethical interpretation of the homoiosis, since it was presented as telos or “goal” of man’s life, which occupied a central place in Hellenistic and Late Antique discussions on ethics. Another group of Middle Platonists, however, under the influence of Aristotle, tends to prefer the epistemological interpretation. True, they retain the value of the ethical process, but more as a preparation for the higher fulijillment of assimilation, which took place once all worldly ties, even those of discursive reasoning, had been left behind. One ijinds precisely the same approach in Nag Hammadi texts that deal with the assimilation to God, by which they obviously meant the highest, transcendent, and unknowable God. The ethical and the epistemological approaches to the likeness to God that we ijind in Nag Hammadi texts simply echo the same interpretations one ijinds in contemporary Middle Platonism. Against the testimony of anti-heretical writings and some modern approaches to the world of Gnosticism, the analysis of the Nag Hammadi corpus allows us to afijirm that the worldview behind it is optimistic rather than pessimistic. Admittedly, the view of the world we live in and our physical body is certainly negative and is often presented in very dark hues. The myth of the cave in Plato’s Republic and the flight from this world in the Phaedo, however, seem to provide sufijicient precedent for these views, and no one would label (pace Nietszche) Plato’s philosophy pessimistic. Gnostics, it is true, to a certain extent radicalize Plato’s dualism, since it now affects not only cosmology and anthropology, but also theology. However, this radicalization also reaches the very concept of the 98 L. Roig Lanzillotta / Numen 60 (2013) 71–102 assimilation to god, by means of which humanity could be freed from the oppression of existence. On the one hand, we see a higher conijidence in the possibility of salvation, which is attained by recovering the unmixed nature of one’s divine condition. One may even say that they drop the end of Plato’s motto, namely the expression of kata to dunaton, “as far as this is possible,” since either through revealers or by personal development individuals are always granted the vision of their real self. 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