The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look

The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look* zyxw zyxwv zyxw zyxw zyx RICHARD H. IMMERMAN Comparisons between Dwight D. Eisenhower’s policies toward Indochina and those of his successors have served as a principal catalyst driving scholars to revise orthodox critiques of the president’s diplomatic record.’ The barometer for the positive reappraisal is, of course, the administration’sdecision not to intervene during the Dienbienphu crisis in 1954. In the last few years alone it has been the subject of numerous articles, chapters, and two full books, in one of which the author’s explicit aim is to present Eisenhower’s“decision against war” as a case study of this “hiddenhand president.”2This attention has proven enlightening and instructive. Yet it may also prove misleading, for Dienbienphu has not only served as the starting point for studies of Eisenhower and Vietnam but, too frequently, as *This essay was originally presented to the Conference on Soviet-American Relations, 1950-1955, sponsored by IREX and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences History/Social Sciences Workshop, Athens, OH, 7-9 October 1988. Research support was provided by an SSRC/MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Peace and Security Studies. The author thanks George Herring, Gary Hess, and Fred Greenstein for their assistance. lFor an explicit example see Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981), 154-55. 2Melanie Billings-Yun, Decirion against War: Eirenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988), x. See also John Prados, “The Sky Would Fall”: Operafion Vulture, The US. Bombing Mission in Indochina, 1954 (New York, 1983); George C. Herring and Richard H. hnmerman, “Eisenhower. Dunes. and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited,” Journal of American History 71 (September 1984): 34343; Richard H. Immerman. “Between the Unattainable and the Unacceptable: Eisenhower and Dienbienphu,” in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the Fifties, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana, 1987), 120-54; John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein, “Presidential Penonaiity and National Security Leadership: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam Decision-making,” International Political Science Review 10 (January 1989): 7392. The “hidden-hand presidency” is essentially synonymous with Eisenhower revisionism. See Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Ekenhower as Leader (New York, 1982). zyxwv zyxwv 43 44 zy zyx zyxwvut DIPLOMATIC HISTORY the end point as well. In light of what occurred subsequently and the legacy Eisenhower bequeathed to his successors, this narrow focus arguably distorts the record by virtually absolving Republicans in the 1950s of responsibility for the tragedy of Vietnam. A broader perspective indicates they must bear a fair share. The Geneva Conference of 1954, which is a prime illustration of Eisenhower's posture toward Indochina, has received little scrutiny compared to Dienbienph~.~ That it was as significant historically seems indisputable. Geneva was the scene for negotiations on the two major crises that dotted the Asian landscape in the early 1950s, and it was also the initial occasion subsequent to the coalescence of the postwar international order for convening all the major actors. Indeed, the convoluted route that brought the United States and People's Republic of China (PRC) together at the bargaining table, along with the British, French, Soviets, and a substantial supporting cast, is in itself worth retracing with the benefit of new documentation. Moreover, not only did the Soviets at Geneva step onto this crowded stage for the first time since Stalin's death, but they also for the first time confronted the other three quarters of the Big Four with an ally by their side. Finally, at least in Anthony Eden's opinion, the conference's impact on the international system transcended specific bilateral or even multilateral relations among the participants: it demonstrated to all the world leaders the "deterrent power of the hydrogen bomb."4 The conference holds historiographic as well as historical significance. It suggests that the revisionists' applause for Eisenhower may be premature and thereby buttresses the argument for another new look at Republican foreign policy in the 1950s.' This "second cut" should incorporate a number of dimensions. Of these, two of the most prominent are the role negotiations played in the administration's stratcgy for national security and its ability, or willingness, to distinguish between indigenous nationalism and international zy zyxwvutsr zyx zyxwvut 3For example, the most comprehensive study of Geneva by an American remains Robert Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton, 1969). written before the wave of Eisenhower revisionism. Significantly, the other major studies of the conference were written by Europeans. See PhiLippe DeviUers and Jean Lacouture, End of a War: Indochina, 1954 (New York. 1969). 121-313; FranGois Joyaux, Ln Chine cr le Reglement du Premier Conflit d'lndochine: Genevc I954 [China and the settlement of the first Indochina conflict: Geneva 19541 (Paris, 1979); and James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (London, 1986). Recent indications that scholars are beginning to redress this imbalance include H. W. Brands, Jr.'s chapter on Walter Bedell Smith and Geneva in Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generalion and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988). 71-92; Lloyd Gardner. Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Rienbienphu (New York, 1988), 248-314; and several studies by Gary I-Iess. particularly "Redefining the American Position in Souiheast Asia: The United States and the Geneva and Manila Conferences," in Rien Bien Phu and the Crisir of Franco-American Relations, 1954-1955, ed. Lawrence Kaplan. Denise Artaud, and Mark Rubin (Wilmington, DE, 1990). 4Quoted in McGeorge Bundy. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fyty Years (New York, 1988). 271. 'Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quurlerly 101 (Centennial Year 1886-1986): 453-73. zyx zyxwv zyxw zyxw UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 45 communism and, by extension, to recognize the pluralist nature of the Communist bloc. From this perspective the Geneva Conference of 1954 provides an excellent opportunity to extend the parameters by which scholars evaluate Eisenhower's record. This essay will exploit that opportunity. These dimensions are so critical because they address two cardinal aspects of the administration. Owing mainly to the public positions taken by John Foster Dulles. commentators spanning the interpretive spectrum have presented the Eisenhower administration and negotiations with the Communists as antithetical to one another.6 Students of the 1950s associate the president's national security policy with massive retaliation, brinkmanship, and similar concepts if not doctrines, defining it almost exclusively in military terms. The "New Look" prescribed decreasing America's conventional forces by relying on atomic weapons, the strategic air command, a sufficient reserve, and greater mobile capabilities. Supplementing this strategic deterrent was the premium placed on collective security arrangements, the training and equipping of indigenous troops, and the like. According to standard accounts, to the administration negotiating with adversaries was at best an afterthought,at worst indicted as detrimental to America's national security interests. Even if more flexible in this area than Dulles, Eisenhower, as the U-2 incident's sabotage of the Paris summit testifies, had little faith in diplomatic solutions to fundamentalproblems? The efficacy of negotiating with an adversary is intricately tied to perceptions of that adversary. Most work to date on Geneva has understandably concentrated on U.S . behavior and objectives, focusing on alliance management and the quest to prevent the collapse of the FrancoVietnamese front until a mechanism designed to quarantine the Communist virus could be organized.8 A second cut requires close investigation of how Washington diagnosed that virus. At issue is not only whether policymakers considered it virulent and contagious, but also whether they recognized the differences and therefore potential weaknesses within the Communist bloc and sought to exploit them. Geneva is an especially rich subject for exploring the administration's sophistication in this area because it has been zyxwvu 6For illustrations see Townsend H o o p s , The Devil and John Foster Ddles (Boston, 1973). 17C-72. 213. 4 0 3 4 , 492; and Michael A. Guhin. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and Hir Times (New York, 1972). 14649. 7The standard accounts of the New Look remain Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953." in Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, ed. Wamer R. Schilling. Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder (New Yo&, 1962). 383-524; and Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense: Slrategic Programs in National Politics (New York, 1961). 64-113. For a less detailed but more sophisticated analysis see John Lewis Gaddis. Strafegies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982). 127-63, and idem, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990). 'This thrust i s best represented in Hess, "Redefining the American Position in zyxwvu zyxwvu Southeast Asia." For a more idiosyncratic analysis see Frank Zagare, "The Geneva Conference of 1954: A Case of Tacit Deception," International Studies Quarterly 23 (September 1979): 390-41 1. 46 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY zyxw zyxw the source of much rancor among the Communist participants. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has denounced the PRC for “colluding”with the French to deprive the Vietminh of the fruits of its victory. Although Beijing has dcnied this charge, in his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev acknowledged a quasiconspiracy between the Soviets and Communist Chinese to deter Vietminh military effort^.^ Available documentation does not allow for confident conclusions about these dynamics, but the existence of divisions is evident. Whether the United States was sensitive to them is consequently an important question to address. And in doing so one must assess the personal characteristics of those administration figures whose performance demanded this sensitivity, and the interplay among them. The intent of this essay, then, is twofold. First, it is to evaluate America’s conduct at Geneva based on the administration’sattitude toward negotiating with adversaries. Judged by this measurement, that conduct warrants criticism. Intellectually, Eisenhower, Dulles, and other policymakers perceived negotiations as potentially effective in furthering the national interest. Yet in the event they behaved in a consistently obstructionist manner. National security managers were willing to incorporate negotiations when planning strategy but not when implementing it. This dichotomy pertains to the essay’s second investigative area as well: the actors’ perceptions of the divisions among Communists and the extent to which they took advantage of them. The evidence suggests that officials were unable to translate counterintuitively sophisticated insights into operational successes. From both perspectives the administration’sbehavior contradicted its perccptions and beliefs, impeding its pursuit of a constructive strategy. At Dienbienphu Eisenhower avoided a tragedy; at Geneva he laid the groundwork for one. Inheriting the Truman-Acheson estimate of America’s stake in Indochina, Eisenhower highlighted the importance of the French possession in his inaugural address, portraying Ho Chi Minh’s insurgents as an integral component of international communism’s coordinated assault on peace and freedom.1° In fact, the Republicans placed a higher priority than their Democratic predecessors on defeating the Vietminh, evaluating the French struggle as more critical than Korea both in terms of America’s defensive posture and thc Communists’ strategic design. Eisenhower and Dulles quickly ruched agreement on this issue when returning on the Helena from their preinaugural voyage to Korea and held to it even when a Korean zyx zyxwvu zyxwvuts zy zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsrqp 9SRV Foreign Ministry’s White Book on SRV-PRC Relations, The Trufh about Vielnam-China Relations over the Lart 30 Years, FBIS Daily Report 4 (19 October 1979): 2, 11; Nine Years of Sino-US. Talks in Retrospecl: Memoirs of Wang B i n g M n , China Report (7 August 1985): 7-8; Nikita Khrushchev, Khrurhchev Remembers, ed. and trans. Strobe l‘albott (Boston, 1970), 481-82. loE. iscnhower Annual Message to the Congress on the Slate of the Union, 2 February 1953, Public Papers of the President: Dwight D.Eirenhower, 1953 (Washington, 1960), 16. For the Tniman esdrnate scc Richard 11. Irnmcnnan, “Perceptions by the United Slates of Its Inwrcsts in Indochina,” in Dien llien Phu, ed. Kaplan. Artaud. and Rubin. zyxwv zyx zyxw zyxwv zy UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 47 armistice proved elusive.’ Undoubtedly Dulles’s emotional investment influenced his perceptions. Having just successfully concluded the Japanese Peace Treaty, he was acutely sensitive to any threat to Japan’s allegiance to the United States. A Vietminh victory seemed to pose this very threat.12 Eisenhower had less of a personal stake. He had, nonetheless, voiced his concern over falling Asian dominoes as early as 1 9 5 1 . 1 3 Consequently, Indochina attracted a good deal of attention during the Solarium exercise that the administration used to frame the New Look, and the resultant statement of national security policy, NSC 162/2, singled out the colonies as strategically vital to U.S. interests.14NSC 5405, the first policy statement on Southeast Asia, reflected this consensus. Indochina represented a conflict between the Communist and non-Communist “worlds.” The Communists must not prevail.15 As the administration planned to confront the Soviets face to face for the first time, it feared that the Communists might do just that. The foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had agreed to meet in Berlin in January 1954 to discuss the German question and Austrian State Treaty. But with a treaty for Korea still to be negotiated and the Vietminh having laid siege to Dienbienphu, the administration assumed that the situation in the Far East would compete with that of Europe on the agenda. Furthermore, Washington was sure that the Soviets would try to take advantage of volatile conditions in Asia to push for the PRC‘s elevation to the ranks of the great powers. It prepared for all contingencies. The Berlin Conference is another way station in the Eisenhower administration’sevolving policy to which scholars have given short shrift.16 After all, it failed to reach a setllement on either Germany or Austria, and its relevance for Indochina appeared confined to establishing an agenda item for Geneva. Yet at a less instrumental level Berlin holds greater significance. It presented Washington with the opportunity to “experiment” with using negotiations as a tactic for prosecuting the Cold War while at the same time zyxwvutsrq zyxwvuts zyx “Report by the secretary of state, 24 February 1954, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions (Historical Series), 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, 6:168-70. See also memorandum of conversation by the secretary of state, 24 March 1953, Foreign Relations of Ihe United States, 1952-1954 (Washington, 1982), 13:419-20 (hereafter F R U S , with year and volume number); Scott to Allen, 10 March 1954, annex to Cabinet Note. I8 March 1954. Records of the Prime Minister, Record Class PREM 11/64S. Public Record Office, Kew, England. 12Substance of State-DMS-JCS mceting. 28 January 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 13:361. 13Entry for 17 March 1951. The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York. 1981). 190. 14For Project Solarium see especially Report of Task Force “C,” Records of the National Security Council, Record Group 273, NSC Minutes, National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter RG 273); NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954 (Washington, 1984), 2 5 8 4 . 15NSC 5405. 16 January 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 13:971-76. 6The most comprehensive revisionist study of the administration, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York. 1984), ignores the Berlin Conference altogether. 48 zyxwvuts zyxwv zyx DIPLOMATIC HISTORY allowing policymakers to witness firsthand Soviet behavior in the postStalin era. There were those in the administration who would all but forsake negotiating with the Soviets. Eisenhower, however, and more surprisingly Dulles, were not among them.17 To the majority of the national security community negotiations were a means by which the United States could counter both allied and nonaligned nations’doubts about Washington’s desire to reduce international tension and could exploit developments favorable to the West. This logic predisposed the administration to avoid situations where bargains depended on fundamental concessions lest the Soviets manage to present the U.S. position as intransigent. But when the possibilities for obtaining mutually acceptable settlementson secondary, finite issues existed, particularly in light of Stalin’sdeath and Georgi Malenkov’speace overtures, they must not be dismissed. In these instances a tactical compromise might produce a strategic advantage. Accordingly, NSC 16212 concluded that while “the prospects for acceptable negotiated settlements are not encouraging,” the United States must “keep open the possibility of settlements with the USSR, compatible with basic U.S. security interests, which would resolve specific conflicts or reduce the magrutudeof the Soviet threat.”18 The US. posture toward Berlin must be understood within this frame~ork.’~ Dulles hoped to focus on those problems for which a solution was possible in order, at a minimum, to demonstrate to the world that the United States did seek peace. Equally important was the opportunity to size up the Soviet diplomats. This is not in any way to minimize the perceived threat Berlin posed to America’s delegation. Rather than the negotiations advancing U.S.interests in Europe,for example, the Kremlin might be able to use German rearmament as a device to disrupt the Western alliance, a danger made more severe by France‘s continuing refusal to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty. The relationship of EDC to Paris’s intentions as well as capabilities in Indochina exacerbated America’s concern in this regard. Looming above everything, moreover, was the assumption that the Kremlin would at Berlin reiterate its demand that the next conference include the PRC as a major participant, thereby sowing greater discord among the allies and increasing pressure on the United States to recognize the Beijing government. The Soviets called €or afive-power meeting so frequently that Eisenhower termed it their “pet proposal”; by linking it to a settlement in Indochina they had already generated French support.20 zyxw 17See memorandum of discussion of the NSC, 7 October 1953. FRLIS, 1952-1954 2529-3 1 . ’8NSC 162R, ibid.. 584. See also Eisenhower memorandum to Dulles. 8 September 1953, ibid.. 4 6 2 6 3 ; and Report by Project Solarium Task Force “A,” 13, and Report by I’rojcct Solarium Task Force “C,”17, RC 273. 19This may be one of the reasons Dulles‘s suggestion of a “spectacular effort” to “relax world tensions on a global basis’’ was not explored at Berlin. Memorandum by the secretary of state, 6 September 1953. FRUS. 1952-1954 2:459. 2oU.S. delegation at Berlin to the State Department, 30 January 1954. and Soviet Ministly of Foreign Affairs to U.S. embassy, 28 September and 26 November 1953. ibid. zyxwv UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 49 Thus Berlin did not appear conducive to the type of negotiations that the administration advocated: the United States would not be bargaining from a position of unassailable strength, and the scope of the issues on the table was uncomfortably broad. Still, the opportunity to observe the Soviets at close quarters compensated for these disadvantages. Dulles watched Vyacheslav Molotov intently, going out of his way to by to determine what the infamous diplomat really had on his mind. The secretary generally found the foreign minister reasonable and able to project an “appearance of friendly objectivity.” But he was frustratingly difficult to pin down. Not only was Molotov unwilling to commit the Kremlin on major issues; he avoided discussing them altogether. The British and French warned Dulles that by appearing conciliatory but tailoring each conversation to the particular audience, Molotov was trying to drive a wedge between them. Dulles required no warning.2l With regard to the PRCs inclusion in a five-power conference, Molotov did not equivocate. The proposal highlighted his opening remarks and dominated the initial days of discussion. Although the State Department had previously concluded that while it preferred to exclude the PRC from such forums, and that Communist Chinese participation in general talks “to reduce international tension” was out of the question, the United States, as was consistent with the administration’s outlook on negotiations, could not oppose meeting with the PRC on specific Far Eastern matters. Dulles responded to Molotov’sgambit accordingly and never wavered. He explained the administration’s awkward position: “The United States recognizes that Communist China is a fact and that there are certain areas where this fact must be taken into account and dealt with as such, but not, however, in such a way as to increase the authority and prestige of a regime that has fought the United States and continuously builds up the propaganda of hate against the United States.”” After much bargaining the conferees agreed to a communiqu6 stipulating that although they would invite China to a conference on Far Eastern issues, this invitation should not be interpreted as a sign of U.S. re~ognition.~~ Dulles declared that this wording represented a defeat for the Soviet Union, zy zyxw zyxwvut zyx (Washington, 1986). 7:871-77, 641, 673; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-56 (Garden City, 1963), 342; Cable, Geneva Conference, 42. *lPaper prepared by Jacob Beam for the Policy Planning Staff, 20 January 1954, memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 28 January 1954, and Dulles to Eisenhower, 1 February 1954. FRUS. 1952-1954 7:772, 862-63, 916-17; Dulles to State Department, 30 January 1954. ibid. (Washington, 1985). 14:352; memorandum of conversation by Livingston Merchant, 29 January 1954, memorandum of meeting of the tripartite working group, 30 January 1954, and U.S. delegation to State Department. 26 January 1954. ibid. 7:885, 890-91. 835. 22U.S. delegation to State Department, 25 January 1954, minutes of meeting of U.S. delegation, 27 January 1954, minutes of meeting of U.S. delegation, 22 January 1954, and record of first restricted meeting, 8 February 1954, ibid.. 814-17. 837. 786. 993. 23For the final communiquk, dated 18 February 1954, see ibid., 1205. Numerous drafts and related discussions can be found in this volume’s preceding pages, but s e e particularly the record of the second restricted meeting, 11 February 1954, ibid., 1036-51. 50 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY zyx zy zyxwvu zy zyxwvu which had held out until the last moment for something more positive. He was accurate in that it was the Soviets who ultimately made the critical concession. But he exaggerated the extent of America’s victory. Dulles might have been able to thwart the Soviet proposal altogether were it not for French pressure. Reacting to Foreign Minister Georges Bidault’s unmistakable signals that Paris was disposed toward a Southeast Asian conference to focus on Indochina, in Dulles’s eyes Molotov had “played the game very smart,” earning from the secretary the backhanded compliment that “He was one of the shrewdest and wiliest diplomats of this or. . . any ccntury.” In Dulles’sestimation by intimating that the Kremlin would extend its “good offices” to Indochina Molotov had induced Bidault to “force” the Soviets to suggest a formula to incorporate Indochina into the Far Eastern agenda. Because Eden was “very wobbly” on this issue, Dulles realized that to rcmain adamant would not only exacerbate the already strained interallied relations but, given French emotions, also pronounce a death sentence on EDC. As the American chargC in Paris had advised, the French believed that a ncgotiatcd p a c e for Indochina was within their grasp if Washington did not “slam [the] door to eventual five power conference.” Hence the need to “expose and knock down any attempt by Soviet Union [to] bargain off abandonment [ofl EDC in return for calling off Ho Chi Minh” had to be balanced against the French judging that their war continued “thanks” to the United States. Unable to square the circle, Dulles relented. “ w e must be on guard,” he wrote Eisenhower shortly before giving in, “lest Indochina also carry EDC down the drain.’” Therefore, while it is true that the inscription of Indochina on the Gcneva agenda owed much to the EDC conundrum, its root can be traced even deeper to the knotty Soviet-American-Chinese tangle and the administration’s outlook toward negotiations. This cast alters, or at least modifies, accepted interpretations of the U.S.perspective on the conference. With good reason the literature has emphasized the administration’s opposition to discussing an Indochina settlement at this time. It feared that the considerations driving the British as well as the French might exacerbate their rifts with the United States. especially if Washington could not support the result. This potential would complicate efforts to ratify the EDC treaty and, by extension, jeopardize the future of the Western alliance. The concomitant concern that the Vietminh would interpret the West’s willingness to include Indochina as a sign of weakness and accelerate its military operations so as to achieve an overwhelming diplomatic advantage 24hlemorandum of NSC meeting, 26 February 1954, ibid., 1223-26; Dulles telephone conversations with Senators William Knowland. Alexander Smith, and Vice President Richard Nixon, 20 February 1954, all in the Chronological Series, “February 1954 [~elcphonecalls],” John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Historical Division, “The History of the Indochina Incident, 1930-1954” (Washington, 955). 361-62; minutes of the meeting of the tripartite working group. 26 January 1953, Dulles to State Department. 27 January 1954. U.S. delegation to St31c Dcpament, 3 February 1954, Robert Joyce to Slate Department, 7 January 1954, and Dulles 10 Eisenhower, 9 February 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 7:819. 847, 943, 748. 1007. zyxwv zyxwv zyxwv zyxw UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 51 produced still greater trepidation. As time went on Dulles’s failure to assemble an allied coalition committed to defend Southeast Asia against communism, known popularly as United Action, or to gain Britain’s consent to collective military planning, coupled with the deteriorating situation at Dienbienphu and its deleterious impact on France’s enthusiasm for continuing the war, heightened these misgivings. America’s allies appeared bent on eroding any possibility of establishing the credible threat of intervention that deterrence required.z While valid, this analysis overlooks another, more conceptual dimension to the hostility. It should be recalled that the adminisuation sanctioned negotiations as a strategy for promoting national security when they appeared conducive to eroding the Communist threat and promoting specific settlements congruent with U.S. interests. It had to resist efforts to reduce military pressure on the enemy prior to arriving at a settlement and had likewise to resist becoming a party to protracted conferences in which the United States lacked sufficient strength to exact substantive concessions. Perhaps the authors of the Task Force “C” Solarium report captured this dynamic best when they recommended that when negotiating with the Soviets Washington should adopt “a more oriental technique of advancing the maximum requirements that can be supported, albeit over a basis of soundly developed positions and the constant awareness that only enforceable agreements have any inherent value.”% Thus in addition to its potentially direct and adverse effect on the Indochinese equation, the Geneva Conference violated many of the tenets on which the administration based its prognoses for positive negotiations. Small wonder, then, that it opposed the talks. The Americans, according to the British, considered them “unpalatable,” while in private Dulles went so far as to label them “phoney.” They represented the “psychology of ‘appeasement’” that had to be checked. “The obvious answer to Geneva,” the JCS “official” history read, “was American intervention, but the French seemed to dread the cure fully as much, if not more, than the ~ornplaint.”~~ Not all members of the administration perceived an “obvious”need for a military solution, however, and not only because of alliance politics. Proponents of negotiations recognized that good diplomats must be skillful diplomats, willing and able to make the most out of the least favorable circumstances. Strategies that require optimum conditions were intrinsically bankrupt, and policymakers resisted classifying negotiations as such. As zyxwvu zyx zyxwv zyxwvutsr zyx %ee the previously cited literature, particularly Immerman and Herring. “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu”; and Hess, “Redcfining the American Position.” 26Report by Project Solarium Task Force “C,” 23, 150, RG 273. As represented by NSC 5405, the official policy toward Indochina was consistent with this outlook. See FRUS, 1952-1954 13:975. 27Makins to Foreign Office, 28 April 1954, Records of the Foreign Office, Record Class FO 371/112057, PRO; Dulles telephone conversation with Arthur Dean, 22 March 1954, Chronological Series, “March 1954 [telephone calls],” Dulles Papers; Dulles memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, 24 March 1954, “March 1954 (2);’ Dulles Papers; JCS, “History of the Indochina Incident,” 41 1 . 52 zyx zy DIPLOMATIC HISTORY Dulles’s colleague at Berlin, psychological strategist C. D. Jackson, told a pessimistic James Reston, “a shift to virile diplomacy paid dividends.” Congruent with this outlook, the administration searched valiantly for the Geneva clouds silver lining. The conference could serve as a holding action until EDC was ratified, the military balance improved, and increased support for a security mechanism generated. It might demonstrate to the French the wisdom of internationalizingthe war and turning over more responsibility to the United States, which would produce a greater deterrent as well as lessen the consequences of America’s intervention should it still be required. And what is so self-evident that it has received virtually no attention, Geneva ensured that the United States could directly influence the negotiations even though it was not technically a belligerent.28 There was in addition the chance that Communist Chinese participation might present some advantages. In Dulles’s words, their presence alongside the Soviets and Vietminh “will also serve usefully to unmask and challenge thc wiles and designs of the Comm~nists.”~~ Running beneath this cliched perception, intended to soothe Korean President Syngman Rhee’s ruffled feathers, was the suspicion if not conviction that the Communist world was not so monolithic after all. Dulles himself speculated, as reported by Australian foreign minister Richard Casey, that “there was a major tug-ofwar going on behind the scenes between Peking and Moscow.” The administration had mused about driving a wedge between the USSR and PRC since entering office, and while not sanguine about the prospects had included this contingency in its New Look policy statement. Shortly thereafter an NSC staff study explored the “major potentials for tension and discord‘‘ by which the Sino-Soviet alliance might be “critically endangered” and the partners actually “come into conflict.” The crisis over Indochina brought this potential into sharper focus. Ambassador to Moscow Charles “Chip” Bohlen thought he detected indications that the Soviets were serious about resolving the Indochina conflict. Moreover, despite the Kremlin’sproposal that the Big Four admit the PRC into its elite circle, the State Department’s leading Kremlinologist submitted that “no one would be more upset than the Soviets if the Chinese actually participated in a five-power conference.” One might readily interpret Molotov’s concession regarding the Berlin final communiqd as support for Bohlen’sjudgment.% zyxw zyxwvu zyxwvut zyxwvuts %. D. Jackson Log. 23 February 1954, C. D. Jackson Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Jeffrey Kitchen memorandum to acting secretary of state. 1 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 (Washington. 1981), 16:427; Dulles to embassy in France. 11 May 1954. ibid. 13:1534-35; Dulles to embassy in Korea, 24 February 1954, ibid. 16:2122. 29Dulles to embassy in Korea. 17 March 1954, ibid.. 40. 30Entry for 10 September 1954. Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R. G . Casey, 1 9 5 1 4 0 (London, 1972). 104-5; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the H h o r y of lhe Cold War (New York, 1987). esp. 174-82; David Allen Mayers. Cracking !he Monolifh: US. Policy agaimt the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1955 (Baton Rouge, 1986); NSC 162/2, FRUS. 1952-1954 2580; NSC staff study, enclosure to NSC 166/1. 6 November 1953, ibid. 14:296-98; Bohlen memorandum to Dulles, 30 January 1954, and memorandum of conversation, 30 September 1954, ibid. 7:905, 646. zyxwvut zyxwvutsrqp zyxwv zyxw zy zyxw zy UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 53 Dulles thus reported to the NSC following Berlin that “One of the most interesting aspects of the meeting was the light thrown on the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union,” and Eisenhower’sspecial assistant C. D. Jackson came away describing the relationship as a “big question mark.” Dulles pointed out that Molotov did raise the issue of a fivepower conference and pushed for Chinese recognition “at every turn.”Yet in line with Bohlen’s estimate the secretary wondered if the Soviets were not protesting too much. Molotov’s performance seemed more obligatory than sincere. The Soviet foreign minister, Jackson elaborated, could tell Beijing, “I did everything I could for you.” Or, the wily diplomat might be scheming to ensure that the United States continue its nonrecognition policy lest it appear to be acquiescing to the Kremlin. Dulles received the impression that the Soviets were determined to avoid a war and worried that their ally’s ambitions might provoke one. Jackson expressed this belief with characteristic flair. “[Tlhese Soviet rulers haven’t begun to chew the China mouthful,” he wrote Eisenhower, “let alone swallow it-but they know they’ve got something big and tough in their mouths, something that may prove tro~blesome.”~~ There was reason therefore for the administration to approach the negotiations at Geneva with some sense of optimism. A positive outcome, nevertheless, might hinge on whether Washington could turn this “question mark” into an asset. Echoing the conclusions of the last National Intelligence Estimate, in April the State Department prepared for Dulles a background paper on the potential divisions in the Sino-Sovietrelationship, stressing their differing geopolitical interests and incipient rivalry, especially in Asia. Perhaps Molotov could be enlisted to deter the Chinese and Vietminh. Dulles considered this possibility but was not confident that the Soviets could exert sufficient influence. It might be better to recognize the PRC and deal directly with them. Short of that, American interests might be best served by demonstrating to the Communist Chinese and for that matter world opinion a willingness to resolve certain specific issues. Or the administration could simply proceed on the premise that the divisions among the Communists were too superficial to affect their unity and attempt to maneuver them into appearing unreasonable and avaricious. If successful the prospects for both United Action and a regional defense pact would improve immeasurably. Further, this combination of firm diplomacy and military threat could produce the requisite pressure to exacerbatedissension among the Communists. One of the tactics recommended by the Solarium project was to adopt postures “which tend to require Chinese negotiations with the U.S.S.R.,as a means for attaining a split between Moscow and P e i ~ i n g . ” ~ ~ 31hhutes of NSC meeting, 26 February 1954. Jackson memorandum to Eisenhower, 22 February 1954, and Dulles to Eisenhower. 1 February 1954, ibid., 1227, 1215-20. 916; Dulles to Eisenhower, 24 February 1954, Chronological Series, “February 1954 (3): Dulles Papers. 32National Intelligence Estimate (hTE)-10-2-54, 15 March 1954. “The Sino-Soviet Relation and its Potential Sources of Differences,” 6 April 1954, Dulles to Eisenhower, 16 February 1954. and Charlton Ogbum memorandum to Walter Robertson. 26 March 1954. z 53 zyxwvuts DIPLOMATIC HISTORY Of the above options Dulles probably only ruled out recognizing the PRC, which was politically impossible. The others complemented each other. Continued preparations for intervention and a defense organization might accelerate the Communists’ centrifugal tendencies, thereby strengthening America’s negotiating position. Hence Walter Robertson’s statement to the British in April that Dulles had abandoned trying to “play Ihc Chinese off against the Russians” does not ring true.33 This gambit might not have been central to the secretary’sgame plan for Geneva, but he would not dismiss it summarily. Judging from appearances, nevertheless, Dulles arrived at Geneva gn-ded to do battle with the devil. The essentials of the history have been thoroughly described elsewhere. Suffice it to say, Dulles’s obsessive attention to the seating arrangements, his notorious refusal to shake hands with Chou En-lai, and other examples of what the PRC delegation interpreted as his “vilifying” and “arrogant” behavior, juxtaposed with his blatant efforts toward implementing United Action, conveyed the impression of an inflexible moralist who equated Geneva with Munich. Available documentation does not permit definitive conclusions about the extent to which either America’s allies or adversaries were privy to the full range of Washington’s military preparations. Such intelligence, however, was not necessary for the British to conclude that from the outset Dulles resisted giving the discussions the slightest opportunity to succeed. He appeared “bent on doing something”;what remained open to question.” Dulles believed that projecting this Presbyterian image would enhance the West‘s negotiating hand. Further, in all likelihood he had not decided what tack to take. Dulles and Eisenhower sought to foreclose few options, reckoning that at a minimum the uncertainty would serve as a deterrent. Evidence further suggests that before the administration committed itself to any course, if at all possible it wanted to determine the attitudes of the Soviets and, should they prove consequential, those of the Communist Chinese and Vieuninh. This objective might explain a bizarre episode at the start of Geneva. Paid a perfunctory visit by Molotov to deliver a written reply to America’s most recent atomic energy proposal, Dulles asked permission to discuss Southeast Asia. He “hinted” that both the Americans and Soviets could benefit from a tacit agreement stipulating that each would zy zyxwvuts zyxwvutsr zyxw zyxwv zyxwv FRUS. 1952-1954 16:398-91, 401-7, 3 6 1 4 2 , 398-99; minutes of NSC meeting, 26 February 1954, ibid. 7:1225; Report by Solarium Project Task Force “C,” 94. RG 273. 33Entry for 12 April 1954, Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951-56. sclccted by John Charmley (London, 1986). 163-64. 34FRUS, 1952-1 954 16, documents Dulles’s “stringent and convoluted seating requirements.” The volume should be supplemented with U. Alexis Johnson with Jef Mchllister, The Riglrl Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984). 204-5. the source for the above quote. Johnson convincingly rebuts Wang Bingnan’s claim that the hand-shaking incident with Chou En-lai never occurred. Wang, Nine Years, 12-13. For the military preparations see Hess, “Redefining the American Position.” For British perceptions see Makins to Foreign Office, 13 July 1954, PREM 11/650. zyxw UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 55 speak for its respective client. Dulles’s purpose was transparently not only to produce ground rules conducive to tidy negotiations, thereby decreasing the chance that a recalcitrant Indochineseparticipant would upset the balance, but also to signal Molotov to deter the PRC. If Molotov responded positively, then, the United States and Soviet Union could work in tandem to all but impose a mutually satisfactory peace?* Dulles was disappointed; he complained that Molotov would not bite at “any of the flies I had cast.” Still, the secretary believed that he was on to something. Molotov, he reasoned, would not have personally delivered the note if he were not on a parallel fishing expedition. It was written in Russian, which Dulles could not read. Perhaps the Soviet foreign minister felt he could appraise Dulles’s attitude more precisely in an informal setting. Over lunch the following day Dulles asked his British and French counterparts for their assessments. Eden’s hypothesis was that Molotov hoped to earn credit for having made the opening friendly gesture. Bidault thought that the Soviet wanted to ascertain for himself any differences among the allies. Molotov’s good-natured banter after a heated session a few days later hardly clarified matters. Dulles sensed a trap but could not be sure. All that can be said is that Dulles and Molotov were feeling each other out. Neither knew the other’s motives or objectives.% Diplomatic sparring typically produces ambiguous evidence that makes it extremely difficult to draw confident inferences. Yet that is exactly what Washington needed. The most compelling explanation for Dulles’s behavior is that if the administration could safely assume that the Soviets would try to suppress the expansionist intentions of their allies, it could be more tolerant of its allies’ growing sentiments in favor of partition. This would alleviate the serious source of interallied discord that was sapping the West’s bargaining strength. If, then, the British lived up to their pledge to support a regional defense pact that did not subvert Geneva, Southeast Asia might be salvaged after all, and without inter~ention.~~ Because the United States could never evaluate precisely the Kremlin’s intentions and its influence over its allies, neither could it be sure that partition would do anything more than delay the Communist conquest of all zyxw zy zyxwvutsr zyxw zyxw zyxw zyxw 3sJ0hn Burke and Fred Greenstein. in collaboration with Larry Berman and Richard Immerman. How Presidenrs Test Reality: Decisions on Viefman, 1954 and 1965 (New York, 1989). chaps. 4 and 5; Dulles-Molotov meeting, 27 April 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 1 6 5 7 9 4 0 . Lloyd Gardner also highlights this “wink and nod” in Approaching Vietnam, 256-59. 36D~lles-Molotovmeeting, 27 April 1954, and luncheon meeting of Dulles, Eden, and Bidault, 28 April 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16579-80, 152-53; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 220. 370n partition see Hess, “Redefining the American Position”; and George C. Herring, “‘A Good Stout Effort’: John Foster Dulles and Indochina, 1954-55,” in Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles. Immediately prior to Geneva the British had agreed to join with the United States and other interested nations in guaranteeing a “satisfactory settlement” on Indochina and to “study secretly” military measures that might be undertaken should the French capitulate. See memorandum of conversation, 25 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16:354. 56 zy zyxw DIPLOMATIC HISTORY of Indochma. Therefore the administration continued to reject it as a solution, with interallied relations suffering commensurately. Given U.S. perceptions, the sole circumstance (short of London and Paris acquiescing to Washington’s prescriptions) that could have avoided this situation would have been the receipt of an unequivocal indication that the Soviets were willing and able to contain the “other” Communists. This requirement, perhaps, was one of the reasons that Walter Bedell Smith replaced Dulles as head of the U.S. delegation at an early date. The undersecretary of state’s high-level contacts during World War 11, his experience as ambassador to Moscow, and his service as director of the Central IntelligenceAgency made him a belter judge of the Soviets than Dulles. Further, Smith’s intimate relationship with Eisenhower and familiarity with the president’s mind qualified him to handle any ticklish negotiations that ensued between the Soviets and Americans. especially since he was less visible-and politically vulnerable-than his superior at the State Department. He was also more patient. Although to some Western observers Molotov showed signs of trying to dissociate himself from the PRC and Vietrninh, Dulles rapidly concluded, “To date there has been no development. . . which would tend to indicate anything but complete Communist bloc unity.” As evidence he emphasized to Eisenhower Molotov’s refusal to avail himself of the “opening” their initial encounters presented. These complaints suggest that Dulles easily became frustrated with slow progress. Exacerbating the problem, his reputation might have inhibited Molotov from letting down his guard and interpreting the opening as sincere. Smith, Prussian temper and all, was renowned for his flexibility and pragmatism as well as his intelligence. He unquestionably got along better than Dulles with America’s allies. He would, one might safely assume, get along better with its adversaries Until additional documents are declassified, the significance of Smith’s replacing Dulles must remain speculative. No evidence exists of backchannel communicationsbetween the president and his former chief of staff, nor does Eisenhower’s appointment calendar reveal any extraordinary meetings. Dulles had stated early on that his schedule would not permit a protracted stay in Geneva. But no one expected him to leave before the Indochina phase began. As Lloyd Gardner has written, Smith‘s role is “intriguing-even mysterious.” Historian’s intuition, for want of a better term, leads one to suspect that the undersecretary’shand in the negotiations represented an extension of Eisenhower’s hidden one. He improved relations zy zyxw zyxw zyxw 38Smith’s role at Geneva is extensively discussed in Brands, Cold Warriors, 71-92. See also Gardner, Approaching Vietmrn, 248-80; and Dcvillers and Lacouture, End 01War, 12627. For a revealing comparison of Smith and Dulles see entry for 1 May 1954, Shuckburgh, Descent 10 Suez, 186. Dulles’s frustration is evident in his cable to h e State Department. 30 April 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16:621; and memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, I I May 1954, Chronological Series, “May 1954 (9,” Dulles Papers. A contrasting view of Molotov is presented in entry for 29 April 1954, Carey Diaries, 142. zyxwv zyxw UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 57 with the allies, especially the British, and according to one witness, had a soothing effect on the Communist Chinese as well.39 In terms of the Soviets, nevertheless, initially there was little reason to believe that Smith’s presence was particularly significant. Molotov, notwithstanding the undersecretary‘scredentials, resented having to deal with an official “inferior in status.” For his part, Smith expressed surprise over what he considered the Soviet foreign minister’sunusually hostile demeanor. At their first private encounter on 10 May he reprimanded Molotov for contributing to “the worst” conference he could remember. Molotov seemed taken aback and responded that perhaps now that Smith had arrived the tenor would improve. It did. Smith described Molotov‘sproposal for a supervisory commission for Indochina at the next plenary session first as “ostensibly conciliatory” but, on further reflection, as the “most significant Communist pronouncementthus far” and “obviously intended [to] represent a constructive negotiating attitude.” The Kremlin, Smith concluded, was seizing the initiative. How this posture reflected “Moscow-Peking relations,” however, he could not say. Shortly thereafter Molotov provided a tantalizing clue by cautioning Eden against assuming that there were no differences between the Soviets and their allies, including the Chinese. Britain’s foreign secretary immediately relayed the message to Smith, adding that Molotov was proving “reasonable” and much easier to work with than Chou En-lai.4O Doubtless Smith hoped that his next night’s dinner with Molotov would reveal something concrete concerning the Soviet positions toward Indochina and, equally important, toward the PRC.Predictably he could report nothing conclusive. He did find the atmosphere reminiscent of the “honeymoon period” in the Soviet-American relationship, with Molotov appearing “completely relaxed, quite friendly, and objective.” The foreign minister was so frank, in fact, and so dispassionately analytical, that Smith could only attribute his demeanor to the salutary impact of Stalin’s death. In the undersecretary’sjudgment Molotov would no longer support the Communist Chinese and Vietminh position that equated Cambodia and Laos with Vietnam. More than that, the Soviet appeared genuinely worried that the situation was so explosive that the Eisenhower administration’sfailure to understand the Beijing government was as likely to precipitate a war as were the Chinese themselves. The PRC was a very young country, Molotov explained, implying that the mature United States must demonstrate more patience and empathy. Some day, he interjected,Washington would learn the extent to which the Kremlin had restrained Beijing during the Korean War?’ zy zyxwvutsr zyxwvu zyxw zyxwvu zyx 39Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, 2 6 1 4 3 . Albeit focused on Smith’s “calming effect” on Eden, Gardner’s analysis of Smith parallels my own. See also Cable, Geneva, 70-71. For the PRC perspective see Wang, Nine Years, 11. 40Memorandum of conversation. 1 May 1954, U.S.delegation to the State Department, 3 and 6 May, Smith-Molotov meeting, 10 May 1954, U.S. delegation to State Department, 15 and 17 May 1954, and Smith-Eden meeting, 21 May 1954. FRUS, 1952-1924 16:64142, 704, 755-56, 818, 827-28. 41Smith-Molotov meeting, 22 May 1954. and memorandum of conversation, 24 May 1954, ibid.. 895-99, 904-6; Gardner, Approaching Viefnum,272. 58 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY Yet Molotov shied away from commitments. Hence while Smith opined that Moscow would support partition, he could not determine whether it would, or could, induce its allies to respect this compromise. The Soviets would probably agree to a settlement they considered to their advantage, he reasoned, and their track record demonstrated they were “perfectly capable of pulling [the rug] out from under a satellite.” Yet, the Kremlin had frequently deceived the former ambassador and CIA director in the past; Smith advised “Wc must assume bad faith” on their part. He would need a lot more information before venturing to predict that a constructive relationship with the Soviets was feasible. Unfortunately for these purposes, Molotov cxploded when he discovered that Smith had betrayed his confidence by recounting their conversation to the French. Whether this reaction was sincerc or not is unclear. Molotov may have felt that he had been too candid, or been scolded for being so when he returned to Moscow. In any event, Smith feared that “the incident has probably destroyed our small base of zyx If anything Smith was having less success with the Communist Chinese. Washington never believed that whatever tension existed between Moscow and Beijing was a one-way proposition. Even as Moscow worried about Chinese immaturity and adventurism, Ma0 chafed under the Soviet bridle, some observers felt. Moreover, policymakers were aware of the differences between the PRC and Vietminh as well. “[Tlhe people in Indochina don’t like the Chinese,” Dulles remarked, “and that helps our position.” Adding grist to the administration’s intelligence mill were its allies’ opinions. London, Paris, and Canberra maintained that China’s top priority was its domestic program, and therefore its leadership was opposed to another armed conflict. With the proper inducements Beijing was likely to press the Vietminh to accept a settlement. The French in particular insisted that an acceptable compromise hinged on the cessation of PRC assistance which the West might effect through limited concessions and economic incentives. Paris recommended that the United States either employ the Soviets as an intermediary or, preferably, negotiate directly with the Communist Chinese.43 As was the case with the Soviets, Smith seemed better suited to deal with the Chinese than Dullcs, and for all of the same reasons. Most important, he carried none of the political baggage that provided ammunition for the secretary’sright-wing detractors. Smith had not had a long association with Atlanticists, Dewey moderates, or other internationalists; he never wrote a letter on behalf of Alger Hiss. Conversely, and ironically, the PRC zyxwvuts zyxwvu zyxw zyx zyx 42Smith-Molotov meeting. 2 2 May 1954. memorandum of conversation, 24 May 1954, Smith-Eden-Chauvel mecting, 26 May 1954, and U.S. delegation to the State Depanment. 26 May 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954 162396, 905. 932, 936. 43‘cTheSino-Soviet Relation and Its Potential Sources of Differences.” ibid. 16:401-7; Dulles telephone conversation with Senator Alexander Smith, 19 April 1954, Chronological Series, “April 1954 [telephone calls].” Dulles Papers; Donald Heath to State Dcpartment. 16 April 1954, and memorandum of conversation. 14 May 1954, FRUS, 19521954 16530. 804; Randall, Geneva, 126-30; Devillers and Lacouture. End of War, 1 0 2 4 . zyxwv UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 59 perceived Dulles as indistinguishable from his party’s China Lobby. These perceptions, compounded by the lack of formal diplomatic channels, would handicap his efforts to promote discourse.4q Although no more willing than Dulles to alienate Republican conservatives, and as devout an anti-Communist, Smith appears to have impressed the Communist Chinese. There are indications that the PRC interpreted Smith’s views as fundamentally different from those of Dulles, reporting in one instance that he described America’spolicy toward the PRC as “unrealistic.” Not surprisingly there is no U.S. documentation substantiating this allegation, and for Smith indirectly to have criticized Eisenhower in this manner seems incredible. It is equally hard to imagine that he and the president designed a game to deceive the Chinese. More likely Wang Bingnan, who recalls the incident, is inaccurate because he was misled by Molotov, who reported the conversation with Smith. Or the PRC’s chief delegate to the first ambassadorial talks with the United States may have invented a didactic fable. He and his superior Chou En-lai believed their American policy was decidedly realistic. Both probably believed that Smith was more inclined to agree with them than D~lles.4~ Nonetheless there is no reason to believe that the Sino-American relationship changed appreciably following Smith’s arrival in Geneva. For reasons of protocol, if nothing else, he did not meet privately with Chou as he did with Molotov, and his hostility toward the PRC’s bargaining position was as adamant as Dulles’s. If Smith was looking for signs of a Chinese peace offering, he saw none worthy of note. And if Beijing likewise was waiting for an unambiguous U.S. gesture, such as the offer of financial assistance (not to mention recognition), it, too, was disappointed. Domestic politics would have inhibited the administration from making such concessions under any circumstances. In the event, Smith saw no reason to recommend that the administration contemplate the risk. Because he considered the Vietminh the pawn in the game and doubted that the Soviets sought territorial gains, he could only have meant the Chinese when he wrote Dulles after several weeks that the “Communists have not given an inch” and “must feel sure” that they will acquire most if not all of Indochina, even at the cost of intervention. “They have a big fish on the hook and intend to play it out. . . . Our only strength lies in what you [Dulles] are doing in Washington.” The secretary was a step ahead. By their “delaying tactics,” he advised Eisenhower the day before, the Communists were consolidating their position throughout Indochina. On this occasion Dulles and his deputy were of one mind.46 zyxwv zyxwv zyxwvuts zyxwvutsrq zy zyxwvut 44Wang, Nine Years, 6. 451bid., 6-12. On Chou’s views see Kuo-Kang Shao, ”Zhou Enlai’s Diplomacy and the Neutralization of Indochina, 1954-55,” The China Quarferly 107 (September 1986): 483504. 46U.S. delegation to the State Department, 20 May 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16:86465; memorandum of conversation, 19 May 1954, Chronological Series, “May 1954 (4);’ Dulles Papers. In Washington Dulles was continuing his efforts on behalf of both United Action and a regional defense organization. 60 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY One reason for Smith’s pessimism was his growing sense that Beijing did harbor expansionist intentions which the Kremlin could not moderate even if it was so inclined. And he increasingly doubted that it was. Described by C. D. Jackson as “a bundle of raw ganglia,” Smith no longer womed about his “small base of contact” with Molotov. Of greater concern was the hardening of the Soviets’ attitude that the former ambassador detected following the foreign minister’sreturn from Moscow. Washington had hoped that the Kremlin’s efforts to curry favor with India might produce a breakthrough in the negotiations, especially with regard to the composition of the international supervisory commission and the Vietminh’s withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia. Instead Molotov was “absolutely unmovable” on these issues, and at the 8 June plenary session waxed vitriolic in his attacks on the United States and its allies. At his press briefing the next day Smith made no attempt to mask his anger and disappointment. The unfortunate truth, he lamented, was that any expectations of Molotov’s “willingness to cooperate, and . . . play the part of the slightly left-of-center middleman. . . had vanished.”47 Intelligence received several weeks later reported that Molotov had been instructed in Moscow that because Eisenhower had decided against intervention he should take a “stiff attitude” that “would put the United States on test.” The French would score Washington an undependable ally both in Indochina and Europe. Whether Smith read this dispatch cannot be determined; at the time he was at a loss to explain Molotov’s behavior. All he knew was that with prospects for the Soviets to act as a “middleman” between the United States and the PRC apparently having evaporated, and Dulles’s efforts to orchestrate United Action heading inexorably toward failure, America seemed about to realize its worst nightmares. The Communist Chinese and Vietminh would be at liberty to make a mockery out of partition, Indochina’s likely destiny. The Republican right wing and Democrats seeking revenge for McCarthyism and their tribulations over Yalta would find the administration guilty by association. More alarmist still, Smith advised that the Chinese would not only risk America’s introducing troops but might actually welcome them as an excuse for their intervention and an opportunity to fan the flames of Asian nationalism. This bleak outlook, coupled with French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel’s resignation, led Dulles to cable Smith on 14 June that “It is our view that final adjournmentof Conference is in our best interest.” It had not taken long for the administration to run out of patience/* zy ~ ~~~~~ , zyx zyxw zyxw zyxw zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJ 47U.S. delegation to the State Department, 27 May 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16:952; cntry for 1 June 1954, Jackson Log, Jackson Papers; Dulles to U.S. delegation, 5 June 1954, memorandum of conversation, 7 June 1954, fifth plenary session, 8 June 1954, and U.S. delegation to the State Department, 9 June 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16:1038. 105960, 1072-74, 1094-97. 48“Information from Peiping Concerning the Geneva Conference.” attached to Dulles to William Knowland, 30 June 1954. Chronological Series, “June 1954 (1);’ Dulles Papers. Dulles received this intelligence, “allegedly” from Beijing, on 26 June 1954. After reading I t he sent it to W. Park Armstrong, Robert Bowie, and Walter Robertson. See also Hess, zyxwv UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 61 Smith prepared to return to the United States. But before he left the situation changed dramatically. First Molotov agreed to an international supervisory commission in which the Communists would be a minority, and then Chou conceded that the situation in Laos and Cambodia was distinct from that in Vietnam. He also hinted that both the PRC and Vietminh might acquiesce to partition. Smith could not explain this newest change of heart any better than he could the earlier hardening of Molotov’s attitude. He suspected a “trick.” Yet progress had been made, and the undersecretary could not deny that the breakthroughs had resulted from the Communists’overtures and Eden’s receptivity to them. Perhaps the Soviets, and even the Communist Chinese and Vietminh, feared that along with the imminent departure of Smith and Eden from Geneva the announcement of talks to be held at the end of June between Churchill and Eisenhower in Washington breathed new life into United Action. Perhaps the Kremlin believed that by appearing flexible it could prolong the negotiations and induce Laniel’s successor, all but certain to be Pierre Mend&-France, to accept a favorable settlement,and in the bargain, to scuttle EDC. Mendbs-France had pledged to resign if he could not obtain a cease-fire by 20 July. Or perhaps the adverse reaction of nonaligned nations to the deadlock prompted the Communistbloc to take the initiative. Finally, there was always the chance that at least one of the Communist allies was applying pressure to another, or others, to be more conciliatory.49 The administration did not need to decide among these possibilities. The Communist shift probably resulted from a combination of influences, none of which required Washington to alter its course. Indeed, established tactics evidently were producing dividends. Nevertheless, the concessionsdid lead the Americans again to ponder whether cracks existed within the Communist front, and unexpectedly the evidence suggests that their examinations concentrated on Beijing more than Moscow. U. Alexis Johnson, Smith’s substitute, reported that in the opinion of certain journalists the Communist Chinese were acting more independently at Geneva in an “obvious” effort to establish their own international base. Should this view prove valid the PRC, not the Soviet Union, might emerge as the pivotal state.so Intelligence attributed the PRCs concessions to more than an innate desire to strike out independently. Beijing felt vulnerable. According to unnamed sources, when U.S. intervention “seemed to be a reality” and threatened to engulf the PRC, Chou requested a Soviet commitment to zyx zy zyxwv zyx “Redefining the American Position”; and U.S.delegation to the State Department, 7 June 1954. and Dulles to U.S. delegation, 14 June 1954. FRUS, 19.72-1954 16:1054-55, 1146-47. 49Entries for 15-16 June 1954, Casey Diaries, 156-57; Smith-Molotov meeting. 18 June 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16:1189-93; Randle. Geneva, 280-91; Devillers and Lacouture. End of War, 23242. A recent account credits F’RC pressure on the Vietminh for at least the Communist decision to withdraw support for the Khmer and Lao resistance governments’ participation at Geneva. Nayan Chanda. Brother Enemy: Tho War afer rhe War (New York, 1986), 126-27. 50U.S. delegation to the State Department. 26 June 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 16:1251. 62 zy zy DIPLOMATIC HISTORY respond in kind. Molotov replied that Moscow would retaliate instantly if the United States attacked the PRC with atomic or hydrogen bombs; but it would "temporarily stand aside" and limit its assistance to material and technical support if the Americans used only conventional weapons. Ma0 resented what he considered the Kremlin's selfish attitude, concluding that it was unwilling to put itself at risk to defend its ally. It followed, then, that he would seek to free the PRC from this dependency. As for the immediate future, however, with the impending Anglo-American talks reviving the possibility of intervention and the Soviets refusing to pledge support, Ma0 felt compelled to offer concessions?1 Washington could not be sure that this intelligence was accurate. It reached Dulles through William Knowland, an unreliable channel. And even if the information proved correct, the question of how best to exploit it remained. On the surface a certain logic dictated escalating the pressure. This was the precise situation when this tactic could exacerbate Sino-Soviet tension. But to do so would wreak havoc with America's relations with its allies, severely jeopardizing any regional security arrangement and possibly precipitating a military confrontation in which the United States would have to go it alone. Moreover, if the PRC was genuinely reticent to fight and sought to improve its standing throughout Asia, it might abide by partition after all and compel the Vietminh to do likewise. In this case additional pressure could be counterproductive. There was also the danger that concentrating on the PRC would divert Washington's attention from the Kremlin, upon whom Communist Chinese restraint, for one reason or another, still depended. Finally, the administration could not even be sure that the bloc was not rnonolithi~.~~ The documents do not reveal the extent to which the administration discussed these considerations, if indeed it discussed them at all?3 Many officials had lost interest in any negotiations with the Communists. There is no indication that the delegation in Geneva, as it had previously, sought ti% h-tetes with the Soviets, let alone with the Communist Chinese. Possibly Smiths absence precluded these informal contacts. Probably Dulles felt it prudent to stay the course and focus on resolving differences among the allies. Particularly after the United States and Britain agreed both to accept partition and to guarantee its integrity by means of a collective security mechanism, the secretary endeavored to distance the United States from the other conferees. Uncertain over Communist intentions and afraid that Mend&-France's timetable was a recipe for disaster, he felt America's continued participation in the negotiations would accomplish nothing, or worse. He could not predict how long Paris would hold out, and he wanted zyxwvut zy zy 51"Infonnation from Peiping Concerning the Geneva Conference." The memorandum docs not indicate when US. intervention "seemed to be a reality." but it was probably prior to the-fall of Dienbienphu on 7 May. 52Dulles LO Knowland, 30 June 1954; Heath to Philip Bonsal. 4 July 1954. FRUS. 1952-1954 16:1280-82. S30pera~ionaldecisions of this kind were more likely to have been discussed informally in the Oval Office than before the formal NSC. zyxwv zyx zyx UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 63 no part of a settlement that “might come about through the Communist habit of using words in a double sense and destroying the significance of good principles with stultifying implementations.” Dulles urged Eisenhower to keep U.S. representation at Geneva at the ambassadorial level.% After much hesitation Eiscnhower overruled his secretary of state. “We do not want to have an apparent parting of the ways among us occur in the spotlight of the Geneva conference,” he counseled Dulles. The president feared that his refusal to send Smith back would undermine whatever leverage Mendbs-France still retained and damage America’s international image. Additional concessions on the part of the Communists, most notably with regard to the cease-fire line and future elections, made Dulles’sintransigence less comprehensible in the eyes of the world. For his part, the secretary was “shaken,” to borrow Eden’s word, when in Paris he received a warning from Mend&-France that France would hold the United States responsible for an unsatisfactory settlement or the collapse of the negotiations. Dulles and the Frcnch premier worked out a convoluted compromise: the United States pledged to support Mendks-France’s position but not endorse it unconditionally. On 14 July the administration announced that Smith would return to Gene~a.5~ The denouement scarcely requires retelling. Smith returned on 17 July but exercised scant influence on the settlement. Dulles had acceded to the wishcs of his president and allies with regard to form only; he yielded little in substance. In his opinion the critical talks had been those between himself and Mend&-France; Geneva was all but anticlimactic. The Paris meeting had also demonstrated the true locus of international power. “The fact that the entire Geneva Conference had ground to a standstill when Mend&-Franceleft for Paris,” Dulles boasted to the National Security Council, “had punctured the Communist prestige. . . [and] indicated that when it really comes down to something important, the United States is the key nation.” These were the kind of negotiationsthe secretary now favored?6 Dulles instructed Smith to confine his role to that of a “representative of a nation friendly to the non-Communist states” and “avoid getting yourself in a position that would lend itself to. . . a Communist maneuver.” Smith interpreted these instructions to mean that he should avoid contact with all Communists. Although obliged to participate in the final restricted and plenary sessions, he made no effort to reestablish a base of contact with a n y zyxwv zyxwv zyxw zyxwvu zyx 54Memorandum of bilateral conversation with United Kingdom, 26 June 1954, and Agrced Minute of UK and US, 27 June 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 (Washington, 1984), 12576-80, 580-81; Dulles to embassy in Paris, 28 June and 8 July 1954, ibid. 133175758, 1795-97; Dulles to embassy in Pans, 10 July 1954, Chronological Series, “July 1954 (4):’ Dulles Papers; Gardner, Approaching Vieham, 299-31 1. 55Note after conversation with John Foster Dulles, 10 July 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President. 1953-61 (Whiman File), Eisenhower Diary Series, ”DDE Diary 1954 (2);’ Eisenhower Library; entry for 8 July 1954, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Robert Ferrell (Bloomington, 1983). 86; Eden to Foreign Office, 14 July 1954, FO 371/112077: Johnson, Righr Hand, 222-23; I3ess. “Redefining the American Position.” SGhlemorandumof NSC mccting. 15 July 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954 13:1838. 6.4 zyxwvutsr DIPLOMATIC HISTORY Communist delegate. Instead, he confined his energies to ensuring that both the French and British adhered to the previous agreements, that the Final Declaration was something the United States could live with, if refuse to sign, and that America’sunilateral declaration provided sufficient latitude to acknowledge Washington’spledge not to “disturb” the agreements without precluding its taking whatever future actions it deemed necessary. Smith left it to his allies to haggle over the settlement’s details. These included establishing the demarcation line at the seventeenth parallel, extending the date for unification elections to 1956, and deciding that one Western, one Communist, and one neutral state would comprise the international supervisory committee. Completed on 21 July, the accords for the French foreshadowed the “end of a war.” For the United States they foreshadowed the beginning of 0ne.5~ The standard litany of missteps that analysts have ascribed to the administration’s conduct at Geneva is familiar. Opposed to the negotiations from the very start, Washington sought to sabotage efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement, preferring a military solution. Its behavior alienated friends and foes alike. If by these actions it exacted some concessions from the Communists, they were limited and more than offset by the strains they placed on the Western alliance. If by resisting compromise and dissociating the United States from the result officials managed to avoid the label “appeaser.” they cost America countless hearts and minds, particularly those in the Third World. Worst of all, by moving so rapidly to construct a military security arrangement and refusing to sanction the elections, Washington signaled that diplomacy-and international law-were not substitutes for force. Soon it would find itself trapped by its own logic into summoning that force.58 Policymakers admitted to none of the above. They emphasized the tremendous obstacles they confronted,and while anything but sanguine about Southeast Asia’s future prospects, concluded that they had reason to be proud of their accomplishments. Given the military balance in Indochina, the failure to present the Communists with a credible deterrent, and what they considered the irresponsible posture of both France and Britain, the outcome could have been worse. So Eisenhower privately wrote as Geneva came to an end that he was “a touch more hopeful” than previously, and Dulles predicted that allhough the settlement would be a “partial surrender,” it would not be a “sellout.” Smith, who was closer to the negotiations than anyone, captured zyxw zy zyxw zy zyxw zyxw 57Dulles to Smith, 16 July 1954. ibid. 16:1389-91; Dulles to Smith, 19 July 1954. Chronological Series, “July 1954 (3),” Dulles Papers; Johnson, Right Hand, 223-27; Randle, Geneva, 33849; Devillen and Lacouture, End of War, 284-300. 58Hess, “Redefining the American Position”; Herring, ‘A Good Stout Effort’ ”; Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, 313-14. For a more positive recent assessment see Brands, Cold Warriors, 92. ‘I zyxwv zyxw zyx zyx UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 65 the prevailing sentiment when he described the accords upon his return as “the best that could be expected in the circumstance^."^^ This new look at Geneva suggests that Smith exaggerated. It also suggests that the conventional critiques are necessary but not sufficient. The results, judged by the administration’sown standards, were not the best that could be expected in the circumstances. Washington’s stance toward the negotiations underscores a crippling dichotomy. Eisenhower and Dulles had been among those who had advocated negotiations as a strategy for promoting national security, especially when they might lead to specific settlements. Handled skillfully and sensitively, they could produce strategic advantages along with the tactical benefits inherent in projecting a less belligerent image. Admittedly, the consensus held that as an outgrowth of Berlin the inscription of Indochina on the Geneva agenda was ill timed, and the diplomatic and military environment was hardly ideal. Still, the evidence demonstrates that top officials were unwilling to implement the negotiating strategy for which they planned. When their initial tactics failed to produce the desired results, they rapidly gave up. From then on they forced the other conferees, on both sides, to overcome U.S. intractability. Despite its own perceptions the administration,permeated by a political culture that equated negotiations with Munich and Yalta, remained captive of the belief that any concession was tantamount to capitulation. The prevailing predisposition for coercion all but ruled out cooperation; U.S. diplomats would take but not give. They also displayed more interest in problems of war than peace. This may explain Eisenhower’sdetachment from the Geneva proceedings, in sharp contrast to his active participation throughout the crisis over Dienbienphu. Prior to the conference the State Department’sdesk officer wrote, “[Wle will be able to achieve a negotiating result no more favorable than is warranted by Franco-Vietnamesecapacities and will power at the time. We have no fresh political or military contribution to make to a settlement.” The administration remained wedded to this position throughout.@ Policymakers in 1954 could not have been expected to perceive all the dimensions of the divisions that plagued the Communist bloc. Three decades later many questions remain.61What is clear, nevertheless, is that suspicions concerning cracks in the monolith pervaded Washington from the time the zyx zy zyxw 59Eisenhower to General Alfred Gruenther, 19 July 1954, Administration Series, “Gruenther, Alfred 1954 (3);’ Whitman File; Dulles telephone conversation with Henry Luce, 17 July 1954, Chronological Series, “July 1954 [telephone calls].“ Dulles Papers; New York Times, 24 July 1954. 60Memorandum by Philip Bonsal, 15 March 1954, FRUS. 19S2-1954 16:464. For Britain’s retrospective analysis of Washington’s intransigence see Tahourdin note on Geneva, 26 July 1954, FO 371/112084. 611n addition to the sources listed in note 8 see Shao. “Chou EnIai’s Diplomacy”; Mark Thee, “The Indochina Wars: Great Power Involvement-Escalation and Disengagement,” Journal of Peace Research 13:2 (1976): 117-29; Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance (Boulder, 1987), 39-42; William I. Duiker. China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley. 1986). 21-34: and Donald S. Zagona. Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York. 1967). 40-41. 66 zyxwv DIPLOMATIC HISTORY administration took office, suspicions that were all but confmed at Geneva, if not at Berlin. Numerous intelligence reports and planning studies highlighted existing and potential rifts among the Communists that paralleled what Molotov intimated to Dulles, and more so to Smith. Although Americans remained woefully ignorant of Indochina's internal dynamics, Eisenhower revisionists are correct to underscore the administration's sensitivity to the Communists' polycentrism. Yet it failed to exploit this polycentrism effectively; it failed even to make a concerted effort to do so. Notwithstanding all the signals sent by both Moscow and Beijing. signals Smith in particular tried to interpret, the administration resisted adopting a more flexible and imaginative posture. It chose to play it safe, to be conservative. It did not try to use concessions to induce a split. Those tensions and rivalries the U.S. attitude did generate were accidental byproducts, not the result of a calculated design. Republican officials did possess more sophisticated beliefs than has been assumed, but those beliefs did not lead to more sophisticated behavior. One might still wonder, nevertheless, so what? The final settlement was better than the military balance provided reason to expect. Yet negative intangibles are highly significant. The United States at Geneva projected the image of a nation unwilling to compromise even in the interest of peaceful solutions, sulking in the comer when developments did not follow its prescribed course. It thereby failed to exercise constructive leadership at a time when international tension demanded just that. In the same vein it placed additional strains on the Western alliance at a critical juncture. Even if the fate of the EDC was probably already sealed, this behavior drove the French and British to conclude that the Americans were insufficiently empathetic, thus contributing to the climate that produced Suez shortly after. In addition, the administration's posture at Geneva, particularly that of Dulles, suggested that Geneva was a defeat, not a victory, thereby reinforcing the position of those in and out of government who had little faith in negotiations to begin with. Finally, the momentum gathering toward recognizing and exploiting inter-Communisttension was blocked. Less than a decade later the Sino-Soviet split would reverberate throughout the international system. By that time, however, America was at war in Vietnam.