Papers by Richard Immerman
Whistleblowing Nation, 2019
Reviews in American History, 1987
The Journal of American History, 1999
... Each brings his own set of special qualifications to their combined task: Robert Bowie served... more ... Each brings his own set of special qualifications to their combined task: Robert Bowie served as head of the State Department Planning Staff and senior advisor and assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and he was the State member of the NSC Planning Board ...
The International History Review, 2012
Intelligence and National Security, 2011
Abstract This article argues that analytic practices and processes within the US intelligence com... more Abstract This article argues that analytic practices and processes within the US intelligence community have undergone far more fundamental reform than the public or scholarly communities recognize. It identifies the dimensions of this ‘Analytic Transformation’ and explains the reasons for optimism about the future.
Diplomatic History, 1990
Comparisons between Dwight D. Eisenhower's policies toward Indochina and those of his successors ... more Comparisons between Dwight D. Eisenhower's policies toward Indochina and those of his successors have served as a principal catalyst driving scholars to revise orthodox critiques of the president's diplomatic record.' The barometer for the positive reappraisal is, of course, the administration's decision not to intervene during the Dienbienphu crisis in 1954. In the last few years alone it has been the subject of numerous articles, chapters, and two full books, in one of which the author's explicit aim is to present Eisenhower's "decision against war" as a case study of this "hiddenhand president."2 This attention has proven enlightening and instructive. Yet it may also prove misleading, for Dienbienphu has not only served as the starting point for studies of Eisenhower and Vietnam but, too frequently, as *This essay was originally presented to the Conference on Soviet-American Relations,
The American Historical Review, 1991
Political Science Quarterly, 2000
Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World
Political Science Quarterly, 2016
COMMENTING IN 1950 ON THE ACCURACY OF intelligence reports and assessments that the U.S. public e... more COMMENTING IN 1950 ON THE ACCURACY OF intelligence reports and assessments that the U.S. public expected the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to produce, newly appointed director Walter Bedell Smith purportedly remarked that Americans "expect you to be on a communing level with God and Joe Stalin, and I'm not sure they are so much interested in God." 1 Smith exaggerated, but not by much. Americans' expectations (both within and beyond the Beltway) about the value of intelligence for conducting foreign policy and promoting national security are uniformly unrealistic. Collecting intelligence is hard, and analyzing it is even harder. The most one can expect from intelligence, in the words of a veteran official, is to "reduce uncertainty, identify risks and opportunities, and by doing so, deepen understanding so that those with policymaking responsibilities will make 'better' decisions." Done right, intelligence can provide policymakers with a "decision advantage." 2 Intelligence, particularly strategic intelligence, was not done right during the lead-up to and conduct of either the Iraq war or the Afghanistan war.
Diplomatic History, 2008
The years since September 11, 2001, have been heady ones for historians of U.S. foreign relations... more The years since September 11, 2001, have been heady ones for historians of U.S. foreign relations. Enrollments in our courses have exploded, and we have been eagerly sought after by the media. Our expertise in things past evidently provides us with the credentials to provide expert commentary on the present. This problematic relationship notwithstanding, for those of us who write about policymakers and policymaking, the events of the recent past fit comfortably within the boundaries of our scholarship. We dissect the processes by which those who manage U.S. foreign relations and national security receive and assess advice and information. In theory, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other components of the intelligence community (IC) provide much of the grist for the policymakers' mill. Good strategic intelligence (the "big picture") does not guarantee good policy, but, holds the received wisdom, the better the intelligence, the more informed the policymaker. Hence the better are the chances for formulating good policy, however one defines "good." The converse is less ambiguous: bad intelligence all but assures ill-informed policy and dramatically increases the likelihood of "bad" policy. Different administrations connected the dots differently, but they all connected them somehow. Or so I thought. 1 My efforts to decipher the policymaking process and the contributions of intelligence to it drove my forays into the hybrid field of political psychology. 2 Most recently concentrating on cognitive dynamics, I studied attribution theory, *This article expands on my address to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, June 23, 2007. I thank Tyler S. Immerman for her valuable research, Douglas and Raymond Garthoff for their comments, and Fred I. Greenstein and Bob Jervis for their decades of advice, encouragement, and inspiration.
The American Historical Review, 1983
* Preface *1. Truman, Eisenhower, and the Cold War in Latin America *2. Underdevelopment, Repress... more * Preface *1. Truman, Eisenhower, and the Cold War in Latin America *2. Underdevelopment, Repression, and Revolution *3. The Revolutionary Governments: Communism or Nationalism? *4. The View from the North * S. From Truman to Eisenhower: The Road to Intervention *6. Project PBSUCCESS: The Preparation *7. Project PBSUCCESS: The Coup *8. Project PBSUCCESS: The Legacy * Notes * Bibliography * Index
The Journal of American History, 2000
Political Science Quarterly, 1980
... LaBarge et. al. ... attempt to oust Castro, states that Dulles "was closer to the Gu... more ... LaBarge et. al. ... attempt to oust Castro, states that Dulles "was closer to the Guatemala operation than he was to the Bay of Pigs."40 Wisner, the deputy director of plans in 1954, was directly in charge of preparations, and he received significant support from Tracy Barnes, another ...
The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited, 2022
Pennsylvania history, 2004
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Papers by Richard Immerman