AMISOM LL working Draft LK

AMISOM (2007-2023) Lessons Learned: A Robust Peace Support Mission and Human Security By: Leon Kukkuk, Yared Debebe, and Hiwot Arkiso Executive Summary The crisis in Somalia has been so protracted that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) went through several distinct phases. The mission provides the clearest opportunity to compare responses to conflict dynamics over time from which important lessons can be learned. AMISOM originated as an attempt to protect and foster initiatives to rebuild the state. But from 2011, the African Union (AU) called on the international community, and in particular the UN, to take the steps to fully assume its responsibilities towards the Somali people. By the beginning of 2016 the UNSC also encouraged the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to enhance its interaction across Somali civil society, including women, youth, business and religious leaders, and to ensure that their views are incorporated in the political processes. Somalia also moved on to a new phase of state-building and security sector reform for the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) to assume greater responsibility for security. From 2017 the AU PSC started endorsing recommendations for the gradual reduction of AMISOM personnel. The numerous challenges faced by AMISOM resulted in significant evolution in its mandate, reflecting an increasing understanding of the challenges faced by civilians. The mandates and the mission adapted to the conflict as well as to efforts to stabilize the country. Mandates stressed concerns on violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence. The mission established its own mechanisms to facilitate prevention, protection and mitigation of these violations. But discussion or consideration for people oriented security models lagged behind the militarised security response. Mapping exercises that included an analysis of the motivations behind various forms of violence could have helped the mission design more sustainable protection and address the underlying drivers of conflict. Using a military approach, AMISOM was not able to effectively support the delivery of the political, economic and social elements required. Expectations of what AMISOM could have achieved was likely unrealistic with AMISOM extending itself further than it should have done. UNSC Resolution 2551 on November 2020 effectively rounded off the evolution of AMISOM's mandate, recognizing the need for a gradual transition to a mission that reflects the changing dynamics and priorities in the country, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Key Points 1. AMISOM originated as an attempt to protect and foster initiatives to rebuild the state. 2. An important challenge of the mission was of how to protect Somali civilians. The mission was not able to help deliver the political, economic and social elements of the support to Somalia using a military approach. 3. The discontinuities between justification for intervention and priority tasks outlined in the mandates was never resolved (Confusion around different demands on a robust peace support mission, military operations and the relative importance of protection of civilians, humanitarian aid, maintaining the rule of law, and adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL)). 4. Implementation often focused on short-term responses, emphasising outputs rather than longer-term outcomes. Background AMISOM operated in Somalia for seventeen years in a very dynamic security and political environment. It was the first, largest and most deadly African Union led mission and thus provide an important indicative experience from which important lessons can be learned. The crisis in Somalia has been so protracted and the AU-led mission has gone through several very distinct phases that the mission provides the clearest opportunity to compare responses to conflict dynamics over time.1 This paper aims to focus primarily on the human security related lessons that emerged from the mission, although the mission never had a deliberate human security mandate or operational doctrine. It is intended to compliment a study in Human Security in AU PSOs and broadly follow the structure of the main report in that study.2 As was the case in the overall study, this paper discuss Protection of Civilians (PoC), Human Rights (HR) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as proxies for Human Security. 1 Chronology of UNSC responses to events in Somalia can be found at [https://bit.ly/47dzrP3] 2 Kukkuk, Leon; Debebe, Yared, Warsame, Fahria & Arkiso, Hiwot, 2024 AMISOM originated as an attempt to protect and foster initiatives to rebuild the state. This protection was considered necessary because of the existence of various factions in society that violently opposed these initiatives and challenged the legitimacy of nascent forms of central state authority. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate 1744 of 20 February 2007, establishing the AMISOM mission, stressed the need for broad-based and representative institutions reached through an allinclusive political process in Somalia. Mandates for the next four years continued to focus on assisting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the development of the Somali Police Force and the National Security Force. African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) Resolution 203 in 2011 authorized AMISOM to support state-building efforts, good governance, and building the security institutions.3 AMISOM's mandate initially focused mainly on peacekeeping and providing support to the TFG based in Nairobi.4 From 2011, the AU, through the PSC, called on the international community, and in particular the UN, to take the steps expected to fully 3 This was supported by UNSC Resolution 2036. This resolution highlighted the importance of capacity-building and political reconciliation. 4 United Nations (UN) Security Council. (2020a). S/RES/1744 (2007) | Security Council. Un.org. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/1744-%282007%29 assume its responsibilities towards the Somali people, in line with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.5 AMISOM was given the authority to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and facilitate access to humanitarian aid. From 20102012 AMISOM’s mandate expanded contrary to the initial intention authorising the mission for only six months. The PSC authorized the deployment of additional troops. Al-Shabaab escalated their attacks from 2013 to 2015. The AU PSC and UNSC responded by consistently prioritizing strengthening AMISOM's capacity to counter extremism.6 In 2012, the AU PSC again authorized a significant expansion of troop strength to counter the threat posed by alShabaab.7 On 18 September 2012, after the establishment of the Federal 5 Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU). (2021). Communiqué of the 293rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council Held on 13 September 2011, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Africa-Union.org; African Union Commission. https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/handle/123456789/1119 6 Resolution 2124 of June 2013 authorized the deployment of additional troops and resources. It also emphasized the importance of building Somali security force capacity and promoting political reconciliation. 7 AU PSC Resolution 2036, in February 2012 Government of Somalia (FGS), tenuously based in Mogadishu, Resolution 2067 emphasized that protecting and promoting human rights, investigating breaches of international humanitarian law and bringing those responsible for such breaches to account will be essential for the legitimacy of the new Somali authorities. Very importantly, in 2013 the UNSC encouraged AMISOM to develop an effective approach to the protection of civilians and was given an explicit Protection-of-Civilians (PoC) mandate.8 There were also persistent allegations that AMISOM violated the laws of war and was unable to protect civilians.9 The heavy presence of AU troops brought some stability but also reignited hostilities, rivalry and retaliatory attacks by militant groups against potential targets. By the beginning of 2016 the UNSC also encouraged UNSOM to enhance its interaction across Somali civil society, including women, youth, business and religious leaders, and to help ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated in the various political processes.10 It remained 8 United Nations (UN) Security Council. (2020). S/RES/2093 (2013) | Security Council. Un.org. https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2093(2013) 9 UNSOM/OHCHR, 2019 “Protection of Civilians Report Building The Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia: 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019” https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_report.pdf 10 United Nations (UN) Security Council. (2016, March 24). Security Council Authorizes focused on supporting peace and reconciliation, conflict resolution, the state formation process, the electoral process, and the promotion and protection of human rights.11 From 2016 Somalia moved on to a new phase of state-building and security sector reform. The AU PSC and UNSC responded by supporting the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) to assume greater responsibility for security, reinforcing the need for AMISOM to prioritize capacity-building efforts for the SNSF and highlighting the importance of coordination between AMISOM and other international partners to achieve sustainable peace.12 From 2017 the AU PSC started endorsing recommendations for the gradual reduction of AMISOM personnel and reorganization to support Mandate Extension for United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Adopting Resolution 2275 (2016) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Un.org. https://press.un.org/en/2016/sc12301.doc.htm 11 United Nations Security Council. (2017). Resolution 2358 (2017). https://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/RES/2358(2017)&Lang=E 12 United Nations (UN) Security Council. (2017). Security Council resolution 2372 (2017) [on authorization to the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 31 May 2018] | Refworld. Refworld. https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/unsc/2017/en/118245#:~:text =UNHCR- SNSF.13 By June 2020, UNSC Resolution 2525 underscored the commitment to supporting Somalia's state-building and stabilization efforts. It reflected a strategic shift towards a more sustainable and Somali-led security architecture. AMISOM's mandate expanded from traditional peacekeeping to include counter-insurgency operations, increased focus civilian protection, and stronger support for political transition. Key knowledgeable informants spoken to over the last six years of the mission, consisting of senior officers, UN and AU officials, and Somalis identify a number of factors, affecting the TCCs to varying degrees, that threatened AMISOM’s ability to achieve the objectives of its mandate: 1. AU troops do not have a relationship with the local population. 2. They do not speak the language and they do not know the culture of people on whose behalf they are acting. 3. They are not trusted within the community, 4. They rely on the use of force which is often counter-productive. 5. Their presence precludes the possibility of mutual dialogue 13 The phased reduction was suggested in AU PSC Resolution 242 of 2017. This started the gradual drawdown of troop levels and the transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces. UNSC Resolution 2431 on July 2018 supported this process. between the Somali government and their rival militant groups. UNSC Resolution 2551 on November 2020 effectively rounded off the evolution of AMISOM's mandate. The Resolution recognized the need for a gradual transition from AMISOM to a reconfigured international support mechanism that reflects the changing dynamics and priorities in the country. It called for the establishment of a successor mission to AMISOM, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), mandated to providing support to the SNSF that is better aligned with the country's evolving security needs and changing political context. The original approach was that AMISOM will provide security until the Somali National Army (SNA) was able to address the threat from alShabaab themselves. The mission was then to scale back geographically and become a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of sorts, providing rapid surge capabilities for Somali security actors. Al-Shabaab responded to this by demonstrating that if AMISOM can fall victim to their attacks, then the Somali National Army (SNA) can too. Al-Shabaab was especially effective in this tactic from 2013-2015. Although their effectiveness declined subsequently, the mission was never able to comprehensively reduce the risk posed by this group. In addition, developing the SNA as an effective fighting force was slow. The Ethiopian, Djiboutian and Kenyan contingents supported, trained and equipped militias in their sectors. It may have been militarily convenient but the political repercussions was unpredictable. Dynamics Impacting the Mission: Mandates, Politics, Implementation, Civil Society and Local Actors A. On Mandates The numerous challenges faced by AMISOM resulted in significant evolution in the mandate of the mission, influenced by both the AU PSC and the UNSC. The mandates and the resulting mission response adapted to the dynamics of the conflict as well as to efforts to stabilize the country by both the UN and a diverse range of actors from the international community. An examination of the distinct mandates provides useful insights into the mission’s difficulties.14 Resolution 1897 of November 2009 emphasized the need for AMISOM to ensure the safety of civilians. This resulted in AMISOM to adopting a more forceful and robust approach to civilian 14 A more detailed insight can be found here: Kukkuk, Leon, (yet to be published), Special Peace And Security Report: The Evolution of Concepts and Language in UNSC Mandates in typical AU Led Peace support Operations and AU PSC Communiques, Volume I Issue _, Institute for Peace and Security Studies protection. Subsequent mandate renewals reinforced this approach. The mandates circumscribed the scope of the mission’s responsibilities and tasks with regard to civilian protection. Confusion often arose around various responsibilities of the mission and how and by whom they should be implemented. Mandates used the language of protection of civilians, humanitarian aid, maintaining the rule of law, and adherence to International Humanitarian Law. It was not often clear, from the mandates alone, if the mission obligations ended with upholding IHL. In practice the TCCs quickly discovered that they cannot effectively fight, much less defeat, al-Shabaab without the support and protection of the population. Extending mission responsibility to proactive protection activities, much closer aligned to the concept of human security, emerged as a key operational imperative and essential to mission effectiveness.15 The mission struggled to convert intentions into a relevant operational approach. Failure started at the mandate level - in approach, in assumptions, in language used, in implementing mandated instructions into operational practice. On 18 September 2012, after the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), tenuously based in Mogadishu, Resolution 15 Interviews with Documents key informants, 2016-2023 and AMISOM reports and Key 2067 for the first time, emphasized that protecting and promoting human rights, investigating breaches of international humanitarian law and recognising that bringing those responsible for such breaches to account will be essential for the legitimacy of the new Somali authorities. Resolutions gradually evolved to specifically emphasising protecting the human rights of vulnerable groups. Emphases came to be placed on the importance of UNSOM adhering to the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), introduced in 2013, and the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.16 HRDDP provided a more structured approach to assess and mitigate human rights risks associated with mission activities, ensuring that its actions and military operations do not harm civilians.17 Successive resolutions continously stressed concerns on unabated violations 16 Resolution 2102 on 02 May 2013. AMISOM’s initial mandating process was event driven rather than context-driven. AMISOM has had to become a ‘party to the conflict’ in order to protect Somalia’s transitional federal institutions (TFIs) in a high-threat environment. The mission conducts active counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. AMISOM’s logistical support, provided by the UN, was designed for traditional peacekeeping operations and thus has not been a perfect fit for the mission’s needs (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017). 17 AMISOM reports 2013-2022 of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence in Somalia, including in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those who commit such crimes.18 The international community quickly recognized the imperative of prioritizing civilian protection in the mission. A number of statements from the UNSC and AU-PSC urged AMISOM to do what it can to track and reduce civilian harm, including from its own activities. B. Political Responsibilities In 2012, Foreign Policy in Focus observed that the international community, led by the UN, is the architect of convoluted and short-lived political agreements, that is not only confusing the Somali people but is 18 United Nations (UN) Security Council. (2020b). S/RES/2124 (2013) | Security Council. Un.org. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/2124-%282013%29 United Nations (UN) Security Council. (2020a). S/RES/2093 (2013) | Security Council. Un.org. https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2093(2013) United Nations Security Council. (2017). Resolution 2358 (2017). https://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/RES/2358(2017)&Lang=E also baffling international experts monitoring the Somali case.19 AMISOM faced substantial difficulty in implementing civilian protection initiatives due to mixed messaging and inconsistent communication between the mission in Mogadishu and the AU in Addis Ababa. Mixed messages ranged from operational requirements to strategic considerations. This resulted in confusion, blurred lines of responsibility, and divergent views on how to effectively protect civilians.20 To make matters worse, in September 2014 a major controversy erupted when AMISOM’s reputation was badly damaged by the publication of a Human Rights Watch report alleging that personnel had sexually exploited and abused local civilians and had been doing so for some time with impunity.21 Abuse and widespread local perceptions that such abuse are continuous hampered AMISOMs ability to build a strong relationship with the local population. After initially denying the allegations, the AU and AMISOM investigated. The report of the 19 Foreign Policy in Focus 20 February 2012 20 Williams Paul, 2018 21 HRW, 2014 The Power These Men Have Over Us: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia, September https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-overus/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces 2014 investigation was never publicly released. Instead, the AU issued a press release summarizing the principal findings and recommendations. The press release suggested that AMISOM’s Conduct and Discipline Office must monitor all reported cases of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and that the AU Commission should establish an Office of Internal Oversight Services to investigate such issues.22 In addition to encouraging and pressing government authorities to actively engage in civilian protection efforts, the mission established its own mechanisms to facilitate prevention, protection and mitigation of human rights violations. The number of allegations of SEA did decline over time, due to remedial actions. There were criticisms regarding the slow progress in enforcing a "zero tolerance" policy and introducing visible accountability measures for TCCs. AMISOM had already proposed a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis, and Response Cell (CCTARC), receiving support from the UNSC in Resolution 2036 in February 2012. This initiative was intended to monitor, analyse, and address civilian casualties during military operations. The establishment of CCTARC was considered essential for improving the 22 Williams, Paul D. & Hashi, Abdirashid, 2016, Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia, Heritage Institute, February 2016 safety of civilians.23 The UNSC would repeatedly express concern about AMISOM's delay in establishing CCTARC, underlining the increasing importance placed on addressing issues related to sexual violence and encouraging accountability within the mission.24 Along with this, the Concept of Operations (ConOps) and the Rules of Engagement (RoE), establishing the parameters of military actions, also evolved to respond to a more robust civilian protection mandate. Eventually civilian protection extended beyond physical safety to also cover a broader spectrum of needs and rights. The mission began to develop a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between security, PoC, RoL, humanitarian assistance, and development in contributing to the overall well-being of civilians in conflict zones that goes beyond mere physical protection.25 The importance of accountability in its civilian protection efforts became to be recognised but accountability mechanisms and reporting in fostering trust between the mission and the local population lagged behind.26 The reporting of progress or setbacks subsequently recorded shows a degree of 23 Kukkuk and Debebe, 2024 24 Ibid & Kukkuk, Debebe, Warsame and Arkiso, 2024 25 Abdulahi, 2020 26 Li, 2019 & Kukkuk and Debebe, 2024 polemics that one would not expect in an optimally functioning mission with proper investigation and reporting mechanisms. The most complete attempts are two reports by Human Rights and Protection Group (HRPG) of UNSOM in December 2017 and December 2019.27 The first of the reports observes that the findings and analysis are a first attempt to quantify civilian casualties (civilians killed and injured in the context of the armed conflict). It notes limited accountability for civilian casualties, as investigations into such incidents and prosecutions of individuals responsible for violations resulting in civilian casualties are rare. Nevertheless the UNSG’s 2023 report on the financing of AU PSOs indicates that missions such as AMISOM tend to use more force and, therefore, have more civilian causalities. A lot more need to be done to make future missions more responsive to civilian protection. Williams noted in 2013 that AMISOM and its partners cannot protect all Somalia’s civilians from everything. PoC must “not be seen as a substitute for political engagement to resolve the war.” It was initially a war fighting mission and it continually faced challenges of transcending this obligation in terms of concretely making a contribution to resolving the political and economic elements of the support to Somalia, tasks largely entrusted to UNSOM. 27 Kukkuk, Debebe, Warsame and Arkiso, 2024 C. Implementation AMISOM had a contradictory relationship with the challenge as to how to protect Somali civilians, especially during military operations. The mission struggled with the insurmountable difficulty of accurately verifying the types of civilian harm in a complex environment. The variety of different perpetrators were hard to identify. Al-Shabaab adopted a range of tactics that were designed to increase the harm to civilians during AMISOM operations.28 The mission was presented as a brutal occupying force in Mogadishu and accused of harming civilians. This was through indiscriminate fire policies, targeting of civilians mistaken for enemy fighters and also by failing to protect civilians from al-Shabaab snipers and attacks.29 Using a military approach, AMISOM was not able to effectively support the UN and other agencies, which have shared some of the responsibilities for the delivery of the political, economic and social elements that Somalia required for recovery from fragility. It is not what the military is designed, trained and equipped for. AMISOM needed to concentrate on tackling insecurity and instability only where it could do so effectively. It frequently overstretched itself trying to fix too many problems at once.30 28 Williams Paul, 2013 29 ibid 30 Interviews with AMISOM officials, 2016-2023 In the minds of Somalis there developed a sense that peace-building is by and large driven by outside rather than Somali interests.31 Feedback from a cross-section of face-to-face interviews in Somalia in 2023 found that (most) civilians do not know and understand the role of AMISOM. The manner in which AMISOM is perceived by citizens varies fairly widely and within different segments of society such as civilians, government officials, young people and women and men, although there is overlap and convergence on many matters. Even if there is recognition that the intervention did manage to contain violence to some degree, citizens can be highly sceptical and even hostile to the actions taken for their protection. People in positions of power tend to be more sympathetic to the mission. There is a widespread perception that AMISOM was only interested in engaging with powerful people and powerful institutions. In fact, a common response was that AMISOM is of no benefit to ordinary Somalis.32 Looking at the Somalia context in 2000s and the establishment of AMISOM, the Somali public were not consulted before the deployment of mission. There was also no credible, representative body or government that allowed it. It was by and large an outside imposition. 31 Menkhaus, Ken, 2011, Background Case Study - Somalia And The Horn Of Africa, World Development Report 2011 32 Kukkuk, Debebe, Warsame and Arkiso, 2024 AMISOM eventually adopted a gender-responsive approach to civilian protection. The integration of a gender perspective in its operations helped to align protection measures to the diverse needs of the population, particularly considering the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence.33 In order to reduce civilian casualties, the mission, very early on (2009), started to issue advance warnings for planned offensives, introduced new targeting procedures, and conducted After-Action Reviews to learn from incidents and improve future operations:34 The Indirect Fire Policy (IDF) developed by AMISOM is perhaps the most far reaching PoC policy introduced by the mission. It aimed to minimize civilian harm by limiting the use of artillery and indiscriminate small arms fire in areas where civilians could be at risk, especially in urban and residential environments. This policy had a three-step approach: avoid, attribute, and amend. The "avoid" step emphasized minimizing indirect fire unless necessary for achieving a clear military objective or for self- 33 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Resolution 2232 (2015). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/798098/files/S_RES_2232%282015%29EN.pdf?ln=en 34 Williams, P. D. 2009, AMISOM's Five Challenges. Commentary. Center for Strategic and International Studies https://www.csis.org/analysis/amisoms-five-challenges defence, considering the potential impact on civilians.35 AMISOM also introduced “No Fire Zones” in the vicinity of critical civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, residential areas, markets, religious sites, and IDP camps. Despite these measures, civilian casualties persisted due to retaliatory or indiscriminate fire from AMISOM troops. Continued use of mortars in urban areas not infrequently landed in civilian areas, resulting in property damage and even civilian casualties.36 Challenges in accountability and enforcing compliance with the indirect fire policy persisted throughout the mission. Traffic accidents, caused by AMISOM vehicles travelling at high speeds through urban areas also harmed 35 International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016, Minimizing civilian harm in populated areas: Lessons from examining ISAF and AMISOM policies. International Review of the Red Cross, 98(902), https://internationalreview.icrc.org/articles/minimizing-civilian-harm-populated-areas-lessonsexamining-isaf-and-amisom-policies 36 Shahow, A. A. 2024 Before Leaving Somalia, African Union Should Provide Compensation for Civilian Harm. Just Security, 28 February 2024 https://www.justsecurity.org/92822/before-leaving-somalia-africanunion-should-provide-compensation-for-civilian-harm/ civilians.37 The impact of civilian casualties was not only a public relations problem with Somalis but also with the international community. It also had a negative impact on operational efficiency and legitimacy. The broader perception of AMISOM's role in Somalia, and the increasing understanding that Somali civilian participation is essential for its efforts to establish security and facilitate political reconciliation, suffered.38 The full impact of the IDF policy on harm reduction is debated. The lack of effective implementation risked alienation from the very communities it was meant to protect.39 The policy likely led to some changes in AMISOM's practices but, its full implementation was negatively affected by the complex conflict environment in the country.40 The Civil Affairs unit worked to complement military operations in support of the FGS efforts to extend State authority by facilitating community confidence-building measures. The Unit implemented Quick 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 40 Rupesinghe, N. 2019, The Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell in the African Union Mission in Somalia: an emerging best practice for AU peace support operations?. NUPI Policy Brief. Impact Projects (QIPs), with a particular focus on health, water, infrastructure and education.41 The effect of these initiatives were not systematically recorded and there is no monitoring or evaluation reports from which conclusions can be derived.42 It may mean that many of the initiatives outlined above focused on short-term responses, emphasising outputs rather than longer-term outcomes. There was considerable pressure to show positive results, both for accountability and to demonstrate contributions made by international donors. The scope of civilian protection started to include preventive and pro41 In terms of including the Somali civil society, the Civil Affairs component has facilitated sensitizing members of civil society on FGS policies regarding Vision 2016. From 18 to 21 August 2014, the FGS and AMISOM organized a conference in Kigali aimed at identifying the role of civil society organizations in supporting inclusive political dialogue and initiating processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities. The participants agreed to create a Somalia Civil Society Consortium to work with the FGS to implement Vision 2016. The Civil Affairs unit working with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, developed programmes aimed at engaging the Somalis youths in dialogue, reconciliation, security and development (AU PSC 462nd Meeting 16 October 2014 Report). 42 AMISOM Public Information Unit. (2019). THE REVIVAL (pp. 1–44). https://amisomau.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Amisom-Magazine-Issue-29.pdf active measures, that involved identifying and mitigating risks to civilians before they escalate, also recognising that robust AU led missions need to address the multidimensional challenges faced by civilians in conflict zones in a similar way as is beginning to be recognised in UN led peacekeeping missions.43 The importance of community engagement and collaboration with local actors in enhancing civilian protection efforts acknowledged the agency of local communities in their own safety and aspirations, involved as active participants in decision-making.44 D. Civil Society and Local Actors Civil society can do advocating on behalf of local populations; highlighting situations of injustice, corruption and human rights violations; providing early warnings; preventing emerging violence; and serving as an information conduit for local communities when public communications infrastructure is destroyed or disrupted. AMISOM worked closely with humanitarian agencies to facilitate the delivery of essential services to conflict-affected populations. Coordinating with NGOs and UN agencies to address the humanitarian needs of civilians expanded over time to include access to healthcare, education, 43 Schroeder & Nemat, 2021 44 Abdi, 2016 and livelihood support.45 Within the mission, engagements were conducted to foster the involvement of the community or the public to work with the police in the fight against crime and respond to persistent asymmetric attacks in Mogadishu and other areas. Local actors can also help enable positive local conditions conducive to peace talks, support political mediation processes as a neutral monitor and/or actor representing civilians impacted by the conflict, and hold the main parties to the conflict accountable.46 But an “[a]ble, accountable, affordable and acceptable” security force envisioned by the London Security Pact 2017, is still long way off.47 Despite the billions of dollars spent on training and equipping tens of 45 AMISOM Public Information Unit. (2019). THE REVIVAL (pp. 1–44). https://amisomau.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Amisom-Magazine-Issue-29.pdf 46 United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations. (2016). Engagement With Civil Society In UN Peacekeeping: From Policy To Practice United. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/engagement_with_civil_society_in_un _peacekeeping-web.pdf 47 Williams , P. D., & Hashi, A. (2016, February 28). Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia. Heritage Institute. https://heritageinstitute.org/exit-strategychallenges-for-the-au-mission-in-somalia/ thousands of military to liberate Somalia from al-Shabaab, stabilize the country and enforce of rule of law, the country’s security forces remain perpetually weak, deeply fractured and increasingly politicized. The situation is worsened by irreconcilable differences among Somalia’s political elite. They lack common ground on the outstanding state building issues. Regime security is prioritized over national security. A corruptive governance culture remain entrenched. Persistent financial crisis is another major impediment inhibiting the security sector’s ability to recruit, train and equip officers.48 The weakness of the FGS leaves Somali society to find non-state solutions for their security and thus not have ownership of the state-building process. Civil society is a potential force to compel the government to negotiate in good faith with al-Shabaab and other spoilers such as warlords and criminal elements and ensure the best use of the support they receive. Civil society has the potential to play an important role during every stage of conflict given that they often live alongside local armed actors, understand the local political, social and historical context, and tend to enjoy a degree of legitimacy among local populations. Civil society has demonstrated that citizens are not just victims of armed violence, or 48 Ibid passive bystanders to human atrocities, or spoilers to peace processes. Local actors can be peace makers, conflict resolution mediators and community developers. But their efforts explicitly aimed at supporting AMISOM in wider political processes are poorly documented. Clans keep their militias back in order to have a bargaining chip or the option of violence if the political dispensation does not go their way.49 This highlights the stark need for a grass-roots political reconciliation process to bring ordinary Somalis into the process. There were sporadic initiatives by AMISOM to support mediation at local level, but a lack of systematic reporting and monitoring leaves some doubt as to how much was put into effect. For example, on 08 March 2017, AMISOM News reported that a threeday “workshop trained a core group of twenty one Somali leaders representing the country’s diverse background in peace mediation and negotiation with a pledge to “think nationally and act locally.”50 49 Interviews with Somali politicians and military officers, 2016 -2023. Interviews with Ethiopian and Ugandan military officers 2016 -2023 50 Peace Support Operations Division Peace and Security Department African Union Commission. (2017). Report on the Ten-Year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ll-eng-1.pdf The training consisted of mediation and negotiations, dialogue, creating inclusivity, root causes of conflicts, decision-making criteria, and strategies in handling conflicts. A number of the trainers was to be chosen as trainers of trainers (ToT), to be facilitators of subsequent trainings arranged at community or regional levels.51 But that is as far as initiatives tend to go. Conclusion AMISOM's civilian protection mandate did evolve significantly over the lifespan of the mission, reflecting an increasing and more nuanced understanding of the challenges faced by civilians. In view of high expectations, as expressed by the main stakeholders, what AMISOM could ultimately have achieved was likely unrealistic, different from the mandate and by many indicators resulted in AMISOM extending itself even further than it should have done. A careful review of UNSC mandates, demonstrate that human security language is not yet part of mandate language and mandates never incorporate these concepts directly. Rather, they typically allocate related responsibilities such as human rights (HR), Protection of Civilians (PoC) (especially of vulnerable groups), vulnerability, (humanitarian aid (HA)) to 51 Ibid the national government, even in instances where no such government exists, or where it exists in name only.52 Somalia’s security challenges are related to governance. AMISOM cannot fix this and should not have been expected to fix political problems. As long as Somalia’s political elites cannot agree on how to build a genuinely national set of security forces or deliver basic services to their population, especially in areas under their control, AMISOM was not in a position to fully complete its mandated tasks. The quality of the mission was affected by an inability of international support to address the root causes of the conflict. Discussion or consideration for people oriented security models - delivery of services and delivery of justice - lagged behind the militarised security response. While all stakeholders, including the UN, AU, TCCs, and the Somali government, shared a common understanding of countering al-Shabaab's vision, the political commitment to this fight varied. The mission endured, partly because ownership of the TCCs were high, because they all have a stake of some sort in Somalia.53 The implementation of the AU’s Protection of Civilians (PoC) strategies was not based on a close alignment between military operations, and 52 Kukkuk (yet to be published) 53 This is security interests around the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden and arguably business interests in Somalia developed by powerful military figures from the TCCs political, humanitarian and stabilisation priorities that should follow. Balancing the demands of power sharing with the needs for reconciliation proved to be an unsolvable obstacle in Somalia. It is a problem that was never resolved and remains an problematic to the present day. The consideration of state building, not only as is, partially at least, imposed top-down through the mandate, and implemented through a process that is focused on institution building and enhancing the security sector, but also bottom-up within the context of human security, as an organic or felt need by citizens, for many years may have overcome this constraint. When military, civilian and political personnel are all involved in planning and strategy development, they can ensure that Human Security and political strategies are working toward a common goal. But an underresourced force that struggles to protect itself is hardly in a position to pro-actively protect civilians. The Somali community, exhausted after more than thirty years of instability should be taken seriously about building peace and security. Civil society organisations should support efforts to build a well-trained security sector and facilitate initiatives to revitalize the economy. Delays do not lie only with shortcomings in the type and scale of support provided by the international community. It also lies with a lack of seriousness on the part of the FGS. Overall, AMISOM introduced a number of positive actions, over and above reacting to civilian harm and incidences of sexual abuse, including awareness campaigns, trainings, information sharing, policy guidance, and establishing reporting mechanisms.54 It is the improvement in these initiatives, along with systemic support and development of relevant institutional structures that will allow these actions to form the foundation of a human security approach in PSOs. Lessons Learned  The discontinuities (inability to adequately incorporate a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the dynamics of fragility and its variations into policies or practice) between justification for intervention and priority tasks outlined in the mandates developed by the UNSC and the AU-PSC was never resolved.  54 Mapping exercises that included an analysis of the motivations behind Williams, P. D. 2018; Lessons Learned from Somalia: AMISOM and Contemporary Peace Enforcement. Council on Foreign Relations, 19 July 2018. https://www.cfr.org/blog/lessons-learned-somalia-amisom-and-contemporarypeace-enforcement &key interviews with AMISOM officials and Somalis, 2016-2023 various forms of violence could have helped the mission design more sustainable protection and address the underlying drivers of conflict.  There was no mechanism to develop, improve, and adapt a conceptual and political framework that was reflective and responsive to the reality in Somalia taking into account the shifting nature of the political processes that impact on governance and security.  The international intervention (military and civilian) contribution to the development governance of system a in comprehensive Somalia and remains sustainable poorly security reported and inadequately understood.  No mechanism for government and civil society organisations to proactively inform mandate making was developed or emerged from implementation of the mandate.  There was little urgency to highlight the need for full support and long-term commitment from the international community in evidence-based support to the threat posed by al-Shabaab.  The sense of ownership of governance responsibilities by the FGS was a complex issue that was never answered or fully understood by the mission.  Conditions never allowed a scale up of political and technical support to the AU in its peacebuilding, reconstruction and development efforts across all relevant activities and engagements.  AMISOM struggled to address the most important mid- to long-term fundamentals of security governance, generating knowledge and experience as to how sustainable and comprehensive security can be achieved.  AMISOM is a good example of a process where legitimacy and authority may be contested but is nevertheless a process that most stakeholders are willing to support even though they may not agree with it, in the hope that it at least moves the country a few small steps out of its difficulties.  Somalis increasingly relied upon and supported foreign intervention to restore and maintain stability.  Functional, if sometimes sporadic, peace and state-building emerged from below– rather than being imposed through a top-down process – and have taken place in the absence of a central monopoly of violence. Bibliography General literature 2021, Structural Impediments to Reviving Somali’s Security Forces, Heritage Institute April 2021 Abdi, M. 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