Raid in the Rift

Raid in the Ri* – The July 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe. By Clifford Joseph Pereira. B.A. Hons. HumaniDes DissertaDon 1989 University of Ulster Coleraine. Northern Ireland. Note. This is a retype of the surviving original manuscript. Sadly, over the period of Dme some pages are missing. However, most of the intact manuscript has been reproduced with addiDonal recent footnotes for ease of understanding Contents Page Acknowledgements 3 IntroducDon 4 Chapter One: The Hijacking. 7 Chapter Two: The Raid. Chapter Three: The Conclusion. References. Bibliography 2 Acknowledgements There comes a Dme when one is midway through the second dissertaDon of a double dissertaDon course, when one temporarily loses sight of the goals and ambiDons of academic life. For myself a small circle of friends (Adrian, Simon, Marguerita, Fiona and especially in the laZer part – Mary) were responsible for much of the psychological support I needed to complete this dissertaDon. I have to thank Mr. Eric White and Mrs Rosemary White for their understanding and much needed nutriDonal support in the last two academic years; Dave and Mike for the use of their humble abode; and June Anderson for typing the approximately 18,000 words this year. I would also like to express my appreciaDon to Dr. Tom Fraser for the support he has given me since my first interview at U.U.C. in 1985, to pursue what appeared to be a distant degree. On a rather sad note, I would like to express my deepest graDtude to the late Dr. John Coward, both a friend and tutor – he gave us so much, may we keep up to his expectaDons. 3 Introduc)on. The Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, Uganda on the night of the 3 July 1976, was a well-co-ordinated military manoeuvre, lasDng a mere 99 minutes. The capDvaDng, though o*en romanDcised story of the raid, which has been the basis of books and films, is not the focus of this dissertaDon. Rather, the raid is the culminaDon of a series of events on the periphery of the Arab-Israeli conflict, both in a geographical and in a historical perspecDve. This dissertaDon subject serves as one example of the influence of the Middle East Conflict in Sub-Saharan African affairs, seeking to analyse and understand the significance of an event which produced an internaDonal crisis. At a glance the only physical connecDon one would make between Israel and the East African states of Uganda and Kenya, would be that the three naDons straddle the Great Ri* Valley. However, this dissertaDon aims to describe the factors which poliDcally entangled the three naDons in the months of June and July 1976. This is not the first or the latest instance of Jewish/Israeli poliDcal or cultural associaDons with Africa in historical Dmes – a factor o*en overlooked by modern historians. The Jewish connecDon with Africa, is much more than the biblical references to the “Children of Israel” being led out of Egypt into the promised land by Moses (The book of Exodus). Modern Hebrew and Arabic (like Aramaic, the language of Jesus and Ge-ez the “LaDn” of the Ethiopian church) are both SemiDc languages, first taken across the Red Sea, approximately 150,000 years ago from the area of genesis in the Ethiopian Highlands. Some SemiDc languages were re-introduced to the area and sDll exist there today (Tigre, Tigrinya, Harari, Gafat, Guruge and Argobba). Amharic the naDonal language of Ethiopia is a SemiDc language. These SemiDc languages are just one branch of the larger Afro-AsiaDc languages which include modern Berber, the “HamiDc” languages (including Beja - the language of Kipling’s “Fuzzy Wuzzies”), the CushiDc languages (Somali, Afar and Galla), and various ancient languages (e.g., Ancient EgypDan, Akkadian and CopDc).i The relaDonship of the SemiDc languages to one another was first proven by Judah Ibn Kuraish (Ninth Century).ii The linguisDc connecDon conDnues into archaeology. The name “Hebrew” is thought to come from a CopDc (and Ancient EgypDan) word for ‘slave class’,iii and the migraDon of the Israelites out of Egypt is thought to have occurred at around the ninth or tenth centuries B.C. according to Israeli archaeological discoveries at Deil El Balah (Gaza). iv The Falasha, a Jewish tribe in Ethiopia claim Solomonic descent. Though their form of belief and SemiDc scripture (in Ge’ez) suggests a pre-ChrisDan origin, they probably represent the descendants of a Jewish tribe from Arabia.v In the period a*er the birth of Christ, persecuDon would bring Jewish communiDes to many parts of North Africa, especially a*er the Roman destrucDon of the temple at Jerusalem (A.D. 70). Jewish synagogues were built at Naro (Tunisia), Cyrene (Libya) and Alexandria (Egypt). From this period onwards the fate of the Jews in Africa would fluctuate with the course of ChrisDan and Muslim cultures. The last Jewish tribal leader (Queen Dahia Al-Kahinah) of the Berbers died at the hands of the Muslims in A.D. 703/4.vi With the rise of nineteenth century Zionism – a movement encouraged by increasing persecuDon and the growth of European naDonalism, the Jewish diaspora once again looked 4 at Africa. In 1807 the First Zionist Congress at Basle suggested the establishment of a Jewish state in PalesDne. The Muslim Turkish rulers of the region and the German government were adamantly against the scheme. Six years later in 1903 the BriDsh introduced the White Highland Scheme in East Africa (modern day Kenya).vii The seZling of this area by “Whites” was extended to the Zionists as the “Uganda Offer”. viii However, the Zionist Congress led by Chaim Wiezmann1 rejected the offer on the basis, that there was a lack of historical land aZachments. However, some Jewish seZlers did go to East Africa and a Jewish synagogue exists to this day in Nairobi. The ProclamaDon of the state of Israel in 1948,2 served to encourage naDonalist terrorist movements in many other areas of the BriDsh Empire (i.e., EOKA in Cyprus 1956-60, the Mau Mau in Kenya 1952-56 and the Aden insurrecDon 1958-67).ix When the wave of independence rippled through Africa, Israel was quick to offer her military and technological experDse.3 In the mid 1960’s Israel undertook considerable development projects in East Africa4; building roads in Western Kenya and part of Entebbe Airport5, Uganda. By 1970 the Obote6 government was using Israeli instructors in the Ugandan Air Force (UAF) and army.x The Israelis conDnued to train the Ugandans even a*er the coup d’etat on 25 January 1971, which brought General Idi Amin Dada7 to power.xi In early 1971 Amin went to Libya where he held talks with Colonel al-Qaddafi.8 On his return to Uganda Amin declared himself Life President, gaining popular support by expelling the commercially dominant Asian community.xii This led to fricDon in AngloUgandan relaDons turning Amin further towards the Arab and socialist world.9 In a leZer to the Times of India, one of the expelled Ugandan Asians – Mr. Narendra Patel, a barrister and an ex-speaker of the Ugandan Parliament, commented on the expulsion of the Asians a*er Amin’s tour of Libya where al-Gaddafi had similarly ousted 25,000 Italian seZlers.xiii Amin’s closer Des with the Soviet Union and the Arabs led to the cancellaDon of his armaments order with Israel and the ending of all Israeli aid projects in Uganda on 26 March 1972.xiv On the following day Amin issued expulsion orders for the Israeli army and paratrooper 1 Chaim Azriel Weizmann or ‫( חיים עזריאל ויצמן‬27 November 1874 – 9 November 1952) was a Russian-born Zionist leader who later served as the first president of Israel from 1949 to 1952. 2 “White”-ruled South Africa was the first African country to recognise the state of Israel in 1948 followed by Liberia in 1949. 3 Ethiopia maintained consular relaQons with Israel in 1956, Kenya recognized the state of Israel in 1963 at the Qme of independence, a precise date is unavailable, but Uganda is thought to have established relaQons with Uganda in the early 1960’s. Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Somalia have never recognized the state of Israel. 4 Shortly aZer independence Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir met with then Prime Minister Jomo Kenya`a and established formal relaQons between the two countries. Under a scheme called Mashev (‫ )מש"ב‬for overseas development Israel would train Kenyans in agriculture and medicine. 5 Entebbe is a Ugandan city located on the shores of Lake Victoria, about 36 Kilometers from the capital Kampala. It was the capital of the colonial Protectorate of Uganda and its airport grew out of the use of seaplanes using the River Nile and the Great Lakes as a route from the Mediterranean to Southern Africa. 6 Apollo Milton Obote (28 December 1925-10 October 2005) served as the second president of Uganda from 1966 to 1971, and later from 1980 to 1985. 7 Idi Amin Dada Oume (30 May 1928-16 August 2003) died in Saudi Arabia. 8 Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar Al-Gddafi or (c.1942-20 Oct 2011). RevoluQonary Chairman of the Libyan Arab Republic from 1969 to 1977. 9 Britain was the colonial power that ruled Uganda as the Uganda Protectorate unQl independence in 1962. It was under BriQsh rule that the majority of South Asians had entered Uganda. 5 instructors, leading to the breaking of diplomaDc links on 10 April 1972, despite the payment of U.S. $15 million due to Israel. On 12 September, the Sudanese Air Force stopped five Libyan Air Force jets from flying to Uganda. Mr. Narendra Patel claimed that the growing Arab influence in Uganda at this period was characterised by Amin’s “handing over of the Israeli Ambassador’s residence to the Arab Guerrilla OrganisaDon [PLO?]”.xv This point has also been Chaim made by author W. Stevenson.xvi Before the end of the year, Amin made a statement supporDng Hitler’s slaughter of six million Jews in World War Two.xvii The consequence of this ani-SemiDsm was the ending of American, Canadian and Norwegian economic and aid projects. Amin visited Libya again in 1973 and al-Gadaffi was recorded by Uganda Radio on this occasion saying to Amin, “You are a prophet! As I see you, I see another Mohammed! Be brave and we will support you”.xviii The Times of India in May 1973 reported the placing of Muslims as “No 2’s” in government and high posiDons in the army.xix Eye witnesses have told the author that the majority of the Asian residences and businesses were given to Muslim Nubians or members of Amin’s Kakwa tribe. By 1976 the Minister of Defence, the Commander of the Marines, members of the Airforce and Marines and the head of the Entebbe Fire Brigade were Muslims.xx In 1973, the year of the Yom Kippur War and the Arab Oil Embargo, the African states including Kenya and Zaire were forced by Arab oil-pressure to break diplomaDc relaDons with Israel. 10 Soviet military support for Somalia and Uganda was encouraging American arms sales to Zaïre and Kenya as global super-power strategy intensified in Eastern Africa. In 1974 the Soviet Union granted Uganda a “gi*” of one squadron of MIG 17 jet fighters. The event was reported in the Indian Expressxxi and later in the Sunday Times.xxii In June 1975 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Kenyan government had impounded a Russian military convoy of four tracked vehicles on transports with Ugandan drivers and Soviet advisors. The Convoy was held in Nairobi en-route to Kampala. The tracked vehicles were suspected to be SAM missile launchers.xxiii On the 18 January 1976, agents of the Kenyan General Service Unit (KGSU) apprehended three PalesDnian terrorists with anD-aircra* missiles at Nairobi’s Embakasi Airport as an Israeli El-Al plane came in to land. The terrorists were thought to have been involved in the 1973 bazooka aZack at Orly Airport (Paris), and appear to have arrived in Kenya from Beirut. On 21 January 1976 two West Germans arrived in Nairobi and began to invesDgate the whereabouts of the Arab terrorists. The Germans too were arrested by the Kenyan Police who discovered that one of the Germans (a woman) carried espionage instrucDons wriZen in invisible ink on her stomach. On the 3 February the five terrorists were handed over to Mossad11 interrogators by presidenDal order.xxiv Chapter One: The Hijacking. 10 Most energy-starved African naQons broke diplomaQc relaQons in that year including Benin, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Zaïre and Zambia. Territories under Portuguese colonial rule (Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sāo Tomé & Principe, Angola and Mozambique) or French rule (DjibouQ and the Comoros) as well as those under European se`ler rule (Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa) remained open to relaQons with Israel. Kenya was the first country to use the IMF Oil Facility in 1975. 11 The Israeli InsQtute for Intelligence and Special OperaQons (‫ )המוסד למודיעין ולתפקידים מיוחדים‬normally known as Mossad 6 On Sunday 27 June 1976 an Air France flight AF139 took off from Tel Aviv on a flight to Paris via Athens. On board were two-hundred and fi*y-seven passengers of various naDonaliDes and a French crew of twelve. Shortly, a*er refuelling and taking off at Athens four terrorists staged an armed hijacking (with guns and grenades) and ordered the pilot to fly to Benghazi, Libya.xxv The plane circled the airport several Dmes before landing.xxvi At Benghazi the hijackers released one passenger – Mrs. Patricia Hyman, who was six months pregnant. On Monday the plane took off again heading towards the Sudanese capital of Khartoum.xxvii Once again the terrorists ordered the pilot to seek landing rights, but the Sudanese officials refused the request and the plane conDnued the plane conDnued southwards to Entebbe, Uganda. The plane landed at Entebbe at 4.00 a.m. (Tel Aviv Dme) and was immediately surrounded by Ugandan troops.xxviii Three addiDonal terrorist awaited the plane at Entebbe Airport. The Israeli government was noDfied about the hijacking shortly a*er the plane took off from Athens. A call was quickly made to the French government, with the Israeli’s holding the French for the fate of all the passengers on the plane. France was urged to take acDon, but to noDfy Israel of her plans and aZenDons. The French government officially acknowledged receipt of the message and claimed responsibility for all passengers. The hijackers had, meanwhile stated their poliDcal orientaDon as members of the Popular Front for the LiberaDon of PalesDne (PFLP).xxix Despite French negoDaDons (in the first hijacking of a French airliner), the Israelis appeared to have had liZle confidence in the French. The Israeli Transport Minister, Mr. Gad Yacoobi warned that Israel would take all necessary acDon “both poliDcally and in other spheres” to protect Israeli passengers aboard the French airlinerxxx The Israelis decided to establish a special ministerial team to deal with the crisis. On Tuesday 29 June, the passengers on board Flight AF139 were allowed to disembark the aircra*, but were placed into custody in an airport building. The hijackers conveyed their demands to the Ugandans who broadcasted them on Uganda Radio at 2.00 p.m. (Tel Aviv Dme).xxxi The demands were received both in Tel Aviv and by the BBC East and Central African monitoring staDon in Nairobi: which was plugged into GCHQ in England.xxxii The hijackers idenDfied themselves as members of PFLP and threatened to blow up the plane unless their demand were met. The statement condemned France (as a tool of the United States), aZacked Israel and denounced both Egypt and Syria. The demand included the release of fi*y-three imprisoned PalesDnian and Pro-PalesDnian terrorists by Israel (40 prisoners), West Germany (6 prisoners), Kenya (5 prisoners), France and Switzerland (one each).xxxiii The hostages would be released upon arrival of an Air France plane from Israel, bearing the Israeli-held prisoners. The ulDmatum was set at 48 hours. Meanwhile the airport at Entebbe conDnued to funcDon normally and the Ugandan President, Idi Amin Dada with the French Ambassador, Pierre Renard urged the release of the elderly, the children and the ill.xxxiv By Wednesday the Israelis established that there were about eighty-three Israeli naDonals on board the French airline, and that there was no direct means by which they could establish a dialogue with the Ugandans, since the two states had broken-off diplomaDc relaDons. At about 21:00 p.m. (Tel Aviv Dme) on Wednesday evening the Israeli ministerial 7 team convened.xxxv The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) had no plan of acDon and so the team decided to reconvene on the following morning. Meanwhile the terrorists released fortyseven hostages, who were promptly flown to France. NaDonality Number American 2 Canadian 1 Cypriot 1 Dutch 2 French 33 Greek 2 Moroccan 3 Paraguayan 1 Venezuelan 1 Stateless 1 Figure One. Hostages released on the 30 June 1976. The names of these hostages were released and read on Uganda Radio, according to eyewitness accounts. The remaining hostages including the majority of Israeli naDonals and Jews of other ciDzenship were not released (see table of released hostages – Figure One). On Thursday morning the Knesset (Israeli Cabinet) met Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, but the cabinet could only suggest a plan of negoDaDon despite opposiDon from the Minister of Defence. The Cabinet voted unanimously for the proposal to negoDate. However, Rabin sDll urged the IDF to prepare a military opDon.xxxvi The Israelis noDfied the French of their decision and the terrorists announced a new extension of the deadline to Sunday 14:00 p.m. (Tel-Aviv Dme). This new deadline as conveyed by Rabin to the army. At 13:30 p.m. on Thursday the Chief of Staff (Mordechai Gur12) and Defence Minister (Shimon Peres13) proposed a dialogue with Kampala, by sending Moshe Dayan14 to intercede with Amin on behalf of the Israeli government.xxxvii The idea was probably proposed because Israeli intelligence had recognised Amin’s respect for military personaliDes, especially those with a history of involvement in internaDonal crisis situaDons. Rabin wisely rejected the plan in view of Amin’s “unpredictable” nature.xxxviii On Friday 2 July the bargaining in Uganda through the French ambassador (Pierre Renard) on behalf of Israel, and the Somali ambassador (Haski Abdullah Farah) on behalf of the terrorists produced another success, with the release of another one hundred hostages.xxxix President Amin, meanwhile flew to MauriDus to aZend the OrganisaDon of African Unity meeDng. French aZempts to seek a more direct communicaDons network with the terrorists resulted in the PalesDnian LiberaDon OrganisaDon (PLO) dispatching an envoy 12 Mordechau “Mo`a” Gur or ‫( מרדכי "מוטה" גור‬6 May 1930-16 July 1995) was a born in Jerusalem and later joined the Palmach Haganah. 13 Szymon Perski later Shimon Peres or ‫( שמעון פרס‬2 August 1923 – 28 September 2016) was born in Poland. He would serve twice as president of Israel, in 1995-1996 and again 2007 to 2014. 14 Moshe Dayan or ‫( משה דיין‬20 May 1915 – 16 October 1981) was born on the first Kibbutz near the Sea of Galilee to Ukrainian Jewish immigrants. He joined the Haganah in the 1930’s and led a disQnguished career in the Israeli military. 8 (Hani Al-Hassan) to Uganda, amid condemnaDon of the hijacking by the Arab League.xl At 10.30 a.m. (Tel Aviv Dme) on the same day, Mordechai Gur presented another plan to Rabin. This “Hercules Plan” envisaged the landing of military force in Entebbe.xli The problem with the plan included the means of reaching Entebbe with the element of surprise, and a means of disarming the terrorists before they killed the hostages. The Israeli intelligence network was called on to deal with these problems. The Israeli “Special CommiZee”xlii headed by Yitzhak Rabin, also contained his exdeputy and current Defence Minister, Shimon Peres. The Minister of JusDce Chaim Zadok, the Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and the Minister of Transport Gad Yaacobi were also in the commiZee. Yisrael Galili was the only minister without poryolio on the commiZee. Yitzhak Rabin like the other members had seen military acDon, but had also proven his diplomaDc properDes as an ex-ambassador to the United States. His posiDon as Chief of Staff of the Defence Ministry (1964-68) was characterised by methodical planning.xliii Both Ygak Allon and Shimon Peres were ex-Haganah members and served in the commiZee in its relaDons with the “AcDon Plan” (i.e., the IDF), headed by General YekuDel Adam – the Chief of the Infantry and Paratrooper Corps. Outgoing communicaDons took two channels: Chaim Zadok instructed the Israeli Ambassador to France (Mordecai Gazit), who in turn conveyed the Israeli plans to the French Foreign Ministry (the Quai d’Orsay), for further relaying to the French Ambassador in Uganda – Pierre Renard. The second channel of communicaDon was through Gad Yaacobi direct to the government spokesman, for naDonal and internaDonal publicity. Rabin himself was informed by the Special Advisor on Intelligence, Major General Rehavam Ze’evi15, who was briefed by Mossad (the major Israeli intelligence service).xliv The key man would appear to be Ze’evi. However, this man was merely a minor part of the Israeli intelligence network, involved in summarising and communicaDng Mossad results to the Prime Minister. Occasionally – as in the proposed raid on Entebbe, the Prime Minister may require acDon to be taken on the part of the advisor in a maZer of upmost security or internaDonal cauDon (i.e., dealing with foreign governments of doubyul poliDcal orientaDon of integrity). In the preparaDon for the proposed raid on Entebbe several factors needed to be ascertained. Some of which were more detailed than others. An understanding of the local scenario had to be gained, and the easiest source of up-to-date informaDon was by interrogaDng the already released hostages flown to France. Despite the reliance of the Israelis upon the French government, it was well known that eh French intelligence and the Quai d’Orsay had leaks to the PLO.xlv Under such circumstances the gathering of confidenDal Israeli intelligence became a criDcally delicate maZer, one which the Chief of Mossad and the Prime Minister entrusted to the Advisor on Intelligence. Rehavam Ze’evi was sent to Paris where he personally interviewed the released hostages – gathering vital informaDon on the locaDon of the Ugandan soldiers and their guardrouDnes, the nature of the terrorists, the hostage locaDon and other such maZers.xlvi It soon 15 Rehavam Ze’evi or ‫( רחבעם זאבי‬20 June 1926 – 17 October 2001) was born in Jerusalem. He joined the Palmach in 1942 before joining the IDF. In 1981 as director of the Israel NaQonal Museum in Tel Aviv he changed its name to Eretz Israel Museum and wrote several books that naQonalised the history of the region. In 1988 Ze’evi established the Moledat (‫ מולדת‬or “Homeland”) party advocaQng the removal of Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza strip to neighbouring countries. This party merged with Herut – The NaQonal Movement (‫ )חרות – התנועה הלאומית‬and The Religious Zionist Party “Tkuma” (‫ )הציונות הדתית‬to form The NaQonal Union (‫)האיחוד הלאומי‬. He was assassinated by the PLFP at the Jerusalem Hya`. 9 became apparent that the Ugandan soldiers and the terrorists were in cahoots with each other, therefore prompDng the need for further intelligence on the Ugandans. Lt. Col. Baruch Barlev, who had served in Uganda for five years as the head of the Israeli Defence Ministry’s mission to Uganda, provided a dossier on General Amin, who was now seen as the key to Uganda’s relaDonship with the terrorists.xlvii Barlev was also called upon earlier to intercede in release negoDaDons by telephoning Idi Amin, his personal friend. Barlev’s conversaDons on 30 June at 14:00 p.m. and 23:05 p.m. (Tel Aviv Dme) and on Thursday 1 July are produced in William Stevenson’s 90 Minutes at Entebbe.xlviii Barlev’s conversaDons were an aZempt to sway General Amin into a pro-Israeli stance on the pretext that it would bring Amin world admiraDon if he secured the release of the hostages. The conversaDons are clearly ego-boosDng for Amin with Barlev offering to visit Uganda if it would ease the situaDon. Israeli intelligence also gathered informaDon on the Uganda army and air force from old training photographs and a home movie of Idi Amin arriving at the airport in a black Mercedes with an escorDng Land Rover. Israeli TV held footage of the old and new terminals, part of which was originally constructed by the Israeli firm Soleh Boneh, who sDll held the blueprints. Mossad had four other sources of intelligence; Firstly, Israeli agents in Kenya had made contact with the local intelligence service, - the Kenya General Service Unit (KGSU). Despite the lack of proper diplomaDc faciliDes and connecDons, the government of Jomo KenyaZa did have covert links with the Israelis. El Al, the Israeli state airline made scheduled stops at Nairobi, while en-route to/from South Africa. In Nairobi the airline was granted extra security arrangements at the airport and at the offices in the city centre. On this airline several Mossad agents entered Kenya, one of them made his way by fishing boat from Kisumu to Entebbe, and posing as a Sudanese, he gathered informaDon on the locaDon of the UAF MIG’s and on the number of troops at the airport and their rouDnes. There has been a hint that Mossad agents operaDng in the Sudan may also have been involved in intelligence-gathering. A third source of intelligence was via Mossad’s link with the Bureau for State Security BOSS16 in South Africa and the American Central Intelligence (CIA), both of which may have provided satellite and armaments data. Mossad agents acted as navigators on the “Whiskey Run” from Stanstead Airport (UK) to Entebbe, and used the service to spy over Benghazi en-route.xlix The list of prisoners that the terrorists demanded for release, reinforced the prevalent view that the world’s terrorist organisaDons were inter-linked (see Figure two). Among the prisoners to be freed were Fatma Barnawi, Archbishop Hilarion Capucci and William George Nasser – all of the PalesDnian Al-Fatah movement.l Samir Darwish was a PFLP member (as were the majority of terrorists involved in the hijacking). Kozo Okamoto was a member of the Japanese Red Army. The hostages to be freed by Kenya and Jan-Carl Raspe were members of the West German ‘Baader Meinhof group’17. Eye-witness accounts gathered in Paris by Ze’evi suggested that two of the terrorists, who staged the hijacking were German and one was a woman, possibly Gabriella Tiedman-Krieger (involved in the OPEC ministers kidnapping in December 1975) or BrigiZa Kuhlmann. Both women were members of the Baader Meinhof group. 16 The Bureau for State Security (BOSS) or Buro vir Staatsveiligheid, was the main South African state intelligence agency from 1969 to 1980. 17 Also known as the Red Army FacQon (RAF) or Rot Armee FrakQon. 10 17. Red Army Japan (D.S. T.) France Red Bridade Baader-Meinhof _ _ _ _ ___, W. Germany --Al-Fatah - Black September M. East ~ - - - P.L.O. M. East (Mossad) Israel (K.G.B.) U.S.S.R. P.F.L.P.G.CJP.F .L.P. M. East P.D.F.L.P. E.T.A. Spain Provisional I.R.A. N. Ireland (M16) G. Britain E.L.P.F. (K.G. S. U.) Kenya (C.I.A./F.B.I.). U.S.A. E.L.F. - - Eritrea_ _ _ _ __ S. Yemen - - - (S.R.C.) Uganda (R.C.M.P.) Canada Libya Algeria I (S.A.V.A.C.) Iran Iraq (B.O.S.S.) Africa s. (B.O.S.S.) P.L.O. (M16) Figure Two: Intelligence organisation (in brackets) terrorist organisation Organisations activated during the Entebbe hijacking and subsequent raid (underlined) Terrorist and intelligence networks in 1975. 11 For further informaDon the Israeli navy dispatched a Reshef-class surveillance ship to the Indian Ocean off Mombasa. The ship was to monitor messages from the forthcoming OrganisaDon of African Unity (OAU) meeDng in MauriDus to Nairobi and Kampala, as well as messages from Mossad Agents in Kenya.li A reconnaissance plane was sent over the Eastern Mediterranean to listen to Libyan radio communicaDons. The plane intercepted plans for an unscheduled…… -----page missing ---……hijacking, and in 1973 a JAL aircra* was hijacked.lii Increasing aZacks were conducted out of Europe in South America (e.g., Paraguay), and the few aZacks in the 1970’s were more anD-SemiDc than anD-Zionist. The hijacking to Entebbe couldn’t have been conducted by a more experienced terrorist organisaDon, given the above record, the choice of desDnaDon and the support of Libyan Colonel al-Gaddafi. On the morning of 2 July 10:30 am (Tel Aviv Dme) the Israeli Chief of Staff presented the first AcDon Plan, which the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin found to be acceptable. The “Hercules Plan” envisaged the use of military force landed by Hercules aircra*.liii Rabin’s advisor on intelligence in Paris (Reharim Ze’evi) suggested that the terminal buildings hadn’t really been wired with the claimed explosives. Or else the Ugandan troops would not have been posiDoned on the second floor as stated by the last hostages to be released.liv Mossad agents in Kenya approached the local MI618 agent Bruce McKenzie (also SAS),19 and Lional Byrn Davis – the Chief of Nairobi Police.lv They precured a guarantee of assistance from President Jomo KenyaZa and Gregory Karithii – the Commander of KGSU, providing the use of Nairobi’s Embakasi Airport to the Israelis, but treaDng the affair as a normal El Al Charter refuelling exercise. George Githii20, the Chief Editor of Nairobi’s Daily NaDon was persuaded in Israel to promote the Israeli opDon in the eyes of the Kenyan president on Githii’s return from Israel (3 July).lvi The Israeli planes could now refuel in Kenya on their return from Entebbe, with the full sympathy of the Kenyan people, given the poor Kenya-Uganda relaDons. News of an aZempted coup in the Sudan, with the possible backing of Libya was welcomed by Israel as it would retrain Libyan interference in Uganda temporarily.lvii 18 The UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is commonly known as Military Intelligence, SecQon 6 (MI6). It is responsible for foreign intelligence and the analysis of human intelligence on foreign naQonals. 19 Bruce Roy McKenzie (1 Jan 1919-24 May 1978) was a South African-born Minister of Agriculture before independence, who is alleged to have been an agent for the BriQsh, South Africans and Israelis. McKenzie was instrumental in dismantling the White Highlands Scheme aZer independence. Subsequent to this research it has emerged that he was involved the kidnapping of two Germans and three Arab suspected terrorists who were secretly sent to Israel. He was assassinated by a bomb a`ached to his aircraZ aZer a meeQng with Amin. 20 The NaQon newspaper was founded by the Aga Khan (a Muslim) who was also its majority shareholder. The Aga Khan was considered as backing the Arabs at the Qme when Githii was backing the Israelis. According to some sources Githii threatened to resign, which meant a threat to Kenyan free speech, since Githii was parQcularly criQcal of all Kenyan poliQcs. 12 Chapter Two: The Raid. The full-scale rehearsal for the proposed raid at Entebbe was conducted as Sharm ElSheikh on the Friday night 3rd July 1976. The plan was approved by the ministerial team on the following morning. Rabin then summoned a Knesset meeDng at 14:00 p.m. (Tel Aviv Dme) at which the leaders of the opposiDon were invited.lviii Two Boeing 707’s had already taken off some Dme before the main force of four Hercules Aircra*, and their fighter-jet escort. This later fleet was airborne by 15:30 p.m. (Tel Aviv Dme). All planes took off from Sharm El-Sheikh military airfield, though the 707’s had been painted with civilian El Al livery and registraDon numbers at Lod Airport22. There was sDll enough Dme to call off the operaDon, if the cabinet disapproved of it, as the flight to Entebbe would take several hours. Despite a liZle opposiDon the pressure from the hostage families in Israel and the popular firm stand against terrorism resulted in the cabinet voDng unanimously in favour of the operaDon. The meeDng was kept secret unDl the following morning. 21 The four Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircra* were fiZed with extra fuel tanks to enable them to make the 4074 Kilometre trip to Entebbe. Special electronic navigaDon equipment allowed the four planes to fly in close formaDon: at very low elevaDon and without radio communicaDon, as they sped South-Southeast along the Red Sea Civil AviaDon Airpath. A fighter aircra* (F-4 Phantom23) flying at a high alDtude with radar-blocking equipment accompanied the Hercules aircra* for about 1100 kilometres.lix Once the main fleet had cleared the air-space between the Sudan and the Saudi Arabian port of Jeddah, the Phantom returned to Israel. The two Boing 707’s turned southwards at DjibouD24 to cross Ethiopia, flying directly over Addis Ababa, where the airport was closed at night. The first plane landed at Nairobi and taxied to the ‘Maximum Security Area’, at 23:26 p.m. East African Dme (22:26 p.m. Tel Aviv Dme). The second 707 followed the same route to park beside the first plane. The rouDne El Al telex was sent back to Tel Aviv – though its implicaDons were clearly extraordinary. Lionel Davies of the Nairobi Police made sure the ground crews and airport security carried out their rouDne procedures, unaware that the first plane was a fully furnished operaDons centre, and the second, an airborne medical centre, complete with doctors and nurses. The main force (code-named “Thunder”) consisDng of the four Hercules aircra* the 707 route down the Red Sea. There are three different versions of the route taken. The earliest literary version viewed by the author was produced by the New York Times.lx ( and later reproduced in Keesing’s Contemporary Archiveslxi) contained errors in the number of aircra* involved and the Dme of departure. This version also claimed that the planes turned south over Sudanese airspace – heading for Kenya. The source claims that all Sudanese radar staDons were closed down, except for one 21 Sharm El-Sheikh at the Qp of the Sinai Peninsula was conquered by Israel during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and returned to Egypt in 1957. During the Six-Day War it was re-occupied by Israel and remained under Israeli occupaQon unQl the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt in 1982. The present internaQonal airport was originally built by the Israelis as an Air Force base. 22 Lod Airport was renamed as Ben Gurion InternaQonal Airport in 1973. 23 The Israeli Air Force had acquired both newly-built and ex-USAF F-4’s and had modified some as one-off variants. 24 DjibouQ was the capital of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas unQl 27 June 1977 when it became the Republic of DjibouQ. 13 in the extreme south (presumably at Juba25). The author was unable to find any other references to the closing down of these radar staDons as a result of the aZempted Libyanbacked coup in Khartoum on 2 July 1976. One would expect the Sudanese to be on full alert given the strained relaDons with Libya and the frequent incursions of Libyan aircra* into Sudanese airspace. The subsequent Israeli version produced some Dme a*er the raid by Yahuda Ofer in OperaDon Thunderlxii places the outbound route, down the Red Sea then turning south over Eritrea26 and the Blue Nile (i.e., over Western Ethiopia), but it goes on to menDon the “Russians at Berbera in Somalia”. This route is rather doubyul as the Eritrean area of north-west Ethiopia was a War Zone and contained an Arab-financed, Russian-run radar staDon (probably around Asmara)27.lxiii lxiv The Asmara radar staDon was over 960 kilometres from the Soviet radar at their suspected missile base of Berbera.lxv The most plausible route was provided by the American William Stevenson uDlising material from Uri Dan (Chief Correspondent of Maariv (‫ )ַמֲעִריב‬in Israel) in 90 Minutes at Entebbe.lxvi Stevenson claims that the force followed the enDre length of the Red Sea turning south over presentday DjibouD, the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa and into the Kenyan Ri* Valley. Stevenson claims “before turning inland they spoZed naval vessels of Russian origin, but apparently under Arab command”. lxvii The existence of these Russian vessels has been reported by other sources.lxviii The reference to the “Russian built radar pickets at sea and land” applies to Soviet electronic surveillance ships around the Dahlek Archipelago and the South Yemeni base at Perim Island.lxix By turning…… 25 Juba was part of the Sudan unQl it became capital of the state of South Sudan in 2017. Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia in 1962 sparking a thirty-year war, following the Ethiopian RevoluQon of 1974 Ethiopia was supported by the Soviet Union. In 1993 Eritrea became an independent state. 27 Subsequent to the wriQng of this dissertaQon it has come to light that the USA had a funcQoning listening centre (the Kagnew StaQon) at Asmara from 1943 to 1977) that was run by the US Navy at the Qme. 26 14 ,-- ... - - ~ I I I USSR I I I I I 0 / , LIBYA \ ,' EGYPT I / \ '\\ • I/·\_ \ - .... ',... \ l ' I I \ \ ,, \ \ , ) ... 0 IRAN -- - ' ' I \ I ', / / ' I \ I \ \. • ARABIA • ) S U DA N/ , - \ rJ \ SAUDI - I ,, I , ...... , ,, \ - 0 ~' Sharm El-Sheikh , ,, . I ' r',., "'\ -0 I I .,J II / I I I \ - '°'"""'\ . I ..,..., .... \ I I I I ;~I '\\ I ,~ • , ,-1_ I I '- "".,. -\ i',,,,.-- I ....... ETHIOPIA \ .... .,' / ' ,. ,- - ., .,"-,-' '/ / SOMA , ~.,, I I airobi I TANZANIA '' ,, .... 1 ', ~UGANDA Entebbe ,"' \ b) t) 0 , I - Route of rescue aircraft. _.. Route of hijacked plane. 0 8 •Friendl y/Neutrat• radar. 'Hostile radat•statiuns. Figure Three: The route of OperaDon Thunder. 15 -----pages missing ---- -- - -- - Old Terminal Q UAF. MiGs \ New Terminal. 0- New Control Tower. Figure Four: Entebbe Airport, Uganda. The Mercedes made for the old control tower and along the main road to the main gate where the ten commandos engaged a Ugandan sentry. The Israeli pistols were affixed with silencers and the disguise worked so well that the Ugandans did not get a chance to see their weapons. This group then went on to the old terminal building. The second Hercules meanwhile taxied up to the first and a second commando team entered the old terminal building, shooDng one terrorist by the door and another two to the le* of the door. The hostages were ordered to keep down in Hebrew and English, but despite the warnings one hostage was killed in the cross-fire (Jean-Jacques Maimoni). A fourth terrorist was killed across the room, and five civilians were wounded in the cross-fire, which lasted a mere 1 16 minute and 45 seconds.lxx Two more terrorists were discovered on the first floor and were shot. Outside, the second and third Hercules had landed on the le*-hand side runway and made their way over towards the new terminal. Somehow, the runway lights were switched on when the first three planes landed, but they were turned off a*er the second and third planes made their simultaneous landing. Each aircra* was alloZed a guard of a dozen commandos while the others conducted their predetermined tasks. As the 103 were led into the first two Hercules aircra*, commandos from the third aircra* engaged Ugandan troops at the new control and radar towers. The Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan (Yoni) Netanyahu28, the commander of the assault force was shot at this site.lxxi The Israelis proceeded to raid the tower taking away some of the Soviet radar equipment. Commandos from the fourth Hercules headed for the Ugandan Air Force MIG’s destroying seven MIG 21’s and four MIG 17’s. The Fouga Magistar planes and the president’s jet were le* untouched. Amid the sound of exploding MIGS’s and fires at the old and new control towers, the first Hercules took off just 53 minutes a*er landing. Four Israeli soldiers were injured and one of the wounded hostages died before the plane reached Nairobi.lxxii The remaining injured were treated on board the aircra*, with some of them undergoing surgery at the airborne medical centre as Nairobi Airport (on the Embakasi runway!). The ‘Command Centre” aircra* landed at Nairobi just ahead of the first Hercules. Some of the injured were (according to eye-witnesses) taken to Nairobi NaDonal Hospital. The returning force, appears by all accounts to have made its way back to Israel by heading over Mombasa, then northwards around Somalia and up the Red Sea. 28 Yonatan ”Yoni” Netanyahu (13 March 1946 – 4 July 1976) commanded the premier special force known as the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit more commonly known as Sayeret Matkal or ‫סיירת מטכ״ל‬. 17 Chapter Three: The Conclusion. Surprisingly, President Idi Amin was unaware of the Israeli raid on Entebbe, unDl he received the rather brief and sarcasDc call from his old friend from Israel, Lieutenant Colonel Baruch Bar Lev. The conversaDon is reproduced by William Stevenson in 90 Minutes at Entebbe.lxxiii The report of the raid appeared on the early morning ediDon of the New York Times on 4 July! By the 5 July President Amin was making verbal aZacks on Israel and Kenya on the state-controlled Radio Uganda. Eye witnesses claim that Entebbe Airport was closed for three consecuDve days a*er the raid. Meanwhile world opinion on the raid was being voiced. The United States would appear to have had prior knowledge of the raid through her CIA intelligence network, and was openly content with the result of the raid. America saw the raid as a victory for the “West” in the baZle between Western intelligence and Soviet intelligence, which sponsored and assisted terrorism. American prior knowledge of the raid, and possible US assistance to the Israelis is suggested by the arrival on 3 July of a US P-3 Orion Naval Petrol aircra* at Embakasi Airport, from the US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The aircra* would appear out of place, being over 560 Kilometres inland from the Mombasa Naval Base and 600 metres above sea level. However, if the aircra*’s duDes involved surveillance over the shores of Lake Victoria, Nairobi would be the preferable local base, as Ugandan intelligence was known to be acDve at the Kenyan lake-shore city of Kisumu. An American frigate had also arrived at the port of Mombasa on 3 July, and the US Seventh Fleet (reportedly including the 60,000 ton Aircra* Carrier USS Ranger C-61) moved into the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea. The presence of the frigate at Mombasa and the P-3 Orion at Embakasi Airport were later confirmed on the 12 July.lxxiv The Israelis received the congratulaDons of the American President Gerald Ford. Fearing Arab repercussions, the French ambassador to Kenya, Oliver Beleau declared the raid was conducted independent of France. On this maZer, the French government and in parDcular the Foreign Office at the Quai d’Orsay (i.e., the SDCE) as known to have a leak to the PalesDnian LiberaDon OrganisaDon. The Israelis made use of the leak by conducDng all negoDaDons for a (fake) acceptance of the terrorists demands through the SDCE.lxxv It is very possible that the French did discover about the Israeli raid, when the OperaDon Thunder fleet overflew the French base at DjibouD en-route to and from the raid. The base at DjibouD was and sDll is an important French naval facility. Like the French, the Kenyans too denied prior knowledge of the raid. The Kenyan Vice-President, sDll at the OAU meeDng MauriDus denied any collaboraDon between Israel and Kenya, while at the same Dme Nairobi pulled on her defence agreements with the United States and Great Britain. On the following day at a meeDng in Kampala with Amin, the Libyan charge d’affairs to Uganda, offered his government’s support to Kampala.lxxvi Amin aZended the funeral service for the twenty-two Ugandan soldiers killed in the raid, while the Voice of Uganda newspaper confirmed the deaths of two West German and Five Arab terrorists.lxxvii The fate of the other three Arab terrorists involved in the hijacking is not known, though one of them was reported to have been residing at President Amin’s residence during the raid. The Ugandan delegaDon made an official presentaDon to the United NaDons Security Council, the OAU and the UN General Secretary, against the “Zionist invasion of Entebbe Airport”. While the Soviet Union, Somalia and Yugoslavia denounced the Israeli raid. Other states such as the USA, Kenya, France and Great Britain seemed to totally agree with the Israeli acDon.lxxviii Amin made a public vow of his intenDon to aZack Kenya on the 7 July.lxxix A further legacy of the Ugandan role in the 18 hijacking incident centred upon a 74-year-old hostage. Mrs. Dora Bloch29, holding joint BriDsh-Israeli ciDzenship, had been taken to Kampala hospital during the later part of the hijacking. She had been at the hospital during the Israeli raid, but had subsequently vanished. The BriDsh Deputy High Commissioner in Uganda (Mr. James Brian Horrocks) had been invesDgaDng the disappearance of Mrs Dora Bloch to no avail and was finally expelled from Uganda on 14 July.lxxx President Amin’s aZack on Kenya conDnued for the next week, with the Kenyans either denying or ignoring the dictator’s remarks, despite the murder of an esDmated 245 Kenyan naDonals in Uganda by 11 July. It appears that Amin executed the enDre staff on duty at Entebbe Airport at the Dme of the raid, including the Director of Civil AviaDon (Mr. Peter Kalanzi) and non-Ugandan members of the African Civil AviaDon AdministraDon. These killings provoked a mass expulsion of Ugandans from Kenya, including Uganda Airlines personal and railway staff. By the 16 July the Kenyan border police esDmated 3000 refugees crossing into Kenya per day. 200 Ugandan lorries and railway wagons were blocked by Kenya from entering Uganda, thereby starving Uganda of basic necessiDes and rolling stock for exports.lxxxi The build-up of Ugandan troops along the Kenyan border provoked a request by Nairobi to the BriDsh government (with whom Kenya had a defence agreement) for aircra* spare parts and ammuniDon. InternaDonal support and recogniDon for Kenya’s role in the raid despite her iniDal denials was provided on 18 July by Irwin Shapiro in the New York Times in his comment that the “posiDve aspect of the Israeli rescue in Uganda is the cooperaDon of Kenya in the mission”.lxxxii The much-needed boost to the Kenyan government coincided with the successful blockade of fuel to Uganda, which brought a beneficial change in Amin’s a{tude, but a break in electricity transmission to Kenya from the Owen Falls Dam on the Nile in Uganda. Meanwhile the ineptness of General Amin and the hardship produced by the fuel shortage prompted a series of army muDnies. On the 28th July the BriDsh Foreign and Commonwealth Office decided to break diplomaDc relaDons with Uganda, leaving the remaining 200 BriDsh ciDzens in the care of the French Embassy at Kampala. Terrorist retaliaDons for the raid on Entebbe began in August 1976 when the PFLP blew-up the transit lounge at Istanbul Airport, killing four civilians. Western intelligence suggested that the operaDons were conducted by Antonio Bouvier, an Ecuadorian KGB agent and former advisor to ‘Carlos’ in Cuba. Bouvier was thought to have been one of the terrorists that awaited the hijackers in Uganda, and escaped the Israeli raid because he was at General Amin’s residence at the Dme.lxxxiii In May 1977 Bruce McKenzie, the MI6 agent in Nairobi was killed with two other Britons, when the private plane they were flying exploded on a flight from Kampala to Nairobi.lxxxiv The FPLP were suspected to have placed a bomb in the aircra*. The Israelis named a forest in Galilee a*er Bruce McKenzie in recogniDon of his role in the Entebbe raid.lxxxv On New Year’s Day 1981 a bomb explosion rocked the Jewishowned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi killing 20 people instantly, and another two later. A Moroccan and a Maltese passport holder of Arab origin were implicated. Both men had connecDons with the world of PalesDnian terrorism. There were many long-term results 29 In 1979 during the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, Dora Bloch’s body was found by Tanzanian soldiers at a sugarcane plantaQon near Kampala and subsequently returned to Israel for burial in Jerusalem. Subsequent to the wriQng of this dissertaQon, in February 2007 declassified BriQsh documents confirmed that Mrs. Dora Bloch had been murdered by Ugandan authoriQes under Idi Amins orders. The Ugandan policeman who had been guarding Dora Bloch in hospital was also murdered. 19 from emanaDng from the hijacking and raid on Entebbe for all parDes involved. The Israeli hard-line a{tude against Arab terrorist was reinforced, as was her confidence in some African countries (e.g., Kenya and Ethiopia) despite the lack of diplomaDc presentaDon. OperaDon Thunder was obviously the impetus for ‘OperaDon Moses’ in 1984/5, when an esDmated 7,395 Falasha Jews from Ethiopia were airli*ed to Israel as Ethiopia suffered the combined problems of famine and a civil war.lxxxvi Ironically despite the private approval and support for Israel’s acDon in Uganda from many ‘Black African’ states. Israel’s strongest connecDon in Africa since 1976 has been with ‘white-ruled’ South Africa30, with whom she reportedly conducted a joint atomic bomb test in 1979.lxxxvii The test was observed by an American satellite over the Southern Ocean. Israel’s important diamond-cu{ng industry based in Tel-Aviv is fed directly by South African diamond mines31. The raid on Entebbe was expectedly denounced by much of the Arab World, though the country most affected by the raid was Libya. For Colonel al-Qaddafi the Israeli acDon was a humiliaDng blow. Not only was his personal friend (Idi Amin) out-done, but Libya had lost some of her aircra* (the MIG’s) in the raid. The Libyan-backed coup in the Sudan was thwarted, and though Libya conDnues to interfere in the poliDcs of several African states (e.g., Ghana, Chad, Guinea and Morocco) and actually went to war with Egypt in 1977, her role as the patroness of terrorism has conDnued. The former PFLP leader Dr. Wadie Haddad32 died in 1978 of cancer in an East German hospital. He is thought to have been in Somalia at the Dme of the hijacking. Since Hadad’s death the PFLP have been markedly quiescent.lxxxviii As a result of the hosDlity between Kenya and Uganda, and between Libya and her two neighbours, Egypt and the Sudan. The United States has become the major super-power in East Africa; and she has special arrangements with Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and DjibouD. Chester Crocker, Ronald Regan’s Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, proposed a policy of economic and military support to counteract the acDviDes of Libya and the Soviet Union. The raid on Entebbe was seen by the United States as a victory against Soviet 30 Subsequent to this dissertaQon evidence has emerged that apartheid South Africa pursued research into ‘Weapons of Mass DestrucQon’ from the 1960’s to the 1990s’. In 1957 South Africa reached an understanding with the US for a 50-year collaboraQon program that included the South African acquisiQon of a nuclear reactor and fuel. In the 1970’s and 1980’s South Africa collaborated with Israel. The US Vela satellite detected the flash in September 1979 and subsequent post-apartheid sources have confirmed a joint South African-Israeli test code named ‘OperaQon Phoenix’. These sources also confirmed an Israeli nuclear arsenal and means of delivery. South Africa dismantled its seven nuclear weapons in 1990 and joined the Treaty on the NonProliferaQon of Nuclear Weapons in 1991. 31 In the 11 January 1978 (SecQon D, Page 10) ediQon of The New York Times, the Reuters reporter in Tel Aviv stated that Israeli exports of polished diamonds reached a high of more than $1 billion, and that they were worth $700 million in 1976, with the USA imporQng $217.4 million as the main importer of polished Israeli diamonds. 32 Wadie Haddad or ‫( ودﯾﻊ ﺣداد‬1927-28 March 1978) also known as Abu Hani was born into a PalesQnian ChrisQan (Greek Orthodox) family in Safed. His home was destroyed in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War forcing the family to flee to Lebanon. He graduated from the American University in Beirut and worked with the United NaQons Relief and Works Agency for PalesQne Refugees in Amman, Jordan. There he was arrested by the Jordanians for his naQonalisQc acQviQes in 1956 and escaped to Syria in 1961. He became increasingly involved in anQ-Israeli acQviQes and in the militarizing of the Arab NaQonalist Movement (ANM) that he had cofounded. Haddad was actually expelled by the PLFP in 1973 under pressure from the PLO. 20 supported terrorism and a rather discreet and indirect American support for Zionism, via Kenya. The Soviet Union found herself in the rather posiDon of supporDng both Somalia and Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, and was eventually ousted by Somalia. For Britain with her historical links in PalesDne/Israel and her paramount importance in the Commonwealth, the raid was to have a greater significance. Britain’s breaking off diplomaDc relaDons with Uganda, was the first BriDsh imposed diplomaDc break in thirty-years33, and the first such instance within the Commonwealth of NaDons. The lack of any BriDsh military support to Kenya, was an example of Britain’s declining role as military power in the ‘Third World’. One of the points raised against Britain as a result of the Amin rule was the fact that the harassment and expulsion of 55,000 Asians with BriDsh passports in 1972 did not result in a severe diplomaDc acDon, while the death of one person of joint Anglo-Israeli ciDzenship provoked the break of diplomaDc Des. This factor is worsened by the fact that the East African Asians are barred from holding joint naDonality and many Ugandan Asians were not ulDmately awarded residenDal rights in the UK (some were accepted by India and the USA, the majority went to Canada). At the same Dme Britain as happy to conDnue the supply of Scotch Whiskey and armaments to Amin a*er the diplomaDc break! The “Israeli Invasion” of Entebbe was a miniature prelude to the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1978-79) and the overthrow of General Idi Amin. Amin was given temporary shelter in Libya and was later given diplomaDc asylum in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia). For Kenya the raid and its repercussions were a successful test of her internaDonal defence agreements and a boost in popular support for the ailing President Jomo KenyaZa. The rise in naDonalism (not seen at that scale since independence in 1963) and the need to have a secure infrastructure (i.e., electricity) has resulted in self-sufficiency in power generaDon which in turn has boosted the economy. The daring raid on Entebbe that gave Israel so much admiraDon – however diplomaDcally disguised, was not enough to save the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his cabinet from being forced to resign in December 1976, and being replaced in June 1977 by Menachem Begin. In Rabin’s memoirs (1976) the raid was not remembered so much as a military success at Entebbe, as it would be for “a year of much progress in Middle East diplomacy”.lxxxix But the experience and confidence gained by Israel were to be used in ‘OperaDon Babylon’ on the night of 7 June 1981, when Israeli jest travelled 970 kilometres across Arab territory to destroy Iraq’s Osirak Nuclear Reactor near Baghdad. One could ponder that the change in government produced no change in the military experience and confidence in an air force capable of dominaDng the clear, open skies of the Middle East and beyond. One would discern from the conclusion of this dissertaDon that the role of Israel in African affairs is of importance not just to Israel and the African states involved, but to global super-power rivalry, and is of greater importance to the poliDcs of Africa and the Middle East. In this dissertaDon, several sources of informaDon from eye witness accounts, through books and newspapers were uDlised to demonstrate the long and short-term effects of an incident lasDng a mere 99 minutes. Similar points and arguments could be made in dealing with Israel’s relaDons with Zaïre, or Israel’s Des with South Africa. 33 The previous was South Africa which was barred in 1961, due to pressure from African and Asian countries and Canada. 21 Bibliography Primary Sources. Newspapers. Daily Telegraph, London, UK. 28 June 1975. Indian Express, New Delhi, India. 27 April 1974. New York Times, New York, USA. 28 June – 5 July 1976. New York Times, New York, USA. 18 July 1976. Standard, Nairobi, Kenya. 15 July 1976. Sunday Times, London, UK. 22 June 1975. Times of India, New Delhi, India. 19 May 1973. Voice of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda. 6 July 1976. Keesing’s: Fraser, R. (Ed.), Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1976, Keesing’s PublicaDons, London, UK. 1976. Memoirs: Rabin, Y. The Rabin Memoirs, LiZle, Brown & Company, Toronto, Canada. 1979. Eye Witness Accounts: Dr. A. Hamilton. Mrs. N. Hamilton. Mr. A. Pereira. Secondary Sources Books. Bender, M., Brown, J., Cooper, R. & Ferguson, C., Language in Ethiopia, Oxford University Press, London, UK. 1976. Bernal, M., Black Athena – The AfroasiaDc roots of Classical CivilisaDon (Vol. 1), Free AssociaDon Books, London, UK. 1987. Bloch, J and Fitzgereld, P., BriDsh Intelligence and Covert AcDon, JuncDon Books Ltd., London, UK. 1983. 22 Deacon, R., The Israeli Secret Service, Sphere Books Ltd., London, UK. 1985. Stephenson, W., 90 Minutes at Entebbe, Bantam Books, New York, USA. 1976. Herzog, C., The Arab-Israeli Wars, Arms and Armour Press, London, UK. 1982. Kivingere, F., I Love Idi Amin, Marshall, Morgan & ScoZ, London, UK. 1977. McNaughter, T., Arms and Oil, The Booking InsDtute, Washington, USA. 1985. O’Balance, E., Arab Guerilla Power (1967-1972), Faber & Faber Ltd., London UK. 1974. Ofer, Y., OperaDon Thunder – The Israeli’s Own Story, Penguin Books Ltd., London, UK. 1976. Peres, S., David’s Sling, Wilmer Brothers Ltd., London, UK. 1970. Pry. P., Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA. 1984. Reports Hansen, H., Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda (Research Report No. 43.), Uppsala Offset Center A.B., Uppsala, Sweden. 1972. Israkit-Israel Fact Sheets, The Zionist FederaDon & B.I.P.A.C., London, UK. 1981. Strategic Survey 1973, 1974 & 1975, The InternaDonal InsDtute for Strategic Studies, London, UK. 1976. Atlases and Encyclopaedias. Barraclough, G. (Editor), The Times Concise Atlas of World History, Time Books Ltd., London, UK. 1982 Roth, C. (Editor), The Standard Jewish Encyclopaedia, W.H. Allen, London, UK. 1960 23 References. IntroducDon. i M. Bender, J. Bowen, R. Cooper & C. Ferguson, Language in Ethiopia (London, UK. 1976). C. Roth (Ed.) The Standard Jewish Encyclopaedia (London, UK. 1960), p. 1684. iii M. Bernal, Black Athena – The AfroasiaQc roots of Classical CivilisaQon (London, UK. 1987) iv NaQonal Geographic Magazine (New York, USA. December 1982) v The Family of Man (London, UK 1974) , Vol. III, pp.822-826. vi C. Roth (Ed.) The Standard Jewish Encyclopaedia (London, UK. 1960), p. 520. vii E. Soja, The Geography of ModernizaQon in Kenya (Syracruse, USA. 1968), p. 21. viii C. Roth (Ed.) The Standard Jewish Encyclopaedia (London, UK. 1960), p. 1852. ix G. Barraclough (Ed), The Times Concise Atlas of World History (London, UK. 1982), p. 138. x Strategic Survey 1971, (London, UK. 1972), pp. 65-66. xi W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 60. xii F. Kivengere, I Love Idi Amin, (London, UK. 1977) pp. 21-22. xiii Times of India, (India. 19 May 1973) xiv W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 213. xv Times of India, (India. 19 May 1973) xvi W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 67. xvii F. Kivengere, I Love Idi Amin, (London, UK. 1977) p. 22. xviii F. Kivengere, I Love Idi Amin, (London, UK. 1977) p. 30. xix Times of India, (India. 19 May 1973) xx Voice of Uganda, (Kampala, Uganda. 6 July 1976). xxi Indian Express, (India. 27 April 1974). xxii Sunday Times, (London, UK. 22 June 1975). xxiii Daily Telegraph, (London, UK. 28 June 1975). ii Chapter One: The Hijacking. xxiv New York Times, (New York, USA. 28 June 1976). Y. Ofer, OperaQon Thunder – The Israeli’s Own Story, (London, UK. 1976), p. 19. xxvi Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 283. xxvii Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 283. xxviii Y. Ofer, OperaQon Thunder – The Israeli’s Own Story, (London, UK. 1976), p. 14. xxix New York Times, (New York, USA. 29 June 1976). xxx New York Times, (New York, USA. 29 June 1976). xxxi Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 283. xxxii J. Boch & P. Fitzgerald, BriQsh Intelligence and Covert AcQon, (London, UK. 1983), p. 24. xxxiii New York Times, (New York, USA. 30 June 1976). xxxiv New York Times, (New York, USA. 30 June 1976). xxxv Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 284. xxxvi Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), pp. 284-285. xxxvii Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 285. xxxviii Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 285. xxxix New York Times, (New York, USA. 2 July 1976). xl New York Times, (New York, USA. 1 July 1976). xli Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 286. xlii Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 282. xliii Israkit-Israel Fact Sheets, (London, UK. 1981 onwards), chapter F3. xliv R. Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, (London, UK. 1985), p. 310. xlv R. Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, (London, UK. 1985), p. 315. xxv 24 xlvi R. Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, (London, UK. 1985), p. 310. R. Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, (London, UK. 1985), p. 308. xlviii W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), pp. 209-215. xlix J. Bloch & P Fitzgerald, BriQsh Intelligence and Covert AcQon, (London, UK. 1983), p.142. l W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 20. li W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 65. xlvii Missing page lii W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 53. Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 286. liv Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 286. lv J. Bloch & P Fitzgerald, BriQsh Intelligence and Covert AcQon, (London, UK. 1983), p.153. lvi R. Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, (London, UK. 1985), p. 313. lvii Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (London, UK. 1976), p. 27883. liii Chapter Two – The Raid. lviii Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 287. P. Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, (Boulder, Colarado, USA. 1984), p. 104. lx New York Times, (New York, USA. 4 July 1976). lxi Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (London, UK. 1976), p. 27889. lxii Y. Ofer, OperaQon Thunder – The Israeli’s Own Story, (London, UK. 1976), p. 109. lxiii Strategic Survey 1974. (London, UK. 1974), p. 109. lxiv Strategic Survey 1975. (London, UK. 1976), p. 127. lxv Strategic Survey 1975. (London, UK. 1976), p. 127. lxvi W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), pp. 101-104. lxvii W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 103. lxviii The Economist Intelligence Unit – Sudan/Egypt (London, UK. 1975) lxix W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 103. lix Missing pages lxx New York Times, (New York, USA. 5 July 1976). W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 118. lxxii New York Times, (New York, USA. 5 July 1976). lxxi Chapter Three: The Conclusion. lxxiii W. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York, USA. 1976), p. 215. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (London, UK. 1976), p. 27891. lxxv R. Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, (London, UK. 1985), p. 315. lxxvi Voice of Uganda, (Kampala, Uganda. 6 July 1976). lxxvii Voice of Uganda, (Kampala, Uganda. 6 July 1976). lxxviii Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (London, UK. 1976), pp. 27890-1. lxxix Voice of Uganda, (Kampala, Uganda. 7 July 1976). lxxx Voice of Uganda, (Kampala, Uganda. 14 July 1976). lxxxi The Standard, (Nairobi, Kenya. 16 July 1976). lxxxii New York Times, (New York, USA. 18 July 1976). lxxxiii Y. Ofer, OperaQon Thunder – The Israeli’s Own Story, (London, UK. 1976). lxxxiv J. Bloch & P Fitzgerald, BriQsh Intelligence and Covert AcQon, (London, UK. 1983), p.157. lxxxv J. Bloch & P Fitzgerald, BriQsh Intelligence and Covert AcQon, (London, UK. 1983), p.157. lxxxvi Israkit-Israel Fact Sheets, (London, UK. 1981 onwards), chapter O9. lxxxvii P. Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, (Boulder, Colorado, USA. 1984), pp. 36-37. lxxiv 25 lxxxviii lxxxix Israkit-Israel Fact Sheets, (London, UK. 1981 onwards), chapters H4-H9. Y. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (Toronto, Canada. 1979), p. 289. 26