British Military Medicine during the Long Eighteenth Century:
A Relationship between Preventative and Reactionary Medicine, Supply,
and Empire
by
Erin Spinney
Bachelor of Arts, University of New Brunswick, 2010
A Report Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in the Graduate Academic Unit of History
Supervisor:
Wendy Churchill, PhD History
Examining Board:
Sean Kennedy, PhD History, Chair
Marc Milner, PhD History
Gary Waite, PhD History
This report is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK
August, 2011
© Erin Spinney, 2011
ii
To my grandparents William and Shelia Baker;
thank you for your unfailing love and support.
iii
ABSTRACT:
This MA report analyses British military medicine during the long eighteenth century
through an examination of the interaction between preventative and reactionary forms of
medical treatment. Study of three theatres of military conflict, the American Revolution
(1775-83), the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15), and the West Indies during the period from
(1775-1815), will showcase the obstacles to successful medical treatment and their
solutions while illuminating the integral relationship between preventative and
reactionary medicine. Analysis will include a focus on the provisioning of supplies,
threats to health, and administrative mismanagement and the resolution of these
difficulties through transport reform, prophylactic treatment, and the reorganization of
the administrative system. This investigation will argue that experience in preventative
and reactionary treatment methods and military administration and supply gained from
previous theatres of conflict were successfully implemented during the Peninsular
Campaign (1808-14) of the Napoleonic Wars and thus simultaneously reflected
continuity and change within the medical system.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION...............................................................................................
ii
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................
iv
INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................
1
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY..................................................................
The American Revolution..................................................................
The West Indies.................................................................................
17
17
33
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.................................................................
The Peninsular Campaign.................................................................
52
52
CONCLUSION............................................................................................
68
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................
72
CURRICULUM VITAE
1
INTRODUCTION:
An analysis of military medicine provides key insights into the practice of
medicine in the long eighteenth century (1688-1815) particularly within the interaction
of preventative and reactionary forms of medical treatment. With the growth of the
British Empire throughout the century, especially after the Treaty of Paris ended the
Seven Years War in 1763, British military forces encompassing both the British Army
and the Royal Navy were pressed into a wider sphere of service. The purview of
military service stretched throughout the boundaries of the British Atlantic World from
the torrid regions of the West Indies and West Africa to the more temperate climes of
North America and the British Isles and the ocean in between. Despite the growth in
responsibility, the military services were actually reduced during the peacetime period
between 1763 and 1775, an eventuality that disguised the extent of an ever-present
manpower shortage. The importance of keeping trained soldiers and sailors in place at
duty stations was readily visible to military commanders, and military medicine was
increasingly called upon to maintain force deployment at acceptable levels.
While the military medical establishment was expected to provide care for sick
and wounded personnel, a multitude of obstacles hindered this important task. These
obstacles can be divided into two categories: those that fell under the domain of
medicine such as epidemics and battle wounds, and those considered the auspices of
administration. Medical obstacles were often outside the control of medical practitioners
working within the eighteenth-century medical system. Indeed, the epidemic diseases
responsible for the highest mortality and morbidity amongst British servicemenmalaria, typhus, and typhoid- were not curable until the twentieth century, while yellow
2
fever remains incurable.1 In order to combat this reality military medicine incorporated
both preventative and reactionary methodologies. The administrative obstacles were the
largest impediments to successful medical care that could be influenced by human
action in order to induce positive change. As such, these obstacles were the easiest to
overcome. They existed within three domains: the hierarchical structure and nature of
the military administration, the supply and transport system responsible for conveying
both goods and individuals, and the military medical establishment which established a
lack of continuity within the medical system between military conflicts due to the high
turnover of medical practitioners. An examination of three theatres of military conflict
during the latter half of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century- the
American Revolution (1775-83), the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15), and the West Indies
during the period from (1775-1815) - will show these obstacles and their solutions while
illuminating the integral relationship between preventative and reactionary medicine.
Analysis will include a focus on the provisioning of supplies, threats to health, and
administrative mismanagement and the resolution of these difficulties through transport
reform, prophylactic treatment, and the reorganization of the administrative system. This
investigation will argue that experience in preventative and reactionary treatment
methods and military administration and supply gained from previous theatres of
conflict were successfully implemented during the Peninsular Campaign (1808-14) of
the Napoleonic Wars and thus simultaneously reflected continuity and change within the
medical system.
1
Philip Curtin, Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9-10.
3
There were two principal types of eighteenth-century military medical treatment.
One employed reactionary forms of care after illness or injury had been inflicted. This
form of treatment was time-sensitive, especially when dealing with injuries, and also
may or may not have been successful. In addition, there was also proactive treatment
which utilized preventative measures in an attempt to avoid the necessity of later
treatment. Given that the most effective way of preventing injuries from combat was
the avoidance of combat, an option that was fundamentally unavailable for the military,
the majority of preventative medicine centred on the prevention of illness and disease.
However, both forms of treatment had an equal basis for functioning within the military
medical system owing to the dual function of military forces as combat and garrison
forces. The reliance of the military system on both forms of medicine did not preclude
the emphasis on prevention by many medical practitioners, such as army surgeons John
Pringle (1707-82) and William Blair (1766-1822).2 The beliefs of Blair and Pringle
were echoed by their medical counterparts in the navy. The realities of naval service –
including isolation, prolonged voyages, and lack of reinforcements – made preventative
treatment a requisite of naval medicine. This necessity was clearly demonstrated by the
many East India Company ships that had to be crewed by Indian sailors known as
lascars for the return trip to England partly owing to the illness or death of their English
crews.3
The importance of preventative and reactionary medical treatment to
contemporary military practitioners has been well acknowledged within the
2
John Pringle, Observations of the Diseases of the Army in Camp and Garrison in Three Parts (London,
1752), ix; William Blair, The Soldier's Friend: or The Means of Preserving the Health of Military Men;
Addressed to the Officers of the British Army (London and Dublin: 1798), 7.
3
Michael Fisher, "Working Across the Seas: Indian Maritime Labourers in India, Britain, and in Between,
1600-1857," International Review of Social History 51, Supplement 14 (2006), 21-23.
4
historiography of the past sixty years. The majority of works focusing on reactionary
treatment have, unsurprisingly, tended to examine surgical practices.4 Preventative
medicine is most often a factor in discussions of naval medicine, with the treatment of
scurvy as a focal point.5 However, even with the recognition of these forms of medical
treatment and the acknowledgement of the contemporary medical framework there has
been an alarming tendency in historical writings to blame the medical system for the
problems facing the military medical establishment. This placement of blame forces the
reader's attention upon something that was outside the control of military medical
practitioners - the contemporary medical system - and detracts attention from extrasystem problems such as administration, transport, and supply.6 These three external
obstacles have been addressed in a separate, more compartmentalized body of
literature.7 Such compartmentalized study was beneficial for in-depth analysis on each
individual subject. However, an integration of these subjects within scholarship
concerning military medicine permits an alternative, more broad-ranging analytical
approach.8 This has been employed in other studies of the military in the eighteenth
century, but which do not focus on medical aspects. A key example is the work of N.
4
The primary example of this trend being Matthew Kaufman, Surgeons at War: Medical Arrangements
for the Treatment of the Sick and Wounded in the British Army during the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries (London: Greenwood Press, 2001). Other examples include: Martin Howard, Wellington's
Doctors: The British Army Medical Services in the Napoleonic Wars (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2008),
147-178; Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine, Volume II: From the
Renaissance Through Modern Times (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 143-215.
5
Christopher Lloyd and Jack L. S. Coulter, Medicine and the Navy 1200-1900, 4 vols. Vol. III: 1714-1815
(Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone Ltd., 1961), 293-328.
6
Neil Cantile, A History of the Army Medical Department, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone,
1974); Richard Blanco, Wellington's Surgeon General: Sir James McGrigor (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1974).
7
Examples include: R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 17751783 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); David Syrett, Shipping and the American War
1775-1783: A Study of British Transport Organization (London: The Athlone Press, 1970); John Brewer,
The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
8
Bowler, 3.
5
A. M. Roger on the Royal Navy.9 There also exists no comprehensive study of military
medicine that assigns detailed attention to both the Royal Navy and the British Army.
Analyzing both allows the reader to grasp the similarities and differences between the
medical systems of the two entities, but also highlights the interdependency of the two
medical services operating from within the same medical system. This form of
integration, which will be practised throughout this report, allows for more
comprehensive conclusions concerning late eighteenth-century military medicine to
emerge. This will be facilitated by the examination of primary sources including
correspondence of military commanders and medical practitioners, as well as medical
treatises that detailed advancements in medical science and aspects of disease
prevention. Broad analysis will demonstrate the importance of the interactive
relationship between medical treatment, medical practitioners, military commanders
and supply, transport, and empire.
Since the mid-twentieth century, the significance of individuals in the practice
of military medicine has been readily recognized by scholars. Many authors have
utilized the work of particular individuals as a central point for study. The emphasis on
individuals has developed into two approaches. One of these is biographical studies,
such as Nelson's Surgeon by Laurence Brockliss, John Cardwell, and Michael Moss,
and Richard Blanco's Wellington's Surgeon General, which examine the life of an
individual medical practitioner and through this form of study infer broader conclusions
regarding the nature and peculiarities of military medicine.10 The second approach,
9
N. A. M. Rodger, Command of the Ocean (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 378; N. A. M. Rodger, The
Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London: Fontana Press, 1988), xi.
10
Blanco; Laurence Brockliss, John Cardwell, and Michael S. Moss, Nelson's Surgeon: William Beatty,
Naval Medicine, and the Battle of Trafalgar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6
representing the majority of other works respecting eighteenth-century military
medicine, examines a multitude of medical practitioners with frequent reference to
prominent individuals such as James Lind (1716-94).11 Furthermore, the focus on
individuals has extended to military commanders, such as Admiral Horatio Nelson
(1722-1805) and Arthur Wellesley the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852), due to their
positions of power within the military medical establishment.12 The use of individuals
as a methodological hub of analysis was partly a recognition of the power of individuals
(regardless of whether medical practitioners or military commanders), but was also
representative of the prominence of individuals within the source material. This
emphasis was especially present in the printed medical treatises that delineated the
various innovations in medical treatment and aspects of disease prevention.13 While the
importance of individuals to the study of eighteenth-century military medicine cannot
be ignored, the specific attention on individuals can negate the work of a broad cohort
of practitioners who were responsible for the care of the majority of military personnel.
This was particularly evident for regimental surgeons who provided most, if not all,
medical care to the men of a specific regiment. Therefore, while the work of individuals
will form a necessary component of my study, attention must also be paid to those
medical and military men outside the category of 'Great Men.'
Although the prominence of preventative medicine in the naval context has been
well acknowledged in the historiography,14 this influence has not been present in studies
11
Lloyd and Coulter, 296-303; Kaufman, 11-27
Brockliss et al., 98.
13
Robert Hamilton, The Duties of a Regimental Surgeon Considered: With Observations on his General
Qualifications; and hints relative to a More Respectable Practice, and Better Regulation of that
Department (London, 1794), i; Alexander Aberdour, Observations on the Small-pox and Inoculation
(Edinburgh, 1791), 8.
14
Lloyd and Coulter, 70-93, 293-328; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 484-485; Brockliss et. al, 91-94.
12
7
of the medical system of the British Army. Such works have instead chosen to
emphasize surgical innovations and other forms of reactionary treatment, primarily to
combat casualties.15 This oversight negates the importance of preventative medicine in
the army context, as well as a great deal of contemporary writing on the subject of
health preservation.16 Indeed, preventative medicine was a key factor of army medicine
particularly due to the ongoing manpower shortage that plagued the service throughout
the latter half of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, and the need to
deploy forces throughout a vast empire. Therefore, an examination of both preventative
and reactionary forms of treatment in land- and sea-based military services will help
achieve a more balanced picture of military medicine within the British empire,
between 1775 and 1815.
In order to address the above issues within the historiography, three approaches
to study were here. First, it is necessary to consider all contemporary medical decisions
within the framework of the humoral medical system without assigning blame to the
system. Second, the works of individuals must be included in such a matter that allows
for a more comprehensive inclusion of practitioners. Third, it is the goal of this report
to present a more comprehensive approach to the study of military medicine. This will
be achieved through a comparison of the North American, West Indian, and Peninsular
theatres of conflict, a method which will be facilitated by using a broad chronological
lens and an approach that encompasses both the army and the navy. The development
of this inclusive methodology will be further enhanced through an examination of the
15
Howard, 143; Kaufman, 23.
Many treatises had the goal of 'preserving the health of soldiers' such as the work of Donald Monro
(1728-1802). Donald Monro, Observations on the Means of Preserving the Health of Soldiers, and of
Conducting Military Hospitals (London, 1780).
16
8
tripartite relationship between medicine, military operations, and supply and transport.
By eliminating the segregation of these entities, which has been present in the
historiography to date, it will be possible to draw broader, more comprehensive
conclusions about British military medicine in the long eighteenth century. The report
reveals the importance of previous experience in military conflicts to improving medical
treatment during the Napoleonic Wars.
In order to provide adequate contextualization of military medicine during this
period, the general precepts of humoral theory must be understood. The humoral system
formed the basis of medical thought during the early modern period and was the
framework through which all changes and recommendations in medicine were
understood.17 The humoral theory of medicine originated from the Roman physician
Galen (129-216 AD) and the Hippocratic treatises written between 420 and 350 BC.18
These medical writings were 'rediscovered' during the Middle Ages and remained the
foundation of medical thought until the mid-nineteenth century.19 Humoral theory
divided the body into four humours: black bile (also known as melancholy), yellow bile
(also known as choler), phlegm, and blood. Each of these humours possessed particular
attributes aligning to the Aristotelian four elements of nature (earth, air, wind, and fire),
and additionally the constitutional qualities of age, gender, and temperature.20 Each
individual had a particular make-up of humours that formed the basis of his/her
individual constitution. Good health, according to humoral principles, derived from a
17
Andrew Wear, Knowledge and Practice in Early Modern English Medicine, 1550-1680 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 37.
18
Ibid., 35.
19
Jacques Bos, "The rise and decline of character: humoral psychology in ancient and early modern
medical theory," History of the Human Sciences 22(3) (2009), 30.
20
Wear, 37, 38.
9
balance of the four humours. An imbalance of the humours, whether from the excess or
deficiency of a particular humour, caused illness. In order to restore the necessary
balance of the humours, medical and lay practitioners prescribed treatments that
included purges, vomits, sweating, bloodletting, and blistering.21 Supplementing the
humours were the non-naturals.22 The non-naturals provided other rationales for the
causes of illness and were the results of choices made by individuals. Included in these
explanations for illness was miasma or bad air. Since the fourteenth century miasma
had been viewed as the causal agent of various diseases such as plague and fever. Bad
air was believed to originate from putrefaction, the decaying process of dead bodies and
plants. The foul smell given off by such a process was believed to transmit disease and
provided a rationale for contagion.23 Until the late nineteenth century military medical
practitioners continued to identify miasma as the cause of tropical fevers and scurvy,
diseases responsible for the deaths of thousands of servicemen.24 This belief influenced
many decisions made by military medical practitioners including the placement of
hospitals, the design of barracks, and the use of a ventilation system on board ships.
While the humoral system remained the basis of medical thought for
approximately five hundred years, this does not mean to suggest that medical
philosophy remained stagnant. During the eighteenth century, the medical system
evolved concurrently with the Enlightenment and was part of wider changes in British
21
Ibid., 39.
Ibid., 156.
23
Lucinda Cole, "Of Mice and Moisture: Rats, Witches, Miasma, and Early Modern Theories of
Contagion," The Journal of Early Modern Cultural Studies 10(2) (2010), 66-67.
24
Gregg Mitman and Ronald L. Numbers, "From Miasma to Asthma: The Changing Fortunes of Medical
Geography in America," History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 25 (2003), 393-394; Rodger, The
Wooden World, 106.
22
10
society, including increased focus on rationality and empiricism.25 As the eighteenth
century progressed, the emphasis of the medical system shifted from reactionary
treatment to a greater focus on preventative medicine. This modification in medical
thought evolved from the connection between the environment and medicine, as well as
the recognition that preventing illness, particularly tropical diseases, was reliant on
effectively managing environmental factors.26 The emphasis on preventative medicine
also stemmed from medical advancements in eighteenth-century prophylactic
treatments. For instance, by mid-century, empirical evidence had demonstrated that
citrus and spruce beer were not only effective treatments for scurvy, but that they were
also useful in warding off the illness.27 Furthermore, as shown by clinician Harry Wain,
the practice of inoculation, used by the military beginning in the Seven Years War, and
later vaccination implemented by the army in 1801, had demonstrated the ability to
prevent smallpox.28 The measurable success of these preventative treatments reinforced
the importance of preventative medicine and facilitated the perpetration of these
methods among medical practitioners. Before the wider military establishment initiated
such measures, individual military medical practitioners often adopted such preventative
treatments due to their demonstrated success, if they had the inclination and financial
means to procure them.29 This manner of gradually adopting various methods of
25
James C. Riley, The eighteenth-century Campaign to Avoid Disease (London: The Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1987), 5; Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International,
1990), 66.
26
Ibid., xv.
27
Paul E. Kopperman, "The British Army in North America and the West Indies, 1755-83: A Medical
Perspective," in British Military and Naval Medicine, 1600-1830, ed. Geoffrey Hudson (New York:
Rodopi, 2007), 72.
28 Harry Wain, A History of Preventative Medicine (Springfield Il.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), 175-189.
29 Tabitha Marshall, "The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781," (PhD Diss., McMaster
University, 2006), 47; William Paine, "Instructions for the Acting Purveyor at Hospital Halifax N.S.,"
William Paine Papers 1768-1832, 19 July 1782.
11
preventing disease among medical practitioners also served to demonstrate utility of
such measures to the military hierarchy and assisted in proving their worth for servicewide use.
The unsuitability of whites to work in hot climates became ingrained in the
medical system and established the tenet that non-Europeans, particularly Africans and
those of African descent, were suited for labour in torrid climates.30 Medical
justification for the use of non-Europeans as labourers was appropriated by the British
Army to utilize blacks for fatigue duties in the Americas and the West Indies during the
Seven Years War, the American Revolution, the French Revolutionary, and the
Napoleonic Wars, as has been shown by Roger Buckley and Peter Voelz.31 Blacks were
also enlisted to fight, particularly in the West Indian Regiments that were formed to
protect the valuable colonial possessions in the 1790s.32 Military service, as shown by
Peter Voelz, was frequently an opportunity for enslaved blacks to gain their freedom,
with the prospect of emancipation used by military commanders to entice slaves to enter
into service.33 From a medical perspective, black recruiting ensured that in the torrid
zones there was an ample supply of non-Europeans to perform fatigue duties.
Military medicine by definition combined medical thought and practice with
military realities. During the eighteenth century, the British military medical
establishment was heavily constrained by the administrative principles of both the
30
Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Fear of Hot Climates in the Anglo-American Colonial Experience," The
William and Mary Quarterly 41(2) (1984), 215.
31
Roger N. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats: The British West Indian Regiments, 1795-1815 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1979), 2; R. Norman Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the
Military in the Revolutionary Age (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1998), 99; Peter M.
Voelz, Slave and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1993), vi.
32
Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 3.
33
Voelz, 6.
12
British Army and the Royal Navy. Although maintaining a healthy and effective
fighting force was an important military concern, the needs of military medical
practitioners and their sick and wounded patients were often assigned lower priority
than tactical or strategic goals by military commanders.34 In accordance with this
military prioritization, all high-level medical decisions,35 such as the placement of
hospitals and the dispersion of medical staff, rested with the military administration or
the regimental commanding officer, not with medical personnel.36 An example of this,
as noted by historian Michael Howard, may be found in the relationship between the
chief medical officer and his commanding officer, James McGrigor (1771-1858), and
the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular Campaign.37 Upon learning of the
military plans for the upcoming battle of Salamanca, McGrigor requisitioned wagons
for the transport of the wounded and set up an evacuation route without informing
Wellington of his plans.38 After hearing of these plans Wellington angrily informed
McGrigor:
'I shall be glad to know,' exclaimed his Lordship [Wellington], 'who is to
command the army? I or you? I establish one route, one line of
communication for the army; you establish another, and order the
commissariat and supplies by that line. As long, as you live, Sir, never do so
again; never do anything without my orders.' I [McGrigor] pleaded that 'there
was no time to consult him to save life.'39
34
Howard, 11.
The term 'high-level' in this instance refers to ‘big picture’ decisions such as the placement of hospitals
and the organization of evacuation routes for the wounded. 'Lower-level' decisions would include such
concerns as patient treatment.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 11.
38
Blanco, 131.
39 James McGrigor, The Autobiography and Services of Sir James McGrigor, Bart. Late DirectorGeneral of the Army Medical Department with an appendix of Notes and Original Correspondence
(London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861), 302.
35
13
The problem with McGrigor's arrangements was not the arrangements themselves,
which were part of his duties as a medical officer, but that he had put in place such
provisions without consulting Wellington. While in principle military commanders had
the authority to issue all high-level orders, including those affecting medical matters,
this was not always possible.40 McGrigor was again called upon to act without
command authorization when arranging the evacuation from Ciudad Rodrigo to
Oporto.41 McGrigor was further reprimanded for this plan, although it had proven
extremely effective.42
By removing agency from medical personnel, military administration
exacerbated what was commonly an already deficient medical situation. Problems of
agency were heightened due to the low status of regimental and ships' surgeons, despite
the fact that these individuals were often the only source of medical care available.43
Even high-ranking medical practitioners could only provide recommendations for
medical arrangements and wait for their suggestions to be enacted by military
commanders.44 Given the lack of standardized medical training for British military
service, something which existed in continental armies, there was limited opportunity
for the advancement of military medical personnel and their ideas.45 Furthermore, the
diversity in education and training produced variations in the standard of medical
treatment, which could be detrimental to the health of sick and wounded servicemen.
40
Howard, 107.
Ibid.
42
McGrigor, The Autobiography and Services of Sir James McGrigor, 310.
43
Blanco, 15; Rodger, The Wooden World, 21.
44
Kaufman, 17.
45
Institutions that taught military medicine had been established in France, Prussia, and Russia during the
mid-eighteenth century: Gabriel and Metz, 123, 126, 129; Brockliss et. al., 97.
41
14
The agency that medical practitioners lacked in influencing wide-ranging
medical decisions did not hamper their ability to provide care for individual patients.
The military administration mandated that all decisions regarding medical treatment
were securely in the hands of medical practitioners. On board ship, for example, the
surgeon's cockpit, where most medical procedures occurred, could be arranged however
the surgeon desired. Furthermore, naval surgeons had complete authority over the food
and drink served to the sick on board.46 Although it was difficult for a regimental
practitioner to exert the same sort of control over regimental hospitals, once such
organizations were established they were also under nominal control of their medical
practitioners.47
The military medical establishment also changed over time, particularly at the
upper level of the administration. For the majority of the period under consideration the
army and the navy had their own medical boards. The Army Medical Board was
disbanded twice during this period of study.48 It was principally, but not always,
composed of three physicians. In the Royal Navy, the Sick and Hurt Board was
responsible for all medical officers and naval hospitals.49 At the practitioner level, the
army medical establishment was further divided into two services: the staff service and
the regimental service. Medical staff officers manned the general hospitals, which were
set up to handle the large numbers of casualties resulting from combat. These officers
46
Rodger, The Wooden World, 91; Lloyd and Coulter, 92-93.
Kaufman, 8.
48
The Army Medical Board was first disbanded after the end of the Seven Years War when John Hunter
was appointed as head of the Army Medical Department. The Board was again disbanded after the
medical disaster of the Scheldt/Walcheren campaign in 1809. Ibid., 33; Howard, 15-16.
49
The Sick and Hurt Board was formally known as the Commissioners for the Care of Sick and Wounded
Seamen and of Prisoners of War. The Sick and Hurt Board was disbanded in 1806 and was replaced by
the Transport Board, which took over the responsibilities until 1817. P. K. Crimmin, "The Sick and Hurt
Board and the health of seamen c. 1700-1806," Journal for Maritime Research December (1999), 48-49.
47
15
were also responsible for the running of permanent hospital installations such as the
Royal Chelsea military hospital in London. The second service was the regimental
branch, attached to the service of a specific regiment. Both branches of medical service
operated on the same rank system. In theory, the more qualified medical personnel were
given the title of surgeon while the less qualified served as a surgeon's mate.50 Every
regiment was to be equipped with at least one surgeon and mate, though more mates
could be warranted if they were deemed necessary by the regiment's commanding
officer. While the same hierarchical system, as seen in the biography of William Beatty
by Laurence Brockliss et al., also existed in the naval service, the number of medical
personnel aboard ship was determined by the size of the ship. A single deck sloop only
warranted a surgeon's mate and a two-deck ship of the line was entitled to a surgeon and
a mate, while the largest ships (such as Nelson's HMS Victory) had a complement of one
surgeon and four assistants.51 Both army and navy surgeons underwent examinations in
front of the Company of Surgeons in order to assess their qualifications.52 There were,
however, marked improvements in the proficiency of the surgeons in both the army and
the navy, with advancements in medical science, and improvements in the pay and
status of military medical practitioners.53
50
The rank of surgeon's mate in the army was changed to assistant surgeon in 1796 in an attempt to
elevate the status of these practitioners. Howard, 23. The same change was made in the navy in 1805 at
the same time that naval surgeons were given an official uniform. Lloyd and Coulter, 33-34.
51
However, staffing numbers for medical personnel were rarely met. During the Battle of Trafalgar
Victory only had two assistant surgeons. Brockliss et. al., 7.
52
These examinations were described by contemporaries as mainly perfunctory in nature especially in
wartime. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether these examinations were successful in determining
whether a surgeon was ready for service. James Watt, "Naval and Civilian Influences on Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-century Medical Practice," Mariner's Mirror 97(1) (2011), 148; Gabriel and Metz, 100.
53 Tabitha Marshall, "Surgeons Reconsidered: Military Medical Men of the American Revolution,"
Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 27(2) (2010),
16
Until 1779, all medicines for the army were acquired by the Apothecary General
and shipped to their destinations through the provisions of the Treasury.54 A naval
surgeon was responsible for his own medicine chest, which included both medical
instruments and medicines. Medicines for naval use were supplied, often at conflated
prices, by an adjunct of the London Society of Apothecaries known as the Navy Stock
Company.55 Fortunately, during the latter years of the eighteenth century the purchase
of medicines was increasingly subsidized.56 Regimental surgeons were required to
purchase their own instruments, but medicines would be provided by the Apothecary
General and shipped by the Transport Board through the 'medicine money' of their
regiment.57 These revenues were the result of a pay stoppage that was deducted from
the pay of each member of the regiment.58 General Hospitals did not issue a pay
stoppage on the men in their care in order to pay for medicines, receiving them instead
directly from the Apothecary General through a medicine allowance.59 Medicines were
not the only supplies that were shipped by the Transport Board; all 'necessaries' –
including food and clothing – were shipped in the same manner. The efficient issue and
transport of medicinal and other necessary supplies were essential to the practice of
preventative and reactionary medicine in all theatres of war.
54
Syrett, 121, 139.
Brockliss et. al., 15.
56
Lloyd and Coulter, 15-16.
57
Marshall, "Surgeons Reconsidered: Military Medical Men of the American Revolution," 305.
58 Tabitha Marshall, "The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781," (PhD Diss., McMaster
University, 2006), 62.
59
Norman Baker, Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and War Supplies 1775-1783
(London: Athlone Press, 1971), 184.
55
17
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: The American Revolution
The American Revolution was the first eighteenth-century military conflict that
demonstrated the deficiencies within the contemporary framework of military medicine.
The first of these deficiencies stemmed from how both the medical establishment and
the larger military organization were seemingly surprised when frustration and antiBritish sentiment in the Thirteen Colonies became an open military conflict with the
battles of Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775.60 This is not to suggest that some
British colonial officers did not foresee the eventuality of war or the need to
aggressively prepare for a military contingency. In the autumn of 1774, General
Thomas Gage (1719/20-1787) estimated, in a letter to the Secretary at War Lord
William Barrington (1717-93), that the colonials would be able to "overwhelm us with
forty to fifty thousand men."61 The British would need at least twenty thousand new
recruits to counteract such a rebel force, as well as cavalry and artillery units.62
However, the recognition of the need for substantial numbers of British reinforcements
in the American colonies did not ensure that such recruitment transpired.63 Thus, at the
outbreak of hostilities the British Army and the Royal Navy were unready for war,
particularly on such a large scale. The rapid recruitment of large numbers of men that
followed Lexington and Concord highlighted several problems relating to military
medicine, such as supply difficulties and the need for preventative medicine.
60
Oscar Reiss, Medicine and the American Revolution: how diseases and their treatments affected the
colonial army (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1998), 11; J. Revell Carr, Seeds of Discontent: The
Deep Roots of the American Revolution 1650-1750 (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), 329-330.
61
General Thomas Gage to Lord William Barrington 3 October 1774 quoted in Clarence Carter, ed., The
Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, and with the War Office and the
Treasury 1763-1775, Vol. II (Hamden Conn.: Archon Books, 1969), 656.
62
Ibid.
63 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary
Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 4.
18
The importance of preventative medicine was even more explicit when the
conflict soon spread to the valuable West Indies, where the French anticipated being
able to use the distraction of rebellion in the Thirteen Colonies as an opportunity to
conquer the British island colonies. These two theatres of military conflict presented
many diverse challenges to the military medical system, including: extremes in climate,
logistical and supply considerations, and medical contingencies. In order to surmount
these challenges a combination of preventative and reactionary treatments were
employed. These diverse challenges, their potential solutions, and the impact of both on
military medicine will discussed here in order to demonstrate the origin of the
foundations of successful military medical treatment.
The first major obstacle to successful military medical practice that needed to be
overcome was that of physical distance between Britain and its American colonies. The
American Revolution was the first large-scale overseas deployment of troops, coupled
with an extensive naval commitment, in the history of the British Empire.64 While there
had been previous military conflicts in the North American theatre, most notably the
Seven Years War (1756-63), the number of British regulars deployed was relatively
small at only twenty-five regiments.65 These regiments were heavily augmented with
colonial recruits. During the first two years of the Seven Years War colonial
recruitment and enlistment eclipsed that occurring in the British Isles by 3,000 men.66
Neither were the peacetime garrison commitments following the Treaty of Paris large
64
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 333.
Robert Henderson, "British Regular Regiments in North America 1755-1763," accessed 3 August 2011,
http://www.militaryheritage.com/charts/7warchtb.htm.
66
Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: the British soldier and the war in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 19.
65
19
enough to display the deficiencies present in the system of military administration.67
With the growth in the military commitment following the outbreak of the American
Revolution, the problems in the logistical system and the effects that these deficiencies
could have on the military medical system were compounded.
Therefore, based on previous combat experience in North America, it was not
logistically impossible to fight a trans-Atlantic war. Indeed, since the seventeenth
century there had been a system in place to allow military garrisons to be deployed to
North America and the West Indies.68 The recent conflict of the Seven Years War and
the garrison requirements of the interwar period should have laid the foundation for
future military activity in both North America and the West Indies, regardless of the size
of conflict.69 Ideally, this infrastructure should have also facilitated the distribution of
medicines and other supplies necessary to medical practice. However, there was a
distinct lack of continuity in the military administration from 1763 to the outbreak of
hostilities in 1775, which had repercussions in terms of the ability of medical
practitioners to successfully perform their duties.
The reasons for this lack of continuity primarily rested on the differences
between the actualities of wartime and garrison duties. Following the established
method of raising an army and a navy for war, the military forces grew rapidly during
the Seven Years War.70 The change to a peacetime force in 1763 resulted in large
numbers of personnel being placed on half-pay or discharged outright. A large standing
67
Approximately one-fifth of British Army regular regiments served in North America between 1763-75.
Michael McConnell, Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758-1775 (Lincoln
and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), xvii.
68
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 49; John Grenier, The First Way of War: American war
making on the frontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 66.
69
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 55; McConnell, 102.
70
Frey, The British Soldier in America 4-5.
20
army and navy were not justifiable expenses and were therefore quickly curtailed as
soon as the opportunity arose.71 Historian Michael McConnell has established that the
garrison army of the interwar years differed greatly in its make-up when compared to
the wartime army. Garrison soldiers, particularly those in North America, were
typically older career soldiers whereas wartime recruits tended to be younger.72 As such,
the provisioning of this sort of armed force was significantly altered. These older
soldiers were more accustomed to military expectations and could, for instance, be
called upon to tend gardens to supplement their rations while their static duty station
allowed for the establishment of permanent facilities for this valuable food service.73
Gardening was deemed to be such an important activity by soldiers that laying out a
garden patch was one of the first activities of a new garrisoning force, and a successful
and diverse garden was a source of pride for a regiment.74 A large and diverse garden
had the added benefit of providing fresh stores for winter and helping to limit instances
of scurvy.75 These activities were not available to the mobile forces during the
American Revolution and scurvy once again became a medical problem, as supply lines
were unable to follow the army's movements.
The older garrison army also required a different sort of medical care. Due to
their more advanced age and little need to serve in an active combat role, the most
common ailments that plagued this group were epidemic typhus (commonly known as
'camp fever'), smallpox, and respiratory diseases, which all resulted from close and
71
Gage to Barrington 22 February 1766 quoted in Carter, ed., 340.
McConnell, 142‐144.
73 Ibid., 105.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 110.
72
21
unsanitary quarters.76 In addition to these camp diseases, military forces stationed in
North America were also exposed to many illnesses associated with seasonal
malnutrition and exposure, including scurvy in winter, and yellow fever and malaria in
summer.77 The experience gained concerning the treatment of these diseases during the
inter-war period should have been easily applied to medical practice during the
American Revolution, as the same diseases were present. However, the lack of
continuity within the medical establishment between the two intervals forced medical
practitioners to re-learn these treatments.
The medical practitioners who were in charge of treating these men in peacetime
service also differed from their wartime counterparts. Army surgeons, especially staff
surgeons, were rapidly discharged from service as the military establishment downsized
following the cessation of conflict. The regimental surgeons who remained in service
throughout the interwar period were often at the end of their careers and had no
opportunity for advancement. Due to the practice of only retaining a limited number of
medical practitioners on half-pay most army surgeons chose to establish a civilian
medical practice, which offered more opportunities for profit than retention in military
service.78 This was an expressly appealing choice to many of the surgeons who had
enlisted during the war out of patriotic duty and not due to the opportunities for pay. In
76
77
Ibid., 114‐115.
Ibid., 115. For seasonal outbreak of yellow fever and malaria see: Darrett Rutman and Anita Rutman,
"Of Agues and Fevers: Malaria in the Early Chesapeake," William and Mary Quarterly 33(1) (1976), 39;
Trevor Burnard "'The Countrie Continues Sicklie': White Mortality in Jamaica, 1655-1780," Social
History of Medicine 12(1) (1999), 57.
78
Howard, 240; Marshall, "Surgeons Reconsidered: Military Medical Men of the American Revolution,"
312.
22
fact, the relatively low rate of pay for surgeons in both the army and the navy was a
popular grievance until the end of the Napoleonic Wars.79
The high turnover rate of military medical practitioners from service in one war
to the next ensured that there was little continuity of medical knowledge and even less
transmission of the lessons learned in previous conflicts. This explained why military
medical practitioners in the American Revolution began with such a steep learning curve
and why the lessons that had emerged out of the Seven Years War had to be re-learned.
This process of re-education on the medical advancements from previous conflicts and
innovations of these techniques was neither fast nor without consequences. There were
frequent shortages of 'necessaries' and medicines for the British troops fighting in North
America. In many instances, medical practitioners purchased medicines out of pocket
and were reimbursed later, an option that was only available to those units who had a
medical practitioner equipped with the funds to do so.80 The system of transport for
medicines, involving their shipment from Europe and then dispersal throughout the
military stations in North America, also delayed the arrival of such medicines. This
method of shipment was most troubling for regimental medical practitioners who were
among the very last to receive supplies. Procuring emergency allocations from general
hospitals in the area could ease the resulting shortages of medical supplies. This
procedure was evidenced by a 1782 request from regimental medical practitioners
stationed at Trois Rivières, Quebec:
79
Kaufman, 7; John M. Cardwell, "Royal Navy Surgeons, 1793-1815: A Collective Biography," in Health
and Medicine at Sea, 1700-1900 eds. David Boyd Haycock and Sally Archer (Woodbridge: The Boydell
Press, 2009), 38; John Bell, Memorial Concerning the Present State of Military and Naval Surgery
addressed several years ago to the Right Honourable Earl Spencer First Lord of the Admiralty and now
submitted to the public (Edinburgh, 1800), 20.
80
William Paine Papers 1768-1832, 12 August 1783.
23
Mr. Austin Surgeon to the Royal New Yorkers, Mr. Starch Surgeon to the
44th Regiment and Mr Mensries Surgeon to the 24th Regiment have each of
them requested to be supplied with a few medicines from the General
Hospital, sufficient to answer the exigency of this interval, till the arrival of
the ships from Europe; I shall be glad to be inform'd by the first opportunity,
whether their requisitions are approved by his Excellency the Commander in
Chief.81
In addition to demonstrating how regimental practitioners relied on general hospitals for
assistance, the above request also shows how distance and weather affected the
distribution of supplies. Spring was a particularly lean time of year for provisions as it
marked the end of the previous year's requisitions. As such, requests for additional
medicines could be – and were – denied depending on what was available at the
General hospitals themselves.82
Even if medicines were available within the supply network this did not ensure
that they could reach units that needed them. Winter transportation to inland units was
exceedingly difficult owing to frozen rivers and the great hindrance of travelling
overland. The transport of medical personnel was also hindered by winter weather. One
such case representing this difficulty was that of Mr. Menzies, a surgeon serving the
naval station at Detroit who had been called into service with the 84th Regiment of
Foot. Due to winter weather, it was impossible for him to join his new regiment at Trois
Rivères until the spring.83 This delay left the 84th Regiment under the care of only one
medical practitioner, an assistant surgeon, who had recourse to medical help by
assigning some of his patients to beds in a nearby General hospital, space permitting.84
81
WO 28/6, General Hospital Three Rivers, 26 April 1782.
Kaufman, 78.
83
WO 28/6 William Barr to Captain Lernoult Adjunct General, 9 February 1781.
84 Ibid.
82
24
Instances like this could negatively affect the ability of medical practitioners to provide
medical care to the servicemen under their charge.
Other necessary goods were also at the mercy of the transatlantic transport
system. There were frequent complaints that special seasonal issue and standard issue
clothing was late in arriving or completely absent.85 The failure of the military
administration to provide proper clothing and other necessaries to troops hampered not
only their ability to fight, but also posed a risk to their health. There were several
complaints by military commanders attesting to the 'nakedness' of their soldiers and
their want of various other types of supplies.86 Mismanagement at the administrative
level has often been blamed for the deficiencies of these supplies, but this was not the
sole cause of the shipping and distribution problems. For British supplies to reach their
forces in North America, they had to overcome many obstacles. While weather always
presented a threat to ocean crossings, supply ships also had to fend off the American and
French navies and privateers.87 The Admiralty Board continually worried about the
state of supplies in the American War. These concerns were voiced by Admiral Hugh
Palliser (1723-96), a member of the Board in 1778: "I am very uneasy about the state of
our provisions in America. I am afraid they have not enough to carry them through the
winter, and the ships going out with supplies, the odds is against them that they will not
get hold of the coast, or that they will be blown off the coast."88 While all supplies were
important, winter supplies were especially crucial as it was difficult to procure food and
other necessaries from the finite supply of the local population. Furthermore, upon a
85
Marshall, "The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781," 144.
Ibid., 145.
87
Ibid.
88
George Barnes and John Owen, eds., The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the
Admiralty, 1771-1782, volume 4 (London: Navy Records Society, 1938), 130.
86
25
successful Atlantic crossing, there was the issue of finding a safe harbour that was
sufficiently close to troop locations to avoid difficult and dangerous overland
transport.89 Rerouting of supplies to avoid fighting further delayed provisions and could
have a detrimental effect on the health of troops and the ability of medical practitioners
to provide adequate medical care.
It was not just army forces that were inhibited by supply deficiencies. In 1778,
the acute supply and logistical problems of waging a large-scale war across the ocean
became manifest in the navy. Admiral Augustus Keppel (1725-86), the commander in
chief of the naval forces in America, was concerned that the fleet would be unable to
sail "for want of provisions."90 Any delay in the fleet's departure from Spithead would
further impede the shipping of supplies to North America by taking away naval
protection from transport ships. Unguarded naval convoys were susceptible to capture
by privateers. The loss of the goods that these ships carried could have detrimental
effects on the health of servicemen and the ability of medical practitioners to care for
them.91
In addition, troop reinforcements needed to be transported across the Atlantic to
the war in North America. The British Army administration was reluctant, at least in the
initial years of the war, to recruit a portion of necessary troops from the colonial
population, a practice utilized in previous North American conflicts. The rationale for
this was two-fold. First, due to the civil war nature of the conflict it was difficult to
ensure the loyalties of colonial troops. Second, it was believed that colonial troops were
89
Transport overland was made difficult by poor road conditions, foul weather, and the risk of attack from
American forces. Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,” 145.
90
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 337.
91
A similar example being, WO 28/6, General Hospital Three Rivers, 26 April 1782.
26
medically inferior to troops imported from Britain or Ireland. This inferiority stemmed
from empirical evidence that colonials were more susceptible to contagious diseases
such as smallpox and respiratory aliments to which troops born in Britain had developed
immunity.92 The failure and/or inability to use Loyalist troops to ease the manpower
shortage within the British Army had multiple medical repercussions. The imported
supplemental troops from Britain were often young and inexperienced with military life,
resulting in a greater probability of battlefield injuries. In addition, there was a greater
initial susceptibility to the so-called 'camp diseases' of typhus and typhoid amongst new
recruits because these men had recently been placed in the close confines of military
living and brought many infections into the Army. Furthermore, as this was the first
time that these men had travelled to North America they were also unacclimatized and
had not developed the immunity to many environmental diseases that their colonial or
former garrison army cohorts had developed after significant postings in the region. The
lack of acclimatization was of particular concern with the shift to the Southern
Campaign in 1778 where tropical diseases existed.93 Although acclimatization will be
discussed in greater detail below, it is sufficient to say that the lack of immunity
amongst troops serving in the southern states reinforced the importance of preventative
medicine.
The manpower shortage that affected the army during the American Revolution
also affected the Royal Navy. N. A. M. Rodger described why the manpower shortage
during this war was so acute:
92
Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: the American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 530-32.
93
Marshall, "The Health of the British Soldier in America 1775-1781," 19.
27
The manning problem in the American War was more severe than ever
before, because a large proportion of Britain's naval manpower was already
committed to the transport force, the naval squadron and the extensive
amphibious and inland operations in North America, before the main fleet
mobilized at all.94
The need to fill the ranks of the navy in order to effectively fight in the American
Revolution therefore had medical repercussions when the navy was forced to press
landsmen into service. The pressing of men into naval service was made substantially
more difficult by the loss of manpower resources from the American colonies.
Although these men were not the skilled sailors, they were necessary members of the
naval service and freed up topmen from positions that could be performed by
landsmen.95 The issue was further exacerbated by the repercussions of the American
Revolution in Britain.96 However, the impressment of large numbers of men into naval
service brought contagious diseases into the service and hampered the practice of naval
medicine.
Military medicine benefitted from reform of the transport system, which began
in 1779 when the responsibility for transporting army provisions was assumed by the
Commissioners of the Navy.97 According to historian David Syrett, transport reforms
relied on "the ability of the Admiralty, Navy Board, and Treasury to coordinate their
activities."98 The reforms ideally meant that the Treasury would make the requisite
supplies available for loading on the agreed upon schedule, the Navy Board would
provide a sufficient number of transport ships to carry the tonnage, and the Admiralty
94
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 395.
Ibid.
96
Ibid., 396.
97
Syrett, 139.
98
Ibid., 140.
95
28
would supply warships to escort the convoy to North America.99 Escort ships helped to
lower the number of transports captured by the enemy, ensuring that goods reached their
destination.
Logistically, the transhipment of goods, whereby through coastal and river
shipping supplies reached their destinations, was also streamlined. Before 1779,
provisions destined for East Florida and New York were shipped from Cork, Ireland,
while those provisions intended for Canada, the West Indies, and West Florida shipped
from the River Thames.100 Furthermore, in order to compile the necessary goods for the
Cork shipment, dry goods needed to be shipped from England; conversely assemblage
of the required goods for the shipment from the River Thames required wet goods to be
shipped from Ireland.101 This system contained two unnecessary transhipments of
goods before the Atlantic voyage had even began. By making Cork the sole
embarkation point for all goods regardless of final destination, the transhipment problem
was solved. On the North American side, the shipment process was also made more
efficient following the 1779 system reforms. Supplies destined for Canada and the West
Indies would be shipped in their own convoys. Those intended for the American
colonies would land at New York, before being distributed through coastal shipping.102
The solutions that had been put in place to alleviate the transport and supply
difficulties presented by the American Revolution were a significant move in the right
direction. Supply and logistical issues were not completely solved. There continued to
99
Ibid. The region surrounding Long Island Sound was particularly dangerous due to privateer activity.
Ibid., 127.
100
Ibid., 143.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid., 139.
29
be deficiencies in the supply of medicines and other necessaries.103 The successful
streamlining of the supply system established an efficient and necessary framework for
supplying British military forces. The logistical work completed during the American
Revolution was further expanded during the French Revolutionary wars and enabled a
more efficient practice of military medicine during the Peninsular Campaign.104
In addition to the difficulty of ensuring that supplies and personnel reached their
required destination, the environment of North America was often inhospitable.
Although the North American climate did not instil fear in British and colonial
populations like that of the West Indies, the climate did generate concerns for medical
practitioners.105 The primary hindrances to medical practice in North America were
climatic extremes. Winter in regions north of the Chesapeake brought numbing and
dangerous cold, while summer in the same regions could be oppressively and
debilitatingly hot. In the southern regions, scorching temperatures persisted throughout
half the year and could completely paralyze an army through fatigue and disease.106
Military medical practitioners needed to adapt military procedures in order to assist in
reducing the environmental health risk to soldiers.
The most vulnerable to harsh climates were sick and wounded personnel. For
this reason, it was necessary to construct hospitals that were protected from the cold of
winter and ventilated in the heat of summer. William Barr, a surgeon and the hospital
purveyor for the military forces in Canada, detailed the importance of establishing a
103
Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,” 145.
Howard, 22-23, 214.
105
Kupperman, 215.
106
Gary Puckrein, "Climate, Health and Black Labor in the English Americas," Journal of American
Studies 13(2) (1979), 180.
104
30
winterized hospital at Québec City in 1778 in a letter to General Guy Carleton (17241808) the commander of British forces in Canada:
Some few disbursements will be necessary to make [the building] a good
Winter Hospital; but when Your Excellency considers that the expence is
for the comfort & happiness of the poor Sick Soldier, I am persuaded the
money will be no longer an object with you; besides I have to inform you
that by having this house fitted up for a winter Hospital, you will save to the
Public the following Rents which I formerly Paid.107
It is clear that Barr believed that without proper winter facilities, the threat of exposure
would hamper the recovery of the sick and wounded. Exposure could also cause further
illness such as frostbite. These dangers were also recognized by General Carleton , who
dispensed £200 for the provisioning of the above winter hospital.108
Hospitals were equally vulnerable to the heat of summer as the cold of winter.
Summer conditions, in addition to generating an immediate threat to health, contributed
to the spread of contagion.109 High temperatures, close quarters, and a lack of
ventilation contributed to the spread of disease and further aggravated the fevers that
many of the patients were suffering. Within the framework of humoral medicine, a lack
of ventilation was blamed for causing bad air that spread contagion. Based on this
belief, many military medical practitioners suggested that changes be made in the
location of and manner in which hospitals were erected.110 One of these practitioners
was Donald Monro (1728-1802), a staff surgeon during the Seven Years War, who
outlined his recommendations for the placement of summer hospitals as follows:
In summer, when the moveable or flying hospital is ordered into villages,
large barns, and the largest airy houses, are the best.... In warm climates,
107
WO 28/6, William Barr to Guy Carleton, 25 August 1778.
WO 28/6 William Barr to Captain Le Masstre, 27 August 1778.
109
Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,” 141.
110
Monro, 90; John Pringle, 121.
108
31
particular care ought to be taken to choose proper places for erecting
hospitals. The situation ought not only to be dry and airy, but likewise at a
distance from large woods and marshes, and out of the draught of winds
which come over such grounds, otherwise the hospitals will often be
unhealthy.111
Monro's suggestions for hospital placement had many health benefits. Adequate
ventilation and space between patients would allow for cleaner, less contagious rooms.
Distance from woods and marshes limited exposure to malaria-carrying mosquitoes and
decreased the rate of malarial infections. While the connection between malaria, the
mosquito, and water sources was not made in the eighteenth century, miasmic theory and
empirical observations fostered the belief that marshes should be avoided.112 The
relationship between the locations of West Indian hospitals and the reduction in fevers in
the late eighteenth century has been made by historian Roger Buckley.113
The stationing of hospitals in healthier regions became a standard practice during
the French Revolutionary Wars, and demonstrated the effectiveness of both preventative
and reactionary forms of medicine. Medical practitioners set up hospitals in response to
outbreaks of disease and illness, and employed preventative measures to ensure that these
hospitals did not further generate or propagate sickness. For example, wards were set up
in order to isolate those sick with fevers from patients with other illnesses or wounds,
thereby helping to contain infection, and when possible medical practitioners would be
assigned to a specific ward, thereby further reducing the threat of cross-contamination.114
111
Monro, 91-92.
Rutman and Rutman, 44-45.
113
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 11.
114
Ibid., 314-315.
112
32
Furthermore, the dead were buried as quickly as possible, a practice which lessened
further exposure to contagion.115
However, it was not just sick and wounded servicemen who were exposed to the
extremes of the North American climate. Indeed, all troops were equally exposed to
unhealthy conditions. The winter months were particularly troublesome because troops
wintering in northern regions needed to be satisfactorily clothed against the elements.
The standard uniform for an eighteenth-century British foot soldier consisted of a cloth
coat, waistcoat, breeches, stockings, shoes, and a shirt.116 The breeches, stockings, and
coat, in spite of being fashioned out of wool, were insufficient attire to survive out-ofdoors in winter north of the Carolinas. Fortunately, due to its previous experience in the
Seven Years War, the army was aware of the threats that the North American climate
could pose to troops. Army surgeons thus urged the adoption of proper winter attire.117
In response to these recommendations and previous experience in this theatre of war,
winter overcoats were issued to the men as well as mittens, leggings, and hats.118 By
pre-emptively supplying winter uniforms, the British Army nearly eliminated cases of
frostbite.119 The same proactive issuance of clothing was also applied to summer wear.
Summer linen breeches were issued in order to off-set the high temperatures and
regiments were encouraged to adopt colonial forms of uniform in order to more
effectively campaign in all types of weather.120 Adaptations to uniform included the
115
Ibid., 215.
Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,” 141-142.
117
Monro, 316; Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for Young Officers, Containing A System of the Art of
War (London, 1776), 358.
118
Hew Strachan, British Military Uniforms 1768-1796: The dress of the British Army from official
sources (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1975), 17.
119
Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,” 142.
120
Ibid., 141.
116
33
shortening of coats and swapping leather shoes for either moccasins or gaiters.121 The
willingness of the British army to adapt the summer uniform helped to reduce the
probability of heatstroke, a malady that frequently plagued the British Army's Hessian
allies throughout the American Revolution.122
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: The West Indies
The harshness of the West Indian climate was unparalleled in any other theatre
of war during the late eighteenth century. The West Indies were viewed by the British
as the most deadly of colonial possessions and the rationale for this perception was
climatic in nature.123 Interestingly enough, the same climate that made the islands so
deadly to European colonists was also what made them the most profitable of colonial
possessions.124 Historian Karen Kupperman described the relationship between heat and
wealth as follows: "Early modern science taught that there was a direct trade off
between heat and [crop] abundance.... Colonists marvelled at how swiftly crops came to
fruition, leading to claims of 'incredible usurie' in increase as well as multiple harvests
every year."125 As suggested by Kupperman, the wealth of the islands made them
highly desirable to both the French and the Spanish126 and therefore the British West
Indian colonies were continually vulnerable to attack, requiring garrison forces to be
121
Ibid., 150-151, 154.
Ibid., 141.
123
Kupperman, 213.
124
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 10-12.
125
Kupperman, 217-218.
126
The Bahamas was particularly vulnerable to attack, owing to distance from other British West Indian
colonies and reliance on American ports for supplies instead of receiving shipments directly from Britain.
Such vulnerability was exploited by American rebels as well. An expedition of seven American warships
arrived in March 1776 and quickly took the capital of Nassau. The Americans remained on the islands for
two weeks before leaving uncontested. Maya Jasanoff, Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the
Revolutionary World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 219.
122
34
established.127 Unfortunately, the European garrison forces were highly susceptible to
disease.128 Tropical fevers generated such a great loss of life in the troops of the West
Indian garrisons that the turnover rate was remarkably high.129
The West Indian islands were noted by contemporary travel writers, medical
practitioners, and colonists as being one of the worst disease environments in the
world.130 Thomas Trapham (d. ca 1692), for example, in his 1679 Discourse of the State
of Health in the Island of Jamaica, set out to warn his countrymen of those practices that
"happy and agreeable enough to the northern Climes, but unsuitable to the torrid Zone,
where through the great activity of Nature most sudden changes are effected a sound
health oft precipitated into Distemper, and such Distempers posting to the Grave."131
The need for preventative medicine, and the avoidance of a 'posting to the Grave,' was
clear in such an environment. The British military stationed in the islands applied two
measures to combat the hostile disease environment: the use of non-European troops as
garrison forces and the use of preventative medical practices.
The European colonists had used African and indigenous slaves as labourers
since the first island settlements. The dark colour of skin of the West African slave was
believed to have originated from extensive exposure to the powerful rays of the sun in
the equatorial regions.132 In the early eighteenth century, this belief went so far as to
127
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 11.
Burnard, 46.
129
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 272.
130
Trevor Burnard has demonstrated that Jamaica was the most deadly of the West Indian colonies.
Burnard, 57.
131
Thomas Trapham, A Discourse of the State of Health in the Island of Jamaica. With a provision
therefore Calculated form the Air, the Place, and the Water: The Customs and Manners of Living, etc.
(London, 1679), 4.
132
Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 13. The eighteenth-century theory whereby race was
environmentally determined was known as monogenism; it specified that all humans were the children of
128
35
suggest that if an African slave was removed from the tropical climate he would
gradually adopt a paler, even white complexion.133 Conversely, it was believed that
Europeans who settled in the tropics would adopt a darker complexion over time. These
beliefs, however, soon proved incorrect through the continual presence of white
Europeans in the West Indies and African slaves in Europe.134 For the greater part of the
eighteenth century, the majority of medical practitioners considered skin colour to be
unchangeable.135 Nevertheless, skin colour was still utilized as a rationale for why
blacks were best suited to work in the West Indian climate and why that climate was so
harsh for Europeans. By using African labour, white plantation owners spared
themselves and their families’ arduous work and freed them to establish the planter ruler
class.136 However, blacks were not immune to tropical fevers or the harshness of labour
in the hot sun, despite appearances to the contrary. Observations that non-Europeans
suffered fevers to a lesser degree than colonists led to the perception that blacks were in
fact immune to these diseases.137
Given the vulnerability of the islands to attack and the relatively small body of
white inhabitants from which to draw a militia, it was necessary to use blacks for
one set of first parents. Conversely, the theory of polygenism permitted multiple sets of first parents. By
doing so "polygenism denies environment has the power to cause differences in physical appearance."
Monogenism was the dominant philosophical racial theory by the latter half of the eighteenth century.
Norris Saakwa-Mante, "Western Medicine and Racial Constitutions: Surgeon John Atkins' theory of
polygenism and sleepy distemper in the 1730s," in Race, Science and Medicine, 1700-1960 eds. Waltraud
Ernst and Bernard Harris (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 29-30,
133
Puckrein, 181.
134
Roxann Wheeler, The Complexion of Race: Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century British
Culture, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 4.
135
Jordan, 16.
136
Richard Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 170-171.
137
Mark Harrison, "'The Tender Frame of Man': Disease, Climate, and Racial Difference in India and the
West Indies, 1760-1860," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 70(1) (1996), 75.
36
emergency defence.138 There were three reasons for the small settler population: the
minimal need for white plantation labour, the reluctance of white colonists to settle, and
the high mortality rate from tropical diseases. Jamaica, for example, had a settler
population of 8,230 with a slave population of 75,000 in 1730.139 While the settler
mortality rate decreased after the 1730s due to more successful medical treatment, the
demographic structure of the island was not altered.140 By virtue of the disease
environment, Jamaica and the other West Indian islands were unable to maintain white
settler populations without prodigious immigration from Europe.141 Historian Peter
Voelz describes the need of blacks for defence in the following manner:
Throughout the entire colonial period and in virtually every area of the
Americas, the black man was appreciated for this military worth at one very
important time - in an emergency. It is in times of alarm, when whites were
driven to desperation, that they reached out to blacks, usually slaves, to be
rescued from death or captures and gave them the two things most denied
them in bondage- weapons and freedom. And blacks responded, not as
usually feared - against their masters, but rather in their support, and not
grudgingly by most indications, but willingly, often beyond even the hopes of
the surprised whites.142
Reliance upon black troops, throughout the colonial Americas, for defence in the event
of emergency attack or invasion was therefore an act of desperation as well as a medical
outcome. Black soldiers did not appear to fall victim to the same diseases that
paralyzed European armies, hence they could outlast an invading force whilst
preserving the health of British regulars. The ability with which slaves could be turned
138
Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 2. During the American Revolution, for example, twelve regiments of
British Regulars were sent to the West Indies. Eleven per cent of each regiment died before reaching the
islands and many of those who survived the passage were quickly invalided back to Britain. These
circumstances further required the use of blacks as emergency soldiers. Ibid., 4.
139
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the population of the white settlers in the West
Indies was dwarfed by the African population by a ratio of 9:1. Burnard, 52.
140
Ibid., 53.
141
Ibid.
142
Voelz, 23.
37
into soldiers in crisis situations diminished resistance to the formation of a standing
black regiment.
Black troops had been used by both sides during the American Revolution and
demonstrated the viability of slaves as soldiers on a more permanent basis. For British
forces, the use of blacks served a three-fold purpose. First, these men helped to ease the
manpower shortage in the military. Second, there was the perception, especially in the
Southern colonies, that blacks were immune to tropical diseases, as well as being
brutally effective soldiers. Finally, by offering freedom to any slave that decided to join
the British cause, it was possible that the rebel side would be drained of some of its
labour force.143 Removing slaves from rebel-owned plantations could have the dual
economic hardship of forcing the purchase of new slaves and threatening harvest yields.
The American Revolution marked the first use of blacks on a more than expeditionary
level, with the establishment of standing regiments and other smaller units that would
remain active for the duration of the conflict.144 Social historian Sylvia Frey postulated
that the "British experience in the American Revolution demonstrated the possibility of
143
On 7 November 1775, the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, Lord John Dunmore issued the first
proclamation promising freedom to those slaves of rebel masters who fought for the British cause.
Dunmore hoped that such measures would assist in "the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper
Sense of their Duty, to his Majesty's Crown and Dignity." Dunmore's Proclamation, November 7, 1775
accessed 21 July, 2011,
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.hil.unb.ca/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/hsns.2011.41.1.41.pdf. In the month
following Dunmore's Proclamation "more than five hundred slaves left their masters and became black
Loyalists. Thomas Allen, Tories: Fighting for the King in America's First Civil War (New York: Harper
Collins, 2010), 155. Other proclamations stipulating freedom for the slaves who fought for the British
cause were issued throughout the colonies.
144
Not all enlistments were for the duration of the war. However, units raised on a situational basis, such
as the Black Pioneers and other temporary forces such as construction details, remained active throughout
the American Revolution. Mary Clifford, From Slavery to Freedom: Black Loyalists After the American
Revolution (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2006), 26-27, 61. Units such as Captain Martin's Black Pioneers
represented the first use of a permanent black force and served as partial justification for future use of
such forces. Todd W. Braisted, "The Black Pioneers and Others: The Military Role of Black Loyalists in
the American War for Independence," in Moving On: Black Loyalists in the Afro-Atlantic World, ed. John
W. Pullis (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 11-12.
38
using slaves as a permanent military force."145 The success of these permanent black
forces, favourable opinions of military officers regarding the conduct of black units, and
the harsh medical environment of the West Indies on the European constitution all
contributed to the formation of the West Indian Regiments.146 Some members of the
British black units of the American Revolution continued to serve the British cause in
exile, including 241 veterans who enlisted on St. Lucia.147
The troop situation in the West Indies during the French Revolutionary Wars
was just as dire as in previous conflicts. In 1794, the British military garrisons only had
2,000 men listed as fit for duty to defend eleven island colonies. This small number was
deemed to be woefully inadequate to provide successful defence of the islands, a feat
that army commander General Charles Grey (1729-1807) believed would only be
possible with at least 10,000 troops.148 In order to immediately correct the troop
deficiency, provide adequate defence for the colonies, and launch expeditions toward
French colonial possessions, the West Indian Regiments were established. In order to
supplement the troop levels created by the formation of the West Indian Regiments,
27,000 troops were sent from Britain over the two-year period from 1795-96. Their
losses from disease were staggering: 6,000 reinforcements had died in St. Martinique by
March 1796.149
145
Sylvia Frey, Water From the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 89.
146
Voelz, 165.
147
Ibid. Other black veterans continued their service in garrison and road construction details in Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick before eventually being discharged and given land grants. Clifford 62-63.
148
Voelz, 162. General Grey had succeeded General Carleton as the commander of British forces in
America in December 1782 and had served in the American colonies and the West Indies. Rory Cornish,
"Grey, Charles," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
149
On average only one-third of each regiment escaped death by tropical fever. This force was the last
large British force sent to the West Indies before the end of hostilities in 1815. J. R. McNeill, Mosquito
39
The West Indian first regiment was formed on 16 April 1795 in order to
counteract the threat posed by both French Royalists and French Nationalists on the
Caribbean islands.150 A second regiment was commissioned soon after on 2 May.151
Both regiments were to consist of blacks and mulattoes then residing in the West Indies.
Henry Dundas (1742-1811), the Secretary of State for War, in a letter soliciting royal
approval for the raising of the regiments, attested to the usefulness of black troops in hot
climates by citing their ability to perform fatigue duties and their proficiency at pursuing
insurgents.152 Over the course of the French Revolutionary Wars, six additional West
Indian Regiments were commissioned.153 The regiments, which consisted of white
officers and black foot soldiers, were highly effective fighting units. The use of local
black troops eliminated the need to import large numbers of European soldiers into a
harsh disease environment and thus enabled these European troops to be used in other
regions of conflict.154
The effectiveness of the West Indian regiments was attributed by many military
commanders to the lack of seasoning that these troops had to undergo, making for quick
reinforcements and improved survival rates. Seasoning, or acclimatization, was the
period of sickness that all new European arrivals to the islands underwent before
adapting to the climate. Physician Hans Sloane (1660-1753) detailed the deadly effects
Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 246-247.
150
Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 20.
151
Ibid.
152
Ibid; Henry Dundas to the Duke of York, 16 April 1775, W.O. 6/131.
153
Ibid., 135. By October 1818 all the regiments had been disbanded, with the exception of the First and
Second, which retained a peacetime contingent of 650 soldiers each.
154
Although black soldiers had a significantly lower mortality rate from tropical disease, there were five
thousand disease-related deaths between 1795 and 1815. Howard, 182.
40
of tropical fevers in his A Voyage to Jamaica (1707)155 and outlined his views of
acclimatization:
A great many were of opinion that this Fever was what is call'd the
Seasoning, that is to say, that every New-comer before they be accustomed to
the Climate and Constitution of the Air in Jamaica, are to have an acute
Disease, which is thought to be very dangerous, and that after this is over,
their Bodies are made more fit to live there, with less hazard than before; and
this is not only thought so in the Island, but in Guinea, and all over the
remote Eastern parts of the World.156
Sloane was sceptical of the seasoning process, referencing the morbidity of permanent
inhabitants of Jamaica, as well as the lack of sickness among some of the recently
arrived Europeans.157 Africans and Native Americans were widely perceived to be
immune from the procedure entirely or believed to suffer for a short period before
recovering their full capabilities.158 The belief in acclimatization persisted throughout
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries among medical practitioners and the
general European population.159 The ability of blacks to escape the seasoning process
was noted by army physician John Hunter (1754-1809):
Europeans, after remaining some time in the West Indies, are less liable to be
affected by the causes of fever than on their first arrival. The negroes afford a
striking example of the power acquired by habit of resisting the causes of
fevers; for, though they are not entirely exempted from them, they suffer
inevitably less than Europeans.160
155
Hans Sloane, A Voyage to the Islands Madera, Barbados, Nieves, S. Christophers and Jamaica, with
the Natural History of the Herbs and Trees, Four-footed Beasts, Fishes, Birds, Insects, Reptiles, &c., Vol.
1 (London, 1707), xcvii.
156
Ibid., xcviii.
157
Ibid.
158
Christian Warren, "Northern Chills, Southern Fevers: Race-Specific Mortality in American Cities,
1730-1900," The Journal of Southern History 63(1) (1997), 33; Susan Klepp, "Seasoning and Society:
Racial Differences in Mortality in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," William and Mary Quarterly 51(3)
(1994), 500.
159
Mary Dobson, "Mortality Gradients and Disease Exchanges: Comparisons from Old England and
Colonial America," Social History of Medicine (1989), 270; Puckrein,181. Seasoning also occurred in the
American colonies, especially surrounding Chesapeake Bay where cases of 'seasoning' had been
documented as early as 1680. Rutman and Rutman, 43.
160
John Hunter, Observations on the Diseases of the Army in Jamaica; and on the best means of
Preserving the Health of Europeans, in that Climate (London, 1788), 24.
41
Europeans, if they survived the first seasoning ordeal, would be far more likely to
continue to survive in the West Indian environment. However, it was still difficult to
convince those who did not seek the wealth of the islands to go through the seasoning
process.161 Historian Roger Buckley has demonstrated that many soldiers and sailors
deserted upon hearing that they were to be sent to the Caribbean, or during the summer
months after their arrival, due to their fear of disease.162 Furthermore, the fear of the
West Indian climate and the seasoning process eliminated another potential source of
troops, German mercenaries, increasing the value of the black troops of the West Indian
Regiments.163
Tropical fevers were equally deadly to the sailors of the Royal Navy stationed in
the West Indies. Bartholomew James (1752-1828), a lieutenant and transport agent
serving on St. Martinique, described the situation thus in a 1794 journal entry:
The dreadful sickness that prevailed in the West Indies is beyond the power
of the tongue or pen to describe. In a few days after I arrived at St. Pierre I
buried every man in my boat twice, and nearly all of a third boat's crew, in
fevers; and shocking and serious to relate the master, mate, and every man
and boy belonging to the Acorn transport, I came from England in, and had
continued my pennant on board during the whole of the time up to May 12.
The constant affecting scenes of sudden death was in fact dreadful to behold,
and nothing was scarcely to be met but funeral processions in this town, of
both officers and soldiers; and the ships of war was so extremely distressed
that many of them had buried almost all of their officers and seamen.164
The conditions detailed by James considerably hampered the British naval force. In
order to ease the strain on European sailors in the region, blacks were also recruited into
161
Kupperman, 227.
Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 220-221.
163
Ibid., 62. German mercenaries provided 29,000 men during the American Revolution. The use of
German troops was so great that German forces outnumbered British regulars in Canada by 1783.
Marshall, "The Health of the British Soldier in America 1775-1781," 16.
164
John Laughton and James Sullivan eds., Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James (London: Navy
Records Society, 1896), 241-242.
162
42
the Royal Navy. Coastal shipping in the Leeward Islands for example was dominated
by black sailors and provided a pool of able seamen that could be recruited into naval
service.165 Certain naval medical practitioners believed that shore parties in the West
Indies should be exclusively composed of blacks in order to prevent infection to white
sailors.166
Preventative medicine was an essential component of military medical practice
due to the harsh disease environment of both North America and the West Indies.
Additionally, this form of medicine was part of a larger trend in eighteenth-century
military medicine. John Pringle (1707-82), Physician-General during the War of
Austrian Succession (1740-48), delineated the importance of preventative medicine in
the preface to his Observations on the Diseases of the Army (1752).167 This same
insistence and focus on the prevention of disease in military forces was found in the
work of William Blair (1766-1822), an army surgeon during the American Revolution.
For Blair, attention to preventative medicine was a duty that would not only preserve the
life of servicemen but also protect the state which they served. This sentiment was
stated by Blair in The Soldier's Friend (1798), a treatise that advocated for the use of
preventative medicine and other proactive practices:
On the Importance and Practicability of preserving the Health of Soldiers:
Health is the main spring of action, both in public and private affairs: it is
that, without which all our motions must languish, and our designs become
vain. The health of an army must therefore be of equal importance with its
165
W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1997), 18. Slaves who had been impressed into the navy were often returned at
the request of their masters. Rodger, The Wooden World, 160.
166
McNeil, Mosquito Empires, 79. Christopher Lloyd, The Health of Seamen: Selections from the Works
of Dr. James Lind, Sir Gilbert Blane and Dr. Thomas Trotter (London: Navy Records Society, 1965),
193-194.
167
John Pringle, Observations on the Diseases of the Army in Camp and Garrison in Three Parts
(London, 1752), ix.
43
existence; or rather, I should say, an army without health is a burden to the
state it was intended to serve.168
The potential burden to the state, noted by Blair, was a feature of service in the West
Indies especially when coupled with the manpower shortage within the military and the
harsh disease environment. Preventative treatment methods were essential to
maintaining an adequate fighting force in the British colonial Americas. These methods
included prophylactic treatments and the amelioration of the design and location of
hospitals and garrisons. The use of black soldiers and sailors may also be viewed as a
preventative medical measure as their use removed British regulars from unhealthy
regions entirely or supplanted European troops in fatigue duties.
Prophylactic treatments were the most common in the West Indies, where the
danger to health was the most acute. These measures included the use of Cinchona to
prevent the onset of tropical fevers. Cinchona, commonly referred to as Peruvian or
Jesuits bark, had been used by the indigenous population of South America to prevent
and treat tropical fevers. Jesuit missionaries first utilized the bark as a treatment in the
seventeenth century.169 The drug was transported back to Spain and its use was quickly
adopted by other European colonial populations and medical practitioners.170 Although
it was not until the nineteenth century that alkaloids located in the bark's molecular
168
William Blair, The Soldier's Friend: or the Means of Preserving the Health of Military Men;
Addressed to the Officers of the British Army (London and Dublin, 1798), 7.
169
There is debate within the scholarship over the first European use of cinchona. One version attributes
this milestone to the Countess of Chinchon, the wife of the Spanish viceroy to Lima, in 1623. Cinchona is
believed to be derived from the misspelling of her name. The second version states that Jesuits observed
the use of the bark and requested samples that they could bring back to Spain in the 1620s. Saul Jarcho,
Quinine's Predecessor: Francesco Torti and the Early History of Cinchona (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993), 1-6.
170
Ibid., 7.
44
structure were distilled as quinine, cinchona had been long used as effective
prophylactic and treatment for malarial fevers.171
The differential diagnosis of the various tropical fevers was beyond the reach of
eighteenth-century medical practitioners. As cinchona was the only medical treatment
that had been empirically shown to aid in the prevention and treatment of tropical
fevers, the bark was often prescribed for all instances of tropical fevers.172 George
Pinckard (1768-1835), an army physician who accompanied the disastrous Abercromby
expedition to the West Indies in 1796,173 described the use of cinchona as follows:
You will not be surprised to know that rumour has been busy on the subject
of the prevailing sickness.... In consequence of such remarks, and in order to
satisfy my own feelings, trying every means which it was in my power to
obtain, for the relief of the sick, I have solicited the aid of the medical men of
the country, both English and Dutch, and requested them to oblige me by
attending frequently at the hospital... but I find that here, as at [British
Guiana], the disease is treated in the same manner as the common remittent
fever of the country, and nearly the whole reliance confided to the bark - that
great sheet-anchor of West India practice. This was prescribed in ample
quantity, and in various forms, but it wholly failed of success.174
As Pinckard described, 'the bark' was the staple of medical practice in the West Indies,
even when it was not a successful form of treatment. The limited efficacy of cinchona
against the scourge of yellow fever placed doubt upon its value as a prophylactic,
especially given the difficulty of procuring the bark as the specific species of cinchona
171
McNeil, Mosquito Empires, 74. There are four strains of malaria, but only two that commonly infect
humans. Plasmodium vivax is more benign and Plasmodium falciparum is more virulent. Quinine is
effective in both cases. Rutman and Rutman, 34. Vivax was present throughout the world while
falciparum was restricted to the West Indies, Africa, and the Southern United States. Dobson, 289.
172
Thomas Percival, "Experiments on the Peruvian Bark," Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775)
(1767), 227.
173
This expedition was disastrous due to the extreme morbidity and mortality attributed to tropical fevers.
George Pinckard, Notes on the West Indies: Written during the Expedition under the Command of the Late
General Sir Ralph Abercromby, vol. III (London, 1806), 79.
174
Ibid.
45
was only obtained in the Andes mountains at elevations higher than 2,500 meters.175
Despite these concerns, cinchona continued to be used well into the nineteenth century
as a fever treatment, alone or in combination with other methods such as bleeding,
mercury, blistering, and cold-water baths.176 Sailors on shore parties would routinely be
given prophylactic doses of cinchona while serving in tropical regions.177 These
activities demonstrate the reliance on preventative measures in military medicine and
reveal how practitioners responded to specific disease environments.
Other measures, in addition to cinchona, were necessary to combat and prevent
tropical fevers. As replacing the entire fighting forces of the British Army and the Royal
Navy with black forces was neither a viable solution nor one that was advocated by the
British government, it was expedient for military forces to enact procedures that
mitigated the morbidity and mortality of their servicemen.178 These measures included
arriving on location and campaigning at times when the mosquito population was
lowest. While eighteenth-century medical practitioners had not identified the mosquito
as the carrier of tropical fevers, the presence of 'sickly seasons' had long been noted.179
As such, it was advisable to conduct military campaigns in the southern American
colonies during the spring. During the Southern Campaign of the American
Revolution, British forces successfully captured the southern ports of the Carolinas in
175
Jarcho, 196.
McNeil, Mosquito Empires, 75-78. James Lind recommended the use of bleeding, blistering, and
opiates in conjunction with the use of cinchona bark. James Lind, An Essay on Diseases Incidental to
Europeans in Hot Climates (London, 1792), 240-242.
177
Gilbert Blane, A Short Account of the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen,
particularly in the Royal Navy (London, 1781), 41.
178
The colonial government of Jamaica heavily resisted the implementation of a black regiment on the
island and lobbied Parliament to prevent recruitment efforts. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 43.
179
Kupperman, 232. Dobson, 272.
176
46
the spring of 1780, only to be decimated by the summer 'sickly season.'180 Nicholas
Durand, a French travel writer, noticed the connection between hot weather and
sickness among settlers surrounding Chesapeake Bay in 1686:
Along the seashore and also along the rivers which contain salt, because of
the tide, the inhabitants in these places are rarely free from fever during the
hot weather; they call this a local sickness; but the salt in the rivers
disappears about twenty leagues from the seas, just as one enters the
county of Rappahannock, and those who live beyond that point do not
suffer from it.181
Many medical practitioners made observations similar to those of Durand, connecting
low-lying marshy areas such as those along the shoreline with miasma.182 The bad air
from these regions could be avoided if newcomers reached the colonies at specific times
of the year. Military commanders were also privy to this information. In 1766, General
Gage delayed the departure of new recruits from New York to Florida until the end of
summer in order to avoid sickness.183 When travelling to the West Indies it was
advisable to arrive between December and May, a stipulation that J. R. McNeil noted
was well known by European strategists since the 1690s.184 Caution extended to those
forces stationed off shore as well. In the late eighteenth century, the naval surgeon
Elliot Arthy delineated the danger and cause of tropical fevers in the West Indian naval
service: "The loss of seamen is here again occasioned by the Yellow Fever, in
consequence of impressing seamen onshore, and out of merchantmen, in the West-
180
J. R. McNeil, "Yellow Jack and Geopolitics: Environment, Epidemics, and the Struggles for Empire in
the American Tropics," OAH Magazine of History 18(3) (2004), 12. The best arrival time for the
Carolinas was in late autumn. Kupperman, 232; Kopperman, 65.
181
Nicholas Durand quoted in, Gilbert Chinard, ed., A Huguenot Exile in Virginia, or Voyages of a
Frenchman exiled for his Religion with a description of Virginia & Maryland (New York: The Press of
the Pioneers Inc., 1934), 174.
182
Mitman and Numbers, 393.
183 Kopperman, 65.
184
J. R. McNeil, "Ecology, Epidemics and Empires: Environmental Change and the Geopolitics of
Tropical American, 1600-1825," Environment and History 5 (1999), 180.
47
Indies; through, also improper medical treatment of the Fever; and through the want of
a sufficient quantity of the Peruvian Bark."185 Naval ships were encouraged to anchor
away from shore winds and to limit time on shore particularly at night. Gilbert Blane
(1749-1834), a naval physician, recommended that "seamen should be allowed to go on
shore as little as possible, especially at night, for they are here exposed not only to the
land air from the marshes that are generally near the shore, and thereby catch
intermittent fevers, but they also find the means and opportunity of getting drunk."186 If
sailors did not go ashore they would avoid the marsh air, as Blane suggested. They
would also avoid exposure to disease- carrying mosquitoes and thus tropical fevers.
While avoiding the deadly southern torrid zones, the northern regions of North
America also faced environmental obstacles. A harsh winter presented a significant
barrier to good health. The North American winter eliminated any supply of fresh fruit
and vegetables beyond that which could be procured before the first snows, contributing
to incidents of scurvy.187 The death toll due to scurvy was entirely preventable and had
two common remedies: spruce beer and citrus fruits. The efficacy of spruce beer had
been first demonstrated to the French in the seventeenth century. Spruce beer was used
extensively in the American Revolution. In 1777, by decree of George III, a half-gallon
of spruce beer was issued as an anti-scorbutic and part of the daily ration to all troops
185
Elliot Arthy, The Seamen's Medical Advocate: Or An attempt to shew that Five Thousand Seamen are,
annually, during the War, Lost To the British Nation, in the West-India Merchants' Service, on-board
Ships of War on the West-India Station, through the Yellow Fever (London, 1798), 122.
186
Blane, A Short Account of the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen, 40.
187
As an example of scurvy's potency, a British force of 7,300 had been reduced to 3,000 able-bodied
men by scurvy during the battle of Quebec in the winter of 1759/60. Erica Charters, "Disease, Wilderness
Warfare, and Imperial Relations: The Battle for Quebec, 1759-1760," War in History 16(1) (2009), 1.
Paul Kopperman has described this outbreak of scurvy as "perhaps the worst outbreak of scurvy ever to
hit the British Army." Garrisons throughout Canada, the Ohio River Valley and New York were all
afflicted with the disease. Kopperman, 70.
48
serving in North America, a provision that remained in place until the end of the war.188
Owing largely to the consumption of spruce beer, a large outbreak of scurvy was
avoided in the British regiments of the American Revolution.189
The same good fortune was not present among the sailors of the Royal Navy, so
scurvy continued to be the greatest cause of morbidity and mortality amongst sailors.190
Long voyages accompanied by little dietary diversification and a lack of fresh fruit and
vegetables ensured that scurvy persisted in the navy throughout the eighteenth century.
Even soldiers transported across the Atlantic fell victim to scurvy, an outcome far more
likely on board ship than on shore.191 Citrus as a cure for scurvy in sailors was
documented as early as 1562.192 Historians have credited James Lind and his
experiments on board HMS Salisbury as the impetus for the push to adopt a ration of
citrus fruits as a preventative measure in daily naval rations in the mid-eighteenth
century.193 In the Salisbury experiments, conducted in 1747, Lind treated twelve
patients (divided into groups of two) with cider, vitriol, vinegar, seawater, garlic, and
oranges and lemons, giving one cure to each group. The trials determined that oranges
and lemons were the best course of treatment for scurvy.194 The results of these
discoveries were published in 1753 in A Treatise of the Scurvy. Following this
publication, citrus was further adopted by medical practitioners as a cure and
188
Kopperman, 73.
Ibid., 72-73.
190
Lloyd and Coulter, 293.
191
Soldiers on board transport ships only received two-thirds of a sailors' rations. Marshall, “The Health
of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,”, 16-17.
192
Thomas Freeman of the Minion left money to the ship's surgeon in his will for the purchase of antiscorbutics, including oranges. J. D. Alsop, "Sea Surgeons, Health and England's Maritime Expansion: The
West African Trade 1553-1660," Mariner's Mirror 76(3) (1990), 219.
193
Lloyd and Coulter, 296-307, 321. Historian Michael Bartholomew has recently attempted to downplay
the influence of Lind's experiments in the adoption of citrus as an anti-scorbutic. Michael Bartholomew,
"James Lind and Scurvy: A Revaluation," Journal for Maritime Research (2002), 1-2.
194
James Lind, A Treatise of the Scurvy, In Three Parts. Containing An inquiry into the Nature, Causes,
and Cure, of the Disease (Edinburgh, 1753), 516-519.
189
49
prophylactic for scurvy.195 The increased use included medical trials during the
voyages of explorer James Cook, the success of which advanced the use of citrus as an
anti-scorbutic.196
The Admiralty has been blamed by both contemporaries and historians for its
delay in adopting citrus as a preventative measure on board ship.197 There were,
however, many obstacles that needed to be surmounted before citrus could become
standard issue in the Royal Navy. The limited supply of fresh fruit, the inability to
adequately preserve the juice in a manner that provided Vitamin C, and the cost of
supplying ships were all prohibitive factors.198 When lemons and limes were finally
introduced service-wide in 1795, the year after Lind's death, the benefits were
immediately noted.199 At Haslar hospital, the cases of scurvy dropped from 329,000 per
year in 1782 to 20,000 per year in 1799.200 By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, scurvy
had "almost disappeared from the fleet," with annual cases measured in single digits
rather than thousands and demonstrating how advancements in medicine were
dependent upon supply and administrative elements.201
Military hospitals were also a component of preventative medicine. The use of
winter hospitals in the northern regions assisted in limiting the exposure to the elements
that would hamper potential recovery.202 Proper winter hospital installations could also
195
R. E. Hughes, "James Lind and the Cure of Scurvy: An Experimental Approach," Medical History
19(4) (1975), 343.
196
Lloyd and Coulter, 303.
197
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 484-485. Rodger, The Wooden World, 86-87. Lloyd and Coulter, 321.
198
Early preservation methods for citrus juices entailed the boiling and distilling of the fruit into a
concentrate known as rob. This method of preservation significantly decreased, or in some instances,
completely destroyed the curative properties. Lloyd and Coulter, 315-316.
199
Ibid., 322.
200
Ibid., 329.
201
Ibid., 326.
202
WO 28/6, William Barr, 25 August 1778.
50
reduce infections of pleurisy and pneumonia, which were the seasonal afflictions in the
northern regions from November to May.203 In warmer climates, the location and
construction of hospitals could provide the greatest preventative benefit. As suggested
by Donald Monro in 1780, hospitals should be situated in dry and elevated regions,
minimizing where possible the threat of infection of tropical fevers.204 When
constructing hospitals that were intended to be fixed entities, such as general hospitals,
it was recommended that they should feature large and airy corridors and rooms. This
form of design diminished heat and allowed for ventilation and was the same
construction that had been adopted by plantation owners.205
Another method of preventing disease included measures to improve the
cleanliness of military personnel. Improved cleanliness not only prevented the onset of
disease, it also helped to control the spread of infection.206 In conjunction with such
efforts were plans to redesign barracks hospitals and garrisons to ease crowded
conditions.207 These installations were notorious for overcrowding, especially in winter
when tenting was not a viable option.208 William Barrington in his "Instructions for the
direction of the Hospital established for the Forces in Canada" in 1776 stipulated:
The Senior Physician by appointment, is to attend the General Hospitals to
visit the Sick and prescribe for them such Diet and [Medicines] as he shall
Judge most proper, to give directions to have them conveniently lodged in
Wards with a free Air. Kept clean and not crowded, to assign the several
parts of duty to the other Physicians who may be imploy'd to the Master
203
Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America, 1775-1781,” 22.
Monro, 91-92.
205
Kupperman, 234-235.
206
Typhus and typhoid were both spread by lice. Marshall, “The Health of the British Soldier in America,
1775-1781,” 141.
207
Ibid.
208
Hamilton, 46.
204
51
Apothecary, and Mates, and in order for the more effectual care of the
Sick....209
When instructions like those of Barrington were followed by medical practitioners and
military commanders the preventative measures instituted helped to control the spread
of epidemics and infection. Such prophylactic methods established throughout North
America and the West Indies provided the basis for preventative medicine in later
conflicts.
Smallpox inoculation and vaccination were additional preventative measures
that were utilized within military medicine during the long eighteenth century.
Smallpox was present in all regions of North America and the West Indies.210 The
disease was extremely contagious and could rapidly spread through army camps and
garrisons.211 British army medical practitioners had been practising inoculation among
troops and the colonial population since the Seven Years War.212 Inoculation, the
process whereby a healthy patient was infected with a small specimen of the smallpox
virus from the pustule of a living victim, was a dangerous but effective procedure.213
Traditionally, innoculation had been practiced in Asia, Africa, and the Balkans. This
knowledge was transported to Western Europe and the colonies during the early
eighteenth century.214 Frequent smallpox outbreaks were such a problem in the
Continental Army during the Revolutionary period that the disease has been cited as the
209
W.O. 28/6 William Barrington, "Instructions for the direction of the Hospital established for the Forces
in Canada," 28 February 1776.
210
Dobson, 289.
211
Reiss, 14.
212
Charters, 23.
213
Wain, 173.
214
Mark Harrison, Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present Day (Cambridge: The Polity
Press, 2004; repr. edn, 2005, 2006), 61-62.
52
reason for the failure of the American campaign into Canada in 1776.215 The
prevention of smallpox changed rapidly following Edward Jenner's successful
vaccination experiment.216 Vaccination, which used cowpox as the immunization
agent, was considerably safer than inoculation and did not cause the patient to fall ill
with a mild case of smallpox, avoiding debilitation and allowing servicemen to continue
with their duties.217 With the publication of Jenner's An Inquiry into the Causes and
Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae in 1798, which detailed the vaccination process,
vaccination became the primary method of smallpox prevention.218 The success of
vaccination was quickly demonstrated in a military setting, when the first military
expedition to be vaccinated was that of General Abercromby to Egypt in 1801.219 The
adoption of vaccination by the military showcased the validity of preventative medicine
within the military administration.
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: The Peninsular Campaign
The Peninsular Campaign of the Napoleonic Wars demonstrated the potential for
the various elements of military medicine to coalesce into an effective system of care.
However, while the campaign illustrated the tremendous capacity to successfully deal
with the ever-present problem of attending to the sick and the wounded, there were also
many examples where the reality was very much the opposite. Cornet Francis Hall, a
soldier with the 14th Light Dragoons, upon witnessing the horrendous conditions at
215
Ann Becker, "Smallpox in Washington's Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease During the
American Revolutionary War," Journal of Military History 68 (2004), 382.
216
Wain, 189.
217
Ibid., 188.
218
Wain, 190-191; Edward Jenner, An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variole Vaccinae, a
disease discovered in some of the Western counties of England, particularly Gloucestershire, and known
by the name of the Cowpox (London, 1798), 56.
219
Howard, 216.
53
Celerico hospital in Portugal, complained that, "two patients occupied each bed, and
when one died another was brought in to fill his place, and share in mind as well as
body, the infection of his disease."220 It was not necessary for such conditions to persist,
as was demonstrated by hospital reforms. A higher standard of care was possible by
utilizing the improvements in preventative medicine, transportation, and administration
that had emerged during the American Revolution and the West Indian conflicts of the
French Revolutionary Wars. Nonetheless, the improvements to the medical system
were neither universal nor in some instances long lasting. Hospitals, for instance, were
notorious for alternating between periods of adequate and inadequate patient care. The
number of patients in a specific institution often determined the standard of care. Fewer
patients ensured that better care was provided, due to a lower patient-practitioner ratio.
In order to maintain adequate care levels, regimental surgeons were often pulled from
their stations in order to be sent to general hospitals.221 There continued to be instances
of patients languishing in deplorable conditions and soldiers perishing in large numbers
due to epidemic diseases. Those occasions where improvements had been implemented
were the result of the influence of individual military commanders and medical
practitioners, medical advancements, and situational realities. The significance of these
individuals and their circumstances will become clear through an examination of
preventative and reactionary forms of medicine, transport, and administration.
During the Peninsular Campaign previously established methods of disease
prevention were improved due to necessity, command influence, and a growing
appreciation that medicine was an important military provision. Experience gained
220
Cornet Francis Hall, "Recollections in Portugal and Spain During 1811 and 1812," Royal United
Services Journal 56(418) (1912), 1737.
221
Howard, 137.
54
from the North American winters during the American Revolution and the Seven Years
War taught the importance of proper shelter from the elements. James McGrigor, in the
winter of 1812/13, recommended that the men be adequately quartered either in huts or
in private homes rather than in tents. If these facilities were not possible, the best
alternative would be the construction of fireplaces in order to warm the troops.222
Unfortunately, as noted by historian Martin Howard, these suggestions for improved
comfort and the health of servicemen were only slowly implemented due to their high
cost, forcing continued exposure to the elements.223
From a medical perspective, moisture was just as detrimental to good health as
exposure to cold due to the connection between dampness and disease. John Pringle, an
army physician, outlined the medical relationship between wetness and fevers among
soldiers, "the men will either by duty or by misconduct often suffer from wet ground,
wet clothes, nocturnal damps and colds. And the danger of their falling into these
diseases is the greater, as the interchanges of heat and cold are some sensible and
frequent in the field than in quarters."224 These observations, made during the War of
Austrian Succession, demonstrate the importance of previous experience in the practice
of military medicine. The connection between illness and the damp was also remarked
upon during the Peninsular Campaign. Joseph Donaldson, a soldier with the 94th
Scottish Regiment, noted in his 1865 memoirs that "during the time we were in the
Peninsula, the troops suffered much from exposure to rain; and nothing renders a solder
so uncomfortable as having wet clothes about him; or, I believe, hurts his health more
222
James McGrigor, "Sketch of the Medical History of the British Armies in the Peninsula of Spain and
Portugal, During the Late Campaigns," Medico-Chirurgical Transactions (1815), 394.
223
Howard, 213.
224
Pringle, 10.
55
when first exposed to it."225 Donaldson's observations are particularly illuminating as he
did not possess a medical background, yet he was able to discern the same conclusions
as medical practitioners regarding dampness and health. This was partly due to shared
understanding of medical philosophies in the general population but it was also the
result of his observations of the situation. In order to prevent discomfort and decrease
the risks to health he recommended that infantrymen be issued oilskin coverings similar
to those worn by their officers. Equipping men in such a manner would have been,
according to Donaldson, "neither expensive nor heavy," but would "have been the
means of saving many lives."226 The failure of the military to issue protective clothing
to troops and to quickly establish provisions for adequate winter shelter was a major
administrative shortcoming, and the result of financial considerations, not a deficiency
of medical practitioners or the medical knowledge of the time. These instances also
indicated the lack of agency in medical practitioners. Due to the low status of medical
practitioners in the military hierarchy, their opinions did not often carry sufficient
weight to influence policy.
There were, however, great medical successes that occurred during the Peninsular
Campaign as a result of preventative medical knowledge gained in other conflicts, such
as the American Revolution, being favourably applied. One area was that of seasoning or
acclimatization. Before reinforcements from Britain arrived on the frontlines of the
Iberian Peninsula, they were first shipped to Cadiz or Gibraltar. At these relatively
healthy coastal locations soldiers could be gradually introduced to drill in the hot summer
225
Joseph Donaldson, Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier (Philadelphia: G. B. Zieber & Co.,
1865), 101.
226
Ibid.
56
heat without causing a shock to the constitution.227 When this provision was not
possible, troops were often detained at their ports of arrival in order to initiate
acclimatization.228 Furthermore, greater acclimatization could be facilitated if it could be
scheduled in such a manner so that these new men joined their units at the end of the fall
campaign season.229 Another form of seasoning was also necessary, whereby new
recruits survived the period of adjustment to the health hazards of military life, including
close quarters and exposure to disease.230 New recruits, as previous experience in the
West Indies and the American Revolution had demonstrated, were more susceptible to
disease than experienced troops. For instance, McGrigor attributed the high morbidity of
the 7th Regiment of Foot to the number of new recruits serving in the unit. For the
period between 19 August 1811 and 20 May 1812, forty-eight per cent of new recruits
succumbed to disease, compared to just six per cent among the seasoned troops.231 The
proper selection of recruits could further lower morbidity and mortality rates. Referring
to statistics showing that sixty per cent of the new recruits who died in the 7th Regiment
were from urban occupations, with forty per cent coming from farming backgrounds,
McGrigor recommended that future recruits come from agricultural backgrounds.232
The knowledge of how to eradicate scurvy as a cause of death was another gain
for preventative medicine established during previous conflicts and one which continued
to be successfully implemented in the Napoleonic Wars.233 The prevention of scurvy
demonstrated the intersection of the transport system with preventative medicine and
227
Howard, 211.
McGrigor, "Sketch of the Medical History of the British Armies," 466.
229
Howard., 211-212.
230
Ibid., 211.
231
McGrigor, "Sketch of the Medical History of the British Armies," 467.
232
Ibid., 468.
233
Scurvy was not listed as a cause of death on the Army medical returns between 1811-15. Ibid., 479481.
228
57
continuity within the military medical system. The disappearance of scurvy was due to a
plentiful and inexpensive supply of citrus fruits present in the Iberian Peninsula. In
addition, the supply and transport system for necessaries had been significantly
streamlined as a result of previous experience, mitigating disruptions that had been
present throughout the eighteenth century. With the food supply only rarely impeded,
troops enjoyed a balanced diet regularly throughout the year, further contributing to the
elimination of scurvy.234
The same preventative medical measures which were being introduced into the
army were also implemented in the navy during the Napoleonic Wars. Gilbert Blane
considered the year 1796 to be "an era in the history of the health of the navy."235 With
citrus in use throughout the navy and effectively eliminating scurvy in that year, the next
greatest cause of morbidity and mortality in the naval service was fevers. Blane credited
the "sudden decrease of sickness in the first years of this century" to preventative
measures such as "improvements in the method of promoting ventilation and cleanliness,
and particularly to the strict discipline adopted and inforced in the Channel fleet."236 The
use of ventilators helped to circulate fresh air below decks and to remove foul air.237
Uniforms and frequent swabbing of the deck helped to maintain cleanliness and assisted
in maintaining discipline.238 These preventative measures fostered a healthier navy as
evidenced by a forty-nine per cent reduction in the admissions of fever patients at Haslar
234
Food supplies were only severely disrupted by retreats and advances surrounding battles. Ibid., 423.
Gilbert Blane, "Statements of the Comparative Health of the British Navy, From the Year 1779 to the
Year 1814, With Proposals for its Farther Improvement," Medico-Chirurgical Transactions (1815), 503.
236
Ibid.
237
Fan-like ventilators had first been proposed in the mid-eighteenth century. Rodger, The Wooden
World, 106-107.
238
Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 527.
235
58
hospital between 1759 and 1799.239 The reduction in patients demonstrated the
auspicious effects of preventative medicine and the transference of medical knowledge
from one military conflict to the next.
The influence of military commanders was also crucial for the introduction of
preventative medical measures. Historian Matthew Kaufman described Wellington as
"particularly concerned" with the welfare of the soldiers under his command.240
Wellington was instrumental in improving the cleanliness of hospitals and would, as in
the case of Santander hospital in 1814, institute quarantine during outbreaks of epidemic
disease.241 In order to stem epidemics amongst new arrivals of troops, all soldiers
departing from Britain were screened for evidence of disease and cleanliness on
Wellington's orders.242 Wellington's involvement was also influential in procuring winter
clothing for soldiers and ensuring that it was delivered to regiments in a timely
manner.243 In addition to these preventative measures, after initial reluctance, in 1812
Wellington gave unprecedented authority to medical practitioners to enact medical
decisions in order to more effectively manage the medical system.244 With this new
authority, McGrigor transferred patients out of general hospitals and into regimental
hospitals.245 At the command level, regimental hospitals were often seen as interfering
with military operations, hence Wellington's reluctance. However, regimental hospitals
were often cleaner, cheaper, and had fewer instances of contagious disease than general
239
Lloyd and Coulter, 329.
Kaufman, 25.
241
Howard., 127.
242
McGrigor, "Sketch of the Medical History of the British Armies," 465.
243
In addition to winter clothing, some regiments were also given linen trousers for summer wear.
Ibid., 469.
244
Howard, 137.
245
Ibid.
240
59
hospitals. Regimental hospitals had the added benefit of care being provided by medical
practitioners known to the patients.246
Command influence was also important in the navy. Nelson, who suffered from
many medical aliments during his naval service, was especially concerned with the
welfare of the men under his command.247 With the assistance of his agent-victualler
Richard Ford, Nelson was an instrumental force in ensuring that the Mediterranean Fleet
was meticulously victualled with supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables, including citrus
fruits. Laurence Brockliss et. al. praise Nelson's efforts through which one million
pounds of fresh beef and forty-seven thousand pounds worth of fruit and vegetables were
consumed by approximately six thousand men between February 1804 and April 1805.248
In the four-month period from October 1804 to January 1805, 62,400 oranges and 35,700
lemons were supplied to fend off scurvy.249
The increased cooperation between medical practitioners and military
commanders was a response to the heightened status of the medical profession in both the
army and the navy. Nelson's surgeon, William Beatty (d. 1842), was consulted by
Nelson and HMS Victory's captain Thomas Hardy (1769-1839) on medical matters and
measures necessary for the improvement of health aboard ship.250 In 1804, in recognition
of the importance of retaining skilled surgeons in order to maintain the health of the fleet,
Nelson offered a "powerful endorsement" of the surgeons' petitions for improved pay and
246
Marshall, "Surgeons Reconsidered: Military Medical Men of the American Revolution," 303.
Since first joining the navy as a boy, Nelson had fallen victim to malaria, yellow fever, dysentery, and
scurvy. Brockliss et al., 84.
248
The number of men in the Mediterranean Fleet at this time fluctuated between six and eight thousand.
Ibid., 86.
249
Ibid.
250
Ibid., 96.
247
60
status.251 The relationship between Wellington and McGrigor, though sometimes
uncertain, also demonstrated how surgeons and the tasks they performed were valued by
the military establishment, a contrast to the status of medical personnel in previous
conflicts wherein surgeons were considered uneducated and unable to perform their
duties.252
In addition to the improvements noted in preventative medical treatments, the
Peninsular Campaign was a theatre for reforms in reactionary medicine. Much like
preventative treatment forms, the amelioration of reactionary medicine relied on
advancements in medical knowledge, situational realities, and the influence of
individuals. Advancements in amputation techniques, such as the removal of a leg by
an incision through the hip joint which was successfully performed by George Guthrie
(1785-1856) in the aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo, denoted clear advancements in
medical technology.253 Such advancements were also the result of the personal
experience of the surgeon and the situation in which the amputations were performed.
The more experienced the surgeon, the greater likelihood that the operation could be
preformed quickly and efficiently. Furthermore, operations that were conducted
immediately following trauma had a higher probable rate of survival. Both of these
conditions, of experience and location, were met by Guthrie following Waterloo.
Guthrie only performed one other operation in addition to the example above. Although
both of these procedures were complex and exceedingly difficult, Guthrie had ample
251
Ibid., 97.
Howard, 11-12.
253
Kaufman, 17. Guthrie was an extremely accomplished surgeon, who entered the army as an assistant
surgeon in 1801 before his sixteenth birthday. Additionally following Waterloo he performed a ligation
of the femoral artery by the patient’s calf muscle allowing the foot to remain attached. Ibid., 15, 17.
252
61
time to perform them, a luxury unavailable to many other practitioners.254 Guthrie and
other military surgeons often benefitted from the knowledge and experience that had
been gained by civilian surgeons throughout the eighteenth century. Civilian surgeons
and anatomists like Charles Bell (1774-1842) were contracted by the Army Medical
Department to provide lectures to military surgeons on anatomy and surgery, which
facilitated the transfer of new information.255 The improved treatment of open fractures
generated by gunshot wounds received in combat, for example, was the application of
advancements in civilian medical knowledge in a military situation.256
Advances in medical science and surgical techniques were only beneficial to
wounded servicemen if surgical procedures could be performed quickly after receiving
an injury. This observation was the result of previous experience with military surgery
in the eighteenth century. For instance, army surgeon John Bell (1763-1820) noted in
1800 that speed was important in "procuring adhesion," a necessary component in
successful operations.257 In order to expedite the transfer of wounded men to the
surgeons, field hospitals were established in close proximity to the battlefield.258 Field
hospitals had been used throughout the eighteenth century. These hospital installations
had been used by regimental surgeons and were often stationed within cannon distance
of a battle.259 By 1813, the field hospital system had been transformed. Field units were
now part of the staff branch of the medical service. Staff surgeons often had more
experience and were more efficient in performing operative procedures than their
254
Ibid., 17; Howard, 75-76.
Ibid., 19-20; Howard, 147-148.
256
Gabriel and Metz, 144.
257
John Bell, Discourses on the Nature and Cure of Wounds (Edinburgh: 1800), 13-14.
258
Kaufman, 85-87.
259
Howard, 141. Field hospitals were also known as flying hospitals.
255
62
regimental counterparts. In theory this meant that more of the wounded could be seen
more quickly than under the previous field hospital system.260 Field hospital
establishments were further improved by the introduction of portable, hard-sided
hospital buildings. Wellington wrote to his brother Sir Henry Wellesley (1773-1847),
then a diplomatic envoy to Spain, in January 1814 on the importance of military
hospitals, especially portable installations:
It is quite impossible for a large army to carry on extended operations without
military hospitals. We have had nearly 30,000 wounded upon this frontier
since the month of June last, besides the sick which there must be among so
many men kept in a constant state of exertion; yet I am certain that no
individual has been put to the slightest inconvenience for which he has not
received compensation; and I must add, that the inconvenience of having
hospitals at all has been much relieved by my having provided portable
buildings, brought from England purposely to be constructed into
hospitals.261
The large number of wounded noted by Wellington could not be treated in the
stationary general hospitals available, thus field hospitals were a great asset in ensuring
that adequate medical care was obtained by injured servicemen. Additionally, portable
field hospitals, which allowed for quicker amputations, significantly reduced the
necessity of secondary operations and rates of gangrene.262 Following the battle of
Toulouse in the spring of 1814, the mortality rate for primary amputations was 11.7 per
cent, far lower than the typical rate of 25-30 per cent.263 These favourable results may
be attributed to the above field installations instituted by Wellington.
260
Kaufman, 77.
"Duke of Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley January 14, 1814," in John Gurwood, ed., Selections from
the Dispatches and General Orders of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington (London: John Murray,
1851), 787.
262
Primary amputations were the first operations performed on an injury, while secondary amputations
were performed in order to remove gangrenous tissue and create a clean wound field that could heal
without infection. Secondary amputations had a higher mortality rate than primary operations due to the
stress of the second operation without anaesthetic and the higher probability of infection. Kaufman, 19.
263
Ibid., 77.
261
63
Speedy transport of the wounded from the battlefield to a field hospital or to a
general or regimental hospital was crucial to minimizing discomfort to the patient and
increasing the survival rate. As previously mentioned, by moving the field hospital
closer to the battlefield, the time required to transfer a patient to surgery could be
reduced. Unfortunately, no standard battlefield evacuation system existed in the British
medical service. The French army under the direction of surgeon Dominique Larrey had
established an ambulance corps for the removal of the wounded from the battlefield in
the 1790s.264 The British relied on members from each regiment to remove their
wounded fellows from the battlefield. This system was notoriously inadequate.265
George Ballingall (1780-1855), an army surgeon who had served in India and taken part
in the 1815 occupation of Paris, delineated the need to establish a suitable system for
battlefield evacuation:
For this purpose, the only effectual provision seems to be, the formation of an
Hospital Corps, placed entirely at the disposal of the medical staff, and
consisting of men either enlisted and embodied solely with this view, or
transferred to the hospital establishment in consequence of having, from
years or from accidents, become less effective in the line. A body of men of
this description, trained to the particular duties required of them, qualified to
attend the sick in the hospitals, as well as to succour and bear off the
wounded in the field, would preserve the integrity and effective force of
regiments; would afford a degree of comfort to the sick and wounded, to
which they are too often strangers; and would give an efficiency to the
medical staff, which the most zealous devotion to the duties of the service
cannot otherwise ensure.266
A hospital corps such as that suggested above would increase the survival rate and help
eliminate the suffering of the injured through quickly obtaining medical care. The
importance of quickly evacuating the wounded from the battlefield was also noted by
264
Kaufman, 84-85.
Howard, 85-86.
266
George Ballingall, Outlines of Military Surgery, Third Edition (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black,
1844), 92-93.
265
64
army surgeon John Gideon Millingen (1782-1849), who suggested that each member of
a hospital or ambulance corps be outfitted with a blanket and a nine-foot long pike.
Members of the corps working in pairs would be able to form a stretcher out of the pikes
and one blanket and cover the wounded patient with the second blanket.267 In inclement
weather the pikes and blankets could also be used to provide shelter to the wounded
while awaiting treatment in hospital.268 These recommendations for the amelioration of
the transport of men from the battlefield arose from the experience of the Napoleonic
Wars. They were not, however, implemented until the mid-nineteenth century. There
are many possible explanations for the delay in forming a hospital corps. The simplest
is that the war ended before such recommendations could be installed and the period of
peace that followed saw the typical reduction of the medical establishment as in
previous conflicts. The establishment of a hospital corps would also require the
enlistment of men specifically for the purposes of filling the corps. This would
necessitate a costly reorganization of recruitment efforts and changes to regimental
hierarchy. The cost and the need to reorganize made the suggestion of a British hospital
corps unappealing to the military administration at the start of the nineteenth century.269
Transport of the wounded to general and regimental hospitals was equally
difficult. At the beginning of the Peninsular campaign, civilian vehicles were hired to
perform this task. These consisted mostly of open ox carts which exposed the wounded
267
The blankets would also be affixed with straps to brace the weight of the patient and holes through
which to insert the pikes. John Gideon Millingen, The Army Medical Officer's Manual Upon Active
Service; of, Precepts for his Guidance in the Various Situations in which he may be Placed; with
Observations on the Preservation of the Health of Armies upon Foreign Service (London: Burgess and
Hill, 1819), 22-24.
268
Ibid., 225.
269
Kaufman, 85.
65
to the elements and owing to rough roads a great deal of jarring.270 The wooden wheels
on Portuguese carts were also ungreased, causing a great deal of noise and adding to the
jolting of passengers.271 Army surgeon Henry Milburne in 1809 described the carts in
the following manner:
A more inconvenient, ill-constructed, clumsy carriage cannot be well
conceived.... The shocking inconvenience of such a jolting conveyance for
the sick and wounded persons may easily be conceived; added to which the
noise they make in the most disagreeable possible, the revolution of the axletrees producing a king of humming monotonous sound, something similar to
the drone of a bagpipe, which may be heard at the distance of a mile or
upwards.272
By transporting hospital patients in a fashion as such that described by Milburne, the
suffering of the sick and the wounded was greatly increased. Additionally, transport
convoys were also at risk of being captured by the enemy as the front lines shifted and
armies manoeuvred, resulting in the potential for even further discomfort.273 Beginning
in 1812, McGrigor began to institute transport reforms. These reforms included the
introduction of spring wagons which provided a smoother, more comfortable ride.274
Transport convoys were also conducted along routes that could be protected and were
more in line with the army's movements.275 Changes in hospital placement from landlocked regions to locations alongside rivers allowed for the use of barges to transport the
wounded. Transport by water was the fastest and most efficient form of long distance
270
Howard, 90-92.
Ibid., 90.
272
Henry Milburne, A narrative of circumstances attending to the retreat of the British army under the
command of the late Lieut. Gen. Sir John Moore; with a concise account of the memorable battle of
Corunna (London, 1809), 94-95. Quotation on Ibid., 90-91.
273
Although designed to bring more comfort, some men found the spring wagons to be more
uncomfortable owing to their tendency to bounce. Ibid., 92.
274
Ibid., 93.
275
Ibid., 88.
271
66
medical transportation.276 While these transportation measures continued to be
supplemented by requisitions of civilian transport, McGrigor's reforms, implemented as
a result of Wellington's confidence in his decisions and the improved status of military
medical practitioners, greatly increased the comfort of transport easing the suffering of
wounded servicemen.
It was during the Peninsular Campaign that the administrative system within the
military medical establishment was improved. The previous administration, the Army
Medical Board, was disbanded due to its ineptitude at preparing for and handling the
Scheldt expedition in 1809.277 Causality rates were significantly higher than expected,
with 4,000 soldiers dying from 'Walcheren' fever, and 11,000 more being invalided back
to Britain. William Fergusson (1773-1846), who had served as Inspector General of
Army Hospitals in Portugal, was particularly upset with the management of the situation
by Physician-General Lucas Pepys (1742-1830). According to Fergusson, "when at an
after period he [Pepys] was ordered to proceed to the succour of the distressed army in
Walcheren, refused to obey putting on record his official declaration, that he had no
knowledge of camp and contagious diseases."278 A Commission of Enquiry following
the expedition concurred with Fergusson's views and concluded that the high morbidity
and mortality rates were due to an insufficient number of medical practitioners and the
incompetence of the medical board. The Commission also determined, according to
Matthew Kaufman, that the "gross inefficiency of the Board was directly responsible for
276
Ibid., 96-97.
Kaufman, 33.
278
James Fergusson ed., Notes and Recollections of a Professional Life, by the late William Fergusson,
Esq. M. D. Inspector General of Military Hospitals (London: Longman, Green, and Longmans, 1846), 56.
277
67
the unnecessary loss of thousands of soldiers' lives each year."279 This demonstrates the
degree of authority that the army medical administration had over medical practitioners
and the installations manned by these practitioners. The culpability of the medical
board also underscores the improvements of consecutive medical administrations.
Even prior to the Scheldt expedition there were several complaints made against
the Medical Board. The three board members, while all possessing medical
qualifications, had limited military experience.280 Their positions, for which they were
paid £2 per day, were part-time and thus allowed the pursuit of other medical activities.
For example, Thomas Keate (1745-1821), the inspector of regimental hospitals, also
served as a surgeon to St. George's, Royal Chelsea, and York Military hospitals. In
addition to his positions as an inspector for the National CowPox Establishment and an
examiner for the College of Surgeons, he also maintained a private surgical practice.281
In light of their extensive outside commitments, the members of the Army Medical
Board were rarely in their offices and only infrequently held meetings to determine the
medical arrangements necessary for military expeditions.282 This negligence resulted in
expeditions, like the Scheldt, being launched with inadequate provisions of medical
practitioners and medical supplies.
Improvements to the military medical situation were immediately noted upon the
dissolution of the Medical Board in 1809. A new Army Medical Board was formed in
1810 and its members were all full-time officers who had notable military and
279
Kaufman, 32.
Ibid., 29.
281
Ibid.
282
Ibid., 31.
280
68
administrative experience.283 Following the introduction of the new board, a more
streamlined administrative system was established with increased contact between the
Board and medical personnel. The concerns of medical practitioners in the field were
given greater consideration and local administrators, such as McGrigor, were given
more authority to enact medical measures. Surgeons who did not hold a degree from
Oxford or Cambridge were also encouraged to apply for promotion to physician, a point
of discord between the previous administration and military medical practitioners.284
However, this new provision succeeded in retaining many highly competent surgeons
who would have otherwise left the military service in order to enter into private practice.
CONCLUSION:
The Peninsular Campaign represented the culmination of improvements in
supply, transportation, and preventative and reactionary medicine, which increased the
effectiveness and efficiency of the British Army and the Royal Navy. The amelioration
of the medical system required that all facets of medical treatment and the military
administration function together successfully. Additionally, each of these components
needed to evolve and improve within the framework of their establishments. Such
improvements were the result of previous experience within several theatres of conflict
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The American Revolution demonstrated the need for adequate supplies and
military personnel (which included, but were not limited to, those of a medical nature)
283
Ibid., 33.
The previous medical board had limited opportunities for promotion to those with an Oxbridge degree.
This eliminated the majority of surgeons, who possessed a degree from the Scottish or Continental
universities, from applying for promotion. Ibid., 30-31. In the naval medical service, approximately sixty
per cent of surgeons originated from the Irish and Scottish universities. Cardwell, 40-41.
284
69
while validating improvements in hospital and garrison design for inclement weather.
The transportation reforms after 1779 improved the capacity of the Royal Navy to
adequately supply a large force stationed overseas with medicines, clothing, food, and
other necessaries. These same principles, of reducing the necessity of transhipment and
overland transport, could be applied in other theatres of conflict throughout the world,
including the Iberian Peninsula. The threat posed to troops by inclement weather was
reinforced by experiences in Canada and north of the Chesapeake, confirming the
necessity of sufficient housing and clothing for soldiers. Furthermore, the military
encounter with the North American climate strengthened the belief that in order for
requisite medical care to be provided to servicemen, hospital installations must also be
able to withstand the elements.
The West Indian conflicts during the American Revolution and the French
Revolutionary Wars (1775-1802) taught the British military the value of preventative
medical treatments, which included seasoning, cinchona bark, and the consumption of
citrus to ward off scurvy. The need to defend these valuable colonial possessions placed
the health of thousands of servicemen at risk of contracting tropical fevers. In order to
combat the harsh disease environment, the West Indian Regiments were created to
reduce reliance on European soldiers in such settings, thereby reducing the health risks.
Seasoning could be used to aid in preserving the health of those troops who needed to be
sent to the West Indies. Additionally, the prophylactic issue of cinchona helped to
prevent and treat malarial fevers in both the army and navy, while citrus fruits issued to
the navy would ultimately help to eradicate the threat of scurvy. As in the northern
climes in North America, the design of hospitals and barracks in the West Indies was
70
modified to help prevent illness and promote healing by increasing ventilation and
introducing wards to stem cross-contamination.
Successful military medicine, as seen in some instances during the Peninsular
Campaign, required the application of knowledge acquired from previous conflicts in
the Americas and thus simultaneously reflected continuity and change within the
medical system. It also culminated from the recognition of the important relationship
between preventative and reactionary forms of medical treatment, military
administration, and supply and transport. Reforms to the transport of patients ensured
that they would be moved more quickly, comfortably, and safely. The improvements in
transport extended to the speedy and efficient movement of other necessary supplies
including food, clothing, and medicines. Meanwhile, medical treatment was advanced
through a greater respect for and understanding of the role of medical practitioners by
the military administration, and by the further development of medical techniques and
theories. These changes were the result of the influence of individuals including medical
practitioners and military commanders, as has been widely acknowledged in the
historiography of military medicine during the long eighteenth century. However, there
continued to be occurrences where adequate medical care was not provided. These
cases were often the result of financial considerations and situational constraints.
Nevertheless, an examination of the Peninsular Campaign at the beginning of the
nineteenth century does illustrate the tremendous capacity of the newly reformed
military medical and administrative systems to apply the knowledge gained from
previous conflicts in order to benefit sick and wounded servicemen. These changes are
most noticeable through an in-depth investigation of military medicine in both the army
71
and the navy throughout the later half of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth
centuries. Such analysis reveals the crucial role of military medicine in fostering the
growth and development of the British empire, by helping to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of British military forces.
72
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CURRICULUM VITAE
Education:
Bachelor of Arts History Honours
University of New Brunswick, 2010
Master of Arts History
University of New Brunswick, 2011
Academic Conferences:
"Communication, Medical Treatises and 18th century Military Hospital Reform"
'Let's Give Them Something to Talk About': Communication Through the Ages
Dalhousie University
Halifax NS
March 18-20, 2011
"Pearl Harbor: An Analysis of Historiographical Controversy"
Making History: Challenging the Past
University of Western Ontario
London ON
November 4-5, 2010