Humanitarian intervention today
Alexis Heraclides2017, Manchester University Press eBooks
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Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War
2006
Preface to the English Edition Two sorts of sentiments inspire political action: hope and indignation. This book is largely the product of the latter sentiment, but the aim of its publication is to encourage the former. A brief and subjective overview of the political evolution of the past twenty years can explain the source of my indignation. The collapse of the Soviet Union can be compared to the fall of Napoleon. Both were the product of major revolutions whose ideals they symbolized, rightly or wrongly, and which they defended more or less effectively while betraying them in various ways. If their natures were complex, the consequences of their fall were relatively simple and led to a general triumph of reaction, with the United Stales today playing a role analogous to that of the Holy Alliance nearly two centuries ago. 1 There is no need to be an admirer of the Soviet Union (or of Napoleon) to make this observation. My generation, that of 1968, wanted to overcome the shortcomings of the Soviet system, but certainly did not mean to take the great leap backwards which actually took place and to which, in its overwhelming majority, it has easily adapted. 2 A discussion of the causes of these failures would require several books. Suffice it to say that for all sorts of reasons, some of which will be touched on in what follows, I did not follow the evolution of the majority of my generation and have preserved what it would call my youthful illusions, at least some of them. And so, when the Kosovo war began in 1999, I found myself completely isolated. To the right, there were still a few realpolitikers who saw no good reason for France to wage war against Serbia, least of all to please Germany and the United States. But on the left, the concept of humanitarian intervention was accepted almost unanimously, even within organizations that had retained revolutionary labels, whether Trotskyist, communist, or anarchist. Even today (in August 2006), the movement against the occupation of Iraq is weak and opposition to the threat of war against Iran is weaker still. In reaction to all that, in 1999 I began writing texts diffused mainly by the Internet, sometimes published here and there. But inasmuch as those texts were often polemic and linked to particular events, I decided, partly in response to various objections encountered in the course of debates, to bring together in a single book my arguments against Western interventionism and its humanitarian justifications. This book was written initially for a European public, but having lived and worked in the United States, I am convinced that it could also be of interest to an American public, for two reasons: for one, because it provides a glimpse of what is going on in Europe, especially in the progressive and ecological circles often idealized by the American left; and for another, because the ideological weaknesses of the movements of opposition to imperial wars are the same on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the readers of the French edition of this book remarked to me that it was a critique of the left, but one not made from a right-wing viewpoint, which is a fairly good description of what I meant to do. Let us say that the intention here is to make a modest contribution to an ideological reconstruction of the left. Everyone admits that it is weak and, in my view, it is weak, partly because it has not come up with a proper intellectual response to the ideological offensive waged by the right after the fall of communism and has, on the contrary, much too thoroughly interiorized the arguments advanced by the right in the course of that campaign. In this preface, I want to make a few remarks explaining how the arguments made in this book fit into the broader perspective of what could be meant by an intellectual reconstruction of the left. Historically, one can consider that the "left" represents roughly three types of combat: • For social control of production, ranging from defense of workers to establishment of different forms of ownership of the means of production other than private. Another problem is that, after the fall of communism, large parts of the left have lost any sense of direction or of purpose or have even entirely given up the very notion of historical progress. To combat that sentiment adequately would require another book, but a few remarks on the history of the 20th century may illustrate the lines along which to proceed. On July 1, 1916, began the Battle of the Somme; on that single day the British suffered more than 50,000 casualties, out of which 20,000 died. The battle went on for four months, leading to about a million casualties on all sides and the war itself continued for another two years. In the summer of 2006, the Israeli army stopped its attacks on Lebanon after losing about a hundred soldiers; the majority of the U.S. population turned against the Iraq war after fewer than 3,000 died. That indicates a major change in the mentality of the West, and this reluctance to die in large numbers for "God and Country" is major progress in the history of mankind. From the neoconservative point of view, however, this phenomenon is a sign of decadence; in fact one of the positive aspects of the present conflict, from their perspective, is that it should strengthen the moral fiber of the American people, by making them ready to "die for a cause." 4 But, so far, it is not working. More realistic people, the planners at the Pentagon for example, have tried to replace waves of human cannon fodder by massive "strategic" bombing. This works only rarely; in Kosovo and Serbia it did succeed at least in bringing pro-Western clients to power in both places. But it clearly is not enough in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine or Lebanon. The only thing that might work, in a very special sense of course, would be nuclear weapons, and the fact that those weapons are the West's last military hope is truly frightening. To put this observation in a more global context, Westerners do not always appreciate that the major event of the 20th century was neither the rise and fall of fascism, nor the history of communism, but decolonization. One should remember that, about a century ago, the British could forbid the access of a park in Shanghai to "dogs and Chinese." And, of course, most of Asia and Africa was under European control. Latin America was formally independent, but under American and British tutelage; military interventions were routine. All of this collapsed during the 20th century, through wars and revolutions; in fact, the main lasting effect of the Russian Revolution is probably the Soviet Union's not insignificant support to the decolonization process. This process freed hundreds of millions of people from one of the most brutal forms of oppression. It is major progress in the history of mankind, similar to the abolition of slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries. Still, it is true that the colonial system gave way to the neocolonial one and that most decolonized countries have adopted, at least for the time being, a capitalist form of development. That provides some consolation to the ex-colonialists (and disappoints expectations of the Western left that opposed colonialism). But such sentiments may reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of "socialism" in the 20th century and of the historical significance of the present period. Before 1914, all socialist movements, whether libertarian or statist, reformist or revolutionary, envisioned socialism, that is, the socialization of the means of production, as an historic stage that was supposed to succeed capitalism in relatively developed Western societies possessing a democratic state, a functioning education system and a basically liberal and secular culture. All this disappeared with World War I and the Russian Revolution. After that, the libertarian aspects of socialism withered away, most of the European socialist movements became increasingly incorporated into the capitalist system and its main radical sector, the communists, identified socialism with whatever policies were adopted by the Soviet model. But that model had almost nothing to do with socialism as it was generally understood before the First World War. It should rather be understood as a (rather successful) attempt at rapid economic development of an underdeveloped country, an attempt to catch up, culturally, economically and militarily, by whatever means necessary, with the West. The same is true of post-Soviet revolutions and national liberation movements. As a first approximation, one can say that all over the Third World, people, or rather governments, have tried to "catch up" either by "socialist" or by "capitalist" means. But, if one recognizes that aspect, the whole history of the 20th century can be interpreted very differently from the dominant discourse about the "socialism that was tried and failed everywhere." What was tried and actually succeeded (almost) everywhere was emancipation from Western domination. This has inverted a centuries-old process of European expansion and hegemony over the rest of the world. The 20th century has not been the one of socialism, but it has been the one of anti-imperialism. And this inversion is likely to continue during the 21st century. Most of the time, the "South" is strengthening itself, with some setbacks (the period surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union being a time of regression, from that point of view). This has important consequences for both the Western peace movement and the old issue of socialism. There is some truth to the Leninist idea that the benefits of imperialism corrupt the Western working class-not only in purely economic terms (through the exploitation of the colonies), but also through the feeling of superiority that imperialism has implanted in the Western mind. However, this is changing for two reasons. On the one hand, "globalization" means that the West has...
Classical and Political Humanitarianisms in an Era of Military Interventionism and the War on Terror
Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 2017
This paper scrutinises the modus operandi of classical and political humanitarianism: the use of ambiguity and prescription to frame calls for international action to protect civilians, and public commentary on jus in bello and jus ad bellum. It does so by innovatively considering the perspectives of belligerents alongside those of humanitarian actors, so as to identify how belligerents have responded to the two humanitarian modus operandi, and to ascertain the connection of humanitarian actors to the wars and international military interventions that they have implicitly or explicitly called for or endorsed. The paper finds that the response of belligerents differs from what both classical and political humanitarians expect. Even where humanitarians maintain ambiguity, the intention to will military action remains present and even the documentation and reporting of violence will bolster military intervention. Such consequences will be perceptible to belligerents, who may restrict h...
Tainted Humanity: The Dilemma of Military Interventions
2001
Everytime I discussed or even fought with friends about the Kosovo-War of the NATO, a paralysing undecidedness befell me. Why was it so hard to take a definite attitude of consent or rejection towards this operation. In a certain way, my paper is an attempt to show the ethical problem, which underlies this indecision. I'm still uncertain about a conclusive moral evaluation of Humanitarian Interventions (HI) in general -though I'm now more confident to give a verdict about the Kosovo-War -, because I think that the situations where a HI is considered, i.e. where there is a great amount of suffering which can only be ended by military means, confronts us with a moral dilemma. On the one hand, people in need and misery ought to be helped, on the other hand this can only be accomplished by means which themselves involve harm and destruction. So the usual question "Are you in favor or against HI?" I can only answer by saying evasively: "It depends".
Preface: Militarism and Humanitarianism
Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 2012
Leveraging the idea of 'Humanitarian War'
In attempting to bring the frame of war more directly into the discussion over humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s, Adam Roberts quipped that '"humanitarian war" is an oxymoron that may yet become a reality'. No longer was humanitarianism only meant to restrain the means of warfare, but the violent and political logic of war was now supposed to serve the caring and universal dictates of humanitarianism. This essay takes the chance to theorize the idea of humanitarian war further to help improve our understanding of the reality that has become of it, where not only humanitarian interventions or coercive enactments of the 'Responsibility to Protect' feature humanitarian casus belli, but even more geopolitically motivated wars often do as well. It notes how scholarship on such phenomena often rests on overly restrictive and sometimes only implicit notions of how a humanitarian justification can and does influence the practice of war. It then offers a deeper and more plausible theorization of humanitarian war, laying out a range of possible forms and a central tendency that ties them together. This essay closes by discussing some of the benefits of grounding future analyses of humanitarian war in the theorization on offer.
Globalisation and War: The Historical and Current Controversy on Humanitarian Interventions
2009
In the debate about the question if, when, and how humanitarian interventions can afford peace and justice, military action needs to be taken into consideration. To discuss the meaning of justice in relation to military intervention, conclusions can be drawn from a historical view of the bellum iustum topic, as treated by the Spanish scholars Sepúlveda, Vitoria and Las Casas. Historical analysis reveals the principles both for the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello, that can be found in a recent
Humanitarian Intervention and Just War
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Humanitarian intervention today
Humanitarian intervention – that is, military intervention aimed at saving
innocent people in other countries from massive violations of human rights
(primarily the right to life) – entered public consciousness around 1990 as never
before in the course of the twentieth century. It has earned a central place in
scholarly research and in the preoccupations of decision-makers and international organizations and has captured the imagination of the wider public in
a fashion few other political subjects have achieved in the post-Cold War world.1
Ironically, it is in the limelight not due to its general acceptance but because of
its controversial character, which has led to acrimonious debates. At the two
ends of the scale there is, on the one hand, rejection, with the notion seen as nonsensical, an ‘oxymoron’,2 the hallmark of deceit and, on the other, its acceptance
as one of the clearest manifestations of altruism, the epitome of human solidarity
and compassion (the ‘good Samaritan’), the willingness to face great risk and
considerable loss to save the lives of ‘strangers’, with no gains.
Interestingly, rejection of, and sheer incredulity with, ‘humanitarian intervention’ is shared across the ideological spectrum, from realist scholarship in
international relations to Marxism and other forms of leftist critique, as well as
pacifism. From the realist line of reasoning, which has its origins in Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza, so-called ‘humanitarian’ or other ethical
concerns have no place in international politics and are damaging to rational
foreign policy. More scathing is a critique from Carl Schmitt, who argued that
‘war in the name of humanity, is not war for the sake of humanity, but a war
wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military
opponent’, identifying itself with humanity and denying it to the enemy.3 He adds
(as if he were a Marxist) that it has been used as ‘an ideological instrument of
imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle
of economic imperialism … whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat’.4
The question of intervention for humanitarian reasons poses agonizing
dilemmas. There is the tension between the sanctity of life (saving human beings)
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and the veneration of sovereignty and independence; and there is the tension
between doing something salutary in a humanitarian crisis if the United Nations
Security Council is paralysed and abuse in the name of humanitarianism by intervening states. Most liberals opt for saving lives5 and for intervening, exceptionally,
even without the authorization of the United Nations, provided the intervention has gained wide international legitimacy and the plight is so appalling that
the interest in global humanity overrides narrowly defined national interest.6
Realists of course discard ethics in foreign affairs (with exceptions, such as those
realists who take seriously the ‘morality of states’7) and regard only threats to
vital interests worthy of intervention, and intervention for humanitarian reasons
a delusion, or as bogus. Most leftist thinkers, such as Noam Chomsky,8 Edward
Said, Tariq Ali,9 Jacques Derrida or Jean Baudrillard denounced the 1999 intervention in Kosovo and the whole idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’, as have
other critical thinkers in more scholarly manner, such as Anne Orford,10 Antony
Anghie11 and Costas Douzinas.12 For them, intervention is by definition abusive,
the diktat of the powerful, a form of blatant neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism.
But a minority of leftist thinkers, who put a premium on self-determination and
saving the weak from the strong, are favourable to such interventions, albeit in
very exceptional cases, such as Jürgen Habermas,13 Michael Walzer14 and the
more controversial Bernard Kouchner, with his droit d’ingérence.15
Most international lawyers are opposed to such interventions, emphasizing
state sovereignty and independence. There has, though, been a shift, which is
far from insignificant, in that during the Cold War, among those opposed, the
majority were against the whole notion, while in the post-Cold War era most are
opposed to intervention only if it does not obtain UN authorization. Students
of international relations are more nuanced, especially non-realists,16 with those
in the field of international ethics, cosmopolitans in particular, who tend to be
less burdened by sovereignty, supporting unilateral humanitarian intervention,
followed more guardedly by communitarians, from Michael Walzer in the late
1970s onwards.17 They, together with international lawyers supportive of humanitarian intervention even without a UN mandate, disagree mainly as to the level
of onslaught that warrants intervention, which ranges from systematic violations
of fundamental human rights to a situation akin to genocide,18 and the point at
which to intervene: early on or late in a conflict, when all attempts to stop the
humanitarian plight peacefully have failed.
During the Cold War, humanitarian intervention was generally considered
beyond the pale, although even then a minority of international lawyers supported
armed intervention on humanitarian grounds.19 Some states, notably the US in the
cases of the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983), Belgium in Congo
(1960–61), Belgium and the US in Congo (1964) or France in the Central African
Republic (1979), had justified their actions on humanitarian grounds. But the near
consensus is that only three military interventions qualify as humanitarian given
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that they put an end to widespread loss of life: India’s intervention in East Pakistan
(1971) (hundreds of thousands of civilians dead and almost nine million refugees
fleeing to India), which led to the creation of Bangladesh; Vietnam’s overthrow
of the heinous Khmer Rouge regime under Pol Pot in Cambodia (1979) (with up
to two million civilian deaths mainly from disease and malnutrition in forced
labour camps); and the overthrow of Amin’s odious regime in Uganda (with
300,000 citizens murdered by Amin’s thugs) by Tanzania (1979). Interestingly,
all three intervening states did not justify their action on humanitarian grounds
(with the partial exception of India 20) but on grounds of self-defence, and all three
intervened mainly for instrumental reasons, especially Vietnam. The first two
interventions faced heavy wind internationally, notably in the UN (especially the
Vietnamese invasion), even though they both saved many lives.21
Following the end of the Cold War, the first post-bipolar decade witnessed
unprecedented interventionism on humanitarian grounds: safe haven for the
Kurds of northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1992–95), the intervention
of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia
(1990–96), the US-led intervention in Haiti (1994), French-led forces in Rwanda
(1994), NATO’s intervention in Serbia and Kosovo (1999) and the Australian-led
intervention in East Timor (1999).
In Rwanda effective French intervention came very late, following three
months of genocidal massacre by the Hutus of more than 800,000 Tutsis and many
moderate Hutus.22 The peacemaking intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia headed
by Nigeria23 and NATO’s Kosovo/Serbia operation took place without authorization by the UN Security Council. NATO’s Kosovo/Serbia operation gave rise to a
heated discussion not only because of its lack of UN endorsement but also due to
the choice of means (high-altitude aerial bombardment), which led to hundreds of
civilian deaths, more intense ethnic cleansing by the repugnant Milosevic regime,
thousands of refugees, considerable destruction of infrastructure and environmental pollution.24 Many had feared that this Kosovo precedent would open a
Pandora’s box but this did not come about, partly due to these unintended consequences. In the second part of 1999, the Australian-led peacekeeping operation in
East Timor took place with UN sanction, with no mismatch between the military
means and humanitarian ends, and it turned out to be peaceful.25 With the onset
of the new millennium – and with ‘9/11’ and its repercussions as far as US priorities
were concerned (the ‘war on terror’) – the idea of humanitarian intervention
seemed to have ‘evaporated’,26 although there were at least two candidates, Sierra
Leone and Sudan’s Darfur. The next humanitarian interventions took place
more than a decade later: the NATO-led operation in Libya (February–October
2011) and the French peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic
(December 2013), both authorized by the UN Security Council.27
In the wake of the Kosovo experience, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
pondered: ‘On the one hand is it legitimate for a regional organisation to use
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Humanitarian intervention today
force without a UN mandate? On the other is it permissible to let gross and
systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences,
continue unchecked?’28 Addressing the UN General Assembly in September
1999, he expressed his strong reservations about NATO’s unauthorized intervention in Kosovo and Serbia but added: ‘If in those dark days and hours leading
to the genocide [in Rwanda] a coalition of States had been prepared to act
in the defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council
authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror
to unfold?’29 And he challenged the member-states to come up with a new vision
of sovereignty.30
The Annan challenge was taken up by the Canadian-sponsored twelve-person
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which
responded by subsuming humanitarian intervention under the novel concept of
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P or RtoP).31 The aim of the R2P approach was to
‘shift the terms of the debate’;32 it amounts to a ‘rhetorical trick’ of flipping the coin
and shifting the emphasis from the controversial right to intervene for humanitarian reasons to the ‘less confrontational idea of a responsibility to protect’,33 but
the substance remains the same.
In 2005 at intergovernmental level, the Outcome Document of the UN World
Summit (15 September) made it a primary responsibility of states to protect their
population against ‘genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing’; if they fail to do so, a ‘timely and decisive response’ becomes the
responsibility of the international community. The ICISS had suggested that the
permanent members of the Security Council refrain from using the veto in such
cases as long as their vital interests are not at stake but this was unacceptable to the
US, Russia and China.34 The first test case of R2P was the intervention in Libya.35
Given the situation during the Cold War and the interventionism of the 1990s
and the ongoing debate, the general impression is that humanitarian intervention is basically a recent phenomenon, but in fact the concept of humanitarian
intervention had been established in the nineteenth century.
Before moving back in time (in chapter 2), let us identify the main issues at
stake in the present-day debate on the question of intervening or not intervening militarily for humanitarian reasons. Putting aside the proverbial question
of whether ‘violent means can ever serve humanitarian ends’,36 today’s debate
includes six main questions and at least three secondary ones.
The first question concerns the legality–legitimacy spectrum. Is legality through
UN authorization indispensable? Is non-authorized intervention by definition
illegal or is it perhaps legal given an alternative reading of the UN Charter?37 Can
intervention be condoned if it appears legitimate even though it is technically
illegal, as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded in its
detailed report?38 Another tack is the contention that one is faced with a complex
legal problem39 which may or may not be resolved on an ad hoc basis.
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A second question is where to place the threshold for intervening with or
without UN authorization: on systematic human rights violations (such as
systematic discrimination akin to apartheid or ‘internal colonialism’), on
something more grave, such as so-called egregious crimes (i.e. ethnic cleansing,
war crimes, crimes against humanity), or only at the level of mass extermination
and genocide?40
A third issue is in which cases to intervene (with or without UN authorization): in a protracted internal war (Liberia, Syria), in a Hobbesian ‘war of all
against all’ (Somalia), a separatist war (Kosovo) or only to put an end to one-sided
onslaught (Rwanda), or in all four cases?
A fourth problem is abuse (wrong intentions and ulterior motives) and
how it can be checked, if at all. UN authorization, collective intervention and
intergovernmental supervision may do the trick but what if they are not forthcoming? And even if they are, they may still be seen as suspect, for the permanent
members of the Security Council (as in the case of the Concert of Europe in the
nineteenth century) can hardly be counted upon – or live up – to being the moral
consciousness of the world. A related factor is the presence of tangible interests
as motives and how they can be reconciled with humanitarian motives and
intentions, especially since ‘saving strangers’ on its own is unlikely to provoke
intervention.41
Another question is timing. Should intervention take place only after the
exhaustion of all peaceful means (i.e. as a last resort) or should there be early,
anticipatory intervention and preventive deployment once egregious crimes have
been spotted, such as ethnic cleansing, so as to forestall a humanitarian disaster
(the Kosovo model) and to avoid greater use of military force later, even though
early intervention would be more difficult to justify internationally?42
There is also the need for a reasonable estimate of a successful outcome, that
is, of attaining the humanitarian goals, avoiding ‘noble intentions and bloody
results’,43 with few deaths of civilians and little destruction of infrastructure
(sparse ‘collateral damage’).44 There is also the related issue of ensuring that less
damage is done by intervening than by not intervening.45
The three secondary questions concern: a quick exit strategy or a longer stay
for fear that the bloodbath and anarchy will resume;46 how many casualties of ‘our
soldiers’ are acceptable;47 and the fact that the intervening states are by definition
more powerful, which smacks of the powerful bullying the weak under a smokescreen of righteousness.48
The recent tendency of advocates of humanitarian intervention is to borrow
from the well developed ‘just war’ doctrine of the Middle Ages and Renaissance
(see chapter 2), with the criteria for a just war remodelled to fit modern conditions.
The following ‘just war’ criteria are all regarded as essential for a humanitarian
intervention to be contemplated: right authority, in the sense of ‘legitimate
authority’ and not simply legal (factual) authority, which also alludes to ‘failed
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states’ as illegitimate and not worthy of sovereignty;49 just cause (massive
suffering); right intention (humanitarian motives genuine and not a ruse); last
resort; proportional means (good over harm); and a reasonable prospect of
success, leading to a ‘just peace’.50
Notes
1
2
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
B. Jahn, ‘Humanitarian Intervention – What’s in a Name?’, International Politics, 49:1
(2012), 36.
A. Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’, International
Affairs, 69:3 (1993), 429.
C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976,
translated from the German, with Introduction and notes by G. Schwab) [1932], 54.
Ibid., 54.
M. J. Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues’, Ethics and
International Affairs, 12:1 (1998), 73.
M. Walzer, ‘The Politics of Rescue’, Social Research, 62:1 (1995), 59.
D. C. Hendrickson, ‘In Defense of Realism: A Commentary on Just and Unjust War’,
Ethics and International Relations, 11 (1997), 19–53; M. Wesley, ‘Toward a Realist Ethics of
Intervention’, Ethics and International Affairs, 22:1 (2008), 55–72.
N. Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of
the West (New York: Verso, 2001).
T. Ali (ed.), Masters of the Universe? NATO’s Balkan Crusade (New York: Verso, 2000).
A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 274–308.
C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism
(Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).
J. Habermas, ‘Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border Between Legality and
Morality’, Constellations, 6:3 (1999), 263–72.
Walzer, ‘The Politics of Rescue’, 53–66; M. Walzer, ‘The Argument About Humanitarian
Intervention’, Dissent, 49:1 (2002), 29–37.
See S. Hoffmann, ‘The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention’, Survival, 37:4
(1995–96), 34–6; Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 70–5; T. Allen and S. Syan, ‘A Right
to Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism’, Journal of Development,
12 (2000), 825, 828–36, 840; G. J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian
Intervention (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 11–24.
See e.g. Hoffmann, ‘The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention’, 29, 37–41; Smith,
‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 63–79; N. J. Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2:2 (2001),
550–67.
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 101–8.
For a low threshold see W. M. Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’, American Journal of International Law, 84:4 (1990), 866–76;
A. D’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny’, American
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
7
Journal of International Law, 84:2 (1990), 516–24; F. R. Tesón, ‘Eight Principles for
Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Military Ethics, 5:2 (2006), 95–100, 105–6. For a
high threshold, a ‘spike test’, see T. Farer, ‘Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Intervention: A
Five-Part Test’, International Affairs, 19:2 (2005), 215–19.
They included some major figures from an older generation, such as Lauterpacht,
Guggenheim, de Visscher, Reisman, McDougal and Jessup, as well as Lillich, D’Amato,
Moore, Chilstrom, Levitin, Umozurike, Sornarajah and Tesón.
N. J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 64 n.43.
M. Leifer, ‘Vietnam’s Intervention in Kampuchea: The Rights of States Versus the Rights
of People’, in I. Forbes and M. Hoffman (eds), Political Theory, International Relations, and
the Ethics of Intervention (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 145–56; F. Hassan, ‘Realpolitik
in International Law: After Tanzanian–Ugandan Conflict, “Humanitarian Intervention”
Reexamined’, Willamette Law Review, 17 (1981), 897; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 65–71,
80–106; M. Akehurst, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in H. Bull (ed.), Intervention in World
Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 95–9; S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 71–4, 77–80.
B. D. Jones, ‘“Intervention without Borders”: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda,
1990–94’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24:2 (1995), 225, 230–1.
See H. Howe, ‘Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping’, International
Security, 21:3 (1997), 145–76.
For the international law debate see: R. A. Falk, ‘Kosovo, World Order, and the Future
of International Law’, American Journal of International Law, 93:4 (1999), 847–57;
B. Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, European Journal of
Inter national Law, 10 (1999), 1–22; A. Cassese, ‘Ex injuria jus oritur: Are We Moving
Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the
World Community?, European Journal of International Law, 10, (1999), 23–30; L. Henkin,
‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”’, American Journal of International
Law, 93:4 (1999), 824–8; R. Wedgewood, ‘NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia’, American
Journal of International Law, 93:4 (1999), 828–34. More generally see Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response,
Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); A. Schnabel and R. Thakur
(eds), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, 2000).
N. J. Wheeler and T. Dunne, ‘East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism’,
International Affairs, 77:4 (2001), 805–37.
T. G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in
a Unipolar Era’, Security Dialogue, 25:2 (2004), 135.
J. Pattison, ‘The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya’, Ethics and International
Affairs, 25:3 (2011), 271–7.
K. Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 18 September 1999, 49.
Press release SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (20 September 1999), 2.
R. Thakur, ‘Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect:
Experiences from ICISS’, Security Dialogue, 33:3 (2002), 325.
G. Evans and M. Sahnoun, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Foreign Affairs, 1:6 (2002),
99–100; T. G. Weiss, ‘R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit’, Wisconsin International Law
Journal, 24:3 (2006), 741–60.
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8
Humanitarian intervention today
32
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Responsibility
to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 16–18; Thakur,
‘Outlook’, 327–8.
33 C. Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’,
American Journal of International Law, 101:1 (2007), 102.
34 A. J. Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and
the 2005 World Summit’, Ethics and International Affairs, 20:2 (2006), 146–7, 151–2, 167.
35 J. Welsh, ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into
RtoP’, Ethics and International Affairs, 25:3 (2011), 255–62.
36 Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention’, 556.
37 For the alternative reading see e.g. W. D. Verwey, ‘Humanitarian Intervention Under
International Law’, Netherlands International Law Review, 32 (1985), 357–418, especially
406–18; C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘The Conundrum of Recourse to Force – To Protect Persons’,
International Organizations Law Review, 3 (2006), 7–53, especially 37–9, 47–53.
38 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, 2.
39 I. Hurd, ‘Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World’,
Ethics and International Affairs, 25:3 (2011), 293–313.
40 M. J. Bazyler, ‘Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the
Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 23 (1987),
598–601; Hoffmann, ‘The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention’, 37–8; D. Fisher,
‘The Ethics of Intervention’, Survival, 36 (1994), 51–9; Farer, ‘Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Intervention’, 215–17; M. Fixdal and D. Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just
War’, Mershon International Studies Review, 42:2 (1998), 296–9.
41 R. B. Lillich, ‘Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights’, Iowa Law Review, 53
(1967–68), 53; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 101–4; Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian
Intervention’, 238–9.
42 Hoffmann, ‘The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention’, 44; Fixdal and Smith,
‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, 301–2.
43 M. Ignatieff, ‘The Seductiveness of Moral Disgust’, Social Research, 62:1 (1995), 78.
44 G. Levy, ‘The Case for Humanitarian Intervention’, Orbis, 37:4 (1993), 624; A. Roberts,
‘The Crisis in U.S. Peacekeeping’, Survival, 36 (1994), 109.
45 Fixdal and Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, 305; Farer, ‘Cosmopolitan
Humanitarian Intervention’, 219; B. Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’,
International Political Science Review, 18:1 (1997), 67.
46 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Rescue’, 56–7, 61; Hoffmann, ‘The Politics and Ethics of Military
Intervention’, 41, 43.
47 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Rescue’, 58–9; Hendrickson, ‘In Defense of Realism’, 46.
48 Hassan, ‘Realpolitik in International Law’, 910.
49 Fixdal and Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, 291–2; A. Coates, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Conflict of Traditions’, in T. Nardin and M. S. Williams (eds),
Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 62–3.
50 J. B. Hehir, ‘Expanding Military Intervention: Promise or Peril?’, Social Research, 62:1
(1995), 46–8; Fixdal and Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, 283–312;
Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention’, 550–67; Thakur, ‘Outlook’, 332–3;
G. Reichberg and H. Syse, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Case of Offensive Force?’,
Security Dialogue, 33:3 (2002), 309–22; J. Boyle, ‘Traditional Just War Theory and
Humanitarian Intervention’, in Nardin and Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention,
31–57.
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