Chapter 5
Enabling and Supporting Irregular
Migration
Despite widespread efforts to stop irregular migration, it continues; and irregular
migrants remain present in societies, often finding alternative modes of inclusion.
However, irregular migrants are not alone. It is essential to recognise that a variety
of intermediaries enable irregular migration. Between states, we can observe a complex interplay among ‘facilitating’ or ‘enabling’ actors that enable or facilitate irregular migration and include human smugglers, who provide services that help
migrants cross borders. Human smuggling has become big business, not least
because governments increasingly aim to restrict (irregular) migration. The consequential commercialisation of migration, in which people help migrants cross borders to make a profit, has been termed the ‘migration industry’ (Andersson, 2014;
Schapendonk, 2018). Likewise, other scholars have observed the ‘illegality industry’, i.e., the industry created around border security (Andersson, 2016).
However, to a large extent, irregular migration is also enabled within states. It is
so not least because a substantial number of irregular migrants cross borders legally,
but their presence becomes ‘irregular’ when they ‘overstay’ their visa. Within states,
supporters of irregular migrants play a prominent role in the interplay between
migrants and states. These supporters act in favour of migrants and respond to their
practical and social needs. They can be seen as belonging in the broader category of
migrant intermediaries (Ambrosini, 2017; see Chap. 3). Because irregular migrants
most often cannot depend on help provided by the state or local public authorities
(see also Chap. 3), most of the help given to them is informal (Ambrosini, 2016).
Irregular migrants rely more on their ‘network’ than do those who are regular (Bloch
et al., 2009); and those with a strong network generally fare better than those
without one.
This chapter will first discuss how border crossing is enabled and supported. It
will describe the variety of actors that support irregular migrants in (receiving) societies. Moreover, it will dwell on these actors’ various motivations for supporting
irregular migrants. Lastly, it will elaborate on how these actions to support irregular
migrants relate to the state.
© The Author(s) 2023
M. Ambrosini, M. H. J. Hajer, Irregular Migration, IMISCOE Research Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30838-3_5
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5.1 Actors Enabling Irregular Border Crossing
Through Smuggling
In order to become irregular migrants, people have to cross borders. Their border
crossing often has to be enabled by third parties. Western states increasingly make
it more difficult for an ever-larger group of migrants to enter their territories legally,
thus creating a ‘market’ for human smugglers who enable border crossing because
reliance on smugglers is a necessity in many places. This ‘migration industry’
shapes mobility patterns before, during, and even after migration (Alpes, 2012;
Cranston, 2016; Schiller & Çağlar, 2009; Spaan & Hillmann, 2013). Triandafyllidou
(2018) describes the relationship between restrictive border policies and human
smugglers as a vicious circle where restrictions make migration ‘irregular’, increasing the risks and costs of migration, as well as the dependence of migrants on human
smugglers. This leads to more advanced methods of circumventing border controls
which trigger more restrictions and border controls. According to estimates by the
US Border Patrol, 80 to 95% of the migrants apprehended at the US-Mexican border in 2015 had been helped by a smuggler to cross the border. This is confirmed by
data from the Mexican Migration Project, which show the involvement of smugglers in almost 90% of cases in 2017. In Europe, the border agency Frontex reports –
on the basis of voluntary interviews with newly-arrived migrants – that 84% of the
latter had used a smuggler to arrive in Italy, Greece, or Spain (Campana &
Gelsthorpe, 2021: 5–6; Sanchez, 2018).
Migrant smugglers are often portrayed as criminals who “exploit the desperation
and vulnerability of migrants” (Europol, 2016, as cited in Siegel, 2019: 104), or as
“ruthless criminal networks [that] organise the journeys of large numbers of
migrants desperate to reach the EU. They make substantial gains while putting the
migrants’ lives at risk” (European Commission, 2015:1, as cited in Siegel, 2019:
104). In this way, smugglers are portrayed – by governmental reports and certain
scholars alike – as violent and evil criminals who do not care about the suffering of
the migrants that they are transporting, or even semi-kidnap them, and who treat
migrants much like other illicit goods that can be smuggled, such as drugs (Siegel,
2019: 107–108). However, one wonders whether this is not a too one-sided picture.
Amidst the discourse on criminalisation and the many negative aspects of migrant
routes and irregular border crossings, it is important not to base one’s understanding
solely on reports written from the perspective of crime or criminology. Many social
scientists have sought to nuance the image of irregular border crossing and those
who help migrants cross borders irregularly. For instance, they show how border
crossing has increasingly become irregular because the means to migrate legally are
increasingly limited (see, for instance, Spener, 2009). Providing this nuance, however, remains problematic. The graphic images of migrant smuggling conveyed by
the global news media, ranging from dead migrants in unventilated and unrefrigerated trucks in both the USA and the EU to dead children washed up on beaches on
both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, are so horrible that contextualisation of smuggling and the role of smugglers within the contemporary restrictive and punitive
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migration regimes is a delicate endeavour (Zhang et al., 2018; Sanchez, 2017). One
way to tackle this difficulty is to collect empirical data on who smugglers are and
how they work.
First and foremost, it is important to differentiate between smuggling and trafficking – instead of equating the former with the latter – in order to understand the
role of migrant smugglers (Carling, 2006). This also shines a different light on the
binary relation between migrant enablers and migrants. The relation is not between
a predator and a victim; rather, it is one in which both are active agents in the migration journey. As the objective of (irregular) migrants is to migrate, smugglers can be
considered important helpers; the dynamic between migrants and smugglers may
therefore be also viewed as a supply-demand relation, rather than one of pure
exploitation. Instead of referring to two distinctly different phenomena, the terms
‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ are often used interchangeably to refer to the facilitation of irregular border crossing, especially in everyday language. Moreover, these
concepts are subject to debate within academic studies. The Protocol against
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea defines smuggling as: “the intentional
procurement for profit of the ‘illegal’ entry of a person into and/or ‘illegal’ residence in a state of which the person is not a national or permanent resident”. In other
words, smuggling involves a smuggler who enables border crossing, a form of payment, and the migrants’ voluntary participation in this arrangement (Van Liempt,
2018: 140). Likewise, Campana and Gelsthorpe (2021) explain smuggling as a form
of illegal trade where the illegal entry into a country is traded; where trafficking is a
form of illegal trade in which the control over a person is traded (Campana &
Gelsthorpe, 2021: 7–8; see also, Campana & Varese, 2016). On the basis of this
definition, we can draw a distinction between smuggling and trafficking: the most
significant difference is that smuggling involves voluntary participation, while trafficking involves victimhood. Another factor is time. Smuggling only concerns the
time required for the border crossing. Instead, with trafficking the time during which
traffickers have control over ‘migrants’, or better victims of trafficking, is prolonged
even after they have reached their destination.
However, this distinction assumes a clear-cut dividing line between what is voluntary and what is forced. The reality of migrant mobility and border crossing is
much fuzzier. Since irregular migrants are dependent on smugglers for their migration, they often have only a few choices about who will make their journey possible.
Calling this choice ‘voluntary’ may not be to use the right word. Moreover, migrants
who are smuggled, and are voluntary participants in the smuggling, can be coerced,
taken hostage, punished by their smuggler during their journey (Van Liempt, 2018;
see also, Baird, 2014; Gallagher, 2002), making the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary mobility difficult to demarcate. Human trafficking is, for instance,
often associated with (forced) prostitution. In this case, women are transported over
borders, much like ‘human cargo’ (Hartman, 1997), to be forced to work in the sex
industry. And while there certainly are scenarios in which this occurs in an entirely
involuntary manner, there are many other imaginable scenarios in which there is a
combination of voluntary and involuntary aspects. It may also happen that people
purposefully and voluntarily leave their country of origin but become trafficked and
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exploited for prostitution, or exploited in other ways, at a later stage or along the
way (Andrijasevic, 2010; Van Liempt, 2007). Moreover, Freedman (2016) describes
how women and sexual minorities with insufficient means to pay for their journey
can use transactional sexual relations to move along smuggling routes. The distinction between smuggling and trafficking is both complex and important, because
equating smuggling with trafficking paints a biased picture of the actual activities of
those actors that make border crossing possible. In this chapter on the enabling of
irregular migration, we will focus on forms of smuggling.
Smuggling occurs in various forms, of which Fig. 5.1 provides a visual
representation.
The best-known form of smuggling is the practice of helping those who want to
migrate irregularly to cross borders physically. Migrants can either organise individual border-crossings directly with the border-crossing executors or use a middleman. Migrants who do not have much financial capacity, or those who only need to
cross one border, tend to arrange their journey directly with a smuggler. While many
scholars contest the prevailing image of smuggling as involving pyramid-shaped,
centrally organised, mafia-style criminal organisations (see, for instance, Demir
et al., 2017, or Paus, 2021), a collaboration between smugglers in order to organise
longer smuggling trajectories certainly occurs. In this way, smugglers collaborate
with other smugglers or connect through a middleman in order to be able to guarantee a longer journey to migrants, sometimes with multiple borders to cross.
However, while physical assistance during border crossings may be the bestknown form of smuggling, it is most certainly not the only one. A large part of
smuggling, especially for wealthier migrants, occurs through documents and is performed with ordinary means of transport like commercial aeroplanes. This smuggling through documents can be divided into various subcategories. A first division
can be made between genuine visas or travel documents and fake ones. When being
smuggled with fake documents, migrants board regular planes, buses or boats, using
Fig. 5.1 The various forms of migrant smuggling
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forged passports or visas or real passports that belong to someone else. The act of
smuggling consists of arranging these fake documents directly or through middlemen. Those who forge passports and visas or sell their passport to prospective
migrants can be seen as smuggling enablers. However, smuggling can also happen
with real, not forged, travel documents; the smuggling aspect here lies in the mismatch between the application for a visa and the actual purpose of the journey. In
this case, middlemen arrange the documentation for a visa application using contacts in a destination county or a third country. In this form of smuggling, visa
applications are often made in a third country, For instance, in the case of Europe,
any country in the Schengen zone can issue visas for the entire Schengen area, but
obtaining a visa for some countries is easier than for others (Neske, 2006: 142). For
visa applications, one often needs an invitation. Migrants can arrange this themselves when they, for instance, have a family member that can invite them for a
family visit and act as a guarantor, even when the actual purpose of the journey will
be to migrate irregularly by overstaying the visa. As described in Chap. 2, overstaying a visa is the most common way to become an irregular migrant. Another way to
obtain a visa can be to use an intermediary who arranges a fake invitation or a fake
tourism trip to the target country. They can, for instance, organise fake business trips
in collaboration with local businesses in the target country or book a series of hotels
to make the tourist application plausible (Neske, 2006). Citizens in the target country enable this form of smuggling but do not necessarily have to be conscious participants in the smuggling.
On the basis of these types of smuggling, we can identify three kinds of roles that
actors have in the smuggling process. Firstly, there are those who execute the physical act of smuggling, also known as passeurs, pilots, or coyotes. These are the people that one often thinks of when considering smugglers because they actually
accompany migrants during the border crossing. They are usually people with
extensive knowledge of the geographical area that must be crossed, and they are
trained to cross, and to guide people across, rugged terrain. They are, for example,
former soldiers, shepherds in the case of land crossings, fishermen in the case of sea
crossings.
Secondly, there are brokers or middlemen. These people connect the ‘demand’
for human smuggling to the ‘supply’ of smugglers. In other words, they connect
would-be migrants with the smuggling services available. For instance, they connect migrants to passeurs who will help them to cross the border physically, or
arrange for forged documents by connecting migrants with various types of document forgers. Moreover, because smuggling with visas is gaining importance, these
middlemen have an important role in connecting the various aspects of a (fake or
semi-fake) visa application.
Thirdly, there are enabling services. These comprise all the services that make
the smuggling process possible: for instance, financial services, document forgers,
or the organisation of safehouses and food for smuggled migrants en route.
Smuggling is a business that has to be paid, and a facilitating service can therefore
make these financial transactions possible. These transactions often happen covertly
and informally out of necessity because states and institutions that want to combat
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smuggling know that blocking the cash flow from migrants to smugglers is one way
to make smuggling more difficult.1 Belloni, for instance, describes the case of
Eritrean Hawala, the financial agents of an informal money-transfer system who
function as informal financial middlemen between (prospective) migrants and their
family, and smugglers. The Hawala on the migrants’ side transfers money to the
Hawala on the smugglers’ side, and because Hawala are often shop-owners who
are therefore already involved in trade activities, they can arrange these informal
transactions within a regular trade transaction (Belloni, 2019: 108). These types of
financial middlemen have been described in other contexts, where they are used to
pay smugglers but, perhaps more importantly, to send remittances to the family left
behind after migration: for instance, cashiers in Turkey (Içduygu & Toktas, 2002)
moneychangers in Pakistan (Koser, 2008), Xawilaad in Somalia (Lindley, 2010).
Another enabling service can be the provision of passports and visas, and documents that might be needed for a visa application like birth certificates and school
diplomas. The example of document forgers shows that there can be a grey area
between an enabling service and brokerage. These forgers can arrange false documents for middlemen, but, as Alpes reports, they can also target prospective migrants
directly, for instance, with flyers at internet cafes or on university campuses (Alpes,
2017: 310).
Although the business of migrant smuggling seems to be rather male-dominated,
women play a role as well. The involvement of women in the smuggling process
mainly consists in its enabling. Sanchez describes how women recruit customers,
negotiate fees or draw up payment plans. They are sometimes the people that withdraw the payment from banks or money wire shops. They also play an essential role
in maintaining safe houses where migrants can be sheltered en route and in the
provision of food and water along the way (Sanchez, 2016: 388).
As the above demonstrates, there are different forms of smuggling in which different types of smugglers play different roles. The popular image of migrant smugglers often portrays ‘organised crime groups’ (OCGs) or mafia-like organisations,
of evil criminals who smuggle migrants only to make large profits and do not care
about the fate of the people that pay them to cross borders. However, given the findings of empirical, often qualitative, studies, this picture should be nuanced. Starting
from the organisational structure, scholars have observed empirically that smuggling most often does not occur in large OCGs, but can best be seen as involving a
network of different smugglers, since “even the most structured form of a human
smuggling network when compared to an organisational structure would only take
the form of a decentralised, loosely coupled organisation” (Paus, 2021: 177).
Moreover, while smugglers are certainly not all Good Samaritans, nor are they all
ruthless and only profit driven. Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli describe how smugglers
are often otherwise ordinary people, often have a migrant background, and often
come from the same communities as the people that they smuggle (Zhang et al.,
1
Moreover, informal money transfer services have been targeted because authorities believe they
are used to finance terrorism (Cook & Smith, 2011).
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2018). Sometimes, smugglers are migrants themselves who act as enablers in
exchange for a discount on their journey (Sanchez, 2015, 2017).
Moreover, most smugglers, or smuggling enablers, are not violent. Because
smugglers often come from the same communities and are sometimes even friends,
relatives, or acquaintances of the migrants they assist, they are often subject to some
form of social control. In other words, smugglers can have social and moral obligations to their families and communities to provide a reliable and safe service for
those who want to cross borders (Zhang et al., 2018). Hence, instead of malicious
people, smugglers can also be seen as figures of trust within their communities.
Zhang (2007) describes how Chinese migrants in the USA sometimes see their
smugglers as philanthropists. Maher (2018) describes how, in Senegal, smugglers
are often seen as respected and trusted members of the community of (potential)
migrants. Likewise, Belloni reports the case of Eritrean smugglers that are not only
seen as trusted persons but also actively try to maintain this trust. Smugglers do their
best to protect the migrants in their care from, for instance, kidnappers in the Sinai
desert, and they take pride in the safe passage of their customers (Belloni, 2019:
112–113).
Trust, reputation, and personal relationships are important to understand smuggling (Siegel, 2019: 108). This can be deduced not just from who smugglers are but
also from how they work. While the voluntariness of choices is still a difficult issue,
as described above, within their ability, migrants can be observed (trying) to carefully consider their options when deciding with which smuggler to migrate (see, for
instance, Van Liempt & Doomernik, 2006; Alpes, 2012). Personal contacts and
word-of-mouth information are major determinants of this choice (Campana &
Gelsthorpe, 2021). Therefore, smugglers have an incentive to provide a good service to migrants to guarantee work in the future. Spener (2004), in his study on
‘coyotes’ on the Mexico-US border, shows how smugglers/coyotes have an important role in keeping migrants safe en route because their business model is based on
providing a successful passage. This is because when migrants choose a coyote to
entrust with their border crossing, they often rely on the coyote’s proven record of
safe trips organised, about which family or community members who have already
migrated inform them (Spener, 2004: 310). Some (rare) survey studies on migrant
smuggling confirm this. Sanchez et al. (2018) show that of 686 surveyed migrants
who crossed from Libya to Italy, almost three-quarters used personal contacts to
find the most trusted source of information regarding border crossing. The study by
Slack and Martinez (2018) shows how, of the 655 migrants surveyed on the
Mexico-US border, 53% stated that someone they knew had put them in contact
with their smuggler.
Scholars have therefore sought to describe the field of migrant smuggling in
terms of demand and supply. In the accounts of irregular migrants, smugglers are
seen as supportive, important enablers of their journey in the case of the Mexico-US
border (Sanchez, 2018), or as important helpers, not as criminals, in the case of
migrants on Lesbos, Greece (Siegel, 2019). In the end, smugglers provide a service
for which there is great demand, not least because of restrictive border regimes. As
the opportunities to migrate regularly have decreased over time, people also rely on
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smugglers to cross borders to escape warzones. Although the border crossing might
be considered irregular in this case, this does not necessarily turn the migrants
crossing the border into irregular migrants. Migrants can cross borders irregularly
but then apply for asylum, for instance, which may grant them legal stay in the
country that they have entered irregularly.
5.2
NGOs and Irregular Border Crossing
Another aspect of the debate regarding migrants’ irregular border crossing and the
support that migrants receive while crossing borders is the role of non governmental organisations (NGOs). Debate on this issue is perhaps most prominent in
regard to search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean Sea, for
instance by the German NGO Sea-Watch or the Spanish NGO Open Arms, both
of which are national NGOs operating internationally and in international waters.
These NGOs used to have relatively good collaboration with coastguards, who
coordinated SAR operations according to the vessels closest to a potential emergency, whether it was a coastguard ship or an NGO one. But when in 2018 the
Italian government stopped accepting responsibility for SAR and started to deny
NGO vessels access to Italian ports, the cooperation began to fail (Cusumano &
Villa, 2021; Cuttitta, 2020). On the basis of this lays a change in how the activities
of NGOs in the Mediterranean are viewed. The image of SAR NGOs was subject
to change because they were targeted by nationalist and right-wing anti-migration
campaigns, which influenced the position of politicians and governments with
regard to the activities of NGOs. Cusumano and Villa (2021) describe how NGOs
that rescue migrants at sea were initially seen as ‘angels’ because of the number
of lives saved by their activities. However, due to this change in attitude regarding
SAR NGOs, they became increasingly stigmatised and criminalised and were
accused of functioning as ‘sea taxis’ and ‘vice smugglers’ because of their alleged
aiding and abetting of illegal migration. A notorious case is that of Carola Rackete,
the captain of the ‘Sea-Watch 3’ ship, who was arrested in 2019 and then prosecuted by the Italian authorities for having forced a blockade by the Italian Navy in
order to disembark people rescued at sea in the harbour of Lampedusa. Allsopp
et al. (2021) describe how, by defining migrant smuggling not in terms of how
smugglers benefit from enabling border crossing but by emphasising the violation
of borders of nation-states, NGOs can become seen as smugglers (Allsopp et al.,
2021: 66–67) because they de facto make this irregular border crossing possible.
The subsequent policing of SAR NGOs at sea, and other civil society organisations (CSOs) and even individual citizens on land, has been referred to as ‘policing humanitarianism’ (see, for instance, Carrera et al., 2019). This policing has
escalated from creating suspicion, intimidation, and harassment of NGOs, and it
has even led to the criminal prosecution of NGOs for their alleged involvement in
illegal migration. An important argument put forward is that the presence of rescue vessels is a ‘pull factor’ for illegal migration (Cusumano & Villa, 2021: 24).
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Another of the main accusations is that not only do NGOs SAR activities not
reduce deaths at sea but that the actions of NGOs have actually increased the
number of deaths, because the presence of rescue vessels encourages smugglers
to force migrants to embark on unseaworthy boats (see, for instance, Deiana et al.,
2019; Heller & Pezzani, 2018). This discourse, which paints a negative picture of
NGOs, fails to mention the actions of governments in this matter. For instance, the
increasing use of rubber dinghies could well be the (unintended) by-product of
states’ attempts to fight smugglers by sinking their wooden or iron boats so that
they cannot be re-used, thereby making rubber boats more economically sustainable (Cusumano & Villa, 2021: 35; Heller & Pezzani, 2018).
These different frames and discourses regarding borders and border-crossing
make borders a political issue. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that, while
irregular migrants who cross borders irregularly and consequently end up on these
boats in the Mediterranean may be the most visible form of irregular migration, they
are not representative of the phenomenon of irregular migration as a whole. As seen
in Chap. 2, many irregular migrants use legal entryways and become irregular, for
instance, when they overstay their visa. This shows the difference between irregular
entry and irregular stay (see, for instance, De Haas, 2008). Irregular migration in
this manner requires different competencies and different enablers. The Global
North has increasingly tightened its physical borders and the administrative borders
of visa applications for many people in the Global South. Border crossing to become
irregular migrants has to be enabled by different actors. Instead of ‘traditional
smugglers’, this type of border crossing is made possible by, for example, travel
agencies, employment brokers, passport or visa forgers (Sanchez, 2017) – but also
by family members who can, for instance, act as a guarantor. Alternatively, other
actors and agencies can help potential migrants circumvent the ‘Paper Curtain’ of
highly problematic and seemingly impossible visa applications (Lavenex & Ucerer,
2004) by applicants in the Global South (Van Wijk, 2010).
5.3
Supporters of Irregular Migrants in Society
After irregular migrants have arrived in the host country, they often continue to need
support. There are numerous ways in which irregular migrants can require help and
assistance, and therefore numerous ways in which actors in the receiving society
can help them. As a general overview, Ambrosini (2016) describes five ways in
which these intermediaries can help irregular migrants. They can help through connection, acting as bridges between the irregular migrants and various parts of the
receiving society, for instance, the labour market. They can provide services to
irregular migrants, for instance, medical care outside the state welfare system. They
can give help by resolving basic yet fundamental needs, such as providing food or
clothes to those who do not have them. They can support irregular migrants through
their tolerance by turning a ‘blind eye’ to the irregular migration status. Moreover,
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these supporters can help irregular migrants by applying political pressure and
encouraging the state to change its stance on issues related to irregular migration or
the policies that target irregular migrants (Ambrosini, 2016: 4–6). The following
sub-section will outline how NGOs and CSOs, co-ethnic networks, social movements and activist networks, municipalities, as well as some specific professions,
provide support to irregular migrants.
5.3.1
Civil Society
A first, and fundamental, entity that supports irregular migrants in the societies in
which they live irregularly is civil society. A variety of civil society actors are
involved in the reception and integration of migrants. CSOs are often service providers to those in the most marginal positions in society, like irregular migrants.
Besides performing SAR operations, non-state actors provide a myriad of services
and other forms of ‘poor-relief’ (see, for instance, Ambrosini, 2016; Hajer &
Ambrosini, 2020; Leerkes, 2016; Panebianco, 2021). Civil society, and especially
NGOs, have become the primary healthcare providers for immigrants who do not
live in reception centres.
Moreover, the voluntary work of healthcare professionals has become a key nonmonetary input to the organisation of healthcare services for immigrants
(Bozorgmehr et al., 2019). In addition, civil society has become an essential provider of shelter to irregular migrants in need (Van der Leun & Bouter, 2015). In
other words, CSOs have become especially important actors compensating for the
restricted access that irregular migrants have to social rights (Laubenthal, 2011:
1363). They can compensate for the exclusion of irregular migrants by providing
services. When they have high levels of organisation and professionalisation, CSOs
are able to provide these services on a professional and long-term basis.
Furthermore, civil society can help negotiate the access of irregular migrants to
public services. Schweitzer (2022), for example, points out how NGOs in Barcelona
and London play a significant role in mediating the access to public services for
irregular migrants, who are sometimes formally entitled to public services but
unable to access them due to difficulties with bureaucratic procedures. Moreover,
CSOs can help with the integration of (irregular) migrants into receiving societies;
for example, through language classes organised by NGOs but also by social movements and grassroots initiatives (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016; Hoppe-Seyler, 2020).
Moreover, civil society can function as a watchdog for democratic values in general when it addresses issues related to the fate of irregular migrants. For this purpose, CSOs can use various lobbying and advocacy strategies towards governments.
CSOs like trade unions can, for instance, lobby for the regularisation of irregular
workers. Moreover, CSOs can lobby the government to uphold the human rights of
irregular migrants. Laubenthal (2011) describes how the Catholic Church in
Germany tries to use its influence to ‘remind’, and essentially lobby, government
and policymakers of the human rights of (irregular) migrants hoping that they will
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grant them access to certain social rights. The same has occurred in the USA, where
Christian churches have played a key role in defending migrants’ rights (Hondagneu
Sotelo, 2006).
Moreover, CSOs can have an important role in promoting the cause of irregular
migrants for the ‘general public’. Tazreiter (2017), for instance, describes the advocacy strategies of Australian CSOs that addressed the violation of the human rights
of irregular migrants, mainly those stuck on the islands of Manus and Nauru. They
sought to remedy these violations by collaborating with international organisations,
like the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), as well as international
media to pressure the Australian government to change its policy. In this case, CSOs
also had a task in promoting the issue of human rights of irregular migrants to the
broader public, which, as Tazreiter describes, largely tended to agree with the
restrictive government policy. CSOs can use both their professional competencies,
such as their specialised legal expertise, and their practical experience with irregular
migrants to help improve their situation.
5.3.2
Co-ethnic Networks
Irregular migrants are excluded from formal support structures. They therefore rely
on informal support networks to both ‘get by’ and ‘get ahead’. This informal support is often found within networks of (extended) family members and co-ethnics
(Bloch et al., 2014; Bloch & McKay, 2016). Whether irregular migrants manage to
establish a life in irregular conditions largely depends on whether they are able to
construct a network of people who can function as ‘brokers’ that connect them to
receiving societies (Faist, 2014). This network can be helpful in finding a place to
live or a job in the informal economy (see, for instance, Van Meeteren et al., 2009).
Hence, it may be said that “having a reliable contact in the receiving society pays
more than a high school diploma” (Ambrosini, 2016: 7). Moreover, irregular
migrants often find employment in their co-ethnic networks, because potential
employers also tend to resort to their co-ethnic networks to find employees (Bloch
& McKay, 2015; Jones et al., 2006). For irregular migrants, it is often important to
be able to rely on close contacts like family members or close friends, who can support them in the case of a temporary setback. For instance, irregular migrants by
definition in general work irregularly. Therefore, they lack both employment protection and forms of employment-related social security. Being able to rely on friends
and family members’ proximity is often needed to feel secure.
However, the flipside of this importance of co-ethnic networks is that the constraints that induce irregular migrants to rely on their co-ethnic networks also keep
them within those networks (Sigona, 2012). As various scholars have shown, the
more constraints there are for irregular migrants, the further irregular labour is
pushed underground and deeper into immigrant circles (see, for instance, Bloch &
McKay, 2016). Especially irregular migrants who do not speak the host country’s
language and work within their co-ethnic network are prone to exploitation (Bloch,
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2013: 384). McIlwaine shows in a study on Latin American migrants in London that
40% of them experienced problems in the workplace, and that those who were irregular were most vulnerable to forms of abuse, like not getting paid, as well as verbal
abuse (McIlwaine, 2015: 507). The strong dependence of irregular migrants on coethnic networks can hinder their contact with the broader society, essentially ‘trapping’ them inside those networks (Bloch & McKay, 2015).
5.3.3
Social Movements and Activist Networks
Besides many of the actors traditionally involved in supporting irregular migrants,
social movements and activist networks have also become significant actors in the
support of irregular migration. While previously more focused on ‘traditional political action’, like demonstrations, activists have started to provide more practical support to irregular migrants in recent years. How activists make help to migrants an
integral part of their political mission has been conceptualised as ‘direct social
action’ (Zamponi, 2017). Here, the political mission is carried out by directly influencing the issues that are considered to be unjust, instead of, or in addition to, making claims to a government, for instance. The resulting networks of help and services
provided by community initiatives and activist groups can be referred to as ‘welfare
from below’ (Montagna, 2006). Squatting and the support of informal settlements
of irregular migrants have become vital ways in which activists support irregular
migrants, because they are often formally or practically excluded from the housing
market. Social movements, squatters’ movements, and activists play a crucial role
in these squats and camps (Belloni, 2016; Grazioli, 2017; Pogliano & Ponzo, 2019;
Raimondi, 2019; Sandri, 2018). In Italy and Greece, but also in other countries such
as the Netherlands, social movements have occupied empty buildings to host homeless migrants, often irregular, rejected asylum seekers, and other people in need of
accommodation (Hajer, 2021). Moreover, these actors can also organise services
ranging from legal advice to medical care and language classes for irregular migrants
in these squats or camps (Belloni, 2016; Hajer & Ambrosini, 2020). Lastly, as will
be the focus of Chap. 6, activists have a crucial role in the political mobilisation of
irregular migrants who want to express themselves politically.
5.3.4
Municipalities
Chapter 3 already touched upon the unique role that certain municipalities have in
influencing the life conditions of irregular migrants. Even though municipalities are
part of the state, they sometimes adopt a rather different stance on irregular migration. Municipalities, and mayors in particular, are charged with the practical governing of cities. Therefore, the municipalities are confronted, on a practical level, with
those who are excluded from state provisions on the national level. For instance,
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while national governments can decide to exclude irregular migrants from welfare
provisions like public healthcare, local-level governments are confronted with sick
people who are not allowed to visit a doctor. Likewise, the national government may
decide to block irregular migrants’ access to housing, but the local governments are
confronted with homeless irregular migrants, or illegal dormitories in poor conditions. These different viewpoints on practical matters can cause municipal policy to
differ from national policy (Spencer & Triandafyllidou, 2020).
Perhaps the most telling example of this are the cities that have declared themselves Sanctuary Cities, as described in Chap. 3. However, also cities that are not
sanctuary cities, or do not even have a political profile that usually aligns with a
pro-migrant stance, can be observed to be more inclusive than national policies.
Moreover, street-level bureaucrats can have, and use, some discretionary power to
help irregular migrants beyond their formal professional mandate. While their official job is to execute government policy, which can be very strict and exclusionary
towards irregular migrants, these bureaucrats can help irregular migrants by interpreting policies in ways that are less strict or exclusionary when they deem it necessary (Schweitzer, 2022). Especially professionals who comply with a professional
code, such as doctors, teachers, school managers, can try to find possible favourable
interpretations of the rules, establish exceptions, and avoid careful controls, in order
to allow access to services when they are confronted with irregular immigrants and
their many practical problems (Van der Leun, 2006). They can use their power “to
cheat honestly” the state (Zincone, 1999).
5.3.5
Employers, Medical Professionals
and Legal Intermediaries
Besides the various categories of actors described above, we can identify some professions that can be of importance to irregular migrants: business owners and other
kinds of employers of irregular migrants, medical professionals, and legal
intermediaries.
Employers
The way in which employers help irregular migrants is a delicate discussion. On the
one hand, employers provide irregular migrants with an income that they otherwise
would not have. Yet, on the other hand, employment in the underground economy is
unregulated and can easily lead to situations of exploitation (see Ambrosini, 2018;
Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012). Moreover, as Van der Leun and Kloosterman
(2006) show in the case of the Netherlands, the increased restriction of labour
opportunities for irregular migrants since the late 1990s has pushed these forms of
unauthorised labour further underground, making it even easier to exploit the weak
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social position of irregular migrants. Waite and Lewis (2017) call the participation
of irregular migrants in exploitative employment arrangements ‘survival-oriented
labouring’. However, also in this case, irregular migrants are not just passive victims
of exploitation. Even when exploitative, employment in this form can be a conscious choice because it is, for instance, better than unemployment. Alternatively,
even if the job does not pay a great deal, irregular migrants can earn some money.
Schewel (2021), for instance, writes when describing the migration motivations of
young Ethiopian women who want to work as domestic workers in the Middle East,
how the vast majority of them are aware of the risks of labour exploitation, especially of irregular migrants employed as domestic workers, before they leave.
Moreover, employers can be an essential bridge between irregular migrants and
society. An example of this is the particular case of migrant domestic workers and
care workers in Southern Europe, who develop close relationships with their
employers due to the intimate nature of this type of work. Although asymmetric and
often unfair, these relationships are characterised by complex forms of affective and
economic reciprocity, which can be beneficial to irregular workers (see, for instance,
Näre, 2011). Employers are observed to help their workers to learn the language,
access services, financially support their relatives (Artero et al., 2021). Decisive is
their choice to regularise their stay, when periodic amnesties give them this opportunity, especially in Italy (Ambrosini, 2022).
Medical Professionals
Medical professionals are another essential category of supporters of irregular
migrants; after all, everyone can fall ill. Moreover, people living in marginal conditions, like many irregular migrants, may be even more at risk of illness and, therefore, more in need of medical care than others. Irregular migrants often do not have
the same access to medical care as citizens. Consequently, Bendixen (2018)
describes how, in the case of Norway, the exclusion of irregular migrants from medical care is an integral part of the migration policy intended to discourage irregular
stay in the country. The same can be said for other Northern European countries. An
exception to this rule is usually medical care for conditions that are a risk to public
health, sexually transmitted diseases, or highly infectious diseases like tuberculosis.
Moreover, the inclusion of (irregular) migrants in health care, and specifically vaccination campaigns, is already a struggle in normal times. The Covid-19 pandemic
prompted governments to devise strategies to include irregular migrants in health
care and in the vaccination campaigns (see Armochida et al., 2021), even if only to
prevent the spread of the virus. Likewise, regularisation programmes started during
the pandemic, such as those in Italy and Portugal, were partially set up to grant
access to irregular migrant workers to the healthcare system (e.g., Bonizzoni &
Hajer, 2022; Mazzilli, 2022). Another exception, as also mentioned in Chap. 3, is
emergency care, which is generally accessible in one way or another. Doctors have
sworn the Hippocratic oath and are required to provide medical care to all those in
need. Yet, as Wilmes (2011) writes, hospitals and other healthcare institutions have
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to find ways to cover the costs that accompany the care for the uninsured or otherwise excluded from a country’s social welfare provision. Consequently, medical
staff can be, or feel, pressured into treating only financially secure patients. Or,
health institutions report their irregular patients in the hope of receiving a (partial)
reimbursement for the costs of their care. This can lead to a hesitancy to seek, or
self-exclusion from, medical care by irregular migrants (Wilmes, 2011: 126–127).
Gómez Cervantes and Menjívar (2020) describe the formal exclusion of irregular
migrants from health care as a vicious circle. The exclusion from health care and the
fear that healthcare institutions will report them to the authorities prevent irregular
migrants from seeking care; yet this protracted situation of stress and fear makes
them ill at the same time. In their case study of irregular Latino immigrants in
Kansas, USA, Gómez Cervantes and Menjívar describe how this leads such immigrants to seek health care in informal networks of indigenous medicine and selfmedication because of a lack of other options, especially in rural parts of Kansas
(Gómez Cervantes & Menjívar, 2020). The extent to which irregular migrants can
access formal health care, as well as the extent to which fears of formal healthcare
institutions are justified, depends on a combination of migration policy (see Chap.
3) and differences in welfare regimes. Echeverría (2020), for instance, describes
how pregnant Ecuadorian irregular migrants living in the Netherlands go to Spain to
have their babies because in the Netherlands they would be charged the full costs of
their maternity care, while this is free in Spain also for irregular migrants (Echeverría,
2020: 217–218).
In any case, NGOs and CSOs, have an important role in medical care for irregular migrants. The World Health Organisation calls NGOs and CSOs “valued partners of the WHO Europe, who play a crucial role in providing health care for
refugees and migrants” (WHO, 2019: 1). NGOs and CSOs educate irregular
migrants about their right to health care, help them access state services, transport
them to medical appointments or pay for transportation, or even organise (nonurgent) medical care themselves (see, for instance, Hintjens et al., 2018; Ambrosini,
2015; Castañeda, 2013; Hajer & Ambrosini, 2020; Schweitzer, 2022; Wilmes, 2011).
Besides NGOs and CSOs, medical professionals themselves can play an important role. Bendixen (2020) describes the practice of irregular migrants in Norway to
seek out doctors and other medical professionals with names that they believe indicate an immigrant background, as they consider them more likely to be sensitive to
the particular problems of irregular migrants and less likely to report them to the
authorities (Bendixen, 2020: 493). A simple practice with which physicians can
make an important difference is ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’, in other words, not to ask
for formal identification or proof of legal residence (see, for instance, Castañeda,
2013; Miklavcic, 2011; Bendixen, 2018). This ‘turning a blind eye’ to formal rules
that exclude irregular migrants from health care makes medical professionals
important supporters.
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Legal Intermediaries
Irregular migrants are often excluded from, or have difficulty in accessing, basic
rights such as education for their children or medical care. Moreover, they risk alien
detention or may want to regularise their irregular status. For this purpose, they may
need help from the law. One type of intermediary that warrants special attention is
the ‘legal intermediary’, which is a term often used to denote lawyers or other legal
professionals that help mediate transactions among citizens, government agents,
and organisations (Lejeune & Orianne, 2014: 225). The activities of legal intermediaries that aim to influence law or policy are often described as cause lawyering or
legal activism. The term cause lawyering denotes the activity of socially engaged
lawyers who select their cases and clients according to the “broader stakes of litigation” (Scheingold, 1998: 118). Their aim is to use the law to achieve social change
(Menkel-Meadow, 1998: 38) by connecting “law to morality” (Sarat & Scheingold,
1998: 3). ‘Legal activism’ refers to the activities of lawyers, and other legal experts,
who use their expertise to achieve political ends and base their strategies on the
political goals that they wish to attain (Kawar, 2015: 19). Lawyers can, for instance,
use strategic litigation as an advocacy tool when they bring cases to court in the
hope of achieving a result that goes beyond the specific interests of the parties
involved in the case and is focused on the public interest instead (Roa & Klugman,
2014: 31). While most of the socio-legal literature on legal intermediaries deals with
legal professionals, some scholars describe how non-legal intermediaries also play
a role in “shaping legal consciousness” (Pélisse, 2019: 121). Civil-society actors,
for instance, play an important role in framing social problems, in legal terms, as
rights violations (Roa & Klugman, 2014: 31). An interesting example of strategic
litigation for irregular migrants in Europe has been the ‘bed, bath and bread’ ruling
of the European Committee for Social Rights. Here, CSOs brought a legal case
against the state of the Netherlands, claiming that it should grant access to fundamental social rights also to those without formal authorisation to reside in a country,
in the hope of creating a legal precedent (see, for instance, Roodenburg, 2019; Kalir,
2017). The subsequent ruling stipulated that the state, in this case the Netherlands,
should grant access at least to shelter and food. The legal precedent determined the
provision of ‘bed, bath, and bed’ to all irregular migrants in the country, not just
those involved in the case. In this manner, we can consider legal intermediaries to
be important supporters of irregular migrants.
5.4
Reasons to Support Irregular Migrants
A question that might arise while reading the above is: why do these diverse actors
help irregular migrants? There is no straightforward answer to this question, because
the vast array of actors and activities have a multitude of reasons and motivations.
Reasons to help irregular migrants are often a combination of idealistic, religious,
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and political motives, sometimes mixed with personal and utilitarian interests
(Ambrosini, 2015). In other words, these reasons can be both societal and personal.
This could, for example, be related to literature that has investigated why people
participate in social movements. The social movement literature maintains that participation can be instrumental when actors expect that the benefit they will receive
will be greater than the cost of protesting. People can participate because they derive
some sort of collective identity from their participation. Or, because they are susceptible to group-anger, or public outrage, regarding a particular political issue.
Alternatively, they participate out of ideological motivations. This may occur when
people want to adhere to a specific ideology, but it may also occur when people want
to address that an opponent had violated their values (Stekelenburg et al., 2011: 92).
Following this line of thought, people helping irregular migrants also have a variety
of reasons and motivations that may be directly linked to the cause of irregular
migrants but may also derive from other aspects of volunteering. Some see their
volunteering as a way to be connected with like-minded people or to have a shared
experience (see, for instance, Feischmidt & Zakariás, 2019). For instance, some
retired doctors that provide free medical care to irregular migrants see it as an
opportunity to remain professionally active and maintain the social identity that
comes with that (Ambrosini, 2015). Sometimes, people do not have clearly formulated motivations but say they ‘simply had to do something’ or ‘simply wanted to
help’ (Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019: 300). Clearly, some motivations count more for
some categories of intermediaries than for others. Social movements, for instance,
may see political goals and opportunities in their help for migrants, while initiatives
by churches to help migrants may be motivated by their faith and ideas of charity.
We could say that migrant smugglers are primarily driven by financial gain
because enabling border crossing has become an important industry. Yet this financial gain does not necessarily only benefit (criminal) smuggling organisations.
Molenaar (2017) describes how, while counterproductive in the long term, smuggling networks in Niger provide important economic resources, especially for
young people. Smuggling creates financial opportunities in both the formal and
informal economy, sustaining and contributing to people’s livelihoods
(Molenaar, 2017).
Providing support to people in co-ethnic networks can also have a variety of
reasons. They may range from seeing economic opportunities to employ, or even
exploit, newly arrived co-ethnics, through feelings of solidarity for those who face
the same difficult circumstances as the already-arrived migrants, to moral obligations towards family members (Engbersen et al., 2006). Yet it can also be combined
with specific moments in time. Siruno (2021) describes, for instance, how a specific
Filipino notion of solidarity, bayanihan, among both documented and irregular
Filipino migrants in the Netherlands was an important motivation to start organising
food distribution during the Covid-19 pandemic. The respondents in Siruno’s study
stated that they felt specific solidarity towards their fellow countrymen and women,
saying that they believed that if they did not show solidarity within the Filipino
community, there would not be other people to express this kind of compassion and
organise help for irregular Filipino migrants in need.
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Moreover, researchers have written about how the ‘long summer of migration’ –
also referred to as ‘the migrant crisis of 2015’ – was characterised by grassroots
initiatives to welcome refugees. People who were previously uninvolved with volunteering for initiatives related to migrants and refugees became active for the cause
in this period. In the German case, this has been described as the Willkommenskultur
or culture of welcome. Karakayali and Kleist (2016) describe, based on a survey of
more than 400 people who volunteered with migrants in Germany, how an important motivation for volunteering is to ‘do something for society’, to make a difference. Almost half of the volunteers stated that media reports regarding the ‘migration
crisis’ were the reason that they became active as volunteers. Furthermore, older
volunteers more often had religious motivations for their voluntary work and indicated that they had people with a migration background in their social networks,
while the younger volunteers more often had ‘social closeness’ to the migrant population, meaning that either they themselves had a migration background or had
friends with one, and were not, or less, driven by religious motives. Fleischmann
and Steinhilper (2017) confirm these findings by highlighting that German citizens
committed to welcoming asylum seekers in 2015–2016 were mainly “ordinary citizens”, neither politically engaged nor involved in other forms of voluntary work.
They justified their commitment, in rather vague humanitarian terms, as a “humane
duty to people in need aimed at providing assistance and care in order to relieve
human suffering” (Fleischmann & Steinhilper, 2017: 19). Sutter (2017) describes
how volunteers in German welcome initiatives mainly provided practical help stemming from a ‘hands-on’ pragmatism or an ‘ethic of doing’. Yet, at the same time,
this help for migrants could be a response to (extreme) right-wing political sentiments in society (Sutter, 2017).
Fleischmann (2020) describes a similar tendency among volunteers, for whom
their voluntary work functioned as a way to express their disagreement with nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes and to show their support for a multicultural society. Volunteering, in these cases, was often a response to a hostile attitude towards
migrants in society. It could be seen as enacting a vision of how society should act
in a moment of ‘migrant crisis’: by supporting migrants, voluntary workers create
an alternative to the sometimes-hostile response to the arrival of migrants in society
(Fleischmann, 2020: 12–13). In other words, these forms of pro-migrant volunteering can be a response to right-wing anti-migrant sentiments and discourses in society (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016), or a way to express frustration with the
governmental approach to issues related to migrants and asylum seekers (Togral
Koca, 2016). Yet, what is surprising about these forms of volunteering is that many
of the volunteers interviewed stated that, even when they were motivated by these
‘alternative to right wing’ sentiments, they considered their activities to be neutral
and apolitical (see, for instance, Fleischmann, 2020; Fleischmann & Steinhilper,
2017; Karakayali, 2019; Sinatti, 2019; Schwiertz & Schwenken, 2020;
Parsanoglou, 2020).
According to Fleischmann and Steinhilper (2017) one of the explanations for this
could be that helping migrants has become more mainstream, in the sense that the
increase of volunteers that were previously uninvolved with migrant issues makes
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helping migrants a cause that is no longer solely the activity of religious charities or
political activists. As they observe, especially these newly involved volunteers tend
to avoid explicit political contextualisation (Fleischmann & Steinhilper, 2017).
They tend to view the forms of overt ‘political action’ in support of migrants as
destructive and unrealistic and prefer a ‘hands-on’ and practical approach to building a ‘better society’ (Fleischmann, 2020: 19). However, the dividing line between
what should be seen as political action and what should be seen just building a better
society is somewhat blurred (see, for instance, Feischmidt & Zakariás, 2019).
Moreover, as already mentioned, other scholars have defined this ‘directly transforming some specific aspects of society’ instead of ‘claiming something from the
state or other powerholders as forms of ‘direct social action’ (see Zamponi, 2017:
97) as a kind of political action.
Similarly, Sandri (2018) uses the term ‘volunteer humanitarianism’ to describe
how volunteers/activists see the connection between humanitarianism – specifically,
doing voluntary work in the refugee camp in Calais – and forms of protest against
institutional border securitisation practices. Vandevoordt and Verschraegen (2019)
instead describe a ‘subversive humanitarianism’: “a morally motivated set of actions
which acquires a political character not through the form in which these actions
manifest themselves, but through their implicit opposition to the ruling sociopolitical climate” (Vandevoordt & Verschraegen, 2019:105).
To account for this tension between practices of humanitarian volunteering and
its political meaning, we introduce the concept of ‘debordering solidarity’. This
expression refers to a vision and a rationale for action which extends concerns for
humans in distress beyond the conventional conception of national communities. It
disapproves of the idea that human rights are nationally bounded, and not universal,
and the idea that solidarity is due only to co-nationals, or related to state reasoning
and regulations. Debordering solidarity can also involve citizens not eager to engage
in (conventional) political struggles. Their practices can be inspired by the belief
that help should be given regardless of borders, both external and internal, and
therefore can be political in its debordering effects. It is therefore not the action that
is political in nature, because one can imagine a world in which saving human lives
at sea, or taking care of ill people, are not political acts or even acts of rebellion but
moral duties or acts of compassion. However, these actions become political because
they run counter to the fundamental exclusionary state logic, which includes citizens and some migrants and excludes others.
The next chapter will elaborate on this topic further. However, it is important to
recognise that the topic of (irregular) migration also works the other way around.
Some ‘ordinary’ and previously uninvolved citizens begin to mobilise in favour of
and help (irregular) migrants, while others move in the opposite direction and begin
to mobilise against the arrival of (irregular) migrants. Moreover, volunteers who are
primarily involved in giving practical help to irregular migrants and who see their
help as apolitical can be ‘accused’ of political action, when anti-migrant actors see
their (practical) help as transgressing borders and circumventing state sovereignty.
In turn, this can cause previously apolitical volunteers to see the political meaning
of their practical help.
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Supporters of Irregular Migrants Versus the State
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, those who help irregular migrants (can)
have a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the state. In the case of smugglers,
their activities go directly against the wishes of states that increasingly want to close
their borders. Other types of supporters provide practical help which irregular
migrants desperately need, and which is sometimes even fundamental for saving
their lives. Humanitarianism is often seen as “the provision of relief to victims of
human-made and natural disasters guided by principles of neutrality, impartiality,
and independence” (Barnett & Weiss, 2008: 3), or aid which enables survival
(Fassin, 2007: 510). Sometimes it is interpreted more broadly to include the promotion of human rights, democracy, development, or peace building (Barnett & Weiss,
2008). However, it is often defined as apolitical. Following the logic of ‘suffering
and compassion’ (Sciurba & Furri, 2018: 766) humanitarian aid is often seen as
doing what is morally right.
But a stream of literature has been critical of this apolitical interpretation of
humanitarianism within the academic literature. A common criticism is that humanitarianism focuses on relieving ‘symptoms’, i.e., the suffering, but it ignores, and
consequently does not address, the causes of suffering. Moreover, some argue that
remaining ‘neutral’ confirms existing power relations, and that therefore the humanitarian aid of non-state actors could be seen as cooperation with the exclusionary
practices of states. Some forms of support to irregular migrants could be interpreted
as reinforcing an oppressive order, as it reproduces inequalities or silences, intensifies, consolidates or aggravates conditions of exclusion and discrimination (see, for
instance, Ticktin, 2011; Fleischmann, 2020). Using the example of medical care for
irregular migrants, we can observe how the presence of non-state actors that provide
medical care can be of vital importance for irregular migrants who cannot access the
state healthcare system or encounter problems in accessing state facilities. As seen
above, if irregular migrants do not or cannot trust state facilities, medical services
by non-state actors can be crucial. However, a critical view of these serviceproviding NGOs and CSOs argues that, by taking over the state’s tasks, they ‘allow’
it to circumvent its responsibilities.
Because non-state actors provide, for instance, medical care, they could be seen
as responsible for maintaining a situation in which irregular migrants are excluded
from a right to health care. Moreover, because the needs of irregular migrants are
covered, states do not experience a negative (political) backlash for their ‘negligence’. However, despite the high numbers of deaths on borders globally, the negative backlash against the states that allow this deadly situation to continue comes
mostly from a minority. Cuttitta (2018) argues that when issues shift from the political sphere to the private one, in a process of ‘de-politicisation’, policies are often
portrayed as ‘natural’ occurrences to which there are no alternatives, removing the
possibility for debate, and therefore obscuring its political nature (Cuttitta, 2018).
Especially forms of emergency care that require immediate action to preserve
human life, like urgent medical treatment or SAR operations, can easily obscure the
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107
structural (political) causes of these emergencies (Cuttitta, 2018: 636). Moreover,
one can question whether it is morally and socially acceptable to let people die, or
be deprived of medical care, in order to hold governments responsible for the abandonment and exclusion of (irregular) migrants. This would mean using human
beings as weapons in a political struggle, even if it is for the right purposes.
Governments, on their side, have amply demonstrated their ability to escape the
blame for this loss of human life.
Subcontracting, the execution of state policies by NGOs, is often seen as a classic example of de-politicisation (Vandevoordt, 2019). It can also be argued that
those who support (irregular) migrants largely collaborate or even ‘work for’ the
state during their activities. CSOs, and especially NGOs, have acquired an important role in migration governance (Haselbacher, 2019). Because asylum and migration policies, in general, have been driven by an ‘organised non-responsibility’,
meaning that EU member states passed responsibilities to each other (Pries, 2018;
Vandevoordt 2019) during, and after, the 2015 ‘long summer of migration’ (Hess
et al., 2017), NGOs and CSOs that provided services to migrants filled this institutional gap. This can be interpreted as shifting responsibilities from the public sector
to the private sector (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018). The critical anthropology of
humanitarianism tends to see the activities of NGOs and volunteers as an expression
of depoliticised humanitarianism, which softens the consequences of repressive
policies against immigrants and asylum seekers (Fassin, 2012). According to Sözer
(2020: 2164), “contemporary humanitarianism is a product, a symptom and a suggested solution to neo-liberal political and economic transformation: it is neo-liberal
humanitarianism” (Sözer, 2020: 2164).
Moreover, as shown in Chap. 3, the services that non-state actors provide to
irregular migrants are sometimes financed, or at least subsidised, by states. Bendixen
(2018), for instance, describes how the Norwegian government declared the medical care of irregular migrants to be ‘unwanted’ but also ‘not illegal’, and at the same
time partially funded the organisations of volunteer doctors that provided this medical care to irregular migrants (Bendixen, 2018: 486). On the other hand, for states,
financing civil society to provide services to irregular migrants can be a pragmatic
solution that enables them to preserve their ‘internal borders’ yet simultaneously
provide some care that people need.
While some of those who support irregular migrants maintain an apolitical position, supporting irregular migrants can also be seen as (part of) a political mission,
or it may have political aspects that coexist with the apolitical aspects of the support.
As Cuttitta notes:
SAR NGOs … political-humanitarian intervention does not only increase SAR capacities
of governmental actors but is also able, to some extent, to condition and influence, to control and denounce the activities of the latter in international waters. (Cuttitta, 2018: 652)
In other words, the SAR activities of NGOs may be seen as tasks that ought to pertain to the state because they rescue people in need in the Mediterranean.
Nevertheless, in doing so, these NGOs can address and criticise states’ approach to
handling the issue of people drowning at sea. Humanitarianism in this sense, is not
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necessarily apolitical. While the initial aim of humanitarianism actors might be to
‘relieve immediate suffering’ with their actions, they also denounce states’ practices of exclusion. Cook (2011), for instance, describes the motivations of the US
citizens who appealed against the littering fines that they received for leaving water
bottles in the desert of the Mexico-US border in a project called ‘No More Deaths’.
Their stated reason for not paying the fine was that ‘humanitarian aid is never a
crime’. In challenging the charges against them, they intended to reshape and negotiate the law so that their humanitarian work would be recognised (Cook, 2011).
Humanitarianism’s connotation with political neutrality and the idea of ‘just doing
good’ or ‘just saving lives’ can be ways to criticise the authorities (see also, Leebaw,
2007) in a more indirect way. The NGO Sea-Watch, for instance, writes thus on its
website about its participation in the #safepassage campaign: “With our actions we
advocate for the creation of safe and legal escape routes. Until then, there must be a
common European sea rescue operation to prevent further deaths” (Sea-Watch, n.d.).
Moreover, various scholars have shown empirically how forms of practical support can have or convey a political message simultaneously. By defining what is
‘political’ more broadly than what is traditionally seen as political action – for
instance, demonstrations – these scholars show how support for (irregular) migrants
becomes political “by enacting alternative modes of togetherness and belonging on
the ground” (Fleischmann, 2020: 18, emphasis in the original). In other words, by
supporting irregular migrants, supporters can express their disagreement with government actors or policies that exclude them; by showing alternative ways to interact with irregular migrants, they contest with their solidarity (Fleischmann, 2020).
Moreover, as with debordering solidarity, activists and volunteers can contest policies of asylum and borders in practice by helping migrants even without aiming to
achieve profound political changes and without sharing the ideology and rules of
conduct of big humanitarian agencies. As shown by well-known cases, such as
Cédric Herrou in France or Carola Rackete in Italy, against a polarised political
backdrop humanitarian support can quickly assume a political meaning.
5.6
Enabling Irregular Migration: Including
the Excluded (Conclusion)
This chapter has shown that all the stages of irregular migration are somehow
enabled or supported. Irregular migration is a complex process in which various
actors are involved, each with its own goals and motivations. Perhaps the most visible aspect of irregular migration is the migration itself, where, nowadays, attempts
to cross borders are frequently countered with attempts to repel migrants. This visible representation of hostility towards immigrants and of their exclusion creates a
‘border spectacle’ (De Genova, 2013) which is clearly visible in the attempts to
discredit, or even criminalise, NGOs’ search and rescue operations, for example, in
References
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the Mediterranean. Likewise, smugglers are often portrayed in popular discourse as
malicious criminals that traffic migrants as part of their criminal enterprise.
In most instances, smuggling may best be seen as a business and therefore as part
of the ‘migration industry’. There is a demand for help to cross borders irregularly
in this business. Such demand stems from the increasing difficulty faced by migrants
to cross borders legally; the services that enable border crossing meet this demand.
Therefore, it is important to remember that part of this business model is the success
stories of migrants that have managed to cross borders safely; smugglers have a
vested interest in enabling safe passage. Moreover, instead of criminals, people
often see smugglers as trusted figures in their community. However, amid all this
attention paid to the visible ‘spectacle of borders’, it is also important to remember
both that most irregular migration occurs after border crossing because it takes the
form of visa overstaying (see also Chap. 2), and that large part of the enabling of
irregular migration therefore occurs within receiving societies.
Because irregular migrants are formally excluded from state support, their assistance is provided by private actors. The main actors are co-ethnic networks, NGOs
and other CSOs, social movements and activist networks, and some municipalities.
Moreover, this chapter has also shown how specific professions – namely employers, medical professionals, and legal intermediaries – provide support to irregular
migrants. Together, these actors allow irregular migrants to live their lives in host
societies even if they are not formally recognised. Actors involved in enabling irregular migration have a wide variety of motivations to enable irregular migration.
Smugglers may be wanting to earn money. Employers may only be looking for
cheap labour, but they might also be motivated to hire an irregular migrant out of
solidarity or because of a felt connection with them due to the same ethnic background. Moreover, activists may help irregular migrants out of political conviction
or as part of a larger struggle against the violation of human rights, racism, or even
against the government in general. However, it is interesting to observe how this
help can take the same form _– the provision of shelter, food and clothes, for
instance – as the help given to irregular migrants out of humanitarian concern or
charity. As described with the concept of ‘debordering solidarity’, both outright
political motivations and those driven by humanitarian concern can be political in
their effect of countering the process of bordering and exclusion.
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