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1987, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
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4 pages
1 file
Mention "free-market economics" to a member of the lay public and chances are that if he has heard the term at all, he identifies it completely with the name Milton Friedman. For several years, Professor Friedman has won continuing honors from the press and the profession alike, and a school of Friedmanites and "monetarists" has arisen in seeming challenge to the Keynesian orthodoxy.
The review cites the “Open Society” twice in its title—and is clearly pro-Popperian—but then fails to mention the fourteen-point list, and surrounding discussion, that explicitly compares Popper’s critical rationalism with anarcho-libertarianism (strong similarities) and liberal democracy (strong dissimilarities); EfL, pp.135-142. If the review had engaged more closely with the arguments of EfL and been more informed by the relevant social scientific literature, then it would probably have found the anarcho-libertarian case to be far more robust and realistic than such a cursory dismissal can hope to refute.
The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism
The Review of Austrian Economics, 2013
Critical Review, 1998
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1988
No one can quarrel with the requirement that the budget plan should be designed to maximize social welfare… Musgrave and Peacock (1958, ix) At first sight it might be argued that anyone who set himself up as a judge and wished to establish standards for the distribution of expenditure or amounts of revenue different from those approved by Parliament, must belong to one of three categories: either he must be mentally the equal of that average intelligence [in Parliament], in which case he could not arrive at a different judgment; or he must be inferior to it, in which case his opinion would be less reliable; or he must be superior to it, which could not be proved. Pantaleoni (1883, 17) Economic journals continue to publish a steady stream of articles dealing with the public sector. Readers familiar with this literature will notice a crucial difference however. The field is passing through a transitional phase. A central paradigm – the model of the social planner – is losing its long-...
The Philosophical Review, 1992
lead of Ronald Dworkin in identifying liberalism with the view that "political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life." 1 Thus, the goods recognized by a political and moral order may only be the goods of the members of that order, marshalled in some fair way behind public institutions. Appeals to a supposed "absolute" good, standing over and above every individual and over which no individual has any choice or authority, or over which only an elite class has such choice or authority, are ruled out. Thus the liberal must justify principles, policies and institutions, to any person affected by them, by showing that person they are for his or her good as seen by that person; or at any rate, that only the goods of others persons as seen by those other persons can be appealed to in argument purporting to justify those policies, together with some sufficient reason, as seen by that person, for permitting his or her interests to be outweighed for that purpose by those of the others. In this sense (and only this sense), we may accept Dworkin's dictum that for the liberal, everyone counts and moreover counts, in some sense needing to be further explained, equally. The alleged goods of unanalyzed groups, for instance, or of the universe at large, will not do, any more than the whims or even the earnest ideological proclivities of some privileged class. David Gauthier does not use the term 'liberal' in this context, but he presents what we may regard as an excellent statement of the idea nevertheless: "In saying that an essentially just society is neutral with respect to the aims of its members, we deny that justice is linked to any substantive conceptions of what is good, either for the indivdiual or for society. A just society has no aim beyond those given in the preferences of its members." 2 A conservative view, by contrast, does invoke precisely such a conception, insisting that the individual must sacrifice his or her own interests to this august purpose. Alternatively, the conservative will have it that the individual's own interests really are quite other than the individual in question thinks they are, irrespective of inclination or belief to the contrary, adding that policy is to be guided by his "real" or "true" interests, rather than the shallow conception of those interests held by the individual concerned. On the liberal view, every individual has a realm over which he or she is the absolute monarch. Dworkin's usage departs from a frequent employment of these expressions in which they refer to the relation of the view or policy in question to current practice: if it departs substantially, it is said to be "liberal"; if it purports to uphold that practice, or perhaps its "underlying principles", then it is conservative. Conservatives, in this usage, are opposed to change, whereas liberals are in favor of change. Plainly that can't be all there is to it in any case, for we would want, usually, to distinguish between liberal changes and "reactionary" changes-changes "forward" vs. changes "backward". Plainly that requires that in addition to signifying change or the lack of it, some further idea is intended. Moreover, this usage becomes confusing when the society in question is, for example, a liberal society and has been for a long time-such as the United States, which may reasonably be thought of as the world's oldest liberal society. What does a "conservative" in this sense advocate in, say, America? Or in the Soviet Union-which some seem to want to classify as "liberal" in some sense, though only, I suppose, because it is on the "left". The point is that this sense of the terms doesn't correlate with anything of conceptual interest. We want to know, not whether to support the status quo or not, but why we should or should not do so. Nobody, I hope, thinks that any and all change is necessarily for the better, nor again that it is necessarily for the worse. Some may, however, think that we owe a duty of loyalty to our roots, our origins, the society that reared us, etc.; and if they also think that this is our supreme duty, or that because of this we have no rights against the state, then we indeed have a form of Conservatism in the sense here discussed. It is typical for conservatives in this sense, however, to be opposed to changes within their society that clearly have a wide social base of support. They have to think, then, that the "society" or "state" to which our fundamental allegience is owed may not be simply identical with the one we happen to live in. The two have this in common, though: both hold that there is an entity which we must respect simply because it is the locus, as it were, of ultimate authority. But whereas conservatives identify this locus with the State or the larger society or the like, liberals identify it with the individual person, as he or she may be, here and now. Or at least with the person insofar as rationally accessible to others: my reasonable concern with you cannot follow you all the way into the possibly incomprehensible, hidden recesses of your soul. But it can, I believe, follow you far enough so that the rest of your soul can meditate in peace. Why be a liberal? That is an important and profound issue, which we will in effect be grappling with in part Two of this book. Is it possible, really, to be a liberal? That will in part be a concern in Part I and now. Liberalism requires a certain impartiality, as Thomas Nagel has pointed out in a superb recent essay, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy". 3 It says that only individuals' values count, and it says that none of them count, as such, for more than any others'. Thus the poorest beggar has rights which the richest and most powerful must respect, and the intellectual nonentity has ideas which, however lacking in any shred of rational merit, he is nevertheless entitled to hold, even when those ideas are flatly inconsistent with one's own obviously superior ones. This raises the question whether one can be sincerely liberal. Must a liberal deny the truth of liberalism when dealing with someone of a different political hue? This is an important question, to which the answer is happily in the affirmative, once we see what is involved. The liberal need not deny the truth of liberalism in that or any context; but her liberalism requires her to move over and accomodate the conservative and radical nevertheless-not because their views are true, nor even because they are equally as true as one's own (they aren't, after all); but rather, because they are entitled to hold them; their right to hold their views is to be respected just because the views are theirs. Further implicit attachment to and explicit articulation of this outlook will be found throughout these pages. But the reader is referred to Nagel's brilliant essay for an insightful account of the issue in its own right. Right, Left, Centre This is a good place to enter an initial complaint about the use of the terms 'left', 'right', and 'centre' in current political discussions. The usage implies that there is a single spectrum along which any particular packet of political views may be located. Are you in favor of free trade and against high import duties? This, apparently, puts you on the "right". Are you in favor of extending the franchise in South Africa to black persons? That is, apparently, "left". And if you favor both, then what? What if you disapprove of socialism (that puts you on the "right") but also disapprove of dictatorships (which puts you on the "left"-unless the dictatorships in question happen to be Marxist, in which case, somehow, your disapproval now puts you back with the "right")? Plainly, this usage is futile. Liberal Individualism as One Kind of Conservatism people in general matter to everybody. Clearly there are those who have no aversion to restricting the liberty of others. It seems much more plausible, though, to say that the liberty of each rational being matters to that rational being: Smith's liberty matters to Smith, and in general the liberty of person A, matters to A. 1 And why is this more plausible? Because not to be at liberty is to be unable to do what we want to do, to achieve our ends, to realize our values-in short, to live, in this or that respect, our lives. This must matter as much as, and because, those wants, ends, and values-those lives-matter. Liberty is essential. But we will go no farther with such reflections at this point. Liberty and Autonomy Recent writers have made much of the idea of autonomy as an important, indeed perhaps fundamental, concept in the moral arena. The emphasis is on self-directedness, as the term implies (in Latin): the "autonomous" individual is self-directed. Lawrence Haworth expounds a particularly clear and perspicuous account of this elusive concept 2. On his analysis there are, in brief, three traits necessary for autonomy: (1) competence (2) procedural independence (not just borrowing one's motivations straight from others) (3) self-control (not being exclusively subject to one's passions and impulses-acting reflectively, with ability to choose whether one will follow a given impulse or not). The second is self-rule visa -vis others-as distinct from other-rule; the third is self-rule visa-vis oneself-as distinct from rule by one's "baser elements" (not Haworth's term); he, not just his passions, is in charge. 3 These traits are independent and each necessary. The necessity of "procedural" independence, that is, of thinking for oneself and not simply acting on others' directives or desires with no further mental processing of one's own, is obvious. Regarding the others two, Haworth points out that "No amount of competence can make up for a tendency to yield to every impulse; no amount of independence can compensate for inability to carry out the simplest projects." 4 He sums up as...
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