North Waziristan: The Death Trap

December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” North Waziristan: The Death Trap Stirring the hornet’s nest may lead to more instability and insecurity in Pakistan INTRODUCTION On December 16th, 2010, President Obama’s White House released an abridged summary of its Review of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Expected to report sufficient progress to allow the US to begin a modest pullout of troops in July 2011, the review - based on a series of Pentagon benchmarks and assessments - is at odds with a separate report by US intelligence services and clandestine sources that paints a gloomier picture about the war's progress. Michael Hughes called it “a self-fulfilling Afghanistan war assessment devoid of any substantial feedback from native Afghans and one wholly disconnected from the objective reality of retrogressing conditions on the ground”1. In retrospect, US President Barack Obama confirmed that the review represented a fundamental rethink of US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat an “increasingly perilous” situation. As such, both Pakistan and Afghanistan said they “welcomed” the new strategy2. To achieve its goals, Mr. Obama said, the US needed a “stronger, smarter and more comprehensive strategy”, and to recognize the connection between the future prospects of Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially because of the fact that both are shared homes of the Pukhtun population. Part of this reviewed Af-Pak strategy also entails a drawdown not only of US military personnel engaged in combat activities in Afghanistan, but also of clandestine operatives, and bolstering unconventional technologies like drone surveillance and drone attacks against militants and their safe havens. This is in line with an escalation in drone attacks in 2010 – there have been more drone attacks this year than from 2004 to 2009 all inclusive – that have gone beyond the regular Waziristan areas and now target even Khyber agency. By December 17th, 2010, nearly 60 people had died in a series of rare attacks by US drones in Pakistan's Khyber region3. Due to sensitive security environment in the area, it could not be confirmed how many militants and how many innocent civilians were killed. 1 White House Afghan review divorced from war’s brutal reality US rethinks Afghanistan strategy 3 Scores die as drones renew attack on Pakistan's Khyber 2 Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 1 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” FATA IN THE “AF-PAK” CONTEXT Pakistan’s autonomous tribal areas have long been regarded as marginally governed swathes of territory with an intensely religious constituency ‘shackled’ by a tribal mindset. The truth of the matter is that Pakistan never sent its military forces or its traditional civilian infrastructure in these areas out of respect for the local customs and traditions of the fiercely conservative Pakhtun tribes. These tribals have ethnic and familial linkages that transcend colonial constructions like the Durand Line, and their military prowess is known to the British, the Soviets, and also the Indians, who were repulsed by FATA tribesmen from Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the 1948 war – a time when the Pakistan Army chief, Gen. Douglas Gracey, refused to send British-trained Pakistani troops to fight British-trained Indian troops occupying Jammu & Kashmir state. This respect and autonomy has long been confused as ridicule and isolation, but this misunderstanding and confusion is inevitably borne out of a Westernized mindset which cannot even understand the Pakhtun man’s affinity to his weapon, and cannot correlate it to a woman’s affinity to Figure 1 - Taliban Spillover in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Courtesy: BBC News Online – May 12, 2009 her jewelry. “It is not often understood that even in a turbulent agency like Waziristan, where the tribal confederations are often irate and radicalized, there are several tribes, subtribes, and tribal leaders of extended families who oppose al-Qaeda and the Taliban insurgency and are willing to cooperate with the Pakistani government if it can provide them with effective security and protection”4. Afghanistan has had Pakhtun kings for 200 years, and Afghanistan is as much the Pakhtun homeland as Pakistan is – there is no other reason why Pakistan would accommodate upwards 4 “Pakistan and the War on Terror” by Ashley J. Tellis (2008). Page 43-44. Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 2 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” of 3 million Afghan refugees during the Soviet invasion – and there is reason to believe that additional refugee populations have been created by the effects of the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan’s operations in the tribal areas and refugee-inhabited cities, towns and villages. As a result of the 2001 invasion, and subsequent ethnic reconfiguration in Afghanistan’s corridors of power, the Americans know that despite any withdrawal(s) in 2011 and/or 2014, the US will inevitably be involved in any future Afghan civil war, ostensibly to preserve, protect and defend the minority Uzbek/Tajik Northern Alliance dispensation that is currently in power. It is high time that the US stops being construed as a foreign invader meddling in Afghanistan’s internal problems and continuing civil war, and acknowledges that it is time to talk peace and negotiate with the Taliban who control most of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan – now referred to as the “Pashtun heartland”5 – and are now slowly advancing into the previously peaceful North and North-West. Just as it is fallacious to lump together all militant factions and Afghan freedom fighters into a monolithic “Taliban”, it is also preposterous to believe that these fighters can be defeated on their home ground, or that their allegiance or linkages to Al Qaeda’s ideologically motivated commanders cannot be replaced by the overarching ethos of national identity and pride in a free and sovereign homeland. If the US/NATO/ISAF combine and President Karzai do not talk to the Taliban, or to Hekmatyar, or to the Haqqani’s, they will keep on talking to Al Qaeda and creating nuisances directly for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and indirectly for the United States. Such a distinction is necessary because – as in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal – the United States can easily ‘pack up and leave’, while the Afghans and Pakistanis can’t. This is the very reason why Pakistan presented overtures of peace through equal negotiating terms to the militants operating in areas like Swat, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. Those peace deals were not ceding Pakistan’s authority as much as they were validating the opinion that these elements are not trustworthy and – if the need arises – will pose a direct Figure 2 - The Pashtun Ethnic Group and existential challenge to the Pakistani state itself. Courtesy: Heritage Foundation 5 Partitioning Afghanistan Is a Terrible Idea Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 3 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” Maintaining ‘lines of contact’ with these militants is only a means of gathering intelligence and deterring such nefarious designs against the Pakistani state – it is again preposterous to assume that the same suicide bombers attacking Pakistani military checkpoints and killing Pakistani soldiers and civilians are being sanctioned and deployed by Pakistan’s Army and ISI to Kabul or to Mumbai to gain some perverted measure of “strategic depth”. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister has affirmed that the concept of strategic depth – clarified by General Kiyani as ‘soft’ strategic depth – only implies a peaceful and sovereign Afghanistan where the rights and duties of all Afghans are equal, and which is non-aligned and “friendly” with Pakistan6. Foreign Minister Qureshi was careful to clarify and reiterate that Pakistan’s interpretation of “strategic depth” does not – and never did – imply the establishment of a puppet government in Kabul. The United States and her allies – which also includes Pakistan – should not make the same mistake, especially because such mistakes have grave spillover effects in Pakistan. THE NORTH WAZIRISTAN DEBATE – A BACKGROUND Ever since the United States and its NATO/ISAF allies conquered the settled areas of Afghanistan and set up shop in Kabul, a shortsighted mindset declared victory over the Taliban, and assumed that the capture or death of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri and the rest of the Al Qaeda network would follow suit. Yet Mullah Omar claimed that he was going into hiding, and would resurface later to fight for Afghanistan’s freedom. Between 2001 and 2006, Islamic fundamentalism and radical extremism became a hot topic around the world, and neither Muslim majority nations nor Western countries were safe from Muslim nationals who could become marginalized, or were encouraged to join fringe elements that struggled against any manner of oppression according to any definition of ‘us’ and ‘the other’. Inhabited mainly by the Utmanzai Wazirs and the Dawars, the Northern Waziristan area was a part of the Mughal Empire during Emperor Aurangzeb’s reign, and after its demise, they resisted the Sikh and Khalsa armies from Punjab in order to confirm their allegiance to Kabul and the Durrani Emperor. In 1849, the British settled in Bannu district, and 45 years later, they entered North Waziristan as well. What did they do when they came to this tribal region for the first time? They struck deals and made agreements with the tribes. The British also introduced a measure of modernity in the tribal areas; land recording systems, revenue administration systems, and so on. By 1910, North Waziristan became a formal British tribal agency. 6 Pak has no objection to India, Afghanistan ties: Qureshi Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 4 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” The first ‘insurgency’ in North Waziristan happened as a result of a Hindu-Muslim marriage quarrel in Bannu; incensed by the marriage of a Hindu girl to a Muslim male, the tribals rallied around one Mirza Ali Khan – the Faqir of Ipi – who declared war against the British, and conducted offensive guerilla operations against them till they left in 1947. While the Faqir died in 1960, he continued his opposition to Pakistan in his remaining years; despite the fact that the tribes had already decided in a Jirga to join Pakistan. It was not until 1954 that peace could be brought to North Waziristan by the personal surrender of the Faqir’s Commander in Chief, Mehar Dil, to the Deputy Comissioner of Bannu District. The political administration in North Waziristan is headed by a Political Agent who administers the region on behalf of the Federal Government (as opposed to the provincial KhyberPakhtunkhwa government). The administration is still carried out under redundant Frontier Crimes Regulations, and Customary Law which is open to interpretation as well as misuse in the absence of strict institutional controls. The North Waziristan Agency consists of three subdivisions and nine Tehsils, administered by political Tehsildars and political Naib-Tehsildars whose main duty is to “control the tribes” and maintain law and order within their own areas – in effect, their duties are not to serve the tribes, but to control them. This, along with the draconian FCR, is one of the most important reasons for tribal disdain against Pakistan – economic and social development can only follow political development, and the former without the latter will lead to greater inequality and greater isolation of the tribal masses. Land revenue administration in some parts of the agency continues to be carried on exactly on the same lines as in the settled districts of Pakistan. Some cases are decided by the tribes themselves through their elders who are known as Maliks and Motabars. The Maliki system introduced by British government was the same in North Waziristan Agency as functioning in other FATA. Maliks used to work as a medium between administration, and the Qaum or tribe. A Malik is a hereditary title and devolves on the son and his son so on, for which regular benefits and subsidies are sanctioned from time to time. One of the major reason why Al Qaeda was able to gain a foothold in this region was that it was successfully able to eliminate all the Maliks and their families, thereby wresting institutional control from them and vesting it into self-appointing Amir’s and Mujahid’s who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. As such, North Waziristan cannot be simply configured according to certain perceptions of modern state institutions or Western liberal secular values. North Waziristan and its inhabitants have their own rich cultural traditions and historical antecedents, and they must be cautiously and gradually accommodated into a localized political, economic and security solution for the Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 5 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” agency. It is not uncommon to hear that most tribesmen are armed; such a scenario makes a standing police force redundant. At the same time, having an irregular tribal militia or Lashkar perform security duties and police the area is also akin to surrendering the writ of the state – if such bodies are not appropriately formed and administered. NORTH WAZIRISTAN AND THE “EPICENTER OF TERRORISM” THE US WAR IN AFGHANISTAN When the US and its NATO/ISAF allies realized that the Taliban were not a conventional military phenomena, they suddenly understood the importance of referring to history (however late) and figuring out the modus operandi of the Mujahideen during the Soviet war. Utilizing the complex inter-linkages and connexion among Pakhtuns across the Durand Line, a ‘rear base’ was located in the FATA region for these terrorists. To fight the Jihad, the Taliban recruits simply crossed the Durand Line (i.e. Af-Pak border) into Afghanistan, created havoc in Southern and South-Eastern Afghanistan (i.e. the Pakhtun “heartland”), and when US technological supremacy and modern weaponry got the best of them, they melted away and retreated to their safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal area after brief pit-stops and detours through Afghanistan’s sprawling countryside and villages – areas which the US does not deem necessary to control, just like the Soviets. It is the villages and the tribal areas of Afghanistan that fall under NATO/ISAF jurisdiction, yet are still used by the Taliban (or their allies in the Afghan national resistance) as a staging area for attacks on foreign troops perceived as Figure 3 - The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan – 1979-1989 Courtesy: Wikimedia occupation forces. Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 6 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” Thankfully, President Obama’s strategy for this war – greatly unpopular back home in the US – has been multifaceted. A military approach must be balanced by a political, economic and diplomatic approach as well. Yet, the US Administration continues to support President Karzai’s corrupt and inefficient dispensation which is restricted to Kabul’s Green Zone precisely because the Pakhtuns have not been thoroughly taken on board. The US is yet to funnel in some major economic breakthroughs into Afghanistan – or into the RoZs (Reconstruction Opportunity Zones) in FATA, for that matter – because without offering an alternate vocation (or an alternate allegiance) to the ordinary Taliban footsoldier, the Petraeus COIN model – successful in Iraq but considered a “scorched earth” policy for Afghanistan – can never succeed. The late US Special Representative Richard Holbrooke was in charge of President Obama’s tenuous and tricky diplomatic mission to the region – an attempt at killing two birds with one stone that never worked. Holbrooke's death has made an already-precarious "Af-Pak" situation more deadly and uncertain; the Ambassador was efficiently – but ineffectively – managing Obama's Af-Pak objectives, which continued to be a difficult job but Ambassador Holbrooke "learnt the ropes" and understood regional political sensitivities. He also built great rapport with Pakistan and Afghanistan – something that will be difficult to build up again for his replacement, Mr. Ruggerio, especially after the Wikileaks fiasco. THE AFGHAN WAR SPILLING OVER INTO PAKISTAN While the US clamors for Pakistan to do more – more action on the ground against militants based in FATA, more pressure against Al Qaeda whether they are of Pakistani origin or not – the situation is restricted to US drone attacks on the tribal areas, as well as limited clear-hold-build operations by the Pakistan Army. The drone attacks issue transformed into a debacle when a tribesman, Karim Khan, initiated a case against one Jonathan Banks, allegedly the CIA Station Chief in Islamabad, for conducting drone attacks and killing innocent civilians. Rather haphazardly, the CIA chief was exfiltrated from Pakistan. Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org Figure 4 - FATA and the Afghan Border 7 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” President Obama – ostensibly having determined that a surge strategy akin to the one employed in Iraq will be suitable for Afghanistan since these both wars are just the War on Terror – has escalated drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas along with enhancing the scope of diplomatic engagement with Pakistan via the Strategic Dialogue, and the Af-Pak Review does include further political, military and financial sustenance. But following a gradual course in unusual circumstances is a Figure 5 - Attacks by US drones & Islamic militants between 2009 and 2010 grave mistake that cannot be Courtesy: BBC NEWS Online – 22 July, 2010 accepted. General McChrystal’s policies of restricting raids and military powers of NATO/ISAF that offended the Afghans were welcome strategies that definitely seemed to weaken the moral and social hold the native Taliban had over the average Afghan. The strategy of calculated and timely Special Forces action was also a maneuver developed after careful study of the ground realities and the most feasible solution available. However, General McChrystal’s departure has brought the battle-tested General Petraeus to the Afghan front, and the ground strategy has shifted in two of three measurements; NATO/ISAF forces are now re-empowered to defend themselves over and above the safety and security of the Afghans, and conduct night time raids so as to eliminate terrorist threats but also unwittingly defiling the honor of an Afghan home in the process. The calculated and surgical Special Forces action methodology is now going to be employed on a surge quantum – this means that between 2011 and 2014, regular troops and infantry forces can draw down while the remaining contingent consists mostly of NATO trainers and US Special Forces operatives. And despite the lessons of Operation Khanjar and Operation Anaconda, the continuing counterinsurgency doctrine is one of establishing battlefield superiority in enemy territory while they have the operational and logistical momentum. Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 8 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” DRONE WARFARE The use of unmanned drones (UAVs) for offensive operations is a double-edged sword for the Allied forces; on one end, they allow the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance and establish identity without compromising one’s friendly forces, and they also take out the enemy without any successful chance of retaliation, but on the other end, these technologies have not been able to demonstrate a quantum leap from the collateral damage issues and technical or systemic malfunction issues that many modern warfare technologies suffer from. That does not mean that Pakistan itself does not want to acquire this capability; US defense officials have said that Pakistan will be provided 12 RQ-7 Shadow UAVs, which seems to be the fulfillment of a longstanding demand by Pakistan. Figure 6 - Drone Strikes in Pakistan - 2004-2010 Courtesy: Long War Journal However, the RQ-7 A/B Shadow is an unarmed UAV, and as such it will only boost the Pakistan military’s reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations in the FATA areas. It will not grant the Pakistani military an enhanced capacity or greater resources to carry out an effective campaign in any militant infested area, whether it is a frontier region or a tribal agency. Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 9 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” In light of such operations, it is necessary that when the terrorists are forced to retreat from their strongholds in Afghanistan, they are not able to utilize the routes or ‘rat lines’ that lead to various safe havens in Pakistani territory. This is where the drone attacks strategy – and the escalating use of armed UAVs – plays a major role. While the federal political office-holders have declared their protestations over the drone attacks, as representatives of the general public, the following two outcomes are clear not only to the so-called ‘ruling elite’, but to all Pakistani; that Pakistan is not helpless in the face of cross-border aggression since some attempted helicopter raids have been repulsed in the past, and more importantly, that the armed drones eventually do end up killing those people who are planning attacks not in the United States, but in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even so, the last cross border raid led to closure of NATO logistics for ten days and destruction of cargo in stranded trucks because the Taliban went on a rampage and targeted the NATO supply routes throughout the road network that exists in Pakistan. Figure 7 - NATO Tankers on fire in Balochistan, Pakistan Courtesy: Express Tribune Nevertheless, the Pakistani Prime Minister has rightly stated that the drone attacks are counter-productive7 because they demonstrate the weakening writ of the Pakistani state – something the terrorists are also doing – and such unilateral actions by a foreign power inside sovereign Pakistani territory encourage people to join the ranks of the Taliban; as a result of collateral damage caused by drone strikes, people who previously have no grudge against the United States are attacked, their houses are destroyed, and their family members are killed, 7 US drone attacks counter-productive: Gilani Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 10 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” whether by chance or by accident. The aftermath of such tragedies is the recruiting boon for terrorist handlers and planners that must be dis-incentivized and ultimately restore civil defense and social infrastructure to such a level that remedial actions and safety measures can be taken immediately. Of the 212 strikes since 2004, 70% have hit targets in North Waziristan, and 24% have hit targets in South Waziristan8. On December 17, 2010, three drone strikes killed approximately 60 people in the Khyber agency9, and on December 27, two drone strikes in North Waziristan killed 18 alleged militants10. A study has shown that “only 30 Al-Qaeda operatives have perished in the last six years but more significantly 1266 civilians were killed and over 445 civilians were left injured to run a tally of 2.5% as the strike rate against the AlQaeda operatives”11. However, precisely because the US can achieve some of its objectives via unmanned drone operations, it is highly unlikely that the US would ever opt for “boots on the ground” in North Waziristan, even as a unilateral decision, because it would destabilize Pakistan thereby creating a very serious problem for the US. It will be considered an infringement of Pakistani sovereignty and would effectively end the strategic alliance even if the façade is maintained. Even though the Pakistan Armed Forces are unlikely to retaliate against the US, it remains evident that the unilateral US/NATO action would trigger asymmetric reaction against them in Afghanistan and FATA in turn. The only remaining scenario that can be considered is that the US and Pakistan operate together in North Waziristan – something that public opinion would never accept because Pakistan would end up completely alienating the Pakhtuns. This is mainly why The White House has denied that Afghanistan-based US forces are planning to conduct anti-militant ground raids across Pakistani territory12, and The Pentagon has denied media reports that the United States might launch ground operations inside FATA13. Figure 8 - The MQ-9 Reaper Courtesy: NewsRealBlog 8 Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2010 60 killed in year’s deadliest drone hit 10 Pakistan: suspected US drone strike against Taliban kills 18 11 Drone Attacks in Pakistan have a 2.5% strike rate against Al-Qaeda 12 US officials move to refute reports of cross-border attacks 13 Pakistan military best able to root out Fata militants: US 9 Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 11 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” CONTINUED FUTILITY Experts argue that the NATO military campaign is “suppressing, locally and temporarily, the symptoms of the disease, but fails to offer a cure”; military action may produce local and temporary improvements in security, but those improvements are neither going to last nor be replicable in the vast areas not garrisoned by western forces without “a political settlement”14. Afghanistan remains insecure, and classified UN assessments for March 2010 and October 2010 paint a dismal picture of the security situation as well as the outcome of aggressive military operations in troubled areas15. Figure 9 - Major Taliban Fighting Fronts in Afghanistan Courtesy: “Pakistan and the War on Terror” by Ashley J. Tellis (2008) THE PAKISTANI MILITARY IN THE WAR ON TERROR – 2007-2009 The United States Government has long been pushing Pakistan to send troops into North Waziristan, in what some judge as ‘pestering’, while others call it ‘gentle nudging’. President 14 15 Time for negotiation in Afghanistan U.N. Maps Out Afghan Security Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 12 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” Obama’s campaign statements can be recalled in this case; “if we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets” in Pakistan, and we tell the Pakistani government and military about it and they can’t or won’t act, then “we will”16. In 2006, the Pakistan government was desperately trying to bring peace in the volatile frontier region of FATA, and struck peace deals in North and South Waziristan. However, infighting between the Taliban ranks, as well as turf wars between the Taliban, their allies and other indigenous militias, led to an untenable situation. In 2007, Pakistan had already devised a new North Waziristan strategy which included military, political, administrative steps with heightened coordination among different departments and stakeholders in order to curb “Talibanization” and growing militancy in then-NWFP and FATA17. A detailed version of this plan18 entailed scaling up military operations and surveillance, strengthening law enforcement agencies, targeting militant commanders in particular, and fast-tracked recruitment of policemen in the then-NWFP. However, these actions were not put into play after the Lal Masjid siege in July 2008, when all ideologically fundamentalist militant groups with fresh throngs of religious zealots and fanatics declared holy war against the Pakistani state, a ‘puppet’ of the ‘infidel’ United States. While the siege was under way, Pakistani troops stationed in Waziristan came under fire – attacks on military convoys on July 14 and 15, 2007, resulted in the martyrdom of 41 soldiers and five civilians, while 101 were injured19. A Figure 10 - Taliban militants in Pakistan Courtesy: TopNews.in police headquarters in the area was also attacked by a suicide bomber, causing the martyrdom of 28 police officers and recruits and wounding 35 people. The Pakistani Army came under intense pressure after the Lal Masjid siege; its officers were targeted by hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombers even in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, while it was being labeled a ‘mercenary force in the pay of its imperialist master, the US’. This narrative is also evident in the debate over military intervention in North 16 Remarks of Senator Obama: The War We Need to Win Plan ready to curb militancy in Fata, settled areas 18 Pakistan’s new Waziristan strategy 19 Two Days of Homicide Attacks Kill 70 in Pakistan 17 Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 13 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” Waziristan, and specifically, how the US is encouraging Pakistan to do so. This event escalated the War on Terror in Pakistan, in comparison to all security assessments, evaluation of quantum and momentum of enemy forces in Afghanistan. The militants who had been using safe havens in Pakistan to launch attacks on Afghanistan now also busied themselves with attacking Pakistan. This war became Pakistan’s war; fighting these militants was in Pakistan’s interest. By 2010, when it had become clear to the various elements of the Taliban insurgency – as well as to other constituents of the Afghan national resistance – that the US/NATO/ISAF combine would eventually withdraw, the “Talibanization” movement picked up greater pace, and targeted coalition troops in Afghanistan and the Pakistan Army on the other side of the border with greater vigor and tenacity. On December 24, 2010, over a hundred Taliban militants attacked a military check post in Mohmand Agency, and the battle resulted in 24 militants killed and 11 Pakistan Army soldiers martyred20. The Pakistan Army moved in en-masse to North Waziristan after the Lal Masjid siege, and September 2007 witnessed escalating violence and commitment of greater resources by both sides to the battle in North Waziristan. By October 2007, the Pakistan Army was also engaged in Swat, despite suffering heavy personnel casualties in settled urban areas courtesy of the relentless suicide attacks carried out by the Taliban. In January 2008, the situation in South Waziristan also demanded military action as pro-Taliban militants overran Sararogha Fort. The Pakistan Army launched Operation Zalzala, sending in the 14 th Infantry Division to “flush out” militants affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud, the leader/emir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Army came in control of the area in just over three days, and thereafter focused operations onto the villages and outlying rural areas of the Agency. The operation, however, led to the displacement of over 200,000 tribesmen and their families, and the announcement for their repatriation has just been made in December 2010 with conditionalities involved regarding the security situation. In September 2008, Pakistani tribal elders raised a private army, or Lashkar, to fight the Taliban militants and restore peace. The Lashkar was approximately 30,000-strong and one of its first acts was to burn down the houses of the Taliban and their accomplices in Bajaur Agency. The mass displacement of tribals, as well as civilian casualties in the fight between the Army and the Taliban militants, were cited as the core reasons for raising the Lashkar and for the tribesmen taking matters into their own hands. While this strategy calls for measures akin to the 20 Eleven soldiers, 24 militants killed in Mohmand clashes Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 14 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” strengthening of Sunni Awakening groups in Iraq, US proposals for strengthening Pakistani Lashkars have not borne any fruit so far. The Pakistan Army’s stance regarding these proPakistan tribal Lashkars – as well as any estimation or calibration of intelligence operations in the areas where the Lashkars are dominant – remains unclear. In 2009, Pakistan authorized Operation Black Thunderstorm in Swat, aimed at retaking Swat, Buner, Lower Dir and Shangla, and eliminating militants from the area. In Operation Rah-e-Rast, the Army initiated maneuvers on May 5, 2009, to retake Swat after securing Buner and Lower Dir. By May 30, the Army had retaken Mingora from the Taliban, while sporadic fighting continued. According to the military, 128 soldiers were martyred and more than 1,475 alleged militants were killed. 317 soldiers were wounded during Operation Black Thunderstorm. 95 soldiers and policemen were captured by the militants and held hostage; 18 of them were recovered after rescue operations. 114 militants were captured, including some local commanders, and at least 23 of the militants killed were identified as foreigners. These military actions led to an eventual blockade of South Waziristan, so as to strangle Baitullah Mehsud’s control in the region and to stifle his supply lines. Operation Rah-i-Nijat (Road to Salvation) was launched on October 17, 2009, after a threemonth blockade that resulted in numerous battles and skirmishes, and hundreds of casualties on both sides. “The dramatic irruption of the Pakistani state into the FATA, through a significant military presence of the kind not seen in more than a century, resulted in making conditions sufficiently inhospitable for al- Qaeda such that its senior leadership and cadres were compelled to relocate under fire from South to Figure 11 – Operation Rah i Nijat in South Waziristan North Waziristan”21 in the first place; causing the Courtesy: BBC News – October 29, 2009 terrorists to move into the settled areas. The operation to invade and retake South Waziristan was dubbed “the mother of all battles”, with more than 28,000 infantry and airborne troops from the 50 th Airborne Division, the 7th and 9th 21 “Pakistan and the War on Terror” by Ashley J. Tellis (2008). Page 10. Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 15 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” Infantry Divisions of the XI Corps, and the 40th Infantry Division of the Army Reserve Center22 facing a rough estimate of between 7,000 to 20,000 Taliban militants aided by Uzbek militants in the thousands as well. By December 12, 2009, the military operation was over with the entire South Waziristan Agency under military control, but with none of the Taliban leaders captured. 594 Taliban militants were killed and 80 soldiers of the Pakistan Army were martyred during the ground offensive. Another 243 soldiers were wounded and 83 militants were captured. THE NORTH WAZIRISTAN OPERATION – AVOIDING THE DEATH TRAP WHAT TO DO? In light of all this battle experience, and the untold suffering and devastation that has been caused by militancy as well as reactive military operations in their response, the dominant view in Pakistan is to resist the knee-jerk reaction to invade North Waziristan. One of the most important determinants of any Pakistani military action in North Waziristan is the regional situation, especially the security situation of Afghanistan. A “regional approach is sine qua non to eliminate terrorists as Pakistan claims no Figure 12 – North and South Waziristan monopoly over the industry of Courtesy: BBC News – Via Zeitgeist Politics (Wordpress) terror” because terrorism pervades “every country in the region”23. Terrorism exists throughout South Asia – not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan – but also occurs in Iran and India, yet the blame is squarely put on Pakistan, 22 23 Order of Battle: Pakistani Military in FATA and Northwest Frontier Province Operation Rah-e-Nijat and beyond Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 16 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” which incidentally also suffers the most from terrorist attacks24. Pakistan “supports an Afghanled and inclusive reconciliation process in Afghanistan to pave the way for durable peace and stability in the war-torn country”, and does not want Afghanistan to become “a theatre of proxy wars”25. A recent Washington Post article rightly suggested that the end game in South Asia is far more important for Pakistan than any immediate tactical action whose results can be destabilizing. WHEN IS IT POSSIBLE? The Pakistan Army’s plans to launch a full-scale offensive in North Waziristan may hit further delays in light of resurgent Taliban attacks in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and South Waziristan agencies. Recent error strikes in Mohmand and Bajaur have indicated that areas already cleared by the military were still to be consolidated and secured, and unless that happens, it would be “impossible to rush into another campaign”26. Figure 13 - The Af-Pak Border Courtesy: Spearhead Research The Pakistan military can tackle North Waziristan only when FATA has been stabilized. The resurgence of violence in FATA and threatening resurgence of militants in Swat is the Taliban response to the threat of operations in North Waziristan. Recent reports indicate that the sanctuaries and their users exist on both sides of the Durand Line, and that the Taliban fighting in FATA have bases in, and support from, across the border. There is increased cooperation and coordination in this cross border 24 Terrorism and our neighbours Pakistan doesn’t want Afghanistan to be theatre of proxy war 26 N Waziristan offensive may see further delays 25 Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 17 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” activity27; this makes the situation very complex. Pakistan is already redeploying into Swat, Mohmand, Khyber and South Waziristan, and troop deployments there will not leave sufficient resources and manpower to successfully enter North Waziristan, attack and eliminate Taliban strongholds, capture or kill their leaders and commanders, and restore peace and writ of the state in the area. So far civilian administration has not taken over any of the areas cleared by the military and most development work in the area is under military supervision. It is a fallacy that Pakistan is so ‘India-centric’ that it cannot move forces from the east to the west; over 140,000 troops are already deployed in Pakistan’s west. RETHINKING EXISTING STRATEGIES A fundamental prerequisite to any Pakistani military incursion in North Waziristan would be sealing off the border from both sides to the maximum extent possible – failing which, a renewed ‘hammer-and-anvil’ approach must be devised so that the Pakistani military can conduct hot pursuit operations to capture or kill Taliban commanders seeking refuge in Afghanistan, which is complicated, sensitive and extremely tenuous. The ‘hammer-and-anvil’ cannot be executed successfully, just as the history of this Afghan war demonstrates, until and unless there is proactive assistance from the US/NATO forces along the Afghanistan border to guard or eliminate the escape routes on the already porous Durand line. Reports and ground assessments indicate that only the Pakistani forces are deployed in almost a thousand check posts along the Durand Line, and the Tripartite Military Commission has been an abject failure so far. The brilliant framework articulated by General Karl-Heinz Lather28, Chief of Staff of NATO SHAPE, still remains to be tested and implemented. The second requirement for Pakistan to march into North Waziristan would be the stabilization of the other six agencies in FATA and civilian administration on the ground. The standards and indicators for strong and successful civilian control in these areas have yet to be identified and attained. Finally, enough resources will have to be mustered to ensure a balance in military approach and the logistical timeframe as it exists in terms of the military objectives; right now, Pakistani forces are overstretched because of continued instability in settled urban areas as well as tribal agencies, and the recent flood devastation continues to utilize Pakistan Army resources that are rehabilitating the civilian population ‘in aid of civil power’. This is besides the fact that the Army 27 28 Insurgents Set Aside Rivalries on Afghan Border NATO in Afghanistan and better Cooperation with Pakistan Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 18 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” is deployed along sensitive logistical routes in the urban, rural and tribal areas, apart from ensuring safety and security of Pakistani citizens in the cities and especially in urban cantonment areas. Another factor which should be of critical concern for both the US and Pakistan is the collateral damage caused by the drone attacks. Every civilian casualty from a ‘miss-hit’ gives legitimacy to the narrative of oppression propagated by the Taliban and their Al Qaeda proxies, garnering further support for the ‘national resistance’ in Afghanistan as well as increasing ill-will for the Pakistani state and military. Rather than eliminating the Figure 14 - The MQ-9 Reaper firing an AGM-114 Hellfire missile Courtesy: PressTV.ir malaise, such strikes give the native population a reason to pick up arms and join the Taliban in their ‘holy war’ by increasing their numbers exponentially. Both Pakistan and the US do not gain any advantage through causing collateral damage since it fuels the momentum of the Taliban and offers them greater recruitment opportunities. Most importantly, Pakistan has properly managed the counter-insurgency and counterterrorism component (which is essentially military in nature), but the counter-extremism component (which is political and economic) has not been able to work as well. Pakistan needs to formulate a programme with a civil government-in-a-box quality – with reference to the US strategy for Marjah – which can roll into place once the military clears the areas; this can be tested in Swat and South Waziristan to enhance consolidated control of those areas before it is employed in North Waziristan. Terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in Pakistan is more about poverty than about Islam. Political inclusion, economic reconstruction, employment opportunities, social safety nets, rehabilitation from war and benefits to the ordinary people in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA is necessary for any counter-extremism programme to successfully augment the military and security components of Pakistan’s COIN strategy. The most crucial outcome of any successful operation in North Waziristan – or anywhere else in Pakistan – is the elimination of the Al Qaeda brand and its aura, which can only come about by forceful anti-militant propaganda campaigns that question and attack the role that Al Qaeda Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 19 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” firebrands occupy in the minds and lives of conservative Pakhtun Muslims in the tribal areas. This is because the main threat is not from the brainwashed militants, but from their Al Qaeda handlers who brainwash them and prepare them for a war without end29. Recent initiatives like “Yeh Hum Naheen – Say No To Terrorism”30 have been appreciated not only by the mainstream Pakistani population at home and abroad, but also by US State Department officials in their communications with one another. Figure 15 - Ethnic Groups: Configuration in Pakistan Ahmed Rashid has an interesting view on the possible outcome of the Afghan war; with specific respect to Pakistan, he argues that peace might be possible if Pakistan issues an ultimatum to all Afghan Taliban leaders to leave for home, or to seek asylum in another country, while it undertakes military operations in North Waziristan to eliminate remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda elements which could sabotage a ‘peace process’. “Even if such action were not fully successful”, he argues, “the aim would be to limit their capacity to sponsor insurgency” 31. This reason lacks strategic and tactical logic, while it is also not a justifiable objective for a Pakistani incursion into North Waziristan. Pakistan must aim to destroy the militants’ capacity to sponsor, create or foment insurgency, not just to limit or restrain it. 29 Al-Qaeda braced for a war without end Yeh Hum Naheen – Say No To Terrorism 31 The Way Out of Afghanistan 30 Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 20 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE From the Pakistani point of view, the entire war in Afghanistan has been extremely disastrous. “The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 to deny al Qaeda its main sanctuary led to the spillover of the war into Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s relocation east of the Durand Line forced Islamabad to side with Washington against the Afghan Taliban and laid the foundation for the Talibanization of Pakistan”32. One of the biggest mistakes attributed to the US strategy is the way the counter-insurgency efforts were initially executed. Unlike the Pakistan-India border, the Durand line is porous and has no definite boundaries. Therefore, when the US initially exerted pressure from the other end, it created a free flow of militants into Pakistan; to either escape to safe havens, or to call for new enforcements from North Waziristan. Had the US realized this while drafting and executing the initial strategic plan a decade ago, the scenario would have had been different altogether and Pakistan would not have been involved in the ‘mess’ that it is in today. In this context, the US strategy seems like a massive failure; for the future, the success of the new Af-Pak strategy is entirely dependent upon the elimination of such strategic failures. Figure 16 - The Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Courtesy: PakistanIdeology.com 32 The Pakistani View of the U.S. Strategy on Afghanistan Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 21 December 29, 2010 Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst “The Death Trap” CONCLUSION THE WAY FORWARD: AGGRESSIVE COOPERATION FOR MUTUAL INTEREST The gravity of the situation in this region dictates both US and Pakistan to realize that North Waziristan tribes cannot be forced into making a ‘fair deal’ until and unless the aforementioned strategy is executed to perfection and such a scenario is attained without making any further blunders. Every mistake further diminishes the possibility of a practical workable solution which is in the best interest of both the parties. Trying to cut out a deal with North Waziristan seems to be the best option right now, and this is what Pakistan should ideally aim for, but this will not be possible until and unless there is active support from the US/NATO forces within Afghanistan. Any Pakistani effort to effectively counter the threat of militant extremism is dependent upon the US strategy on the other side of the border. Just as the United States is dealing with a very difficult situation where it has no good options, Pakistan is also caught in a dilemma. There are broad and opposing views among the Pakistani stakeholders in regard to what the United States should do that, in turn, would also serve Pakistani interests – the important commonality between the two is that Pakistani interests should indeed be factored into any possible future action, and into every perceived future outcome. There will have to be clarity in US strategy on the ‘end game’ in Afghanistan, especially as far as the negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan is concerned; the Indian and Iranian influence in Afghanistan, as well as the capacity and capability of Afghan forces, are also pressing issues that require due time and consideration in the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. “The best bet for the US is to understand the security imperatives for Pakistan”33 and to realize the limitations its military faces. No ‘Af-Pak’ strategy can succeed if it aims to restore peace and security in Afghanistan by causing instability, chaos and destruction in Pakistan. This is exactly why Pakistan’s security perceptions and national interest must be factored into the roadmap for regional peace; the inclusion and mainstreaming of the Pakhtun population of both Pakistan and Afghanistan is the first step towards achieving a lasting peace and eliminating religious terrorism and militant extremism from the region. An important consideration should be the economic viability of Pakistan and more major communication links with Afghanistan—there is much less violence in the areas around the northern and southern corridors because of the economic activity generated there. 33 US contemplating raids in Pakistan Spearhead Research www.spearheadresearch.org 22