Holy War and Eternal Peace

Mercenaries and Crusaders Mercenaries and Crusaders Edited by AttilA Bárány Debrecen, 2024 MEMORIA HUNGARIAE 15. Series Editor: AttilA Bárány Published by the HUN-REN (Hungarian Research Network) – University of Debrecen Research Group “Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe”. The volume was sponsored by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office project “Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organization in Europe, 1301–1437”, no. K 131711. It was funded by the Thematic Excellence Program, Project no. TKP2021-NKTA-34, implemented through the support of the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. This is the proceedings of a conference held between 22-24 June 2022, funded by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology through the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund, under the project MEC-SZ-140616. http://memhung.hu Edited by AttilA Bárány Copy-editor MelindA JAkAB Desktop editing, layout and cover design Sándor ÓnAdi Debreceni Campus Nonprofit Közhasznú Kft. ISBN 978-963-490-554-7 ISSN 2498-7795 (Print) ISSN 2786-1163 (Online) © The Authors © 2024, University of Debrecen „Hungary in Medieval Europe” and the HUN-REN–UD „Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe Research Group” All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Publisher. Cover illustration: The first appearance of the Gugler company in Alsace near Strassburg, 1365. Diebold Schilling, Amtliche Berner Chronik, Bern, 1478-1483. Bd. 1. 181. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Mss.h.h.I.1: (https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/list/one/bbb/Mss-hh-I0001). By courtesy of Burgerbibliothek, Bern. Printed by Printart Ltd., Debrecen Managing Director: Balázs Szabó. Debrecen, 2024 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9 Sándor Ónadi From Jerusalem to Ascalon: The role of the clergy in the last phase of the First Crusade ������������������������� 11 Benjámin Borbás The use and reuse of the spoils of war during the Crusades (1096–1291) ���� 33 Attila Bárány Richard I’s return from the Holy Land ���������������������������������������������������������� 61 Gábor Barabás To eradicate the depravity of heresy: a Hungarian crusade in the early thirteenth century? ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87 Zsolt Hunyadi Turcopoles of the Templars and Hospitallers (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries) ������������������������������������������������������������������ 105 Gergely Kiss Conrad of Urach, papal Legate in the service of Crusades ������������������������� 117 Rui Pedro Neves The epic tale of Pedro Sanches: the infant, the mercenary and the crusader� ������������������������������������������������������������������ 129 Yanina Ryier Lithuanian troops in the military campaigns of Władysław Łokietek in the 1320s–1330s ������������������������������������������������������ 157 Boris Stojkovski Mercenaries in medieval Serbian lands ������������������������������������������������������� 173 Ágnes Virágh Mercenary uprisings (1349, 1350) in Apulia during thy dynastic war of the Angevins������������������������������������������������������������������ 191 Ölbei Tamás Hungarian mercenaries in the service of the Signoria Fiorentina (1360–1365) ����������������������������������������������������������� 215 László Pósán Hungarian Mercenaries in the service of the Teutonic Order ��������������������� 245 Ferenc Sebők Mercenaries in charters of the Angevin era between 1342–1366 ����������������� 265 Nicholas Coureas King James II of Cyprus and his multicultural mercenaries ��������������������� 273 Imre Solt Varga The 1420 anti-Hussite crusade of Sigismund of Luxemburg: a case study ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 287 Ádám Novák Opportunities and challenges in researching the political and military history of the Upper Regions ��������������������������������������������������� 301 Saul António Gomes The idea of Crusade in Portugal through the fifteenth century ������������������ 317 Valérie Toureille Violences de guerre et réforme de l’armée royale française au XVe siècle �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 333 Attila Györkös Holy war and eternal peace� Crusading idea and the Franco-Hungarian relations in the 1450s–1460s ���������������������������������������� 353 Zoltán Véber Hungarians and the Crusade from the fall of Constantinople to the Regensburg Reichstag ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 365 Alexandru Simon Giovanni Mario Filelfo and Michael Marullus at the Humanist frontiers of the Ottoman Empire: “international” and “national” crusading after 1453 ������������������������������������������������������������������ 381 László Szokola The role of the urban military in the military organization of the late medieval kingdom of Hungary ������������������������������������������������������� 397 Mihály Boda Pelbartus of Temesvár’s warfare ideology: the emergence of just war doctrine in medieval Hungary ����������������������������������������������������� 411 Ferenc Petruska State organisational prelude and aftermath of the battle of Mohács ��������� 425 Zoltán Jobbágy The social Wave-front theory and the forms of war ������������������������������������� 437 Authors �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 452 FOREWORD This volume is the proceedings of an international conference „Mercenaries and Crusaders (1202–1480)” held between 22-24 June 2022 at the University of Debrecen (https://mercenariesandcrusaders.com/). It was organised and the proceedings have been edited under the auspices of the HUN-REN (Hungarian Research Network) – University of Debrecen Research Group “Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe”. The conference was funded by National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The volume is also sponsored bv the „Hungary in Medieval Europe” project under the framework of the University of Debrecen’s Thematic Excellence Program as well as the “Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organization in Europe, 1301–1437” research program of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The original idea of a conference like that was brought forward years ago by Ölbei Tamás (Université de Lorraine, Nancy-Metz – University of Debrecen) and João Nisa (Universidade de Coimbra), for which I myself and the editorial board are grateful. It is due to their efforts that the conference was to be organised in a collaboration with the Histoire et Cultures de l’Antiquité et du Moyen Âge (Université de Lorraine, Nancy-Metz) and the Centro de História da Sociedade e da Cultura (Universidade de Coimbra). I need to thank here for the members of the Organizing and Scientific Committee, Professor José Pedro Paiva (Coimbra) and Professor Guy Vottéro (Nancy), Professor Miguel Gomes Martins (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Professor Francisco García Fitz (Universidad de Extremadura), Professor João Gouveia Monteiro (Coimbra). We are also grateful for the key-note speakers, Professor Valérie Toureille (CY Cergy Paris Université), Professor Sylvain Gouguenheim (Ecole normale supérieure de Lyon) and Professor Saul Gomes (Coimbra). Professor Toureille and Michael Depreter (Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford), László Veszprémy (Péter Pázmány Catholic University), Ágnes Maléth, Zsolt Hunyadi and István Petrovics (University of Szeged) as well as João Nisa (Universidade de Coimbra), László Pósán, Attila Györkös, Ádám Novák and Orsolya Tóth (University of Debrecen) also acted as reviewers. Due to help of João Nisa in the first place the conference was also supported by the Asociación Ibérica de Historia Militar, Cáceres, the Instituto de Estudos Medievais, the Universidade Nova de Lisboa and the Universidade de Extremadura as well as the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, República Portuguesa. Some scholars also gave papers in a partnership with the University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training. In June 2022, 52 researchers presented papers in 16 sessions. We were pleased to welcome distinguished scholars from the Polish Academy of Sciences (Kraków), Webster University Vienna, the University of Bucharest, the Europa-Universität Flensburg, Uzhhorod National University, Institute of History, Belgrade, Novosibirsk State University, the Centre for Transylvanian Studies, Romanian Academy (Cluj), Odessa Mechnikov National University, University of Novi Sad, University of Crete (Rethymnon-Heraklyon), Cyprus Research Centre (Nicosia), Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń), the University of Białystok, the Jesuit University Ignatianum (Kraków), Móra Ferenc Museum (Szeged), Universitat de València, the universities of Pécs and Szeged as well as Eötvös Loránd University Budapest. Special panels were organised by the scholars of Stanford University and Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario) the Universidade de Coimbra and the Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Speakers from Canada, Greece, Albania, Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Belarus also presented papers. The conference explored the subject of crusaders and mercenaries from a broad perspective. It covered the armies of the Hundred Years’ War, the Catalan companies, the condottieri in Florence and Genoa, mercenaries in the Balkans, the Levant, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom, as well as the Turcopoliers of the knightly orders. The Northern Crusades, the Baltic Crusades, the Iberian Reconquista, the crusades against the heretics in Bosnia and Hussites were examined. The role of the ideological and religious background, the Holy See, the papal legates, recruitment, tactics, strategy, supply, logistics, equipment, booty, were also investigated. The organisers placed an emphasis on mentoring. PhD students also had an opportunity to present themselves in front of prestigious representatives of medieval studies. I would especially like to thank Sándor Ónadi, Melinda Jakab and Ádám Novák for their enormous work and all their never-ceasing efforts in the editorial process. I also do thank Zoltán Véber for his IT services all through the organization and the hosting of the website. I am also pleased to have – as usual – Balázs Bacsa “at hand” in the English language proofs. Attila Bárány Department of History University of Debrecen Further information: http://memhung.hu/ Attila Györkös* HOLY WAR AND ETERNAL PEACE. CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450S–1460S The Crusade against the Infidels after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 has been a recurring idea in European public opinion. It found favourable resonance primarily in regions directly affected, such as Hungary, Venice, and the Balkan states, as well as at the papal court and in Burgundy. France, which had just concluded the Hundred Years’ War, initially showed no interest or capability to participate in such a joint action.1 However, in the late 1450s and early 1460s, it increasingly expressed its intention to join the European coalition. This study aims to examine the reasons that shaped the anti-Ottoman visions of King Charles VII and King Louis XI between the victory at Belgrade and the failed Papal Crusade of 1464. Was there a genuine basis for French participation in any international cooperation, or were their declarations merely rhetorical flourishes serving different dynastic interests? While the Duchy of Burgundy had been a committed supporter of anti-Ottoman efforts since the late fourteenth century, and after the solemn oath of the 1454 Oath of the Pheasant, Philip the Good repeatedly promised support for the fight against the Infidels – for instance, at various imperial assemblies or after the siege of Belgrade2 – it was only in 1457 that we find the first clear sign of such commitment from the French monarch. Significantly, this commitment had a Hungarian – or more precisely, a Central European – dimension. The planned marriage between King Ladislaus the Posthumous (King of Hungary, Bohemia and Archduke of Austria, d. 1458) and Magdalena of France held the prospect of a joint Habsburg-Valois action against the Infidels. This was the most crucial reason for Hungary to accept the alliance. Archbishop István Várdai of Kalocsa (Hungary), leader of a massive seven-hundred-member delegation that travelled to France to sign the marriage contract, expressed * The author is a member of the HUN–REN–DE: “The Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe” Research Group. This project has received funding from the HUN-REN Hungarian Research Network. It was also funded by the University of Debrecen Thematic Excellence Program, Project no. TKP2021-NKTA-34, provided by the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary under the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. 1 Bárány, Attila, “Magyarország és a kései keresztes hadjáratok”, In. Laszlovszky, József – Majorossy, Judit – Zsengellér, József (eds.), Magyarország és a keresztes háborúk. Máriabesnyő–Gödöllő, 2006. 156–157. 2 Schnerb, Bertrand, L’État bourguignon. Paris, 2005. 314–318.; Vaughan, Richard, Philip the Good� The Apogee of Burgundy. Woodbridge, 2002. 334–372.; Paviot, Jacques, Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l’Orient (fin XIVe siècle – XVe siècle). Paris, 2003. 117–177. 354 ATTILA GYÖRKÖS this sentiment in his welcoming speech to King Charles VII on November 18, 1457. He depicted the two monarchs as defenders of the faith, addressing the French king as follows: “You are the pillar of Christianity, and my sovereign lord is its shield; you are the Christian home, and my sovereign lord is its protective wall.”3 Contemporary French chroniclers also saw this as one of the motivations for establishing the alliance. According to Thomas Basin: “From him [Ladislaus], one could hope the most that together with the other Christian rulers, especially if he could unite his forces with the power of the French king, he would drive out the Turkish emperor from Greece and other European territories occupied by the Turks, this bloodthirsty wild beast.”4 Jean Chartier, approaching the question from another angle, stated: “the most Christian French king, desiring to disturb his enemies, especially the Turks, the Saracens, and other enemies of the Christian faith, formed an alliance with the King of Hungary.”5 However, we must not forget that there was another, less noble goal in establishing Habsburg-Valois relations: the acquisition of the Duchy of Luxemburg, which was occupied by Duke Philip the Good but also claimed by the French monarch and the Czech crown, as well as ensuring the defense of Habsburg possessions in Upper Alsace. Mathieu d’Escouchy, a chronicler who served in the Burgundian court, did not hide his opinion on the matter: “The marriage was very unpleasant for the Duke of Burgundy, as he was at war with the aforementioned Ladislaus over the Duchy of Luxemburg. And it seemed to him that due to the aforementioned treaty, King Charles would provide assistance and support to King Ladislaus, which could cause great harm to him, his lands, and his subjects.”6 Thomas Basin, quoted earlier, also did not overlook the significance of this matter: “The death of the Bohemian king [Ladislaus in November 1457] favoured the Duke of Burgundy: it freed him from a formidable enemy, whose alliance the King of 3 Mémoires de Jacques Du Clercq, sur le règne de Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne. Ed. Reiffenberg, Frédéric de, Bruxelles, 1839. 105–106.; Eckhardt, Sándor, “Várdai István beszéde a francia király előtt”, = Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny 62, 1938, 101–104.; Csernus, Sándor, “Lancelot király és Magyarország, mint a Kereszténység védőbástyája”, In. Jankovics, József (ed.), A magyar művelődés és a Kereszténység. Budapest–Szeged, 1988. 580–596. 4 Csernus, Sándor, A középkori francia nyelvű történetírás és Magyarország (13–15. század)� Budapest, 1999. 242. 5 “le tres chrestien roy de France, affectant de insulter ses ennemys et par spécial les Turcs, Sarrasins et autres estans contre la foy chrestienne, fist aliance avecque le roy de Hongrie (...).”: Chronique de Charles VII par Jean Chartier� Ed. Viriville, Valet de, Paris, 1858. III. 74. 6 “[le mariage] estoit chose bien desplaisante au duc de Bourgoingne, pour ce qu’il faisoit guerre audit Roy Lancelot, pour la duchié de Luxembourg: car bien lui sambloit que, par le moien d’icellui traictié, le Roy Charles bailleroit ayde et confort audit Roy Lancelot, qui lui pooit porter à grant préjudice, et à ses pays et subgez.”: In Chronique de Mathieu d’Escouchy. Ed. Beaucourt, Gaston du Fresne de, Paris, 1863. II. 354–355. CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450–1460’S 355 France so greatly desired, in order to take revenge on the Duke of Burgundy with the help of such a great ally.”7 The marriage proposal of 1457 appears to have a dual purpose: it seems that the French kingdom, which was not directly exposed to the Turkish threat, could only be nominally involved in the anti-Turkish alliance if its abstract and fundamentally non-interest-based cause could be linked to concrete benefits. The question is whether in the later years, when broader international coalitions are formed, there will be a genuine French commitment to the fight against the Infidels. Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who was well-versed in Central European affairs and the Turkish threat, mobilised unprecedented energies for the expulsion of the Infidels when he ascended to the throne of Saint Peter in 1458 as Pope Pius II. In 1459, he convened a congress in Mantua, where Christian rulers were supposed to coordinate their policies and make commitments to support a future crusade. However, the meeting ended in failure. Few princes attended in person, and those who did sent envoys with few substantial proposals.8 Mantua essentially became a forum where countries, while proclaiming their anti-Turkish commitment, sought to assert their own often conflicting political interests. The situation was no different for France. When envoys of King Charles VII arrived in the Italian city, two long-standing unresolved issues were immediately brought to the table, instead of the announced program. The Pope urged the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction introduced in 1438,9 while the French envoys sought ecclesiastical recognition for King Charles’s brother-in-law, René of Anjou’s claim to the throne of Naples. The relevance of the latter question stemmed from the fact that in 1458, Ferdinand, the illegitimate son of Alfonso of Aragon, ascended to the throne of the Kingdom of Naples in southern Italy, and he later became the father-in-law of Matthias. His rule was not recognised by Pope Callixtus III but was eventually acknowledged by his successor, Pope Pius II.10 The French-supported Anjou family, harbouring ambitions for the Neapolitan throne, immediately sought to overthrow the new ruler. René sent troops to Southern Italy, and after the relative calm following the 1454 Treaty of Lodi, the Italian peninsula once again became divided in the power struggle. While Florence, ruled by the Medicis, pursued a pro-French policy, it did not intervene directly. Venice remained neutral, and Milan committed itself to the side of the Neapolitans and, in alignment with the Pope, dispatched troops.11 As neither Csernus, A középkori francia, 1999. 242. II� Piusz pápa feljegyzései. Eds. Bellus, Ibolya – Boronkai, Iván, Budapest, 2001. II/1. (cap. 3.14.) 120. [hereinafter Feljegyzések] 9 The Pragmatic Sanction, accepted in 1437 (and codified in 1438 in Bourges), abolished the annates and restored the elective nature of ecclesiastical offices in France, which the popes never accepted. See: Dictionnaire Encyclopédique du Moyen Age. Ed. Vauchez, André, Paris, 1997. II. 1248 (article of Jean-Louis Gazzaniga). 10 Setton, Kenneth Meyer, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571. Philadelphia, 1978. 204–205. 11 Favier, Jean, Le roi René� Paris, 2008. 407–413. 7 8 356 ATTILA GYÖRKÖS Pius nor Charles VII were willing to concede on the contentious issues, French participation in the future crusade was scarcely discussed. The envoys cited that as long as there was a threat of an English attack, they could not undertake foreign action.12 Despite the French and other Western powers’ lack of interest, the Pope did not give up on his long-term goals. Following the failure in Mantua, he increased his efforts to create a European coalition against the Infidels. In his famous letter to Mehmed II in 1461, he called on the Sultan to convert to Christianity,13 but he also took more realistic steps. After extensive work, by 1463, the outline of an alliance had emerged, which could be considered a smaller European coalition. This alliance included Venice and Hungary, both deeply interested in the fight against the Turks, and also Burgundy. The Pope sought to involve France in this alliance, a kingdom which was undergoing significant changes. After the death of Charles VII in 1461, his son Louis XI adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Rome. His decisions following his accession to the throne could be interpreted as a break from his father’s policies, although, as we will see, certain elements remained constant in French aspirations. Three months after his coronation, on November 27, Louis XI abolished the Pragmatic Sanction, which had asserted the liberties of the Gallican Church. However, he still sought papal support for the ambitions of René of Anjou. Pope Pius was content with the gesture and rewarded the French envoy, Jean Jouffroy, Bishop of Arras, and the king’s relative, Louis d’Albret, with cardinal hats. As an encouragement for the crusade, the Pope also sent a sword to Louis XI.14 While the appointments increased French influence in the Curia, they did not fully satisfy the king’s demands. The rejection of the Anjou ambitions led to the king’s threat to recall his prelates from Rome.15 The Pope did not back down, so the French monarch had to choose a different tactic to achieve his goals. Taking advantage of the fact that several states sent ambassadors to him for introductory visits, Louis engaged in negotiations with the Italian powers during the autumn and winter. He attempted to persuade Florence to abandon its neutrality, and Milan to withdraw its troops from Naples, from Venice, he expected to exert pressure on Milan and the Papacy in accordance with French interests.16 Feljegyzések, II/1. (cap. 3.40.) 146–151. Babinger, Franz, Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time. Princeton, 1978. 199.; Nótári, Tamás, “Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini és a defensio imperii Christiani gondolata”, = Jogelméleti Szemle 4, 2003. Online: http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/notari16.html (Accessed on 31 August 2023) 14 Feljegyzések, II/2. (cap. 7.10.) 322.; Lettres de Louis XI, roi de France. Eds. Vaesen, Joseph – Charavay, Etienne, Paris, 1900. II. 41–43. (No. XXVIII.) [hereinafter Lettres de Louis XI...].; Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, received a similar sword. Paviot, Les ducs de Bourgogne, 2003. 160. 15 Feljegyzések, II/2. (cap. 8.7.) 356–358. 16 Louis XI tried every diplomatic means to win over the three Italian states: he offered a marriage between Anjou René’s son, John of Calabria, and the daughter of 12 13 CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450–1460’S 357 Venice’s position also underwent a change in these years. At the Mantua Congress, they initially pursued a rejectionist policy regarding the anti-Ottoman coalition, fearing conflict with the Sultan and to protect their Mediterranean interests. However, the Ottoman empire’s advances in Asia and its attacks in Greece prompted a shift in their stance.17 From this point on, the Venetian Republic financially supported the Hungarian king18 and attempted to involve France in the organization of the crusade. The negotiations of the Signoria’s envoys in 1461 vividly illustrate this shift: while the first envoy instructions on October 12 prioritised Italian affairs, later directives increasingly emphasised action against the Turks.19 Despite lengthy negotiations, the two Venetian diplomats were unsuccessful. Opposing the idea of a crusade would not have been beneficial for the ruler who bore the title of the “Most Christian King”. Therefore, the French monarch did not completely rule out a war against the pagans. Nonetheless, he explained that such an action could only be carried out on two fronts: firstly, from Hungary, which was made impossible due to the conflict between the Emperor and Matthias Corvinus, and secondly, by sea, from Albania. For the latter, he would need control over the ports of Genoa and Naples. In other words, all anti-Turkish efforts were linked to the resolution of French interests in Italian affairs. However, the Republic of Venice aimed to maintain its neutrality in the affairs of Naples and Genoa, and as a result, the negotiations ended in failure. Milan also rejected the French proposal, 20 and Florence was unwilling to support the strengthening of any foreign power in Italy. 21 Louis XI had to try a different approach. In an attempt to soften Pope Pius, in March 1462, he offered 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry troops for the fight against the Turks in exchange for support for René’s rights.22 But the credibility of his commitment was undermined when it became known to the Venetians the Duke of Milan, Hippolita Maria Sforza. (Kendall, Paul Murray, Louis XI� Paris, 1974. 490.).; He declared that he did not support the aspirations of the House of Orléans for the Milanese throne, and he knighted the Florentine envoy, Piero de’Pazzi, and the Venetian emissary, Bernardo Giustiniani. This information is derived from the report of the Florentine envoys on January 11, 1462. In Desjardins, Abel, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane� Paris, 1859. I. 126. 17 Setton, The Papacy, 1978. 240–241. 18 In the spring of 1462, Venice allocated 3,000 ducats per month in support of the Hungarian king and promised an additional 16,000 gold. Teke, Zsuzsa, “Az itáliai államok és Mátyás”, In. Rázsó, Gyula – V. Molnár, László (eds.), Hunyadi Mátyás� Emlékkönyv Mátyás király halálának 500� évfordulójára. Budapest, 1990. 246–248. 19 Perret, Paul Michel, La première ambassade vénitienne à Louis XI� 12 octobre – mai 1462� Paris, 1891. 20 Perret, La première ambassade, 1891. notes 7. and 3. 21 The instructions given to the Florentine envoys on October 20, 1461, and the report provided by the envoys at the end of their mission on March 13–14, 1462. Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques, 1859. I. 114, 127–133. 22 Mandell, Creighton, A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome. New York, 1897. III. 278. 358 ATTILA GYÖRKÖS that he would only provide a maximum of 10,000 soldiers for the operation.23 Nevertheless, for the Pope, recognizing the Anjou claims would have been too high a price for uncertain military assistance, so he rejected the proposal. The French embassy coincided with the appearance of Poděbrady’s envoys in Rome, who were determined to, albeit unsuccessfully, reaffirm the Prague Compactata that guaranteed the freedom of the Czech church. An interesting situation arose because one of the leading proponents of conciliarism, Piccolomini, as Pope Pius, no longer recognised the decisions made at the Council of Basel. The Pope cleverly used this as a tactical move to present the French monarch as an example to the Czechs. He portrayed the French king as someone willing to accept the authority of the Holy See by abolishing the Pragmatic Sanction. In reality, it seems that in Rome, both the disappointed French and Czech policies found common ground at this point.24 George of Poděbrady sought to break out of the political isolation stifling his country and embarked on a grand diplomatic manoeuvre. His envoy and trusted representative, the Frenchman Antoine Marini, proposed a large European coalition-based crusade in which the Bohemian king would have played a leading role. As Poděbrady’s relations with Frederick III, the Holy Roman Emperor, had deteriorated by this time, the Czech ruler sought closer ties with Poland and then France. He also counted on Hungary as a natural ally since Matthias’ wife was his daughter. To achieve his goal, Marini explored potential European powers one by one: in August 1462, he negotiated with Venice,25 interested in the fight against the Turks, and in October, he engaged with the French king, who, due to his growing animosity toward Rome, appeared to be an ideal partner for Czech politics. However, Louis XI did not want to sever ties with the Pope but rather exert pressure on him. Additionally, the Czech connections raised suspicions at the Burgundian court that the 1457 coalition might be revived, and the issue of Luxemburg could resurface. The French king did promise assistance in the fight 23 The letter from Venice to his Papal envoy on March 19, 1462. “Regiam Majestatem Franchorum sperandum est et pro suo naturali more et persuasionibus V. S. inductam si non plures saltem X milia pugnatorum ad hanc expeditionem missuram esse.” In. Magyar diplomácziai emlékek Mátyás király korából. Eds. Nagy, Iván – Nyáry, Albert, Budapest, 1875. I. (No. 77.) 120. [hereinafter MDE]. 24 Our intuition is reinforced by the fact that the Czech envoy negotiating in Rome at this time, Zdenek Kostka, will lead the French delegation two years later, which initiates the Peace Plan. According to Macek, Antoine Marini, the later engine of Franco-Bohemian relations, also took part in the 1462 Roman negotiations, where he may have become acquainted with the French anti-papal sentiments. Macek, Josef, “Le mouvement conciliaire, Louis XI et Georges de Podebrady”, = Historica 15, 1967, 23–24.; Pius’s memoirs do not mention Marini’s presence. Feljegyzések, II/2� (cap. 7. 15.) 328–330. 25 The minutes of the Venetian Council dated August 9, 1462. MDE, I. (No. 111.) 178–179. CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450–1460’S 359 against the Turks,26 but tried to reassure Philip the Good as well.27 Marini’s negotiations in November with the Burgundian court were not as successful. The Duke did commit to the fight against the Turks once more, but he wanted to lead the campaign himself, was suspicious of Poděbrady, and considered the Papal alliance indispensable for the success of the action.28 Furthermore, it seems that Marini acted independently during the negotiations. While in Venice, he appeared only as a representative of the Bohemian king, but at the French court, he negotiated on behalf of the Polish ruler and Matthias as well – all of this apparently without the knowledge of the Hungarian court.29 However, the diplomatic manoeuvres did not help. XI. Louis’s energies were tied up in repurchasing the cities in the Somme region that had previously been pledged to Burgundy in the 1435 Arras Treaty. The transaction, which took place in the autumn of 1463, did not go smoothly. Although Duke Philip the Good was inclined to agree, partly to allocate the more than 400,000 écu received from it for financing a crusade, his son, the future Charles the Bold, firmly rejected the offer. These negotiations reignited tensions between the two states, stemming in part from their previous strained relationship. Moreover, another critical French diplomatic endeavour concerning Naples also took a wrong turn. In the summer of that year, the Anjou forces suffered several defeats in southern Italy, weakening Louis’s arguments in favour of the René faction in Rome. The other front, involving Aragon, showed more promise: 26 Venice learned about the French stance regarding the anti-Turkish coalition from the returning Marini’s report, which seemed positive to them at the time. In the same document, they informed the French about the danger threatening Hungary. The State Council’s letter dated March 17, 1463, addressed to King Louis XI. MDE, I. (No. 124.) 197–198. 27 King Louis XI’s letter to Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy, dated October 12, 1462, in which he declares that he will not act against the interests of Burgundy: “Si vous avons bien voulu escrire ces choses, afin que en soiez adverty, et aussy pour vous acertener que se ledit roy de Behaigne vouloit parler ou faire mention dudit duché de Luxembourg, ou d’autre chose quelconque qui vous peust fournir à prejudice, nous n’y entendrons en quelque maniere, mais vous en edvertirons.”: Lettres de Louis XI ..., (No. LII.) 83.; The question became important because negotiations between the French and Burgundians were already underway for the repurchase of the Somme River towns (see below), and a precondition for this was that Louis would renounce his claims to Luxembourg, which he did on November 25th. Lavisse, Ernest, Histoire de France illustrée� Paris, 1911. IV./2. 340. note 1. 28 Paviot, Les ducs de Bourgogne, 2003. 161–162. 29 In the Venetian minutes of August 9, 1462, which have already been mentioned, the following statement can be found: “Spectabili militi domino Antonis Gallico, oratori Serenissimi D. Regis Bohemie qui ad presentiam nostram venit (...).”: MDE, I. (No. 111.) 178.; However, Louis XI writes about the same matter as follows: “le roy de Behaigne nous a puis nagueres escript, par homme propre qu’il a envoié devers nous, que, se nostre plaisir estoit, luy et les rois de Hongrie et de Poulaine desireroient bien avoir aliance et confederation avec nous, principalement pour l’explusion des ennemys de la foy chrestienne.”: Lettres de Louis XI..., (No. LII.) 82–83. 360 ATTILA GYÖRKÖS the French crown’s intervention in the succession disputes on the Iberian Peninsula led to the occupation of Roussillon and Cerdagne territories, although not without considerable difficulty.30 However, Louis was troubled by the end of Lancaster rule in England, known as the Wars of the Roses. His fears of a potential new English invasion grew.31 These commitments seriously constrained France’s manoeuvrability. In the meantime, Pius continued to work on the envisioned Christian alliance. In early spring of 1463, he first sent a legate to Burgundy and then aimed to involve Hungary and once again, specifically, France in the crusade.32 On July 19th, he successfully brokered the Peace of Wiener Neustadt between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Hungarian ruler, which was a prerequisite for the anti-Ottoman action on Matthias’ part.33 Thanks to this agree, on September 12th, Venice and Hungary formed an alliance. They agreed that the Republic would attack the Peloponnese Peninsula, while Matthias would focus on Bosnia. The Signoria also provided financial assistance to the Hungarian ruler.34 In the autumn, another positive turn of events occurred in the planned war effort: the Hungarian-Venetian coalition was supplemented by an offer from Burgundy. In September 1463, Guillaume Fillastre, the envoy of the Duke, promised 6,000 soldiers.35 On October 19th, he signed a three-year alliance with the Holy See and Venice. The Duke himself announced in late December that he would set off for the East in the following May.36 Although Philip the Good’s commitment can be considered sincere, his illness and resistance from his advisers raised doubts about his actual participation in the anti-Turkish campaigns. King Louis XI himself made the release of his vassal contingent on the outcome of peace negotiations with the English Crown.37 Convincing the French proved to be a tough nut to crack. When Niccolò Canale, the Venetian envoy, encouraged the king to participate in the coalition in the autumn of 1463, he received evasive responses. While the French king declared in November that he was willing to equip 12 warships worth 300,000 ducats for Heers, Jacques, Louis XI� Paris, 2003. 58–59. Henry VI of Lancaster’s wife, Margaret of Anjou (a distant cousin of Louis XI), sought refuge in France and then, with the help of Louis, attempted to regain her husband’s throne. Gillingham, John, A Rózsák háborúja� Budapest, 1985. 178–179.; The French monarch in 1462–1463 implemented defensive measures along the entire western coast, fearing a potential English invasion. See Lettres de Louis XI..., (Nos. XLII–LII.) 67–83.; Favier, Jean, Louis XI� Paris, 2001. 442–444. 32 Feljegyzések, II/2. (cap. 12.14–16.) 548–50.; The Pope sent Teodoro Lelli, Bishop of Feltre, to France, and Domenico de Lucca, Bishop of Torcello, to Hungary, and they also held negotiations in Venice. MDE, I. (No. 128.) 204–205. 33 Kubinyi, András, Mátyás király. Budapest, 2001. 51–52. 34 The total sum was determined at 4,000 ducats per month in January 1464, later increased to 6,000 ducats. Teke, Az itáliai államok, 1990. 248. and note 20. 35 Creighton, A History of the Papacy, 1897. III. 315–316. 36 Schnerb, L’État, 2005. 314.; Setton, The Papacy, 1978. 249. 37 Paviot, Les ducs de Bourgogne, 2003. 162. 30 31 CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450–1460’S 361 the enterprise and in his December letter to Florence stated that the transfer of Genoa, over which he now had only nominal control, to Milan was justified by the peace in Italy and the cooperation against the Turks,38 he did not consider the elderly Burgundian duke suitable for participation in the campaign. He believed that Philip the Good would die on the way, so it would be better if he gave the money allocated for the crusade to Matthias Corvinus.39 The king was sceptical about the war itself, but he criticized its implementation, especially. The death of the Burgundian ruler would have brought to power in his country the French-averse forces represented by his son (the future Charles the Bold), which was not in the interest of Louis XI. It appears that the personal behaviour of the Signoria’s envoy did not contribute to winning French support. His lengthy negotiations at the French court aroused suspicion rather than facilitating persuasion. On April 22, 1464, for instance, Louis XI stated in written instructions to his Roman envoys that the entire anti-Turkish action merely served the selfish interests of the Venetians, and they would be the only beneficiaries of its success.40 He was equally outraged by the Pope’s Neapolitan politics. In May, he expressed his fear that Canale wanted to poison him, “because every great plot seems like a small matter in the eyes of the Venetians.”41 The contrasts and suspicions were at work elsewhere as well. The Venetians, while signalling their commitment to the anti-Turkish alliance, harboured doubts about the Pope’s true intentions. This suspicion is evident in a letter from the Doge Cristoforo Moro on November 12, 1463, in which he wrote to Pope Pius II that he would only be willing to engage in the battle against the Infidels if it were done jointly with him and the Burgundians.42 The fear of going to war alone is also seen a few months later when the Signoria informed its envoy to France that the success of the entire crusade depended on Hungary.43 On the same day, the Republic informed its envoy in Hungary that negotiations with France were progressing well, and Louis promised 10,000 soldiers for four months if they 38 “Quod profecto Italiae paci ac faciliori contra Theucrum (sic!) expeditioni quam plurimum conducere arbitrabimur.”: December 24, 1463. Lettres de Louis XI..., (No. CIX) 177. 39 “Gli dise che forsa meglio seria de fare spendere li soy dinari in lo re de Ungaria.”: Report of Maletta, the Milanese envoy, on November 23, 1463. Mandrot, Bernard de, Dépêches des ambassadeurs milanais en France sous Louis XI et Francesco Sforza. Paris, 1916. I. 325. 40 We know Louis’s statements from Alberico Maletta, the Milanese envoy’s report on April 27, 1464. “Poy fa dire el Re che questa impresa non era honorevolle al papa nè al duca de Bergogna et farla con Veneziani mercadanti insolenti et populari, li quali non fano questa guerra per reverentio de Dio, ma per suo proprio (...)”: Mandrot, Dépêches des ambassadeurs, 1919. II. 94. 41 May 26, 1464. “che ogni grandissimo tradimento parira picolo ad Venesani.”: Mandrot, Dépêches des ambassadeurs, 1919. II. 151. 42 Setton, The Papacy, 1978. 266 and note 122. 43 Letter from Venice on March 2, 1464, to his envoy, Niccolò Canale. See: Setton, The Papacy, 1978. 267–268. 362 ATTILA GYÖRKÖS could secure the Anglo-French peace.44 It appears that the Venetians wanted to secure the support of both powers by assuring their rulers that the other state had already committed. In reality, the French king displayed strong aversion to the campaign in his entire demeanor. It is indicative that the Duke of Milan had to apologise for his participation in the coalition. In his letter to King Louis dated April 18, Francesco Sforza explained that the planned Papal-Burgundian action did not contradict the interests of France but served to save Hungary and thereby Italy.45 Similarly, when in May, Angelo de Rieti, the Papal Legate, sought 60,000 ducats of aid for the Hungarian king from the tithe,46 Louis refused to grant the tithe exemption. Among the treaties concluded in the autumn of 1463, only the Venetian-Hungarian one proved effective. While Matthias launched a campaign into Bosnia, retaking Jajce and surrounding strongholds, Venice seized almost the entire Peloponnese and the island of Lesbos. During this time, Poděbrady’s diplomacy also became active. His envoy, Marini, negotiated in Hungary in the spring of 1464. Here, he presented the commonly referred to the “Eternal Peace” Plan of the Bohemian king, envisioning a European forum where members would hold regular consultations to maintain peace among themselves and to drive the Turks out.47 The proposal conspicuously excluded the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, aiming to increase the influence of the French monarch in European politics.48 The Hun44 The Venetian Council’s letter of authorization to their envoy in Hungary on March 2, 1464. “Habemus quoque apud serenissimum regem Franchorum unum oratorem nostrum, qui litteris suis dierum 27 et 29 januarii decursi significavit nobis optimam mentem et dispositionem majestatis sue, que optulerat X mille bellatores armatos et bonarum gentium ad hanc sanctam expeditionem; sed necessere fore commemorabat, quod vel concordia, vel treugue sequerentur inter Serenitatem Suam et Regem Anglie (...)”: MDE, I. (No. 163) 270.; The same is confirmed by Alberico Maletta, the Milanese envoy’s report from France on April 27, 1464: “Et seguendo questa pace tra questi duy regnami, se farà tale possanza per laquale certamente el Turcho (...) et ch’el Re de Franza sarà contento pagare a sue proprie spese Xm combatanti per IIII mesi (...).”: Mandrot, Dépêches des ambassadeurs, 1919. II. 94. 45 Mandrot, Dépêches des ambassadeurs, 1919. II. 36–37. 46 Report of the Milanese envoy from the French court on May 12, 1464: “D. Angelo rechiedo ch’el Re voglia essere contento lassare tore LXm ducati de questa decima per dare al re de Ungaria.”: Mandrot, Dépêches des ambassadeurs, 1919. II. 133. 47 Experts in the history of the European Union consider this document an important precursor to the formation of continental unity, e.g., Bóka, Éva, Az európai egységgondolat fejlődéstörténete. Budapest, 2001.; Németh, István, Európa-tervek 1300–1945. Visszapillantás a jövőbe. Budapest, 2001.; Zourek, Jaroslav, “Le projet du roi tchèque George de Podiebrad”, = Annuaire français de droit international 10, 1964, 14–37. 48 Therefore, researchers in the field of medieval diplomatic history generally interpret the proposal as the Bohemian king’s attempt to break free from the political vacuum that was suffocating his country. Fraknói, Vilmos, Hunyadi Mátyás király� Budapest, CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450–1460’S 363 garian royal council was indeed outraged that Marini had negotiated with the French on behalf of Matthias two years earlier. However, they agreed to let the envoy represent both the Hungarian king and the king of Poland alongside King Louis XI.49 King Louis XI was indeed ambivalent about the Czech proposal because his prelates rejected forming an alliance with the Utraquist ruler. He didn’t want to break with the Pope and including Luxemburg in the agreement would have also offended Burgundian interests. Taking into account the stance of the clergy, Louis ultimately rejected the plan that omitted the Pope and the Emperor but, in the summer of 1464, a general non-binding Franco-Bohemian friendship agreement was signed.50 In this way, we can witness the formation of two major European coalitions under the pretext of anti-Ottoman cooperation: one led by the Pope, consisting of Venice and Burgundy, and the other, excluding the Pope, composed of Czechs, French, and Poles. Both emphasised the expulsion of the pagans in their rhetoric, but only the first coalition materialised, and military activity was expected from it. Matthias, driven by the idea of the widest possible alliance, maintained relations with both groups, although it is unclear to what extent he was aware of the Czech plan’s true, anti-Papal objectives. Despite the grand promises of their allies, when Pope Pius took to the field in the summer of 1464, he practically had only the support of the Venetians. The Republic sent about a dozen galleys to the meeting announced in Ancona, under the personal command of Doge Cristoforo Moro. Philip the Good’s fleet arrived late. The Burgundian navy, led by the illegitimate children of Philip, received the news in Marseilles on August 15 that the Pope had died. The French monarch failed to fulfil any of his earlier promises. Pope Pius was succeeded by Pietro Barbo, a Venetian by origin, who took the name Pope Paul II. He aimed to continue the fight against the Turks. Organizing this effort, he entrusted the French Cardinal Guillaume d’Estouteville and Cardinal Carvajal with the revenue from the Tolfa alum mines and, in theory, the church tax levied for the Crusades. However, the Italian states did not provide the support expected by the Pope,51 and other Western powers politely evaded his call for assistance. 1890. 139–140.; Tervezet a Kereszténység leendő békéjéről. (Documenta Historica, 39.) Ed. Karáth, Tamás, Szeged, 1998. [hereinafter Karáth]. 49 The only edition of the letter testifying to this problem: Epistolae Matthiae Corvini regis� Ed. Kelcz, Imre, Cassoviae, 1743. (No. LXII.) 138–140. See also: Karáth, 1998. 16–18. 50 The meeting between the Czech envoys and the French king took place on June 30th. According to a travel report prepared by one of the delegation members, the French king specifically requested that in the alliance to be concluded, the title of Luxemburg, which was claimed by both the Czech crown and Burgundy, should not be among Poděbrady’s titles. The English edition of the text: Diary of an Embassy from King of George of Bohemia to King Louis XI of France� Ed. Wratislaw, A. H., London, 1871. 33, 49–52. 51 MDE, II. (No. 167.) 230–237.; Letter of Pope Paul II regarding expected aid from the Italian states at the turn of 1464–1465. Incorrectly dated to 1471. See also: Setton, The 364 ATTILA GYÖRKÖS Matthias received 40,000 ducats from the Pius treasury “pro subventione sancte expeditionis adversus impium Turcum” (for the support of the holy expedition against the impious Turks),52 and later, he received additional aid from the Pope in 1465–1466. He defended his Bosnian conquests from a Turkish counterattack. The Venetians continued their struggle until 1479, but the Burgundian ships did not participate in the fight against the Infidels, apart from a minor conflict against Berber pirates besieging Ceuta.53 With the death of Pius, the anti-Turkish coalitions fell apart. Matthias broke ties with the Bohemian king, Venice withdrew its financial support from him, and a conflict arose between them over the matter of Senj.54 The Burgundians also gave up on the crusade because Charles the Bold, who exercised power on behalf of his father, focused on French politics. Concurrently, the Bohemian king’s visions of broad European cooperation also faded away.55 The relationship between King Louis XI and Matthias did not break entirely. In early 1465, the Hungarian ruler still expressed hope that the French king would participate in a reformed anti-Turkish alliance,56 but he was disappointed. Louis was no longer in a position to support any international actions, as he was preoccupied with the War of the Public Weal, a conflict against significant regional barons. So when his envoy, a certain Knight George, visited the Hungarian court during his Central European tour, he could only reassure Matthias of Louis’s friendly intentions, without offering more substantial support. 57 Summary In the 1450s and 1460s, the containment of the Ottoman Empire appeared as a European concern, leading to various plans and initiatives. The Oath of the Pheasant and Pope Pius II’s call for the conversion of Mehmed II to Christianity fell within the realm of romantic ideals of the time. The Mantua Congress and the Pope’s later efforts for alliance-building set more realistic goals. Venice, Hungary, and Burgundy, later led by the dreams of his prince, took the expulsion of the Infidels from the continent seriously, given the threat posed by the Ottomans. However, France, which was strengthening after the Hundred Years’ War and seeking its place in the Western European power structure, became too committed to its own immediate political goals to seriously support abstract plans like the expulsion of the Turks. Declarations of intent in this direction served only to neutralise its adversaries or to more effectively assert own interests. As we have seen, they did not contribute materially or militarily to the realization of the crusading idea. Papacy, 1978. 275. note 14. 52 Setton, The Papacy, 1978. 272. 53 Schnerb, L’État, 2005. 316–317. 54 Teke, Az itáliai államok, 1990. 250–251. 55 Németh, Európa-tervek, 2001. 52.; Karáth, 1998. 18. 56 Mátyás király levelei� Ed. Fraknói, Vilmos, Budapest, 1893. I. (No. 49.) 64–65. [hereinafter MKL]. 57 The letter itself is not known, only the Hungarian response dated December 2, 1465. MKL, (No. 95.) 130–131.