Doctoral Thesis

INTRODUCTION

Introduction:

Politicization of ethnicity and ethnicization of politics are tangible in most parts of the contemporary World. However, the manifestation of various ethnic sentiments in the public sphere has been comprehended only in recent times but the issue of ethnicity is penetrated the ancient anthropological history. Ever since the early days of human history, people incline to constitute groups or communities for their safety and security.

Later on, the progression of civilization has perceived the construction and abolition of numerous shared identities in different historical milieus. In general, an ethnic group is a group of people who share a common and historical identity. These groups have harmonized, strived and contravened throughout the human history. However, it was only in the twentieth century that the question of ethnicity entered into the political arena and grown strength to strength in the light of doctrines like freedom, selfdetermination and democracy. The processes of socio-economic transformation, rising democratic values, globalization, and the policies and strategies taken by different regimes to covenant with the aspirations of ethnic groups have provided the impulse to the proclamation of ethnic sentiments.

The challenge of ethnic cataclysm is correspondingly felt by developed states of Europe and North America as well as the developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

A common form is the ethnic reinforcement and growing political assertiveness, often vacillating in plea from regional autonomy to secessions of minority ethnic groups, such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Bretons and the Corsicans in France, the Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium, the Scots, Welsh and Irish in the United Kingdom, the African-Americans in the United States, and the French-speaking Quebecois in Canada 1 . In the late twentieth century, ethnic conflict intensified into a violent civil war in disintegrated USSR and Yugoslavia. Ethnic identity has been a crucial variable of formation and consolidation of state structure in South Asia as well 2 .

The creation of India and Pakistan and later on Bangladesh on the basis of ethnic identity, civil war between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri-Lanka, politicization of ethnicity by the Maoists in Nepal are some of the few specimens of growing ethnic assertiveness in this South Asia. Therefore, the task of national integration and nationbuilding in this part of the globe has been seriously endangered vis-a-vis the rise of innumerable ethno-nationalistic sentiments. Thus, a major challenge for these plural states of South Asia has been to play the dual role of managing the ethnic forces on the one hand and carrying out the task of nation-building on the other. All the South Asian states have witnessed sporadic ethnic fragmentation and conflict in different magnitude in the latter half of the twentieth century. Therefore, if the urge for recognition as "nations" based on "ethnic self-determination" is symbolized as a resistance against the overriding power structure of the state, South Asia has been "a kaleidoscope of latent, overt and explosive ethnicity". 3 The intensification of nationalistic spirits on the part of ethnic factions frequently proceeded hand in hand with the growing proclamation on the part of majority and dominant ethnic groups for the elevation and, in some cases the reinstatement of their political, economic and socio-cultural privileges. These plural states, therefore, born with a lack of internal cohesion and confronted ethnic divergence between majorities and minorities, social fragmentation, civil dissonance, institutional decay and regime instability, that made the errands of nation-building and governing difficult. 4 In addition, the post-colonial and nation-building approaches have focused on creating a unified "national identity" based on either a common political values and citizenship or a putative majoritarian "ethnic identity". Both the approaches tried to constitute "a pulverized and uniform sense of national identity to coincide with state boundaries that seldom reflect ethnic divisions on the ground". 5 The modernization theories discard the notion that states incorporating more than one ethnic group could be both stable and harmonious. However, "identity movements have the potential to expand and deepen democracy by pushing for states that are more equitable in their distribution of resources and power among their citizens" 6 because democracy emboldens pluralism and delivers the scope to the relegated groups to express their accounts. Consequently, the ethnic politics in Nepal fits to this "global pattern in which democratic transitions are often accompanied by the mobilization of ethnic groups". 7

Statement of the Problem:

The question of ethnicity remains a crucial variable in the process of nation-building in Nepal. The Movements based on ethnicity have been reshaping debates on the definition of nation, nationalism and the structure of the state. Although Nepal was supposed to be defined by a state-sponsored "Nepali" national identity until 1990 that appeared to be highly exclusionary for the ethnic minnows. 8 The peoples' movement of 1990 provided the primary stimulus to the ethnic forces for the manifestation of their political ambitions. Thereafter, the ethnic politics in Nepal has grown strength to strength vis-a-vis different politico-historical perspectives in the last couple of decades or so.

Nepal is a small state from the Himalayan foothills, is geo-politically sandwiched by India and China. Furthermore, Nepal is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state with population of around 26,494,504 9 . Hindu is the leading religion (85%) followed by Buddhist (11%), Muslim (4.2%), Christian (3.6%). 10 Nepali is the national official language which is spoken by 60 % of population and there are 125 different ethnic communities 11 (See Figure-1.1). Nepal has been ethnically diverse ever since the ancient times. The earliest historical evidence suggests that during the reign of the Newar king Jayasthiti Malla (1380-1394) at Kathmandu valley, 64 different castes were allotted different tasks and ranks in the social hierarchy. Ram Shah (1609-1636), the forefather of the Shah monarch, further introduced some rules and regulations about relations between different groups of people outside the Kathmandu valley. Later, the Shah Rulers' conquered the various petty kingdoms adjacent to the Kathmandu valley and used the concept of the caste hierarchy as an organizing principle for consolidating the diverse peoples inhabiting Nepal into a nation state under their authority. In 1984, Jang Bahadur Rana, the most powerful Rana Prime Minister, had promulgated mulki ain, a national legal code that laid out detailed codes for inter-caste behavior and specified punishments for their infringement. The Civil Code 1854 had offered three fold classification of the population, namely, Tagadhari (scared-thread wearing castes) at the top, Matwali (alcohol drinking castes and ethnic groups) in the intermediary, and Sudra (impure but touchable) and Acchut (impure and untouchable castes) at the bottom. Bahuns (Brahmans), Chhetris and Thakuris (Warriors), migrated from the western hill and spoke Khas Kura 12 (Nepali Language), occupied the top position of this caste hierarchy. This high caste group was classified as Tagedhari, or "wearers of the sacred thread" signifying their status as "twice-born" or those initiated into the sacred Hindu texts. People from the "pure" middle-ranking Vaishya and Sudra varnas in Nepal's hill and mountain were accorded to the existing indigenous groups, belonging mainly to the Tibeto-Burman language group, were called Matwali (liquordrinkers) by the Bahuns and Chhetris whose caste status did not allow them to take alcohol which was considered polluting. These ethnic groups are called adivasi janajati (indigenous nationalities) in contemporary Nepal. The impure group, also called Pani Nachaine from whom water cannot be accepted, were collectively classified as achut (untouchable) ranked at the bottom of the caste hierarchy. Many social groups from the Tarai region were, however, missing from the muluki ain hierarchy, including a number of "untouchable" occupational groups such as the Chamars, Musahars and Tatma. So, ethnic inequality has been a constant and pervasive feature of the modern Nepali state. 12 A Sanskrit based language from which modern Nepali language was born. The Chetris used to be known as Khas and the language that they spoke was known as Khas Kura ("the speech of the Khas"). Today the word "Khas" is generally considered somewhat insulting in central Nepal but versions of it continue to be used in other Nepalese languages. The Gorkhali, Parbatiya, or Khas Kura language is now known as Nepali . Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (p. 3). London and New York: Routledge.

Figure 1

In fact, the complexity of the ethnic movements in Nepal is arguably linked to the extreme diversity of the social composition. In addition to this, there has been numerous overlapping categories of identity and, therefore, tagging specific ethnic labels or drawing certain ethnic boundary has been difficult over time. The Nepali state often contributed to the formation of ethnic identities by categorizing these groups under the same ethnic label and treating them as a single group. 13 The indigenous nationalities are internally extremely diverse. Besides, much variation exists within those groups who apparently share same ethnic label. The Tharus, for instance, share neither a common culture nor a language rather many ethnic groups across the Tarai region began to see themselves as sharing a Tharu ethnic identity once some Tharu elites launched a political movement to promote this idea in the midtwentieth century. 14 In addition to this, many Tharu share languages with other groups that are not labeled Tharu, such as those in eastern Nepal that speak Maithili. 15 The dominant caste-groups/ ethnic groups are Chhetri (16.6%), Brahman-Hill (12.2%), Mager (7.1%), Tharu (6.6%), Tamang (5.8%), Newer (5%), Kami (4.8%), Yadav (4%) and Rai (2.3%) 16 .

Brahman constitutes only a minor percentage of the total population but lead all the major political parties, the judiciary, the universities, and the civil service. Bahuns (Brahmans) and

Chetris togetherjust 31 per cent of the populationhad two-thirds of the jobs, whereas hill janajatis (excluding Newars and Tharus), with 22 per cent of the population had only 8 11 percent of the jobs. Dalits with near 9 percent of population had just 0.3 per cent of the jobs. 17 The Gorkha king Prithvi Narayan Shah, the symbol of Nepali Nationalism and the architect of modern Nepali state, unified the Himalayan state by invading and integrating the adjacent peripheral regions in the mid-twentieth century. He embraced the integrative policy of nation-building by enforcing a legal framework based on state sponsored cultural-religious ideology of Hinduism. The Shah dynasty endorsed Hinduism as a symbol of Nepali nationalism through concerted efforts to blend inherent rights with divine authority. 18 Since then, Nepal went through different types of regimes like 104 years of family rule of Ranas (till 1950), multiparty democracy (1950 to 1960), Party-less Panchayat System (1960 and multiparty system again in 1990. The integrative strategy of nation-building based on Hindu religious ethos touched the zenith during the Panchayat regime. However, bringing multiparty system back as a result of first peoples' movement was an important step towards the reconstruction of a new system to shape up Nepal socio-politically, culturally and economically because the endeavor of multi-party democracy is to ensure the representation of all the sections of the society in the political process. Peoples' Movement of 1990 can arguably be marked as the historical transition of Nepali politics because the reinstallation of democratic culture that instigated to dismantle the hegemony of Hinduism demonstrated to be a driving force behind the ethnicization of Nepali politics later on. The ethnic politics has been exaggerated in Nepal in the context of considerable political upheavals. The decade of Maoist insurrection (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006) accounted for almost 13,000 lives and the transposition of hundreds of thousands people. 19 The agonizing royal massacre 20 A major debate instigated to dominate the public sphere between those who believe that provinces must be demarcated on the basis of economic viability and others single-minded in their demand for identity based division of the country to counter the historical ostracism by the Kathmandu centre. The growing public opinion submitted that a large number of people were against identitybased federalism which was contrary to the momentum of Constituent Assembly (CA). Therefore, the CA had to function under relentless compression and menace from all political forces. Therefore, the task of constitution-making in particular and nation-building in general on the one hand and managing ethnic forces by reaching a point of consensus remain the dual challenge for Nepal. The state-building process amalgamated the dominance of Caste Hill Hindu Elites (CHHE) and marginalized the "other" ethnic minorities. 22 The Nepali state has institutionalized the values and culture of CHHE by endorsing Hinduism on the one hand and Nepali language on the other.

Even after the democratic transformation of 1990, these dominant groups continued to dominate every sector of the government and the leadership in the public sphere. 23

Review of Existing Studies Relevant to the Topic:

From within the wide-ranging bulk of literatures on the subject, only some of the significant studies have been briefly reviewed here by confining the appraisal limited to the ethnic problem in Nepal. Urmila Phadnis and Rajat Ganguly have provided a comparative appraisal of the dynamics of ethnic identities and movements in South Asia especially regions like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. 24 They have put forward two hypotheses, one, ethnic identity is a significant but not a sufficient requisite for evoking ethnicity, rather it is the mobilization and manipulation of group identity and interest by the leadership that leads to ethnicity; and two, the higher the states (material as well as emotional) of the community and its leadership in the power structure, the greater the possibilities for strengthening the building of the nation as an amalgamation of ethnic pluralities. They have offered a critical appraisal of the theoretical approaches and strained to understand the problems of ethnicity and nation-building within the conceptual framework of ethnic heterogeneity. Susan Hangen has untaken an insight on the recent ethnicization of Nepali politics beyond ideological struggles and insurgency. 25 She made convincing efforts to elucidate how the margins 13 inhabited by "marginal populations" are developing "non-hegemonic discourses" in Nepal.

According to Hangen, the emergence of a democratic environment between the end of the authoritarian Panchayat era and the plunge of the Hindu monarchy in 2008 endorsed new socio-political and liberal constructions to take shape and new forms of local governance defined by non-dominant ethnic communities to foster. 26 Likewise, Hangen's analysis intended to ascertain how new democratic discourses and practices were familiarized and understood by ethnic minorities, through which channels they have been stimulated (ethnicity based political party, village headsmen) and according to which community-oriented agendas and cultural reproductions. 27 For the author, ethnic variances presented by the self-identified "Mongols" serve as homogenizing cultural indicators, supposed to challenge the state authority, popularly depicted as subjugated by CHHE. 28 But the examination of the tools, discourses, and cultural strategies defined by the Mongol National Organization leadership underscores the complexity of rural and ethnic politics in Nepal. While the homogenization of "indigenous nationalities" is sought by Mongol political leaders, the latter hardly astounded language differences or the multitude of religious practices and societal patterns traditionally anchored in Nepal's rural landscape.

Another significant contribution in this field has been "Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal", edited by David N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka and John Whelpton, has considered the myriad changes in politics and culture underway in post-1990 Nepal. 29 David Gellner's introduction effectively laid the historical foundations and introduces comparative themes, the contested cultural domains of language and 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid 28 Ibid. (p. 51). 29 Gellner, D. N., Pfaff-Czarnecka, J., & Whelpton, J. (1997). Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom:

The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

religion. 30 John Whelpton's chapter, "Political Identity in Nepal: State, Nation, and Community" provides a useful history of the notion of "asali Hindustan" as well as an overview of the controversies that have pivoted on religious identity and linguistic diversity in the modern state.

In the next chapter, "The King and the Cow", Axel Michaels traces how the state since 1805 has utilized the sacredness of the cow in the legal codes to promote its hyper-Hindu credentials abroad and coerce internal integration, particularly vis-a-vis the non-Pahadi ethnic groups, especially the highland peoples. The contributors of this volume thoroughly explain ethnic politics of Nepal based on respective micro-level case studies. Harka Gurung's chapter, "State and Society in Nepal", subsidized an alternative history of state formation in ethnic perspective, added an important section on the chronology of early incidents of resistance to the Shah-Rana state. In conclusion, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka abridged the models of political rule in light of ethnic relations: pre-1950 under the "empire model", the panchayat era followed the "modern nationalism model", and the post-1990 epoch is "the patchwork of minorities". Pfaff-Czarnecka understands the "ethnicization of the state" as fashioned in reaction to its initial formation under the Shah-Rana state: the long-standing "closed society" of high caste Pahadis who controlled local development programs and harvested government employment for their own ethnic group.

David N Gellner's further investigation on this topic in the form of an article titled, "Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal", dispensed with the emergence, evolution and current trends of social inequality based on caste and ethnicity in Nepal. 31 He labelled the period of Party-less

Panchayat System as the phase of nation-building and the post-1990 era as the phase of "ethnicity building" 32 . To him, Nepal has been on the verge of facing the danger of an all-out ethnic war in 30 Ibid,. 31 Gellner, D. N. (2007). Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal. Economic and Political Weekly,42(20). 32 Ibid.

the Tarai between Madheshis and Parbatyas. But the existence of so many complex and crosscutting ethnic loyalties throughout the country makes a Sri-Lankan type ethnic polarization improbable. 33 However, the author has presumed that in the eastern Tarai with its 30% population belong to Parbatyas, there is a very real probability that "two majorities with minority complexes" could provoke each other in bloody vendettas. 34 In his article, Krishna Hachhethu 35 has branded the post-1990 transition of Nepali politics by flouting some of the traditional ingredients of nationalism and building of new values and systems for national unity and integration. Further, he has contended for the transformation of Nepali society and polity from a mono-ethnic nation to a poly-ethnic nation.

Mahendra Lawoti in his seminal contribution, "Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political

Institutions for a Multicultural Society" has scrutinized the problems with the post-1990 political system and provided a detailed blueprint for constructing a democratic polity. 36 Lawoti has been most concerned with ending the political exclusion of "marginalized socio-cultural groups". He has assumed if political exclusion continues, "there is a high possibility for violent ethnic conflicts and insurgencies in Nepal". 37 The exertion of this volume has been the quest for alternative democratic institutions that would facilitate the inclusion of these underrepresented groups. The author has presented the general critique of the 1990 Constitution and then placed some basic arguments in favour of federalism and reservations. He has also advocated for "ethnic federalism" 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Hachhethu, K. (2003, July). Democracy and Nationalism: Interface between State and Ethnicity in Nepal.

Contributions to Nepalese Studies, 30 (2), 217-252. 36 Lawoti, M. (2005). Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicultural Society.

New Delhi: Sage Publication 37 Ibid. as a way of providing autonomy to ethnic groups. Nevertheless, Nepal is highly fluid and fragmented, and the process of identifying which groups should be recognized by the government for reservations would be belligerent. Therefore, the question relics if ethnicity based territorial federalism is implemented, would these individuals be pressurized to leave their current homes and relocate to their own ethnic community dominated region?

Lawoti has, further, inspected the causes of the multiple conflicts and crises in Nepal during the 1990-2002 periods and develops guidelines to avoid them in the future in his later publication. 38 He has contended that over-centralization of the polity even during the democratic period resulted in the exclusion of ethnic and caste groups and promoted a culture of impunity. It also contributed to the growth of Maoist insurgency and facilitated government instability, corruption, and related crises.

In his recent work, Lok Raj Baral has taken a critical look at three important aspects of modern Nepal 39 : (a) viability of the Nepali State; (b) prospects and challenges of its liberal democracy; (c) strategies for managing the emerging geo-political trends. He has also described the values of secularism, the role of fractured parties, and external influence in the politics of Nepal. He has maintained that the political developments in Nepal comprises a series of jumpsshort, long, high, lowthat towards a liberal democracy. He has, further, illustrated that the end of Rana regime in 1951 as a high jump, followed first by King Mahendra's coup in the early 1960s as a jump backward -then the 1990 movement as a shorter jump, followed by the movement in 2006 as a much longer jump. According to him, Nepali politics keeps jumping around instead of settling on a liberal democracy because of the "sudden breaks" from the past. Thus, the end of Rana oligarchy twisted into a revival of the absolute monarchy because although there was a regime change, there was no change in the political culture. Similarly, "politics of disruption" played a major part.

Although the elements of liberal democracy were regained in 1990 but snatched by King Gyanendra from 2002 onwards and it continued up to 2006, when the Madheshi movement twisted a "long jump" that abolished the institution of monarchy. Baral has further acknowledged the central role played by the state in people's lives, and the realization of that compels them to revolt against their rulers time and again. The Nepali state largely belongs to a narrow caste-based group with a rigid culture, who relish a total control over the state structures such as the army, police and bureaucracy which has not changed even after the most serious attempt to "capture" the state mounted by the Maoists. The long time demand like "Hindi to be accepted as national language" is yet to be achieved and also the control over the army has been the exclusive privilege of high caste groups.

In his article Biswanath Chakraborty has hunted the determining factors and the nature of grass root leadership in Nepal. 40 He has specified factors like sex, caste, ethnicity, education, occupation, etc. as the regulating forces of grass-root level leadership in Nepal. The study has, further, proposed that in Nepal, Janajatis, Madheshis and Dalits are far behind than the Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars in terms of various Human Development Indexes like literacy rate, per capita income, life expectancy, etc. Chakraborty has summarized his article by upholding that a country with such diversity is required to accommodate all the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious groups both at the local level as well as at the national level politics. Likewise, the author has optimistically suggested that a change in the leadership structure could ensure the success of democracy in Nepal.

The aforementioned academic inquiries aids to comprehend the causes of marginalization of ethnic groups vis-a-vis the state efforts to create hegemonic form of nationalism. But the political and nationalistic discourse of the subaltern ethnic groups have been often intimidated by the "subjective" state-centric nationalism. The political development in Nepal in the last decade was so rapid that there was very little scope for undertaking a research especially on the issues of ethnicity and nation-building. The most of the available literatures in this field have comprehensively premeditated ethnicity and nationalism from the perception of the dominant ethnic groups or state-centric nationalist discourse but very little have been inspected from the outlook of the subaltern ethnic groups. These academic works have often dealt with the exposition of inequalities and disparities faced by the marginalized ethnic groups but a new enquiry is obligatory at this juncture to put profound insight into the ethnic problem in Nepal.

Objectives:

Considering the research gap in mind, this study has been designed in terms of three specific objects. Firstly, the thesis has investigated whether the process of transition from Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic has a correlation with the growth of ethnic assertiveness in Nepal. Secondly, the study has tested the process of constitution-making in particular and Nation-building in general in the light of ethnic politics in Nepal. Thirdly, this inquiry has appraised the demand of "ethnic federalism" as a mean to achieve more inclusive, institutionalized and sustainable democratic polity in Nepal. Finally, the thesis has ended with the summary of major findings and prescription of some important policy recommendations.

Methodology:

This investigation has been grounded on both quantitative as well as qualitative data. However, more emphasize has been given to quantitative data collected from various government and nongovernment reports and micro-level studies. The primary data have been obtained through a survey-based on purposive sampling conducted amid various ethnic groups. During the course of the field work, a sum of 200 respondents have been interviewed and 20 focus group (each group comprised by 10 respondents) discussions have also been conducted at venues like Kathmandu,Lalitpur,Bhaktapur,Biratnagar,Jhapa,Saptari,Lumbini and Birganj. In addition to this,20 experts including political commentators, academic experts and leading journalists have been interviewed during the field survey.

Chapter Outline:

Following this introduction, the thesis proceeds with a broad theoretical outline to contextualize ethnicity and nation-building in Nepal. The successive chapter titled "The Rise of Ethnicity in Nepal: An Appraisal of Nepal's Transition from Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic" has proven the correlation between the identity assertion by the ethnic groups and the transition of Nepal from Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic. The next chapter titled, "Politics of Constitution Making in Nepal: An Ethnic Perspective" has conceptualized the increasing political mobilization of marginalized ethnic groups and its reflection in the constitution making process between 1990 and contexts. However the global manifestation of ethnicity in the contemporary world has caught serious attention of social and political scientists. Both Modernist as well as Marxist theorists assume that "ethnicity will fade and even die out" with modernization and industrialization. 2 The assimilationist and "melting pot" 3 paradigm advocate for the "withering away of ethnic identification as a result of ethnic assimilation and amalgamation" 4 . But the significance and vitality of ethnicity in the contemporary world have been on the ascendance. Furthermore the question of ethnicity has been raised not only in the developed or industrialized world but also in the developing or the third world.

The developed states of Europe and North America have been experiencing a common form of ethnic nationalism i, e. the ethnic revival and growing political assertiveness of minority ethnic groups often ranging in demand from regional autonomy to secession.

Basques and Catalan in Spain, Bretons and Corsicans in France, Walloons and Flemish in Belgium, Scots, Welsh and Irish in United Kingdom, African-American in United States, and the French-speaking Quebecois in Canada are some of the examples. 5 The rapid political transformation and economic liberalization vis-a-vis the disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union have unleashed anti-immigrant and right-wing nationalist assertion in the developed world since 1980s. On the other hand, the rise of ethnic nationalism and the formation of ethnic political movements in the developing world especially in South Asia can largely be attributed to the process of colonization and decolonization which created many sovereign nations by setting aside prevailing ethnic and cultural diversity. 6 Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, almost all the South Asian states have been experiencing intermittent ethnic fragmentation and conflict of different forms. The "ethnicization of politics" and "politicization of ethnicity", therefore, result in rising ethnic consciousness. 7 Being one of the most plural societies in South Asia, Nepal has faced some serious ethnic turmoil since the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990. The processes of socio-economic change, the ethnic dimensions of power structure, and the policies, strategies and tactics adopted by various regimes in different historical contexts

to deal with the urges and aspirations of ethnic groups, therefore, provide the wider setting for academic understanding of ethnicity and the processes of nation-building in Nepal. 8

Making Sense of Ethnic Identity:

Making sense of identity is essential in our day-to-day life. We simultaneously belong to divergence category of identities based on different contexts. When these identities "compete for attention and priority over each other (they need not always, since there may be no conflict between the demands of different loyalties), the person has to decide on the relative importance to attach to the respective identities" depending on a certain context. 9

However, two distinct issues are to be carefully addressed in this connection -one, "the recognition that identities are robustly plural, and that the importance of one identity need not obliterate the importance of others"; two, "a person has to make choicesexplicitly or by implication about what relative importance to attach, in a certain context, to the divergent loyalties and priorities that may compete for precedence". 10 Identity movements express two complementary types of collective demandsthe defense of interests and the promotion of rights of certain groups of individuals who feel discriminated against, and the search for symbolic recognition by a significant other. Identity movements defend the interests, world visions, and values of groups of individuals or communities defined by such characteristics as phenotype (or race) and ethnicity; sex; language; sexual orientation; mythical origins and ancestral territory.

The term "ethnicity" is derived from ethnos, the Greek word for "people" or "tribe" or race, first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary only in 1972. However, the concept of -23 -ethnicity has long-founded roots. The word "ethnic" had appeared in the English language in the medieval age referring to those who were pagan or heathen. It was most likely that it derived from the Greek New Testament, which used it as a synonym for gentile. 11 Since then, the usage of ethnos, or ethnie (plural) has been subject to much discussion and variation. Often associated with what Edward Said would term the "other", today, as in ancient Greece, the term is often reserved to differentiate "us" from "them." For the Greeks, the foreign barbarians were the ethnea, while they would commonly refer to themselves as Genos Hellenon or the "family of Hellenes". 12 In the contemporary World, particularly the Western world, one is more inclined to refer to "nation" for themselves and "ethnic" for immigrant peoples, as in the frequently used term "ethnic minorities". This implies that the power dynamics is involved in the usage of the term "ethnicity"one that is often associated with differentiation and boundaries of, or indeed from, the "other", who in turn is often, although not exclusively, viewed as "exotic". 13

Defining Ethnicity:

Ethnicity is seemingly a straight-forward concept but it is subject to different interpretations. The scholars including anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists interchangeably use the terms "ethnicity", "ethnic groups" and "ethnic communities". The term "ethnic" primarily falls under the dichotomy of "us" and "them" likewise the ancient Greeks proudly designated themselves as "Helenians" and rests as the "Barbarians". Till now, different definitions have been used to define the term "ethnic group". Mention, here,

-24 -may be made that there has been an ongoing debate over the attributes of an ethnic group.

The subjectivists stress on the structural aspects of ethnic identity whereas the objectivists emphasize on the social psychological dimensions. The objectivists affirm that ethnic identity manifests through cultural markers while the subjectivists stress on the self and its feelings of identity. Then there has been a composite approach that has attempted to combine these two approaches and instead of stressing the preeminence of one approach over the other, they bring about a linkage between the two. As a political construct, ethnicity is viewed as a means to gain power. Oommen argues that ethnicity is a "product of disjunction between territory and culture". 14 Ethnicity as a cultural construct signifies a composite of symbolic markers, real or putative, used by the members of an ethnic group who define themselves and are defined by others as having a distinctive identity. 15 Weber viewed an ethnic group as a human collectivity based on an assumption of common origin, real, or imagined 16 . But his definition is too broad and under it almost all identifiable social groups become ethnic groups and therefore loses its analytical value. Frederic Barth defines ethnic group to designate a population which is biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction, has a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. 17 Wallerstein argues that the membership in an ethnic group is a matter of social definition, an interplay of self-definition of members and definition by other groups 18 .

Phadnis and Ganguly define an ethnic group as "either a large or small group of propel, in either backward or advanced societies, who are united by a inherited culture (including language, music, food, dress, and practices), racial similarity, common religion, and belief in common history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the group". 19 Cohen perceives ethnic group as "a collectivity of people who share some patterns of normative behaviour and form a part of a larger population, interacting with people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system". 20 According to Yinger, "an ethnic group is a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients". 21 Hutchinson and Smith define ethnic group by identifying six features including-one, a common proper name to identify and express the "essence" of the community; two, a myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in time and place and that gives an "ethnie" a sense of fictive kinship; three, shared historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration; four, one or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs, and language; five, a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnic, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with Diaspora peoples; and six, a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnic population. 22 Considering a wide range of definition of "ethnic group", the present study adopts the following definition:

Ethnic group are those imagined communities, imagined by themselves and/or by others, are united either by a shared culture, racial similarity, common religion, common birth-place, belief in common history or ancestry, a strong psychological sentiment and some shared patterns of behaviour.

Approaches to Ethnicity:

There are several approaches and perspectives on ethnicity. Primordialists argue that the tradition of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and territorial location is the pre-condition for the existence of ethnic groups 23 . It is "subjectively held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional criterion". 24 In the primordialist vision, according to McKay, -Man is seen as a leopard who cannot change his ethnic spots. 25 The Primordialist school is thus based on three focal arguments: one, ethnicity is an "ascribed identity" or "assigned status" inherited from ancestors; two, ethnicity is "static"; and three, common ancestry determines the ethnicity. 26 There are two variant views within the primordial school. The sociobiological perspective 27 , on the one hand, emphasis on the "sociobiological factor like kinship" and culturist perspective, on the other, stresses on the "importance of common culture" in determining ethnic identity. 28 is "socially constructed" or "socially determined" identity; and two, "ethnic boundaries are flexible or changeable". The constructivist school, however, encompasses several different perspectives like "emergent ethnicity" 30 , "theory of ethnicization" 31 , "resurgent ethnicity"

and "social constructionist" 32 The instrumentalists (Like Cohen), contrary to Primordialists and constructivists, explain ethnic persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power 30 William Yancey and his associates argued that "the formation, crystallization, and development of ethnic communities, cultures and identities" are "shaped by structural conditions" of "Industrialized process in the host society and the positions of ethnic group within it" [Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 44). New York: State University of New York]. 31 Jonathan Sarna maintained that "ethnicity is created by two conditions: ascription and adversity" [Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 44). New York: State University of New York]. 32 Werner Sollars argued that "ethnic identity is embedded in tradition which is created, sustained, and refashioned by people" [Yang, P. Q. (2000). Modernists make a much more straightforward historical claim about the origin of ethnic groups. The modernist assert that ethnicity and nationalism are distinctively modern phenomena. Depending on one's preferred emphasis, they have arisen in, and are essentially linked to, the age of "print capitalism" 36 , the rise of industrial or would-be industrial states with their "requirement" of cultural homogeneity 37 , or competition between elites for control of or access to the resources of the state 38 .

Post-orientalist claim that the state's classification project and the identities which resulted from it are the creation of colonialism. However, as Rogers points out, "A shift toward rigid categorization … was not uniquely colonial …parallel process was taking place in Britain itself and in other countries not under colonial rule". 39 Nepal, in fact, would be a good example of the latter. In the Nepalese case, the selfconsciously Hindu Rana regime designated the social units it recognized as jāt, essentially "caste", though the term could apply equally well to units that outside observers would view as tribes or ethnic groups. 40 Modernists neither deny that ethnic categories, collections of people sharing a common language and/ or culture, existed and often persisted in the pre-modern era nor that in many situations ethnic categories and cultural allegiances had some political significance. 41 However, they deny that before the eighteenth century national and ethnic identity were ever seen as the single overriding factor determining a person's political rights and duties

The epiphenomenalists assert that the class structures and institutionalized patterns of power in society are fundamental in explaining political events rather than any biological or cultural social constructions like ethnicity. According to this perspective, the exploitation of an ethnic group by the other(s) is an epiphenomenon, the second order reality, of real differences in power between ethnic groups. 42 The epiphenomenalist perspective, thus, uses class, for their political and economic motives to describe cause of ethnic conflict. Hence the source of ethnic enmity is not in the cultural differences of ethnic groups but in the nature of capitalist modes of production and the inherent inequalities that it produces. 43 Considering the above mentioned approaches on the nature and basis of ethnicity, one may reveal that an integrated approach is required to make a sweeping statement on ethnicity.

The ethnic identity is, therefore, partly ascribed but largely constructed by society, having relatively stable but changeable ethnic boundary, and subject to cost and benefit (rational choice) in partly determining affiliation and identification. Based on varying context and nature of affiliation in society, multi-layered ethnicity has become as a serious concern.

For example, within a linguistic ethnic group, there may be more than one ethno-religious groups or castes or races. On such scenario, an individual has to constantly make choices while identifying himself or herself with a certain ethnic identity based on a particular context. For instance, on the one hand, the ethno-religious identity was given relative 43 Ibid. 44 Cox, O. C. (1948

Ethnicity and Nationalism:

The significant compatibility between "theories of nationalism" and "theories of ethnicity"

is overlooked, to the extent that, "the two bodies of theory have largely developed independently of each other" 46 . Smith suggests that ethnicity offers "a potent model for human association which has been adapted and transformed, but not obliterated, in the formation of modern nations". 47 Connor, further, insists on "the ethnic nature of nations, thereby linking nationhood closely to a ubiquities and perennial ethnicity" 48 . A nation is, therefore, "a self-aware ethnic group" or "pre-national peoples" 49 .The "nation" or "national identity" are, therefore, respectively, varieties of ethnic collectivity. Hobsbawm, however, argues that nationalism and ethnicity are "different, and indeed non-comparable, concepts". 50 Since the nature of ethno-nationalism is reactionary to "state-centric nationalism" or "civic nationalism", the clash between the two often leads to a violent ethnic-war. Therefore, "the rise of nationalistic feelings on the part of ethnic minorities often proceeded hand in hand with the growing assertion on the part of majority and dominant ethnic communities for the promotion and, in some cases the restoration of their political, economic and sociocultural privileges". 56

Nations were not the determinant products of prearranged sociological settings such as language or race or religion; "they had been in Europe and elsewhere in the world, imagined into existence". 57 The "nation", is thus "an imagined political communityand 54 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 55 . The Ethnic Origins of Nation (First ed.) (p. 32). London: Basil Blackwell. 56 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 57 . Whose Imagined Community? In G. Balakrishnan (Ed.), Mapping the Nation (p. 216). London: Verso .

-36 -imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign". 58 Anderson also emphasized on the institution of "print capitalism" through which the "imagined community" came to acquire concrete shape. Furthermore nationalism was probably regarded as "Europe's most magnificent gift to the rest of the world". 59 However, it faced serious challenge in the middle of twentieth century when most of the colonies of European super-powers emerged as independent nation by asserting nationalistic sentiment based on the demand of selfdetermination. When the idea of "imagined community" and the "right to selfdetermination" are united, it gives rise to the principle of "national self-determination" which confers such rights to the nation "to determine the sovereign state to which they would belong and the form of government under which they live". 60 'The historical experience of nationalism in Western Europe, in the Americas and in Russia had supplied for all subsequent nationalisms a set of modular forms from which nationalist elites in Asia and Africa had chosen the ones they like'. 61 But "the most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a difference with the modular forms of the nationalist society propagated by the modern west". 62 The new democracies like Nepal, overwhelmed by the modular forms offered by the west, eventually, failed to design an indigenous democratic model of nationalism best suited to its people and culture. There are two types of state -37 -policies available to multiethnic states in the process of nation-building viz. integrative and pluralistic. 63 Nepal, ever since the unification, adopted the integrative model of nationbuilding which is suited for the homogenous societies of the west. It is noteworthy, however, in this regard that defining democracy in a diverse society is a challenging task since it has an additional task of accommodating diversities of various types.

In the age of globalization and technological advancement especially in the sectors of ecommunication, social and electronic media, the ethnic communities in various parts of the globe have been gradually but significantly becoming mobilized for the attainment of their political right of self-rule or secession. In fact, modernization can be extremely important for the development of nationalism, both civic nationalism and ethno-nationalism, by producing greater socio-political mobilization and increasing assimilation of those mobilized. 64 Therefore the general tendency of all the ethnic groups in the cotemporary world, is to transform from "relatively apolitical cultural community" into "an imagined political community" by emphasizing relative importance on the cultural history of the group through the process of "accommodation" and "assimilation" by political elites either from within the group or from outside the group. However identity based movements are entitled to expand and deepen democracy by pushing for status that are more equitable in their distribution of resources and power among their group members. 65 The core propositions of the nationalist doctrine neither furnish a complete theory of social change and political action nor define the unit of the population which can claim and enjoy its own state and government. 66

Ethnicity, Democracy and Federalism:

Ethnic politics is often viewed as incompatible with democracy. Political systems with multiple ethnic groups become less democratic because people vote, not as individual who are concerned with the common good, but rather as groups concerned only with group needs. Therefore, the incompatibility between ethnicity and liberal democracy it can be comprehended by reconsidering the very theoretical the foundation of liberal political order. Locke conjectured the "state of nature", the pre-social and pre-political condition of human civilization, as a state where people used to enjoy the natural rights of life, liberty and estate but once they entered into the modern civil society over and done with the social contract (the first treaty) and later on formed a liberal political order via constituting a civil government (the second treaty), the obligation of safeguarding the natural rights, thus, transferred to the state. Rousseau, though, forbidden Locke's second treaty arguing that the institutions of government are created not on the basis of a bilateral contract between people and a sovereign, but only as a commission, as agencies operating on behalf of and under the direct control of the people who, collectively, are the only sovereign. 67 In fact, the basic difference between Rousseau's arguments and the conceptions of Christenliberal-natural law lies in the fundamental dichotomy between morality and politics in the liberal idea of state. In liberal interpretations, man is seen as inherently imperfect, fallen because of an original sin; moral salvation is thought to be unfeasible in any form of political community, and the "good citizen" is not necessarily the "virtuous man". 68 For Rousseau, the origin of sin lies in society, not prior to it or outside it, and that it is only in a properly constituted political community that true morality can be realized. Rousseau, therefore, proclaimed that the presence of representative institutions with generic powers vis-à-vis people limits the natural rights in a liberal political order. In addition to this, the limited state fashioned by majorities consent could only toil for a "cosmetic equality" via "rule of law". Hence, the existence of communitarian essentials like ethnic sentiments and the changing pattern of inequality among ethnic groups persist beyond the theoretical jurisdiction of liberalism. Rousseau's contentions on the "general will", "constitutionalism" and "socialism", therefore, turn out to be convenient considering the lapses in liberal democratic model to address ethnicity. Schumpeter developed a "pluralist elitist equilibrium model" 69 of examining democracy in the context of socialism, and socialism in the context of capitalism. For Schumpeter, modern democratic exercise "presided over the process of political and institutional change by which the bourgeoisie reshaped, and from its own point of view rationalized, the social and political structure that preceded its ascendancy" 70 . He further argued that democracy should not be identified with "rule by the people" because just as popular rule need not necessarily require democracy, democracy does not necessarily constitute "rule by the people" 71 . Lijphart stumbled on a 68 Colletti, L. (1972). From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society. New York: Monthly Review Press Classics. 69 C. B. Macpherson characterizes Schumpeter as the founder and first systematic formulator of a "pluralist elitist equilibrium model" of democracy which became predominant in much of the political theory of the second half of the twentieth century. 70 Schumpeter, J. A. (2003). Capitalism, Socialism and democracy (p. 125). London and New York:

Routledge. 71 Ibid, (p. 246).

-40 -"model of consociationalism" by power-sharing among segmented groups as a remedy to sustain democracy in plural societies deeply divided along ethnic and religious cleavages. 72 He further recommended "consensus democracy" as appropriate for any society with a "consensual political culture". 73 In addition, Lijphart revealed nine different parameters to ascertain centrifugal/ centripetal tendency and potentiality of developing as a "consociational democracy" -the absence of a solid majority, cross-cutting economic cleavages so that there are no large socioeconomic differences among the segments, a moderate number of segments, segments of equal size, small population size, external threats to the nation, overarching loyalties, geographic concentration of segments and traditions of compromise and accommodation. 74 This model, therefore, putatively fits into segmented Nepalese society considering the existing flora of ethnic mosaic where none of these groups are measured as majority.

Federalism is a normative political philosophy that recommends the use of federal principlescombining joint action and self-government. "Federal political systems" are a democratic catchall terms for all political organizations that combine "shared rule and self-rule". There are, however, three different perspectives dealing with the interrelationship between federalism and nationalism. The first one holds that federalism and nationalism are mutually exclusive. French Jacobins, for instance, believed that federalism was hostile to the necessity of linguistic homogenization, a road-block in the path of authentic, indivisible, monistic popular sovereignty. Federalism, therefore, belongs 72 Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid.

-41 - with "multi-cultural constitutionalism" have successfully transformed many "divided"

Latin American societies into peaceful multicultural polities. The salient features of this multi-cultural model were "formal recognition of the multi-cultural nature of their societies and of the existence of indigenous people as distinct, sub-state social collectivities", "recognition of indigenous peoples' customary law as official public law", "collective property rights with restriction on the alienation of division of communal lands", "official status for indigenous languages in territorial units", "a guarantee of bilingual education". 75 2.7. Ethnicity, Power and Resistance:

The ethnic scenario in Nepal can be explained more empirically and effectively in the light of the Foucauldian theory of power-relations. Foucault challenges the idea that power is wielded by people or groups by way of "episodic" or "sovereign" acts of domination or coercion, seeing it instead as dispersed and pervasive. "Power is everywhere" and "comes from everywhere", hence in this sense, power is neither an agency nor a structure. 76 Foucault uses the term "power/knowledge" to generalize that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and "truth". Power subsists only when it is applied, and it does not depend on agreement or resistance. 77 Power operates only upon free subjects, presupposes the concept of freedom since the relations between power and the freedom of a person are inseparable. In addition to this, resistance to power is also a part of the power relations because power is the force that produces the resistance, determines its place, and administers it. In fact, from the existing form of power, resistance to power draws its means of struggle and its actual social position. A successful exercise of power, therefore, means promotion of certain forms of resistance no less than effective mobilization of means against this resistance. 78 Those resistances and individual forms that are promoted by the existing power relations also create conditions for preventing the appearance of other may be more dangerous and subversive forms of resistance. Foucault, therefore, defines various kinds of resistances, all of which finally questions the status of the basic identity of an individual-"who are we?" The quest for individual identity and the 76 Foucault, M. (1998). The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (p. 63). London: Penguin. 77 Ibid.

78 Minson, J. (1986). Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics. London: Macmillan Publishers.

-43 -desire to be different from others are the most important wisdom that a person possesses.

This kind of "identification with difference" can be happened at different levels -national and international, education and knowledge, culture and religion. It consists of analyzing power relations through the opposing strategies rather than analyzing it from the point of view of its internal rationality. Foucault, therefore, explains that a historical awareness of our present situation shapes our conceptualization of power relations which varies over a period of time. In this context, an analogy can be drawn to explain ethnicity. Ethnic groups claim for their unique identity in order to be different from others which results in a profound struggle that replaces the initial order of power and transforms power-relations.

It is, therefore, noteworthy here that although, "power-relations change positions of power in a political system, power, in essence, remains intact; it is the processes of the world and its systems that administer power, that change". 79 Ethnic politics is, thus, not exclusively a struggle to rectify the grievances of minority groups, but it is fundamentally about the distribution of state power along ethnic lines. It is the exclusion of the ethnic groups from state power and competition over sharing national resources that breed ethnic conflict. The traits of general ethnic upsurge has, therefore, been to attain power in order to modify their position in the "power binary" 80 . But what is unique in Nepal's case is the existence of multiple "power binaries" grounded on different contexts like in the region wise, Pahadi Nationalities. In Tarai also, Tharus, Muslims, Dalits and Tarai Janajaties can be placed at the margin of Madhesh. The division of groups in line with dominant and subaltern can, therefore, be useful in dealing with the question of inclusion and exclusion in Nepal. Weber came across that society is an "arena of conflict and struggle" over resources, between dominant and subordinate groups. He argues that there are many "status" groups in a society which possess varying degrees of social power. The conflict between ethnic groups in Nepal are, therefore, self-explanatory of the existing uneven power distribution in the society and polity.

Conclusion:

Politics in Nepal has been historically Kathmandu centric. It has been precisely in last two and half decades, the centre of mass of politics has been drastically shifting towards the political periphery of the Himalayan nation. Prior to unification of the country by Prithvi Hindu religious ethos and the royal army to exercise control over territory. 1 In fact, the Royal Army was "not (never) fully under the control of the elected government(s)". 2 The Nepali rulers including Shahs and Ranas, being die-heart Hindus both in ritualistic and functional terms 3 , had committed to shape Nepal as a homogenous, monolithic and unitary state protecting one religion (Hinduism), one language (Nepali) and one ethnic/ caste group, ignoring the reality of diversified and pluralistic character of Nepali society. In addition this, the process of hinduization led to the spread of parbatya Gorkha culture, institutionalization of caste system converting separate identity of ethnic group into caste structures, and centralization of politics and administration. Non-Hindu religions were, however, allowed but informally, were subordinated to the main Hindu religious tradition.

The pre-unification Nepal had, however, provided a rich cultural heritage-religious tolerance, adoptability, resilience, social harmony and secularism. 4 The indigenous nationalities of Nepal claim that they have been the victims of century old process of "hinduization" of the country by the dominant ruling class in the name of nationalism. 5 "Hinduization" can be understood as the process by which the Nepal have been turned into a "Hindu State" setting aside the diverse cultural, religious and linguistic nature of the people and often replacing their culture, religion and language with that of dominant Bahuns and Chhetris from the Hills of Nepal through political, legal and constitutional measures. 6 The leaders of indigenous nationalities movement contemplate the process of hinduization as the primary source of deprivation, discrimination and exclusion of indigenous nationalities. Hinduization has been the process by which Nepali language as well as Hindu practices have been introduced to the peoples in Nepal and have, further, been extended beyond linguistic and religious changes to include a whole complex of interrelated cultural changes ranging from the adoption of different values to that of different clothing styles and food preferences. 7 Some scholars also identify this process in a broader sense as "Nepalization" 8 . The analysis of the political development in Nepal in terms of the interrelationship between state and Hindu religion results in identification of three distinct waves of hinduization, each followed by a reverse wave.

On the Nepalese society had, formally, been recognized by the Constitution of 1990

conforming the global trend of "anti-assimilationist" and "anti-hegimonist" treatment of minorities which has been a significant departure from its persistant cultural policy. From the very first effort towards the drafting of the constitution, a confrontation between the King, who demonstrated an unwavering will to remain as the source of sovereignty, and the democratic alliance, began to develope. Although, there were demands for addressing the regional, religious, linguistic, gender and ethnic issues from all over the country, the commission unfortunately denounced these issues as a threat to nation's unity. 2 In fact, the commission's chairperson characterized most of the issues raised by the people as "unfortunate" and "peripheral" demonstrating their lack of Constitutional knowledge. This implies that in order to establish a nation-state, the discourse that is put forward is that the Nation states are embracing and cohesive, whereas ethnic groups are exclusive and divisive.

Nation states represent modernity while ethnic groups simply represent a harping, mis- Furthermore, Indigenous nationalities struggle against the feudal state structure had built on and kept reinforcing the dominance of a high-caste minority over the highly diverse majority, and had gained significant support and power during the Maoist insurgency (1996 -2006).

The ethnic struggle between 1990 and 2013 has nullified the hypothesis that the state policy The ethnic politics of Nepal in the 1990s seems to have elements conforming with both the primordialists and the instrumentalists models'. 87 In addition to this some foreign scholars also indicate the elitist nature of ethnic movements and thus Nepal has greater elements of instrumentalism and lesser primordialism. Gellner, for example, warned that "one should not assume that ethnic activists and ordinary people share the same agenda" 88 . Scholars from ethnic group discard instrumentalist and primordialist model and urge to see the ethnic movement of Nepal from the perspective of the principles of equality and struggle against discrimination. 89 Gurung (1999) stated, 'ethnic movements in Nepal are a natural outcome of age old suppression through the imposition of stratified hierarchical model by the Hindu rulers of Nepal, which needs to be removed with a view to making the hitherto deprived ethnic groups equal partners in the development of a single territorial Nepalese nationstate'. 90 However, the issue of diversity has been the main topic of discussion in the constituent assembly debates. This is a very difficult and highly conflict laden issue. The fundamental question during the Maoist insurgency was whether federalism based on ethnic affiliation will .be materialized. But after the Madhesh mutiny, the question that dominated the public discourse was whether "ethnic federalism" can be materialized as a mean to achieve more inclusive, institutionalized and sustainable democratic polity in Nepal.

In the federal system, there will be generally two governmentsthe state and central Canada has asymmetric federation because Quebec province has been given more autonomy in comparison to other provinces. The federal form where emphasis has given to the autonomy of various states and power is clearly divided, it is called dual federal structure. There is legislature and executive in every level. Since the states and the centre act autonomously, several works can be duplicated. This kind of federation is in Belgium, Australia, Brazil and Switzerland. The federal form where works are divided level-wise between the centre and the state is called cooperative federal system. In this duties and rights are distinctly divided between the centre and the state. The states also equally participate in formulating the policy of the centre. In such countries the centre formulates policy and makes laws and acts and the agencies lower than this implement the same.

Cooperative federal structure is in Germany, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Canada. Here, the question remains being what kind modular form of federalism will be suited for Nepal on the face of the demand of differential identity and autonomy by ethnic forces.

On the backdrop of the above discussion, it can be maintained that a radical transformation is necessary in Nepal in order to implement policies of federalism for immediate political effect. However it needs a thorough evaluation of the administrative and social ramifications. Such details are for the most part left undiscussed by the groups demanding these reforms, as well as the government that will be responsible for implementing them.

Although factions within both NEFIN and MPRF were quick to criticise the agreements -140 -that their leaders made with the government for not going far enough to ensure proportional representation and ethnic/regional autonomy, they offered few substantive alternatives to foster genuine inclusion. Madheshi leaders have yet to demonstrate how they will bridge the differences between the multiple geographical, linguistic, religious and ethnic groups that make up the Madhesh in order to achieve a genuine mandate. Despite the rhetoric of culture and CHHE dominated state apparatus. In the last decade all these features have either been eliminated or weakened. The nationalism of "Naya Nepal" can, now, be characterized by Secular state, inclusive democracy through the recognition of identities and institutions of various groups, recognition of multiple "non-Nepali" languages. Therefore, Nepali nationalism is transforming from mono-ethnic promise to multiethnic reality. Lowoti has maintained, 'If a nation is a self-defining cultural community that has a strong association with territory and seeks self-governance, then there are multiple nations in Nepal such as Tamang,Limbu,Newar,Tharu and Madheshi'. 2 Hence, the traditional definition of nation as "homogeneous cultural-political community"

is unable to address the nature of Nepali nation. Nepal is a unique case in this regard because almost all the ethno-nationalist movement are seeking autonomy for self-determination but that is also within the Nepali state not outside. Yet, the most problematic transformation of inclusive democracy though a little has done to substantiate it at the grass-root level.

Presently the procedure of proportional representation which has only been followed in the election of defined numbers of seats in the Parliament, is needed at the local level institutions in order to assure equitable representation of all the ethnic groups.

2. The issue of frequent violation of human rights of ethnic minorities can also be dispensed by adopting the model of "restorative justice" 3 . This model has been successfully working in New Zealand. 3. In order to accomplish political stability and democratic sustainability in near future, the Nepali state ought to adopt the model of "consociational democracy".

The First Wave:

The Gorkhali king Prithvi Narayan Shah, the architect of "Gorkha Imperialism", unified the Himalayan state by invading and integrating the adjacent peripheral regions. Some scholars, however, argue that the manner of annexure of this region was "particularly telling". 9 Shah had adopted the integrative policy of nation-building or "empire model of national integration" 10 by enforcing legal framework based on state sponsored cultural-religious ideology of Hinduism. The Shah dynasty promoted Hinduism as a symbol of Nepali nationalism through concerted efforts to blend inherent rights with divine authority. 11 However, in the Gorkha regime, "Hindu kinship was central but cultural practices in many ways followed the specimen of Mughal India". 12 Shah being a logical politician did not want to disturb the cultural diversity of newly invaded territories by revolutionary imposition of Gorkha culture. He familiarized the process of internal "cultural imperialism" through the instrument of hinduization to brand Nepal as the "asli hindustan". In addition to this, "Hinduism was being flexible enough to accommodate local religious traditions, so those who wished for patronage from the Gorkali state did not have to abandon their own previous belief system" 13 . The source of legitimacy that the Shah Monarch derived was from the divine right enforced by the the traditional Hindu view of the nobility of birth and the tradition coming through the ancient and the medieval times.

The king was, therefore, placed as a sovereign lord, a protector of territory and subjects, a guardian of moral order, an upholder of traditions, and the source of all spiritual and temporal power. 14 Since Hinduism provided legitimacy to the Shah regime, the Shah rulers, in turn, used it as an instrument of territorial integration by spreading it all over the country.

Thus, the process of assimilation fitted into the Gorkhali agenda of domination of one group over others. 15 After the demise of Prithvi Narayan, because of the weakness of his successors, instability and chaos among the "bhardars" culminated to the bloody "Kot Massacre" of 1846, which led to the emergence of the strong Prime Minister, Jang Bahadur Rana who introduced a system of hereditary prime ministers. The Shah King was, therefore, reduced merely to the de jure head of the land and the Rana family, by contrast, became the de facto rulers. However, both Shah and Rana regimes were based upon the patrimonial system governed by traditional authority. 16 Jang Bahadur had reinforced Hinduism through the promulgation of a unified civil code called "muluki ain", based upon it was regulated largely by hokum (order) of the king and bachan (advise) of the priests.

The significance of the contribution of Jang Bahadur in this regard is that he provided the legal framework to the Hindu caste system. Scholars argue that this arrangement had "worked more in the spirit of inclusion" as was an attempt for "the historical solution to the problem of cultural diversity". 17 But at the same time the mulki ain was promulgated at the cost of social and cultural equality. It translated diversity into inequality by putting ethnic groups into the fold of Hindu hierarchical caste system (See Table-

The First Reverse Wave:

The revolt against the traditional authority system in 1951 had marked the end the Rana authoritarianism followed by the establishment of multi-party democracy based on popular sovereignty. Then again the constitution of 1959 offered a "mixed system" that respected "both the inherited idea of the sovereign right of the monarch and the political process based on democratic procedure". 18 Despite of the legal abolition of caste discrimination, it had hardly translated into practice because of self-contradiction of the value system what the state ushered. The complementation between Hindu religion and caste system was well reflected in late king Birendra's perception of the source of legitimacy of monarchy when he remarked: 'In Nepal, the monarchy and his subjects have been governed by Dharma, a system drawn from the Hindu religion. The King cannot change this value system'. 19

The Second Wave:

King Mahendra got rid of multi-party democracy and substituted it by centralized Partiless Panchayat System. The new system allowed popular representation through committees or panchayats. The panchayats were modeled as per the ancient Indian subcontinental system called "Panch" where group elders used to make decisions for the community. The village and town panchayats were directly elected by the people, however, the district panchayats and national panchayats were elected indirectly by the representatives of the panchayats below the rank. 20 The resurgence of Monarchy and a rapid hinduization had been the significant feature of Panchayat regime. 21 The Panchayat regime had promulgated the new civil code of 1963 to uphold the old religious symbols and practices. It was, thus, a radical departure from the past as the constitution of 1951 which had recognized universal principle of equality. The constitution of 1962 had, however, identified Nepal as a Hindu nation for the first time unlike the previous constitutions (See Table- integration was based on homogenization and assimilation of diverse ethnic groups into the fold of parbatiya (hill) Hindu culture which was reflected in slogans of that period such as "our king, our country" and "one language, one dress, and one culture." Nepal-1951, 1959, 1962 The Ministry of Law, Govt. of Nepal.

The Second Reverse Wave:

The second reverse wave or the rise of subaltern narrative against the dominant religious discourse of Hinduism had began tentatively in 1990. The constitutional status of Hindu nationalism on the one hand and overwhelming presence of Bahun-Chhetris in the state apparatus on the other had hegimonaized over the subaltern discourses until then. Since the freedom of religion is greatly associated with democracy, the political events of this period had significantly been contributed to the process of transition of Nepali politics in -56 -the post-1990 era, and the adoption of Buddhism by Gurungs in the late 1980s can symbolically be placed as the beginning.

The Gumba controversy:

The Gumba controversy can be marked as the symbol of resistance or the anti-thesis of hinduization. After having practiced Hinduism for generations, Gurungs shifted to Buddhism to "create a more democratic polity". 24 However, the shift was not really the conversion since the Gurungs describe it as "return to their ancestral religion" rather than "the adoption of new religion". Prachar Samity, in this juncture, decided to found a small Gumba 27 . As soon as the Gumba was founded, the police began to monitor and even interfere the activities of the 24 Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 132). Washington DC: East-West Centre. 25 Ibid. 26 About 30 men from Maidel and two neighbouring villages were involved in the "Buddha Dharma Prachar Samiti". The most active member was Moti Lal Gurung, the wealthiest amongst all the members . Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 134). Washington DC: East-West Centre.). 27 Gumba literally means Monastery. It serves as a site for conducting rituals as well as teaching young lamas . Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 134. Washington DC: East-West Centre.] -57 -organization. A year later, an office order was issued by the bahun Chief District Officer 28 (CDO) of Illam district to close the Gumba. To materialize the order, a Tamang policeman put a padlock on the door of the Gumba and informed the Gurungs that the Gumba must be registered to be reopened. In addition to this, the local authorities tried their level best to remove the Gumba by using various means. The members of the Buddha Dharma Prachar Samiti, therefore, put lot of effort and spent money to get the registration from the Home Ministry but failed. The locked building of the Gumba was demolished, once the multi-party democracy was installed in 1990, and a new thatched-roofed Gumba was built in its place.

One fundamental question raised certainly from the Gumba controversy, that is, why the local authorities reacted to the gumba? Hangen extracted three explanation of this. One, the Gumba founders accepted the local authorities' explanation that the Gurungs were required to register the monastery. But there was no law dealing with the registration of monasteries. In fact there was a voluntary system of registering monasteries through a government committee called the Monastery Management and Development Committee (MMDC) which was formed to keep track of the number of monasteries in disrepair. Two, the closing or demolition the gumba was a part of the Panchayat state's policy to suppress all public organizing. Three, the local authorities did not want the Gurungs to become non-Hindu. Hence the CDO office issued orders to close the gumba because they wanted the Gurungs to follow Hinduism. 29 Interestingly, the Sherpas had built similar Gumba few years back than the Gurungs did few miles up the hill, yet they were not hasseled by the state or the local authorities. The central difference between the two incidents, therefore, remains that the Gurungs were previously Hindus whereas the Sherpas were not. Hence, the Panchayat regime had a negative approach to religious change although there were no laws regarding the shift in religion in that period. 30 The constitution of 1959 had, however, introduced an injunction in this regard and it also remained in the constitution of 1990:

'Every person shall have the freedom of profess and practice his own religion as handed down to him from ancient times having due regard to traditional practices:

Provided that no person shall be entitled to cause another person to change from one religion to another'. 31 Furthermore, the narrative of the Gurung shift from Hinduism to Buddhism became intertwined with the narrative of MNO mobilization in the 1990s. MNO's narrative was that the rejection of Hinduism is necessary to escape oppression from Bahuns. Therefore, the Nepali state perceived the shift to Buddhism to be clsely connected to the MNO's political movement. The Gurungs, however, did not view their shift from Hinduism as resulting from the choise between the two systems of beliefs. 32 Because the adoption of Buddhism engendered a shift in subjectivity for the Gurungs. This gave them a new form of identity that was inspired by the transnational Gurung movement to uplift Gurung culture 33 . The Gurungs probably wanted to overcome their marginality by switching over from the Bahun-Chhetri dominated Hindu power binary to outside the umbrella of Hinduism through the construction of a separate Gurung identity. That's why the Gurungs despite of being shifted their religious faith to Buddhism, they continue insist that the practice of Gurungs' Buddhism should be a distinct enterprize. 34 Hence, the narrative of Gurungs' shift to Buddhism has nullified the connection between the notion of democracy and the idea of religious freedom and choice. The closing of Gumba by the local authorities can, therefore, be marked as an evedance of lack of freedom in the panchayat era.

Boycott of Dashain Festival:

The boycott of Dashain has been one of the most significant event in the post-1990 ethnic There is a political dimension of Dashain holiday as well. The political hierarchies are reaffirmed and acknowledged during Dashain. As the individual members of the family receive tika and blessings from their higher rank kin, the political leaders also receive tika from their political superiors. Throughout the panchayat era, common villagers used to buy gifts and brought it to the Headmen of the village concerned in order to receive tika and blessings during Dashain. Therefore, in this way, Dashain plays a "legitimating role" in the political realm of Nepal. 37 Moreover Dashain has been a centerpiece of the Hindu identity of the Nepali nation. 38 Those who does not celebrate Dashain are perceived to be "outsiders to greater Nepalese society". 39 There was a debate amongst indigenous nationalities whether to boycott Dashain or not in the 1990s. But once MNO began to be strengthened its political base, the common villagers of Maidel began boycotting Dashain. From about 1991 to 1993, MNO activists led the Dashain boycotting activities. They tried to make people understand their own narrative that why they should receive Dashain tika.

Therefore, the boycott of the Dashain festival had clearly challenged the very definition of the Nepali nation. 40 The mytho-historical narrative, highlighted by the protagonists of Dashain boycott, is interesting and singnificant indeed. This discourse suggests that Dashain is celebrated in Therefore, the subaltern discourse of the Mongols defies the dominant nationalist narrative of how Nepal was unified under the leadership of the royal family's ancestors by describing this as a process through which the original Mongol rulers had lost power. The Dashain boycott had, therefore, been the strategic move from the MNO to substantiate its shared non-Hindu identity.

-62 -

The Third Wave:

The post-janaandolan-I conspiracy of King Gyanendra to destabilize the democratic process and constitution by using the loyalty of the "royal army" towards "the palace" had given rise to people's discontent against the political parties that led to the growth of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 for a decade. 44

The Third Reverse Wave:

The erosion of devine right of the Monarch had been quite evident in the Royal Massacre of June, 2001 in which King Birendra and his entire family and five other members of the royalty were killed. This incident had a profound impact in the minds of common masses who, until then, believed that the royal kings are devine and, therefore, alien to the humanity. The royal massacre and the follow up events in the royal palace created a skepticism in peoples' minds that "kings are not different from common masses".

However, the report of a probe committee found the dead crown prince Dipendra as the culprit of the royal massacre, though the people of Nepal, on the whole, did not accept the findings of the two-member committee headed by the chief justice since the committee had wrapped up its work in a hurry and in a suspicious manner. Furthermore, its findings had been taken by the people as an eye wash of a further conspiracy in the palace. 47 The royal -64 -massacre, therefore, brought about a change in the relation between the monarchy and the people since Gyanendra's succession as the new king was in a horizontal line, unnatural and against tradition, if not illegal. Although Gyanendra tried to project his kingship as the core of the Hindu ethos and also cultivated a leverage for the Hindu monarchy for obvious reasons. In fact, answering to a question from a news correspondent, Gyanendra stated that he was glad to see his role as the preserver of all things, a role that has been spelled out for a king in Hindu mythology as the personification of the god Vishnu. 48 The political development after post-2006 mass movement had nullified the theocratic nature of Nepali state. 49 Nepal was declared as "multi-ethnic" and "multi-religious" state by the Interim Constitution of 2007. The constitution affirmed that "the state would not profess any religion", however, "religious groups would have the freedom to profess their 48 . The Maoist Agenda of Restructuring the State: An appraisal. In: Nepal: Facts of Maoist Insurgency (p. 40). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 49 Baral, L. R. (2012). Nepal-Nation-State in the Wilderness: Managing State,Democracy,and Geopolitics (p. 34). New Delhi: Sage Publication.

-65 -respective religion". 50 Furthermore, the abolition of all kinds of discriminations based on religion were substantiated by the supreme law of the land. The secularization allowed people to embrace broad socio-cultural and human values that can only be possible in a democratic polity.

Indigenous Nationalities Narrative on Systematic Exclusion:

The first systematic challenges to the exclusionary state policy were undertaken by the Indigenous Nationalities Movement. The indegenous groups had organized collective protests throughout the country in 1990s in order to restore and defend cultures and practices that contradicts the dominant discourse of "Nepaliness". Unification of these disparate groups was formalized through the creation of the Adivasi Mahasangh or the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities which had reframed Hindus as non-natives, a rhetorical move that also enables ethnic activists to portray the dominant group as colonizers whereas indigenous groups are "original" and, thus, more authentically Nepali than caste Hindus. The movement also intentionally worked to introduce race as a form of self-identification in Nepal, in the process of strengthening racial identities for both the marginalized and their oppressors. The spite of these developments, the constitution of 1990 was contradictory and ambiguous towards indigenous nationalities like the historical markers that preceded it. 9 In order to trace out the theortical cause of this one can revisit Rousseau's critique of liberal political order which suggests that liberal constitutions promise equal rights only for the members of the "political society" not for the entire "civil society" and, therefore, parochial, exclusive and limited in scope. Rousseau's remedy to this has been a Constitution based on "general will". "multi-lingual" status, however, Hinduism was given privileges over other religions.

Similarly, the Chapter-10 on Quadrupeds of the Country Code (1963) stated that "whoever takes cows, bulls, bullocks or calves of any category to a foreign territory from Nepal and slaughters them, causes them to be slaughtered, he/she shall be liable to a punishment of imprisonment for 6 years" 10 . This law prohibits indigenous nationalities from slaughtering of cows which are sacred to Hindu religion only. As a result of this, indigenous nationalities continue to face social discrimination being labeled as "cow-eaters." According to the preamble of the Country Code (1963), "…punishments shall not be more or less merely based on people's higher or lower status…" This clearly shows that the Country Code recognizes the higher and lower status of Nepali society although the constitution mandates equality for every citizen regardless of their background. 11 Indigenous Nationalities rights over the natural resource of the country were snatched through discriminatory law like Land Eviction of the Country Code, 1963. It stated that "Kipat (common communal property) lands which lack official documents are equivalent to Raikar, lands on which taxes can be levied."

-77 -Furthermore, Article 6 (1) stated that "the Nepali language in the Devnagari script is the language of the nation of Nepal" therefore "shall be the official language". This article is discriminatory as it does not recognize other indigenous languages as the languages of the nation of Nepal although the constitution recognizes the country as a multilingual nation.

Indigenous intellectuals and activists argue that only the Khas language spoken by Bahuns

and Chhetris of the Hills should not be the only "language of the nation" because there are more than a hundred languages spoken in Nepal. 12 In 1999, the Supreme Court banned the use of local language as formal language in local bodies. The apex court had made the ruling in response to a writ filed against the use of Newari and Maithili language by Kathmandu metropolitan and Rajbiraj municipality, respectively. 13 In addition to this, the rticle 18 (2) stated that "each community shall have the right to operate schools up to the primary level in its own mother tongue for imparting education to its children". Communities were not allowed to operate schools in their own mother tongue beyond the primary level which promotes the "one language policy". This has discouraged the reduction of drop out rates of indigenous nationalities whose first language is not Khas Kura. The lower literacy rate among indigenous nationalities has lagged them behind as it has "lowered their ability to articulate and demand rights, compete for administrative and political positions, and be effective supporters of ethnic movements and parties among other things". 14 The interrelationship between language and culture is wide and complex and the debate over linguistic and ethnic/cultural inequality and intercultural communication is there to stay in Nepal for a long time, in fact, as long as the "them" and "us" mentality is present in those who come to power. Therefore, it is important to rhetorically analyze such discourses and identify and understand the hidden agendas before giving any approval to any plans and policies that deal with the critical issues of language, culture, and ethnicity in the newly democratized nations like Nepal.

Nepal Adivasi Mahasangh (NEFIN):

The Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) is an umbrella organization of indigenous nationalities in Nepal, identifies itself as an autonomous and politically nonpartisan organization 15 . It was formed after the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal, 1990 with 8 member organizations with the goal of documenting, preserving and promoting cultures, languages, religion, customs, and traditions of the indigenous nationalities of Nepal and to assist them in developing and obtaining equal rights. 16 The focus on strengthening ethnic and cultural identity was particularly essential after the first peoples' movement because they had been damaged, and any effort to restore them had been suppressed by the monolithic policy of "one culture" 17 .

The 19 In fact, these areas had been a target of leftist proselytisation from the 1950s onwards and the village of Thabang was known as a communist stronghold already in the panchayat days. Maoists established a magar-dominated "special district" (bishes jilla) in their heartland in west Nepal in April 2002 which led the way for the later declaration ofautonomous regions in January and February, 2004. The entire country was divided into nine "autonomous" regions, which on paper were the first level of government below the national. 20 Six of the nine were named on an ethnic basis, and the unspoken assumption was that the leader of that region and the majority of the representatives in the regional government must come from the ethnic group so named, though no explicit statement to this effect is to be found in the Maoist rule book. 21 Organization. Rather, they are of the opinion of accepting the word "Tarai" derived from the Persian word "Tar" which means "low", the nature of the plain region. Scholars like and argue that the Tharus are the only original inhabitants of Tarai whereas the Hindus and Muslims are migrants into the Tarai or the decedents of those migrants. In fact on the aftermath of the first amendment of the interim Constitution, 2007, when the government used the word "Madheshi", Tharus protested against it to substitute the word by "Tarai".The government, henceforth, used the term "Tarai-Madhesh". Dahal, P. (1997). Nepalko Itihas (History of Nepal) (First ed.). Kathmandu: M. K. Publishers and Distributers. 26 In his letter written to his Army officials in November-December, 1971, Prithvi Narayan Shah used the word 'Madhesh'. 27 Chitwan, Jhapa, Morang,Rupandehi,Sunsari,Dang,Banke,Bardiya,Kanchanpur,Nawalparsi,Kailali,Dhansura,Saptari,Parsa,Kapilbastu,Bara,Siraha,Sarlahi,Mahottari,Rautahat. 28 Indo-Nepal Border comprised by four India States viz, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttrakhand. 29 . Nepalko Madheshi Samaj (Madheshi Society in Nepal) (Upgraded ed.).

Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 30 Ibid. 31 40 Besides Shah ordered "not to call up Tamangs, Newars and Madheshi in the army" 41 . Even the Pahadis from India are not questioned about their loyalty to the state. Madheshi political elites, on contrary, firmly turn down this allegation and skepticism. Nevertheless, the Madheshis believe that Madhesh-India relation is unique and incomparable. They consider that Madhesh is having a special relation or "roti-beti ka sambandh" 46 with India.

They further argue that there is hardly a family in Madhesh where they have not married their daughters off in India or where they have not brought brides from there. Madhesh is thus dependent upon India for virtually everything-from brides to grooms to goods, jobs and education 47 . Having such kind of intimate relationship with India has probably given negative signal to the Kathmandu centre and consequently have strengthened "othering" of . Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (First ed.). Washington DC: East-West Centre. 55 The traditional dress of ruling hill communities of Nepal. 56 The traditional dress of Madheshis. 57 The cultural conflict between Dhoti wearing Madheshis and Topi (Traditional hat in the Hills) wearing Pahadis.

-93 -lingual region (See Table - 59 In response, the Tarai Nepali Congress 60 (TNC) initiated "Save Hindi" campaign. In November 19, 1957 pro-Hindi and pro-Nepali groups clashed in Biratnagar where many people injured. 61 languages are yet to be accepted in official purpose and the medium of instruction in educational institutions. 63 Lok Raj Baral has characterized the political activities of the Nepali Congress between 1963 and 1968 as "disillusionment" . Oppositional Politics in Nepal (Second ed.). Lalitpur: Himel Book Classics]. 64 Lawoti, M., . Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (p. 21). London and New York: Routledge.

Relative Deprivation of Tarai-Madhesh:

Tarai-Madhesh has been the backbone of Nepali national economy with more than 60 per cent of the ago-industry contributed two-thirds of the GDP. Despite of that almost in every social sector, Madheshis are lagged behind than the Pahadis. More than half of the population reside in Tarai but there is less number of schools with very poor School-Student ratio (Table -4.5). There are only 25% Primary Schools, 25% Upper Primary/ Lower Secondary Schools, 36% Secondary Schools and 40% Higher Secondary Schools in Tarai.

Interestingly Tarai has the more population (4862582) than Hill (4077611) in the age group of 5-19. Furthermore the School-Student Ratio is as low as 140/School. These indications are really made a case of relative deprivation in the Tarai.

-96 -

Democratic Deficit:

Democratic deficit simply refers to "inadequate opportunities for popular participation". 66

Participation includes not only the institutional representation in the Legislature, Local Government, Bureaucracy, Political Parties, Army, Police, etc. but also informal representation in the State-building process through building public opinion. The restoration of democracy in 1990 generated a lot of hope amongst the marginalized groups in this regard 66 Heywood, A. (2007). Politics (Third ed.) (p. 448). New York: Palgrave Foundations.

-100 -but there was hardly a genuine transition to an inclusive democracy. 67 The democratic years (1990 -2002) were thus a form of "exclusionary democratization". 68 The major precondition of inclusive democracy is believed to be the active participation of the people in was operating from across the border areas of India. The royal government was probably assumed "the Nepali Congress and India as being the main threats to the territorial integrity of the Nepali state as well as to its own rule". 72 However the differential criterion of descent was retained by the Constitution of 1990 and was continued until 2006 when the Citizenship Act of Nepal was amended. As a result nearly 3.5 million people estimated to be without citizenship certificates, the majority of them were from the Tarai region. 73 Among many formalities to obtain the citizenship certificate, Madheshis needed to exhibit official documentation of property ownership in Nepal which "created a vicious circle because without a citizenship one cannot get a property ownership document". 74 The Citizenship Act Table -4.9).

-104 - Furthermore, 'the relatively low representation of Madheshis need to be understood in the context of many political parties (See Table - 4.10), especially the Nepali Congress, having used the Tarai as entry point to launch various political struggles as well as to maintain a presence in Nepal while in exile in India. Representation in Bureaucracy is regarded as one of the major indicators of sound democracy. But in this case also the Tarai-Madheshis lagged far behind compare to Hill origin people (See Table - 4.11).

Representations of Madheshis in Gazatted Level

Employment at all classes is seriously poor and a matter of utmost concern. Army has played a major role in Nepali politics. Since the time of Shah-Rana regime, Army has been dominated by the Pahadis. The common Madheshi people in the street allege that since the recruitment in the Army is fully in the hands of Pahadis, they often discourage the Madheshis to join army (See Table- 4.12). This is probably due to the perception among Hill based political elites that 'Madheshis are not loyal to the Nepali state and would act in the interests of India along with commonly held belief that Madheshis are "less martial". 78

78 Sijapati, B. (2013).

The Demand of Autonomy and Self Determination:

The demand of autonomy and self-determination in Nepal is neither new nor imported from the west. Prithvi Narayan Shah himself granted internal autonomy to Limbus 2 back in the latter half of eighteenth century. 3 A royal order was issued in this connection in 1774 by King Shah which said, "Although we have conquered your country by dint of our valor,

-115 -we have afforded you and your kinsmen protection. We hereby pardon all your crimes, and confirm all the customs and traditions, rights and privileges of your country". 4 Limbus from far-Kirat, however, revolted for the encroachment of ethnic autonomy in 1792. Then, Khambus from Mid-Kirat, demanded for local autonomy in 1808. In the eastern hills, Kirats launched an insurgency for local autonomy and supersession in 1950. Tamangs also revolted for the same in 1951. peoples from other areas for autonomous provinces, Nepal shall be a Federal Democratic sealed in the minds of many" 9 The restructuring debate has, thus, focused more on "state nation" rather than "nation-state". 'Nation-state advocates making one-caste state whereas state nation considers the whole communities resident within the geographical limit of the state as the nation'. 10 The Maoists were the only mainstream political party with a strong public commitment to federalism. They used it not only during the war to build support but they campaigned on it in the elections, giving more detail than others on how "ethnicfederalism" should work. 11 The Maoists utilized the subaltern discourse of marginalized ethnic groups by expanding their alliances with these groups. The Maoist insurgency, 'Arrangements will be made for a federal state with regional autonomy while the sovereignty, national unity and integrity of Nepal will be kept intact during the restructuring of the state. The rights, nature and limits of regional autonomy will be as decided by the constituent assembly'.

-124 -

The role of State Restructuring and Division of State Power Committee was very significant for federalism. The committee had identified two main parametres of the basis of federalism i, e., Primary Basis (Identity) and Secondary Basis (Ability). The former includes ethnicity, language, culture, geography/ region and history whereas the later covers "economic interdependence and ability", "condition and prospect of infrastructure development", "availability of natural resources" and "administrative accessibility". 22 The preamble of the report states that the restructuring is needed "to solve the prevailing issues of class, caste, regional, gender, and community by ending the unitary structure of the state and transforming Nepal into a progressive democratic, inclusive and proportional federal republic" by "establishing independent, autonomous, and sovereign provinces, Federalism is a secondary issue for them. Although not necessarily fundamentally opposed to it, they are critical towards provinces based on identity.

4.

A viable Local Government would confer powers to the subalternized sections.

3 Restorative justice is a way of thinking about crime and conflict. It is not a particular practice or type of program, but rather a philosophy, or a set of principles. The United Nations Working Group on Restorative Justice defines it in the following way: a process whereby parties with a stake in a particular offence resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future Restorative justice processes worldwide are premised on the following principles: holding the offender accountable in a more meaningful way of repairing the harm caused by the offence achieving a sense of healing for the victim and the community, reintegrating the offender back into the community.

-145 -5. There should be an opportunity for all the ethnic groups to take education in their vernacular languages.

6. Affirmative actions including researvation of seats in all govt. jobs as well as educational institution and local bodies along with financial assistances in the form of scholarship ought to be provided to the marginalized sections in order to achieve socio-economic justice.