Doctoral Thesis

THE QUESTION OF ETHNICITY: IMPLICATION FOR THE PROCESS OF NATIONBUILDING IN NEPAL (1990-2013) Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science By Asis Mistry Department of Political Science Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata 2017 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to express my appreciation to a number of individuals who have provided invaluable assistance to me during the process of writing this dissertation. First of all, I would like to express gratitude to Professor Biswanath Chakraborty for his guidance all the way through this research work. In addition, I have acquired invaluable advices from the faculty members of the Department of Political Science of Rabindra Bharati University including Professor Sabyasanchi Basu Roy Chowdhury, Professor (late) Rajashree Basu, Professor Abhik Kumar Roy, Professor Arunabha Ghosh, Professor Bankim Mondal and Professor Ishani Naskar. During the passage of field work, I met a large number of people belonging to various professions and political persuasions and, therefore, the list is too long to acknowledge individually. Nevertheless, I am immensely grateful to all of them for enlighten me on various facets of the society, culture and politics in Nepal. I would like to show gratitude to Prof. Lok Raj Baral and Sri Chandra Kishore Jha for the assistance that they provided during my field visit. In addition to this, I would like to acknowledge to my family especially to my wife for the mental support. Moreover, it is my duty to thank the respondents for their time and cooperation during the course of the lengthy survey and interview process. Kolkata ASIS MISTRY Date: 25/10/2017 II TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1.1.Introduction 01 1.2.Statement of the Problem 03 1.3. Review of Existing Studies Relevant to the Topic 12 1.4. Objectives 18 1.5. Methodology 19 1.6. Chapter Outline 19 CHAPTER II: CONTEXTUALIZING ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING IN NEPAL 2.1. Introduction 20 2.2. Making Sense of Ethnic Identity 22 2.3. Defining Ethnicity 23 2.4. Approaches to Ethnicity 26 2.5. Ethnicity and Nationalism 33 2.6. Ethnicity, Democracy and Federalism 38 2.7. Ethnicity, Power and Resistance 42 2.8. Conclusion 45 III CHAPTER III: THE RISE OF ETHNICITY IN NEPAL: AN APPRAISAL OF NEPAL’S TRANSITION FROM HINDU MONARCHY TO SECULAR REPUBLIC 3.1 Introduction 47 3.2. Monarchy and Hinduism 47 3.2.1. The First Wave 49 3.2.2. The First Reverse Wave 52 3.2.3. The Second Wave 53 3.2.4. The Second Reverse Wave 55 3.2.4.1. Gumba Controversy 56 3.2.4.2. Boycott of Dashain Festival 59 3.2.5. The Third Wave 61 3.2.6. The Third Reverse Wave 63 3.3 Conclusion 65 CHAPTER IV: POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN NEPAL: AN ETHNIC PERSPECTIVE 4.1. Introduction 68 4.2. Indigenous Nationalities Movement 70 4.2.1. Indigenous Nationalities Narrative on Systematic Exclusion 71 4.3. Nepal Adivasi Mahasangh (NEFIN): 78 4.4. Maoists Ethnic Agenda 80 4.5. Madhesh Uprising 81 4.5.1. Early History and Demography of Tarai-Madhesh 82 IV 4.5.2. Tarai- Madhesh in the Context of National Integration 84 4.5.3. Immigration and Emigration in the Tarai- Madhesh 89 4.5.4. Politics of Custom and Language 91 4.5.5. Relative Deprivation of Tarai- Madhesh 95 4.5.6. Democratic Deficit 99 4.6. The Changing Dynamics of Madheshi Politics 106 4.6. Conclusion 110 CHAPTER V: FEDERAL RESTRUCTURING OF NEPALI STATE: MYTH OR REALITY? 5.1 Introduction 112 5.2. The Demand of Autonomy and Self-determination 114 5.3. Attempts of State Restructuring (Prior to 1990) 116 5.4. Federal Restructuring in the Post-1990 117 5.5. Constitutional Proposal and Committee Proceedings 123 5.6. The Stand of Political Parties on Federal Restructuring 126 5.7. The Role of Civil Society in Federal Restructuring 134 5.8. Conclusion 139 CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 6.1. Summary of Findings 141 6.2. Recommendations 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY 146 - 164 APPENDIX 165 - 171 V LIST OF TABLES Page No. Table- 1.1. Region-wise ethnic/ caste groups in Nepal with hierarchical rank 09 Table- 3.1 Social hierarchy in Nepal as per the Mulki Ain, 1854 52 Table- 3.2. Status of Religion in different constitutions of Nepal 55 Table- 4.1. Overview on cultural status of indigenous nationalities 73-74 Table- 4.2. Janajatis represented under various political parties in the Constituent Assembly, 2008 78 Table- 4.3. Population Growth in Tarai-Madhesh 92 Table- 4.4. Major languages in Nepal 95 Table- 4.5. No. of Schools in Nepal 96 Table- 4.6. Human Development Index (HDI) of Caste/ Ethnicity, 2011 (Nepal) 97 Table- 4.7. Rank on the basis of HDI among 75 districts 98 Table- 4.8. Poverty rate in Nepal in Percentage (2011) 99 Table- 4.9. Representation in the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, 2008 104 Table- 4.10. Representation of Madheshis in mainstream political parties 104 Table – 4.11. Representation of ethnic groups in administrative services 105 Table- 4.12. Candidacy for Different posts in Nepal army 106 Table – 5.1. Demands of different ethnic groups 115 Table- 5.2. Demands for autonomy by indigenous ethnic groups 124 Table- 5.3 Position of Political Parties on Federalism Table- 5.4. For or against autonomy of self and/or others VI 129-132 139 LIST OF FIGURES Page No. 1.1.Ethnographic Map of Nepal 06 4.1.Loss of Territory to British East India Company by King Bhim Sen Thapa 87 VII LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CA Constituent Assembly CHHE Caste Hindu Hill Elites CPN(M) Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) CPN (Maoist) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) CPN (ML) Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist Leninist) CPN-UML Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist Leninist CPN (Unified) Communist Party of Nepal (Unified) CPN (United) Communist Party of Nepal (United) GDP Gross Domestic Product INGO International Non-governmental Organization MNO Mongol National organization MJF Madheshi Janaadhikar Forum NA Nepal Army NC Nepali Congress NC (D) Nepali Congress (Democratic) NCP Communist Party of Nepal NGO Non-governmental Organization NSP Nepal Sadbhawana Party PR Proportional Representation RJP Rashtriya Janashakti Party RNA Royal Nepal Army RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party RPP-N Rashtriya Prajatantra Party- Nepal SPA Seven Party Alliance T-MLP Tarai- Madhesh Loktantrik Party UCPN(Maoist) Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) ULF United Left Front UML Unified Marxist Leninist VIII LIST OF APPENDICES Page No. Annexure-I: Questionnaire for Interview of the Leading Personalities of Different Ethnic Background: Annexure-II: List of Group Discussion Agenda and the Particulars of Venues: Annexure-III: 167-168 List of Organization/ Offices Visited for the Collection of Primary Data during the Course of the Fieldwork: Annexure-IV: 165-166 169 List of Persons/ Experts Met/ Interviewed in the due Course of Fieldwork: IX 170-171 CHAPTER- I INTRODUCTION 1.1. Introduction: Politicization of ethnicity and ethnicization of politics are tangible in most parts of the contemporary World. However, the manifestation of various ethnic sentiments in the public sphere has been comprehended only in recent times but the issue of ethnicity is penetrated the ancient anthropological history. Ever since the early days of human history, people incline to constitute groups or communities for their safety and security. Later on, the progression of civilization has perceived the construction and abolition of numerous shared identities in different historical milieus. In general, an ethnic group is a group of people who share a common and historical identity. These groups have harmonized, strived and contravened throughout the human history. However, it was only in the twentieth century that the question of ethnicity entered into the political arena and grown strength to strength in the light of doctrines like freedom, selfdetermination and democracy. The processes of socio-economic transformation, rising democratic values, globalization, and the policies and strategies taken by different regimes to covenant with the aspirations of ethnic groups have provided the impulse to the proclamation of ethnic sentiments. The challenge of ethnic cataclysm is correspondingly felt by developed states of Europe and North America as well as the developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. A common form is the ethnic reinforcement and growing political assertiveness, often vacillating in plea from regional autonomy to secessions of minority ethnic groups, such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Bretons and the Corsicans in France, the Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium, the Scots, Welsh and Irish in the United -1- Kingdom, the African-Americans in the United States, and the French-speaking Quebecois in Canada1. In the late twentieth century, ethnic conflict intensified into a violent civil war in disintegrated USSR and Yugoslavia. Ethnic identity has been a crucial variable of formation and consolidation of state structure in South Asia as well2. The creation of India and Pakistan and later on Bangladesh on the basis of ethnic identity, civil war between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri-Lanka, politicization of ethnicity by the Maoists in Nepal are some of the few specimens of growing ethnic assertiveness in this South Asia. Therefore, the task of national integration and nationbuilding in this part of the globe has been seriously endangered vis-a-vis the rise of innumerable ethno-nationalistic sentiments. Thus, a major challenge for these plural states of South Asia has been to play the dual role of managing the ethnic forces on the one hand and carrying out the task of nation-building on the other. All the South Asian states have witnessed sporadic ethnic fragmentation and conflict in different magnitude in the latter half of the twentieth century. Therefore, if the urge for recognition as “nations” based on “ethnic self-determination” is symbolized as a resistance against the overriding power structure of the state, South Asia has been “a kaleidoscope of latent, overt and explosive ethnicity”.3 The intensification of nationalistic spirits on the part of ethnic factions frequently proceeded hand in hand with the growing proclamation on the part of majority and dominant ethnic groups for the elevation and, in some cases the reinstatement of their political, economic and socio-cultural privileges. These plural states, therefore, born with a lack of internal cohesion and confronted ethnic divergence between majorities 1 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia (pp. 15-16). New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 2 Ibid, (p. 17). 3 Ibid, (p. 18). -2- and minorities, social fragmentation, civil dissonance, institutional decay and regime instability, that made the errands of nation-building and governing difficult.4 In addition, the post-colonial and nation-building approaches have focused on creating a unified “national identity” based on either a common political values and citizenship or a putative majoritarian “ethnic identity”. Both the approaches tried to constitute “a pulverized and uniform sense of national identity to coincide with state boundaries that seldom reflect ethnic divisions on the ground”.5 The modernization theories discard the notion that states incorporating more than one ethnic group could be both stable and harmonious. However, “identity movements have the potential to expand and deepen democracy by pushing for states that are more equitable in their distribution of resources and power among their citizens”6 because democracy emboldens pluralism and delivers the scope to the relegated groups to express their accounts. Consequently, the ethnic politics in Nepal fits to this “global pattern in which democratic transitions are often accompanied by the mobilization of ethnic groups”.7 1.2. Statement of the Problem: The question of ethnicity remains a crucial variable in the process of nation-building in Nepal. The Movements based on ethnicity have been reshaping debates on the definition of nation, nationalism and the structure of the state. Although Nepal was supposed to be defined by a state-sponsored “Nepali” national identity until 1990 that appeared to be highly exclusionary for the ethnic minnows.8 The peoples’ movement 4 Ibid. (p.17). Ibid, (p. 13). 6 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins. London and New York: Routledge. 7 Lawoti, M. (2013). Transforming Ethnic Politics. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal:Identities and Mobilization after 1990 (p. 5). New York: Routledge. 8 Gellner, D. N. (2007). Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(20). 5 -3- of 1990 provided the primary stimulus to the ethnic forces for the manifestation of their political ambitions. Thereafter, the ethnic politics in Nepal has grown strength to strength vis-a-vis different politico-historical perspectives in the last couple of decades or so. Nepal is a small state from the Himalayan foothills, is geo-politically sandwiched by India and China. Furthermore, Nepal is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state with population of around 26,494,5049. Hindu is the leading religion (85%) followed by Buddhist (11%), Muslim (4.2%), Christian (3.6%).10 Nepali is the national official language which is spoken by 60 % of population and there are 125 different ethnic communities11 (See Figure-1.1). Nepal has been ethnically diverse ever since the ancient times. The earliest historical evidence suggests that during the reign of the Newar king Jayasthiti Malla (1380- 1394) at Kathmandu valley, 64 different castes were allotted different tasks and ranks in the social hierarchy. Ram Shah (1609-1636), the forefather of the Shah monarch, further introduced some rules and regulations about relations between different groups of people outside the Kathmandu valley. Later, the Shah Rulers’ conquered the various petty kingdoms adjacent to the Kathmandu valley and used the concept of the caste hierarchy as an organizing principle for consolidating the diverse peoples inhabiting Nepal into a nation state under their authority. In 1984, Jang Bahadur Rana, the most powerful Rana Prime Minister, had promulgated mulki ain, a national legal code that laid out detailed codes for inter-caste behavior and specified punishments for their infringement. The Civil Code 1854 had offered three fold classification of the population, namely, Tagadhari (scared-thread wearing castes) 9 Central Bureau of Statistics. (2012). National census report, 2011. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics (Nepal). 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. -4- at the top, Matwali (alcohol drinking castes and ethnic groups) in the intermediary, and Sudra (impure but touchable) and Acchut (impure and untouchable castes) at the bottom. Bahuns (Brahmans), Chhetris and Thakuris (Warriors), migrated from the western hill and spoke Khas Kura12 (Nepali Language), occupied the top position of this caste hierarchy. This high caste group was classified as Tagedhari, or “wearers of the sacred thread” signifying their status as “twice-born” or those initiated into the sacred Hindu texts. People from the “pure” middle-ranking Vaishya and Sudra varnas in Nepal’s hill and mountain were accorded to the existing indigenous groups, belonging mainly to the Tibeto-Burman language group, were called Matwali (liquordrinkers) by the Bahuns and Chhetris whose caste status did not allow them to take alcohol which was considered polluting. These ethnic groups are called adivasi janajati (indigenous nationalities) in contemporary Nepal. The impure group, also called Pani Nachaine from whom water cannot be accepted, were collectively classified as achut (untouchable) ranked at the bottom of the caste hierarchy. Many social groups from the Tarai region were, however, missing from the muluki ain hierarchy, including a number of “untouchable” occupational groups such as the Chamars, Musahars and Tatma. So, ethnic inequality has been a constant and pervasive feature of the modern Nepali state. 12 A Sanskrit based language from which modern Nepali language was born. The Chetris used to be known as Khas and the language that they spoke was known as Khas Kura (“the speech of the Khas”). Today the word “Khas” is generally considered somewhat insulting in central Nepal but versions of it continue to be used in other Nepalese languages. The Gorkhali, Parbatiya, or Khas Kura language is now known as Nepali [Gellner, D. (1997). Ethnicity and Nationalism in the World's Only Hindu State. In D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, & J. Whelpton, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers]. -5- Figure-1.1. Ethnographic Map of Nepal Source: Lawoti, M., & Hangen, S. (2013). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (p. 3). London and New York: Routledge. -6- In fact, the complexity of the ethnic movements in Nepal is arguably linked to the extreme diversity of the social composition. In addition to this, there has been numerous overlapping categories of identity and, therefore, tagging specific ethnic labels or drawing certain ethnic boundary has been difficult over time. The Nepali state often contributed to the formation of ethnic identities by categorizing these groups under the same ethnic label and treating them as a single group.13 The indigenous nationalities are internally extremely diverse. Besides, much variation exists within those groups who apparently share same ethnic label. The Tharus, for instance, share neither a common culture nor a language rather many ethnic groups across the Tarai region began to see themselves as sharing a Tharu ethnic identity once some Tharu elites launched a political movement to promote this idea in the midtwentieth century.14 In addition to this, many Tharu share languages with other groups that are not labeled Tharu, such as those in eastern Nepal that speak Maithili.15 The dominant caste-groups/ ethnic groups are Chhetri (16.6%), Brahman-Hill (12.2%), Mager (7.1%), Tharu (6.6%), Tamang (5.8%), Newer (5%), Kami (4.8%), Yadav (4%) and Rai (2.3%)16. Brahman constitutes only a minor percentage of the total population but lead all the major political parties, the judiciary, the universities, and the civil service. Bahuns (Brahmans) and Chetris together – just 31 per cent of the population – had two-thirds of the jobs, whereas hill janajatis (excluding Newars and Tharus), with 22 per cent of the population had only 13 Gaenszle, M. (1997). Changing Concepts of Ethnic Identity among the Mehwang Rai. In D. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, & J. Whempton, Nationalism and ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom (pp. 355356). Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers; and Hofer, A. (1979). The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: a Study of the Mulki Ain of 1854. Khumbu Himal, 13(2), 142. 14 Gunaratne, A. (2009). Introduction. In Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (pp. xviii- xix). Kathmandu, Nepal: Himel Books and Social Science Baha. 15 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 27). London and New York: Routledge. 16 Ibid. 7 11 percent of the jobs. Dalits with near 9 percent of population had just 0.3 per cent of the jobs.17 The Gorkha king Prithvi Narayan Shah, the symbol of Nepali Nationalism and the architect of modern Nepali state, unified the Himalayan state by invading and integrating the adjacent peripheral regions in the mid-twentieth century. He embraced the integrative policy of nation-building by enforcing a legal framework based on state sponsored cultural-religious ideology of Hinduism. The Shah dynasty endorsed Hinduism as a symbol of Nepali nationalism through concerted efforts to blend inherent rights with divine authority.18 Since then, Nepal went through different types of regimes like 104 years of family rule of Ranas (till 1950), multiparty democracy (1950 to 1960), Party-less Panchayat System (1960 to 1990) and multiparty system again in 1990. The integrative strategy of nation-building based on Hindu religious ethos touched the zenith during the Panchayat regime. However, bringing multiparty system back as a result of first peoples’ movement was an important step towards the reconstruction of a new system to shape up Nepal socio-politically, culturally and economically because the endeavor of multi-party democracy is to ensure the representation of all the sections of the society in the political process. Peoples’ Movement of 1990 can arguably be marked as the historical transition of Nepali politics because the reinstallation of democratic culture that instigated to dismantle the hegemony of Hinduism demonstrated to be a driving force behind the ethnicization of Nepali politics later on. 17 Central Bureau of Statistics. (2004). Nepal Living Standerd Survey 2003/2004 (Vol. 1). Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics (Nepal). 18 Hachhethu, K. (2007, May 19). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly. 42 (20). 8 Table- 1.1. Region-Wise Ethnic/ Caste Groups in Nepal with Hierarchical Rank Behan/ Chhetri 1.1 Hill Brahman 1.2 Hill Chhetri (Chhetri, Sanyasi, Thakuri) 1.3 Madheshi Brahman and Chhetri (Madhesi Brahman, Nurang, Rajput, Kayastha) Caste Groups Madheshi Other Castes 2.1 Kewat, Mallah, Lohar, Nuniya, Kahar, Lodha, Rajbhar, Bing, Mali Kamar, Dhuniya, Yadav, Teli, Koiri, Kurmi, Sonar, Baniya, Kalwar, Thakur/Hazam, Kanu, Sudhi, Kumhar, Haluwai , Badhai, Barai, Bhediyar/ Gaderi Dalit Newar 3.1 Kami, Damai/Dholi, Sarki, Badi, Gaine, Unidentified Dalits 3.2 Chamar/Harija n, Musahar, Dushad/Paswa n, Tatma, Khatwe, Dhobi, Baantar, Chidimar, Dom, Halkhor 4 Newar Indigenous Nationalities Hill Janajati Tarai Janajati 5.1 Tamang, Kumal, Sunuwar, Majhi, Danuwar, Thami/ Thangmi, Darai, Bhote, Baramu/Bramhu, Pahari, Kusunda, Raji, Raute, Chepang/Praja, Hayu, Magar, Chyantal, Rai, Sherpa, Bhujel/ Gharti, Yakha, Thakali, Limbu, Lepcha, Bhote, Byansi, Jirel, Hyalmo, Walung, Gurung, Dura Source: National census report, 2011. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal. 9 5.2 Tharu, Jhangad, Dhanuk, Rajbanshi, Gangai, Santhal/Satar, Dhimal, Tajpuriya, Meche, Koche, Kisan, Munda, Kusbadiya/ Patharkata, Unidentified Adibasi/ Janajati Others Muslim Other 6 Madheshi Muslim, Churoute (Hill Muslim) 7 Marwari, Bangali, Jain, Punjabi/Sikh, Unidentified Others The ethnic politics has been exaggerated in Nepal in the context of considerable political upheavals. The decade of Maoist insurrection (1996-2006) accounted for almost 13,000 lives and the transposition of hundreds of thousands people.19 The agonizing royal massacre20 in 2001 generated further instability as immediately after this incident, king Gyanandra terminated an elected government. The peoples’ movement of 2006 reinstalled democracy and marked the end of the ten years of Maoist rebellion. In 2007, Madheshis21 launched their movement in the Tarai region for regional autonomy demanding single, elongated plains-specific province (ek madhes ek pradesh), caused further instability. However, between the two Peoples’ movements, the ethnic politics became increasingly persuasive and led to a new kinds of political demands. The major demands of the first peoples’ movement were the establishment of multi-party democracy and downsizing the role of Royal Palace, etc. whereas at the end of the second successful peoples’ movement, the ethnic forces have substituted their previous demands by new claims of a federal republic and a secular state. 19 Lawoti, M. (2013). Dynamics of Mobilization. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (p. 6). New York: Routledge. 20 The royal massacre occurred on Friday, June 1, 2001, at the Narayanhity Royal Palace, the thenresidence of the Nepalese monarchy, when Crown Prince Dipendra shot and killed several members of his family. Because of the shooting, ten people died and five were wounded. The dead included King Birendra of Nepal and Queen Aiswarya, Dipendra’s father and mother ["Nepal mourns slain king". BBC News. 2 June 2001. Retrieved 31 May 2012.]. Prince Dipendra became de jure King of Nepal upon his father’s death and died whilst in a coma three days later. Birendra's brother Gyanendra became king after the death of King Dipendra. Then, an investigation took place that found Crown Prince Dipendra as the culprit for the incident. However, many conspiracy theories suggest different conclusion, but there is little evidence to support them. Therefore the royal massacre still remains mysterious. ["Prince blamed for Nepal massacre". BBC News. 14 June 2001. Retrieved 31 May 2012.] 21 Madheshi refers loosely to the people of Indian origin residing in the Tarai region of Nepal. The definition of the term “Madhesi” is ambiguous and therefore includes Hindu caste groups, Muslims and indigenous people of the Tarai. However the migrants to the Tarai from the hills in Nepal and Tharus do not consider themselves as Madheshi [Gellner, D. N., Pfaff-Czarnecka, J., & Whelpton, J. (1997). Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers]. 10 A major debate instigated to dominate the public sphere between those who believe that provinces must be demarcated on the basis of economic viability and others single-minded in their demand for identity based division of the country to counter the historical ostracism by the Kathmandu centre. The growing public opinion submitted that a large number of people were against identitybased federalism which was contrary to the momentum of Constituent Assembly (CA). Therefore, the CA had to function under relentless compression and menace from all political forces. Subsequently, the CA was unable to finish the job of drafting a Constitution for Nepal notwithstanding four years in operation. Nevertheless, on May 28, 2012, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai dissolved the CA. Bhattarai himself resigned as the prime minister of Nepal which made the main political parties of Nepal to nominate Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi as Prime Minister on a short-term basis, to supervise elections. He was sworn in on 14 March 2013 by President Ram Baran Yadav. Regmi emanated into media attention earlier when Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), proposed him as the leader of elected government to hold fresh Constituent Assembly polls. On 19 February 2013, all four major political parties settled to constitute election government under Chief Justice Leadership. According to the agreement amongst the political parties, 11-member interim election government led by Chief Justice Regmi was formed to hold elections. Nepali Congress earned most number of seats while none of the political parties could secure overwhelming majority in the election. The veteran Nepali Congress leader Sushil Koirala turn out to be the Prime Minister after the Post-poll-coalition. A new Constituent Assembly was constituted devouring the daunting task in hand of drafting a new Constitution for “naya” Nepal. Therefore, the task of constitution-making in particular and nation-building in general on the one hand and managing ethnic forces by reaching a point of consensus remain the dual challenge for Nepal. The state-building process amalgamated the dominance of Caste Hill Hindu Elites (CHHE) 11 and marginalized the “other” ethnic minorities.22 The Nepali state has institutionalized the values and culture of CHHE by endorsing Hinduism on the one hand and Nepali language on the other. Even after the democratic transformation of 1990, these dominant groups continued to dominate every sector of the government and the leadership in the public sphere.23 1.3. Review of Existing Studies Relevant to the Topic: From within the wide-ranging bulk of literatures on the subject, only some of the significant studies have been briefly reviewed here by confining the appraisal limited to the ethnic problem in Nepal. Urmila Phadnis and Rajat Ganguly have provided a comparative appraisal of the dynamics of ethnic identities and movements in South Asia especially regions like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives.24 They have put forward two hypotheses, one, ethnic identity is a significant but not a sufficient requisite for evoking ethnicity, rather it is the mobilization and manipulation of group identity and interest by the leadership that leads to ethnicity; and two, the higher the states (material as well as emotional) of the community and its leadership in the power structure, the greater the possibilities for strengthening the building of the nation as an amalgamation of ethnic pluralities. They have offered a critical appraisal of the theoretical approaches and strained to understand the problems of ethnicity and nation-building within the conceptual framework of ethnic heterogeneity. Susan Hangen has untaken an insight on the recent ethnicization of Nepali politics beyond ideological struggles and insurgency.25 She made convincing efforts to elucidate how the margins 22 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 13). London and New York: Routledge. 23 Lawoti, M., & Hangen, S. (2013). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (p. 13). London and New York: Routledge. 24 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 25 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins. London: Routledge. 12 inhabited by “marginal populations” are developing “non-hegemonic discourses” in Nepal. According to Hangen, the emergence of a democratic environment between the end of the authoritarian Panchayat era (1962–1990) and the plunge of the Hindu monarchy in 2008 endorsed new socio-political and liberal constructions to take shape and new forms of local governance defined by non-dominant ethnic communities to foster.26 Likewise, Hangen’s analysis intended to ascertain how new democratic discourses and practices were familiarized and understood by ethnic minorities, through which channels they have been stimulated (ethnicity based political party, village headsmen) and according to which community-oriented agendas and cultural reproductions.27 For the author, ethnic variances presented by the self-identified “Mongols” serve as homogenizing cultural indicators, supposed to challenge the state authority, popularly depicted as subjugated by CHHE.28 But the examination of the tools, discourses, and cultural strategies defined by the Mongol National Organization leadership underscores the complexity of rural and ethnic politics in Nepal. While the homogenization of “indigenous nationalities” is sought by Mongol political leaders, the latter hardly astounded language differences or the multitude of religious practices and societal patterns traditionally anchored in Nepal’s rural landscape. Another significant contribution in this field has been “Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal”, edited by David N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka and John Whelpton, has considered the myriad changes in politics and culture underway in post-1990 Nepal.29 David Gellner’s introduction effectively laid the historical foundations and introduces comparative themes, the contested cultural domains of language and 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid 28 Ibid. (p. 51). Gellner, D. N., Pfaff-Czarnecka, J., & Whelpton, J. (1997). Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 29 13 religion.30 John Whelpton's chapter, “Political Identity in Nepal: State, Nation, and Community” provides a useful history of the notion of “asali Hindustan” as well as an overview of the controversies that have pivoted on religious identity and linguistic diversity in the modern state. In the next chapter, “The King and the Cow”, Axel Michaels traces how the state since 1805 has utilized the sacredness of the cow in the legal codes to promote its hyper-Hindu credentials abroad and coerce internal integration, particularly vis-a-vis the non-Pahadi ethnic groups, especially the highland peoples. The contributors of this volume thoroughly explain ethnic politics of Nepal based on respective micro-level case studies. Harka Gurung's chapter, “State and Society in Nepal”, subsidized an alternative history of state formation in ethnic perspective, added an important section on the chronology of early incidents of resistance to the Shah-Rana state. In conclusion, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka abridged the models of political rule in light of ethnic relations: pre-1950 under the “empire model”, the panchayat era followed the “modern nationalism model”, and the post-1990 epoch is “the patchwork of minorities”. Pfaff-Czarnecka understands the “ethnicization of the state” as fashioned in reaction to its initial formation under the Shah-Rana state: the long-standing “closed society” of high caste Pahadis who controlled local development programs and harvested government employment for their own ethnic group. David N Gellner’s further investigation on this topic in the form of an article titled, “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal”, dispensed with the emergence, evolution and current trends of social inequality based on caste and ethnicity in Nepal.31 He labelled the period of Party-less Panchayat System as the phase of nation-building and the post-1990 era as the phase of “ethnicity building”32. To him, Nepal has been on the verge of facing the danger of an all-out ethnic war in 30 Ibid, (pp. 20-21). Gellner, D. N. (2007). Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(20). 32 Ibid. 31 14 the Tarai between Madheshis and Parbatyas. But the existence of so many complex and crosscutting ethnic loyalties throughout the country makes a Sri-Lankan type ethnic polarization improbable.33 However, the author has presumed that in the eastern Tarai with its 30% population belong to Parbatyas, there is a very real probability that “two majorities with minority complexes” could provoke each other in bloody vendettas.34 In his article, Krishna Hachhethu35 has branded the post-1990 transition of Nepali politics by flouting some of the traditional ingredients of nationalism and building of new values and systems for national unity and integration. Further, he has contended for the transformation of Nepali society and polity from a mono-ethnic nation to a poly-ethnic nation. Mahendra Lawoti in his seminal contribution, “Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicultural Society” has scrutinized the problems with the post-1990 political system and provided a detailed blueprint for constructing a democratic polity.36 Lawoti has been most concerned with ending the political exclusion of “marginalized socio-cultural groups”. He has assumed if political exclusion continues, “there is a high possibility for violent ethnic conflicts and insurgencies in Nepal”.37 The exertion of this volume has been the quest for alternative democratic institutions that would facilitate the inclusion of these underrepresented groups. The author has presented the general critique of the 1990 Constitution and then placed some basic arguments in favour of federalism and reservations. He has also advocated for “ethnic federalism” 33 Ibid. Ibid. 35 Hachhethu, K. (2003, July). Democracy and Nationalism: Interface between State and Ethnicity in Nepal. Contributions to Nepalese Studies, 30(2), 217-252. 36 Lawoti, M. (2005). Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicultural Society. New Delhi: Sage Publication 37 Ibid. 34 15 as a way of providing autonomy to ethnic groups. Nevertheless, Nepal is highly fluid and fragmented, and the process of identifying which groups should be recognized by the government for reservations would be belligerent. Therefore, the question relics if ethnicity based territorial federalism is implemented, would these individuals be pressurized to leave their current homes and relocate to their own ethnic community dominated region? Lawoti has, further, inspected the causes of the multiple conflicts and crises in Nepal during the 1990-2002 periods and develops guidelines to avoid them in the future in his later publication.38 He has contended that over-centralization of the polity even during the democratic period resulted in the exclusion of ethnic and caste groups and promoted a culture of impunity. It also contributed to the growth of Maoist insurgency and facilitated government instability, corruption, and related crises. In his recent work, Lok Raj Baral has taken a critical look at three important aspects of modern Nepal39: (a) viability of the Nepali State; (b) prospects and challenges of its liberal democracy; (c) strategies for managing the emerging geo-political trends. He has also described the values of secularism, the role of fractured parties, and external influence in the politics of Nepal. He has maintained that the political developments in Nepal comprises a series of jumps – short, long, high, low – that towards a liberal democracy. He has, further, illustrated that the end of Rana regime in 1951 as a high jump, followed first by King Mahendra’s coup in the early 1960s as a jump backward - then the 1990 movement as a shorter jump, followed by the movement in 2006 as a much longer jump. According to him, Nepali politics keeps jumping around instead of settling on 38 Lawoti, M. (2007). Looking Back, Looking Forward: Centralization, Multiple Conflicts, and Democratic State Building in Nepal. Washindton: East-West Centre. 39 Baral, L. R. (2012). Nepal- Nation- State in the Wilderness: Managing State, Democracy, and Geopolitics. New Delhi: Sage Publication. 16 a liberal democracy because of the “sudden breaks” from the past. Thus, the end of Rana oligarchy twisted into a revival of the absolute monarchy because although there was a regime change, there was no change in the political culture. Similarly, “politics of disruption” played a major part. Although the elements of liberal democracy were regained in 1990 but snatched by King Gyanendra from 2002 onwards and it continued up to 2006, when the Madheshi movement twisted a “long jump” that abolished the institution of monarchy. Baral has further acknowledged the central role played by the state in people’s lives, and the realization of that compels them to revolt against their rulers time and again. The Nepali state largely belongs to a narrow caste-based group with a rigid culture, who relish a total control over the state structures such as the army, police and bureaucracy which has not changed even after the most serious attempt to “capture” the state mounted by the Maoists. The long time demand like “Hindi to be accepted as national language” is yet to be achieved and also the control over the army has been the exclusive privilege of high caste groups. In his article Biswanath Chakraborty has hunted the determining factors and the nature of grass root leadership in Nepal.40 He has specified factors like sex, caste, ethnicity, education, occupation, etc. as the regulating forces of grass-root level leadership in Nepal. The study has, further, proposed that in Nepal, Janajatis, Madheshis and Dalits are far behind than the Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars in terms of various Human Development Indexes like literacy rate, per capita income, life expectancy, etc. Chakraborty has summarized his article by upholding that a country with such diversity is required to accommodate all the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious groups both at the local level as well as at the national level politics. Likewise, the author has 40 Chakraborty, B. (2007). Pattern of Grass-Root Level Leadershio in Nepal: Need to Unlock Submerged Voices. The West Bengal Political Science Review, X(1). 17 optimistically suggested that a change in the leadership structure could ensure the success of democracy in Nepal. The aforementioned academic inquiries aids to comprehend the causes of marginalization of ethnic groups vis-a-vis the state efforts to create hegemonic form of nationalism. But the political and nationalistic discourse of the subaltern ethnic groups have been often intimidated by the “subjective” state-centric nationalism. The political development in Nepal in the last decade was so rapid that there was very little scope for undertaking a research especially on the issues of ethnicity and nation-building. The most of the available literatures in this field have comprehensively premeditated ethnicity and nationalism from the perception of the dominant ethnic groups or state-centric nationalist discourse but very little have been inspected from the outlook of the subaltern ethnic groups. These academic works have often dealt with the exposition of inequalities and disparities faced by the marginalized ethnic groups but a new enquiry is obligatory at this juncture to put profound insight into the ethnic problem in Nepal. 1.4. Objectives: Considering the research gap in mind, this study has been designed in terms of three specific objects. Firstly, the thesis has investigated whether the process of transition from Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic has a correlation with the growth of ethnic assertiveness in Nepal. Secondly, the study has tested the process of constitution-making in particular and Nation-building in general in the light of ethnic politics in Nepal. Thirdly, this inquiry has appraised the demand of “ethnic federalism” as a mean to achieve more inclusive, institutionalized and sustainable democratic polity in Nepal. Finally, the thesis has ended with the summary of major findings and prescription of some important policy recommendations. 18 1.5 Methodology: This investigation has been grounded on both quantitative as well as qualitative data. However, more emphasize has been given to quantitative data collected from various government and nongovernment reports and micro-level studies. The primary data have been obtained through a survey-based on purposive sampling conducted amid various ethnic groups. During the course of the field work, a sum of 200 respondents have been interviewed and 20 focus group (each group comprised by 10 respondents) discussions have also been conducted at venues like Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Biratnagar, Jhapa, Saptari, Lumbini and Birganj. In addition to this, 20 experts including political commentators, academic experts and leading journalists have been interviewed during the field survey. 1.6 Chapter Outline: Following this introduction, the thesis proceeds with a broad theoretical outline to contextualize ethnicity and nation-building in Nepal. The successive chapter titled “The Rise of Ethnicity in Nepal: An Appraisal of Nepal’s Transition from Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic” has proven the correlation between the identity assertion by the ethnic groups and the transition of Nepal from Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic. The next chapter titled, “Politics of Constitution Making in Nepal: An Ethnic Perspective” has conceptualized the increasing political mobilization of marginalized ethnic groups and its reflection in the constitution making process between 1990 and 2013. The penultimate chapter titled, “Federal Restructuring of Nepali State: Myth or Reality?” has reconsidered the federalism debate with special reference to the demand of ethnicity based federalism. The summary of major findings and policy recommendations have embraced the final chapter. ***************** 19 CHAPTER-II CONTEXTUALIZING ETHNICITY AND NATION BUILDING IN NEPAL 2.1. Introduction: The phenomenon of ethnicity is “an intrinsic component of the socio-political realities of multi-ethnic states in South Asia as well as most of the countries of the world”.1 From the genesis of human civilization, group identities based on putative common descent and culture have emerged, coexisted, clashed and even diminished in different historical contexts. However the global manifestation of ethnicity in the contemporary world has caught serious attention of social and political scientists. Both Modernist as well as Marxist theorists assume that “ethnicity will fade and even die out” with modernization and industrialization.2 The assimilationist and “melting pot”3 paradigm advocate for the “withering away of ethnic identification as a result of ethnic assimilation and amalgamation”4. But the significance and vitality of ethnicity in the contemporary world have been on the ascendance. Furthermore the question of ethnicity has been raised not only in the developed or industrialized world but also in the developing or the third world. 1 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia (p. 7). New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 2 Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 39). New York: State University of New York. 3 The term “Melting Pot” was used by Israel Zangwill (1909) to describe a situation of assimilation of various cultural groups in America. ‘In melting pot assimilation, each group contributes a bit of its own culture and absorbs aspects of other cultures, such that the whole is a combination of all the groups’ [Eshleman, R. J., & Cashion, B. G. (1985). Sociology: Introduction (p. 256). Boston: Little Brown and Co.]. 4 Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 39). New York: State University of New York. - 20 - The developed states of Europe and North America have been experiencing a common form of ethnic nationalism i, e. the ethnic revival and growing political assertiveness of minority ethnic groups often ranging in demand from regional autonomy to secession. Basques and Catalan in Spain, Bretons and Corsicans in France, Walloons and Flemish in Belgium, Scots, Welsh and Irish in United Kingdom, African-American in United States, and the French-speaking Quebecois in Canada are some of the examples.5 The rapid political transformation and economic liberalization vis-a-vis the disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union have unleashed anti-immigrant and right-wing nationalist assertion in the developed world since 1980s. On the other hand, the rise of ethnic nationalism and the formation of ethnic political movements in the developing world especially in South Asia can largely be attributed to the process of colonization and decolonization which created many sovereign nations by setting aside prevailing ethnic and cultural diversity.6 Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, almost all the South Asian states have been experiencing intermittent ethnic fragmentation and conflict of different forms. The “ethnicization of politics” and “politicization of ethnicity”, therefore, result in rising ethnic consciousness.7 Being one of the most plural societies in South Asia, Nepal has faced some serious ethnic turmoil since the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990. The processes of socio-economic change, the ethnic dimensions of power structure, and the policies, strategies and tactics adopted by various regimes in different historical contexts 5 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia (p. 7). New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 6 Ibid, (p. 16). 7 Ibid, (p. 7). - 21 - to deal with the urges and aspirations of ethnic groups, therefore, provide the wider setting for academic understanding of ethnicity and the processes of nation-building in Nepal.8 2.2. Making Sense of Ethnic Identity: Making sense of identity is essential in our day-to-day life. We simultaneously belong to divergence category of identities based on different contexts. When these identities “compete for attention and priority over each other (they need not always, since there may be no conflict between the demands of different loyalties), the person has to decide on the relative importance to attach to the respective identities” depending on a certain context.9 However, two distinct issues are to be carefully addressed in this connection – one, “the recognition that identities are robustly plural, and that the importance of one identity need not obliterate the importance of others”; two, “a person has to make choices – explicitly or by implication about what relative importance to attach, in a certain context, to the divergent loyalties and priorities that may compete for precedence”.10 Identity movements express two complementary types of collective demands – the defense of interests and the promotion of rights of certain groups of individuals who feel discriminated against, and the search for symbolic recognition by a significant other. Identity movements defend the interests, world visions, and values of groups of individuals or communities defined by such characteristics as phenotype (or race) and ethnicity; sex; language; sexual orientation; mythical origins and ancestral territory. The term “ethnicity” is derived from ethnos, the Greek word for “people” or “tribe” or race, first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary only in 1972. However, the concept of 8 Ibid. Sen, A. (2007). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (p. 19). London: Penguin. 10 Ibid. 9 - 22 - ethnicity has long-founded roots. The word “ethnic” had appeared in the English language in the medieval age referring to those who were pagan or heathen. It was most likely that it derived from the Greek New Testament, which used it as a synonym for gentile.11 Since then, the usage of ethnos, or ethnie (plural) has been subject to much discussion and variation. Often associated with what Edward Said would term the “other”, today, as in ancient Greece, the term is often reserved to differentiate “us” from “them.” For the Greeks, the foreign barbarians were the ethnea, while they would commonly refer to themselves as Genos Hellenon or the “family of Hellenes”.12 In the contemporary World, particularly the Western world, one is more inclined to refer to “nation” for themselves and “ethnic” for immigrant peoples, as in the frequently used term “ethnic minorities”. This implies that the power dynamics is involved in the usage of the term “ethnicity” – one that is often associated with differentiation and boundaries of, or indeed from, the “other”, who in turn is often, although not exclusively, viewed as “exotic”.13 2.3. Defining Ethnicity: Ethnicity is seemingly a straight-forward concept but it is subject to different interpretations. The scholars including anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists interchangeably use the terms “ethnicity”, “ethnic groups” and “ethnic communities”. The term “ethnic” primarily falls under the dichotomy of “us” and “them” likewise the ancient Greeks proudly designated themselves as “Helenians” and rests as the “Barbarians”. Till now, different definitions have been used to define the term “ethnic group”. Mention, here, 11 Ibrahim, V. (2011). Ethnicity. In S. M. Caliendo, A Routledge Companian to Race and Ethnicity (p. 12). London and New York: Routledge. 12 Ibid 13 Ibid. - 23 - may be made that there has been an ongoing debate over the attributes of an ethnic group. The subjectivists stress on the structural aspects of ethnic identity whereas the objectivists emphasize on the social psychological dimensions. The objectivists affirm that ethnic identity manifests through cultural markers while the subjectivists stress on the self and its feelings of identity. Then there has been a composite approach that has attempted to combine these two approaches and instead of stressing the preeminence of one approach over the other, they bring about a linkage between the two. As a political construct, ethnicity is viewed as a means to gain power. Oommen argues that ethnicity is a “product of disjunction between territory and culture”.14 Ethnicity as a cultural construct signifies a composite of symbolic markers, real or putative, used by the members of an ethnic group who define themselves and are defined by others as having a distinctive identity. 15 Weber viewed an ethnic group as a human collectivity based on an assumption of common origin, real, or imagined16. But his definition is too broad and under it almost all identifiable social groups become ethnic groups and therefore loses its analytical value. Frederic Barth defines ethnic group to designate a population which is biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction, has a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.17 Wallerstein argues that the membership in an ethnic group is a matter of social 14 Oommen, T. K. (1990). State and Society in India-Studies in Nation Building (pp. 34-35). New Delhi: Sage Publication. 15 Cohen, A. (2004). Urban Ethnicity. London and New York: Routledge. 16 Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society (p. 393). California: University of California Press. 17 Barth, F. (1981). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. In F. Barth, Process and Form in Social Life: Selected Essays (pp. 198-227). London: Routledge. - 24 - definition, an interplay of self-definition of members and definition by other groups18. Phadnis and Ganguly define an ethnic group as “either a large or small group of propel, in either backward or advanced societies, who are united by a inherited culture (including language, music, food, dress, and practices), racial similarity, common religion, and belief in common history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the group”.19 Cohen perceives ethnic group as “a collectivity of people who share some patterns of normative behaviour and form a part of a larger population, interacting with people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system”.20 According to Yinger, “an ethnic group is a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients”.21 Hutchinson and Smith define ethnic group by identifying six features including- one, a common proper name to identify and express the “essence” of the community; two, a myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in time and place and that gives an “ethnie” a sense of fictive kinship; three, shared historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration; four, one or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs, and language; five, a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the 18 Wallerstein, I. (1987). The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity. Sociological Forum, 2(2), 373-388. 19 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia (p. 19). New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 20 Cohen, A. (2004). Urban Ethnicity. London and New York: Routledge. 21 Yinger, J. M. (1965). Toward A Field Theory of Behavior: Personality and Social Structure. New York: McGraw-Hill. - 25 - ethnic, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with Diaspora peoples; and six, a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnic population.22 Considering a wide range of definition of “ethnic group”, the present study adopts the following definition: Ethnic group are those imagined communities, imagined by themselves and/or by others, are united either by a shared culture, racial similarity, common religion, common birth-place, belief in common history or ancestry, a strong psychological sentiment and some shared patterns of behaviour. 2.4. Approaches to Ethnicity: There are several approaches and perspectives on ethnicity. Primordialists argue that the tradition of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and territorial location is the pre-condition for the existence of ethnic groups23. It is “subjectively held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional criterion”.24 In the primordialist vision, according to McKay, ―Man is seen as a leopard who cannot change his ethnic spots.25 The Primordialist school is thus based on three focal arguments: one, ethnicity is an “ascribed identity” or “assigned status” inherited from ancestors; two, ethnicity is “static”; and three, common ancestry determines the ethnicity.26 There are two variant views within the primordial school. The sociobiological 22 Schermerhorn, R. (1996). Concepts of ethnicity. Ethnicity and minority groups. In J. Hutchinson, & A. D. Smith (Eds.), Ethnicity (p. 7). Oxford University Press. 23 Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, Ink., Publishers. 24 Hussain, A. (1982). Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity (First ed.). New York: Praeger. 25 Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. D. (1996). Ethnicity. London: Oxford university Press. 26 Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 42). New York: State University of New York. - 26 - perspective27, on the one hand, emphasis on the “sociobiological factor like kinship” and culturist perspective, on the other, stresses on the “importance of common culture” in determining ethnic identity.28 In the context of Nepal, the Primordial perspective suits to conceptualize all the indigenous ethnic groups including Limbu, Gurung, Tamang, Khambu or Rai, Magar, Newar, Tharu and so on. The Indigenous Nationalities Act of 2002 (Nepal) states, “Indigenous nationalities refers to those ethnic group or community which has their own mother tongue and traditional customs, different cultural identity, different social structure and written or oral history”. Jones, however, criticizes the primordial view on four specific grounds: one, “the intangible aspects of the primordial approach constitute at best ex-post facto argument in searching for the givens of social existence, the primordial approach explains everything and nothing”; two, Primordial approach cannot explain the fluid nature of ethnic boundaries, the situational quality of ethnic identity at the level of individual, nor the fact that the importance of ethnicity itself varies significantly in different social contexts and between different individuals; three, Primordial explanations suggest that ethnic groups are formulated in a social and political vacuum; and four, Primordialist approaches also fail to consider the historically situated and culturally constructed nature of the very concepts that are central to their argument, most notably “ethnic group” and “nation”.29 Pierre Van Den Berghe (1981) argued that ethnicity is an extension of kinship” [Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 42). New York: State University of New York]. 28 Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (Pp. 42-43). New York: State University of New York. 29 Jones, S. (1997). The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constracting Identities in the Past and Present (Pp. 68-72). London: Routledge. 27 - 27 - Constructivists (Like Weber, Brass and Keyes), on contrary, believe that through the processes of “assimilation” and “accommodation”, individuals construct new knowledge from their experiences. When individuals assimilate, they incorporate the new experience into an already existing framework without changing that framework but when individuals’ experiences become contrary to their internal representations, they may change their perceptions of the experiences to fit their internal representations. Accommodation is thus the process of reconstituting one's mental representation of the external world to fit new experiences. The constructivist school is thus based on two focal arguments: one, ethnicity is “socially constructed” or “socially determined” identity; and two, “ethnic boundaries are flexible or changeable”. The constructivist school, however, encompasses several different perspectives like “emergent ethnicity”30, “theory of ethnicization”31, “resurgent ethnicity” and “social constructionist”32 perspective. The constructivist perspective is, therefore, applicable in the context of Nepal for ethno-regional identities like Parbatya (Prototypes of Mountain), Pahadi (inhabitants of Hill) and Madheshi (occupants of Plain). The instrumentalists (Like Cohen), contrary to Primordialists and constructivists, explain ethnic persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power William Yancey and his associates argued that “the formation, crystallization, and development of ethnic communities, cultures and identities” are “shaped by structural conditions” of “Industrialized process in the host society and the positions of ethnic group within it” [Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 44). New York: State University of New York]. 31 Jonathan Sarna maintained that “ethnicity is created by two conditions: ascription and adversity” [Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 44). New York: State University of New York]. 32 Werner Sollars argued that “ethnic identity is embedded in tradition which is created, sustained, and refashioned by people” [Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 45). New York: State University of New York]. 30 - 28 - and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes. Ethnicity and race are, therefore, instrumental identities, are organized as means to for the attainment of particular ends. The recent formulation of instrumentalism has been the rational-choice theory (used by Horowiz, Meadwell, Hechter and Fearon). It argues that the political actions undertaken by different communities are determined by a well calculated cost/benefit analysis. Therefore the ethnic groups will act violently if it “maximizes their security and enhances their political and economic interest”33. Rational choice theory helps to understand the change of ethnic identity, but it has limitations too. ‘Since ethnic choice is subject to ancestral constrains defined by a society, not everyone can freely choose ethnic identity’34. In addition to this all ethnic choice may not be rational and materialistic. Some people choose ethnic affiliation not for material gain or prosperity but for psychological satisfaction. This kind of ethnic affiliation is just symbolic. In the context of ethnic mosaic of Nepali society, the instrumentalist version is observed in the cases of Madheshi identity assertion. The power elites of Tarai had fabricated the Madheshi identity for the accomplishment of political ideals like federalism, republicanism and secularism. In the post- Madhesh uprising phase, however, the Tharus and Muslims of Tarai who were previously identifies within the collective identity of Madhashaya, have formed their respective political organization and are against of being identified as Madheshi. Jones outlines five major critiques of instrumentalist theory: firstly, Many instrumentalist approaches fall into a reductionist mode of explanation whereby ethnicity is defined in terms of the observed regularities of ethnic behavior in a particular situation; secondly, the 33 Fearon, J., & Latin, D. (2000). Violence and Social Construction of Ethnic Identity (First ed.). London: International Organization. 34 Yang, P. Q. (2000). From Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches (p. 47). New York: State University of New York. - 29 - reduction of ethnicity to economic and political relationships frequently results in the neglect of the cultural dimensions of ethnicity; thirdly, the reductionist model of analysis in many instrumentalist studies also results in the neglect of psychological dimensions of ethnicity; fourthly, the assumption in many instrumentalist approaches that human behavior is essentially rational and directed toward maximizing self-interest results in an oversimplification of the perception of interests by culturally situated agents, and disregards the dynamics of power in both intragroup and intergroup relations; and finally, as a result of the tendencies to define ethnicity as a politicized or mobilized group identity, and to neglect the cultural and psychological dimensions of ethnicity, it is difficult to distinguish ethnic groups from other collective-interest groups such as race and class.35 Modernists make a much more straightforward historical claim about the origin of ethnic groups. The modernist assert that ethnicity and nationalism are distinctively modern phenomena. Depending on one’s preferred emphasis, they have arisen in, and are essentially linked to, the age of “print capitalism”36, the rise of industrial or would-be industrial states with their “requirement” of cultural homogeneity37, or competition between elites for control of or access to the resources of the state38. Post-orientalist claim that the state’s classification project and the identities which resulted from it are the creation of colonialism. However, as Rogers points out, “A shift toward 35 Jones, S. (1997). The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constracting Identities in the Past and Present (pp. 76-79). London: Routledge. 36 Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities (Second ed.). New York: Verso. 37 Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. London: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited. 38 Brass, P. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage Publications. - 30 - rigid categorization … was not uniquely colonial …parallel process was taking place in Britain itself and in other countries not under colonial rule”.39 Nepal, in fact, would be a good example of the latter. In the Nepalese case, the selfconsciously Hindu Rana regime (1846– 1951) designated the social units it recognized as jāt, essentially “caste”, though the term could apply equally well to units that outside observers would view as tribes or ethnic groups.40 Modernists neither deny that ethnic categories, collections of people sharing a common language and/ or culture, existed and often persisted in the pre-modern era nor that in many situations ethnic categories and cultural allegiances had some political significance.41 However, they deny that before the eighteenth century national and ethnic identity were ever seen as the single overriding factor determining a person’s political rights and duties The epiphenomenalists assert that the class structures and institutionalized patterns of power in society are fundamental in explaining political events rather than any biological or cultural social constructions like ethnicity. According to this perspective, the exploitation of an ethnic group by the other(s) is an epiphenomenon, the second order reality, of real differences in power between ethnic groups. 42 The epiphenomenalist perspective, thus, uses class, for their political and economic motives to describe cause of 39 Rogers, J. D. (1994). Post-Orientalism and the Interpretation of Premodern and Modern Political Identities: The Case of Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies, 53(1), 20. 40 Gellner, D. (1997). Ethnicity and Nationalism in the World's Only Hindu State. In D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, & J. Whelpton, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in contemporary Nepal (p. 13). Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 41 Ibid. 42 Tellis, A. J., Szayna, T. S., & James, A. W. (2000). The Process Model for Anticipating Ethnic Conflict. In T. S. Szayna, Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of Process Model (p. 21). Washington DC: RAND Corporation. - 31 - ethnic conflict. Hence the source of ethnic enmity is not in the cultural differences of ethnic groups but in the nature of capitalist modes of production and the inherent inequalities that it produces.43 As Marx puts that the class consciousness remains a real potent force of social change. The epiphenomenalists, therefore, believe that ethnic identities can only be transcended once a genuine communist society is attained. Cox, one of the first sociologists who articulated a coherent Marxist account of ethnicity, affirms that ethnic conflict is no more than hidden class conflict.44 All in all, Cox’s theory of ethnicity is embedded in classical Marxism which prioritizes class over ethnicity by giving primacy to the economic base over the cultural super- structure, and views racial and ethnic identity claims as something that hinders the development of proletarian consciousness in its long march forward to universal progress.45 Considering the above mentioned approaches on the nature and basis of ethnicity, one may reveal that an integrated approach is required to make a sweeping statement on ethnicity. The ethnic identity is, therefore, partly ascribed but largely constructed by society, having relatively stable but changeable ethnic boundary, and subject to cost and benefit (rational choice) in partly determining affiliation and identification. Based on varying context and nature of affiliation in society, multi-layered ethnicity has become as a serious concern. For example, within a linguistic ethnic group, there may be more than one ethno-religious groups or castes or races. On such scenario, an individual has to constantly make choices while identifying himself or herself with a certain ethnic identity based on a particular context. For instance, on the one hand, the ethno-religious identity was given relative 43 Ibid. Cox, O. C. (1948). Caste, Class and Race. New York: Monthly Review. 45 Malešević, Siniša. (2004). Sociology of Ethnicity. London: Sage Publication. 44 - 32 - priority over other simultaneous social and cultural identities during the partition of India led to the creation of India and Pakistan as sovereign nations but later on the secession of erstwhile east-Pakistan or today’s Bangladesh from Pakistan was the consequence of the assertion of ethno-linguistic identity despite that the people share a common religious identity of Islam. 2.5. Ethnicity and Nationalism: The significant compatibility between “theories of nationalism” and “theories of ethnicity” is overlooked, to the extent that, “the two bodies of theory have largely developed independently of each other”46. Smith suggests that ethnicity offers “a potent model for human association which has been adapted and transformed, but not obliterated, in the formation of modern nations”.47 Connor, further, insists on “the ethnic nature of nations, thereby linking nationhood closely to a ubiquities and perennial ethnicity” 48. A nation is, therefore, “a self-aware ethnic group” or “pre-national peoples”49.The “nation” or “national identity” are, therefore, respectively, varieties of ethnic collectivity. Hobsbawm, however, argues that nationalism and ethnicity are “different, and indeed non-comparable, concepts”.50 He opines that nationalism is a recent and programmatic political philosophy, while ethnicity expresses authentic or primordial group identity, rooted in the distinction between insider and outsider. An ethnic culture, furthermore, encompasses values, 46 Eriksen, T. H. (2002). Ethnicity and Nationalism: An Anthropological Perspective (p. 99). London: Pluto Press. 47 Smith, A. D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nation (p. X). London: Basil Blackwell. 48 Connor, W. (1994). Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 49 Conversi, D. (2004). The Mass of Nation. In D. Conversi, Ethnonationalism in the Contemporery World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism (p. 59). New York: Routledge. 50 Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (p. 4). London: Cambridge University Press. - 33 - traditions and practices, but crucially it also provides people a common identity and sense of distinctiveness, usually by focusing on their origins and descent. Anderson and Gellner have, although, found congruence between ethnicity and nationalism. Hobsbawm, Gellner and Anderson, however, share a common understanding of political modernization as the triumph of the nation-state and of nationalism as a specific philosophy of political legitimacy with eighteenth– and nineteenth-century roots in the cultural homogenization produced by industrialization and the bureaucratic state. Nationalism was, therefore, the byproduct of the political history of Europe and America. Paul Brass presented a distinctive theoretical perspective on ethnicity and nationalism based on two focal arguments.51 First, there is nothing inevitable about the rise of ethnic identity and its transformation into nationalism, rather, the conversions of cultural differences into bases for political differentiation between people arises only under specific circumstances.52 Thus, ethnicity and nationalism are not “given” but are social and political constructions. He, therefore, considered ethnicity as a variable which is intrinsically related to the specific types of interactions between the leadership of centralizing states and elites from ethnic groups. In addition to this, he presented a theory of elite competition as the basic dynamic that precipitates ethnic mobilization. The second argument stresses on the crucial role of the relationships between elites and the states particularly the roles of collaborators with and opponents of state authority and state intrusion into regions inhabited by the ethnic groups.53 51 Brass, P. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. - 34 - An ethnic group that “expresses the sentiments of loyalty towards the nation can be said to demonstrate the spirit of ethno-nationalism”.54 ‘Ethnic nationalism… unlike the territorial and civic versions of nationalism … conceives of the nation as a genealogical and vernacular cultural community. Whereas civic and territorial conceptions of the nation regard it as a community of shared culture, common laws and territorial citizenship, ethnic concepts of the nation focus on the genealogy of its members, however fictive; on popular mobilization of “the folk”; on a native history and customs; and on the vernacular culture. As a vernacular community of genealogical descent, the ethnic nation seeks to create itself in the image of an ancestral ethnie. In so doing, it often helps to recreate that ethnie’.55 Since the nature of ethno-nationalism is reactionary to “state-centric nationalism” or “civic nationalism”, the clash between the two often leads to a violent ethnic-war. Therefore, “the rise of nationalistic feelings on the part of ethnic minorities often proceeded hand in hand with the growing assertion on the part of majority and dominant ethnic communities for the promotion and, in some cases the restoration of their political, economic and sociocultural privileges”.56 Nations were not the determinant products of prearranged sociological settings such as language or race or religion; “they had been in Europe and elsewhere in the world, imagined into existence”.57 The “nation”, is thus “an imagined political community – and 54 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 55 Smith, A. D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nation (First ed.) (p. 32). London: Basil Blackwell. 56 Phadnis, U., & Ganguly, R. (2012). Ethnicity and Nation-building in South-Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publication Ltd. 57 Chatterjee, P. (1996). Whose Imagined Community? In G. Balakrishnan (Ed.), Mapping the Nation (p. 216). London: Verso . - 35 - imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.58 Anderson also emphasized on the institution of “print capitalism” through which the “imagined community” came to acquire concrete shape. Furthermore nationalism was probably regarded as “Europe’s most magnificent gift to the rest of the world”.59 However, it faced serious challenge in the middle of twentieth century when most of the colonies of European super-powers emerged as independent nation by asserting nationalistic sentiment based on the demand of selfdetermination. When the idea of “imagined community” and the “right to selfdetermination” are united, it gives rise to the principle of “national self-determination” which confers such rights to the nation “to determine the sovereign state to which they would belong and the form of government under which they live”.60 ‘The historical experience of nationalism in Western Europe, in the Americas and in Russia had supplied for all subsequent nationalisms a set of modular forms from which nationalist elites in Asia and Africa had chosen the ones they like’.61 But “the most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a difference with the modular forms of the nationalist society propagated by the modern west”.62 The new democracies like Nepal, overwhelmed by the modular forms offered by the west, eventually, failed to design an indigenous democratic model of nationalism best suited to its people and culture. There are two types of state 58 Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities (Second ed.). New York: Verso. Chatterjee, P. (1996). Whose Imagined Community? In G. Balakrishnan (Ed.), Mapping the Nation (p. 215). London: Verso. 60 Hayes, C. J. (1931). The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (Pp. 10-11). New York: Macmillan. 61 Chatterjee, P. (1996). Whose Imagined Community? In G. Balakrishnan (Ed.), Mapping the Nation (p. 216). London: Verso . 62 Ibid. 59 - 36 - policies available to multiethnic states in the process of nation-building viz. integrative and pluralistic.63 Nepal, ever since the unification, adopted the integrative model of nationbuilding which is suited for the homogenous societies of the west. It is noteworthy, however, in this regard that defining democracy in a diverse society is a challenging task since it has an additional task of accommodating diversities of various types. In the age of globalization and technological advancement especially in the sectors of ecommunication, social and electronic media, the ethnic communities in various parts of the globe have been gradually but significantly becoming mobilized for the attainment of their political right of self-rule or secession. In fact, modernization can be extremely important for the development of nationalism, both civic nationalism and ethno-nationalism, by producing greater socio-political mobilization and increasing assimilation of those mobilized.64 Therefore the general tendency of all the ethnic groups in the cotemporary world, is to transform from “relatively apolitical cultural community” into “an imagined political community” by emphasizing relative importance on the cultural history of the group through the process of “accommodation” and “assimilation” by political elites either from within the group or from outside the group. However identity based movements are entitled to expand and deepen democracy by pushing for status that are more equitable in their distribution of resources and power among their group members.65 The core propositions of the nationalist doctrine neither furnish a complete theory of social change 63 Brass, P. (1974). Language, Religion and Politics in North India (First ed.). London: Cambridge University Press. 64 Deutsch, K. (1953). Nationalism and Social Communication (First ed.). London: MIT Press Cambridge. 65 Lawoti, M., & Hangen, S. (2013). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (First ed.). London and New York: Routledge. - 37 - and political action nor define the unit of the population which can claim and enjoy its own state and government.66 2.6. Ethnicity, Democracy and Federalism: Ethnic politics is often viewed as incompatible with democracy. Political systems with multiple ethnic groups become less democratic because people vote, not as individual who are concerned with the common good, but rather as groups concerned only with group needs. Therefore, the incompatibility between ethnicity and liberal democracy it can be comprehended by reconsidering the very theoretical the foundation of liberal political order. Locke conjectured the “state of nature”, the pre-social and pre-political condition of human civilization, as a state where people used to enjoy the natural rights of life, liberty and estate but once they entered into the modern civil society over and done with the social contract (the first treaty) and later on formed a liberal political order via constituting a civil government (the second treaty), the obligation of safeguarding the natural rights, thus, transferred to the state. Rousseau, though, forbidden Locke’s second treaty arguing that the institutions of government are created not on the basis of a bilateral contract between people and a sovereign, but only as a commission, as agencies operating on behalf of and under the direct control of the people who, collectively, are the only sovereign.67 In fact, the basic difference between Rousseau’s arguments and the conceptions of Christenliberal-natural law lies in the fundamental dichotomy between morality and politics in the liberal idea of state. In liberal interpretations, man is seen as inherently imperfect, fallen because of an original sin; moral salvation is thought to be unfeasible in any form of 66 67 Smith, A. D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nation (First ed.). London: Basil Blackwell. Chatterjee, P. (1981). Problems of a Marxist Political Theory: Considerations on Colletti. Economic and Political Weekly, 1 - 8. - 38 - political community, and the “good citizen” is not necessarily the “virtuous man”. 68 For Rousseau, the origin of sin lies in society, not prior to it or outside it, and that it is only in a properly constituted political community that true morality can be realized. Rousseau, therefore, proclaimed that the presence of representative institutions with generic powers vis-à-vis people limits the natural rights in a liberal political order. In addition to this, the limited state fashioned by majorities consent could only toil for a “cosmetic equality” via “rule of law”. Hence, the existence of communitarian essentials like ethnic sentiments and the changing pattern of inequality among ethnic groups persist beyond the theoretical jurisdiction of liberalism. Rousseau’s contentions on the “general will”, “constitutionalism” and “socialism”, therefore, turn out to be convenient considering the lapses in liberal democratic model to address ethnicity. Schumpeter developed a “pluralist elitist equilibrium model”69 of examining democracy in the context of socialism, and socialism in the context of capitalism. For Schumpeter, modern democratic exercise “presided over the process of political and institutional change by which the bourgeoisie reshaped, and from its own point of view rationalized, the social and political structure that preceded its ascendancy”70. He further argued that democracy should not be identified with "rule by the people” because just as popular rule need not necessarily require democracy, democracy does not necessarily constitute “rule by the people”71. Lijphart stumbled on a 68 Colletti, L. (1972). From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society. New York: Monthly Review Press Classics. 69 C. B. Macpherson characterizes Schumpeter as the founder and first systematic formulator of a “pluralist elitist equilibrium model” of democracy which became predominant in much of the political theory of the second half of the twentieth century. 70 Schumpeter, J. A. (2003). Capitalism, Socialism and democracy (p. 125). London and New York: Routledge. 71 Ibid, (p. 246). - 39 - “model of consociationalism” by power-sharing among segmented groups as a remedy to sustain democracy in plural societies deeply divided along ethnic and religious cleavages.72 He further recommended “consensus democracy” as appropriate for any society with a “consensual political culture”.73 In addition, Lijphart revealed nine different parameters to ascertain centrifugal/ centripetal tendency and potentiality of developing as a “consociational democracy” - the absence of a solid majority, cross-cutting economic cleavages so that there are no large socioeconomic differences among the segments, a moderate number of segments, segments of equal size, small population size, external threats to the nation, overarching loyalties, geographic concentration of segments and traditions of compromise and accommodation.74 This model, therefore, putatively fits into segmented Nepalese society considering the existing flora of ethnic mosaic where none of these groups are measured as majority. Federalism is a normative political philosophy that recommends the use of federal principles – combining joint action and self-government. “Federal political systems” are a democratic catch – all terms for all political organizations that combine “shared rule and self-rule”. There are, however, three different perspectives dealing with the interrelationship between federalism and nationalism. The first one holds that federalism and nationalism are mutually exclusive. French Jacobins, for instance, believed that federalism was hostile to the necessity of linguistic homogenization, a road-block in the path of authentic, indivisible, monistic popular sovereignty. Federalism, therefore, belongs 72 Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. 73 Ibid. Ibid. 74 - 40 - to an entirely different co-operative philosophy - a non-nationalist logic of legitimacy and/ or the anti-dot of nationalism. The second perspective, by sharp contrast, holds that federalism and nationalism are synonymous. The third perspective, however, unites the aforementioned perspectives viz, “federalism and nationalism can intersect and be compatible” and “not all federalisms are compatible with all federalisms”. This agreement, although, marks an important difference between mono-national federalists and multiethnic federalists. The former argue that the primary objective of federalism is to “unite people living in different political units, who nevertheless share a common language and culture”. The latter, on contrary, advocate federalism to “unite people who seek the advantages of membership of a common political unit, but differ markedly in descent, language and culture”. A remarkable changes were witnessed in 1990s both in established as well as new democracies in the World commensurate with the ethno-cultural composition. The constitutions of many Third World countries attempted to address the issue of multi-ethnic nature of the polity. Furthermore, the Latin American experiments with “multi-cultural constitutionalism” have successfully transformed many “divided” Latin American societies into peaceful multicultural polities. The salient features of this multi-cultural model were “formal recognition of the multi-cultural nature of their societies and of the existence of indigenous people as distinct, sub-state social collectivities”, “recognition of indigenous peoples’ customary law as official public law”, “collective property rights with restriction on the alienation of division of communal lands”, “official status for indigenous languages in territorial units”, “a guarantee of bilingual education”.75 75 Khanal, K. P. (2006). The Maoist Agenda of Restructuring the State: An appraisal. In L. R. Baral, Nepal: Facts of Maoist Insurgency (p. 167). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. - 41 - 2.7. Ethnicity, Power and Resistance: The ethnic scenario in Nepal can be explained more empirically and effectively in the light of the Foucauldian theory of power-relations. Foucault challenges the idea that power is wielded by people or groups by way of “episodic” or “sovereign” acts of domination or coercion, seeing it instead as dispersed and pervasive. “Power is everywhere” and “comes from everywhere”, hence in this sense, power is neither an agency nor a structure.76 Foucault uses the term “power/knowledge” to generalize that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and “truth”. Power subsists only when it is applied, and it does not depend on agreement or resistance. 77 Power operates only upon free subjects, presupposes the concept of freedom since the relations between power and the freedom of a person are inseparable. In addition to this, resistance to power is also a part of the power relations because power is the force that produces the resistance, determines its place, and administers it. In fact, from the existing form of power, resistance to power draws its means of struggle and its actual social position. A successful exercise of power, therefore, means promotion of certain forms of resistance no less than effective mobilization of means against this resistance.78 Those resistances and individual forms that are promoted by the existing power relations also create conditions for preventing the appearance of other may be more dangerous and subversive forms of resistance. Foucault, therefore, defines various kinds of resistances, all of which finally questions the status of the basic identity of an individual- “who are we?” The quest for individual identity and the 76 Foucault, M. (1998). The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (p. 63). London: Penguin. Ibid. 78 Minson, J. (1986). Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics. London: Macmillan Publishers. 77 - 42 - desire to be different from others are the most important wisdom that a person possesses. This kind of “identification with difference” can be happened at different levels - national and international, education and knowledge, culture and religion. It consists of analyzing power relations through the opposing strategies rather than analyzing it from the point of view of its internal rationality. Foucault, therefore, explains that a historical awareness of our present situation shapes our conceptualization of power relations which varies over a period of time. In this context, an analogy can be drawn to explain ethnicity. Ethnic groups claim for their unique identity in order to be different from others which results in a profound struggle that replaces the initial order of power and transforms power-relations. It is, therefore, noteworthy here that although, “power-relations change positions of power in a political system, power, in essence, remains intact; it is the processes of the world and its systems that administer power, that change”.79 Ethnic politics is, thus, not exclusively a struggle to rectify the grievances of minority groups, but it is fundamentally about the distribution of state power along ethnic lines. It is the exclusion of the ethnic groups from state power and competition over sharing national resources that breed ethnic conflict. The traits of general ethnic upsurge has, therefore, been to attain power in order to modify their position in the “power binary”80. But what is unique in Nepal’s case is the existence of multiple “power binaries” grounded on different contexts like in the region wise, Pahadi (Dominant) versus Madheshi (Subaltern); in the milieu of Religion, Hindus (Dominant) versus Non-Hindus including Buddhists and Muslims (Subaltern); in the perspective of Hindu Caste hierarchy in the Hills and Mountains, Bahun- Chhetri (Dominant) versus 79 Ibid. Power binary refers to a bi-power structure comprising an omnipotent or a hegemon and a powerless or a subaltern. 80 - 43 - indigenous ethnic groups and Dalits (Subaltern); in the background of Hindu Caste hierarchy in Tarai, higher caste Hindus including Brahmins and Kshatriyas (Dominant) versus indigenous nationalities like Tharus and Dalits (Subaltern); and so on. Hence, in order to understand and conceptualize the cultural diversity in the Nepali society one requires to adopt deconstructivist approach81. Almost all the ethnic groups in Nepal simultaneously hold multiple identities based on different circumstances. Thus, the question of marginalization or exclusion or subalternity is fluctuated from context to context. The Brahmans and Kshatriyas are dominant groups in the power binary of Madhesh based on the Hindu caste hierarchy but these groups become subaltern in relation to the Bahuns and Chhetris of the Hill. Muslims of the Tarai region, in a different example, Madheshis are subaltern vis-a-vis the Pahadis, however, they are placed in the subaltern position within the Madhesh. Therefore, a “relative subalternity” or multiple subalternity is found within such broad ethnic constructions. In addition to this, ethnic groups can also be branded as “dominant within subaltern” and “subaltern within subaltern”. For illustration, the Pahadi Newars, Gurungs and Limbus are dominant within Indigenous Nationalities of Hills or, the Madheshi Brahmins and Kshatriyas are dominant within Madheshis. On contrary, the Pahadi Janajaties like Bhonte, Tamang, Rai along with Dalits can be considered as subaltern within the greater subaltern segment of Indigenous Nationalities. In Tarai also, Tharus, Muslims, Dalits and Tarai Janajaties can be placed at the margin of Madhesh. The division of groups in line with dominant and subaltern can, therefore, be useful in dealing with the question of inclusion and exclusion in Nepal. Weber 81 Deconstructivism is a movement of postmodern architecture which appeared in the 1980s gives the impression of the fragmentation of the constructed building. It is characterized by an absence of harmony, continuity, or symmetry. Its name comes from the idea of "Deconstruction", a form of semiotic analysis developed by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. - 44 - came across that society is an “arena of conflict and struggle” over resources, between dominant and subordinate groups. He argues that there are many “status” groups in a society which possess varying degrees of social power. The conflict between ethnic groups in Nepal are, therefore, self-explanatory of the existing uneven power distribution in the society and polity. 2.8. Conclusion: Politics in Nepal has been historically Kathmandu centric. It has been precisely in last two and half decades, the centre of mass of politics has been drastically shifting towards the political periphery of the Himalayan nation. Prior to unification of the country by Prithvi Narayan Shah in the sixteenth century, Kathmandu valley was literally isolated from the peripheral regions. Geo-politics has, therefore, played an important role behind the relative isolation of Kathmandu valley from Indian Sub-continent in particular and the rest of the world in general. The restoration of democracy in 1990 as a result of the first peoples’ movement against autocratic Rana regime provided the impetus to ethnic mobilization and conflict, had increased further since end of Maoist insurgency in 2006. The relatively peaceful identity movements of 1990s became violent once Madheshis launched their ethno-regional assertion in 2007 and, thereby, reshaped the Nepali nation and nationalism, and the structure of the Nepali state. The problem with the ethnic groups have been that they couldn’t speak for generations vis-a-vis the dominance of hegemonic ethnic groups and the autocratic regime. Spivak has rightly perceived that the subaltern can’t speak and even if they do, others do not have the patience to listen to them.82 This has been the feature 82 Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak. In C. Nelson , & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (pp. 66-110). Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. - 45 - of the sequential struggle of indigenous nationalities and Dalits against the repressive state apparatus controlled by Bahuns and Chhetris. The lack of resistance from their part lagged them far behind and pushed them to the doom of powerlessness. They lost their history since they couldn’t protect it. As Milan Kundera in his book “The Laughter and Forgetting” mentioned: ‘The first step in liquidating a people…..is to destroy its history…its books…..its culture. Then have somebody write new books, manufacture a new culture, invent a new history’.83 ****************** 83 Kundera, M. (1985). The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (First ed.). Middlesex: Penguin Books. - 46 - CHAPTER-III THE RISE OF ETHNICITY IN NEPAL: AN APPRAISAL OF NEPAL’S TRANSITION FROM HINDU MONARCHY TO SECULAR REPUBLIC 3.1. Introduction: The years old monarchy was abolished in Nepal and the country was declared a Federal Republic by the Constituent Assembly in May of 2008. The historical transition of Nepal from a monarchy to a republic was made possible by the 19 days Peoples’ movement of 2006, led by an alliance of seven major political parties, marked the beginning of a “New Nepal” with the end of direct rule by the King. The declaration of Nepal as a secular state in 2006 gave the formal recognition to the diverse ethnic and religious nature of the Nepali population for the first time. The Interim Constitution of 2006 states that Nepal is “an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive and a full democratic nation.” The Interim Constitution under 33 (4) mandates that the government of Nepal shall end the centralized and one-way political structure to create an inclusive, democratic and a progressive state. It also mandates for the formation of an inclusive Constituent Assembly with representatives from different minority groups such as women, Dalits, Madheshis and indigenous nationalities. This has finally given the people of Nepal an opportunity to write their own constitution. 3.2. Monarchy and Hinduism: The monarchy and Hinduism have always endured as the core components of Nepali nation and nationalism. The Monarchs were considered as incarnations of Lord Vishnu and, therefore, possessed divine authority to rule. The institution of Monarchy has always authenticated - 47 - Hindu religious ethos and the royal army to exercise control over territory.1 In fact, the Royal Army was “not (never) fully under the control of the elected government(s)”. 2 The Nepali rulers including Shahs and Ranas, being die-heart Hindus both in ritualistic and functional terms3, had committed to shape Nepal as a homogenous, monolithic and unitary state protecting one religion (Hinduism), one language (Nepali) and one ethnic/ caste group, ignoring the reality of diversified and pluralistic character of Nepali society. In addition this, the process of hinduization led to the spread of parbatya Gorkha culture, institutionalization of caste system converting separate identity of ethnic group into caste structures, and centralization of politics and administration. Non-Hindu religions were, however, allowed but informally, were subordinated to the main Hindu religious tradition. The pre-unification Nepal had, however, provided a rich cultural heritage- religious tolerance, adoptability, resilience, social harmony and secularism.4 The indigenous nationalities of Nepal claim that they have been the victims of century old process of “hinduization” of the country by the dominant ruling class in the name of nationalism.5 “Hinduization” can be understood as the process by which the Nepal have been turned into a “Hindu State” setting aside the diverse cultural, religious and linguistic nature of the people and often replacing their culture, religion and language with that of dominant Bahuns and Chhetris from the Hills of Nepal through political, legal and constitutional 1 Hachhethu, K. (2006). Monarchy and Insurgency. In L. R. Baral, Nepal: Facets of Maoist Insurgency (pp. 118-133). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 2 Baral, L. R. (2012). Nepal- Nation- State in the Wilderness: Managing State, Democracy, and Geopolitics. New Delhi: Sage Publication. 3 Ibid, (p. 34). 4 Ibid, (p. 51). 5 Bhattachan, K. B. (2010). State Building: Proposals for Federalism. In K. Stokke, & M. D. Manandhar (Eds.), State and Society. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. - 48 - measures.6 The leaders of indigenous nationalities movement contemplate the process of hinduization as the primary source of deprivation, discrimination and exclusion of indigenous nationalities. Hinduization has been the process by which Nepali language as well as Hindu practices have been introduced to the peoples in Nepal and have, further, been extended beyond linguistic and religious changes to include a whole complex of interrelated cultural changes ranging from the adoption of different values to that of different clothing styles and food preferences.7 Some scholars also identify this process in a broader sense as “Nepalization”8. The analysis of the political development in Nepal in terms of the interrelationship between state and Hindu religion results in identification of three distinct waves of hinduization, each followed by a reverse wave. 3.2.1. The First Wave: The Gorkhali king Prithvi Narayan Shah, the architect of “Gorkha Imperialism”, unified the Himalayan state by invading and integrating the adjacent peripheral regions. Some scholars, however, argue that the manner of annexure of this region was “particularly telling”.9 Shah had adopted the integrative policy of nation-building or “empire model of national integration”10 by enforcing legal framework based on state sponsored cultural- 6 Gaige, F. (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (First ed.). Delhi: Vikas. Ibid. 8 Sharma, P. R. (1997). Nation Building, Muti-Ethnicity, and the Hindu State. In J. P.-C. David N. Gellner, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood academic publishers. 9 Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990 (p. 150). New York: Routledge. 10 Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. (1997). Vestiges and Visions: Cultural Change and the Process of NationBuilding in Nepal. In D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, & J. Whelpton, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal (p. 421). Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 7 - 49 - religious ideology of Hinduism. The Shah dynasty promoted Hinduism as a symbol of Nepali nationalism through concerted efforts to blend inherent rights with divine authority.11 However, in the Gorkha regime, “Hindu kinship was central but cultural practices in many ways followed the specimen of Mughal India”.12 Shah being a logical politician did not want to disturb the cultural diversity of newly invaded territories by revolutionary imposition of Gorkha culture. He familiarized the process of internal “cultural imperialism” through the instrument of hinduization to brand Nepal as the “asli hindustan”. In addition to this, “Hinduism was being flexible enough to accommodate local religious traditions, so those who wished for patronage from the Gorkali state did not have to abandon their own previous belief system”13. The source of legitimacy that the Shah Monarch derived was from the divine right enforced by the the traditional Hindu view of the nobility of birth and the tradition coming through the ancient and the medieval times. The king was, therefore, placed as a sovereign lord, a protector of territory and subjects, a guardian of moral order, an upholder of traditions, and the source of all spiritual and temporal power.14 Since Hinduism provided legitimacy to the Shah regime, the Shah rulers, in turn, used it as an instrument of territorial integration by spreading it all over the country. Thus, the process of assimilation fitted into the Gorkhali agenda of domination of one 11 Hachhethu, K. (2006). Monarchy and Insurgency. In L. R. Baral, Nepal: Facets of Maoist Insurgency (pp. 118-133). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 12 Whelpton, J. (2005). A History of Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 13 14 Ibid, (p. 56). Sharma, P. R. (1997). Nation Building, Muti-Ethnicity, and the Hindu State. In J. P.-C. David N. Gellner, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood academic publishers. - 50 - group over others.15 After the demise of Prithvi Narayan, because of the weakness of his successors, instability and chaos among the “bhardars” culminated to the bloody “Kot Massacre” of 1846, which led to the emergence of the strong Prime Minister, Jang Bahadur Rana who introduced a system of hereditary prime ministers. The Shah King was, therefore, reduced merely to the de jure head of the land and the Rana family, by contrast, became the de facto rulers. However, both Shah and Rana regimes were based upon the patrimonial system governed by traditional authority.16 Jang Bahadur had reinforced Hinduism through the promulgation of a unified civil code called “muluki ain”, based upon Vedic prescriptions of moral social order, which had placed Madheshi Brahmins and Kshatriyas inferior to Pahadi Bahuns and Chhetris. The caste system was, however, introduced in their respective territories prior to Jang Bahadur by Jaisthiti Malla (king of Kathmandu valley in 1382-95) and Ram Shah (king of Gorkha principality in 1603-36) but it was regulated largely by hokum (order) of the king and bachan (advise) of the priests. The significance of the contribution of Jang Bahadur in this regard is that he provided the legal framework to the Hindu caste system. Scholars argue that this arrangement had “worked more in the spirit of inclusion” as was an attempt for “the historical solution to the problem of cultural diversity”.17 But at the same time the mulki ain was promulgated at the cost of social and cultural equality. It translated diversity into inequality by putting ethnic groups into the fold of Hindu hierarchical caste system (See Table- 3.1). The 15 Baral, L. R. (2012). Nepal- Nation- State in the Wilderness: Managing State, Democracy, and Geopolitics (p. 50). New Delhi: Sage Publication. 16 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly. 17 Sharma, P. R. (1997). Nation Building, Muti-Ethnicity, and the Hindu State. In J. P.-C. David N. Gellner, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal (p. 481). Amsterdam: Harwood academic publishers. - 51 - transformation of Hindu moral code of conduct into legal framework was, thus, the strongest weapon for the Nepali state to hegimonize over fragmented ethnic sentiments by integrative policy of Hinduization in the name of Nation-building. Rana regime further divided the whole principality into 35 districts for the general administrative purpose of revenue collection but most importantly for the distribution of belief, value and culture associated with dominant Hindu religious discourse. The “integrationist” attempt by ShahRana regime, therefore, brought about exclusion of both non-Hindu ethnic groups as well as the ethnic groups plunge in the margins of Hindu caste hierarchy. Table- 3.1 Social hierarchy in Nepal as per the Mulki Ain, 1854 Water Acceptable (Pure) Wearers of Sacred Thread/ Tagadhari Bahuns and Chhetris (Mountain & Hill) ReligionHinduism Brahmans (Madheshi) Alcohol Drinkers/ Matwali (nonenslavable) Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar, Thankali, Rai, Limbu (Hill) ReligionTribal/ Shamanism ReligionBuddhism Chepang, Gharti, Hayu (Hill) Dhobi, Kasai, Kulu (Mountain/Hill) ReligionHinduism Musalman (Madhes) Religion- Islam ReligionHinduism Upper-Caste Newar (Kathmandu) ReligionHinduism Alcohol Drinkers/ Matwali (enslavable) Bhonte, Tamang (Mountain/ Hill) Water un-acceptable/ Pani Nachaine (Impure) Touchable Untouchable (Achhut) Newar (Kathmandu) ReligionBuddhism Kamal, Tharu (Tarai) ReligionBuddhism ReligionAnimism Mlechha (European/ Foreigner) ReligionChristianity Badi, Damai, Gaine, Kadara, Kami, Sarki (Mountain/ Hill) ReligionHinduism Chiyama, Pode/ Lower- Caste Newar) (Kathmandu) ReligionHinduism Source: Gurung, H. (2003). From Exclusion to Inclusion Socio-Political Agenda for Nepal. Kathmandu: Social Inclusion Research Fund. - 52 - 3.2.2. The First Reverse Wave: The revolt against the traditional authority system in 1951 had marked the end the Rana authoritarianism followed by the establishment of multi-party democracy based on popular sovereignty. Then again the constitution of 1959 offered a “mixed system” that respected “both the inherited idea of the sovereign right of the monarch and the political process based on democratic procedure”.18 Despite of the legal abolition of caste discrimination, it had hardly translated into practice because of self-contradiction of the value system what the state ushered. The complementation between Hindu religion and caste system was well reflected in late king Birendra’s perception of the source of legitimacy of monarchy when he remarked: ‘In Nepal, the monarchy and his subjects have been governed by Dharma, a system drawn from the Hindu religion. The King cannot change this value system’.19 3.2.3. The Second Wave: King Mahendra got rid of multi-party democracy and substituted it by centralized Partiless Panchayat System. The new system allowed popular representation through committees or panchayats. The panchayats were modeled as per the ancient Indian subcontinental system called “Panch” where group elders used to make decisions for the community. The village and town panchayats were directly elected by the people, however, the district panchayats and national panchayats were elected indirectly by the representatives of the panchayats below the rank.20 The resurgence of Monarchy and a 18 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly. Shaha, R. (1975). Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect (p. 7). Delhi: Oxford University Press. 20 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 22). London and New York: Routledge. 19 - 53 - rapid hinduization had been the significant feature of Panchayat regime.21 The Panchayat regime had promulgated the new civil code of 1963 to uphold the old religious symbols and practices. It was, thus, a radical departure from the past as the constitution of 1951 which had recognized universal principle of equality. The constitution of 1962 had, however, identified Nepal as a Hindu nation for the first time unlike the previous constitutions (See Table- 3.2). The late King Birendra himself argued for the divine legitimacy of the throne in order to defend the traditional authority of the Monarch. The Panchayat Constitution complimented this claim by declaring: “The sovereignty is vested in His Majesty and all powers – executive, legislative and judiciary – emanate from him”.22 The process of institutionalization of Hinduism as the sole instrument of nation-building had continued till the end of the Party-less Panchayat System (henceforth PPS). The constitution of 1990, the byproduct of first peoples’ movement had retained three important features regarding the legitimacy of the institution of Hinduism and Monarchy, one, “His Majesty is a descendent of the great King Prithvi Narayan Shah and of the adherent of Aryan culture and the Hindu religion”, two, “Nepal is a Hindu Monarchical Kingdom” and three, “His Majesty is the symbol of Nepalese nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people”.23 The Panchayat regime had also modernized the “old revenue-based administration”, shaped it in the form of tenants-local chiefs’ relations, by introducing a 21 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 May. 22 The Govt. of Nepal. (1962). The Constitution of Nepal, 1962. Kathmandu, Nepal: The Ministry of Law, Govt. of Nepal. 23 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 May. - 54 - uniform administrative system that divided the administrative units into five development regions, fourteen zones and seventy five districts. Hence, the Panchayat model of national integration was based on homogenization and assimilation of diverse ethnic groups into the fold of parbatiya (hill) Hindu culture which was reflected in slogans of that period such as “our king, our country” and “one language, one dress, and one culture.” Table- 3.2 Status of Religion in different constitutions of Nepal Constitution 1951 1959 1962 1990 Religion Freedom to profess and practice own religion. 1. Freedom to profess and practice own religion. 2. Prohibit to convert another person from one religion to another. 1. Hindu Kingdom 2. Freedom to profess and practice own religion. 3. Prohibit to convert another person from one religion to another. 1. Hindu Kingdom 2. Freedom to profess and practice own religion and to protect religious places and trusts. 3. Prohibit to convert another person from one religion to another. Source: Complied from the Constitution of Nepal- 1951, 1959, 1962, 1990, Kathmandu, Nepal: The Ministry of Law, Govt. of Nepal. 3.2.4. The Second Reverse Wave: The second reverse wave or the rise of subaltern narrative against the dominant religious discourse of Hinduism had began tentatively in 1990. The constitutional status of Hindu nationalism on the one hand and overwhelming presence of Bahun-Chhetris in the state apparatus on the other had hegimonaized over the subaltern discourses until then. Since the freedom of religion is greatly associated with democracy, the political events of this period had significantly been contributed to the process of transition of Nepali politics in - 55 - the post-1990 era, and the adoption of Buddhism by Gurungs in the late 1980s can symbolically be placed as the beginning. 3.2.4.1. The Gumba controversy: The Gumba controversy can be marked as the symbol of resistance or the anti-thesis of hinduization. After having practiced Hinduism for generations, Gurungs shifted to Buddhism to “create a more democratic polity”.24 However, the shift was not really the conversion since the Gurungs describe it as “return to their ancestral religion” rather than “the adoption of new religion”.25 The Gurung movement, in fact, started in Maidel and surrounding areas in 1987 when Rinpoche Karma Wanchuk Gurung, a reincarnated lama, came from Darjeeling to teach Buddhism to Gurungs in eastern Nepal. The Rinpoche had visited Maidel several times in the next four years and had often stayed at the homes of his disciples for performing ceremonies. An inspired group of Gurungs, therefore, formed the “Organization for the promotion of Buddhism”26. The active members of the organization, then, arranged to bring two Gurung lamas from the primarily Gurung Ramghat Monestery in Pokhra in order to teach and train Buddhism to local young boys. The Buddha Dharma Prachar Samity, in this juncture, decided to found a small Gumba27. As soon as the Gumba was founded, the police began to monitor and even interfere the activities of the 24 Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 132). Washington DC: EastWest Centre. 25 Ibid. 26 About 30 men from Maidel and two neighbouring villages were involved in the “Buddha Dharma Prachar Samiti”. The most active member was Moti Lal Gurung, the wealthiest amongst all the members (Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 134). Washington DC: East-West Centre.). 27 Gumba literally means Monastery. It serves as a site for conducting rituals as well as teaching young lamas [Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 134. Washington DC: East-West Centre.] - 56 - organization. A year later, an office order was issued by the bahun Chief District Officer28 (CDO) of Illam district to close the Gumba. To materialize the order, a Tamang policeman put a padlock on the door of the Gumba and informed the Gurungs that the Gumba must be registered to be reopened. In addition to this, the local authorities tried their level best to remove the Gumba by using various means. The members of the Buddha Dharma Prachar Samiti, therefore, put lot of effort and spent money to get the registration from the Home Ministry but failed. The locked building of the Gumba was demolished, once the multi-party democracy was installed in 1990, and a new thatched-roofed Gumba was built in its place. One fundamental question raised certainly from the Gumba controversy, that is, why the local authorities reacted to the gumba? Hangen extracted three explanation of this. One, the Gumba founders accepted the local authorities’ explanation that the Gurungs were required to register the monastery. But there was no law dealing with the registration of monasteries. In fact there was a voluntary system of registering monasteries through a government committee called the Monastery Management and Development Committee (MMDC) which was formed to keep track of the number of monasteries in disrepair. Two, the closing or demolition the gumba was a part of the Panchayat state’s policy to suppress all public organizing. Three, the local authorities did not want the Gurungs to become nonHindu. Hence the CDO office issued orders to close the gumba because they wanted the Gurungs to follow Hinduism.29 Interestingly, the Sherpas had built similar Gumba few years back than the Gurungs did few miles up the hill, yet they were not hasseled by the 28 The CDO used to play the most powerful role in the district administration during the Panchayat era. 29 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (Pp. 135137). London and New York: Routledge. - 57 - state or the local authorities. The central difference between the two incidents, therefore, remains that the Gurungs were previously Hindus whereas the Sherpas were not. Hence, the Panchayat regime had a negative approach to religious change although there were no laws regarding the shift in religion in that period.30 The constitution of 1959 had, however, introduced an injunction in this regard and it also remained in the constitution of 1990: ‘Every person shall have the freedom of profess and practice his own religion as handed down to him from ancient times having due regard to traditional practices: Provided that no person shall be entitled to cause another person to change from one religion to another’.31 Furthermore, the narrative of the Gurung shift from Hinduism to Buddhism became intertwined with the narrative of MNO mobilization in the 1990s. MNO’s narrative was that the rejection of Hinduism is necessary to escape oppression from Bahuns. Therefore, the Nepali state perceived the shift to Buddhism to be clsely connected to the MNO’s political movement. The Gurungs, however, did not view their shift from Hinduism as resulting from the choise between the two systems of beliefs.32 Because the adoption of Buddhism engendered a shift in subjectivity for the Gurungs. This gave them a new form of identity that was inspired by the transnational Gurung movement to uplift Gurung culture33. The Gurungs probably wanted to overcome their marginality by switching over from the Bahun-Chhetri dominated Hindu power binary to outside the umbrella of 30 Ibid, (p. 137). The Government of Nepal, 1959. The Constitution of Nepal, 1959. Kathmandu, Nepal: The Ministry of Law, Govt. of Nepal. 32 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 141). London and New York: Routledge. 33 From the mid-1950s onwards, Gurungs in Nepal and Darjeeling began organizing to preserve Gurung religion, language and culture [Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (p. 141). Washington DC: East-West Centre.] 31 - 58 - Hinduism through the construction of a separate Gurung identity. That’s why the Gurungs despite of being shifted their religious faith to Buddhism, they continue insist that the practice of Gurungs’ Buddhism should be a distinct enterprize.34 Hence, the narrative of Gurungs’ shift to Buddhism has nullified the connection between the notion of democracy and the idea of religious freedom and choice. The closing of Gumba by the local authorities can, therefore, be marked as an evedance of lack of freedom in the panchayat era. 3.2.4.2. Boycott of Dashain Festival: The boycott of Dashain has been one of the most significant event in the post-1990 ethnic resistance. The Dashain festival is celebrated in the Nepali month of Asoj35 as an occasion on which a god or goddess vanquished a demon after ten days of battle. There are, in fact, two dominant mythological discourses regarding this festival. The first one is based on the story described in Ramayana where Ramchandra, the exiled king of Ayodha and also the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu, fought battle against Ravana, the demon king of Lanka, for ten days. Ramchandra, eventually, vanquished Ravana on the tenth day of the battle. The second one is based on the story elaborated in Markandya Purana, the ancient mythological script. In this interpretation, goddess Durga fought battle against Mahisasur, the buffalo demon, and finally vanquished him and his army on the tenth day of their fight. The festival ends with the joyous exchange of tika36 in the tenth and the final day. The Dashain is, however, remained the major Hindu festival in Nepal because the employees get 10 to 15 34 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 142). London and New York: Routledge. 35 Nepali calendar comprises 12 months. The month of Asoj can be placed between the months of September and October of the international calendar. 36 Tika is a customary practice of Dashain festival. It simply means a vertical paint on the forehead of the elders by hierarchically older member of the family. - 59 - days leave and one month’s salary in advance to meet the expanses come with the festival. During the vacation, offices remain fully closed. The celebration of Dashain may be a cultural practice in Nepal but many more things are associated with this festival. It is not merely the celebration of the victory of deities over demon. People use to buy new clothes, eat meats, consume alcohol and most importantly reassemble in their respective families. There is a political dimension of Dashain holiday as well. The political hierarchies are reaffirmed and acknowledged during Dashain. As the individual members of the family receive tika and blessings from their higher rank kin, the political leaders also receive tika from their political superiors. Throughout the panchayat era, common villagers used to buy gifts and brought it to the Headmen of the village concerned in order to receive tika and blessings during Dashain. Therefore, in this way, Dashain plays a “legitimating role” in the political realm of Nepal.37 Moreover Dashain has been a centerpiece of the Hindu identity of the Nepali nation.38 Those who does not celebrate Dashain are perceived to be “outsiders to greater Nepalese society”.39 There was a debate amongst indigenous nationalities whether to boycott Dashain or not in the 1990s. But once MNO began to be strengthened its political base, the common villagers of Maidel began boycotting Dashain. From about 1991 to 1993, MNO activists led the Dashain boycotting activities. They tried to make people understand their own narrative that why they should receive Dashain tika. 37 Holmberg, D. (1989). Order in Paradox: Myths, Rituals, and Exchange among Nepal's Tamang (p. 226). New York: Cornell University Press. 38 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 145). London and New York: Routledge. 39 Holmberg, D. (1989). Order in Paradox: Myths, Rituals, and Exchange among Nepal's Tamang (p. 226). New York: Cornell University Press. - 60 - Therefore, the boycott of the Dashain festival had clearly challenged the very definition of the Nepali nation.40 The mytho-historical narrative, highlighted by the protagonists of Dashain boycott, is interesting and singnificant indeed. This discourse suggests that Dashain is celebrated in Nepal as the Hindu conquering of Mongols. Hence, Dashain is a symbol of the entire history of High-caste Hindu domination over the Mongols. On contrary, the dominant discourse suggests that the Dashain is the holy occasion of the victory of Goddes Durga over Demon King Mahishasur. However, Mongols consider Ravana and Mahishsur as their “ancestral father”41. Gurung42 has described Ravana, the non-Aryan King, as the real hero of Ramayana. He maintained: ‘Ironically, we celebrate the Dasai (or Dashain) festival to commemorate the death of a non-Aryan king Rawan by a Hindu Aryan king Ram whereas it should be the reverse, a time of mourning. It is shameful that we are helping their cause’.43 Therefore, the subaltern discourse of the Mongols defies the dominant nationalist narrative of how Nepal was unified under the leadership of the royal family’s ancestors by describing this as a process through which the original Mongol rulers had lost power. The Dashain boycott had, therefore, been the strategic move from the MNO to substantiate its shared non-Hindu identity. 40 Hangen, S. I. (2010). The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the margins (p. 145). London and New York: Routledge. 41 Ibid. 42 Gurung, N. & Paulsen, E. (2007). Nepal Moves Mountains. Geneva: United Nations High Commissionars for Refugees (UNHCR). 43 Ibid, (p. 63). - 61 - 3.2.5. The Third Wave: The post-janaandolan-I conspiracy of King Gyanendra to destabilize the democratic process and constitution by using the loyalty of the “royal army” towards “the palace” had given rise to people’s discontent against the political parties that led to the growth of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 for a decade.44 In December, 1999, a private attorney filled a case against the Advantist Development and Relief Agency (ARDA) and the United Missions to Nepal (UMN). In April, 2001, Pashupati Sena Nepal a Hindu Fundamental Group lodged a case against the UMN in the Supreme Court. In a similar incident in 1999, Christen groups in Kathmandu were barred participate Good Friday celebration in a public park showing the lack of paper permit. Next year, police stopped a procession of Tibetan School children on their way to Swaymbhunath Temple in Kathmandu. Likewise, the same year witnessed the Local Governments activism in halting the performance of Traditional Buddhist dance scheduled to be performed on the occaission of Tibetan New Year. On 31st December, 2002, ther cabinet decided that Muslim Religious Schools or the Maddrashas must register with local district administration offices (part of Home Ministry) and supply information about their funding sources of operation. Hence, although Nepal had been largely tolarent to other religions during the quasi-democratic phase but nature of laws and their execution involved an implicit bias against minorities. In 2001, four cases associated with evangelizing was registered, with one case resulting in a guilty verdict of a three month sentence for the four Christen defendants including one Noregian national.45 In this 44 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 May. 45 Basu, S. (2010). Nepal: From Hindu Monarchy to Secular Democracy. In A. Riaz, Religion and Politics in South Asis (pp. 98-118). London and New York: Routledge. - 62 - incident, the government provided undue lodging to the culprits by manipulating the investigation procedings and let them free. The Hindu monarchy regained momentum once again through the royal takeovers of October 2002 and February 2005, however, failed to gain supports from within and from outside the country. The Maoists, on contrary, had consolidated their positions. The king’s limited political maneuverability had, therefore, been exposed by the Maoist consolidation on the one hand and political parties’ continuous challenge to the royal repression on the other.46 The second successful mass rebellion in the history of Nepal in 2006 had, finally, got rid of the century old Hindu Monarchy. 3.2.6. The Third Reverse Wave: The erosion of devine right of the Monarch had been quite evident in the Royal Massacre of June, 2001 in which King Birendra and his entire family and five other members of the royalty were killed. This incident had a profound impact in the minds of common masses who, until then, believed that the royal kings are devine and, therefore, alien to the humanity. The royal massacre and the follow up events in the royal palace created a skepticism in peoples’ minds that “kings are not different from common masses”. However, the report of a probe committee found the dead crown prince Dipendra as the culprit of the royal massacre, though the people of Nepal, on the whole, did not accept the findings of the two-member committee headed by the chief justice since the committee had wrapped up its work in a hurry and in a suspicious manner. Furthermore, its findings had been taken by the people as an eye wash of a further conspiracy in the palace.47 The royal 46 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 May. 47 Ibid. - 63 - massacre, therefore, brought about a change in the relation between the monarchy and the people since Gyanendra’s succession as the new king was in a horizontal line, unnatural and against tradition, if not illegal. Although Gyanendra tried to project his kingship as the core of the Hindu ethos and also cultivated a leverage for the Hindu monarchy for obvious reasons. In fact, answering to a question from a news correspondent, Gyanendra stated that he was glad to see his role as the preserver of all things, a role that has been spelled out for a king in Hindu mythology as the personification of the god Vishnu.48 On October 4, 2002, king Gyanendra had dismissed an elected government led by prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba accusing him as “incompetent”. Then, he formed the government through nomination. His taking over power reached a climax on February 1, 2005 when he dissolved his own nominated government and grabbed the post of chairman of the council of ministers. He had, further, tried his best to justify his acts of taking over power by citing the failures of multiparty governments both in countering the insurgency and tackling the Maoists. The political development after post-2006 mass movement had nullified the theocratic nature of Nepali state.49 Nepal was declared as “multi-ethnic” and “multi-religious” state by the Interim Constitution of 2007. The constitution affirmed that “the state would not profess any religion”, however, “religious groups would have the freedom to profess their 48 Khanal, K. P. (2006). The Maoist Agenda of Restructuring the State: An appraisal. In: Nepal: Facts of Maoist Insurgency (p. 40). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 49 Baral, L. R. (2012). Nepal- Nation- State in the Wilderness: Managing State, Democracy, and Geopolitics (p. 34). New Delhi: Sage Publication. - 64 - respective religion”.50 Furthermore, the abolition of all kinds of discriminations based on religion were substantiated by the supreme law of the land. The secularization allowed people to embrace broad socio-cultural and human values that can only be possible in a democratic polity. However, a new anti-climax has been observed in recent years. An ambiguity has been found among fighting ethnic groups especially the Madheshis on the commitmentment towards secularism. The people in Tarai except Muslims, Buddhists and Christans advocate for federalism almost ununanimously but they oppose the idea of making Nepal a secular state. They are ready to support the abolition of Monarchy but want Nepal to remain a Hindu state. In addition to this, the syndromes of Hindu nationalist movement has been growing steadily in the Tarai and elsewhere in the country. According to a survey conducted in 2008, 75% Madheshis, 91% Madheshi Dalits, 84% Madheshi Janajatis and 69% Tarai ethnic groups want Hindu state in Nepal51. Furthermore, the presence of hostile Hindu organizations in Tarai has been on the rise. The endeavour of the organizations have been to promote the revival of the Hindu state as a rationale to mobilize the Hindus.52 3.3. Conclusion: On the backdrop of the reexamination of Hinduization strategy of the Nepali state vis-àvis the counter narratives of the ethnic forces, it may be argued that the erosion of Hindu ethos and the devine sanction behind the throne have been synonymous and have had a 50 Ibid, (p. 35). Sharma, S. & Sen, P. K. (2008). Nepal Contemporary Political Situation: Opinion Poll Report (p. 59), Lalitpur: Interdisciplinary Analysts. 52 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 87). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 51 - 65 - correlation with the rise of democratic voices of the subaltern discourse from the ethnic groups especially the indigenous nationalities. Gyanendra’s unnatural enthronement along with follow up events had caused for further erosion of legitimacy of Monarchy and Hinduism. In fact, Gyanendra was further alienated by social forces (the ethnic and civil society movements), a rising political organization (the Maoists), established political forces (the mainstream parties) and external powers (the international community). 53 The Maoist backing of indigenous nationalities’ (both NEFIN and MNO) agenda of the construction of “non-Hindu” identity and later on the support from the Madheshi mass mobilization had made the transformation possible. On the aftermath of the second peoples’ movement, the Monarchy had become as the common enemy to all the democratic forces including the Maoists. The transitional politics had, therefore, refused to provide any role to the monarchy in transforming the achievement of the April 2006 popular uprising into a legal/political structure.54 With the anhiliation of Monarchy, Hinduism as the guiding principle of the Nepali nation had lost its relevance. Although the recent upserge of Hindu sentiment in Tarai has raised some new skepticism. However, it is quite limited in scope and whether this has an external dimension like influence from outside the country, will need further enquiry. One thing is obvious that the Hindu hegemony has denied the multicultural characteristics of the Nepali state until 1990s and, thereby, hindered the growth and development of multiculturalism55. The multicultural character of 53 Hachhethu, K. (2007). Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy (p. 1833). Economic and Political Weekly, 19 May. 54 Ibid. 55 “A conception of democracy in which cultures are presented as equals in the public domain” and “diversity of cultures are promoted by eliminating culture-related discrimination” [Mahajan, G. (2002). The Multicultural Pat: Issues of Diversity and Discrimination in Democracy (p. 18). New Delhi: Sage Publications]. - 66 - the Nepalese society had, formally, been recognized by the Constitution of 1990 conforming the global trend of “anti-assimilationist” and “anti-hegimonist” treatment of minorities which has been a significant departure from its persistant cultural policy. However, although the Nepali state has not yet fully conformed to the spirit of multicultural democracy because the attitudes, values, norms and practices of ruling elites have still remained unchanged. ******************* - 67 - CHAPTER-IV POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN NEPAL: AN ETHNIC PERSPECTIVE 4.1. Introduction: Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, as one can understand, is all about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subaltern classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent.1 During the drafting of the new constitution in 1990, which intended to establish a democratic order in the country, a new commission was constituted comprising representatives and experts aligned to the major political parties (Nepali Congress and United left Front – two major democratic forces), and the King of Nepal. From the very first effort towards the drafting of the constitution, a confrontation between the King, who demonstrated an unwavering will to remain as the source of sovereignty, and the democratic alliance, began to develope. Although, there were demands for addressing the regional, religious, linguistic, gender and ethnic issues from all over the country, the commission unfortunately denounced these issues as a threat to nation’s unity. 2 In fact, the commission’s chairperson characterized most of the issues raised by the people as “unfortunate” and “peripheral” demonstrating their lack of Constitutional knowledge. This implies that in order to establish a nation-state, the discourse that is put forward is that the Nation states are embracing and cohesive, whereas ethnic groups are exclusive and divisive. Nation states represent modernity while ethnic groups simply represent a harping, mis- 1 Upadhyaya, P. K. (2011). Multi-cultural and Multi-lingual Issues: Hegemony and Denial in the Constitutions of Nepal since 1990. Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines (CADAAD), 5(1), 112 – 129. 2 Ibid. - 68 - informed, and misguided nostalgia.3 The fundamental challenge in the process of state formation as well as nation-building vis-a-vis the ethnic upsurge during the transitional phase of Nepali politics has been the promulgation of an inclusive constitution. On the aftermath of the first peoples’ movement in 1990 that had overthrown the autocratic Panchayat regime, a new constitution was drafted after wider consultations with peoples from different backgrounds including the various social, religious and linguisticv groups. The Nepali Constitution of 1990 had defined Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multilinguistic, though, it still remained a Hindu kingdom with Nepali as the state language, Bahuns and Chhetris still dominated the state apparatus including bureaucracy. In spite of that, the 1990 Constitution was being far better than the earlier undemocratic constitutions in many respects although it failed in many fronts in becoming a tool for inclusion. As Lawoti4 has found many sources of exclusion such as majoritarian principle and centralised state, racist elements of language and religion, restriction of political parties based on religion, caste and ethnicity. The decade long extra-sytemic insurgency of the Maoist on the agenda of republican state had, further, raised a new equation in Nepali politics. In addition to this, the interim Constitution of 2007, promulgated by the House of Representatives, could not dismantle the monolithic and extremely centralised structure of the state and ensured an inclusive state. The Interim Constitution had further hindered the participation of Janajatis, Madheshis, and Dalits. As a grievance to these fallacies, the Madheshis and Janajatis had waged agitations. The Madheshi agitation led by Madheshi Janadhkar Forum (MJF) became violent in Tarai causing many lives. Therefore, the Interim Constitution had to be amended in order to accommodate 3 4 Ibid Lawoti, M. (2005). Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicultural Society. New Delhi: Sage Publication. - 69 - the marginalized ethnic groups, to change the nature of the state into a confederation and to revise the distribution of seats in the constituent assembly to ensure proportionality of Tarai population in the CA. However, the agitation by the Indigenous Nationalities and the Madheshis could ensure the election of CA fully proportional. Although, significantly, the second amendment to the Interim Constitution did not refer to full proportional representation in the CA. Therefore, the CA could unable to build a consensus or at general agreement among the divergent ethnic forces and finally dissolved in 2012. Hence, the politics of Constitutionmaking has been crucial in investigating the ethno-political dynamics in Nepal in the post1990 period. Broadly, a twofold ethnic demands have been observed in Nepal: quest for identity – the identity assertion of Janajaties for equal rights and cultural autonomy, and the quest for regional autonomy – Madheshis Demand of regional autonomy based on right to selfdetermination. Beside this broad categorization, the Dalits both from the Hills as well as Tarai have a distinct agenda of fighting for the equal status by annihilating the practice of untouchability. 4.2. Indigenous Nationalities Movement: The role of indigenous nationalities movement has been historically significant in the process of transition of Nepali nation. The indigenous ethnic groups gained official recognition by the Constitution of 1990 and the National Foundation of Indigenous Nationalities Act, 2002 which provided a list of 59 indigenous communities in the country. The Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities Act, 2002 defines indigenous nationalities as “those ethnic groups or communities, who have their own mother tongue and traditional customs, different cultural identity, distinct social structure and written or oral history". Indigenous - 70 - nationalities were accused of being “divisive” and “anti-national” prior to the transition to multiparty democracy in 1990. Their political demands such as linguistic rights, reform of discriminatory provisions such as those related to the declaration of Nepal as a Hindu kingdom, equitable representation in state apparatus, collective access to natural resources, self-determination, etc., became an integral part in the post-1990 public discourse of Nepal. Furthermore, Indigenous nationalities struggle against the feudal state structure had built on and kept reinforcing the dominance of a high-caste minority over the highly diverse majority, and had gained significant support and power during the Maoist insurgency (1996 – 2006). 4.2.1. Indigenous Nationalities Narrative on Systematic Exclusion: The first systematic challenges to the exclusionary state policy were undertaken by the Indigenous Nationalities Movement. The indegenous groups had organized collective protests throughout the country in 1990s in order to restore and defend cultures and practices that contradicts the dominant discourse of “Nepaliness”. Unification of these disparate groups was formalized through the creation of the Adivasi Mahasangh or the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities which had reframed Hindus as non-natives, a rhetorical move that also enables ethnic activists to portray the dominant group as colonizers whereas indigenous groups are “original” and, thus, more authentically Nepali than caste Hindus. The movement also intentionally worked to introduce race as a form of self-identification in Nepal, in the process of strengthening racial identities for both the marginalized and their oppressors. The Muluki Ain (1854), the Panchayat Constitution (1962) and later on the Constitution of 1990 vis-a-vis different laws and policies promulgated time to time have legally discriminated, excluded and marginalized the indigenous nationalities.5 These legal provisions have further 5 Whelpton, J. (2005). AHistory of Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. - 71 - strengthend the Hinduized political structure, the caste hierarchy and facilitated the exclusion of indigenous nationalities from various social, economic and political opportunities. Bhattachan6 has found several historical markers of domination and discrimination that historically marginalized or subalternized the indigenous nationalities. These include: one, the caste restructuring by King Jayasthiti Malla in the Kathmandu valley in the fourteenth century that paved the way for intensification of the process of Hinduization or sanskritization of indigenous nationalities of Nepal; two, the conspiratorial attack against the Magar King of Lig-Lig kot by King Drabya Shah, who later won a war against the Khadka King of Gorkha in 1559, was probably the “the beginning of the downfall of independence of indigenous nationalities in Nepal”; three, the “unification” of Nepal in 1769 by king Prithvi Narayan Shah consequencing all indigenous nationalities loss of independence on the one hand and the loss of rights to land, water, forests, mines, rivers and pastures on the other.7 Thus, indigenous nationalities began to loose their language, religion, culture and indigenous knowledge system’; four, the promulgation of Muluki Ain of 1854, the “first ever codified law applicable in all parts of Nepal, it restructured caste and ethnic groups and legally divided them into a fourfold social hierarchy”, by Jung Bahadur Rana; five, the Partyless Panchayat rule from 1960-1990 under the direct and active rule of King Mahendra and King Birendra launched a campaign of “One King, One Country; One Language, One Dress”. This trend had continued even in the two phases of experiment with liberal democracy first time in 1950 and then in 1990. 6 Bhattachan, K. B., & Pyakuryal, K. N. (2002). The Issue of National integration in nepal: An Ethnoregional Approach. Occasional papers, 17-37. 7 Ibid. - 72 - Table- 4.1. Overview on Cultural Status of Indigenous Nationalities: S N. Indigenou s People Ancestral Territory Language Traditional Attire Festival (s) Ethnological History Mythology Customs/ Customary law Traditional Sociopolitical Institutio ns Social Structure Tangible Cultural Heritage 1 Raute, Kusbadia Invaded by others Spoken by majority Used by majority Mainly oral/disappea ring Fully effective Egalitaria n Unsafe/ encroach ed Kusunda, Bankariya Invaded by others Nearly vanishing Egalitaria n Chepang,, Thami, Hayu, Surel Bhote, Sherpa, Dolpo, Lhomi, (Singsawa) Lhopa, Larke, Siyar, Mugali, Walung, Thudamba, Tangbe, Dhokpya, Byansi, Hyolmo Thakali,, Marphali, Thakali, Tin Gaule, Thakali,, Barh, Gaunle Invaded by others Nearly Disappeare d Used by majority Partially effective 3 Spoken by majority Spoken by majority Influenced by great tradition (Hinduism) Lost/ Perished Fully effective 2 Partially effective Partially effective Ranked Spoken by majority Used by majority Somewha t written/ mainly oral Influenced by great tradition (Hinduism) Influenced by great tradition (Buddhism) Unsafe/ encroach ed Unsafe/ encroach ed Inhabited by majority Limited within the communit y Nearly Disappear ed Limited within the communit y Nationally (throughou t kingdom) known (Lhosar) Fully effective Partially effective Ranked Fully safe Inhabited by majority Spoken by majority Used by a few/nearly disappeared Nationally Known Somewha t written /mainly oral Influenced by great tradition (Buddhism) Fully effective Fully effective Stratified Fully Safe 4 5 Nearly Disappearing Mainly oral - 73 - 6 Inhabited by majority Spoken by majority Used by a few/nearly disappeared Nationally Known Inhabited by majority Spoken by majority Used by a few/nearly disappeared Inhabited by majority Spoken by majority Inhabited by others 11 Gurung,, Tamang, Lapcha, Jirel Limbu, Rai, Chhantyal, Pahari, Phri, Yakkha, Raji Magar, Sunuwar, Bhujel, Baramo, Dura, Bote, Kumal, Darai, Majhi, Danuwar Gangain, Rajbansi, Tajpuriya, Tharu, Dhanuk (Rajbansi) Dhimal Miche Jhangad Kisan Santhal 12 Newar 7 8 9 10 Influenced by great tradition (Buddhism) Indigenous type Fully effective Fully effective Ranked Partially Safe Limited within the communit y Somewha t written /mainly oral Somewha t written /mainly oral Fully effective Fully effective Ranked Partially Safe Used by a few/nearly disappeared Limited within the communit y Somewha t written /mainly oral Influenced by great tradition (Hinduism Partially effective Nearly being perished/ vanished Ranked Partially Safe Spoken by majority Used by majority Limited within the communit y Somewha t written /mainly oral Influenced by great tradition (Hinduism Partially effective Partially effective Ranked Unsafe/ encroach ed Inhabited by others Spoken by majority Used by majority Fully Effective Partially Effective Ranked Unsafe/ encroach ed Spoken by majority Used by majority Indigenous type Fully Effective Fully effective Ranked Unsafe/ encroach ed Inhabited by majority Spoken by majority Used by a few/nearly disappeared Somewha t written /mainly oral Somewha t written /mainly oral Mostly written/ Somewhat oral Indigenous type Mostly Displaced Limited within the communit y Limited within the communit y Nationally known Influenced by great traditions (Hinduism) and Buddhism) Partially effective Partially effective Stratified Fully Safe Source: Integrated Institute for Development Studies (IIDS) Report, Kathmandu, 2004 - 74 - Therefore, the limitation of liberal democratic institutions to address the urge for indigenous rights reminds Rousseau’s critique of the foundation of liberal political order. In the ShahRana regime, it was quite understandable that the autocratic orientation of the regime and the integrative-repressive strategy of nation-building through the process of Hinduisation (and/ or Nepalization during the Panchayat regime) had caused exclusion or marginalization of indigenous communities but despite of the reinstallation of liberal political order (often termed as the second democratic experiment) through relatively more democratic constitution of 1990 as a result of the first peoples’ movement, the indigenous communities were still struggled for the equal rights and status. The Constitution of 1990 had recognized the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nature of population of Nepal and granted equal rights irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe or ideology. It also allowed the formation of civil society based on caste and ethnic identity which was a major development for indigenous nationalities who were not able to formally organize themselves previously under the old projection of a single Nepali culture based on that of upper-caste Parbatiyas.8 But, in spite of these developments, the constitution of 1990 was contradictory and ambiguous towards indigenous nationalities like the historical markers that preceded it.9 In order to trace out the theortical cause of this one can revisit Rousseau’s critique of liberal political order which suggests that liberal constitutions promise equal rights only for the members of the “political society” not for the entire “civil society” and, therefore, parochial, exclusive and limited in scope. Rousseau’s remedy to this has been a Constitution based on “general will”. 8 Bhattachan, K. B. (2003). Indigenous Nationalities and Minorities of Nepal. London: Minority Rights Group International. 9 Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (First ed.). Washington DC: EastWest Centre; and - 75 - In this case of the marginalized indigenous communities of Nepal, this interpretation helps us to understand their exclusion even in the liberal political order. Bhattachan mentioned that a consultative workshop organized by Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, NEFIN with support from the Minority Rights Group International (MRG), has identified 26 provisions in the Constitution of Nepal 1990 and 49 legal Acts that discriminate against indigenous nationalities. Article 4 (1) of the Constitution of 1990 provided “multi-ethnic”, “multi-lingual” status, however, Hinduism was given privileges over other religions. Similarly, the Chapter- 10 on Quadrupeds of the Country Code (1963) stated that “whoever takes cows, bulls, bullocks or calves of any category to a foreign territory from Nepal and slaughters them, causes them to be slaughtered, he/she shall be liable to a punishment of imprisonment for 6 years”10. This law prohibits indigenous nationalities from slaughtering of cows which are sacred to Hindu religion only. As a result of this, indigenous nationalities continue to face social discrimination being labeled as “cow-eaters.” According to the preamble of the Country Code (1963), “…punishments shall not be more or less merely based on people’s higher or lower status…” This clearly shows that the Country Code recognizes the higher and lower status of Nepali society although the constitution mandates equality for every citizen regardless of their background.11 Indigenous Nationalities rights over the natural resource of the country were snatched through discriminatory law like Land Eviction of the Country Code, 1963. It stated that “Kipat (common communal property) lands which lack official documents are equivalent to Raikar, lands on which taxes can be levied.” 10 The World Bank. (2006). The World Bank Annual Report 2006. New York: The World Bank. 11 Ibid. - 76 - Furthermore, Article 6 (1) stated that “the Nepali language in the Devnagari script is the language of the nation of Nepal” therefore “shall be the official language”. This article is discriminatory as it does not recognize other indigenous languages as the languages of the nation of Nepal although the constitution recognizes the country as a multilingual nation. Indigenous intellectuals and activists argue that only the Khas language spoken by Bahuns and Chhetris of the Hills should not be the only “language of the nation” because there are more than a hundred languages spoken in Nepal.12 In 1999, the Supreme Court banned the use of local language as formal language in local bodies. The apex court had made the ruling in response to a writ filed against the use of Newari and Maithili language by Kathmandu metropolitan and Rajbiraj municipality, respectively.13 In addition to this, the rticle 18 (2) stated that “each community shall have the right to operate schools up to the primary level in its own mother tongue for imparting education to its children”. Communities were not allowed to operate schools in their own mother tongue beyond the primary level which promotes the “one language policy”. This has discouraged the reduction of drop out rates of indigenous nationalities whose first language is not Khas Kura. The lower literacy rate among indigenous nationalities has lagged them behind as it has “lowered their ability to articulate and demand rights, compete for administrative and political positions, and be effective supporters of ethnic movements and parties among other things”.14 12 Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (First ed.). Washington DC: East-West Centre. 13 Nepal Federation for Indigenous Nationalities Report (2007), Lalitpur (Nepal). 14 Lawoti, M. (2007). Contentious Politics in Democratizing Nepal. In M. Lawoti (Ed.), Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Sage Publications. - 77 - Table- 4.2. Representation of Indegenous Nationalities under Various Political Parties in the Constituent Assembly, 2008. Nepali Congress (NC) Bhujel Lepcha Sherpa United Marxist Leninist (UML) Bharagaule Byansi Chepang Hyolmo Jirel Kumal Lepcha Mugal Sherpa Yakkha Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Bhujel Chepang Dura Jangad Majhi Marfali Thakali Mugal Santhal Sherpa Thami Source: Nepal Federation for Indegenous Nationalities (2009). Lalitpur. URLhttp://www.nefin.org.np/news--update/janajatis-in-pr-system/316, Accessed on 13/12/ 2014. The interrelationship between language and culture is wide and complex and the debate over linguistic and ethnic/cultural inequality and intercultural communication is there to stay in Nepal for a long time, in fact, as long as the “them” and “us” mentality is present in those who come to power. Therefore, it is important to rhetorically analyze such discourses and identify and understand the hidden agendas before giving any approval to any plans and policies that deal with the critical issues of language, culture, and ethnicity in the newly democratized nations like Nepal. 4.3. Nepal Adivasi Mahasangh (NEFIN): The Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) is an umbrella organization of indigenous nationalities in Nepal, identifies itself as an autonomous and politically nonpartisan organization15. It was formed after the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal, 15 NEFIN. (2015, 12 12). Home Page of Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasangh. Retrieved from NEFIN KOREA: www.janjatikorea.blogspot.in/p/blog-page.html - 78 - 1990 with 8 member organizations with the goal of documenting, preserving and promoting cultures, languages, religion, customs, and traditions of the indigenous nationalities of Nepal and to assist them in developing and obtaining equal rights.16 The focus on strengthening ethnic and cultural identity was particularly essential after the first peoples’ movement because they had been damaged, and any effort to restore them had been suppressed by the monolithic policy of “one culture”17. The NEFIN supports its member organizations in leadership development, and organizational development to empower them in exercising their rights to development with identity. The core aim of NEFIN has been to acquire social equality and justice for indigenous nationalities by preserving their distinct social, political, cultural and linguistic identities and by promoting their representation in the state aparetus. Moreover, NEFIN advocates for the establishment of a multicultural democratic state where diverse ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and territorial groups are treated equally; indigenous people’s rights are recognized and respected; and indigenous nationalities enjoy ethnic autonomy on the basis of the principle of right to self-determination.18 NEFIN has been instrumental in representing indigenous nationalities by acting as a unified voice. But in most of the times, the activities of NEFIN have been limited to collective bargaining with the state which has been evident from the chain of events during the transitional phase. Now, some of the member ethnic groups of NEFIN have been raising questions over the internal hierarchichy 16 Basu, S. (2010). Nepal: From Hindu Monarchy to Secular Democracy. In A. Riaz, Religion and Politics in South Asis (pp. 98-118). London and New York: Routledge. 17 Hangen, S. (2005). EducationRace and the Politics of Identity in Nepal. Ethnology, 44(1), 49-64. 18 NEFIN. (2015, 12 12). Home Page of Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasangh. Retrieved from NEFIN KOREA: www.janjatikorea.blogspot.in/p/blog-page.html - 79 - of the organization. Newars, for example, are generally socio-economically viable and the most privileged section for centuries but still they are being most dominant in the organization. 4.4. Maoists’ Ethnic Agenda: The CPN (M) had launched its political-ideological programme of “People’s War” on February 12, 1996, with attacks on police stations in the districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Sindhuli, and on an agricultural development bank in Gorkha district. Rolpa and Rukum are adjacent districts in the west of the country, and the home of the Kham Magars. Being well aware of the ethnic fabric, the Maoist employed it into their strategy of mass mobilization. Although one can understand that the athnic agenda does not generally support the ideological fittings of either Marxism-Leninism or Maoism. Because communist ideologies only supports the class orientation of the society, not caste, tribe or ethnicity. Despite of such ideological mismatch, the Maoist political elites led by Pushpa Kumar Dahal employed the Janajati factor to build their support base at the grass-root level. It is similar to the strategy of the Indian Naxalites who have sought to establish bases in tribal areas to gain support in 1970s. The CPN (M) targeted the Kham Magar regions of Rolpa and Rukum districts as their base area.19 In fact, these areas had been a target of leftist proselytisation from the 1950s onwards and the village of Thabang was known as a communist stronghold already in the panchayat days. Maoists established a magar-dominated “special district” (bishes jilla) in their heartland in west Nepal in April 2002 which led the way for the later declaration ofautonomous regions in January and February, 2004. The entire country was divided into 19 Gellner, D. N. (2007). Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(20), 1827. - 80 - nine “autonomous” regions, which on paper were the first level of government below the national.20 Six of the nine were named on an ethnic basis, and the unspoken assumption was that the leader of that region and the majority of the representatives in the regional government must come from the ethnic group so named, though no explicit statement to this effect is to be found in the Maoist rule book.21 The Maoist could successfully mobilized the Indegenous Nationalities because of the nature of exploitation, oppression and deprivation experienced by the indigenous nationalities from the dominant “high castes” for centuries. This has been evident from the Citizen Survey conducted in 2007 which had placed the CPNMaoist at the top of the list among all actors who were deemed responsible for promoting the cause of the excluded groups. Respondents from different groups, particularly the Janajatis from both the Hill and Tarai groups, gave more credit to the CPN-Maoist than to other actors for working for the cause of the excluded groups. Athough the respondents from all the Madheshi groups, except for the Tarai Janajatis, emphasized more on the contributions made by ethnic organizations in this regard. However during the course of constitution drafting, the Maoist had played most proactive role as far as the ethnic agenda of secular state and “ethnicity based federal state”. 4.5. Madhesh Uprising: The term Madhesh is widely used to address the Tarai region of Nepal comprising 20 districts of plain land situated to the Indo-Nepal boundary. Madhesh, derived from the IndoAryan word Madhyadesh (Middle Land) or Matsyadesh (Land of Fish), is defined as very plain land with no unevenness and hills or Tarai, and Madheshi as lining in Madhesh, 20 21 Ibid. Ibid. - 81 - inhabitants of Madhesh. 22 The word Madhyadesh was evident in ancient Hindu and Buddha scriptures. Mythological scripts suggests that the land between Himalayan range and Ganges was known as “Madhyadesh”. Interestingly, people residing near Indo-Nepal border especially Bihar and Uttar Pradesh ignore the word Madhesh and Madheshi.23 One scholar puts that ‘Madhesh or Tarai is the plain land of Nepal with worm climate lying in the southern part of Nepal, whose boundary is linked to India. It occupies the land of 34109 sq. k. m. Inner Madhesh refers to the three valleys situated in the north of Siwalik hill range (Chure Hill), the northern boundary of Tarai. They are Rapti valley of the west, Chitwan valley of the central Nepal and Udaypur valley of the east lying at the banks of Triyuga river’.24 Although the geographical definition of Madhesh is opposed by Tharu Indigenous Organization. Rather, they are of the opinion of accepting the word “Tarai” derived from the Persian word “Tar” which means “low”, the nature of the plain region. Scholars like Chaudhary (2015) and Gaige (1975) argue that the Tharus are the only original inhabitants of Tarai whereas the Hindus and Muslims are migrants into the Tarai or the decedents of those migrants. In fact on the aftermath of the first amendment of the interim Constitution, 2007, when the government used the word “Madheshi”, Tharus protested against it to substitute the word by “Tarai”.The government, henceforth, used the term “Tarai-Madhesh”. 4.5.1. Early History and Demography of Tarai-Madhesh: ‘The ancient human fossil found on the bank of the Tinau River of Butwal, Rupandehi district (Tarai), is the most ancient human fossil yet found in Asia. Similarly, the stone 22 23 24 Nepali Extensive Dictionary (1998). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. Chaudhary, D. (2015). Nepalko Madheshi Samaj (Madheshi Society in Nepal) (Upgraded ed.). Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. Majumder, S. (2006, April 25). Nepalis cautious over king's move. BBC News. - 82 - weapons were found in the Dang valley, Kotdada of Nawalparsi and in different parts of Jhapa and Morang districts’.25 Thus, the history suggests that people used to live in Tarai since sixth century BC. Furthermore, Tarai was a fertile land for the growth of ancient cultures. Videh-Mithila and Kapilbastu were the centres of Hindu civilization and the birth place of Lord Buddha respectively. Moreover the Tarai region has been known as Madhesh since the time of Prithivi Narayan Shah.26 Presently, Tarai-Madhesh comprised by 20 districts27 situated to the Indo-Nepal border28. Tarai occupies 17-23% of land, mostly fertile. As mentioned earlier that the history of this region has been no less than Kathmandu valley. Furthermore, the aboriginal people of Tarai inhabiting from east to west have much similarities like life style, customs, festivals, languages (Indo-Aryan Language), complexion (Semi white and white or mixture of both), farming system, production and so on.29 The powerful Kirat king Parbhatak helped Chandra Gupta Mouriya of Magadh in 327 B. C. when Chandra Gupta got better of Nalanda King Dhananda. Parbhatak again help him in driving away the Greek Governor Seleucus from Punjab and Sindh.30 Indian Emperor Ashoka established a commemorative pillar at Lumbini to mark the birth place of Lord Buddha. 31 25 Dahal, P. (1997). Nepalko Itihas (History of Nepal) (First ed.). Kathmandu: M. K. Publishers and Distributers. 26 In his letter written to his Army officials in November-December, 1971, Prithvi Narayan Shah used the word ‘Madhesh’. 27 Chitwan, Jhapa, Morang, Rupandehi, Sunsari, Dang, Banke, Bardiya, Kanchanpur, Nawalparsi, Kailali, Dhansura, Saptari, Parsa, Kapilbastu, Bara, Siraha, Sarlahi, Mahottari, Rautahat. 28 Indo-Nepal Border comprised by four India States viz, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttrakhand. 29 Chaudhary, D. (2015). Nepalko Madheshi Samaj (Madheshi Society in Nepal) (Upgraded ed.). Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 30 Ibid. 31 Sharma, P. R. (1973). Culture and Religion: Historical Background. In P. J. Rana, & K. P. Malla (Eds.), Nepal in Perspective (p. 65). Kathmandu: Centre for Economic Development and Administration. - 83 - Mithila civilization has the most profound influence over Tarai. From Karnataka dynasty to Thakkura dynasty (1150-1577) the Mithila kingdom of Tarai had produced a lot of influential academic and cultural works including “Nyaya Sastra” and the famous book “Gitagovinda” by the poet Jayadeva.32 After the demise of Mithila king Kamsanaraya in 1527, the “centre of gravity” of language, culture and scholarship had shifted to Kathmandu.33 The Malla kings of Kathmandu valley even used the Newari language, which has close resemblance with Maithili and Bengali, as the medium of official instruction till 1768.34 Further, scholars and Brahmins of Mithila enjoyed a high social position in Nepal.35 It was only after the Gorkhas conquered Kathmandu, the relations with Tarai had soured because Mithila army had helped the Malla rulers to resist Gorkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah.36 4.5.2. Tarai- Madhesh in the Context of National Integration: The Tarai was unified into the Gorkhali Kingdom by Prithvi Narayan Shah on paper but in reality “no single government had control over Tarai- Madhesh”.37 Even Pahadi Bahuns and Chhetris could not settled down there due to unfavourabe condition both physically and culturally with dense forest and fear of malaria especially in the eastern part of the region 32 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (First ed.). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 33 Pradhan, P. M. (2003). Nepal. In S. K. Chatterjee (Ed.), The Cultural Heritage of India (Vol. V). Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Heritage of Culture. 34 Ibid, p. 702. 35 Sharma, P. R. (1973). Culture and Religion: Historical Background. In P. J. Rana, & K. P. Malla (Eds.), Nepal in Perspective (p. 73). Kathmandu: Centre for Economic Development and Administration. 36 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 44). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 37 Chaudhary, D. (2015). Nepalko Madheshi Samaj (Madheshi Society in Nepal) (p. 24). Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. - 84 - called Taraiyani38. But for the Gorkhali rulers, this region was “superior and revenue yielding territory”39 because of its fertile nature. Prithivi Narayan Shah wrote in a letter to one of his Generals, ‘We should not relinquish territory in the Tarai…even if there is a war’.40 Besides Shah ordered “not to call up Tamangs, Newars and Madheshi in the army”41. Hence Tarai-Madhesh was concerned with revenue collection per se. Therefore it is evident from this that the treatment of Madheshis as foreigner or Indian origin people or “second class citizens”42 by the Pahadis hasn’t been a recent phenomenon rather it has had a historical roots in the unification of Nepal. Most people of Nepal today believe that ‘Madheshis are either Indian who migrated to Nepal or they are decedents of Indian migrants’. 43 Another important development in this connection was the signing of “Treaty of Sugauli” between the British East India Company and the Gorkha King Bhimsen Thapa on 2nd of December 1815 on the aftermath of Anglo-Nepal War. Until then, the territory of Nepal also included Darjeeling, and whole Sikkim to the east, to the South-east, Nanital to the south-west and Kumaon Kingdom, Gadhwal Kingdom and Bashahar to the west. Almost two-third areas of Tarai was lost by Nepal to the British East India Company under the treaty [See Figure-4.1]. However Nepal got back some parts of Tarai as a reward for helping the British in combating ‘Sepoi rebellion’ in India. This newly acquired territory was renamed as “Naya Muluk”. In 38 Taraiyani comprissed by the districts of eastern Tarai such as Chitwan, Parsa, Bara, Rautahat, Saptari and Mahottari. 39 Regmi, M. C. (1978). Thached Huts and Stucco Palaces: Peasants and Land Lords in 19th Century Nepal. New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 40 Chaudhary, D. (2015). Nepalko Madheshi Samaj (Madheshi Society in Nepal) (p. 24). Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 41 Ibid, (p. 27). 42 Second Class Citizen implies the discriminatory attitudes of the state towards Madheshis. 43 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 45). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. - 85 - between these two incidents, a greater rate population migration from the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal had made the Tarai region population wise denser. Initially, the British colonial masters had a plan of developing the region keeping in view the agro-resources of Tarai but highly challenging environment forced them to proceed with their plan. Besides, Nepali Newars were the trading partners of East India Company those days. The trade and commercial exchange between the British and Newari business class also contributed a great deal in terms of proximity and connectivity with India. Later on Rana rulers also encouraged Indian people to reside in Tarai keeping in view the natural resources of the region. In 1950, Nepali people had got rid of Rana oligarchy substituted by multi-party democracy. The same year, Nepal signed historic “Peace and Friendship”44 with India which further encouraged migration of citizens of both the countries. The Article- 6 of the “Peace and Friendship” treaty articulates that, “each Government [India and Nepal] undertakes, in token of the neighborly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts, relating to such development”. Likewise, Article – 7 states that, “The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature”. 44 Legal Information Institute of India. (2014, 02 23). Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal . Retrieved from Indian Treaty Series: www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1 - 86 - Figure-4.1. Loss of Territoty to British East India Company by King Bhim Sen Thapa [The Grey area was lost by Nepal to the British East India Company] Source: http://nepology.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Sugauli_Treaty2.png, Accessed on 25/08/2015 - 87 - Consequently, the treaty of Peace and Friendship had facilitated expanding immigration of Indians into Tarai. In 1961, among the total foreign born population in Tarai, 92.3 percent were Indian origin people. All these developments had labeled the Madheshis as Indian migrants and therefore disloyal to the Nepali state. Interestingly many other people from different ethnic and national background had inhabited in Tarai but the Nepali government, especially once the Party-less Panchayat System had substituted the multi-party democracy in 1960, had facilitated discriminatory policies both at procedural as well as substantive levels based on the claim of the Indian affiliation of Madheshis. Furthermore, the panchayat regime had tried policies and measures to regulate the increment of Indian immigrants in Tarai. State policies regarding language and citizenship had thus strengthened the Madheshis identity. On this backdrop, Madheshis are identified by the Nepali state dominated by the Hill people as if the “imagined other” within the “imagined community” of Nepal. The term “imagined others” here simply means “image of otherness”. The reason behind such coinage is that though other marginalized communities in Nepal including Adivasi Janajities are treated unequally by Pahadi Bahun and Chhetris but they are still accepted as Nepali citizens whereas Madheshis are treated as foreigners, Indians because of their cultural familiarity with the people of Indian states of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal.45 Even the Pahadis from India are not questioned about their loyalty to the state. Madheshi political elites, on contrary, firmly turn down this allegation and skepticism. Nevertheless, the Madheshis believe that Madhesh-India relation is unique and incomparable. They consider that Madhesh is having a special relation or “roti-beti ka sambandh”46 with India. 45 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 46). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 46 Roti-beti ka sambandh refers to the intimate relationship between the Indians living across the Indo-Nepal border and Madheshis. They have common physical complexion, language, religion and - 88 - They further argue that there is hardly a family in Madhesh where they have not married their daughters off in India or where they have not brought brides from there. Madhesh is thus dependent upon India for virtually everything- from brides to grooms to goods, jobs and education47. Having such kind of intimate relationship with India has probably given negative signal to the Kathmandu centre and consequently have strengthened “othering” of Madheshis. Even during the course of field work, this researcher has observed from interactions with Pahadi political elites again and again that the alienation of Madheshis from the Nepali state was due more to their “Image-Ind” outlook. Therefore the Madheshis strength of “roti-beti ka samband” has arguably the reason behind the “otherization of Madheshis”. 4.5.3. Immigration and Emigration in the Tarai-Madhesh: From 1885 to 1951, Nepal was ruled by authoritarian Rana dynasty when the Himalayan state was virtually isolated from the rest of the world. As the Tarai region has an open border with India, it was like a safe haven for Indian freedom fighters to take shelter in Madhesh. Therefore the presence of Indian politicians fueled in rising consciousness of the Madheshi elites who also supported the underground Nepalese political parties who were struggling to get rid of the authoritarian Ranas. Close proximity with India further encourage Madheshis to organize various political programmes in Tarai. Even during the anti-Rana movement, as claimed by Madheshi elites, the sons and daughters of Tarai-based landlords helped underground political parties of Nepal who were eventually able to overthrow the Ranas in customs. Madheshis have to depend largely on those border adjacent Indian states for bread (Roti) as well as Bride (Beti). 47 http://admin.myrepublica.com/opinion/story/41928/thecitizenshipdebate.html#sthash.Rn6eHRY2.dpuf, Accessed on 25/12/2015. - 89 - 1951. Then the multiparty parliamentary democracy was installed in Nepal but the Tarai based politicians began to feel excluded on the issues of cultural discrimination and political representation. Besides the issue of migration of Pahadis from hill to Tarai had huge impact over land share in Madheshis (See Figure No.-I). Tarai was considered as the region infected by malaria until DDT came along in the mid-1950s. The government of Nepal, facilitated by the malaria eradication programmes, had pursued the policy of ‘Pahadization’ of the Tarai through various government-sponsored resettlement programmes encouraging large-scale hill migration to Tarai.48 Hill population had increased from 5.94 % in 1951 to 42.62% in between 1951 and 1981. Even today Pahadis constitute majority in seven of the twenty districts of Tarai.49 However these resettlement programmes, rationalized by the panchayat government as an economic need had probably been politically motivated. Further the political elites of Hill might “considered it imperative to curtail the possibility of India using the Tarai, and the Madheshis, who the rulers perceived as being sympathetic towards India, to gain influence and even take over Nepal”.50 Another politically motivated state policy responsible for the overwhelming growth of Hill population in Tarai had been restructuring 48 Gaige, F. (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (First ed.). Delhi: Vikas; Gunaratne, A. (2009). Introduction. In Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (pp. xviii- xix). Kathmandu, Nepal: Himel Books and Social Science Baha; and Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990. New York: Routledge. 49 Central Bureau of Statistics. (2012). National census report, 2011. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics (Nepal). 50 Gaige, F. (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (First ed.). Delhi: Vikas; Gunaratne, A. (2009). Introduction. In Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (pp. xviii- xix). Kathmandu, Nepal: Himel Books and Social Science Baha; and Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990. New York: Routledge. - 90 - of the country into 75 districts in 1963. Previously there had been 32 districts in Nepal out of that Tatai included only 9. But after the enforcement of new structuration, the number of districts increased in Tarai to 20. A large areas of Shiwalik Range and mid-hills had been incorporated into Tarai. Mid-hill and Shiwalik range covers 11041 sq. k.m. which is 34.2% of the total area of Tarai-Madhesh.51 Therefore a large portion of Hill people had to be counted under the Tarai population. Therefore all these developments have forced Tarai political elites to often claim that Pahadi government encouraged hill migrants to settle in Tarai as they wanted to ‘de-Madheshi-fy’52 Tarai. Although the increase of Pahadis in TaraiMadhesh was thus an opportunity for both Pahadis as well as Madheshis to familiar with the culture of each other but the conflict of economic interest and discriminatory state policies led them to further hostility. 4.5.4. Politics of Custom and Language: The first experiment of multiparty democracy in 1951 was eventually hijacked by King Mahendra in 1960. He substituted it by an undemocratic Party-less Panchayat System (PPS) which lasted till 1990. All the political parties were banned. Therefore the motto of Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) had fall in line with the “extrasystematic opposition”.53 Under the aegis of “Ek desh, Ek bhesh, ek bhasa” (One country, one dress, one language), “Panchayat regime systematically sought to homogenize its 51 Upreti, B. R., Paudel, S. B., & Ghimire, S. (2013). Ignored or ill-represented? A grivance of TaraiMadhes Conflict in Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 52 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 55). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 53 Baral, L. R. (2006). Oppositional Politics in Nepal (p. 65). Lalitpur: Himel Book Classics. - 91 - diverse groups while casting ethnic affiliations as being counter protective to modernization and development”.54 Table- 4.3. Population Growth in Tarai-Madhesh. Year Pahadi % Madheshi % Total 1952 142000 5.946399 2246000 94.0536 2388000 1981 2795000 42.6262 3762000 57.3738 6557000 1991 3444000 39.55892 5262000 60.44108 8706000 2001 4120000 36.74634 7092000 63.25366 11212000 2011 4912197 36.91971 8392884 63.08029 13305081 Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. (2012). National census report, 2011. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics (Nepal). Earlier in 1885, Rana Prime Minister Bir Shamsher Rana declared the ‘Daura-Suruwa’55, as the national attire of the country and this continued till 2006. On contrary, Dhoti-kurta56 was never recognized as the national attire. The “Dhoti-Topi dichotomy”57 further made the Madheshi culturally excluded from the Kathmandu centre. One by one autocratic policies were framed and implemented in the name of Nepalization or Nepali language based nationbuilding. The significant measure by the state was the projection and promotion of Nepali language as the sole medium of instruction in all official work. Tarai-Madhesh being a multi- 54 Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (First ed.). Washington DC: East-West Centre. 55 The traditional dress of ruling hill communities of Nepal. The traditional dress of Madheshis. 57 The cultural conflict between Dhoti wearing Madheshis and Topi (Traditional hat in the Hills) wearing Pahadis. 56 - 92 - lingual region (See Table – 4.4) with existence of more than three dozen languages succumbed vis-a-vis integrative model of nationalism sponsored by the Nepali state. The issue of language had come to the political frame when, based on National Education Planning Commission Report of 1956, the education ministry of Nepal in 1957 issued an order instructed ‘all schools [in Nepal] to use Nepali as the medium of instruction.58 The medium of national radio broadcasting had also been restricted by the state to Nepali language per se. The medium of broadcasting till then used to be made in Hindi, Maithili and Awadhi besides Nepali. Therefore the people of Tarai most of whom used to speak nonNepali languages went confused by these decisions. Further, in many parts of Tarai the government had facilitated the formation of pro-Nepali language committee.59 In response, the Tarai Nepali Congress60 (TNC) initiated “Save Hindi” campaign. In November 19, 1957 pro-Hindi and pro-Nepali groups clashed in Biratnagar where many people injured.61 In 1959, the constitution of Nepal declared Nepali as the National language. Eventually, NTC failed to win a single seat in the election held on same year. Nepali Congress was able to win majority of seats in Madhesh because of non-Hindi speakers in the region negatively responded to MNC sponsored “Save Hindi” campaign. Later the PPS regime systematically passed legislations to project and promote Nepali language as the symbol of nationalism. The Nepal Company Act of 1964 made the use of Nepali language mandatory in business.62 Further the imposition of Nepali language over multi-lingual Tarai was not much resisted as 58 Gaige, F. (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (p. 111). Delhi: Vikas. Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 46). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 60 Tarai Nepali Congress was established in 1951 by the Tarai political elites on the issue of Exclusion from Kathmandu. 61 Gaige, F. (1975). Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Delhi: Vikas. 62 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 59 - 93 - ‘the powerful feudal Madheshi elites supported the royal regime’ for patronage like important posts in local government. The “disillusionment”63 of NC had also contributed to a great deal in this regard. However Madheshi activist Gajendra Narayan Singh formed Nepal Good Will Council in 1985 in order to advocate Hindi language.64 Moreover, monarchy, Hinduism and language were thus the three pillars of Nepali nationalism during the panchayat regime. Even after the Janandolan-I, the Constitution of 1990 had retained the fundamental panchayat features like “Hindu Kingdom” and “Nepali as the National Language”. In addition to this, the constitution also had given all non-Nepali languages the status of “languages of the nation”. Hence the language issue was one of the major agenda of “Madhesh mutiny”. As a result, the Interim Constitution of 2007 recognized all mother tongues as national language, nonetheless, declared Nepali as the official language per se. Later the Second Constituent Assembly successfully drafted and enforced the ‘New Constitution of Nepal’ in September, 2015. The new Constitution has accepted the term “multilingual” in the preamble. Furthermore Article -3 of Part-I (Preliminary) titled “Nation” of the latest Constitution declares the Nepali nation as “multilingual”65. But still the regional languages are yet to be accepted in official purpose and the medium of instruction in educational institutions. 63 Lok Raj Baral has characterized the political activities of the Nepali Congress between 1963 and 1968 as “disillusionment” [Baral, L. R. (2006). Oppositional Politics in Nepal (Second ed.). Lalitpur: Himel Book Classics]. 64 Lawoti, M., & Hangen, S. (2013). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (p. 21). London and New York: Routledge. 65 The Constitution of Nepal (Third Edition), Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Nepal, Law Books Management Board, Kathmandu, 2016. - 94 - Table- 4.4. Major Languages in Nepal Languages Nepali Maithili Bhojpuri Tharu Tamang Newar Magar Bajjika Urdu Awadhi Limbu Gurung Rajbanshi Percent 44.6 11.64 5.98 5.77 5.11 3.23 2.98 2.33 2.61 1.89 1.3 1.23 0.46 Family Indo-Aryan Indo-Aryan Indo-Aryan Indo-Aryan Tibeto-Burman Tibeto-Burman Tibeto-Burman Indo-Aryan Indo-Aryan Indo-Aryan Tibeto-Burman Tibeto-Burman Indo-Aryan Remarks National Language Tarai Language Tarai Language Tarai Language Hilly Language Hilly Language Hilly Language Tarai Language Tarai Language Tarai Language Hilly Language Hilly Language Tarai Language Hindi 0.29 Indo-Aryan Tarai Language Source: Chaudhaury, D. (2011). Tarai/ Madhesh of Nepal: Anthropological Study (p. 57). Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 4.5.5. Relative Deprivation of Tarai- Madhesh: Tarai-Madhesh has been the backbone of Nepali national economy with more than 60 per cent of the ago-industry contributed two-thirds of the GDP. Despite of that almost in every social sector, Madheshis are lagged behind than the Pahadis. More than half of the population reside in Tarai but there is less number of schools with very poor School-Student ratio (Table – 4.5). There are only 25% Primary Schools, 25% Upper Primary/ Lower Secondary Schools, 36% Secondary Schools and 40% Higher Secondary Schools in Tarai. Interestingly Tarai has the more population (4862582) than Hill (4077611) in the age group of 5-19. Furthermore the School-Student Ratio is as low as 140/School. These indications are really made a case of relative deprivation in the Tarai. - 95 - Table- 4.5. No. of Schools in Nepal. No. of Schools Eco-belts Primary Lower Secondary Secondary Higher secondary Total Mountain 3131 727 366 292 4516 SchoolStudent Ratio 89 Hill 17201 6369 2524 1482 27576 100 Tarai 6886 2366 1473 1190 11915 140 Total 27218 9462 4363 2964 44007 107 Source: Tabulated by the author himself in accordance with the National Census Report (CBS), Nepal, 2011. In addition, Tarai districts have trailed further in terms of latest ranking amongst 75 Nepali districts on the basis of Human Development Index (HDI, 2011) (See Table.- 4.6). The basic social indicators like Poverty Deprivation, Socio-economic and Infrastructural Growth, Woman Empowerment, Child Deprivation, Child Illiteracy Rate, Per Capita Development suggest a dismal show of Tarai districts. Only Chitwan, Jhapa, Morang and Rupandehi rank better. But the rest of the 16 district’s performance is more than below par. The Human Development Index (2011) of Nepal also suggests further backwardness of Madheshi Dalits, Muslims and Janajatis/Ethnic Groups (See Table- 4.7). Therefore the portrait of backwardness of Tarai is clearly reflected through these rankings and HDIs. During the field visits in the districts of Jhapa, Illam, Morang Parsa and Janakpur, almost all the respondents of Madheshi community raised this common issue of social injustice. - 96 - Table: 4.6. Human Development Index (HDI) of Caste/ Ethnicity, 2011 (Nepal) Caste/ Ethnicity Newar Hill Bahun Hill Chhetri Hill Janajati Hill Dalit Madheshhi Bahun/ Chhetri Non-dalit Tarai Caste Madheshhi Janajati Madheshhi Muslim Madheshhi Dalit HDI 0.565 0.557 0.507 0.509 0.446 0.536 0.46 0.473 0.422 HDI Ranking 1 2 5 4 8 3 6 7 9 0.4 10 Source: Human Development Index 2011, Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu, Nepal - 97 - Table- 4.7. Rank on the Basis of HDI amongst 75 Districts. Name of Tarai Districts Poverty Socio- Women Deprivation economic and Empowerment Rank on the basis of various index Child Child Overall Deprivation Illiteracy Infrastructural Per Capita Per Capita Literacy Regular Development Rate Budget Budget Growth Expenditure Expenditure Over all Composite Index Chitwan 3 4 8 16 6 3 35 39 2 Jhapa 1 6 16 7 14 6 60 73 3 Morang 5 9 24 32 42 25 65 8 11 Rupendehi 11 5 31 43 30 9 58 45 13 Sunsari 10 8 27 29 35 17 53 74 14 Dang 8 28 32 28 32 21 61 33 21 Banke 16 15 47 51 52 22 18 40 30 Bardiya 20 25 40 46 54 52 69 47 34 Kanchanpur 19 24 49 39 26 19 63 31 35 Nawalparsi 36 36 33 49 41 24 64 72 37 Kailali 31 27 42 52 50 36 67 67 40 Dhansua 46 18 59 57 60 47 69 44 46 Saptari 37 19 62 53 56 44 66 68 47 Parsa 43 29 63 69 64 56 59 65 52 Kapilbastu 48 53 58 72 62 57 72 59 54 Bara 42 39 67 61 61 55 73 75 55 Siraha 49 40 65 59 63 58 71 61 58 Sarlahi 57 46 64 64 69 65 75 14 61 Mahottari 61 56 71 66 72 68 68 70 65 Rautahat 68 61 72 74 74 72 74 71 68 Source: Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (First ed.). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point - 98 - Caste, ethnicity, religion and even regional identities have deep roots in economy as well. Hence the poverty rates amongst Tarai ethnic communities and their comparison with the Hill are really important in order to trace the economic disparity. Table – 4.8. Poverty Rate in Nepal in Percentage (2011). Ecological Zone Hill Tarai Caste/ Ethnicity Bahun Chhetri Newar Janajati Dalit Non-Hindu Castes Janajati Dalit Muslim Others % of Population under Poverty 10.34 23.4 10.25 28.25 43.63 28.69 25.93 38.16 43.7 12.34 41.8 Average Source: Poverty Trends in Nepal. Nepal living Standerd Survey- III (2010/ 2011). Kathmandu: Central bureau of Statistics (Nepal). The average poverty rate in Tarai is 41.8% compare to 23.17% in Hill. Muslims in Tarai live under severe famine. On the other hand the dominant ethnic groups of Nepal viz. Behuns and Chhetris and Newars (Hill) place very high with less poverty trends (See Table- 4.8). 4.5.6. Democratic Deficit: Democratic deficit simply refers to “inadequate opportunities for popular participation”.66 Participation includes not only the institutional representation in the Legislature, Local Government, Bureaucracy, Political Parties, Army, Police, etc. but also informal representation in the State-building process through building public opinion. The restoration of democracy in 1990 generated a lot of hope amongst the marginalized groups in this regard 66 Heywood, A. (2007). Politics (Third ed.) (p. 448). New York: Palgrave Foundations. - 99 - but there was hardly a genuine transition to an inclusive democracy.67 The democratic years (1990 - 2002) were thus a form of “exclusionary democratization”.68 The major precondition of inclusive democracy is believed to be the active participation of the people in the political system. The constitutional right to citizenship is thus the most important instrument of ensuring or enforcing participant political culture in the polity. Besides citizenship certificate is a legal document that recognizes a person as the franchise of the state. This certificate is compulsory requirement in Nepal in all forms of facilities provided by the state including Govt. jobs, opening bank account, etc. However the Constitutional provisions regarding the citizenship rights in Nepal has been discriminatory since the beginning of panchayat regime. During the 1950s, children having either of their father or mother as Nepali citizen, people married with a Nepali citizen or these living in Nepal permanently for at least five years were eligible to get citizenship certificate.69 This was probably due to the high dependency of Nepal over India and her restricted exposure with the rest of the world. But the mass mobilization in Tarai on the question of language probably 67 Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a "New Nepal": The Ethnic Dimension (First ed.). Washington DC: East-West Centre; Lawoti, M., & Hangen, S. (2013). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal. London and New York: Routledge; Whelpton, J. (2005). AHistory of Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Cambridge University Press; and, Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990. New York: Routledge. 68 Lawoti, M. (2007). Contentious Politics in Democratizing Nepal. In M. Lawoti (Ed.), Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Sage Publications. 69 Upreti, B. R., Paudel, S. B., & Ghimire, S. (2013). Ignored or ill-represented? A grivance of TaraiMadhes Conflict in Nepal (p. 34). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. - 100 - forced the Panchayat regime to revise the citizenship policy. The government of Nepal had promulgated ‘the Citizenship Act, 1964’ on the logic of increased migration in Tarai from the adjacent Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. Although the data suggests that, the number of internal migrants in 1971 was 15.5 % of the total population of Tarai while migration from India was only 7.7 %.70 Interestingly Article 6 and 7 of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, signed between Indian and Nepal in 1950, had encouraged the migration of citizens of both the countries. It was thus facilitated the free movement of people of both the countries without a visa or passport by using the open border. Consequently, a large number of people from across the border adjacent Indian states had immigrated to relatively low density area of Tarai. However the citizenship Act, 1964, had fixed three pre-conditions to get citizenship certificate: one, having birth certificate from Nepal, two, fluently speaking and writing Nepalese and three, Staying in Nepal for at least two years for a person of “Nepalese origin” and twelve years for a ‘person other than Nepalese origin’. The requirement of fluently speak and write Nepali language placed Madheshis at a far disadvantage position since the people in Tarai used to communicate in the regional languages like Maithili, Bhojpuri, Hindi, Awadhi and Tharu. Furthermore the term ‘Nepali origin’ was not defined in the clause on descent. In fact it was generally interpreted as ‘Pahadi origin’ in contrast to ‘non-Nepali origin’ which referred to Madheshis.71 Another reason behind the remodeling citizenship laws by the panchayat government was probably concerned to the exile of Nepali Congress in Tarai. Around the 70 Hangen, T. (1998). Nepal: The Kingdom in the Himalaya (First ed.) (p. 186). Lalitpur: Himal Books. 71 Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990 (p. 152). New York: Routledge. - 101 - time when citizenship regulation came into force, Nepali Congress was in exile in Tarai and was operating from across the border areas of India. The royal government was probably assumed “the Nepali Congress and India as being the main threats to the territorial integrity of the Nepali state as well as to its own rule”.72 However the differential criterion of descent was retained by the Constitution of 1990 and was continued until 2006 when the Citizenship Act of Nepal was amended. As a result nearly 3.5 million people estimated to be without citizenship certificates, the majority of them were from the Tarai region.73 Among many formalities to obtain the citizenship certificate, Madheshis needed to exhibit official documentation of property ownership in Nepal which “created a vicious circle because without a citizenship one cannot get a property ownership document”.74 The Citizenship Act (Amendment), 2006 had made the provision that anyone ‘born and living permanently in Nepal before the end of the Chaitra, 2046 V. S.75 (Mid-April, 1990)’ is eligible for citizenship. With the enforcement of the new citizenship regulation, 1.5 million people had got their citizenship certificate in 2007.76 The Interim Constitution of 2007 as the outcome of Madhesh uprising had tried to resolve the citizenship issue. It provisioned that ‘any person whose father or mother was a citizen of Nepal at his or her birth’ is eligible for Nepali citizenship by descent and ‘a women of foreign nationality who is married to a Nepali citizen’ is eligible for neutralized citizenship. But the Interim Constitution was quiet on the 72 73 Ibid. Gurung, N., & Paulsen, E. (2007). Nepal Moves Mountains (First ed.). Geneva: United Nations High Commissionars for Refugees (UNHCR). 74 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (First ed.) (p. 46). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 75 Vikram Sambat, Nepali Calender. Upreti, B. R., Paudel, S. B., & Ghimire, S. (2013). Ignored or ill-represented? A grivance of TaraiMadhes Conflict in Nepal (p. 39). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 76 - 102 - rights and powers of naturalized citizens. Many social activists are of the opinion that the citizenship by naturalization is way inferior to citizenship by descent. Therefore the new Constitution of Nepal, 2015 tried to resolve the citizenship issue by declaring in the Article10 (1) of Part-II, ‘No citizen of Nepal may be deprived of the right to obtain citizenship’. In order to obtain the citizenship, the Constitution provisions that ‘The persons who have obtained the citizenship of Nepal at the time of commencement of this constitution and who are qualified to obtain citizenship in accordance with this part shall be the citizen of Nepal’. Article-11(6) says that ‘A foreign women who has a matrimonial relationship with a citizen of Nepal army, if she so wishes, acquire the naturalized citizenship of Nepal’. Therefore the Madheshi demand for the citizenship by descent in cases of matrimonial relationships with India is still to be addressed and incorporated into the Constitution which have been surrounding in the public debates in Tarai for sometimes now. In addition to the Citizenship issue, representation at various levels of state apparatus remains key a key parameter of democracy. During the participatory sampling in various parts of Tarai, local masses of respective areas frequently highlighted the question of representation when this researcher had asked questions regarding recent ‘blocked’ in Birgunj and the promulgation of new Constitution by the Second Constituent Assembly. Hence representation of mobilizing social groups at the levels of Constituent Assembly, Political Parties, Bureaucracy, Army, Police and Civil Society is essential to trace the marginalization of social groups including the Madheshis. The first Constituent Assembly which failed to fulfil the task of Constitution making had only 99 (Combined Tarai Social Groups viz. Madheshis, Dalits, Janajatis, and Muslims) representatives out of 240 elected seats (See Table – 4.9). - 103 - Table – 4.9. Representation in the Constituent Assembly, Nepal, 2008. SN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Social Groups Hill Dalit Madheshi Dalit Hill Janajati Madheshi Janajati Madheshi Muslim/ Churaute Bahun & Chhetri Total Elected 6 1 66 13 48 7 99 240 PR 30 12 89 30 76 9 89 335 Nomination Nil Nil 9 7 4 1 5 26 Total 36 13 164 50 128 17 193 601 % 5.99 2.16 27.29 8.32 21.3 2.83 32.11 100 Source: Election Commission of Nepal (2008), Govt. of Nepal. Kathmandu. Furthermore, ‘the relatively low representation of Madheshis need to be understood in the context of many political parties (See Table – 4.10), especially the Nepali Congress, having used the Tarai as entry point to launch various political struggles as well as to maintain a presence in Nepal while in exile in India. Table – 4.10. Representation of Madheshis in Mainstream Political Parties: Political Parties Nepali Congress CPNUML UCPNMaoist Total Members Madheshi Members 60 9 (14%) 86 9 (10%) 43 1 (2%) Remarks 2010, 2012 Mahasamiti 2010, 2012 Mahasamiti 2010, Politbureau Source: Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (First ed.). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. While this heightened political activity in the region should have resulted in a higher member of Madheshis in Nepal’s political apparatus, the fact is otherwise, leading to a sense of relative deprivation amongst Madheshis’.77 77 Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990 (p. 152). New York: Routledge. - 104 - Representation in Bureaucracy is regarded as one of the major indicators of sound democracy. But in this case also the Tarai-Madheshis lagged far behind compare to Hill origin people (See Table – 4.11). Representations of Madheshis in Gazatted Level Employment at all classes is seriously poor and a matter of utmost concern. Table – 4.11. Representations of Madheshis in Gazatted Level Employment Ethnic Groups Bissitha/ Special Class First Class Second Class Officer Level/ Third Class Total Behun 38 (73%) 217 (60 %) 1140 (58%) 6643 (73%) 8038 (69.9 %) Chhetri 6 (11%) 51 (14%) 252 (13%) 915 (10%) 1224 (10.66 %) Janajati* Nil 7 (3%) 57 (3%) 175 (2%) 239 (2.02 %) Madheshhi 3 (6%) 18 (5%) 210 (10%) 546 (6%) 768 (6.69 %) Dalit Nil 30 (0.26 %) 4 (7.7 %) 8 (0.5%) 304 (15.45 %) 22 (0.3%) Newar Nil 63 (17.54 %) 725 (8 %) 1096 (9.55 %) Others 1 (2%) 3 (1%) 8 (0.5%) 65 (0.7%) 77 (0.67 %) Source: Compiled by the author [Central Bureau of Statistics (2015), Govt. of Nepal, Kathmandu] Army has played a major role in Nepali politics. Since the time of Shah-Rana regime, Army has been dominated by the Pahadis. The common Madheshi people in the street allege that since the recruitment in the Army is fully in the hands of Pahadis, they often discourage the Madheshis to join army (See Table- 4.12). This is probably due to the perception among Hill based political elites that ‘Madheshis are not loyal to the Nepali state and would act in the interests of India along with commonly held belief that Madheshis are “less martial”.78 78 Sijapati, B. (2013). In pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madheshi Identity and Madhes Andolan. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990 (p. 152). New York: Routledge. - 105 - Moreover, all the indicators of formal representation supports the long time Madheshi claim of being historically marginalized by the Pahadi dominated state. Table- 4.12. Candidacy for Different Posts in Nepal Army: Ethnicity Candidates Applying for Sipahi Percentage in Total Candidates Percentage in Applying for Total Officer Bahun/ Chhetri 8435 53.3 3683 73.8 Janajati 4872 30.9 11.24 22.5 Dalit 835 5.3 110 2.7 Madheshhi/ Tharu 1683 10.6 76 1.5 Total 15825 100 4993 100 Source: Mistry, A. (2017). Trajectories of Ethnic Politics of Tarai-Madhesh in Nepal. West Bengal Political Science Review, XIX(1), 288. 4.6. The Changing Dynamics of Madheshi Politics: The post mutiny politics of Tarai may be characterized in general by the appearance of fragmented ethno-nationalist forces from within Tarai-Madhesh. These forces include Tharus, Muslims and Dalits. Tharus have had a complex relationship with Madheshis. However Tharus are the largest ethnic group (13% of the Tarai Population) not only in Tarai but also in the country, 90% of whom reside in the rural areas. They are distributed from the district of Jhapa in the east to Kanchanpur in the west. They frequently claim that they are the indigenous inhabitants of Tarai. However the original place of the Tharus remain unknown till date. Alberuni, the Muslim historian of eleventh century, did mention that the inhabitants with black complexion and flat nose called “Taru” used to live in the Tilawat - 106 - region.79 There are many sub groups within Tharus as well. Furthermore the Mithila culture has a profound influence over the Tharus of eastern Tharus. They have been speaking Maithili language but now they prefer to call it Tharu language since their ethnic ascent made it little different from the original one. Tharus from the mid-Tarai or the inner Tarai speak Awadhi and Bhojpuri as well. Tharu Identity Movement is thus the reason for their language consciousness. However although many Tharus from the eastern Tarai had joined with the Madheshi protesters during the Madhesh mutiny in 2006-07. Then few of the Tharu organizations merged with Madheshi political parties but majority of them claimed that Tharus are not Madheshis. They firmly opposed the Madheshi demand of “ek Madhesh, ek Pradesh”. They were of the opinion that the creation of entire Madhesh as an autonomous region will led to further marginalization of Tharus vis a vis the Madheshi power elites. Therefore they demanded for ‘separate autonomous state comprising much of the current far western and mid-western Tarai’. Even some extremist Tharu political forum further demanded for Tarai to be made into a single autonomous state of “Tharuhut”. Hence ever since the Madhesh uprising, Tharus have gradually been the major counter force of Madheshis. ‘While the Tharus fear that their distinct ethnic identity will be lost if they are identified as Madheshis, the Madheshis have been insensitive towards this issue and so far have not done much to address it’.80 During the field survey by this author, many Madheshi activists as well as people in the streets claimed that the Pahadis have been toying with Madhesh using the “divide and rule” policy. Presently Madheshis have agreed vis a vis the 79 Chaudhary, D. (2015). Nepalko Madheshi Samaj (Madheshi Society in Nepal) (p. 209). Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 80 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 83). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. - 107 - Tharu identity assertion to the proposal of dividing Tarai-Madhesh into two autonomous province i, e. “Tharuhat” and “Madhesh”. In addition to the Tharu ethnic movement, Madheshi Muslims and Dalits, who are the most marginalized and deprived sections in the Tarai, have been concerned over their respective identities after 2007. Although both of them had participated in the mutiny in large numbers. After mutiny, they have been fighting within Madhesh to make it more inclusive. They are of the opinion that the Madhesh movement has been primarily driven by high caste Hindus. Interestingly the resistance of the Madheshi elites to the legitimate demands of these marginalized communities is not different from the resistance of the Pahadi elites towards the legitimate demands of the Madheshis.81 The Muslims and Dalits have therefore formed their respective political organizations in the Tarai to deconstruct the Madheshi identity and eradicate caste-based and other forms of discrimination and oppression. Many Dalit activists have expressed their opinion to this researcher that Dalits in Nepal should come under one banner in order to fight against Hindu caste-system. The leader of Dalit Janajati Party, Bisehwendra Paswan had alleged that despite of participating in the Madhesh uprising in large numbers, the high caste elites of Madhesh have overshadowed the Dalit issue. Similarly Muslims had participated in full strength in the Madhesh uprising and some of them even lost their lives in the process. However in recent times some of the Muslim organizations have opined that “the Muslims are a religious minority in Nepal whose identity should be based on religion and not according to region and ethnicity”. Hence marking with a tag like Madheshi may dilute their religious identity. Furthermore this will consequently distinguish them from Pahadi Muslims. Therefore Muslim organizations like Nepal Muslim ‘Nagarik Samaj’ (Muslim 81 Ibid, (p. 82). - 108 - Civil Society in Nepal) advocate that Muslims should not participate in Madheshi movements.82 ‘The collective reconstruction of history by the Nepalese Muslims along religious lines could assume legitimacy as it was primarily aimed at ensuring “recognition of difference” from the larger society’.83 However on the identity question of Muslims, there is a significant consensus amongst Madheshis and Pahadis. On the course of ethnographical sampling, both Madheshi and Pahadis have firmly dismissed the Muslim issue. Even, on contrary, the syndromes of Hindu nationalist movement is growing steadily in the Tarai and elsewhere in the country. According to a survey conducted in 2008, 75% Madheshis, 91% Madheshi Dalits, 84% Madheshi Janajatis and 69% Tarai ethnic groups want Hindu state in Nepal.84 Furthermore the presence of hostile Hindu organization in Tarai are promoting the revival of the Hindu state as a rationale to mobilize the Hindus.85 Hence the political vacuum created by the Madheshi uprising has provided the much needed space for the forces like Tharus, Muslims and Dalits to become politically active. Although ‘the Dalits have mobilized the least based on the criterion of movement capability, extreme functions, ethnic party formation and vote received, representation in governance and concession received by the group in comparison to major demands.86 These incidents clearly indicate that the 82 Ibid (p. 83). Dastider, M. (2013). Refusing to Choose: The Muslim Madhes and the coexistance of religious and regional identity in Nepal's Tarai. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalisma and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990 (p. 186). New York: Routledge. 84 Sharma, S., & Sen, P. K. (2008). Nepal Contemporary Political Situation: Opinion Poll Report (p. 59). Lalitpur: Interdisciplinary Analysts. 85 Mathema, K. B. (2011). Madheshi Uprising: The Resurgence of Ethnicity (p. 87). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 86 Lawoti, M. (2013). Dynamics of Mobilization. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (pp. 200-201). New York: Routledge. 83 - 109 - Madheshi are drastically losing grip over their constracted ethno-regional “Madheshi’ identity. 4.7. Conclusion: The ethnic struggle between 1990 and 2013 has nullified the hypothesis that the state policy of building Nepal as a multi-ethnic nation has erupted. The catastrophe is caused due to the rejection of one religion, one language and one culture policy of state over imposed on the indigenous peoples, Madheshis and Dalits. The peoples’ war waged by Maoists utilized this resistance and became partially successful in bringing this situation of political change and ethnic agitation got justified. Now some accuse that Maoists exploited the sentiments of the ethnic grievances and now they want to dilute the agenda of ethnic autonomous provinces in a federal republic Nepal. Madheshi violent movement shows that the failure of the Maoist promise is turning into an ethnically motivated civil war. That’s why, Sharma (1997) stated, ‘The ethnic politics of Nepal in the 1990s seems to have elements conforming with both the primordialists and the instrumentalists models’.87 In addition to this some foreign scholars also indicate the elitist nature of ethnic movements and thus Nepal has greater elements of instrumentalism and lesser primordialism. Gellner, for example, warned that “one should not assume that ethnic activists and ordinary people share the same agenda”88. Scholars from ethnic group discard instrumentalist and primordialist model and urge to see the ethnic movement of Nepal from the perspective of the principles of equality and struggle against 87 Sharma, P. R. (1973). Culture and Religion: Historical Background. In P. J. Rana, & K. P. Malla (Eds.), Nepal in Perspective (p. 483). Kathmandu: Centre for Economic Development and Administration. 88 Gellner, D. (1997). Ethnicity and Nationalism in the World's Only Hindu State (p. 5). In D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, & J. Whelpton, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. - 110 - discrimination.89 Gurung (1999) stated, ‘ethnic movements in Nepal are a natural outcome of age old suppression through the imposition of stratified hierarchical model by the Hindu rulers of Nepal, which needs to be removed with a view to making the hitherto deprived ethnic groups equal partners in the development of a single territorial Nepalese nationstate’.90 However, the issue of diversity has been the main topic of discussion in the constituent assembly debates. This is a very difficult and highly conflict laden issue. For more than 200 years the state has organised migration of peoples such as Brahmin, Chhetri, Dalits, Magar and Newar for various reasons and purposes and they spread widely all across the country. Therefore the ethnic agenda of restructuring Nepal on ethnic lines is appeared as the most difficult issue to make judgement. One can observe in the context of ethnic politics of Nepal, it is through political and constitutional discourse that ideologies related to ethnic identities are produced, reproduced and reinforced, and the act of denial is always there in the form of hidden agenda in the hands of the elite groups. The participation of ethnic minorities in mainstream politics and various other social activities, though stressed in all forms of democratic governments that come to power, is a notoriously difficult task, as the ruling elites are, as van Dijk indicates, manipulatively playing the game of denial to sustain hegemony. ***************** 89 90 Bhattachan, K. B. (2003). Indigenous Nationalities and Minorities of Nepal. London: Minority Rights Group International. Gurung, H. (2003). From Exclusion to Inclusion Socio-Political Agenda for Nepal (p. 81). Kathmandu: Social Inclusion Research Fund. - 111 - CHAPTER- V FEDERAL RESTRUCTURING OF NEPALI STATE: MYTH OR REALITY? 5.1. Introduction: The agenda of restructuring the state has been the most deliberated issue for all intellectuals, political leaders and civil society activists in Nepal. On the aftermath of the Janaandolan-II, the predominant public discourse favoured federal restructuring the state and thereby transform feudal Nepal into “naya Nepal” based upon secular and democratic federal principles. The articulation of federalism has caught much attention than other issues because of the varied context of ethnicization and regionalization.1 Nonetheless, the restructuring of Nepali state by providing autonomy on the basis of identity to the subaltern ethnic groups came into public debate and discourse since the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990. In fact, the federal restructuring of the state has been the core demand of ethnic groups in post-Madhesh uprising politics in Nepal. The urge for federalism was not only for the decentralization of power but also for a wider agenda of inclusion that encompasses other institutional reforms to ensure proportional representation of all the ethnic groups and recognition of the ethnic and cultural diversity by redefining Nepali nationalism. The ethnic groups also demanded the introduction of affirmative actions to guarantee proportional representation of marginalized groups in government and administration. The Maoists’ promoted for ethnicity based federalism or “ethnic 1 Baral, L. R. (2012). Nepal- Nation- State in the Wilderness: Managing State, Democracy, and Geopolitics (p. 266). New Delhi: Sage Publication. - 112 - federalism” by renaming provinces after the most numerous ethnic and regional groups. Few indigenous groups claimed preferential rights to natural resources of the region they live and priority entitlement to political leadership positions in the future provinces. Many people from CHHE, conversely, protested against the introduction of ethnic quotas and federal restructuring although their resistance was mostly unorganized and fragmented. Open opposition only came from a fringe of the political left who feared Nepal’s unity. The Pro-monarchy groups and the Hindu rights, less concerned for federalism than with the republic and secularism, opposed the redefinition of Nepali nationalism. The restructuring of Nepali state, in addition, became a central component of the 2006 peace deal. Federalism was, in the meantime, included in the interim constitution as a binding principle for the Constituent Assembly on the verge of violent protests in the Tarai in 2007. The fundamental question during the Maoist insurgency was whether federalism based on ethnic affiliation will .be materialized. But after the Madhesh mutiny, the question that dominated the public discourse was whether “ethnic federalism” can be materialized as a mean to achieve more inclusive, institutionalized and sustainable democratic polity in Nepal. In the federal system, there will be generally two governments – the state and central governments. The foreign, monetary, defence are under the central government whereas the local government is responsible for local security, development and other local issues. The constitution delineates the duties and jurisdiction of the two governments. Federal system is called citizen-oriented as it is likely to provide services promptly and embrace diversity. If equal powers are given to the constituent states, then such federations are called symmetric federation. Australia is an example of a symmetric federation. If - 113 - distinction is made between states, then such federations are called asymmetric federations. Canada has asymmetric federation because Quebec province has been given more autonomy in comparison to other provinces. The federal form where emphasis has given to the autonomy of various states and power is clearly divided, it is called dual federal structure. There is legislature and executive in every level. Since the states and the centre act autonomously, several works can be duplicated. This kind of federation is in Belgium, Australia, Brazil and Switzerland. The federal form where works are divided level-wise between the centre and the state is called cooperative federal system. In this duties and rights are distinctly divided between the centre and the state. The states also equally participate in formulating the policy of the centre. In such countries the centre formulates policy and makes laws and acts and the agencies lower than this implement the same. Cooperative federal structure is in Germany, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Canada. Here, the question remains being what kind modular form of federalism will be suited for Nepal on the face of the demand of differential identity and autonomy by ethnic forces. 5.2. The Demand of Autonomy and Self Determination: The demand of autonomy and self-determination in Nepal is neither new nor imported from the west. Prithvi Narayan Shah himself granted internal autonomy to Limbus2 back in the latter half of eighteenth century.3 A royal order was issued in this connection in 1774 by King Shah which said, “Although we have conquered your country by dint of our valor, 2 Limbus are Kirati people of Tibetan origin indigenous to hill and mountainous regions of east Nepal. 3 Lawoti, M. & Hangen, S. (2013). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal. In: H. Lawoti & S. Hangen, eds. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilizations after 1990 (p. 44). New York: Routledge. - 114 - we have afforded you and your kinsmen protection. We hereby pardon all your crimes, and confirm all the customs and traditions, rights and privileges of your country”. 4 Limbus from far- Kirat, however, revolted for the encroachment of ethnic autonomy in 1792. Then, Khambus from Mid- Kirat, demanded for local autonomy in 1808. In the eastern hills, Kirats launched an insurgency for local autonomy and supersession in 1950. Tamangs also revolted for the same in 1951. Table – 5.1. Demands of Different Ethnic Groups: Ethnic Groups Indigenous Groups Practical Demand Strategic Demand Inclusion Autonomy and Self-rule Madheshhi Inclusion Regional Autonomy Dalit Inclusion Inclusion Muslim Inclusion Inclusion Mechanism of Inclusion Reservations, Proportional Representations, ethnic/ indigenous autonomy with right to self determination Reservations, Proportional Representations, regional autonomy with right to self determination Reservations, Proportional Representations Reservations, Proportional Representations Source: Lawoti, M. (2013). Dynamics of Mobilization. In M. Lawoti, & S. Hangen (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal (pp. 200-201). New York: Routledge. 4 Regmi, M. C., 1978. Thached Huts and Stucco Palaces: Peasants and Land Lords in 19th Century Nepal (p. 13). New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.. - 115 - 5.3. Attempts of State Restructuring Till 1990: The demands for restructuring the Nepali state are not new. Many attempts have been made to restructure the Himalayan state vis-a-vis demands of autonomy and self-rule by marginalized ethnic groups. The political process of restructuring the state had started since the the time of unification of Nepal by the Prithvi Narayan Shah in the mid-eighteenth century when he brought together a number of small principalities to give the shape of a single Nepali state (Stiller, 1973). During the course of the Shah-Rana regime the political and administrative structures were organized under feudal lines and the nature of the state was completely dictatorial. The only significant shift in terms of the source of authority in this phase was the transition from tutelar Shah Monarchy to dictatorship of the Rana oligarchy. By seizing his de facto power, their families ruled over the country for more than a century until a political movement threw them out from power in 1951. The political events in the 1950s had dismantled the oligarchic feudal dictatorship of the Ranas may be marked as the beginning of the second phase of state restructuring in Nepal. The introduction of multiparty type of political structure as a result of pro-democracy movement opened an opportunity for the expansion of ruling circle of society. As a result, the downfall of Rana rule brought two different types of forces to operate in political life of society. One such a force was represented by the king. His political role no longer remained into suspension. He was placed into his original place as a sovereign head of the state. Another type of political force was represented by the multiparty leaders. They were representing the emerging political force of society. There was no space for this force under existing organization of the state. A separate political niche had to be carved out for the - 116 - accommodation of this force. This task was accomplished through the introduction of the multiparty type of political structure. 5.4. Federal Restructuring in the Post-1990: There was no substantial change in the main policy and formation of the state even after the mass movement of 1990. After the reinstatement of democracy, the Nepali people started to search for their status, identity and influence in the state apparatus. As a result, Nepali Constitution of 1991 accepted the multi-lingual and multi-ethnic nature of Nepal for the first time, but nothing was done to contrivance this. After the political change of 1990, though the Janajatis, Dalits, Madheshis and other communities of the Tarai elevated the issues of secular state along with ethnic, regional, lingual autonomy, the Constitution did not incorporate this. Consequently, unitary and centralized state was given continuity. Because of this character of the state, there was no equal access of all to the ruling state. Certain class, family and particular caste became dominant. This has not only intensified centralization in politics but also kept the state under the control of group of courtiers and elites. It was felt that the centralized state structure erected on the basis of policy of “one language, one dress” was unable to guarantee justice to the people of all ethnic and language groups and classes. Thus, the issue of equal participation in the state and in the policy-making level was upstretched. Because of the caste and cultural influence under the centralized state, many people have supposed a conception that “Nepal is our country but not our state”. Since all the facilities and opportunities are centred at one place, regional imbalance in development has been created. In order to eliminate socio-economic conflict and discriminations seen in the society, restructuring of the state became necessary. Many have said that the act of making Nepal a Hindu-Khas state after the extension of Gorkha - 117 - kingdom there have been ethnic, linguistic, cultural, gender and class discriminations and oppression, against which struggles have been elevated. This could be the reason behind dmands like ethnicity-based federalism. The Janaandolan-II had provided twin mandates of restructuring the state in an inclusive manner and of taking the peace process to a logical conclusion. In order to challenge the royal rule, the Maoists and the alliance of seven democratic parties signed a twelve-point agreement in 2005. The very next year, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the decade-long Maoist insurgency once King Gyanendra gave up power, thus, began the process of institutionalising the idea of federalism at a time of rapid political change. The CPA called for a democratic restructuring of the state and social, economic and cultural transformation through the decisions of a constituent assembly. During the drafting process of the Interim Constitution of 2007, Madheshi and janajati leaders within the UML and NC had unsuccessfully lobbied their respective parties for the inclusion of an explicit commitment to federalism.5 Even in the negotiations between the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists, only the latter had raised the issue, but had quickly given in when UML and NC negotiators dug in their heels.6 The interim constitution therefore reiterated the commitment to state restructuring but did not mention federalism which in turn sparked outrage among Madheshi activists. The Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) organised protests demanding the amendment of the interim constitution to attain “ek Madhesh, ek Pradesh”. The protests turned into violent, as Maoist cadres killed one Madheshi activist and the security forces shot dead more than 30 5 6 International Crisis Group. (2011). Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism . Kathmandu: Asia Report. Ibid. - 118 - protestors and wounded 800. The Madheshi led blockade at key transit points caused severe shortages and price hikes in Kathmandu. Consequently Prime Minister G.P. Koirala in a television address on 31 January 2007 supported and federalism and the proposal of redelimitation of constituencies. As the protest continued further, he promised representation of minority groups in elected state bodies and administration on a proportional basis. The Madheshhi protest, however, continued until the parliament on 12 April 2007 passed the 1st amendment to the interim constitution, which calls for the state to be restructured into a “democratic, federal system”. A series of subsequent agreements between the interim government and agitating ethnic and regional activists reiterated the commitment to federalism and proportional representation7. But considering very limited legal consequences, one legal expart termed “they were painkillers, not treatments”8. However these agreements certainly raised expectations amongst Janajaties and Madheshis about “ethnicity based federalism”. In fact the fifth amendment of the Interim Constitution stated “accepting the aspiration of the Madheshis, indigenous nationalities, the marginalised and 7 An agreement between the interim government, NEFIN and the Indigenous Nationalities Joint Struggle Committee. “Agreement between the Government and Janajatis”, 7 August, 2007. Agreement between MJF and the government. “Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Madheshi People’s Right Forum, Nepal”, 30 August 2007. Between the government and the Chure Bhawar Pradesh Ekata Samaj. “Agreement letter”, 13 September 2007. The 28 February 2008 eight-point agreement between the government and the Samyukta Loktantrik Madheshi Morcha (SLMM) reiterated the commitments of the earlier 22-point agreement, adding group entry of Madheshis into the army and increasing the Madheshi quota for CA seats from 20 to 30 per cent. The 2 March 2008 agreement between the government, the Federal Limbuwan State Council (FLSC), the Federal Democratic National Forum (FDNF), the United Tharu National Front, the Dalit Janajati Party and the Tamangsequence saling Autonomous State Council promises Limbuwan, Khambuwan, Tharuhat and Tamangsaling autonomous states within a federal Nepal. The 19 March 2008 agreement between the government and the FLSC includes the formation of a Limbuwan state within a federal Nepal. [URL- www.unmin.org in, Retrieved on 12/04/2015] 8 International Crisis Group. (2011). Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism. Kathmandu: Asia Report. - 119 - peoples from other areas for autonomous provinces, Nepal shall be a Federal Democratic sealed in the minds of many”9 The restructuring debate has, thus, focused more on “state nation” rather than “nation-state”. ‘Nation-state advocates making one-caste state whereas state nation considers the whole communities resident within the geographical limit of the state as the nation’.10 The Maoists were the only mainstream political party with a strong public commitment to federalism. They used it not only during the war to build support but they campaigned on it in the elections, giving more detail than others on how “ethnicfederalism” should work.11The Maoists utilized the subaltern discourse of marginalized ethnic groups by expanding their alliances with these groups. The Maoist insurgency, which was initially underestimated by other political forces and assumed as “revolutionary romanticism” by insignificant group of radical youths, spread all over the country especially among the marginalized groups within a short span of time. The failure of the post-1990 democratic regime to cope up the political and legal-administrative challenges and the inherent weakness and contradictions of the polity including the political parties had contributed significantly to the radicalization of Maoist political agenda.12 There was, however, a different reason behind the political mobilization of subaltern ethnic groups by the Maoists. Despite of restoration of democracy and promulgation of new constitution, the Nepali society remained feudalistic in a general sense. The feudalistic mode of 9 The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007. (2008). Kathmandu, Nepal: UNDP. 10 Shrestha, D. K. (2004). Ethnic Autonomy in the East. In People in the 'Peoples' War' (p. 12). Kathmandu: Himel Association. 11 International Crisis Group. (2011). Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism. Kathmandu: Asia Report. 12 Khanal, K. P. (2006). The Maoist Agenda of Restructuring the State: An appraisal. In L. R. Baral, Nepal: Facts of Maoist Insurgency (Pp. 164-165). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. - 120 - production had been sustained by the hegemonic presence of Monarchy for centuries. The very existence of feudalistic norms and elements in the society was the major constrain for the emergence and expansion of civil society outside the Kathmandu valley. The historical examples of socialist revolution both in Russia and China suggest that feudalism provides more favourable condition to the subaltern discourse compare to capitalism because of the dominance of hegemonic class in the civil society.13 The Nepali Maoists, therefore, used this golden opportunity by mobilizing the unorganized primitive ethnic groups on the basis of Mao’s famous “mass-line” theory. The rapid growth of Maoist insurgency was thus due more to the circumstantial advantages than their organizational strength.14 The Maoist agenda of federal restructuring of the Nepali nation came as a surprise to the mainstream political parties. Many democratic forces, even, feared “that it would further fragment the Nepali nation-state, which had already been weakened by the insurgency and the deestablization of the democratic process”.15 The initial steps to develop a framework for federalism and to fix proportional quotas for the constituent assembly were taken by signing 20 point agreements between the government and the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) and the Madheshi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) in August 2007. The fourth point of the agreement stated: ‘A state restructuring commission will soon be formed to present recommendations to the constituent assembly regarding a federal state structure 13 Gramsci, A. (1999). Selections from the Prison Note Books. London: The Electric Book Company Limited. 14 Khanal, K. P. (2006). The Maoist Agenda of Restructuring the State: An appraisal. In L. R. Baral, Nepal: Facts of Maoist Insurgency (p. 165). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 15 Ibid, p. 166. - 121 - based on ethnicity, language, geographic region, economic indicators and cultural distinctiveness while keeping national unity, integrity and sovereignty of Nepal at the forefront. The commission will include indigenous janajatis, Madheshis, dalits, women and eminent experts from various groups, regions and communities’. The eighth point of the aforementioned agreement stated: ‘The Government of Nepal has agreed in principle that all groups, genders, communities, castes and ethnicities should be represented in political parties at all levels. A fully representative task-force will be formed immediately to conduct a study in order to ensure inclusive participation and proportional representation of all castes, ethnicities, groups, communities, genders and regions in all bodies and levels of the state’. The MJF signed 22 point agreement with the government of Nepal about the reconstruction of the Nepali state in August 30, 2007. The fifth point of the agreement prescribed for the establishment of a commission for state restructuring provided that it comprises of experts in an inclusive manner. The sixth point of the same agreement further stated: ‘Arrangements will be made for a federal state with regional autonomy while the sovereignty, national unity and integrity of Nepal will be kept intact during the restructuring of the state. The rights, nature and limits of regional autonomy will be as decided by the constituent assembly’. - 122 - 5.5. Constitutional Proposal and Committee Proceedings: The Constituent Assembly-I formed three types of committees i, e., thematic committees16, process-related committees17 and a constitutional committee to deal with the concept papers for the constitution.18 The demand of separate thematic committees for excluded groups was, however, denied by the mainstream political parties like UCPN, CPN-UML, NC, etc. due the fear of a Madheshhi takeover during constitution making.19 This had resulted in an “early warning” from the UN body for eliminating racial discrimination on March, 13, 2009. The Chairperson of the aforesaid committee, Fatimata-Binta Victore Dah, had stated that political parties are reminded to “ensure that members of indigenous people have equal rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent”.20 The committee issued a follow up note in this connection on September 28, 2009, called for “the establishment of a thematic committee for indigenous peoples to guarantee their full representation and participation in political life”.21 16 Ten thematic committees were formed. These were: National Interest Prevention Committee; Form of Legislative Body Committee; Committee on Determining the basis of Cultural and Social Solidarity; Committee on the Distribution of Natural Resources, Financial Rights, Public Revenue; Committee on Determining the Structure of Constitutional Bodies; Judicial System Committee; Committee on Determination of forms of Governance of State; Restructuring State and Distribution of State Power Committee; Committee on the Protection of Fundamental Rights of the Minority and Marginalised Communities; and Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 17 There were three Process-related Committees i, e., Citizens Committee, Public Opinion Collection and Coordination Committee and Capacity Building and Resource Management Committee. 18 Bhattachan, K. B. (2010). State Building: Proposals for Federalism. In K. Stokke, & M. D. Manandhar (Eds.), State and Society (p. 45). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 19 Bhattachan, K. B. (2010). State Building: Proposals for Federalism. In K. Stokke, & M. D. Manandhar (Eds.), State and Society (p. 46). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. - 123 - The role of State Restructuring and Division of State Power Committee was very significant for federalism. The committee had identified two main parametres of the basis of federalism i, e., Primary Basis (Identity) and Secondary Basis (Ability). The former includes ethnicity, language, culture, geography/ region and history whereas the later covers “economic interdependence and ability”, “condition and prospect of infrastructure development”, “availability of natural resources” and “administrative accessibility”. 22 Table- 5.2. Demands for Autonomy by Indigenous Ethnic Groups Ethnic Autonomous State/ Ethnic Group Ethnic Undecided for Autonomous State territorial or nonof more than two territorial Ethnic Groups autonomy Limbuan (Limbu) Kirata (Rai, Limbu, Majhi Sunuar, Lepcha, Tamsaling Sherpa and Bhote) (Tamang) Nepal Mandala or Morang (Meche, Nepa (Newar) Dhimal, Gangai, Tajpuria, Urao and Tamuan (Tamu) Santhal) Magarat (Magar) Himali (Mountain Bhujel Ethnic Groups) Tharuhat (Tharu) Khambuan Bhote-Lama (Khambu or Rai) (Western, MidWestern and FarRong (Lepcha) Western Mountain Raji Sunuar (Sunuar) Chepang (Chepang) Ethnic Groups) Kochila (Ranjbanshi) Thakali (Thakali) Undecided Remaining Indigenous Ethnic Groups Baramu (Baramu) Source: Data Compiled by the author based on field work [Nepal Federation for Indegenous Nationalities (2015). Lalitpur]. 22 Ibid, p. 48. - 124 - The preamble of the report states that the restructuring is needed “to solve the prevailing issues of class, caste, regional, gender, and community by ending the unitary structure of the state and transforming Nepal into a progressive democratic, inclusive and proportional federal republic” by “establishing independent, autonomous, and sovereign provinces, local-level and special structures with constitution-given right to self-determination and based on identity and capacity, by distributing the authority exercised by the centre, to create peaceful, sovereign, secular, equitable and prosperous Nepal, desiring representation and rights of all castes, regions, genders, and communities in all structures of the stated”. The draft report defines federation, state, local level, special structures, autonomous region, protected area, special area, state authority, and categories. It defines federation thus, “federation should mean the highest level of the federal structure. This word denotes the combined form of the federal Nepal and its states, local levels, and special structures”. The draft report further recommended for three structures of political system at federal, state and local level. The committee proposed a “14-state federal model” with the states: Limbuwan, Mithila-Bhojpura-Koch-Madhesh, Kirant, Sunkoshi, Sherpa, Tamsaling, Newa, Narayani, Tamuwan, Magarat, Lumbini-Awadh-Tharuwan, Karnali, Jadan and Khaptad. The basis of such model was Identity including ethnicity, language, culture, region, etc. and capacity denoting the economic interrelationship, status of infrastructure development, availability of natural resources, administrative convenience, etc. The Article-4 of the draft report recommended the provision to form autonomous regions within the states where there is an ethnic/community or language majority or substantive settlement. The draft report also includes the provision of creating protected areas for minorities, cultural areas, endangered and marginalised communities for their promotion - 125 - and development. It further recommended for various commissions under the federal government such as Women’s Commission, Proportional Inclusive Commission, Dalit Commission, Indigenous Janajati Commission, Madheshi Commission, Muslim Commission and the Commission for Betterment of Minorities. 5.6. The Stand of Political Parties on Federal Restructruring: The eight political parties and the state have in principle reached consensus about forming a federal structure. On the aftermath of the Madhesh movement, then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala in an address to the nation on 7th February 2007 has committed, “the Interim Constitution will be amended immediately to effect change for federal state structure and electoral constituency delineation”. Article 138(1) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 also committed “to bring an end to discrimination based on class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion and region by eliminating the centralized and unitary form of the state, the state shall be made inclusive and restructured into a progressive, Democratic Federal System”. Both the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), UML, had accepted federal restructuring. They had actively participated in drafting a federal model in the Constituent Assembly. There was an agreement on most institutional arrangements including the division of powers between provinces and centre. But this process had been driven by longstanding proponents of federalism within both parties, none of them very influential. Both parties had agreed to federalism in the spirit of bargaining; neither of them owned the agenda. Behind the official positions there was a significant resistance to it. The NC and the Pahadi elites of CPN (UML) opposed the proposal of the thematic Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution of State Power, however, the UCPN (Maoist) and the CPN (UML) leaders belonging to indigenous groups - 126 - support these recommendations. The NC and CPN (UML) had proposed to reactivate the State Restructuring Commission to review the recommendations and reduce the number of federal unites to six or seven based on geography and economic ability but the UCPN (Maoist) disagreed. The Maoists wanted the commission to suggest the technical aspect of the divisions that remain to be workrd out. The political parties have brought out their proposed models of federal and inclusive state with economic and social transformation in their election manifestos during the Constituent Assembly election, 2008. The Maoists manifesto proposed the possibility of restructuring the state along ethnic, geographic feasibility, linguistic base, economic feasibility into 11 autonomous provinces and further sub-regional provinces or units.23 Among these, SetiMahakali and Bheri-Karnali are based on regional basis, and Magarat, Tharuwan, Tamuwan, Newa, Tamsaling, Kirant, Limbuwan, Kochila and Madhesh are based on regional identity. Within Madhesh, Mithila, Bhojpura and Awadh have been proposed as subprovinces based on linguistic basis. In fact this proposal was a revision of the concept of nine autonomous provinces during the insurgency period. Then proposed Kirant province has been divided into Limbuwan and Kirant, and Kochila has been proposed to be carved out of Madhesh province. Chitawan which had been put in Madhesh has been included in Tamsaling. Furthermore, within Madhesh, Mithila, Bhojpura and Awadh were proposed as sub-provinces based on language. Thus the reflection of Madhesh and Limbuwan movement is clearly visible in this proposal. In addition to this, Ridi, Tamakoshi, Narayani and Bijayapur have been proposed as centrally administered geographic regions as other castes outnumber the oppressed 23 UCPN [M] Commitment Paper (2008). P. 21. - 127 - ethnicities in these regions. The Maoists have proposed to establish ethnic autonomous zones and protected villages for endangered communities within the provinces. Thus the Maoist proposal on federalism is basically an ethnic and regional one. UCPN (M) Commitment Paper, 2008 also advocated for sub-national units within a province so that liberation of one ethnicity should not be at the cost of other nationalities, and rights of minorities should be ensured in provinces with mixed nationalities.24 The Nepali Congress had decided to go for restructuring of the state and inclusive democracy at the 11th General Convention of the party. Referring to the various discriminations existing in Nepali society, the political proposal and working direction paper further of NC stated, “Inclusive democracy should get rid of discriminations and it is necessary to have reservations in the state mechanism itself to ensure participation and economic and social equality and justice. Nepali Congress will strive to work towards achieving inclusion”. The NC, therefore, constituted a task force under the coordination of central member Dr Rambaran Yadav to design a model of state restructuring. NC had decided to go for representative federal democratic model of state restructuring based on pluralism. The CA election manifesto of NC also promised to recognise the unique characteristics of Madheshi of Tarai, Janajati of the hills, Dalits and others in the federal structure.25 24 25 Ibid, p. 20. Nepali Congress Manifesto (2008). Kathmandu. P. 12. - 128 - Table- 5.3 Position of Political Parties on Federalism Political Party Forms of Federalism Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Nepali Congress Communist Party of NepalUnified Marxist Leninist Madheshhi Forum Janaadhikar Centre, Autonomous Republic and Local Bodies Centre, Region, Local (3 Levels) Centre, Region, Local Levels) (3 Centre, Region and Autonomous Regions Tarai Madheshh Loktantrik Party Rashriya Prajatantra Party Centre, State, Substate, District and Formation of Federal Units Basis Number Ethnic Composition, Geographical Feasibility, Language and Economic Feasibility 11 States and 3 SubStates National Integrity, Geographical Location and Adaptation, Population, Natural Resources and Economic Feasibility, Inter-relations of regions, Linguistic/Ethnic/Cultural Density, Political Administrative Feasibility Geographical Location, Condition of Population and Ethnic Settlement, Condition of Use of Mother Tongue, Cultural Feature, Administrative Access, Socio-economic interrelations and feasibility of Ability, Availability of Natural Resources and History Regional Basis Geographical Commonality, Cultural Linguistic Affinity, Common Climate, Uniformity in Economy, Ruled Equally or Solidarity of the Victims of Colonisation in their Struggle for Identity, Dignity and Selfrespect Geography, Ethnic Population, Language, Cultural Identity, Natural Resources, Economic Feasibility - 129 - Basis of Naming Federal Units Name of Federal Units Ethnicity, Language Region 2 States namely SetiMahakali and Bheri-Karnali on regional basis; 9 states on ethnic basis and 3 sub-states on linguistic basis and Ethnicity, Language, Cultural Historical Identity In accordan ce to the recomme ndations Number and Names to be identified with participation of the experts Local Levels) (4 Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) Sadvabna Party Centre, Autonomous Region and Autonomous Area Rastriya Jana Morcha Communist Party of Nepal (Samyukta) Ethnic, Linguistic and Cultural Uniformity, Identical Historical Background, and Economic Sustainability Language, Culture, Geography Administrative Units Regional Balance and Social Harmony, Geographica l Construction , Availability of Natural Resources,A vailability of Economic basis for sustainable development , Linguistic,a nd Ethnic and Cultural Density, Administrati by a Commiss ion of experts 6 Regions 3 Autonom ous Regions and autonom ous areas 7 Regions Number to be determined based on people’s aspiration and acceptance - 130 - Sagarmatha, Janak, Lumbini, Karnali, Seti-Mahakali, Bagmati 3 autonomous regionsMountain, Hill and the Madheshh and within Madheshh region- Birat, Janak, Buddha, Tharuhat, Awadh, Bhojpura, Mithila, etc.(Based on language, culture and community) Koshi, Sagarmatha, Bagmati, Gandaki, Lumbini, Karnali and Mahakali ve Fecilitation, Nepal’s geographical location and adaptation and population Rashtriya Prajantantrik Party Nepal Nepal Majdoor Kishan Party Centre, Region Rashtriya Janamukti Party Central, Autonomous Nepal Communist (United) Party Nepal Sadvabna (Anandi Devi) Party Nepali Janata Dal Centre, Region, Subregion and Local Ethnic, Geographical, Economic Feasibility without affecting national sovereignty and unity Constituent Assembly must decide after intensive discussion or existing zones should be transformed into regions on the basis of geography By making majority of certain ethnic groups on the basis of geography and history, ethnicity, language and culture Existing zones to be shaped as regions 12 State Institutio ns Ethnicity, Language and Region 11 State Institutio ns Geography, Environment, Ecological Homogeneity, Life System, Culture, Nature of People’s Movement, Communication and Contact, Social interrelation 13 Nation’s geographical distinction, Ethnic, Cultural and Linguistic uniformity, Equitable Development - 131 - zones based on geography to be transformed into regions Limbuwan, Khambuan, Tamang, Newa, Tamu, Tyalsa, Magarhang, Khasang, Tharuhat, Dalit, Lumbini and Mithila Limbuwan, Khambuan, Tamangsaling, Nepa: Mandala, Tamuan, Magarat, Khasan, Paschim Khasan, Tharuhat, Awadh, Bhojpura, Mithila and Tharu Sub-regions: Birat, Baidehi, Simaraun, Awadh, Tharuan, MadheshhKhambuan, Magarat, Newa, Limbuan, Khasang, Tamsaling; Hill Sub-region: Rasuwa to Manang; Mountain Subregion: Rasuwa to Taplejung Samajbadi Prajatantrik Janata Party Nepal Nepal Pariwar Dal Ethnicity, Language, Geography, Adaptation, Culture, History, Natural Resources Federal, Regional, Local (3 Levels) Ethnicity, Language and Regional Basis Nepal Loktantrik Samajbadi Party Aspiration of the Nepali People, History, Ethnicity, Language, Culture, Geography Federal Regional Local Government Limbuan, Khambuan, Rajbanshi, Mithila, Bhojpuri, Tamasaling, Newa, Awadhi, Tamuan, Magarat, Karnali, Bheri, Tharuhat, SetiMahakali 5 Regions (Pranta) and 16 areas (Pradesh) Eastern Region- Limbuan, Khambuan and Kochila area; Central RegionNewa, Tamasaling, Murmi, Mithila and Bhojpuri area; Western Region- Tamuan, Magarat, and Awadh area; Mid-Western Region- Kham, Bisalpur, Tharuan area; Far-Western Region- Thalara and Doti area Siddhartha Tharuhat Federal State, Birat Janak Tharuhat Federal State, Kirat Federal State, Newa: Federal State, Magarat Federal State, Tambasaling Federal State, Tamun and Khasan Demarcation of regional territories to be done on the basis of the recommendation made by the commission Geography, Natural Resources, Population Density and Other features Nepal Rashtriya Party Churebhavar Rashtriya Ekata Party Nepal 14 Geographical Territory, Equal Distribution of natural resources, Mixed cultural basis and availability of natural resources Source: Tabulated from the manifestos of Political Parties - 132 - CPN (UML) had presented its concept about states restructuring in 2006. UML had further stated its bases for federal restructuring in its election manifesto of CA election of 2008. It advocated for federal restructuring based on characteristics of ethnicity, language, culture and geography. The manifesto states that ethnic concentration, language affinity and cultural characteristics, historicity and geographic distinctiveness should comprise any one entity.26 Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (Nepal) asked for making Tarai a single autonomous political and administrative province. Its manifesto mentioned that their demand for a Madheshi state was not for an ethnic Madheshi state but instead was for a regional one. Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party in its manifesto had stated that it is in favour of an administratively unified and Tarai-Madhesh autonomous unit. The party manifesto gave it rationale for a single autonomous region as there is geographic uniformity, cultural and language affinity, similar climate, agriculture as the backbone of economy, identity of being similarly oppressed and colonialised, unity of feeling and purpose in the struggle for respect and dignity. Rastriya Prajatantra Party advocated for an inclusive, participative and just state by ending centuries-old discriminatory practices based on caste and gender, problems in language and culture, oppression and inequality.The election manifesto of Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) stated, “federal provinces will increase the administrative expenses and the issues of additional expenses should be taken seriously. Economic sustainability will be the chief measure of federal restructuring.” Nepal Communist Party (Unified) had stated that “ethnic-regional principle and autonomy will be the chief basis of federalism”. With 26 Manifesto of UML (2008). Kathmandu. P. 20. - 133 - just only exception of Rastriya Janamorcha which advocated for the establishment of unitary government system based on democratic decentralisation and local autonomy and governance, all the other parties with representation in the 601 member CA accepted federalism in their manifestos. 5.7. The Role of Civil Society on Federal Restructuring: Federations are basically constituted in two ways – one, federations that are formed with mutual agreement among the pre-existing territorial political units – e, g. Federations in America, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, etc.; two, some federations that are determined by decentralising and devolving power of the unitary state – e, g. Austria, Brazil, Belgium and Spain, etc. Since Nepal does not have any pre-existing territorial political units, therefore, the second option i, e. the “consensus-based model of federalism” is suitable. Academicians like Geographer Dr. Pitamber Sharma has proposed a model of federalism that includes 6 federal units i, e. Purbanchal (eastern), Madhyamanchal (central), rajdhani (the capital), Paschimanchal (western), Karnali, Sudurpaschimanchal (far-western), and 19 districts based on the availability of the natural resources and means. His idea has been to put emphasis on the possibilities of future development and the interrelation of the hills and the Tarai rather than ethnicity. Sharma mentions three important issues defining federal units - the ethnicity and language, economic capacity and feasibility and interregional complimentary economic activity.27 Professor Krishna Khanal, eminent political scientist of Nepal has suggested the determination of units of regional or federal rule on the basis 27 Sharma, P. R. (1997). Nation Building, Muti-Ethnicity, and the Hindu State. In J. P.-C. David N. Gellner, Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal (Pp. 134-135). Amsterdam: Harwood academic publishers. - 134 - of ethnic, language and cultural affinity. He has proposed 14 election constituencies with multi-members. Khanal has not pointed out categorically what should be the regional or administrative structure. But later he has suggested that 10 to 13 such regions can be formed. The Nepali Congress leader Narhari Acharya has proposed that regional structures can be formed on the basis of main rivers of Nepal by maintaining ethnic identity as far as possible. He has argued that the main regional language can be made the official language in addition to the Nepali language. Acharya has presented that the geographical location and convenience, language and cultural specialty, natural resource and economical feasibility and population density and ethnic mixture (historical settlements) as the bases while forming federal structures. The UML leader and central member Shankar Pokharel has put forward a proposal of 15 regions.3 he lists them: Tamor, Birat, Koshi, Janakpur, Sunkoshi, Simraungadh, Kathmandu, Narayani, Annapurna, Kaligandaki, Lumbini, Rapti, Karnali, Khaptad, and Bhawar. Different caste and ethnicities are majorities in these provinces: Birat (hill Brahmins 15%), Koshi (Rai 27%), Janakpur (Yadav 17%), Sunkoshi (Tamang 33%), Simraungadh (Muslim 16%), Kathmandu (Newar 36%), Narayani (hill Brahmin 21%), Annapurna (Gurung 28%), Kaligandaki (Magar 28%), Lumbini (Dalit 14%), Rapti (Chhetri 25%), Karnali (Chhetri 41%), Khaptad (Chhetri 54%), Bhawar (Tharu 35%). He has made geographical location, ethnic density and settlements, use of mother language and other languages, socio-economic situation, economic relations and situation, administrative accessibility, availability of natural resources and means, and historical aspects as the bases for the provinces. Pokharel's concept is similar to the UML's concept. - 135 - Another leader of the UML Rajendra Shrestha has brought the concept of 14 regions.4 Shrestha has made geographical accessibility, population, ethnic relation and socioeconomic relation as the bases: Yakthung, Khumbu, Sesant (Tambasaling), Nepalmandal, Tamugandak, Magargandak, Bheri, Karnali, Mahakali, Koshi (Kochila), Janakpur (Mithila), Bhojpur (Simraun), Gautambuddhapur (Awadh), and Tharuhat. Dr. Buddhi Prasad Bhandari has proposed 14 provinces. Development expert Dr. Harka Gurung (2006) had proposed 25 development districts. Giving emphasis on economic viability, he has given importance to reduce the administrative expenses in his proposal. He has suggested amalgamating two to four present districts into on in his proposal. The names of the provinces in his proposals are based on rivers (10), mountains (7), historical place (5), and religious place (3). Leftist intellectual Govinda Neupane has proposed eight provinces based on ethnicity. His proposed eight provinces incorporates the present districts: Kirant (Taplejung, Panchthar, Ilam, Tehrathum, Dhankuta, Sankhuwasabha, Okhaldhunga, Solukhumbu, Khotang, Bhojpur, and Udayapur), Tambasaling (Ramechhap, Dolakha, Sindhupalchok, Kavrepalanchok, Nuwakot, Rasuwa, Dhading, Makawanpur, and Sindhuli), Nepa: (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur), Tamumagarat (Kaski, Lamjung, Manang, Gorkha, Mustang, Palpa, Tanahu, Syangja, and Myagdi), Khasan (Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Arghakhachi, Gulmi, Baglung, Dolpa, Pyuthan, Parbat, Jajarkot, Surkhet, Dailekh, Jumla, Mugu, Kalikot, Humla, Darchula, Baitadi, Doti, Bajhang, Bajura, Dadeldhura, and Achham), Tharuwan (Kapilvastu, Dang, Banke, Bardia, Kailali, and Kanchanpur), Bhojpuri (Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Chitawan, Nawalparasi, and Rupandehi), and Mithila (Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari, and Sarlahi). Neupane’s - 136 - proposal gives more primacy to historical-cultural background and historical settlements besides ethnic presence and language use. Mahendra Lawati (2007) also proposes ethnicity-based 13 provinces. Mangal Siddhi Manandhar, Shobha Shrestha, and Pushpa Sharma have also proposed 12 provinces based on ethnicity and regions. Jana Morcha (People's Front) leader Pari Thapa has proposed nine regions: Khas/Khasan, Khambu/Khambuwan, Gurung/Tamuwan, Tamang/Tambasaling, Tharu/Tharuhat, Newar/Newa Khala, Magar/Magarat, Maithili/Madheshi, and Limbu/Limbuwan. He has said the bases should be ethnic population, local geography, and linguistic areas. Kumar Yonjon Tamang has suggested 11 regions. Among them, he has defined eight provinces on the basis of ethnic population, land or region while the remaining three regions are formed as autonomous on the basis of linguistic area of linguistic dominance. The eight regions based on ethnic population, land, and region are Kirant, Tamang, Newar, Bhote-Tamuwan, Magarat, Tharuwan, Jadan, and Khasan. Similarly, the three based on linguistic dominance are Maithili-speaking region, Kochila-speaking region, and Bhojpurspeaking region. He has also emphasised the possibility of provinces based on regional oppression, though he has not given so much on emphasis on regional basis alone. K B Gurung has proposed 11 autonomous regions and 6 autonomous areas. He has advocated for ethnic-regional autonomy in his proposal. According to him, the autonomous regions of Tamu(Gurung), Magarat, Tharuhat, Limbuwan, Khambuwan, Tambasaling, Newar, Far Western and Western Khasan are based on ethnicity and geography while Maithili-Tharu and Tharu-Bhojpuri autonomous areas are based on primarily language and ethnicity. Similarly, the basis for Awadhi, Maithili, and Bhojpuri- Bajji autonomous regions is language; Bhojpuri-Tharu also language and ethnicity; and Sherpa and Rajbangsi - 137 - autonomous areas are based on ethnicity and geography. Analyst Shyam Shrestha has suggested a maximum of 15 autonomous regions and defined four basic conditions and bases: “ethnicity or language density, geographic proximity, administrative convenience, and availability of natural resources”.28 Federalism is in essence a remedy of and respect to diversity. Constituting of homogeneous federal units helps to reduce communal tension and clash. For the creation of homogeneous federal units, the boundary of the present vertical divisions of the country into five development regions, 14 zones and 75 districts should be deleted first. This means, in the perspective of Tarai, taking out the landscape of the north of Siwalik from Madheshh which in turns help to rejuvenate cultural territories of the diverse plains origin groups of the Tarai. Making the surrounding areas of the East-West high way as a separate unit under the union government further contributes to the proposal of making cultural territories of many federal units. Taking into contemplation of multiplicity of the Madheshh in terms of culture, language and religion, construction of one Madheshh but many Pradeshes is sensible while constructing federal units. The assertiveness of ethnic and regional movements has led to considerable anxiety as well. A significant minority of the Nepali population opposes federalism altogether. More than a quarter of respondents in a 2009 poll said they did not want it. Of the almost 50 per cent who supported federalism, less than half wanted to see the country divided along lines of ethnicity or language. There are three broad responses critical to identity based federalism. 28 Shrestha, D. K. (2004). Ethnic Autonomy in the East. In People in the 'Peoples' War' (p. 42). Kathmandu: Himel Association. - 138 - Table- 5.4. Ethnic Groups for or against Autonomy Ethnic Groups Ethnic Autonomy Regional Autonomy Indigenous Ethnic Groups Madheshhis For Against Extend Support For Muslims Against or Neutral Neutral Against or Neutral Neutral CHHE Against Against Dalits Nonterritorial Autonomy Extend Support Against or Neutral For Geographical Autonomy Neutral For Against For Against Against Neutral or For Source: B. R., Paudel, S. B., & Ghimire, S. (2013). Ignored or ill-represented? A grivance of Tarai-Madhesh Conflict in Nepal (First ed.). New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. A leftist, secular, pro-republican position perceives identity politics as reactionary and federalism as a risk to Nepal’s unity. Many Brahmins and Chhetris feel threatened by assertive ethnic demands; several organisations seek to include them in the emerging group-based order despite being fundamentally critical of it. The last is a conglomerate of Hindutva groups and royalists, primarily opposed to secularism and the republic. Federalism is a secondary issue for them. Although not necessarily fundamentally opposed to it, they are critical towards provinces based on identity. 5.8. Conclusion: On the backdrop of the above discussion, it can be maintained that a radical transformation is necessary in Nepal in order to implement policies of federalism for immediate political effect. However it needs a thorough evaluation of the administrative and social ramifications. Such details are for the most part left undiscussed by the groups demanding these reforms, as well as the government that will be responsible for implementing them. Although factions within both NEFIN and MPRF were quick to criticise the agreements - 139 - that their leaders made with the government for not going far enough to ensure proportional representation and ethnic/regional autonomy, they offered few substantive alternatives to foster genuine inclusion. Madheshi leaders have yet to demonstrate how they will bridge the differences between the multiple geographical, linguistic, religious and ethnic groups that make up the Madhesh in order to achieve a genuine mandate. Despite the rhetoric of “social inclusion” and “state restructuring”, proponents seldom acknowledge the immense challenges that the Nepali government will face in reworking administrative boundaries along ethnic, linguistic, and regional lines, as well as in implementing new policies of affirmative action in a country where there has been inadequate provisions for certifying individuals as members of recognised marginal groups. These inconvenient realities simply cannot be overlooked. ******************* - 140 - CHAPTER-VI SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 6.1. Summary of Findings: The hegemonic nationalist discourse grounded on religious ethos of Hinduism has overshadowed the plural or multicultural character of Nepali society and polity prior to the 1990. This dominant Hindu narrative was defied by the intensification of ethnic distinctiveness on the aftermath of the promulgation of the Constitution of 1990 which was moderately inclusive, representative and liberal. The Indegenous Nationalist who has been historically marginalized or subalternized acquired the much required political impulse to elevate their voice. For that reason, Harbermas and Foucault have rightly perceived that knowledge serves interest and yields power. This illuminates why the minorities of Nepal have been marginalized, for the reason that they are far behind the overriding Bahun-Chhetri and Newar in knowledge industry. The NEFIN could effectively mobilized the indigenous ethnic groups by persuading knowledge of marginalization and in so doing could fabricated a collective voice. The MNO, on the other hand, could judiciously erected a racial identity for Mongols. The construction of this subaltern narrative by MNO has had a profound impression well along the process of transition of Nepal into a secular-republican-state. The conversion of Nepal into a secular state has been evidently the consequence of prolonged struggle of the indegenous nationalities. The Maoists’ extended support especially on the aftermath of the end of a decade old insurrection, legitimacy crisis of Monarchy, consensus amongs mainstream political parties irrespective of different ideologies, Madheshh uprising and the pre-emptive civil society have collectively uprooted the century old Monarchy. Although the Madhesh uprising had provided the much needed pace for the political - 141 - transitions to undergo. Madheshi movement has gained strength and momentum since they have had a relatively cohesive and elongated history of self-regulating political mobilization. The historical marginalization of Tarai-Madhesh both culturally and economically has given rise to the “other” feeling amongst the Madheshis which is an essential chunk of identity construction and proclamation. The Pahadi perception of Madheshis as “imagined others” has fostered the segregation and marginalization of Madheshis since the beginning of the Panchayat regime. Therefore, the high extent of political mobilization of Madheshis can be explicated by the elongated history of their independent political crusade, the relative cohesiveness of the movement at least at critical junctures, the cultural and political arrangements of discrimination against them and the catastrophe of the state to identify them as a group and address their grievances until recently, a favourable international environment, the presence of etymological and other cultural variances from the dominant group, and the comparatively high percentage of education midst the Madheshis1. In addition, the Madheshi movement has contributed in a greater magnitude in transforming the Nepali state and redefining the Nepali nation and nationalism. The state-centric nationalism preceding 2007 was characterized by Hindu monarchy, Nepali language, Pahadi culture and CHHE dominated state apparatus. In the last decade all these features have either been eliminated or weakened. The nationalism of “Naya Nepal” can, now, be characterized by Secular state, inclusive democracy through the recognition of identities and institutions of various groups, recognition of multiple “non-Nepali” languages. Therefore, Nepali 1 Lawoti, M. & Hangen, S., 2013. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal. In: H. Lawoti & S. Hangen, eds. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilizations after 1990 (p. 218). New York: Routledge. - 142 - nationalism is transforming from mono-ethnic promise to multiethnic reality. Lowoti has maintained, ‘If a nation is a self-defining cultural community that has a strong association with territory and seeks self-governance, then there are multiple nations in Nepal such as Tamang, Limbu, Newar, Tharu and Madheshi’.2 Hence, the traditional definition of nation as “homogeneous cultural-political community” is unable to address the nature of Nepali nation. Nepal is a unique case in this regard because almost all the ethno-nationalist movement are seeking autonomy for self-determination but that is also within the Nepali state not outside. Yet, the most problematic transformation of Nepali state remnants inconclusive since the Nepali state is still incompetent to accomplish its commitment towards federalism. The Madheshis and other ethnic groups including Tharus, Limbus and Janajaties are still not granted political autonomy that they have been fighting for decades. Regardless of the constitutional commitment of being a secular republic, the conduct of the state is still governed by Hindu norms and values. Nevertheless, the emerging trends of poly-ethnic nationalism, multinational state, inclusive polity designate increasing level of accommodation. However, the accommodative policies will depend on the state’s response to implement it. 6.2. Recommendations: Considering the major findings, recommendations have been made intended for the attainment of an inclusive and sustainable political order in Nepal. 1. Nepali political system is needed to ensure inclusive democracy based on proportional representation. The latest Constitution has adapted the model of 2 Ibid, (p. 248). - 143 - inclusive democracy though a little has done to substantiate it at the grass-root level. Presently the procedure of proportional representation which has only been followed in the election of defined numbers of seats in the Parliament, is needed at the local level institutions in order to assure equitable representation of all the ethnic groups. 2. The issue of frequent violation of human rights of ethnic minorities can also be dispensed by adopting the model of “restorative justice”3. This model has been successfully working in New Zealand. Restorative justice takes place before somebody is sentenced in court. The judge generally consider any agreements made during the Restorative Justice Conference as soon as somebody is penalized. A Restorative Justice Conference is an informal, simplified meeting between a victim, criminal, supportive people and any other accepted people including community representatives. In addition, every person is at the conference has to talk openly and honestly about what happened and what damage is instigated. After such conference, the organizer writes a report unfolding what happened at the conference and any agreements made. 3. In order to accomplish political stability and democratic sustainability in near future, the Nepali state ought to adopt the model of “consociational democracy”. 4. A viable Local Government would confer powers to the subalternized sections. 3 Restorative justice is a way of thinking about crime and conflict. It is not a particular practice or type of program, but rather a philosophy, or a set of principles. The United Nations Working Group on Restorative Justice defines it in the following way: a process whereby parties with a stake in a particular offence resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future Restorative justice processes worldwide are premised on the following principles: holding the offender accountable in a more meaningful way of repairing the harm caused by the offence achieving a sense of healing for the victim and the community, reintegrating the offender back into the community. - 144 - 5. There should be an opportunity for all the ethnic groups to take education in their vernacular languages. 6. Affirmative actions including researvation of seats in all govt. jobs as well as educational institution and local bodies along with financial assistances in the form of scholarship ought to be provided to the marginalized sections in order to achieve socio-economic justice. 7. 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The Anthropology of Tacit Knowledge in the Domestic Mandala: A Case Study of Chhetris in the Kathmandu Valley. Lalitpur: NCCS. Gurung, O. (2009). Social Inclusion: Politics and Practices in Nepal. Lalitpur: NCCS. Luitel, S. (2009). Dependency and Underdevelopment: The Nepalese Context. Lalitpur: NCCS. Pandey, T. R. (2011). Democracy in Cage: Towards a Framework for a State Restructuring in Nepal. Lalitpur: NCCS. 11, 148-177. REPORTS: International Crisis Group. (2011). Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism. Kathmandu: Asia Report. Economic and United Nations Development programme. (2008). The Dalit of Nepal and a New Constitution. Kathmandu: UNDP. Subba, C., Bastola, T. S., Subba, M. K., Raut, N., & Karki, B. (2014). A study on the Socioeconomic Status of Indegenous People in Nepal. Kathmandu: Lawyers Association for Human Rights of Nepalese Indegenous Peoples. NEWS PAPER ARTICLES AND PRESS DIGESTS: Bhattarai, B. (2001, 08 31). King G’s 100 days. Nepali Times. Budhathoki, B. (2006, 02 10). Royalists decry poll irregularities. Kathmandupost. Chaudary, R. (2016, 7 31). Sorry about that: Madhesi social activists have started a campaign apologising for past discrimination. Kathmandu Post, p. 7. Kantipur Report. (2004, 01 14). CPN-UML reveals 'road map' to move ahead. Kathmandupost. Kantipur Report. (2004, 01 14). UML not for house reinstatement: Oli. Kathmandupost. Kantipur Report. (2007, 08 22). Congress, NC-D, UML MPs want House prorogued for polls. Kathmandupost. Kantipur Report. (2007, 07 25). Nepalese peace process on track but challenges remain: UN Secratary General. Kathmandupost. Kantipur Report. (2008, 03 06). Parties register candidates across the nation. Kathmandupost. Kantipur Report. (2009, 01 15). Monarchy can in no way make a comeback: MK Nepal. Kathmandupost. - 161 - Kathmandupost. (2004, 01 01). King and parties should understand students’ voices: Koirala. Kathmandupost. Kathmandupost. (2004, 01 01). King must bend or give way: Koirala, Nepal. Kathmandupost. Koirala, N. (2016, 01 12). State of denial. Kathmandupost. Majumder, S. (2006, April 25). Nepalis cautious over king's move. BBC News. Nepali Times. (2007, 12 28). The royal massacre was a conspiracy. Nepali Times. Nepali Times. (2015, 24 11). Economic crisis, political solution’. Nepali Times. Nepali Times. (2015, 8 9). Parties agree on six-Pradesh model with boundaries. Nepali Times. Post Report. (2015, 06 08). Decide federalism, plan on rebuilding: UCPN (M. Kathmandupost. Post Report. (2015, 09 10). Decide federalism, plan on rebuilding: UCPN (M. Kathmandupost. WEBSITES: Bhuwan, K. C. (2010, 6 10). Consensus in Just Three. Retrieved 12 9, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/100-justthree Bhuwan, K. C. (2010, 10 6). Public Opinion Collection by CA. Retrieved 12 14, 2015, from Alliance for Social dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/68-public-opinion Bhuwan, K. C. (2011, 5 9). Congress Awareness Campaign for Peace and Constitution. Retrieved 12 9, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogure: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/132-congress-awareness Bhuwan, K. C., & Pathak, T. (2010, 09 24). Challenges and Constraints of CA Committees. Retrieved 12 10, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/ne/transition/constitution/analytical/53-ca-committees Bhuwan, K. C., & Pathak, T. (2010, 6 2). Committee for Determining the Structure of Constitutional Bodies. Retrieved 10 8, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/structure/62-dbl-existing-body Bhuwan, K. C., & Pathak, T. (2010, 9 20). Comparative Study of the 1990, 2007, and the Forthcoming Constitution. 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Retrieved 10 08, 2016, from http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/documents/treaties_agreements/nep_india_open_b order.htm NEFIN. (2015, 12 12). Home Page of Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasangh. Retrieved from NEFIN KOREA: www.janjatikorea.blogspot.in/p/blog-page.html Pathak, T. (2010, 9 29). Discourse of State Structure and Federalism. Retrieved 1 3, 2016, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/restructuring/87-structure-andfederalism Pathak, T. (2010, 10 6). Ethnicity and State Restructuring. Retrieved 1 3, 2016, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/restructuring/50-state-restructuring Pathak, T. (2010, 10 6). Models of Federalism. Retrieved 1 13, 2016, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/restructuring/145-modelsoffederalism Pathak, T. (2010, 12 6). Party Concepts on State Restructuring. Retrieved 1 13, 2016, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/restructuring/73-party-concepts Pathak, T., & Bhuwan, K. C. (2010, 6 2010). A Need for Identity and Recognition. Retrieved 12 9, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/minorities/59-identity Simkhada, D. (2010, 10 06). Civil Society Role in Constitution Drafting. Retrieved 10 09, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/98-civil-society - 163 - Simkhada, D. (2010, 9 27). Extension of the CA Deadline. Retrieved 1 3, 2016, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/94-ca-deadline Simkhada, D. (2010, 10 6). Federalism: Facts and Delusions. Retrieved 1 3, 2016, from Alliance for Social dialogue: http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/restructuring/101-federalism Simkhada, D. (2010, 9 27). Obstacles of the Peace Process. Retrieved 12 9, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/91-peace-process Simkhada, D. (2010, 9 27). Sharp Polarisation in the Constituent Assembly. Retrieved 12 9, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/88-sharp-polarisation Simkhada, D. (http://asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/analytical/97-over-key-issues, 2010 10). People also Divided over Key Issues. Retrieved 1 3, 2016, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: 6 Simkhada, D., & Pathak, T. (2010, 10 2). The Form of Government: Crucial Issues Facing the CA. Retrieved 12 9, 2015, from Alliance for Social Dialogue: http://www.asd.org.np/en/transition/constitution/form/77-crucial-issues-facing-theca ********************** - 164 - ANNEXURE-I Questionnaire for Interview of the Leading Personalities of Different Ethnic Background 1. General Background of the respondents: a) Name: b) Address c) Age: d) Sex: e) Caste/ Ethnicity: f) Religion: g) Educational Qualification: h) Occupation: 2. Do you think that Pahadi Bahuns and Chhetris are privileged vis-à-vis Madheshis, Janajatis and other ethnic minorities? 3. Do you think that ethnic groups other than Pahadi Bahuns and Chhetris are historically marginalized? 4. Do you enjoy equal rights as per Pahadi Behuns and Chhetris? If no then what are the discriminatory practices you face? - 165 - 5. Do you prefer multiparty democracy over Hindu monarchy? Why? 6. Do you support secular state? Why? 7. Do you think that the Maoist’ are the competent force to end the ethnic suppression? 8. How do you assess the role of MNO? 9. How would you see the role of NEFIN? 10. Do you think that the ethnic narratives are rightly placed in the national forum? 11. What kind of status do you want in the constitution? 12. What are your major political demands? 13. Do you support federal restructuring based on ethnicity? Why? 14. How do you assess the role of mainstream political parties on the issue of federal restructuring? 15. How would you assess the role of civil society on federal restructuring? 16. What kind of autonomy do you want? - 166 - ANNEXURE-II List of Group Discussion Agenda and Venues [Each Group comprised by 10 respondents] Agenda of Group Discussion: 1. Gorkha Rule v/s Multiparty Democracy 2. Hinduism v/s Secularism 3. Role of NEFIN, MNO in the mobilization of ethnic groups 4. Opinion about other ethnic groups 5. Maoists as the messiah for ethnic groups 6. Reaction on existing Constitution 7. Federal Restructuring – Ethnicity based federalism Venues of Group Discussion and the Number of Groups: 1. Kathmandu (Near Ratna Park), 1 Group 2. Kathmandu (Office of Central Bureau of Statistics), 1 Group 3. Kathmandu, Office of Mongol National Organization, 1 Group 4. Kathmandu (Office of Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of Nepalese Indigenous Peoples), 1 Group - 167 - 5. Kathmandu, Chakra Path, (Office of Nepal Peasant Federation), 1 Group 6. Lalitpur, Bagmati, (Office of NEFIN), 1 Group 7. Kirtipur (Tribhuvan University), 2 Groups 8. Bhaktapur Durbar Square, 2 Groups 9. Morang, Biratnagar, 2 Groups 10. Birganj (Near Ghantaghar), 2 Groups 11. Mechinagar, Jhapa, 2 Groups 12. Kanchanpur, Saptari, 2 Groups 13. Lumbini, Rupandehi, 2 Groups - 168 - ANNEXURE-III List of Organization/ Offices Visited for the Collection of Primary Data during the Course of the Fieldwork: 1. Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of Nepalese Indigenous Peoples (LAHURNIP) 2. Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) 3. National Indigenous Women Federation (NIWF) 4. Indigenous Mega Front 5. The National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) 6. Nepal Peasant Federation 7. Central Bureau of Statistics - 169 - ANNEXURE-IV List of Persons/ Experts Met/ Interviewed in the due Course of Fieldwork: Academic Experts: 1. Lok Raj Baral, Professor & Executive Chairman, Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies 2. Hari Sharma, Director, ASD Secretariat, Social Science Baha (Nepal) 3. Dr. Mukta Lama Tamang, Anthropologist, Tribhuvan University 4. Dr. Chaitanya Subba, Sociologist 5. Prof. Bishwanbher Pyakuryal, Economist 6. Mr. Baburam Karki, Economist 7. Naniram Karki, Library Officer, Central Bureau of Statistics 8. Prof. Hari Prasad Bhattarai, Sociologist Former Members of the Constituent Assembly: 1. Viswendra Paswan, Dalit Janajati Party 2. Gopal Dahit, Tharuhat Terai Party 3. Bhanu Ram Tharu, Tharuhat Terai Party 4. Bijaya Subba, Federal Socialist Party 5. M.S. Thapa, Rastriya Janamukti Party 6. Suresh Ale Magar, CPN-Maoist 7. Buddha Ratna Manandhar, Nepa Rastriya Party 8. Shanti Jirel, CPN-UML 9. Kumar Rai, Social Democratic Party 10. Dal Kumari Sunuwar, Rastriya Prajatantra Party - 170 - 11. Ang Dawa Sherpa, CPN-Maoist 12. Sitaram Tharu, Tharuhat Terai Party Other Leading Personalities: 1. Sujeev Shakya, Market Expert 2. Chandrakishor Jha, Journalist 3. Kumar Pradhan, President, Yuva Mahasangh of NEFFIN 4. Bal Ram Banskata, Secretary General, Nepal Peasant Federation 5. Ghanashyam Pandey, Member, Nepal Peasant Federation 6. Ajay Kumar Chawrasia, Member of Parliament, Nepal 7. Kirti Chaturbedi, Indian Ambassador in Nepal 8. Shishir Bashyal, Staff, Tribhuvan University 9. Prashanna Pradhan, School Teacher at Lumbini 10. Netra Achariya, Scholar in Buddhist Studies, Tribhuvan University 11. Bindesh Dahal, Documentation and Communication Officer, Centre for Media Freedom 12. Ram Lohani, Stuff, Tribhuvan University 13. Santosh Panjiyar, Research Scholar, Tribhuvan University 14. Hareram Rijal, Stuff, Dept. of Political Science, Tribhuvan University 15. Rakesh Shakya, Hotel Superintendent and Newar Leader from Kathmandu - 171 -