Comparative International Tax Law and Oil & Gas Taxation

Tax treaty protection only goes as far as the treaty's substantive scope. Nations worldwide have adopted the text of Art. 2 ("Taxes covered") of the OECD Model Double Taxation Conventions in concluding bilateral treaties to prevent international double taxation in the area of taxes on income and capital, and taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts. Aigner et al. (eds.) Erbschaftssteuern und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002), pp. 41 et seq., dealing with the substantive scope of treaties on estates, inheritances and gift taxes. See also M. Lang, "'Taxes covered' -What is a 'tax' according to Art. 2 OECD Model Convention?", Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, pp. 216 et seq.; id., "Der sachliche Anwendungsbereich der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und vom Vermögen", in Lang/Jirousek (eds.) Praxis des Internationalen Steuerrechts, liber amicorum Helmut Loukota, pp. 265 et seq. 6 The current versions are: Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, adopted by the Council of the OECD on 15 July 2005; Model Tax Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts, adopted on 3 June 1982. Unless otherwise indicated, reference is always made to the most recent version of the respective OECD Model Convention. 43 Cf. the approach in M. Lang, Einführung in das Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002) m.mos. 137 et seq.

This article looks into central issues which arise when dealing with transfer pricing in so-called developing countries, with a special focus on the development of a transfer pricing system in Ghana.

SSRN, 2019

The Good Place is a new Netflix – series. A fantastic sitcom with Ted Danson in an impressive lead role as (Arch angel) Michael. In the series Eleanor Shellstrop (Kristen Bell) has died and ends up – by mistake – in the Good Place. Michael explains how it works. All actions of people are valued with plus and minus points. At the end of your life, all plus and minus – points are added up and if you have a sufficient balance you end upon in the Good Place. Committing genocide is minus 434.484,45. Use of Facebook as a verb: minus 5,55. Remaining loyal to the Cleveland Browns plus 53,83 and remembering your sister’s birthday plus 0,04. One of the other indicators of really bad people is that they take off both shoes and socks in the plane. It is tempting to use this system to assess the current international tax system and the main actors in this play. We will focus primarily on the Ted Danson of international tax: the OECD and its claim to fame: BEPS. What would be the score of say Pascal St Amans?

—The global economy's centre of gravity is shifting. Emerging and developing countries have been contributing over 50% of the global GDP since the onset of the 21st century, which is unprecedented since the Industrial Revolution. This article offers the first analysis of the creeping convergence of the BRIC world (ie Brazil, Russia, India and China) with global legal standards in a key area of International Law: the International Tax Regime (ITR). The ITR is a legal technology fundamentally designed by the League of Nations in the 1920s, when the BRICs played no relevant role. This article proposes a theory that aims to illuminate the core driving forces of the ongoing trend towards global convergence in this area of International Law from both the static and dynamic dimensions. It is grounded on the logic of two-sided platforms.

In the current era of cross -border transactions across the world, due to unique growth in international trade and commerce and increasing interaction among the nations, residents of one country extend their sphere of business operations to other countries where income is earned. One of the most significant results of globalization is the noticeable impact of one country's domestic tax policies on the economy of another country. This has led to the need for incessantly assessing the tax regimes of various countries and bringing about indispensable reforms. International double taxation has adverse effects on the trade and services and on movement of capital and people. Taxation of the same income by two or more countries would constitute a prohibitive burden on the tax-payer. In view of the above discussion, the article attempts to evaluate various facets of bilateral Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs) with particular reference to India's network of DTAAs as a tool of tax coordination used by nations to distribute rights to tax different bases in the global fiscal commons. More precisely, an attempt has been made, in this article, to analyze and provide a brief account of the various insights in respect of double taxation avoidance agreements with India. By means of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements, each country accommodates the claims of other nations within their fiscal arena to develop international trade and investments with minimal barriers. However, the international tax regime has to be restructured constantly so as to respond to the current challenges and drawbacks.

Tax is a sustainable tool for domestic revenue mobilisation for governments to fund public services. Revenue alternatives have been affected by the global financial liquidity challenges and have become unreliable. There are various tax loopholes threatening tax revenue mobilisation. This paper discusses tax loopholes around tax treaties and the threat they pose to domestic revenue mobilisation in Africa. The network of double taxation treaties is one of the mechanisms used by multinational companies to avoid paying taxes. Whilst tax treaties aim to stem double taxation and double non-taxation, some tax treaty provisions facilitate aggressive transfer pricing as well as base erosion and profit shifting. African Governments have a critical role to play to address tax loopholes inherent in tax treaties. This paper proffers recommendations such as reviewing the provisions of current tax treaties, developing new tax treaty frameworks and coordination of tax rules as important steps to address tax loopholes. Key words: BEPS, tax treaties, transfer pricing, tax coordination, treaty shopping, domestic revenue mobilisation JEL Classification Numbers: E62, H20, H26, H41

This article analyzes the institutional design of international double tax avoidance. The basic argument is that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows between treaty partners. Since investment flows are defined dyadically, bilateral bargaining can best accommodate countries’ concern for the distribution of tax revenues and other economic benefits connected to the tax base. Moreover, because there are no serious externality problems with bilateral agreement, this solution is also viable. At the same time, there is a need for a multilateral organization to disseminate information and shared practices in the form of a model convention that provides a focal point for bilateral negotiations. The strategic structure of a coordination game can also explain why the institutions of double tax avoidance do not have to be equipped with third-party enforcement capabilities. Instead, the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is interpreted as a device to deal with the fact that double tax agreements (DTAs) are incomplete contracts.