IPRPD
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
Volume 03; Issue no 12: December, 2022
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
TRADE DEFICIT AND CURRENCY DEVALUATION:
TESTING THE J-CURVE
Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis1, Dr. Iordanis Petsas2
1
2
Economics/Finance Department, The Arthur J. Kania School of Management, University of Scranton, USA
Professor & Chair, Department of Economics and Finance, Kania School of Management, University of Scranton, USA
Abstract
This paper is testing empirically the effect of a devaluation of a currency on the trade account of the country, the Jcurve effect, by using the trade between the U.S. and seven countries (Euro-zone, Mexico, Canada, United
Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, and Australia). A devaluation (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar is increasing the spot
exchange rate ($/FC) and increases the price of imports and reduces the price of exports. Then, imports are falling
and exports are increasing and the trade account is improved in the long-run. In the short-run, the trade account is
deteriorated because the international trade transactions are pre-arranged and the invoices are in foreign currency,
so it cannot be adjusted. This J-curve hypothesis is tested by using a regression equation and a VAR model, where
the volatility of the real exchange rate (TOT) is specified with a GARCH-M process. Also, different stationary tests
are taking place, like, unit root and cointegration ones. The empirical results mostly are supporting the J-curve
effect.
Keywords
Demand for Money and Exchange Rate, Foreign Exchange, Current Account Adjustment, Forecasting and
Simulation, Information and Market Efficiency, International Financial Markets
JEL (Classification):
«Πονηροί δέ ἄνθρφποι καί γόηηες
προκόυοσζιν ἐπί ηό τείρον,
πλανῶνηες καί πλανώμενοι.»
-
E4, F31, F32, F47, G14, G15
Β΄ Τιμ. γ΄ 13
I. Introduction
A continuing U.S. trade deficit after 1980 is a proof of a major structural problem of the country. This situation is
detrimental to the nation’s economy and to citizens’ wellbeing because it affects negatively production,
employment, income, competitiveness, independence, and causes reductions of foreign assets of the Fed, because
are used in financing the trade deficits, which are foreign currencies, SDRs, gold or debt. A country can buy more
goods from abroad than it makes domestically by borrowing from its trading partners. This can only continue as
long as the lending country trusts the borrowing one to repay the loan. One day, the lending countries could decide
to ask the borrower to repay not only the interest, but the entire debt, which could generate serious effects in the
domestic economy.1 However, this is not likely to happen because it would have adverse effects (depreciation) on
those borrowing countries’ currencies and imports will fall and trade will be reduced, which will deteriorate
lender’s economy. Another concern regarding the trade deficit is about the competitiveness of the deficit country’s
economy itself. By purchasing goods overseas for a long enough period, the companies of the country lose their
expertise and even the factories2 to make those products. As a nation loses its competitiveness, it outsources more
jobs, more companies, and more income, which reduce its standard of living. Countries must be self-sufficient and
1
It might make its debt unsustainable. See, Kallianiotis (2018, p. 164).
See, Niko J. Kallianiotis, America in a Trance. https://www.nikokallianiotis.com/book , where this problem is depicted in
photos.
2
1|
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
in an autarky situation and this depends on the competence of domestic leadership and its public (monetary, fiscal,
and trade) policies.
Countries can use trade policies (devaluation of their currencies) to reduce the trade account deficits, given
that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds (elastic domestic and foreign demands for imports). Devaluation increases
the price of imports and reduces the price of exports and due to the law of demand, imports are falling and exports
are increasing and the trade account is improved. Let us start with a country that has a trade account deficit and
decides to devaluate (depreciate) its currency to reduce the deficit, as it appears in Figure 1. At time t1 , the
depreciation of the domestic currency takes place and a further deterioration in the trade balance occurs and
gradually the trade balance improves, after time t 2 ; this path of adjustment takes the shape of a ―j‖ and for this
reason it called the J-Curve adjustment. There is a theoretical rational behind this hypothesis, but in Finance and
mostly in its mother Economics (Οἰθολοκηθός), everything must be proved beyond mathematics and assumptions
with actual data from the trading partners.
A sudden unexpected depreciation of the
domestic currency has the following impact, in the
current period ( t1 ), due to the contracts for exports
(in $) and imports (in €), which are already in effect.
All or most of the imports are priced in foreign
currencies. Thus, a sudden depreciation of the U.S.
dollar will cause an increase in the trade deficit after
time t1 because the cost of imports will be higher in
dollars, due to its depreciation, while the revenue
from exports will remain unchanged because of the
already existing export contracts. As the time is
passing, the price of imports is increasing and
imports are falling, but the price of exports might
fall (the price of imported raw material or other
inputs for their production will increase) and we will
Figure 1. The J- Curve (TA Adjustment)
reach period t 2 , where the trade account is
Note: t1 = depreciation of the domestic currency
improving, due to reduction of imports and increase
period and t2 = TA improvement period.
to exports. After time t 2 , the trade account becomes
positive (in surplus).
S ($ ) ( M and X ) S R TAS R (int ernational trade transactio ns are pre arranged and cannot adjust )
( M and X ) L R TAL R ( M d and M s are more inelastic in the short run than in the long run )
where, S = spot exchange rate ($/FC), M = imports, X = exports, and TA = trade account.
The adjustment of the trade account takes place over a prolonged period of time. In some industrial
countries the total time elapsing between the time of the depreciation of the currency and the improvement of the
trade account varies between 3 to 12 months (depending on the payments grace period). For example, a
depreciation of the U.S. dollar will have the following effects on its trade account:
TAt1 0 S ($ ) X M ( PX$ Q X ) ( S $ / euro PMeuro QM ) TA
where, PX = price of exports, QX = quantity of goods exported, PM = price of imports, and QM = quantity of goods
imported.
With the passing of time the current contracts will mature and the new contracts will be written with the
new prices, which will reflect the changes of cost, due to the depreciation of the currency and the trade account3will
be improved because imports will fall, due to higher cost and exports will increase because of the lower cost (lower
prices in foreign currency) of the U.S. products. The objective of this study is to test the J-curve hypothesis by using
a regression and a vector autoregression (VAR) model based on the trade account variables and the exchange rate
volatility by applying a GARCH-M specification.
3
The U.S. Current and Trade Account Deficits
2 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
II. A Theoretical Model of the Trade Account
Specification of Currency Volatility
As it was mentioned, countries can use trade policies (the traditional, like, tariffs, import taxes, and quota or the
less reactionary one, devaluation of their currencies) to reduce the current account and the trade account deficits.
The trade account can be presented with eq. (1), as following,
TA X M f 1 ( p, Y ) f 2 ( p, Y )
*
(1)
where, Y = domestic income, Y * = foreign income, and p = the relative price level ( TOT ) or real exchange rate.
The terms of trade ( TOT ) are:
P
S P*
(2)
p TOT M
PX
P
where, p = terms of trade or real exchange rate, PM = price of imports, PX = price of exports, S = spot exchange
rate ($/€), P = domestic price level, and P * = foreign price level.
By presenting the natural logarithm of a variable with its lower-case letter ( ln X t x t ), eq. (2) becomes:
p tot t st pt* pt
(3)
We will test the J-curve hypothesis by using, first, a regression analysis and a GARCH-M model for the
exchange rate fluctuation by writing eq. (1) as follows:
(4)
Now, by taking the logarithms of the variables (the lower case letters are the ln of the capital counterpart),
we have from eqs. (4) and (3) the following eq. (5):
(5)
A Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH)4 model can be used, here, to
model and forecast the conditional variance of the spot exchange rate. The variance of the dependent variable ( )
is modeled as a function of exogenous or predetermined macro-variables ( ) from both countries and of the
conditional variance ( ) of the ( ), which are included in the mean eq. (6) and give the GARCH-in-Mean
(GARCH-M) model:
(6)
Graph 1. Current Acount and Trade Balance
Note: -----Blue line: Balance of CA (goods and services) and ----- Red line: Trade balance (goods).
Source:https://fredblog.stlouisfed.org/2017/02/demystifying-the-tradebalance/?utm_source=series_page&utm_medium=related_content&utm_term=related_resources&utm_campaign=fredblog
4
See, Bollerslev (1986).
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The GARCH-M (q, p) variance is:
∑
∑
(7)
We can determine the volatility of the exchange rate ( ) in eq. (7) if it is statistically significant by using the
multivariate GARCH-M model.5 We can begin with the simplest GARCH (1, 1) specification or a higher order
GARCH model, GARCH (q, p) to test the significant of its lagged values on ( ), where q is the order of the
autoregressive GARCH terms and p is the order of the moving average ARCH terms, eq. (7).
Then, we combine eq. (5) the trade account and eq. (7) the conditional variance or volatility of the spot
exchange rate ( ). This volatility can show the significant effect of past exchange rates movements on our trade
account. We care for the periods of time that the spot rate has caused a positive adjustment on the trade balance.
(8)
or
(
)
(9)
Now, eq. (1), domestic exports ( x t ) or foreign imports ( mt* ) and domestic imports ( m t ) or foreign exports
( xt* ) can be written with the following linear functions:
mt* x t 0 1 ( st pt* pt ) 2 y t* 1t
x t*
mt 0 1 ( s t
pt*
(10)
p t ) 2 y t 2t
(11) 6
If the Marshall-Lerner condition (price elasticity of supply of exports and demand for imports), eq. (12),
holds (elastic domestic and foreign demands for imports), a devaluation of the dollar can improve the trade account.
Devaluation increases the price of imports and reduces the price of exports; and due to the law of demand, imports
are falling and exports are increasing and the trade account is improved. The Marshall-Lerner condition holds
when,
1 1 1
(12)
In addition, a vector autoregression (VAR) model is used based on exports, eq. (10) and imports, eq. (11)
to test the effects of the lagged (
) on and , which is the following VAR system, eqs. (13):
5
6
See, Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987). Also, Smith, Soresen, and Wickens (2003).
The empirical results (regressions) are as following for the logarithm of the U.S. imports ( m t ) from U.K.,
x t* mt 4.418 0.060 ( s t p t* p t ) 1.276 ** y t 0.996 *** AR(1) 0.643 *** MA(1)
(4.939) (0.116)
(0.535)
(0.004)
(0.30)
R 2 0.981, SER 0.110, F 5,891.758, D W 1.875, N 569, RMSE 0.109208
and the U.S. exports ( x t ) to U.K.,
mt* x t 8.077 *** 0.122 ( s t p t* p t ) 1.268 *** y t* 0.904 *** AR(1) 0.421*** MA(1)
(1.564)
(0.138)
(0.124)
(0.030)
(0.067)
R 2 0.899, SER 0.097, F 652.166, D W 1.886, N 372, RMSE 0.096649
The empirical results show that the price elasticity of demand for imports has correct sign (-0.060), but it is statistically
insignificant. The income elasticity is not very high (+1.276) and statistically significant at 5% level. The price elasticity of
supply of exports is (+0.122), but insignificant and the British income elasticity for demand for U.S. exports is (+1.268),
statistically significant at 1% level. Thus, the Marshall-Lerner condition, eq. (12), does not hold: 0.060 0.122 0.182 1
(inelastic demand and supply; thus, a depreciation of the U.S. dollar cannot improve the trade account). Only, it can cause an
increase in prices (inflation), due to excess supply of money, as the following correlation and causality statistics show:
,
);
; also,
;
,
. Thus, the zero federal funds rate since 2008
has caused this enormous inflation (official π = 9.1% in June 2022 and 7.7% in October 2022) in the country; but, (SGS π =
17%) and other independent studies insist that it is over 30%.
4 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
(
(
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
)
)
(13)
The interrelated objective variables and
of the trade account (
) are the endogenous variables of
the VAR as a function of the lagged values of these two endogenous variables plus the lag
and the two
income ( and ) variables to test the real exchange rate volatility and its effects on trade.
III. Some Empirical Results
The data are monthly and are coming from Economagic.com, Eurostat, and Bloomberg. For the Euro-zone (€), the
data are from 2004:12 to 2020:12; for Mexico (MP), they are from 1994:08 to 2021:02; for Canada (C$), they are
from 1981:03 to 2020:12; for U.K. (£), the data are from 1990:01 to 2018:05; for Switzerland (SF), the data are
from 2001:11 to 2021:02; for Japan (¥), they are from 1990:01 to 2021:02; and lastly, for Australia (A$), the data
are from 1986:10 to 2021:02. The variables are U.S. exports to (usxfc) and imports from (usmfc) these foreign
countries, trade accounts (ustafc), incomes ( and ), exchange rates (st) quoted in American terms ($/FC), price
levels ( and ), terms of trades (tott), and the exchange rates volatilities ( ).
We start estimating eq. (9) by using the GARCH-M model of eq. (7). The results appeared in Table 1. We
see that the sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients (α+β) are very close to one (1) for Mexico, Canada, U.K.,
Switzerland, Japan, and Australia, indicating that volatility shocks are quite persistent for these countries. The only
exception is the Euro-zone. These results are often observed in high frequency financial data. The J-curve
hypothesis is that the trade account deteriorates in the S-R and improves in the L-R.7
Table 1 shows that a devaluation of the dollar has significant effects in period ( tot t 3 ) by reducing the
ustaeu and improves it later in (
). The residual (ARCH) t21 has a significant positive effect at the 5% level
and the variances (GARCH) are highly positive significant at t21 (5% level) and negative at t2 2 (1% level). The
devaluation of the dollar has no significant effects on ustam. The residual (ARCH)
and
have significant
positive effects at 1% level and a significant negative effect
at 1% level; the variance (GARCH) is positive
and significant at
(5% level). Also, a devaluation of the dollar has a positive significant effect on ustac at
(1%
(at 1% level). The ARCH has a significant negative effect at t22 (at 5% level) and a positive at
level) and the GARCH a significant negative effect at t2 2 (at 1% level). Then, in t23 the effect becomes positive
at 1% level. With U.K., a devaluation of the dollar has a significant negative effect on ustauk at tot t 7 (1% level)
and another negative one at tot t 9 (at 10% level). The ARCH has positive effect at t21 (at 1% level) and the
GARCH has a significant negative effect at t23 (at 1% level) and two positive effects at t21 (10% level) and at
t2 2 (5% level).
Now, with respect the ustasw, the results are: The devaluation of the dollar has a significant negative effect
at tot t 8 (at 5% level) and a positive at tot t (at 5% level). The ARCH has a positive significant effect at t21 (at
1% level). The depreciation of the dollar has a significant positive effect on ustaj at tot t 7 (at 10% level). The
ARCH has a significant positive effect at t21 (at 1% level) and a GARCH significant negative effect at t2 2 (at
5% level). Lastly, the devaluation of the dollar has a significant negative effect on ustaa at tot t 8 (at 5% level) and
a positive at tot t 9 (at 1% level). The ARCH has significant negative effect at t22 (at 10% level) and a positive at
t21 (at 5% level) and at t23 (at 10% level). The GARCH has significant negative effect at t25 (at 1% level) and
positive at t21 (at 1% level) and at t2 4 (at 1% level). There are some S-R negative effects and some L-R positive
ones that prove the J-curve effect, as Figure 1 shows. The income effects ( y t ) is negative, except with Australia
and the ( y t* ) is positive except with Japan and Australia.
Further, the long run estimates of the U.S. exports (
) and U.S. imports (
) from foreign
countries, eq. (13), are taking place by using a VAR model and are presented in Tables 2a and 2b. The VAR model
is estimated by using lags of terms of trade (
) up to nine lags (j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). The usxeu and
usmeu are positively affected by the U.S. income ( y t ) at the 1% level of significant. The devaluation of the dollar
increases x t and m t at tot t and reduces imports at tot t 1 (at 5% level). The usxm and usmm have significant
positive effects from (at 1% level) and usmm has a positive effect from (at 10% level). The devaluation of the
dollar has significant positive effects on and
at
(1% level) and significant negative effect at
7
The J-curve hypothesis: (M↑ and X↓) => TA↓ (S-R) => (M↓ and X↑) => TA↑ (L-R).
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(1% level). The usxc and usmc have significant positive effects from y t (at 1% level) and negative from y t* (at 5%
level and 1% level respectively). The devaluation of the dollar has significant positive effects on x t and m t at
tot t 1 period (at 10% and 5% level respectively). The devaluation of the dollar has negative effects on x t at tot t 2
(at 5% level). The usxuk and usmuk have significantly been affected by y t (at 10% and 1% level) and negatively
the m t by y t* at 1% level. The devaluation has a positive effect on x t at tot t (at 5% level) at tot t 3 (at 1% level)
and at tot t 8 (at 10% level); it has a negative effect at tot t 1 (at 1% level) and tot t 7 (at 1% level). No significant
effects on U.S. m t from U.K.
The usxsw are positively affected and significant by Swiss income y t* at 1% level, by tot t (at 1% level),
and negatively by tot t 1 (at 1% level). The usmsw are positively affected by U.S. income ( y t ) at the 10% level and
negatively by tot t 8 at 1% level. Now, the usxj are positively affected by y t and y t* at 1% level. The devaluation
of the dollar has positive effects at tot t (at 1% level) and tot t -5 (at 10% level); it has a negative effect at tot t 1 (at
10% level). The usmj have positive significant effects from y t and y t* (at 1% level). The devaluation of the dollar
increases imports at tot t (at 10% level), at tot t -5 (at 5% level) and at tot t -9 (at 5% level). The devaluation of the
dollar reduces usmj at period tot t 3 at 5% level. Lastly, the uuxa are affected positively by y t (at 1% level) and
negatively by y t* (at 10% level). The devaluation of the dollar increases exports to Australia at tot t period (1%
level of significant). The usma have a positive significant effect from y t (at 5% level). The devaluation of the
dollar increases imports from Australia at tot t 3 (at 5% level) and decreases imports at tot t 2 (at 5% level). The
results for these seven countries trading with U.S. show that there are some J-curve effects.
The Graphs A1a, A2a, A3a, A4a, A5a, A6a, and A7a, in the Appendix, show the ustafcf (U.S. trade
forecasting with the seven different foreign countries) and their variances. Graphs A1b, A2b, A3b, A4b, A5b, A6b,
and A7b give the responses to Cholesky innovations, where imports are increasing up to 5 months and then, they
decline. The exports are declining in the S-R and then, they stay constant (flat lines). Consequently, the J-curve has
been tested by examining the pattern of distributed effects of the
(real exchange rate) on exports and imports,
which make up the trade account (
). These coefficients of the lag real exchange rate depreciation
(tot) show that the depreciation of the dollar leads to deterioration of trade in the short-run and to an improvement
in the trade account after some periods. (Tables 1, 2a, and 2b and the Graphs in the Appendix). These tables are
giving some mixed results; but overall, the devaluation of the dollar improves the trade with a delay for all the
countries (J-curve) with Euro-zone, Mexico, Canada, U.K., Switzerland, Japan, and Australia.
Table 3 gives the results by testing the stationarity of our variables used in our regression and VAR
models, with a unit root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test). Some variables are stationary series, I(0); but their
difference stationary series are all integrated as I(1) that there is one unit root; except LSWCPI, which is I(2), a
second order integration (two unit roots). Table 4 reports the Johansen cointegration test of the VAR estimates.
Trace and Max-Eigenvalue tests indicate cointegration at the 1% level.
IV. Policy Implications of Trade Balance
The J-curve hypothesis says that after the depreciation of a currency ($) or increase of the spot exchange rate ($/€),
in American terms, the balance of trade worsens in the short-run, but improves in the long-run, (Figure 1). The
trade balance (
) is very important for a country and shows its competitiveness, production, employment,8
«Μέ ηήλ ἐργαζία θεύγεη ηὀ ἄγτος, ἡ ἀγφλία, ἡ ἀλία, ἡ θαηάζιηυε θαί ηό θελό ηῆς υστῆς θαί δεῖ ὁ ἄλζρφπος εὐηστηζκέλα,
ποιηηηζκέλα θαί ἰδαληθά, ἀθοῦ κέ ηήλ ἀκοηβή ηῆς ἐργαζίας ηοσ ἀποιακβάλεη ηά ἀγαζά θαί γίλεηαη θοηλφληθός θαί
δεκηοσργηθός.» Παῦιος Ἀζ. Παιούθας.
6 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
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DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
resources, self-sufficiency, autarky, public policy effectiveness, leadership, independence, etc. The U.S. trade
deficit after 1980 is enormous,9 showing and proving the inefficiency of the public policies and the aggravation of
the structural problems of our economy. Two important events that have contributed to deterioration of the U.S.
trade account, Graph 2, were: First, the NAFTA agreement in 1994, signed by President Clinton10 and second, the
9
The U.S. trade deficit increased from $676.7 billion in 2020 to $1,076.8 billion in 2021. The trade deficit in January 2022 was
$107.571 billion and up to June 2022, it was $647.7 billion. See, ―Trade in Goods with World, Seasonally Adjusted‖,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html .The U.S. current account the last 60 years is as follows (Graph 2).
See, Petros C. Mavroidis, André Sapir, ―China and the WTO: An uneasy relationship‖, April 29, 2021.
https://voxeu.org/article/china-and-wto-uneasy-relationship
Graph 2: U.S. Current Account
Note: In 1994, the free trade agreement (NAFTA) takes place and the CA deficit increased. In 2002 China joins the WTO and
the CA deficit increased enormously. The current account was in balance until late 1970s and it had the highest deficit during
the years 2005-2008. The current account gap in the U.S. widened to $214.8 billion or 3.7% of the GDP in the third quarter of
2021 from an upwardly revised $198.3 billion in the prior period and compared to forecasts of a $205 billion shortfall. It was
the largest current account deficit since Q3 2006 as imports surged to a record and companies were trying to fill up inventories.
Reduced surplus on services and expanded deficits on secondary income and on goods were partly offset by an expanded
surplus on primary income. The services surplus shrank to $49.9 billion from $62.6 billion in Q2, the goods (TA) deficit rose to
$274.8 billion in Q3 of 2021from $269.6 billion in Q2 of 2021, it became $291.4 billion in Q2 of 2022, led by imports of
industrial supplies and materials, mainly petroleum products and metals and nonmetallic products, and the secondary income
shortfall advanced to $38 billion from $30 billion.
In 2021, the U.S. had a $915.0 billion deficit with its top ten trading partners. With China, it was $355.3 billion, with Mexico
$108.2 billion, with Vietnam $91 billion, with Germany $70.1 billion, with Japan $60.2 billion, with Ireland $60.2 billion, with
Canada $49.5 billion, with Malaysia $41 billion, with Taiwan $40.2 billion, and with Italy $39.3 billion.
https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-trade-deficit-causes-effects-trade-partners-3306276
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
and https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account
Also, Foreign Trade. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html
Further, See, Foreign Trade. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html
10
―NAFTA is over 1,700 pages long--741 pages for the treaty itself, 348 pages for annexes, and 619 pages for footnotes and
explanations. It is difficult to see how 1,700 pages of government rules and regulations can free trade. By definition, free trade
is the removal of government from the trading process, not its expansion.‖ See, Joe Ogrinc, ―The NAFTA Analysis: Not Free
Trade‖, Saturday, May 1, 1993. https://fee.org/articles/the-nafta-analysis-not-free-trade/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMItPzezp
CC9QIVArjICh1dPwHqEAAYAiAAEgJEsfD_BwE . Unfortunately, no one from the Senators is reading these long bills or
laws; they just vote ―Yea‖ or ―Nay‖ going with the party’s will and against their citizens’ and voters’ will. (Sic). Joseph Stiglitz,
Clinton’s economic advisor, had insisted to the president to avoid to sign the NAFTA agreement because, it will be disastrous
for the U.S. economy. But, he signed NAFTA ignoring his advisor’s suggestion. The problem is just a leadership problem. Who
is controlling these pseudo-leaders? On September 30, 2018, an agreement was reached during re-negotiations on changes to
NAFTA. The next day, a re-negotiated version of the agreement was published, and referred to as the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA). In November of 2018, at the G20 summit, the USMCA was signed by President Donald Trump,
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and then-Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. See, Anne Sraders, ―What Is
NAFTA? History, Purpose and What It Means in 2019‖. https://www.thestreet.com /politics/nafta-north-american-free-tradeagreement-14651970 . ―Since NAFTA was ratified, U.S.-Mexico trade—excluding services and petroleum, which are not
addressed by NAFTA—has grown three and a half times faster than U.S. GDP. The United States ran a small trade surplus with
Mexico in 1993; today, the U.S.-Mexico trade deficit is America’s second largest. If NAFTA were solely responsible for all
that trade, it might appear that renegotiating it to obtain more favorable terms for the United States would have big payoffs, and
that repealing it might improve the U.S. deficit.‖ See, Russell A. Green and Tony Payan, ―WAS NAFTA GOOD FOR THE
UNITED STATES?‖ June 2017.
file:///C:/Users/JK/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.IE5/51F9Y8AK/BI-pubNAFTA-062317.pdf . See also, Kallianiotis, Niko J. ―America in a Trance‖ Damiani.
https://www.amazon.com/Niko-J-Kallianiotis-America-Trance/dp/8862085958
7 | www.ijbms.net
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
entrance of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001.11 Now, China has become the
number one producer and net exporter of the world (―everything is Chinese‖). This dependence on Chinese
products will destroy domestic production, existing industries, employment, incomes, and social welfare in U.S.
and EU, too. The U.S. and the entire world will be very soon in big trouble with Chinese aggression.12 It is another
culture and has nothing in common with the traditional (Christian) West.
The country to recover must satisfy the following equation:
(14)
where, Y = GDP or national income, E = expenditures (absorption = C+I+G), T = taxes, G = government spending,
S = saving, I = investment, X = exports, and M = imports.
But,
because
, which shows that the national production is less than the domestic
spending. Also,
the government budget is in deficit, due to enormous spending, inefficiencies,
corruption, wastes, and businesses (corporations) do not pay taxes.13 Further,
because the cost of living is
enormous (high inflation) and the real return on savings is negative (
);
thus savings are declining.14 Lastly,
because the country does not produce the goods needed for
domestic consumption, investment, and government spending. The real GDP growth was negative (-1.6%) for the
1st quarter of 2022 and (-0.6%) for the 2nd quarter of 2022.15 The economy is in a stagflation, (Fedflation and
Bidenflation), Figure 2.
The monetary policy has some small significant effects on the value of the dollar and the trade account,16
but this easy monetary policy since 2008 has caused an enormous inflation and much other harm to people
11
On 11 December 2001, China officially joined the WTO. Its achievements since then have been truly remarkable. In 2001,
China was the sixth largest exporter of goods in the world (fourth, if the European Union is counted as one unit). Since 2009, it
has been the world’s largest goods exporter, surpassing even the EU bloc from 2014 onwards. See, Petros C. Mavroidis,
André Sapir, “China and the WTO: An uneasy relationship”, April 29, 2021. https://voxeu.org/article/china-and-wto-uneasyrelationship
12
The neo-pagan (―economic elites‖) forced the pseudo-leaders to go against Russia, which is a European Christian Orthodox
nation, with the highest moral and ethical values in the world. The principal accessory (aider abettor) of the war in Ukraine is
the U.S. and NATO. Actually, it is a U.S. war against Russia in the land of poor Ukrainians.
13
In U.S., 55 companies with pre-tax income $40.482 billion, paid in 2020, zero taxes and received a tax refund of $3.49
billion; thus, their effective tax rate was -8.6%. See, ―55 Corporations Paid $0 in Federal Taxes on 2020 Profits‖.
https://itep.org/55-profitable-corporations-zero-corporate-tax/ . So, the budget deficit ($1.986 trillion) and the national debt
($31.281 trillion) are going up daily. The Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, said that ―deficits do not matter‖. (Sic) or Sick?
See, https://www.usdebtclock.org/
14
See, Personal Saving Rate. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PSAVERT . See, also, Personal saving as a percentage of
disposable personal income. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A072RC1Q156SBEA . Further, Gross saving as a percentage of
gross national income, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W206RC1Q156SBEA . The U.S. official inflation rate (July 2022) was:
and the SGS inflation was:
. Then,
.
15
See, BEA, ―Gross Domestic Product‖, https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product
16
See, Table A2: Measuring the correlation ( ) and testing the causality ( ) between the instruments ( i FFt , MB , and M s )
and the objective variables ( TA and e )
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1)
The Previous Zero Interest Rate Regime, ZIRR (2008:12-2015:11):
iFF , ta 0.358 iFF ta and ta iFF ( F 6.068*** )
iFF , e 0.073
iFF e ( F 2.877* ) and e iFF
mb , ta 0.663
mb ta ( F 2.726* ) and ta mb ( F 3.747** )
mb , e 0.501
mb e ( F 4.433** ) and e mb
m, ta 0.697
m ta ( F 3.371** ) and ta m ( F 4.519** )
m, e 0.625
m e ( F 3.416** ) and e m
iFF , 0.015
i FF ( F 2.891* )
iFF , p 0.614 iFF p and p iFF ( F 4.743** )
mb, p 0.973
mb p and p mb ( F 4.617** )
8 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
(enormous social cost, bail out cost to taxpayers and bail in cost to depositors),17 by paying IOR, IONRRP, and
forcing a
. Then, a combination of monetary and trade policy is necessary to increase the terms of trade
(
) and improve the TA. This policy can be more effective through a pure trade one, like, a tariff or a
quota or anything else that can affect positively the terms of trade and improve the trade account and consequently,
competitiveness, production and
employment in the country and
reduction of outsourcing. The
trade among countries must be
fair and satisfy the social welfare
of the country’s citizens.
The latest expansionary
monetary policy (zero interest
rate from December 16, 2008
until December 16, 2015, and
then again from March 16, 2020
until March 16, 2022:
)18 and the similar
fiscal one with the stimulus
money plus the unemployment
insurance and the questionable
―infrastructure‖ bill and lately,
the ―inflation reduction act‖ have
increase aggregate demand (AD).
The COVID-19 ―innovation‖, the
irrational vaccine mandates, the
other inhumane restrictions, the
lockdowns, the layoffs and the
resignations of people from their
Figure 2 U.S. Current Aggregate Demand and Supply
Note: The quantitative easing (QE) moved the AD0 to AD1 from point E0 to E1. The
jobs
because
they
were
continue increases in money supply and the COVID-19 stimulus increase the AD to
unvaccinated, the supply chain
AD2 ; Biden’s regulations and businesses’ lockdowns shifted the AS 0 to AS1 and the
problems,
the
traveling
equilibrium output (Q2) and employment (u2) to point E2 . Then, the new money supply
and the ―infrastructure‖ bill moved the AD to AD3 and the vaccine mandates,
resignations, layoffs, supply chain problems, ―protection of the environment‖ by going
**
.971 fuels,
magainst
( FAS
p ASmto
994*the
82 .and
) equilibrium to E4 , which cause
m
p and the
etc, reduce
, p 0fossil
reduction in output (Q4 ) and high unemployment (u4 ) and at the same time an
(2)enormous
Theinflation
Current in
New
Regime, NRIf(2015:12-2020:12):
P4 (stagflation).
the AS had been at AS0 and the AD at AD3 ,
*** the economy almost at full employment and
the
output
would
have
been
to
E
,
with
5
iFF , ta 0.111 iFF ta ( F 6.286 ) and ta iFF
moderate inflation at P5. Then, moderation is the only solution, but our policy makers
values
iFFhistoric
e traditions,
iFF and virtues.
i do, enot
follow
0.139these
and e
FF
mb, ta 0.279
mb ta and ta mb
mb, e 0.297
mb e ( F 5.393*** ) and e mb
m, ta 0.314
m ta ( F 8.792*** ) and ta m ( F 3.180** )
m, e 0.281
m e
iFF , 0.125
i FF ( F 7.570 *** )
iFF , p 0.320
iFF p ( F 2.929* ) and p iFF
mb , p 0.146
mb p and p mb
m, p 0.871
m p
and
e m
and p m ( F 5.208 )
***
Note: iFF = federal funds rate, ta = trade account, e = exchange rate, mb = monetary base, m = money supply, p=ln of price
level, π = inflation rate, m, c = correlation coefficients between m and e , mb e (F ) ) = causality test between mb and e
mb causes e and F-statistic in parenthesis), mb ta = no causality between mb and ta , a lower-case letter (mb) is the
logarithm of the capital one (MB), i.e., mb = ln MB.
Source: Kallianiotis (2021a, Table A2, pp. 107-108).
17
See, Kallianiotis (2022).
18
See, ―Open Market Operations‖, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm
9 | www.ijbms.net
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
restrictions, the tough regulations, the reduction of use of coal, oil and natural gas in production (―green fraud‖),
etc. have reduced aggregate supply (AS), Figure 2. Then, U.S. prices
went up (huge inflation)19 and a reduction in production has increased imports and reduced exports; and
consequently, the trade account has deteriorated (TA<0), Graph 2. The Trade Account deficit was $1,076.8 billion
in 2021 and up to June 2022, it was $647.7 billion.20 The enormous money supply (M2 = $22.072 trillion in April
2022 and fell to $21.338 trillion with September 2022)21 has also generated a very dangerous bubble in the stock
market.22 In March 17, 2022, the Fed started to increase the federal funds target to
and from
November 2, 2022, it became
.23 But, prices continue to grow. Thus, our public policies are
inefficient, ineffective, and anti-social.
The country cannot be dependent on foreign production (Chinese goods), but we have to increase domestic
production (agricultural and manufacturing) to satisfy domestic demand and export also these products to other
nations. The reduction in oil production will cause serious economic and social problems in U.S., the gasoline
prices have increased by 50%. The price of fertilizers is skyrocketing and together with the price of fuel, gas, the
cost of agricultural products continues to go up, which increases their prices. The uncontrolled outsourcing, the
unfair trade, the oligopolist high tech censorship and propaganda, the corruption of our politicians and institutions,
and the anti-social globalization have destroyed the country’s social welfare, its independence, its freedoms, its
value system, its national income, and its citizens’ wellbeing. The risk of the stock market bubble has to be
controlled. Monetary policy must increase the federal funds rate to reduce inflation and make American products
less expensive domestically and for our exports. Real interest rate must be positive (
)24 and the growth in the
stock market enough to cover only the historic risk premium (
). A 36% growth in the financial market
is just a dangerous deception to the poor citizens (investors), who will lose their wealth and their retirement income
(IRA).
V. Concluding Remarks
The official inflation was 9.1% (June 2022), the SGS inflation was 18%, but the average consumer’s inflation (cost of living)
exceeds 30%. See, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/inflation-cpi. See also, http://www.shadowstats. com/alternate_
data/inflation-charts
20
See, ―Foreign Trade‖, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html . See also, https://www.bea.gov/news/2022
/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-january-2022 . Also, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/balance-of-trade .
Further,https://tcf.org/content/report/true-state-u-s-economy/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIxLTQ3tL49gIVpQiICR0Teg9nEAA
YBCAAEgK61fD_BwE
21
See, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WM2NS.
22
The money supply (M2) was in March 2009: $8,438.3 billion and in March 2022: $21,768.8 billion, a small reduction; in
January 2022 it was $21,844.7 billion, an annual growth of 12.12%, and continues to grow; in April 2022 reached $22,072.1
billion and in October 2022 fell to $21,409.7 billion. See, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WM2NS
The DJIA was on 3/9/2009: 6,547.05 and on 1/4/2022 reached 36,799.65 a growth of 36.242% p.a. This enormous liquidity
was not necessary and it causes this colossal bubble in the stock market, which will burst and will generate a new global crisis
even worse than the coronavirus one. See, Macrotrends. https://www.macrotrends.net/1319/dow-jones-100-year-historicalchart . The bubble has started losing air with the Ukrainian crisis that we have created. The DJIA from 36,799.65 (1/4/2022) has
fallen to 28,725.51 (9/30/2022), a decline by 8,074.14 points or -21.941%.
23
See, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU
24
The Fisher equation gives:
, where r = 0.5%, πε = 8.5%; then, an i = 9% is fair for the entire economy and it can
reduce the bubble in the financial market. Kallianiotis (2019b) rule is an expansion of Taylor’s rule by using an extra term, the
growth of the financial market ( g DJIA ), as follows:
19
t
i FFt t rt* ( t
t* ) u (ut
utN ) DJIA ( g DJIAt g *DJIAt )
*
= the optimal (the bubble prevention) growth of the DJIA (
where, g DJIA = the actual growth of the DJIA index, g DJIA
t
t
*
g DJIA
7% i10YTB 5%
t
or HRP 8.7% ), and
0.25 , u 0.50 , DJIA 0.25 .
Kallianiotis rule with June 2021 gives: (1) With official data, the target federal funds rate ( iFF ) must have been:
i FF 5.4% 1% 0.25(5.4% 2%) 0.50(5.9% 4%) 0.25 (18.22% 8.7%) 8.68% , but it was close to zero.
(2) With SGS data, the iFF should have been:
i FF 13% 1% 0.25(13% 2%) 0.50(25.8% 4%) 0.25 (18.22% 8.7%) 8.23%
(3)With February 2022, iFF = 7.5%+1%+0.25 (7.5%-2%)-0.50 (4%-4%)+0.25 (18.73%-8.7%) = 12.383% (with official data)
and with SGS data (u=24.5%), iFF = 2.075% and it was very low, 0.00
̅
0.25%.
10 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
The current paper examines the short-run (up to nine months) relationship between the trade account and changes
in real exchange rates (TOT) of seven countries with respect the U.S. dollar ($/FC). It was found that real exchange
rate changes have a significant impact on the U.S. trade balance. The empirical results show that there exists a
long-run relationship between the trade account (TA) and the income (domestic, Y and foreign, Y*), the terms of
trade (TOT), and volatility of the exchange rate, the residual ε2 (ARCH) and the variance ζ2 (GARCH) have a
significant effect on the TAs, Table 1. The VAR estimations give similar results of the same independent variables
on exports (X) and imports (M) between the U.S. and the other seven countries (Euro-zone, Mexico, Canada, U.K.,
Switzerland, Japan, and Australia), Tables 2a and 2b. A unit root and a cointegration test are given in Tables 3 and
4, too.
The results of this analysis could be relevant regarding the impact of exchange rate changes on trade
account (mostly, U.S. trade deficits). While the short-run effects of changes in the exchange rate on the balance of
trade of a county may be perverse (J-curve), in the long-run the impact of exchange rate changes on trade volumes
are expected to be sufficiently large, so a depreciation of the domestic currency will improve the country’s trade
account. Number of factors may explain the persistence of the J-curve effect. In the short-run, a combination of
price and volume effects, following a currency depreciation may increase a country’s spending on imports by more
than it increases its export earnings, thus accounting for the observed J-curve effect; then a devaluation will likely
result in an initial deterioration of the trade balance. Furthermore, differences in the degree of the restrictiveness of
devaluing countries trade regimes also may affect the duration of the J-curve effect. The graphs in the Appendix
support our argument of existing J-curves between the U.S. and the seven partners in trade countries.
Finally, as far as policy implications are concerned, it is important for the country to use public policies
(monetary, fiscal, and trade) to improve the domestic economy and the social welfare of its citizens. The economy
has some structural problems and must be considered as soon as possible, otherwise the country will lose
completely its competitiveness, as it has already lost its manufacturing output and the agricultural one follows,
compared with China.25 The liberal views of globalization, the new monetary and fiscal policies, which have
caused inflation and high risk, the ―protection‖ of the environment by going against fossil furls, and the disregard
of people, and of ―nothing matters‖ are going to lead the country to a permanent negative trend. The trade must be
fair among the nations and in favor of the domestic economy and not ―the allies first‖ policy that the U.S. is using
since 1980. It seems (it is obvious by now) that there is a serious political (―leadership‖) problem in the western
―democracies‖ the last fifty years.
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by Julia Betti, Meshari A. Albakhat, and Janice Mecadon.
Financial support (professional travel expenses, submission fees, etc.) are provided by Provost’s Office (Faculty
Travel Funds, Henry George Fund, and Faculty Development Funds). The usual disclaimer applies. Then, all
remaining errors are of the authors.
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12 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Variables
𝑒
𝑘
𝑤
𝑗
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0.487
-11.400***
5.298***
-6.293***
22.683***
3.122**
-1.742***
C
(0.934)
(0.430)
(0.198)
(0.684)
(1.135)
(1.220)
(0.609)
-0.065
-2.416***
-0.753***
-1.293***
-4.194***
0.062
1.041***
(0.107)
(0.074)
(0.030)
(0.117)
(0.346
(0.040)
(0.144)
0.110***
2.279***
0.249***
1.447***
1.834***
-0.313***
-0.525***
(0.037)
(0.073)
(0.014)
(0.118)
(0.291)
(0.082)
(0.068)
0.002
0.668***
0.970**
0.744**
(0.064)
(0.197)
(0.409)
(0.295)
-0.223
-0.758***
-0.597
-0.351
1
(0.104)
(0.104)
(0.410)
(0.324)
0.540***
0.174
-0.272
2
(0.071)
(0.120)
(0.215)
-0.375**
0.014
0.306
0.279
3
(0.179)
(0.151)
(0.274)
(0.253)
0.198*
-0.045
4
(0.119)
(0.158)
0.026
0.732*
-0.307
5
(0.141)
(0.387)
(0.230)
0.126
-0.847**
0.344*
6
(0.129)
(0.388)
(0.207)
-0.191
0.574
-0.328**
-0.226**
7
(0.125)
(0.475)
(0.137)
(0.103)
***
*
0.075
0.249
-0.604
0.581***
8
(0.104)
(0.020)
(0.345)
(0.108)
0.062
9
(0.076)
Variance Equation
C
t21
2
2
2
3
2
0.006***
(0.001)
0.204**
(0.100)
0.064
(0.140)
-
4
-
5
-
2
t21
2
2
2
3
0.553**
(0.227)
-0.674***
(0.152)
-
0.001
(0.001)
0.503***
(0.136)
-0.373
(0.311)
-0.379***
(0.187)
0.333***
(0.176)
-
0.001**
(0.001)
0.461***
(0.112)
-0.414**
(0.182)
0.201
(0.145)
-
0.673
(0.604)
0.734**
(0.347)
-0.430
(0.387)
1.111***
(0.226)
-0.772***
(0.296)
0.378***
(0.124)
-
0.003
(0.005)
0.398***
(0.116)
-0.193
(0.172)
-0.047
(0.207)
0.534*
(0.296)
0.600**
(0.255)
-0.407***
(0.148)
Appendix
13 | www.ijbms.net
0.010
(0.007)
0.667***
(0.157)
-0.058
(0.389)
0.218
(0.449)
-0.016
(0.551)
-0.269
(0.595)
0.151
(0.167)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.397***
(0.120)
-0.053
(0.239)
0.525
(0.393)
-0.192**
(0.086)
-
0.003
(0.002)
0.259**
(0.109)
-0.286*
(0.159)
0.295*
(0.161)
-0.029
(0.157)
-0.046
(0.109)
1.013***
(0.266)
-0.316
(0.269)
-0.171
(0.244)
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
2
-0.108
4
(0.193)
2
5
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
0.625***
(0.240)
-0.412***
(0.109)
2
R
0.409
0.607
0.565
0.064
0.469
0.006
0.121
0.081
0.056
0.082
0.181
0.233
0.124
0.225
D W 1.106
0.889
0.614
0.641
0.487
0.586
0.730
N
193
319
478
341
224
367
404
RMSE 0.079504
0.054466
0.081895
0.178658
0.229648
0.122846
0.223410
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Table 1: Estimation of Eq. (9) with the use of GARCH-M Model, Eq. (7): Trade Account and Real Exchange Rate
Note:
𝑒
= ln of U.S. Trade Account with EU,
= ln of U.S. Trade Account with Mexico,
= ln of U.S.
Trade Account with Canada,
𝑘 = ln of U.S. Trade Account with U.K.,
𝑤 = ln of U.S. Trade Account with
Switzerland, ,
𝑗 = ln of U.S. Trade Account with Japan, ,
= U.S. Trade Account with Australia, = ln of U.S.
Income (GDP), = ln of foreign Income (GDP),
= ln of Terms of Trade (Real Exchange Rate),
= lag of Residual
R 2 = R-squared,
= S.E. of regression, D W = Durbin-Watson statistic, F =
F statistic, N = number of observations, RMSE = Root Mean Squared Error, *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at
(ARCH),
= lag of Variance (GARCH),
the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. Source: Economagic.com, Bloomberg, and Eurostat.
14 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------Variables
𝑒
𝑒
𝑘
𝑘
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------0.375***
0.450***
0.077
0.023
0.121**
0.139
0.594***
-0.284***
1
(0.084)
(0.092) (0.110) (0.119)
(0.079)
(0.068)
(0.056)
(0.059)
0.078
0.344*** 0.241**
0.005
0.057
0.142**
0.314***
-0.125*
2
(0.088)
(0.096) (0.116) (0.125)
(0.085)
(0.073)
(0.063)
(0.067)
0.031
0.218** -0.052
0.114
-0508***
-0.085
0.063
-0.156***
3
(0.079)
(0.086)
(0.106) (0.114)
(0.077)
(0.066)
(0.055)
(0.059)
***
0.343*** 0.748***
0.194**
0.285***
0.005
0.542***
0.439***
1 -0.191
(0.069)
(0.076)
(0.101) (0.109)
(0.091)
(0.079)
(0.051)
(0.055)
-0.191***
0.120**
-0.026
-0.096
-0.243*** -0.185
0.197***
2 -0.080
(0.076)
(0.083)
(0.112) (0.121)
(0.097)
(0.083)
(0.056)
(0.059)
0.148***
0.128**
0.442*** -0.072
0.217***
0.110
-0.083
0.181***
3
(0.070)
(0.077)
(0.098) (0.105)
(0.091)
(0.078)
(0.051)
(0.055)
C
-2.898***
-9.182*** -10.348*** -11.930***
-14.070***
-2.871***
0.178
2.142**
(1.973)
(2.154)
(2.011)
(2.164)
(0.680)
(0.585)
(0.970)
(1.032)
1.462*** -0.250
0.696***
0.625***
0.410*
0.743***
2.151***
0.508*
(0.280)
(0.306)
(0.268)
(0.289)
(0.130)
(0.112)
(0.229)
(0.244)
0.759***
-0.054**
-0.070***
-0.168
-0.015
-0.006
-0.590***
1.023***
(0.036)
(0.040) (0.271)
(0.292)
(0.027)
(0.023)
(0.221)
(0.236)
0.382** 0.096
0.273*
-0.212
0.009
-0.176
-0.180
0.444**
(0.173)
(0.189) (0.116)
(0.125)
(0.211)
(0.181)
(0.215)
(0.229)
0.646***
0.565*
-0.122
-0.092
-0.790***
0.548**
-0.500** 0.493***
1
(0.246)
(0.269) (0.178)
(0.192)
(0.308)
(0.265)
(0.334)
(0.355)
0.197
0.050
-0.480*** -0.710***
-0.586**
-0.383
-0.366
0.083
2
(0.246)
(0.268) (0.184)
(0.198)
(0.310)
(0.267)
(0.336)
(0.357)
-0.016
0.447*
0.197
0.212
0.126
0.163
1.018***
0.208
3
(0.244)
(0.267) (0.187)
(0.201)
(0.311)
(0.267)
(0.332)
(0.353)
-0.223
-0.364
-0.145
0.039
0.289
0.137
-0.403
0.085
4
(0.244)
(0.267) (0.186)
(0.200)
(0.309)
(0.266)
(0.335)
(0.357)
0.432*
0.063
-0.210
-0.259
-0.448
-0.307
0.204
-0.185
5
(0.245)
(0.267) (0.181)
(0.195)
(0.308)
(0.265)
(0.338)
(0.356)
-0.178
0.266
0.376**
0.303
0.239
0.020
0.294
0.243
6
(0.248)
(0.271) (0.180)
(0.194)
(0.309)
(0.266)
(0.330)
(0.351)
0.127
0.124
-0.317*
-0.068
0.003
0.018
-0.844***
-0.183
7
(0.250)
(0.273) (0.181)
(0.195)
(0.309)
(0.266)
(0.326)
(0.347)
0.017
-0.096
0.107
-0.044
-0.088
0.002
0.551*
0.030
8
(0.249)
(0.272) (0.181)
(0.195)
(0.308)
(0.265)
(0.325)
(0.346)
0.007
-0.154
-0.065
-0.026
0.162
0.015
-0.210
-0.041
9
(0.178)
(0.194) (0.118)
(0.128)
(0.211)
(0.181)
(0.211)
(0.224)
R2
0.860
0.897
0.982
0.980
0.972
0.985
0.904
0.889
0.060
0.066
0.070
0.076
0.093
0.080
0.092
0.097
58.178
82.413 896.547
823.612
896.769
1644.213
169.298
143.474
N
190
190
319
319
478
478
341
341
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 2a VAR Estimates of Eq. (13): Effects of Terms of Trade on Exports and Imports
Note: See, Table 1.
𝑒 = ln of U.S. exports to EU,
𝑒 = ln of U.S. imports from EU,
= ln of U.S. exports to
foreign country,
= ln of U.S. imports from foreign country,
= S.E. of equation. Source: See, Table 1.
15 | www.ijbms.net
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Variables
𝑤
𝑤
𝑗
𝑗
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------***
0.372
-0.136**
0.085
0.285***
0.244***
1 0.855
(0.070)
(0.337)
(0.058)
(0.065)
(0.050)
(0.066)
-0.064
-0.104*
-0.505
0.138***
0.394***
2 0.013
(0.093)
(0.447)
(0.056)
(0.062)
(0.051)
(0.068)
*
**
***
-0.119
0.432
-0.066
0.027
0.113
0.274
3
(0.070)
(0.336)
(0.058)
(0.065)
(0.049)
(0.065)
0.402***
0.069
-0.103***
0.593***
0.580***
1 -0.118
(0.014)
(0.070)
(0.052)
(0.058)
(0.038)
(0.051)
-0.085
-0.200***
0.159**
0.060
0.096*
2 0.013
(0.017)
(0.080)
(0.058)
(0.064)
(0.042)
(0.056)
0.255***
-0.062*
0.198***
0.039
0.146***
3 -0.007
(0.015)
(0.072)
(0.050)
(0.056)
(0.039)
(0.052)
C
-3.090***
-4.339***
-7.824***
-3.379***
-4.497*** -3.888***
(0.898)
(4.331)
(1.645)
(1.827)
(0.865)
(1.149)
0.153***
0.224***
0.607**
0.886***
0.093
0.905*
(0.097)
(0.469)
(0.041)
(0.046)
(0.219)
(0.291)
0.568*** -0.580
0.447***
0.822***
-0.148*
-0.001
(0.134)
(0.646)
(0.145)
(0.161)
(0.087)
(0.116)
0.986*** -0.178
0.653***
0.320*
0.710***
-0.040
(0.095)
(0.460)
(0.159)
(0.178)
(0.218)
(0.290)
-0.883*** 0.369
-0.413*
-0.099
-0.335
0.262
1
(0.159)
(0.767)
(0.256)
(0.285)
(0.358)
(0.475)
0.225
0.364
-0.257
0.186
-0.277
-0.922**
2
(0.172)
(0.830)
(0.257)
(0.286)
(0.369)
(0.491)
0.019
-1.009
0.010
-0.567**
0.120
1.020**
3
(0.158)
(0.761)
(0.257)
(0.286)
(0.371)
(0.492)
0.025
0.679
-0.103
0.031
-0.013
-0.298
4
(0.137)
(0.662)
(0.253)
(0.282)
(0.372)
(0.494)
0.068
0.102
0.427*
0.551**
0.428
0.233
5
(0.136)
(0.655)
(0.252)
(0.280)
(0.372)
(0.494)
-0.066
-0.818
-0.230
-0.225
-0.457
0.049
6
(0.136)
(0.653)
(0.253)
(0.281)
(0.370)
(0.491)
-0.107
0.691
0.090
-0.065
0.026
-0.026
7
(0.137)
(0.660)
(0.253)
(0.281)
(0.368)
(0.488)
0.082
-1.032*
-0.225
-0.232
0.055
0.290
8
(0.137)
(0.659)
(0.250)
(0.277)
(0.355)
(0.471)
-0.016
0.578
0.233
0.349**
0.060
-0.363
9
(0.092)
(0.442)
(0.156)
(0.173)
(0.217)
(0.288)
R2
0.993
0.936
0.755
0.728
0.930
0.895
0.030
0.144
0.070
0.078
0.107
0.143
1,728.493
166.034
59.269
51.543
285.422
182.242
N
223
223
365
365
404
404
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 2b: VAR Estimates of Eq. (13): Effects of Terms of Trade on Exports and Imports
Note: See, Tables 1 and 2a.
𝑤 = ln of U.S. exports to Switzerland,
𝑤 = ln of U.S. imports from Switzerland,
𝑗=
ln of U.S. exports to Japan, ,
𝑗 = ln of U.S. imports from Japan,
= ln of U.S. exports to Australia,
= ln of U.S.
imports from Australia. Source: See, Table 1.
16 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Variables
Level (y), I(0)
1st Difference [Δ(y)], I(1)
2nd Difference [Δ2(y)], I(2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LUSXEU
-3.162041**
LUSMEU
-0.792457
-3.978001***
USTAEU
-0.368738
-6.092984***
LUSRGDP
-1.640910
-8.998455***
LEUGDP
-1.179551
-19.40762***
LEUHICP
-1.904826
-17.22646***
LUSCPI
-6.418572***
LEUS
-1.777332
-13.57573***
TOTEU
-1.080653
-14.11127***
LUSXM
LUSMM
USTAM
LMGDP
LMCPI
LMS
TOTM
-2.322441
-1.768286
-2.435575
-1.433629
-2.780290*
-3.344312**
-2.419574
-6.206835***
-7.132625***
-23.69309***
-18.77435***
LUSXC
LUSMC
USTAC
LCGDP
LCCPI
LCS1
TOTC
-1.946904
-2.684839*
-1.590967
0.014997
-5.805180***
-2.001353
-0.909630
-5.867487***
LUSXUK
LUSMUK
USTAUK
LUKGDP
LUKCPI
LUKS
TOTUK
-2.243627
-3.555911***
-3.150286**
-0.193334
-4.177993***
-2.595632*
-2.768019*
LUSXSW1
LUSMSW
USTASW
LSWGDP
LSWCPI
LSWS1
TOTSW
-0.473440
-0.067195
-0.052968
-2.553187
-1.973128
-2.461943
-2.867018*
-21.59019***
-8.564824***
-8.949051***
-4.847784***
-2.481234
-18.79962***
LUSXJ
LUSMJ
USTAJ
LJGDP1
LJCPI
LJS1
TOTJ
-2.472834
-4.129341***
-3.926427***
-4.526552***
-4.305581***
-2.137365
-1.499921
-6.908138***
-12.25298***
-8.307771***
-22.15808***
-20.55438***
-22.28565***
-5.865940***
-19.70102***
-15.55943***
-17.69212***
-14.12346***
LUSXA
-2.791847*
LUSMA
-1.653819
-13.85459***
***
USTAA
-5.031164
LAGDP
-3.569385***
LACPI
-1.853885
-4.057147***
LAS
-1950877
-17.77384***
TOTA
-2.239219
-13.78797***
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 3: Unit Root Tests Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Note: See Tables 1, 2a, and 2b. Source: See, Table 1.
17 | www.ijbms.net
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hypothesized
Trace
5% Critical
Maximum
Max-Eig 5% Critical
No. of CEs
Eigenvalue
Statistic
Value
Eigenvalue
Statistic
Value
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXEU and LUSMEU
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.265
66.682
15.495
0.265
57.936
14.265
1
0.045
8.746
3.841
0.045
8.746
3.841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXM and LUSMM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.210
98.721
15.495
0.210
75.391
14.265
1
0.071
23.330
3.841
0.071
23.330
3.841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXC and LUSMC
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.124
83.541
15.495
0.124
63.315
14.265
1
0.041
20.226
3.841
0.041
20.226
3.841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXUK and LUSMUK
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.076
48.669
15.495
0.076
26.932
14.265
1
0.062
21.738
3.841
0.062
21.738
3.841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXSW1 and LUSMSW
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.139
48.938
15.495
0.139
33.245
14.265
1
0.068
15.694
3.841
0.068
15.694
3.841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXJ and LUSMJ
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.127
72.793
15.495
0.127
49.465
14.265
1
0.062
23.328
3.841
0.062
23.328
3.841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Series: LUSXA and LUSMA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0.114
72.273
15.495
0.114
48.853
14.265
1
0.056
23.420
3.841
0.056
23.420
3.841
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4: Johansen Cointegration Test for the VAR Estimates of Eq. (13): Effects of Terms of Trade on Exports and
Imports
Note: Trace tests indicate 2 cointegrating eigenvalues at the 1% level. Max-Eigenvalue tests indicate 2 cointegrating
eigenvalues at the 1% level. Source: See, Table 1.
-.1
-.2
-.3
-.4
-.5
-.6
-.7
-.8
2006
2008
2010
2012
USTAEUF
2014
2016
2018
2020
2018
2020
± 2 S.E.
Fore ca s t: USTAEUF
Actua l : USTAEU
Fore ca s t s a mpl e : 1970M01 2021M12
Adjus te d s a mpl e : 2004M12 2020M12
I ncl ude d obs e rva ti ons : 193
Root Me a n Squa re d Error 0.079504
Me a n Abs ol ute Error
0.063818
Me a n Abs . Pe rce nt Error
16.66371
The i l Ine qua l i ty Coe f.
0.089520
Bi a s Proporti on
0.000042
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.182043
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.817915
The i l U2 Coe ffi ci e nt
0.959980
Symme tri c MAPE
15.44461
.016
.012
.008
.004
.000
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Foreca s t of Va ri a nce
18 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
Graph A1a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with EU and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXEU to Innovations
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXEU
7
8
9
10
LUSMEU
Response of LUSMEU to Innovations
.06
.05
.04
.03
.02
.01
.00
-.01
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXEU
7
8
9
10
LUSMEU
Graph A1b: Response of Trade with EU to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are increasing until the 4th month and exports are falling; then, TA in the S-R and it improved TA after the 5th
month.
.4
.2
.0
-.2
-.4
-.6
-.8
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
USTAMXF
10
12
14
16
18
20
14
16
18
20
± 2 S.E.
Fore ca s t: USTAMXF
Actua l : USTAMX
Fore ca s t s a mpl e : 1970M01 2022M12
Adjus te d s a mpl e : 1994M08 2021M02
I ncl ude d obs e rva ti ons : 319
Root Me a n Squa re d Error 0.078442
Me a n Abs ol ute Error
0.065058
Me a n Abs . Pe rce nt Error
279.0898
The i l I ne qua l i ty Coe f.
0.130340
Bi a s Proporti on
0.042989
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.314878
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.642133
The i l U2 Coe ffi ci e nt
0.334571
Symme tri c MAPE
24.74582
.05
.04
.03
.02
.01
.00
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
Fore ca s t of Va ri a nce
Graph A2a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with Mexico and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
19 | www.ijbms.net
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXMX to Innovations
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXMX
7
8
9
10
LUSMMX
Response of LUSMMX to Innovations
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXMX
7
8
9
10
LUSMMX
Graph A2b: Response of Trade with Mexico to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are increasing until the 2th month and exports are falling; then, TA in the S-R and it improved TA after the 4th
month.
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1.0
1985
1990
1995
2000
USTACF
2005
2010
2015
2020
2015
2020
± 2 S.E.
Foreca s t: USTACF
Actua l : USTAC
Foreca s t s a mpl e: 1970M01 2021M12
Adjus ted s a mpl e: 1981M03 2020M12
Incl uded obs erva ti ons : 478
Root Mea n Squa re d Error 0.081895
Mea n Abs ol ute Error
0.063303
Mea n Abs . Percent Error 76.89202
The i l Inequa l i ty Coe f.
0.156415
Bi a s Proporti on
0.013396
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.112070
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.874534
The i l U2 Coe ffi ci e nt
2.312241
Symme tri c MAPE
34.87563
.05
.04
.03
.02
.01
.00
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Foreca s t of Vari ance
Graph A3a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with Canada and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
20 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXC to Innovations
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXC
7
8
9
10
9
10
LUSMC
Response of LUSMC to Innovations
.07
.06
.05
.04
.03
.02
.01
.00
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXC
7
8
LUSMC
Graph A3b: Response of Trade with Canada to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are increasing until the 4th month and exports are falling; then, TA and it improved TA after the 5th month.
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
1990
1995
2000
2005
USTAUKF
2010
2015
2020
2015
2020
± 2 S.E.
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
.00
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Foreca s t of Vari ance
21 | www.ijbms.net
Foreca s t: USTAUKF
Actua l : USTAUK
Foreca s t s a mpl e: 1970M01 2021M12
Adjus ted s a mpl e: 1990M01 2020M12
Incl uded obs erva ti ons : 372
Root Mea n Squa re d Error 0.178658
Mea n Abs ol ute Error
0.142901
Mea n Abs . Percent Error 400.0042
The i l Inequa l i ty Coe f.
0.568043
Bi a s Proporti on
0.003260
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.562733
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.434007
The i l U2 Coe ffi ci e nt
0.389606
Symme tri c MAPE
113.3731
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
Graph A4a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with U.K. and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXUK to Innovations
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXUK
7
8
9
10
LUSMUK
Response of LUSMUK to Innovations
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
1
2
3
4
5
LUSXUK
6
7
8
9
10
LUSMUK
Graph A4b: Response of Trade with U.K. to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are increasing until the 4th month and exports are falling; then, TA and it improved TA after the 5th month.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
18
20
16
18
20
± 2 S.E.
USTASWF
Foreca s t: USTASWF
Actua l : USTASW
Foreca s t s a mpl e: 1970M01 2021M12
Adjus ted s a mpl e: 2002M07 2021M02
Incl uded obs erva ti ons : 224
Root Mea n Squa red Error 0.229648
Mea n Abs ol ute Error
0.138710
Mea n Abs . Percent Error 3.981089
Thei l Inequa l i ty Coef.
0.029612
Bi a s Proporti on
0.052476
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.195942
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.751582
Thei l U2 Coeffi ci ent
1.741872
Symmetri c MAPE
3.744889
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.4
0.0
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
Forecas t of Variance
Graph A5a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with Switzerland and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
22 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXSW1 to Innovations
.04
.03
.02
.01
.00
-.01
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXSW1
7
8
9
10
LUSMSW
Response of LUSMSW to Innovations
.150
.125
.100
.075
.050
.025
.000
1
2
3
4
5
LUSXSW1
6
7
8
9
10
LUSMSW
Graph A5b: Response of Trade with Switzerland to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are flat and exports are falling; then, TA and it improved TA after the 9th month.
0.4
0.0
-0.4
-0.8
-1.2
-1.6
1995
2000
2005
USTAJF
2010
2015
2020
2015
2020
± 2 S.E.
.14
.12
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
1995
2000
2005
2010
Foreca s t of Vari ance
23 | www.ijbms.net
Foreca s t: USTAJF
Actua l : USTAJ
Foreca s t s a mpl e: 1970M01 2021M12
Adjus ted s a mpl e: 1990M08 2021M02
Incl uded obs erva ti ons : 367
Root Mea n Squa re d Error 0.122846
Mea n Abs ol ute Error
0.096594
Mea n Abs . Percent Error 18.66876
The i l Inequa l i ty Coe f.
0.096303
Bi a s Proporti on
0.015434
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.762221
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.222344
The i l U2 Coe ffi ci e nt
1.441667
Symme tri c MAPE
16.12030
International Journal of Business & Management Studies
ISSN 2694-1430 (Print), 2694-1449 (Online)
Graph A6a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with Japan and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXJ to Innovations
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXJ
7
8
9
10
9
10
LUSMJ
Response of LUSMJ to Innovations
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
LUSXJ
6
7
8
LUSMJ
Graph A6b: Response of Trade with Japan to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are increasing until the 4th month and exports are falling; then, TA and it improved TA after the 5th month.
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
1990
1995
2000
2005
USTAAF
2010
2015
2020
2015
2020
± 2 S.E.
Foreca s t: USTAAF
Actua l : USTAA
Foreca s t s a mpl e: 1970M01 2021M12
Adjus ted s a mpl e: 1987M07 2021M02
Incl uded obs erva ti ons : 404
Root Mea n Squa re d Error 0.223410
Mea n Abs ol ute Error
0.167498
Mea n Abs . Percent Error 24.93902
The i l Inequa l i ty Coe f.
0.124275
Bi a s Proporti on
0.038833
Va ri a nce Proporti on
0.450409
Cova ri a nce Proporti on 0.510758
The i l U2 Coe ffi ci e nt
0.427426
Symme tri c MAPE
19.40256
.30
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
.00
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Foreca s t of Vari ance
Graph A7a: Forecasting of U.S. Trade with Australia and its Variance [Eq. (9)]
24 | Trade Deficit and Currency Devaluation- Testing the J-Curve: Dr. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis et al.
Vol. 03 - Issue: 12/December_2022
©Institute for Promoting Research & Policy Development
DOI: 10.56734/ijbms.v3n12a1
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations
Response of LUSXA to Innovations
.12
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
.00
-.02
1
2
3
4
5
6
LUSXA
7
8
9
10
9
10
LUSMA
Response of LUSMA to Innovations
.16
.12
.08
.04
.00
-.04
1
2
3
4
5
LUSXA
6
7
8
LUSMA
Graph A7b: Response of Trade with Australia to Cholesky Innovations Eq. (13)
Note: Imports are increasing until the 4th month and exports are falling; then, TA and it improved TA after the 5th month.
25 | www.ijbms.net