In W. Christensen, E. Schier, & J. Sutton (eds), ASCS09: proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, pp.131-134, 2010
Experimental memory research has traditionally focused on the individual, and viewed social influ... more Experimental memory research has traditionally focused on the individual, and viewed social influence as a source of error or inhibition. However, in everyday life, remembering is often a social activity, and theories from philosophy and psychology predict benefits of shared remembering. In a series of studies, both experimental and more qualitative, we attempted to bridge this gap by examining the effects of collaboration on memory in a variety of situations and in a variety of groups. We discuss our results in terms of a functional view of collaborative remembering, and consider when and in what ways remembering with others might help or hinder memory.
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Papers by Celia Harris
psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical
debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for
extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which
neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary
properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the
nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive
complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as
“a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as
the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous
systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich
middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism.
Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the
“scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for
understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological
and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary”
metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external
resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or
transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical
results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin.
We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of
memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of
collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical
research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for
mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended,
embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact
with independentlymotivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.
psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical
debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for
extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which
neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary
properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the
nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive
complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as
“a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as
the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous
systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich
middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism.
Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the
“scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for
understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological
and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary”
metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external
resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or
transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical
results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin.
We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of
memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of
collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical
research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for
mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended,
embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact
with independentlymotivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.
individuals. We review evidence from a maturing program of empirical research in which we adopted the lens of distributed cognition to gain new insights into the ways that remembering might be shared in groups. Across four studies, we examined shared remembering in intimate couples. We studied their collaboration on more simple memory tasks as well as their conversations about shared past experiences. We also asked
them about their everyday memory compensation strategies in order to investigate the complex ways that couples may coordinate their material and interpersonal resources. We discuss our research in terms of the costs and benefits of shared remembering, features of the group and features of the remembering task that influence the outcomes of shared remembering, the cognitive and interpersonal functions of shared
remembering, and the interaction between social and material resources. More broadly, this interdisciplinary research program suggests the potential for empirical psychology research to contribute to ongoing interdisciplinary discussions of distributed cognition.
turn taking and consensus. First, 135 individuals learned a word list and recalled it alone (Recall 1). Then, 45 participants in three-member groups took turns to recall, 45 participants in three-member groups reached a consensus, and 45 participants recalled alone but were analysed as three-member nominal groups (Recall 2). Finally, all participants recalled alone (Recall 3). Both turn-taking and consensus groups demonstrated the usual pattern of costs during collaboration and benefits after collaboration in terms of recall completeness. However, consensus groups, and not turn-taking groups, demonstrated clear benefits in terms of recall accuracy, both during and after collaboration. Consensus groups engaged in beneficial group source-monitoring processes. Our findings challenge assumptions about the negative consequences of social remembering."