Books by Wojciech Brzozowski
A free sample taken from the published work.
The objective of the book is to review and clarify the normative content of the principle of impa... more The objective of the book is to review and clarify the normative content of the principle of impartiality of public authorities in matters of personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life (Article 25 (2) of The Constitution of the Republic of Poland). In order to meet this objective, the principle of impartiality has been examined in the context of other constitutional regulations and in light of selected implications of the theory of law.
The book consists of four chapters, each focusing on a particular issue. Its main assumption is that the principle of impartiality of public authorities in matters of personal conviction can be applied not merely to religious convictions but also to other convictions in relation to outlooks on life. This principle is valid only if impartiality is interpreted as neutrality.
Furthermore, the author attempts to codify the key concepts and terms within the law on religious denominations, used in the description of the constitutional model of the relations between the Church and the State.
Papers by Wojciech Brzozowski
Jean Monnet Working Paper 07, 2023
Covid-19 Containment Policies in Europe, 2024
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego, 2024
PL: Prawo do zmiany wyznania obejmuje dwa uprawnienia szczegółowe: prawo do przystąpienia do wspó... more PL: Prawo do zmiany wyznania obejmuje dwa uprawnienia szczegółowe: prawo do przystąpienia do wspólnoty religijnej oraz prawo do wystąpienia z niej. Pierwsze z tych uprawnień wymaga, aby zgodna wola jednostki i grupy religijnej była warunkiem koniecznym i zarazem wystarczającym do nawiązania stosunku członkostwa. Tak rozumiane uprawnienie na ogół nie budzi kontrowersji i jest respektowane w praktyce, natomiast wykonywanie prawa wystąpienia ze związku wyznaniowego napotyka nieraz trudności. Wynikają one z pozostawienia tej materii do unormowania w systemach prawa wewnętrznego związków wyznaniowych, co skutkuje rozproszeniem regulacji, nierównym traktowaniem i niedostatkiem gwarancji proceduralnych. Sytuację znacznie poprawiłoby uregulowanie procedury wystąpienia ze związku wyznaniowego w prawie państwowym. W tym celu jednak trzeba odróżnić od siebie członkostwo w wymiarze duchowym i w wymiarze prawnym. W opracowaniu przeprowadzono analizę formalno-dogmatyczną uwzględniającą standard strasburski, praktykę orzeczniczą organów krajowych i dyskusję doktrynalną.
EN: The right to change religion comprises two sub-rights: the right to join a religious community and the right to withdraw from it. The former requires that the consent of the individual and the religious group be a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing membership. Such a right is generally uncontroversial and respected in practice, whereas the right to leave a religious association is sometimes difficult to exercise. This is due to the fact that this matter is left to be determined by the internal laws of religious associations, resulting in fragmented regulation, unequal treatment, and insufficient procedural guarantees. The situation could be significantly improved by regulating the procedure for leaving a religious association in state law. However, a distinction must be made between the spiritual and legal dimensions of membership. The article is based on doctrinal research involving the Strasbourg requirements, national case law, and existing legal scholarship.
Przegląd Konstytucyjny, 2023
The chilling effect is a real threat to freedom of expression and unfettered public debate. It oc... more The chilling effect is a real threat to freedom of expression and unfettered public debate. It occurs when, as a result of the conduct of public authorities, an individual decides to refrain from freely exercising his or her rights, even though they have not been formally restricted or taken away. This self-restraint is caused by fear of the negative consequences of freely exercising one’s rights, which leads the individual to calculate whether the action in question, although formally lawful, is cost-effective. Such a fear should be real and therefore at least substantiated by objective factors. The account is less obvious if the renunciation of the exercise of rights is based on a threat that is unreal or vague. In legal discourse, the chilling effect is also identified, not necessarily correctly, in different contexts. First, it is sometimes recognised in cases of pressure by political authorities on independent judges. Second, it is claimed in relations between non-state actors, especially between government-sponsored private agencies that launch smear campaigns against political opponents, or between internet platforms and their users. Such use of the chilling effect doctrine may be intellectually appealing, but ultimately dilutes its meaning. It is much easier to identify a chilling effect when it is assumed to be the consequence of a flaw in the design of a legal provision than when it is alleged to result from acts of application of the law. In the latter case, the concept of chilling effect seems to serve two main purposes: the criticism of bad practices on the part of public actors, and the strengthening of the persuasiveness of judicial decisions that employ the concept. Its usefulness for legal analysis is therefore limited.
in: Zagadnienia prawa konstytucyjnego. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Krzysztofowi Skotnickiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin. Tom 1, edited by Aldona Domańska, Łódź, 2023
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego, 2023
W dotychczasowej literaturze na temat autonomii związków wyznaniowych nie poświęcono wiele uwagi ... more W dotychczasowej literaturze na temat autonomii związków wyznaniowych nie poświęcono wiele uwagi normatywnemu charakterowi konstrukcji przyjętej w Konstytucji RP, w tym stosunkowi zasady autonomii do wolności myśli, sumienia i religii. Artykuł zmierza do wykazania, że na gruncie Konstytucji RP autonomię związku wyznaniowego należy rozumieć zarówno jako zasadę ustrojową, jak i prawo podmiotowe. Prawo do autonomii nie ma charakteru absolutnego i może podlegać ograniczeniom, jednak im bliższy jest związek regulowanego przez prawo obszaru autonomii ze sferą tożsamości duchowej danej wspólnoty, tym węższy jest dopuszczalny zakres ingerencji. Ochronę najbardziej wrażliwym przejawom korzystania z autonomii religijnej zapewnia konstytucyjny zakaz naruszania istoty wolności i praw.
in: Prawo i kultura. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Wąsowiczowi, edited by Jarosław Kuisz, Anna Rosner, Warszawa, 2022
Artykuł poświęcony jest koncepcji demokracji otwartej, sformułowanej i rozwiniętej przez Hélène L... more Artykuł poświęcony jest koncepcji demokracji otwartej, sformułowanej i rozwiniętej przez Hélène Landemore w książce o tym samym tytule. Celem opracowania jest opatrzenie koncepcji demokracji otwartej krytycznym komentarzem i ocena szans na jej realizację w praktyce.
Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, 2020
RESUMEN: El curso de la lucha contra la pandemia del COVID-19 en Polonia fue determinado en mucho... more RESUMEN: El curso de la lucha contra la pandemia del COVID-19 en Polonia fue determinado en muchos aspectos por las condiciones locales. Se puede considerar la hipótesis de que los estrechos vínculos del partido gobernante con la Iglesia Católica Romana mitigaron la posible oposición a las restricciones que afectaban a la libertad religiosa. Las autoridades polacas reaccionaron a la pandemia de manera rápida, pero caótica e inconsistente. El problema principal ha sido y sigue siendo el de las deficiencias formales de la legislación, resultantes de la introducción de restricciones profundas de los derechos y libertades mediante reglamento en vez de por una ley ordinaria. La posición oficial de las asociaciones religiosas frente a la amenaza epidemiológica merece reconocimiento. Cabe destacar que ninguna de las principales comunidades religiosas ha cuestionado abiertamente la necesidad de luchar contra la pandemia, y algunas de ellas han mostrado gran compromiso. El efecto más probable de la pandemia en el futuro parece ser la reapertura del debate sobre la reforma del sistema de financiación de las comunidades religiosas en Polonia.
ABSTRACT: The course of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland was in many ways determined by local conditions. It can be assumed that the ruling party's close ties with the Roman Catholic Church mitigated possible opposition to restrictions affecting religious freedom. The Polish authorities reacted to the pandemic quickly, but in a chaotic and inconsistent manner. The main problem has been, and continues to be, formal deficiencies of the legislation resulting from the introduction of severe restrictions of rights and freedoms by means of executive regulation rather than by ordinary law. The official position of religious associations in the face of the epidemiological threat deserves recognition. It should be noted that none of the major religious communities has openly questioned the need to fight the pandemic, and some of them have shown great commitment. The most likely effect of the pandemic in the future appears to be the reopening of the debate on the reform of the system of financing religious communities in Poland.
in: Człowiek – państwo – Kościół. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Księdzu Profesorowi Arturowi Mezglewskiemu, edited by Paweł Sobczyk & Piotr Steczkowski, Lublin, 2020
EN: The aim of this paper is to offer a critical appraisal of the Strasbourg case-law on religiou... more EN: The aim of this paper is to offer a critical appraisal of the Strasbourg case-law on religious education in the public education system. The child’s right to education and their freedom of religion or belief, as well as the right of the parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions, should be the guiding principles in this regard. In the view of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to manifest religion in teaching does not entail an obligation of the State to provide religious education in public schools. This may be seen as a consequence of a more general rule, according to which the planning of the curriculum falls within the competence of the domestic authorities. Nonetheless, most Member States of the Council of Europe offer religious education as a separate school subject, and this usually takes one of two forms: integrated religious studies or parallel instruction in specific religions. While the States are free to opt for either of these models, it is their obligation to ensure that the knowledge of religions be conveyed in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner, since the Convention affords the protection against religious indoctrination by the State. However indisputable in theory, these principles have given rise to some controversy with regard to the pattern of scrutiny employed by the Court in religious education cases. This pattern, which involves a very detailed analysis of the curriculum, appears to contradict the Court’s declarations that the States enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation in this respect. Surprisingly, the most recent developments in the Strasbourg case-law may be a sign of the Court’s willingness to depart from the established approach.
PL: Celem opracowania jest dokonanie krytycznej analizy orzecznictwa strasburskiego dotyczącego nauczania religii w ramach publicznego systemu oświaty. Zasadami przewodnimi w odniesieniu do tej materii powinny być prawo dziecka do nauki oraz jego wolność myśli, sumienia i religii, a także prawo rodziców do poszanowania ich poglądów religijnych i filozoficznych. Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka stoi na stanowisku, że z prawa do uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych w drodze nauczania nie wynika obowiązek państwa zapewnienia nauczania religii w szkole publicznej. Można w tym twierdzeniu dostrzegać konsekwencję ogólniejszej zasady, zgodnie z którą tworzenie programu nauczania należy do kompetencji władz krajowych. Mimo to w większości państw członkowskich Rady Europy religia jest nauczana jako osobny przedmiot szkolny, przy czym stosowane jest na ogół jedno z dwóch rozwiązań modelowych – albo zintegrowane nauczanie o różnych religiach, albo równoległe kursy poświęcone poszczególnym religiom. Państwo ma swobodę w kwestii wyboru jednego z tych rozwiązań, jednak musi zapewnić, że wiedza o religii będzie przekazywana z zachowaniem wymagań obiektywizmu, krytycyzmu i pluralizmu, jako że Konwencja zapewnia ochronę przed indoktrynacją religijną ze strony państwa. Choć zasady te wydają się trudne do zakwestionowania w teorii, oparty na nich schemat badania przez Trybunał treści kształcenia w sprawach z zakresu edukacji religijnej okazał się źródłem kontrowersji. Schemat ten, zakładający bardzo drobiazgową analizę programu nauczania, wydaje się podważać twierdzenie o korzystaniu przez państwa ze znacznego marginesu oceny w tym obszarze. Co zaskakujące, bieżący rozwój strasburskiej linii orzeczniczej może zapowiadać zamiar odejścia Trybunału od ustabilizowanego podejścia.
in: Konstytucjonalizm polski. Refleksje z okazji jubileuszu 70-lecia urodzin i 45-lecia pracy naukowej Profesora Andrzeja Szmyta, edited by A. Gajda, K. Grajewski, A. Rytel-Warzocha, P. Uziębło, M.M. Wiszowaty, Gdańsk, 2020
The idea of State secularity—which needs to be distinguished from secularism—has never been easil... more The idea of State secularity—which needs to be distinguished from secularism—has never been easily accepted in Poland. The main reasons for that are the Polish experiences from the past, such as the traditionally strong position of the Roman Catholic Church and the episode of anti-religious oppression under communist rule, as well as the religious composition of the society, marked with the predominance of Roman Catholicism. This explains why the makers of the Polish Constitution of 1997, while adopting all the key features of the secular State, decided to avoid terms already known to the legal science; as a result, independence was mentioned instead of separation and impartiality instead of neutrality. However, using innovative terminology has its price, as it opens the Constitution to many conflicting interpretations, some of them being rather hostile to the idea of State secularity. Over the years, the constitutional practice has revealed a strong tendency to depart from that model by questioning the Polish secularity and/or adding more and more exceptions to it. The question remains open whether at some point the exceptions can annihilate the rule.
Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 2019
The current EU migration crisis has confronted Europe with the need to manage an unprecedented in... more The current EU migration crisis has confronted Europe with the need to manage an unprecedented influx of refugees and migrants, many of whom report Islamic religious identity. Not only have these recent developments brought about numerous acts of hostility and discrimination motivated by religious hatred, but they also seem to jeopardize, in the long run, inter-religious dialogue in Europe. The conflicts which result from this unexpected, and often unwanted, meeting of people with different cultural and religious background have revived or strengthened doubts about Islam being compatible with European identity.
The actual concern is whether following the rules of Islam in everyday life (e.g. wearing of religious clothing and symbols, respecting gender equality, exercising parental rights) can be reconciled with the Western standards of human rights. The aim of the presentation is to address this question from the legal perspective. Unsurprisingly, it is not a new question, and it has been examined on many occasions—though rarely in an open manner—by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and other standard making bodies in the European legal space. This standard seems to be evolving, slowly and not in one direction, gaining some growing scholarly attention recently.
As regards the Islamic legal order, it has been clear, at least since the ECtHR judgment in the case of Refah Partisi (2003), that the concept of Sharia law is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy. Applying some of Sharia rules by individuals in the private sphere may be permissible as part of their freedom to observe the precepts of their religion, but it should not be endorsed or enforced by the state. However, the recent relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber in a case concerning the application of Sharia law by a state court to an inheritance dispute between Greek citizens belonging to the Muslim minority suggests that this traditional view may soon be challenged.
Not less surprising is the recent ECtHR judgment in the case of Hamidović (2017), in which a violation of freedom of religion or belief has been found on account of the punishment of a witness for refusing to remove his Islamic skullcap while giving evidence before a criminal court. Even though the ECtHR declared that the case of Hamidović is completely different from the cases concerning the wearing of religious symbols and clothing in the workplace, it is hard not to see this judgment as a breakthrough in the Court’s case-law as regards the accommodation of Islamic religious practice.
At the same time, the interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights seems to be well-established, and therefore continuously applied, regarding the admissibility of ban on concealment of one’s face in public places motivated by religion. This practice, which is often considered to be at odds which such values as dignity, liberty and gender equality—or even openly hostile to women’s rights—may be prohibited by domestic authorities. Unfortunately for the ECtHR, the application in the case of S.A.S. (2014), which brought such findings, was made by a woman whose arguments and willingness to find a compromise did not make it easy to dismiss her claims for accommodation as clearly incompatible with the European values.
In the end, however, it is not only about Islamic practice being accommodated by the European standard makers. The question remains open if the idea of European identity itself needs to be transformed, redefining secularity and reflecting social changes in Europe.
Religious convictions are not, as such, relevant grounds for disqualification of a judge from hea... more Religious convictions are not, as such, relevant grounds for disqualification of a judge from hearing or deciding a case. Judges enjoy religious freedom just as any other freedom protected by the [Polish] Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. However, a judge should refrain from hearing a case if they feel unable to control their emotions based on religious views or if their presiding over a case could cause detriment to the image of impartiality of the judiciary. Also, religious convictions of a judge may provide sufficient grounds for disqualification if a judge discharges their duties with favouritism or prejudice based on religion, e.g. makes inappropriate comments concerning religious affiliation (or lack thereof) of a party or behaves in an excessively attentive manner towards members of the clergy involved in the case being heard.
In the judgment of 7 October 2015 (Ref. No. K 12/14) the Polish Constitutional Tribunal assessed ... more In the judgment of 7 October 2015 (Ref. No. K 12/14) the Polish Constitutional Tribunal assessed the statutory provision granting physicians the right to conscientious objection. According to the Tribunal, that right stems directly from the concept of religious freedom and it has been acknowledged on an international level, including the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Tribunal also stated that the right to refrain from performing a medical service against one’s conscience did not even need to be confirmed in a statute in order to be applicable. It appears, however, that the Tribunal’s findings about the Strasbourg case-law are unfounded and misleading. While the European Court of Human Rights accepts the right to conscientious objection to military service, it has been reluctant to extend this right to a wider range of situations. In addition, the Constitutional Tribunal declared unconstitutional the obligation of a physician to inform the patient seeking a particular medical service about the possibility of receiving that service from another physician or in another institution. As a result, patients’ rights to health care in this regard were left unprotected.
It seems very likely that the Polish constitutional debate launched by President Andrzej Duda las... more It seems very likely that the Polish constitutional debate launched by President Andrzej Duda last year will be dominated by the view that the Constitution of 1997 should be replaced with a new one. If that opinion wins, there is a risk that the new constitution will be used to strengthen and consolidate the distorted model of relations between public authorities which came as a result of the recent constitutional crisis. However, this does not necessarily mean that questioning that model should make one an uncritical supporter of the Constitution of 1997, as many of its deficiencies are real and need to be fixed.
The paper discusses some constitutional deficiencies which are rarely examined in the Polish legal debate, such as: excessive openness of the constitutional text, which may result in a ‘hostile takeover’ of its interpretation; declaring that a matter shall be regulated by a statute without imposing any requirements concerning the scope of such a regulation; expecting the public authorities to cooperate in situations in which conflict is more profitable in political terms; lacking clear and uniform standards as to when a term of office can be cut short; constitutional ‘dead ends’, i.e. incomplete legal mechanisms which may lead to a political chaos.
The constitution can be breached in many ways, from minor infringements to flagrant violations. H... more The constitution can be breached in many ways, from minor infringements to flagrant violations. How serious a violation is depends on two factors: (i) the importance of a violated norm in the structure of the constitution; (ii) the intensity of the violation (the range of consequences following from that norm, yet eliminated by an unconstitutional act or action). (Ad i) Even though constitutional norms are not arranged in a hierarchical order, some of them need to be respected together so that a particular goal set by the constitution can be achieved. If the principle of judicial independence is not respected, such a violation affects not only that principle but also the way in which the courts perform their constitutional tasks. If an authorised state body refuses, against the constitution, to exercise its right to appoint another body, such an action violates a provision determining the appointment procedure, but also leads to the shutdown of the latter body and ‘deactivates’ the whole set of provisions determining its powers and duties. (Ad ii) Actions taken by a state body may be distant from the pattern desired by the constitution to a lesser or greater extent. An action which is flawed but pursues the right objectives may be simply unconstitutional, while an action which neglects these objectives or even promotes adverse ones is flagrantly unconstitutional. From that perspective, signing a bill one day after the constitutional period has expired is a violation, but it is a less serious one than not signing it at all.
Małżeństwo, życie rodzinne, związki osób tej samej płci -glosa do wyroku ETPCz z 24.06.2010 r. w ... more Małżeństwo, życie rodzinne, związki osób tej samej płci -glosa do wyroku ETPCz z 24.06.2010 r. w sprawie Schalk i Kopf v. Austria Kwestia statusu prawnego związków osób tej samej płci budzi od kilku lat szczególne zainteresowanie opinii publicznej. Niewiele jest chyba materii, w których różnice kulturowe między krajami Starego Kontynentu zaznaczałyby się tak silnie. Najdobitniejszym tego przykładem w praktyce są komplikacje prawne, jakie wiążą się z niejednolitym podejściem państw członkowskich UE do statusu osób pozostających w rejestrowanych związkach partnerskich 1 . Całkowita unifi kacja tej kwestii na szczeblu ponadnarodowym nie wydaje się obecnie prawdopodobna. Rozpoznanie przez Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka (dalej jako ETPCz) zarzutu dyskryminacji osób homoseksualnych w kontekście ich dostępu do instytucji małżeństwa jest więc wydarzeniem szczególnie godnym odnotowania. Ustalenia zawarte w wyroku w sprawie Schalk i Kopf v. Austria 2 kształtują bowiem wspólne standardy obowiązujące w tej mierze w europejskiej przestrzeni prawnej.
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Books by Wojciech Brzozowski
The book consists of four chapters, each focusing on a particular issue. Its main assumption is that the principle of impartiality of public authorities in matters of personal conviction can be applied not merely to religious convictions but also to other convictions in relation to outlooks on life. This principle is valid only if impartiality is interpreted as neutrality.
Furthermore, the author attempts to codify the key concepts and terms within the law on religious denominations, used in the description of the constitutional model of the relations between the Church and the State.
Papers by Wojciech Brzozowski
EN: The right to change religion comprises two sub-rights: the right to join a religious community and the right to withdraw from it. The former requires that the consent of the individual and the religious group be a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing membership. Such a right is generally uncontroversial and respected in practice, whereas the right to leave a religious association is sometimes difficult to exercise. This is due to the fact that this matter is left to be determined by the internal laws of religious associations, resulting in fragmented regulation, unequal treatment, and insufficient procedural guarantees. The situation could be significantly improved by regulating the procedure for leaving a religious association in state law. However, a distinction must be made between the spiritual and legal dimensions of membership. The article is based on doctrinal research involving the Strasbourg requirements, national case law, and existing legal scholarship.
ABSTRACT: The course of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland was in many ways determined by local conditions. It can be assumed that the ruling party's close ties with the Roman Catholic Church mitigated possible opposition to restrictions affecting religious freedom. The Polish authorities reacted to the pandemic quickly, but in a chaotic and inconsistent manner. The main problem has been, and continues to be, formal deficiencies of the legislation resulting from the introduction of severe restrictions of rights and freedoms by means of executive regulation rather than by ordinary law. The official position of religious associations in the face of the epidemiological threat deserves recognition. It should be noted that none of the major religious communities has openly questioned the need to fight the pandemic, and some of them have shown great commitment. The most likely effect of the pandemic in the future appears to be the reopening of the debate on the reform of the system of financing religious communities in Poland.
PL: Celem opracowania jest dokonanie krytycznej analizy orzecznictwa strasburskiego dotyczącego nauczania religii w ramach publicznego systemu oświaty. Zasadami przewodnimi w odniesieniu do tej materii powinny być prawo dziecka do nauki oraz jego wolność myśli, sumienia i religii, a także prawo rodziców do poszanowania ich poglądów religijnych i filozoficznych. Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka stoi na stanowisku, że z prawa do uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych w drodze nauczania nie wynika obowiązek państwa zapewnienia nauczania religii w szkole publicznej. Można w tym twierdzeniu dostrzegać konsekwencję ogólniejszej zasady, zgodnie z którą tworzenie programu nauczania należy do kompetencji władz krajowych. Mimo to w większości państw członkowskich Rady Europy religia jest nauczana jako osobny przedmiot szkolny, przy czym stosowane jest na ogół jedno z dwóch rozwiązań modelowych – albo zintegrowane nauczanie o różnych religiach, albo równoległe kursy poświęcone poszczególnym religiom. Państwo ma swobodę w kwestii wyboru jednego z tych rozwiązań, jednak musi zapewnić, że wiedza o religii będzie przekazywana z zachowaniem wymagań obiektywizmu, krytycyzmu i pluralizmu, jako że Konwencja zapewnia ochronę przed indoktrynacją religijną ze strony państwa. Choć zasady te wydają się trudne do zakwestionowania w teorii, oparty na nich schemat badania przez Trybunał treści kształcenia w sprawach z zakresu edukacji religijnej okazał się źródłem kontrowersji. Schemat ten, zakładający bardzo drobiazgową analizę programu nauczania, wydaje się podważać twierdzenie o korzystaniu przez państwa ze znacznego marginesu oceny w tym obszarze. Co zaskakujące, bieżący rozwój strasburskiej linii orzeczniczej może zapowiadać zamiar odejścia Trybunału od ustabilizowanego podejścia.
The actual concern is whether following the rules of Islam in everyday life (e.g. wearing of religious clothing and symbols, respecting gender equality, exercising parental rights) can be reconciled with the Western standards of human rights. The aim of the presentation is to address this question from the legal perspective. Unsurprisingly, it is not a new question, and it has been examined on many occasions—though rarely in an open manner—by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and other standard making bodies in the European legal space. This standard seems to be evolving, slowly and not in one direction, gaining some growing scholarly attention recently.
As regards the Islamic legal order, it has been clear, at least since the ECtHR judgment in the case of Refah Partisi (2003), that the concept of Sharia law is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy. Applying some of Sharia rules by individuals in the private sphere may be permissible as part of their freedom to observe the precepts of their religion, but it should not be endorsed or enforced by the state. However, the recent relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber in a case concerning the application of Sharia law by a state court to an inheritance dispute between Greek citizens belonging to the Muslim minority suggests that this traditional view may soon be challenged.
Not less surprising is the recent ECtHR judgment in the case of Hamidović (2017), in which a violation of freedom of religion or belief has been found on account of the punishment of a witness for refusing to remove his Islamic skullcap while giving evidence before a criminal court. Even though the ECtHR declared that the case of Hamidović is completely different from the cases concerning the wearing of religious symbols and clothing in the workplace, it is hard not to see this judgment as a breakthrough in the Court’s case-law as regards the accommodation of Islamic religious practice.
At the same time, the interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights seems to be well-established, and therefore continuously applied, regarding the admissibility of ban on concealment of one’s face in public places motivated by religion. This practice, which is often considered to be at odds which such values as dignity, liberty and gender equality—or even openly hostile to women’s rights—may be prohibited by domestic authorities. Unfortunately for the ECtHR, the application in the case of S.A.S. (2014), which brought such findings, was made by a woman whose arguments and willingness to find a compromise did not make it easy to dismiss her claims for accommodation as clearly incompatible with the European values.
In the end, however, it is not only about Islamic practice being accommodated by the European standard makers. The question remains open if the idea of European identity itself needs to be transformed, redefining secularity and reflecting social changes in Europe.
The paper discusses some constitutional deficiencies which are rarely examined in the Polish legal debate, such as: excessive openness of the constitutional text, which may result in a ‘hostile takeover’ of its interpretation; declaring that a matter shall be regulated by a statute without imposing any requirements concerning the scope of such a regulation; expecting the public authorities to cooperate in situations in which conflict is more profitable in political terms; lacking clear and uniform standards as to when a term of office can be cut short; constitutional ‘dead ends’, i.e. incomplete legal mechanisms which may lead to a political chaos.
The book consists of four chapters, each focusing on a particular issue. Its main assumption is that the principle of impartiality of public authorities in matters of personal conviction can be applied not merely to religious convictions but also to other convictions in relation to outlooks on life. This principle is valid only if impartiality is interpreted as neutrality.
Furthermore, the author attempts to codify the key concepts and terms within the law on religious denominations, used in the description of the constitutional model of the relations between the Church and the State.
EN: The right to change religion comprises two sub-rights: the right to join a religious community and the right to withdraw from it. The former requires that the consent of the individual and the religious group be a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing membership. Such a right is generally uncontroversial and respected in practice, whereas the right to leave a religious association is sometimes difficult to exercise. This is due to the fact that this matter is left to be determined by the internal laws of religious associations, resulting in fragmented regulation, unequal treatment, and insufficient procedural guarantees. The situation could be significantly improved by regulating the procedure for leaving a religious association in state law. However, a distinction must be made between the spiritual and legal dimensions of membership. The article is based on doctrinal research involving the Strasbourg requirements, national case law, and existing legal scholarship.
ABSTRACT: The course of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland was in many ways determined by local conditions. It can be assumed that the ruling party's close ties with the Roman Catholic Church mitigated possible opposition to restrictions affecting religious freedom. The Polish authorities reacted to the pandemic quickly, but in a chaotic and inconsistent manner. The main problem has been, and continues to be, formal deficiencies of the legislation resulting from the introduction of severe restrictions of rights and freedoms by means of executive regulation rather than by ordinary law. The official position of religious associations in the face of the epidemiological threat deserves recognition. It should be noted that none of the major religious communities has openly questioned the need to fight the pandemic, and some of them have shown great commitment. The most likely effect of the pandemic in the future appears to be the reopening of the debate on the reform of the system of financing religious communities in Poland.
PL: Celem opracowania jest dokonanie krytycznej analizy orzecznictwa strasburskiego dotyczącego nauczania religii w ramach publicznego systemu oświaty. Zasadami przewodnimi w odniesieniu do tej materii powinny być prawo dziecka do nauki oraz jego wolność myśli, sumienia i religii, a także prawo rodziców do poszanowania ich poglądów religijnych i filozoficznych. Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka stoi na stanowisku, że z prawa do uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych w drodze nauczania nie wynika obowiązek państwa zapewnienia nauczania religii w szkole publicznej. Można w tym twierdzeniu dostrzegać konsekwencję ogólniejszej zasady, zgodnie z którą tworzenie programu nauczania należy do kompetencji władz krajowych. Mimo to w większości państw członkowskich Rady Europy religia jest nauczana jako osobny przedmiot szkolny, przy czym stosowane jest na ogół jedno z dwóch rozwiązań modelowych – albo zintegrowane nauczanie o różnych religiach, albo równoległe kursy poświęcone poszczególnym religiom. Państwo ma swobodę w kwestii wyboru jednego z tych rozwiązań, jednak musi zapewnić, że wiedza o religii będzie przekazywana z zachowaniem wymagań obiektywizmu, krytycyzmu i pluralizmu, jako że Konwencja zapewnia ochronę przed indoktrynacją religijną ze strony państwa. Choć zasady te wydają się trudne do zakwestionowania w teorii, oparty na nich schemat badania przez Trybunał treści kształcenia w sprawach z zakresu edukacji religijnej okazał się źródłem kontrowersji. Schemat ten, zakładający bardzo drobiazgową analizę programu nauczania, wydaje się podważać twierdzenie o korzystaniu przez państwa ze znacznego marginesu oceny w tym obszarze. Co zaskakujące, bieżący rozwój strasburskiej linii orzeczniczej może zapowiadać zamiar odejścia Trybunału od ustabilizowanego podejścia.
The actual concern is whether following the rules of Islam in everyday life (e.g. wearing of religious clothing and symbols, respecting gender equality, exercising parental rights) can be reconciled with the Western standards of human rights. The aim of the presentation is to address this question from the legal perspective. Unsurprisingly, it is not a new question, and it has been examined on many occasions—though rarely in an open manner—by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and other standard making bodies in the European legal space. This standard seems to be evolving, slowly and not in one direction, gaining some growing scholarly attention recently.
As regards the Islamic legal order, it has been clear, at least since the ECtHR judgment in the case of Refah Partisi (2003), that the concept of Sharia law is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy. Applying some of Sharia rules by individuals in the private sphere may be permissible as part of their freedom to observe the precepts of their religion, but it should not be endorsed or enforced by the state. However, the recent relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber in a case concerning the application of Sharia law by a state court to an inheritance dispute between Greek citizens belonging to the Muslim minority suggests that this traditional view may soon be challenged.
Not less surprising is the recent ECtHR judgment in the case of Hamidović (2017), in which a violation of freedom of religion or belief has been found on account of the punishment of a witness for refusing to remove his Islamic skullcap while giving evidence before a criminal court. Even though the ECtHR declared that the case of Hamidović is completely different from the cases concerning the wearing of religious symbols and clothing in the workplace, it is hard not to see this judgment as a breakthrough in the Court’s case-law as regards the accommodation of Islamic religious practice.
At the same time, the interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights seems to be well-established, and therefore continuously applied, regarding the admissibility of ban on concealment of one’s face in public places motivated by religion. This practice, which is often considered to be at odds which such values as dignity, liberty and gender equality—or even openly hostile to women’s rights—may be prohibited by domestic authorities. Unfortunately for the ECtHR, the application in the case of S.A.S. (2014), which brought such findings, was made by a woman whose arguments and willingness to find a compromise did not make it easy to dismiss her claims for accommodation as clearly incompatible with the European values.
In the end, however, it is not only about Islamic practice being accommodated by the European standard makers. The question remains open if the idea of European identity itself needs to be transformed, redefining secularity and reflecting social changes in Europe.
The paper discusses some constitutional deficiencies which are rarely examined in the Polish legal debate, such as: excessive openness of the constitutional text, which may result in a ‘hostile takeover’ of its interpretation; declaring that a matter shall be regulated by a statute without imposing any requirements concerning the scope of such a regulation; expecting the public authorities to cooperate in situations in which conflict is more profitable in political terms; lacking clear and uniform standards as to when a term of office can be cut short; constitutional ‘dead ends’, i.e. incomplete legal mechanisms which may lead to a political chaos.