Books by Fabio Sterpetti
Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 2021
Le concezioni filosofiche tradizionali e predominanti sulla natura della filosofia e della conosc... more Le concezioni filosofiche tradizionali e predominanti sulla natura della filosofia e della conoscenza affondano le loro radici nel pensiero di pensatori radicalmente antinaturalisti. La logica occupa un posto centrale nella riflessione filosofica e rappresenta un baluardo dell’antinaturalismo. Dunque, dato che la concezione della filosofia che si adotta dipende strettamente dalla concezione della logica che si adotta, fino a quando non si sarà in grado di elaborare una concezione naturalista adeguata della logica, non si sarà in grado di elaborare una posizione naturalista adeguata. Il presente volume intende mostrare come sia possibile elaborare una concezione naturalista in grado di rispondere in modo adeguato alle obiezioni che le vengono mosse dai sostenitori delle concezioni tradizionali solo a patto di accettare di ripensare radicalmente la relazione che sussiste tra la logica, la matematica, le scienze naturali e la filosofia.
Papers by Fabio Sterpetti
Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2023
This article aims at discussing an interesting variant of scientific realism recently proposed an... more This article aims at discussing an interesting variant of scientific realism recently proposed and defended by Sandra Mitchell (forthcoming), namely an affordances-based and pragmatist variant of scientific realism. We firstly place Mitchell's proposal in the context of the current state of the debate over scientific realism. Secondly, we summarize the salient features of Mitchell's proposal. Thirdly, we point out some aspects of that proposal that might require some further refinement and clarification in order to make it less prone to criticisms by both realists and antirealists. More precisely, in this paper we address the following issues: 1) whether Mitchell's proposal can be classified as a genuine form of scientific realism; 2) whether the fact that in Mitchell's proposal figure some variants of the no miracle argument is in tension with some other of its features.
Filosofia italiana, 2023
The aim of this paper is to identify the origin of Italian analytic philosophy of language. First... more The aim of this paper is to identify the origin of Italian analytic philosophy of language. Firstly, some of its forerunners are identified. Then some authors that played a decisive role for establishing conditions that were necessary for an Italian analytic philosophy of language to begin are identified. Finally, it is argued that the first generation of Italian analytic philosophers of language arose in the Seventies.
Foundations of Science, 2021
This article presents a challenge that those philosophers who deny the causal interpretation of e... more This article presents a challenge that those philosophers who deny the causal interpretation of explanations provided by population genetics might have to address. Indeed, some philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection is statistical in character and cannot be construed in causal terms. On the contrary, other philosophers, known as causalists, argue against the statistical view and support the causal interpretation of natural selection. The problem I am concerned with here arises for the statisticalists because the debate on the nature of natural selection intersects the debate on whether mathematical explanations of empirical facts are genuine scientific explanations. I argue that if the explanations provided by population genetics are regarded by the statisticalists as non-causal explanations of that kind, then statisticalism risks being incompatible with a naturalist stance. The statisticalist faces a dilemma: either she maintains statisticalism but has to renounce naturalism; or she maintains naturalism but has to content herself with an account of the explanations provided by population genetics that she deems unsatisfactory. This challenge is relevant to the statisticalists because many of them see themselves as naturalists.
Syzetesis - Rivista di Filosofia, 2021
L’obiettivo di questo articolo è duplice: 1) mettere in luce la rilevanza della metafilosofia per... more L’obiettivo di questo articolo è duplice: 1) mettere in luce la rilevanza della metafilosofia per la filosofia della scienza e della concezione della scienza che si adotta per l’elaborazione della propria posizione metafilosofica. Si cercherà di mostrare come la riflessione metafilosofica sia indispensabile per la definizione della propria concezione della filosofia della scienza e come visioni metafilosofiche diverse conducano a diverse concezioni della filosofia della scienza, nonché di mostrare come l’adozione di una determinata concezione della scienza e del suo metodo, tra le diverse possibili, sia rilevante per la definizione della propria concezione metafilosofica e come concezioni della scienza e del suo metodo diverse conducano a diverse concezioni metafilosofiche; 2) contribuire a chiarire cosa debba intendersi per “metafilosofia” e quale relazione debba ritenersi sussista tra la riflessione filosofica sulla filosofia e la riflessione teorica che avviene nelle discipline non filosofiche, come quelle scientifiche.
Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2020
In the process of scientific discovery, knowledge ampliation is pursued by means of non-deductive... more In the process of scientific discovery, knowledge ampliation is pursued by means of non-deductive inferences. When ampliative reasoning is performed, probabilities cannot be assigned objectively. One of the reasons is that we face the problem of the unconceived alternatives: we are unable to explore the space of all the possible alternatives to a given hypothesis, because we do not know how this space is shaped. So, if we want to adequately account for the process of knowledge ampliation, we need to develop an account of the process of scientific discovery which is not exclusively based on probability calculus. We argue that the analytic view of the method of science advocated by Cellucci is interestingly suited to this goal, since it rests on the concept of plausibility. In this perspective, in order to account for how probabilities are in fact assigned in uncertain contexts and knowledge ampliation is really pursued, we have to take into account plausibility-based considerations.
Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 2019
How should one conceive of the method of mathematics, if one takes a naturalist stance? Mathemati... more How should one conceive of the method of mathematics, if one takes a naturalist stance? Mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, since mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some naturalists try to naturalize mathematics relying on Darwinism. But several difficulties arise when one tries to naturalize in this way the traditional view of mathematics, according to which mathematical knowledge is certain and the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method. This paper suggests that, in order to naturalize mathematics through Darwinism, it is better to take the method of mathematics not to be the axiomatic method.
Axiomathes, 2019
Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s challenge to scientific realism is analyzed. Mizrahi’s argu... more Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s challenge to scientific realism is analyzed. Mizrahi’s argument is worth of attention for at least two reasons: (1) unlike other criticisms that have been made to Stanford’s view so far, Mizrahi’s argument does not question any specific claim of Stanford’s argument, rather it puts into question the very coherence of Stanford’s position, because it argues that since Stanford’s argument rests on the problem of the unconceived alternatives, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. Thus, if Mizrahi’s argument is effective in countering Stanford’s view, it may be able to question the validity of other philosophical positions which similarly rest on the problem of the unconceived alternatives; (2) Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s view is in part based on the development of a Stanford-like argument for the field of philosophy. This makes Mizrahi’s argument potentially relevant to the metaphilosophical debate. After careful examination, Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism is found wanting. Moreover, a Stanford-like argument is developed, which aims at challenging the metaphilosophical stance implied by Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism.
Synthese, 2017
Cancer research is experiencing ‘paradigm instability’, since there are two rival theories of car... more Cancer research is experiencing ‘paradigm instability’, since there are two rival theories of carcinogenesis which confront themselves, namely the Somatic Mutation Theory and the Tissue Organization Field Theory. Despite this theoretical uncertainty, a huge quantity of data is available thanks to the improvement of genome sequencing techniques. Some authors think that the development of new statistical tools will be able to overcome the lack of a shared theoretical perspective on cancer by amalgamating as many data as possible. We think instead that a deeper understanding of cancer can be achieved by means of more theoretical work, rather than by merely accumulating more data. To support our thesis, we introduce the analytic view of theory development, which rests on the concept of plausibility, and make clear in what sense plausibility and probability are distinct concepts. Then, the concept of plausibility is used to point out the ineliminable role played by the epistemic subject in the development of statistical tools and in the process of theory assessment. We then move to address a central issue in cancer research, namely the relevance of computational tools developed by bioinformaticists to detect driver mutations in the debate between the two main rival theories of carcinogenesis. Finally, we briefly extend our considerations on the role that plausibility plays in evidence amalgamation from cancer research to the more general issue of the divergences between frequentists and Bayesians in the philosophy of medicine and statistics. We argue that taking into account plausibility-based considerations can lead to clarify some epistemological shortcomings that afflict both these perspectives.
Paradigmi. Rivista di critica filosofica, 2017
Le principali concezioni del progresso scientifico sono tre: la concezione epistemica, secondo cu... more Le principali concezioni del progresso scientifico sono tre: la concezione epistemica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento della conoscenza; la concezione semantica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento delle verità; la concezione problem-solving, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento del numero dei problemi che si è in grado di risolvere. La concezione epistemica è ritenuta la più compatibile con una prospettiva realista. Di recente, Dellsén ha proposto la concezione "noetica", secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento dell'understanding di un fenomeno da parte degli scienziati. Dellsén sostiene che la concezione noetica sia una concezione realista del progresso più adeguata di quella epistemica. Scopo di questo articolo è valutare se la concezione noetica sia più adeguata della concezione epistemica.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2017
The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of th... more The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of the confusion surrounding it. While the prospects for a Darwinian metaethics appear to be improving, some underlying epistemological issues remain unclear. We will focus on the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) which, when applied in metaethics, are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs so as to undermine their epistemic justification. The point is that an epistemic disanalogy can be identified in the debate on EDAs between moral beliefs and other kinds of beliefs, insofar as only the former are regarded as vulnerable to EDAs. First, we will analyze some significant debunking positions in metaethics in order to show that they do not provide adequate justification for such an epistemic disanalogy. Then, we will assess whether they can avoid the accusation of being epistemically incoherent by adopting the same evolutionary account for all kinds of beliefs. In other words, once it is argued that Darwinism has a corrosive impact on metaethics, what if its universal acid cannot be contained?
Paradigmi. Rivista di critica filosofica, 2015
In the last decades two different and apparently unrelated lines of research have increasingly co... more In the last decades two different and apparently unrelated lines of research have increasingly connected mathematics and evolutionism. Indeed, on the one hand different attempts to formalize darwinism have been made, while, on the other hand, different attempts to naturalize logic and mathematics have been put forward. Those researches may appear either to be completely distinct or at least in some way convergent. They may in fact both be seen as supporting a naturalistic stance. Evolutionism is indeed crucial for a naturalistic perspective, and formalizing it seems to be a way to strengthen its scientificity. On the contrary, it will be underlined how those lines of research may be seen as conflicting, since the conception of knowledge on which they rest may be undermined by the consequences of accepting an evolutionary perspective.
Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 2015
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary ... more Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her coauthors supported the view that EDAs are selfdefeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human arguments are unjustified. De Cruz's objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim that, since by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. The response given by Carlo Cellucci to Hersh's objection shows that the claim that by Gödel's results mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain is not self-defeating, and can be adopted to show that EDAs are not selfdefeating as well in a twofold sense: an argument analogous to Cellucci's one may be developed to face De Cruz's objection, and such argument may be further refined incorporating Cellucci's response itself in it, to make it stronger. This paper aims at showing that the accusation of being self-defeating moved against EDAs is inadequate by elaborating an argument which can be considered an EDA and which can also be shown not to be self-defeating.
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy and Science, 2015
Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) ... more Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called ‘epistemic gap’ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains.
Riflessioni Sistemiche, 2014
Si cercherà di mostrare come il mancato confronto col problema della natura della matematica espo... more Si cercherà di mostrare come il mancato confronto col problema della natura della matematica espone il pensiero sistemico a delle difficoltà notevoli nel far fronte ad almeno due sfide epistemologiche: 1) spiegare l’applicabilità della matematica alla natura; 2) resistere all'assimilazione da parte del realismo scientifico strutturalista.
L&PS – Logic and Philosophy of Science, 2011
The aim of this contribution is to show the compatibility of an em-bodied and bottom-up approach ... more The aim of this contribution is to show the compatibility of an em-bodied and bottom-up approach to mathematics, as developed by Carlo Cellucci, with a constructivist epistemological framework and with a non-adaptationist view of evolution. This different perspectives are shown to be connected with an antirealist stance in philosophy of science.
Book Chapters by Fabio Sterpetti
Model-Based Reasoning, Abductive Cognition, Creativity. Inferences and Models in Science, Logic, Language, and Technology, 2024
Counterfactuals abound in science, especially when one deals with models. Some models, namely hig... more Counterfactuals abound in science, especially when one deals with models. Some models, namely highly idealized models, have assumptions that are metaphysically impossible. This means that in science one has often to deal with counterpossibles. According to the standard semantics for counterfactuals, all counterpossibles are vacuously true. But scientific practice shows that counterpossibles are not always regarded as vacuously true by scientists. To do justice of the use of counterpossibles in science, some authors think that we should adopt a semantics that allows for impossible worlds. It seems difficult to reconcile the role played by highly idealized models in science with scientific realism. Nevertheless, some authors think that it is possible to provide a realist account of highly idealized models. In this view, scientific realism should not be interpreted as the claim that models aim to provide accurate representations of models' targets, rather it should be interpreted as the claim that models aim to provide true modal information about models' targets. This variant of scientific realism seems to imply a commitment to some form of modal realism. I develop an objection to that variant of scientific realism by elaborating on some arguments originally developed to show that there are unknowable facts.
Handbook of Abductive Cognition, 2022
The debate on the role and possible uses of abduction in the health sciences has mainly concerned... more The debate on the role and possible uses of abduction in the health sciences has mainly concerned diagnosis. Indeed, whereas a range of works have addressed abductive reasoning in the elaboration of diagnoses, very limited attention has been devoted to whether and how abduction plays a relevant role also in the adoption and implementation of therapeutic strategies. This chapter provides an attempt to start filling such a gap, considering, in particular, two aspects, that is, the selection and evaluation of evidence when addressing clinical decisions on single cases, and the choice of some therapeutic strategy rather than others. Some reflections will be put forward which try to set a dialogue between philosophical discourse on abductive reasoning and actual therapeutic situations in clinical practice where clinicians' expertise is particularly relevant in conceiving hypotheses about which treatment should be adopted. A couple of actual cases will be presented to exemplify conditions in which abductive reasoning actually plays an important part in clinical contexts.
A Critical Reflection on Automated Science, 2020
The idea that science can be automated is so deeply related to the view that the method of mathem... more The idea that science can be automated is so deeply related to the view that the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method, that confuting the claim that mathematical knowledge can be extended by means of the axiomatic method is almost equivalent to confuting the claim that science can be automated. I argue that the axiomatic view is inadequate as a view of the method of mathematics and that the analytic view is to be preferred. But, if the method of mathematics and natural sciences is the analytic method, then the advancement of knowledge cannot be mechanized, since non-deductive reasoning plays a crucial role in the analytic method, and non-deductive reasoning cannot be fully mechanized.
Predictability and the Unpredictable. Life, Evolution and Behaviour, 2018
Some philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection, as it i... more Some philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection, as it is normally presented in population genetics, is statistical in character and cannot be construed in causal terms. On the contrary, other philosophers, known as causalists, argue against the statistical view and reaffirm the causal interpretation of natural selection. A key element in this debate is the dispute on the nature of drift. If drift is a cause of evolution, uncertainty in population genetics is due to some processes that make a population deviate from predicted outcomes. While causalists see drift as a distinct phenomenon originated by some set of natural processes, statisticalists claim that there is no process that accounts for this uncertainty, since the uncertainty lies not in the events but in the fact that natural selection in population genetics is modeled by a statistical theory. This article aims to illustrate the debate between causalists and statisticalists in order to present a challenge that statisticalists need to address if they wish to maintain a naturalist stance.
Uploads
Books by Fabio Sterpetti
Papers by Fabio Sterpetti
Book Chapters by Fabio Sterpetti
ovvero al dibattito filosofico sulla natura, sul metodo e sulle prospettive
della ricerca filosofica.