Papers by Giulia Bistagnino
Social Theory and Practice, 2018
This paper addresses the problem of pluralism in democratic societies, by exploiting some insight... more This paper addresses the problem of pluralism in democratic societies, by exploiting some insights from the debate about the epistemology of disagreement. First, by focusing on the permissibility of experiments on nonhuman animals for research purposes, we provide an epistemic analysis of deep normative disagreements. We understand that to mean disagreements in which epistemic peers disagree about both the substantive content of an ethical issue and the correct justificatory reasons for their contrary claims. Second, we argue for a compromise solution in which the reasons for reaching it are not prudential but grounded on the recognition of epistemic peerhood.
Food Ethics
In their book Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Matteo Bo... more In their book Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Matteo Bonotti and Anne Barnhill defend a conception of public reason centred on the notion of accessibility and advance an ethical toolkit public health policy makers can use to ensure they are reasoning publicly when designing healthy eating policies. Finally, they propose to institutionalise the process of public reasoning informed by their ethics framework by designing certain procedures of consultation and deliberation. This article focuses on their institutionalisation and raises some doubts and concerns by arguing that the procedures designed by Bonotti and Barnhill may be counterproductive to some of their aims, in particular with respect to citizens’ control, epistemic injustice, and the conception of citizens as free and equal.
Bdl Biblioteca della Libertà, 2019
In his posthumous essay \u201creal legitimation, anarchism and power loops\u201d, Glen Newey prop... more In his posthumous essay \u201creal legitimation, anarchism and power loops\u201d, Glen Newey proposes a criterion to identify the space of the political. What do we do? is, according to him, the basic political question which captures what is essential about politics. In this article, I draw on and develop this suggestion by elucidating how different conceptions of politics meet the basic political question. My aim is to show how Newey has pinpointed an innovative and powerful way to understand what are the basic conditions for assessing what falls within the realm of the political
Food Ethics, 2022
In their book Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Matteo Bo... more In their book Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Matteo Bonotti and Anne Barnhill defend a conception of public reason centred on the notion of accessibility and advance an ethical toolkit public health policy makers can use to ensure they are reasoning publicly when designing healthy eating policies. Finally, they propose to institutionalise the process of public reasoning informed by their ethics framework by designing certain procedures of consultation and deliberation. This article focuses on their institutionalisation and raises some doubts and concerns by arguing that the procedures designed by Bonotti and Barnhill may be counterproductive to some of their aims, in particular with respect to citizens' control, epistemic injustice, and the conception of citizens as free and equal.
Biblioteca della libertà, 2021
Critical Exchange a partire da Corrado Fumagalli, Odio Pubblico. Uso e abuso del discorso intolle... more Critical Exchange a partire da Corrado Fumagalli, Odio Pubblico. Uso e abuso del discorso intollerante, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2020.
The core of justificatory liberalism relies on the idea that coercion must be justified to all ci... more The core of justificatory liberalism relies on the idea that coercion must be justified to all citizens with reasons they can reasonably be expected to accept. Citizens ought to discipline themselves in public discourse because respect triggers a duty requiring them to support only those norms that enjoy public justification. In this article, I question the arguments justificatory liberals use to defend the link between respect and public justification, both in their consensus and convergence version. I argue that the idea of respect they employ runs against their own premises in being inevitably authoritarian and that the requirements of public justification foster some disrespectful attitudes among disagreeing citizens. I contend not only that justificatory liberals lack an argument for the idea that to respect one person is to provide her with reasons she can accept, but also that the problem concerns a misunderstanding about justification. Although it is correct to think that th...
In Th e Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus defends an innovative and sophisticated convergence v... more In Th e Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus defends an innovative and sophisticated convergence version of public reason liberalism. Th e crucial concept of his argumentative framework is that of “social morality”, intended as the set of rules apt to organize how individuals can make moral demands over each other. I claim that Gaus’s characterization of social morality and its rules is unstable because it rests on a rejection of the distinction between the normative and the descriptive. I argue that such rejection is motivated by certain practical aims Gaus wishes his theory to achieve. His method and his idea that morality needs to be understood both as the dictate of impartial reasoning and as a social and historical fact come from the need for his theory to perform the task of settling the problem of order. I discuss Gaus’s philosophical attitude and, fi nally, distinguishing between “therapeutic” and “evaluative” approaches, I present some points of discussion for understanding ...
I suoi interessi di ricerca riguardano principalmente il problema del disaccordo e della giustifi... more I suoi interessi di ricerca riguardano principalmente il problema del disaccordo e della giustificazione di principi morali e politici, le questioni normative connesse alla gestione dei conflitti e dei valori nell'ambito politico, i rapporti tra meta-etica e filosofia politica. Tra le sue pubblicazioni, Let's Play Democracy! Developing multicultural education and the case study of young immigrants in Italian schools («Notizie di Politeia», 2010, n. 99, pp. 44-61).
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Mar 19, 2015
L’antipaternalismo liberale e la sfida della vulnerabilità, 2020
What is Pluralism? Edited By Volker Kaul, Ingrid Salvatore (Routledge), 2020
One of the most prominent and long-standing issues in normative political philosophy concerns how... more One of the most prominent and long-standing issues in normative political philosophy concerns how democratic societies should deal with the problem of pluralism, which may elicit conflicts and have a dangerous impact on relations between citizens. Within this debate, it is commonplace to hold that a liberal solution to the problem of pluralism cannot start from objectivist premises. Scholars defending the theories of public reason and modus vivendi share the conviction that appeals to some form of objective truth is detrimental to the liberal project, aimed at securing political agreements characterized by inclusiveness for different points of view and a stable society in which individuals can pursue their preferred ends and plans of life. Liberals seem to believe that endorsing an objective understanding of moral truth is dangerous insofar as it can be used as a means to silence pluralism, dissolve diversity, and in the end destroy liberty. In this chapter, such a conviction is challenged by suggesting that a certain understanding of the notion of “principled compromise” constitutes an option for those who are committed to objectivist premises and yet want to secure an agreement that is liberal in kind because it is inclusive and stable.
Biblioteca della Libertà, 2019
In “real legitimation, anarchism and power loops”, Glen Newey proposes a criterion to identify th... more In “real legitimation, anarchism and power loops”, Glen Newey proposes a criterion to identify the space of the political. According to him, "what do we do?" is the basic political question which captures what is essential about politics. In this article, I draw on and develop this suggestion by elucidating how different conceptions of politics meet the basic political question. My aim is to show how Newey has pinpointed an innovative and powerful way to understand what are the basic conditions for assessing what falls within the realm of the political.
Notizie di Politeia, 2019
The article focuses on the disagreement concerning the treatment of animals from the perspective ... more The article focuses on the disagreement concerning the treatment of animals from the perspective of normative political theory. In particular, it discusses Federico Zuolo’s perspective on the matter in an attempt to test the limits of contemporary liberal theories of political legitimacy
Notizie di Politeia, 2019
A venticinque anni dalla pubblicazione di liberalismo politico, è inevitabile chiedersi se la cor... more A venticinque anni dalla pubblicazione di liberalismo politico, è inevitabile chiedersi se la cornice concettuale e normativa proposta da Rawls sia non solo valida e convin-cente da un punto di vista filosofico, ma anche capace di fornire principi orientativi per le sfide che animano le democrazie contemporanee. In questo scritto non cercherò di dare una risposta esaustiva circa l'attualità del liberalismo politico in generale. Piutto-sto, intendo occuparmi di un problema limitato e specifico, ovvero quello della diffu-sione di credenze anti-scientiste tra i cittadini di società democratiche. In particolare, la domanda a cui vorrei cercare di dare una risposta è la seguente: come dovremmo giudicare e trattare dal punto di vista del liberalismo politico coloro che propongono visioni del mondo contrastanti con le evidenze scientifiche e le opinioni degli esperti? La questione è rilevante se si condivide l'idea che la scienza sia uno strumento va-lido per mettere in luce e comprendere fatti rilevanti per la vita delle persone e, quindi, la preoccupazione per il diffondersi di atteggiamenti di vero e proprio negazionismo scientifico nelle società contemporanee 1. In quel che segue, quindi, assumo che la scienza possa fornire informazioni importanti per la vita pubblica e privata dei citta-dini democratici e che sia possibile tracciare una distinzione significativa tra scienza e pseudoscienza. Sebbene non sia scevra da problemi filosofici, mi sembra che si tratti di una assunzione ragionevole: da un lato, la scienza sembra fondamentale per l'ide-azione e implementazione di politiche pubbliche e per la soluzione di questioni poli-tiche complesse 2. Dall'altro, negli ultimi anni la sfiducia nei confronti della scienza
Social Theory and Practice (forthcoming), 2018
This paper addresses the problem of pluralism in democratic societies, by exploiting some insight... more This paper addresses the problem of pluralism in democratic societies, by exploiting some insights from the debate about the epistemology of disagreement. First, by focusing on the permissibility of experiments on nonhuman animals for research purposes, we provide an epistemic analysis of deep normative disagreements. We understand that to mean disagreements in which epistemic peers disagree about both the substantive content of an ethical issue and the correct justificatory reasons for their contrary claims. Second, we argue for a compromise solution in which the reasons for reaching it are not prudential but grounded on the recognition of epistemic peerhood.
Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 2018
The idea of public reason lies at the heart of those contemporary liberal theories that seek to s... more The idea of public reason lies at the heart of those contemporary liberal theories that seek to solve the problem of pluralism following the path opened by Rawls’s Political Liberalism. According to this perspective, citizens ought to discipline themselves in public discourse and present only reasons that are acceptable from everyone’s point of view and are neutral towards the different conceptions of the good that are inevitably present in democratic societies. Some political philosophers have criticised this proposal, arguing that the rules of Rawlsian public reason may be disrespectful towards certain citizens, especially those of religious faith, for these rules may constitute an infringement of their moral and psychological integrity. Here, I attempt to show that, despite providing a convincing argument against the Rawlsian perspective, these critics propose unsatisfactory alternatives to it. Finally, I suggest that this theoretical impasse be overcome by going beyond the very idea of public reason.
Notizie di Politeia, 2016
In this interview, Robert Goodin discusses some of the main issues he has tackled in his work, wi... more In this interview, Robert Goodin discusses some of the main issues he has tackled in his work, with a particular focus on the relation between political theory and political science, and the challenges and benefits of an interdisciplinary approach for political philosophers.
Notizie di Politeia, 2018
This article focuses on Pierluigi Barrotta's ideal of citizenship, as derived from his idea of pr... more This article focuses on Pierluigi Barrotta's ideal of citizenship, as derived from his idea of pragmatist democracy. He argues that it is necessary for citizens to acquire a scientific mentality and directly interact with experts in order for democratic societies to survive. Here, I cast some doubts on Barrotta's proposal and attempt to show that the ideal of citizenship he fosters is either impractical, or detrimental to the democratic ideal of political equality.
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Papers by Giulia Bistagnino
L’interruzione volontaria di gravidanza è ammissibile? Il matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso è sbagliato? L’uguaglianza economica è più importante della libertà? È giusto utilizzare animali non-umani per fini scientifici e di ricerca? La prostituzione dovrebbe essere legale? La pena di morte è giusta? Esiste un diritto alla proprietà intellettuale? La libertà di espressione dovrebbe essere limitata? Non è certo un mistero che le società democratiche siano caratterizzate da disaccordi profondi e persistenti, capaci di fomentare divisioni e conflitti. È più complesso, invece, capire come tali disaccordi, che vertono su questioni che richiedono una decisione collettiva, debbano essere trattati a livello pubblico. Nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo, le teorie della ragione pubblica e del modus vivendi tentano di risolvere il problema rinunciando alla ricerca della verità oggettiva, sostenendo che il disaccordo in politica possa essere superato, e così perdere la sua carica conflittuale, solo se viene tralasciata la ricerca di chi ha ragione. Contrariamente a tale convinzione, l’autrice difende una prospettiva che riconosce la ricerca della verità come fondamentale alla risoluzione del disaccordo e propone l’idea di compromesso di principio, ovvero di un accordo non ideale, ma stabilito per ragioni di principio, di natura epistemica, perché fondato sul riconoscimento reciproco della razionalità delle parti.