Papers by Colin D Robinson
Defense Monitor, September-October 2003 [Center for Defense Information], 2003
The Center for Defense Information conducts in-depth research on the social, economic, environmen... more The Center for Defense Information conducts in-depth research on the social, economic, environmental, political and military components of international security. CDI aims to educate the public and inform policymakers on issues of security policy, strategy, operations, weapon systems and defense budgeting, and to produce creative solutions to them.
Comparative Strategy , 2023
The collapse of Western-supported Afghan forces in mid-2021 emphasizes how difficult building who... more The collapse of Western-supported Afghan forces in mid-2021 emphasizes how difficult building whole armies can be. The Liberian experience 2004–2009 holds relevant lessons. After the civil war ended, the US State Department engaged two private military contractors to recreate a new Liberian army from the ashes. But scholarship so far on the Liberian army reconstruction process has been mixed, partially obscuring some of the core truths of the program. On reflection, the reasons for the very mixed results appear to be, first, that the idea of SSR itself is flawed, which is partially why “Security and Justice programming” is rising in prominence—local ownership in such armies is shared upwards through a multi-faceted patronage chain; second, that the Liberian state never had any meaningful history of military professionalism; and that creating an entire army was far more complicated than the usual tasks assigned to private contractors. The complete absence of any experienced leadership in the first months was devastating.
HORN Bulletin Vol V • Iss IV • July-August, 2022
For many years since the end of the Second World War, there has been a certain thread of humanita... more For many years since the end of the Second World War, there has been a certain thread of humanitarian altruism
which has been part of the West’s, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s)
approach toward many parts of the developing world, alongside moves made for more nakedly national interest
purposes. After the Second World War, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) burgeoned, intergovernmental
agencies grew, and individual charitable giving also increased. There was a surge in such activity, paired with an
expansion of peacekeeping operations and the like, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which seemed to
herald the possibility of a bright liberal future. September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks then swung the pendulum
back towards force applied for more purely national and strategic interests. Within a few years of the United
States’ invasion of Afghanistan, climate change was becoming more and more of a factor, diverting attention
from developing countries’ urgent needs. Refugees’ stress on Europe also diverted attention. But with the seismic shock of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the horrible atrocities committed there, much more Western attention swung away from developing countries. By the time the Russian and/or Chinese threat recedes, the combination of refugee stresses and climate change may leave little spare attention and resources for Western humanitarian action.
--, 2002
The U.S. Department of Defense has embarked upon programs which aim to fundamentally transform th... more The U.S. Department of Defense has embarked upon programs which aim to fundamentally transform the U.S. military to face the new challenges of the 21st century, where previously common cross-border warfare is being superseded by internal wars, peacekeeping missions, and anti-terrorist efforts. The closest U.S. allies, Great Britain, France, and Germany among them, are reorienting their forces to face some of the same challenges. Yet the Russian Federation, since Sept. 11 a closer partner for the U.S. than ever before, is facing totally different military development challenges and is steering a different path. Why is Russia in this different situation, and what measures are underway to reform its armed forces?
Conflict, Security, and Development, 2021
Improving defence accountability and effectiveness is even more difficult when wars are actively ... more Improving defence accountability and effectiveness is even more difficult when wars are actively underway. Southern Somalia bears considerable resemblance to previous counterinsurgency theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus considerations of defence assistance should be actively informed by those campaigns. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) intervention force has been critical to seizing much of the towns and terrain now freed from the Islamist Al-Shabaab insurgents. But after 13 years AMISOM’s power is waning. There are vanishingly few instant and game-changing initiatives donors could take quickly to aid the build-up of Somali military forces either at the federal or regional levels. Yet decentralised Federal Member State governments represent important political forces in southern Somalia, and since 2012 efforts have been made to reinforce them.
Post-War Security Sector Reform in Liberia, 2021
This paper examines the U.S. Liberian Security Sector Reform (LSSR) program to rebuild the Armed ... more This paper examines the U.S. Liberian Security Sector Reform (LSSR) program to rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia from 2004, and shows how, despite large-scale effort, its failure could have been expected.
This paper will first trace the history of U.S. assistance to the then-Liberian Frontier Force from 1909 and the reasons why U.S. efforts to professionalise the army were often defeated or eroded by the nature of the Liberian state. Leon Trotsky said an army is “a copy of society, and suffers from all its diseases, usually at a higher temperature.” Therefore, it is extremely difficult to build a strong institution, such as an army, in a weak state.
Second, we will examine the reasons why the United States decided again to provide military assistance to Liberia from 2003 – not really in an effort to build an effective and accountable army, as security sector reform orthodoxy might assume, but part of the more limited aim of curbing Liberia’s potential for regional instability. Adherence to any SSR principles was very mixed. Third, a searching investigation of the results of the contractor-provided training in 2010-11 showed that the results were indifferent to negative. In summary, this negative result is apiece with the historical ineffectiveness of the Liberian army and the weaknesses of SSR as a concept.
Center for Defense Information , 2003
The dangers of merchant shipping under terrorist control was highlighted for U.S. citizens late l... more The dangers of merchant shipping under terrorist control was highlighted for U.S. citizens late last December [2002] by a story in the Washington Post saying that U.S. officials had identified about 15 cargo freighters which they believed were being used by al Qaeda for both generating profit and potentially aiding terrorist attacks. The Post story cited the difficulties of tracking the vessels given the constant practice of re-naming, re-painting and re-registering the ships. It was reported that the material for the East African embassy bombings in 1998 had been delivered by a Qaeda-linked freighter.
The Future of the Middle East , 2020
The U.S.-led reconstruction efforts that followed the 2001 invasions of Afghanistan and that of 2... more The U.S.-led reconstruction efforts that followed the 2001 invasions of Afghanistan and that of 2003 in Iraq were imbued by visions of liberal peace transformation. Yet all three of the components of the liberal peace effort – democratisation, human rights and the rule of law, and opening up of free markets following neoliberal orthodoxy, fell short, sometimes vastly short.
RUSI Journal , 2020
For decades, military assistance in southern Somalia focused on building up a central state army.... more For decades, military assistance in southern Somalia focused on building up a central state army. This reflects standard patterns of Western assistance worldwide. Yet the nature of Somali society and clan, greatly affected by the winnowing process of more than 30 years of conflict, means that most sub-clan groupings are more militarily effective than centralised forces deployed to unfamiliar areas. The centralised Somali National Army remains riven by clan itself, thoroughly politicised, and ineffective (with the exception of the Danab special forces). Based on fieldwork and interviews with military personnel who work in Somalia, Colin D Robinson and Jahara Matisek argue that these locally appropriate forces deserve assistance, albeit with some caveats, in the continuing struggle against Al-Shabaab.
KEA-Learning.nz, 2020
While the missile component of Multi-Domain Operations may be beyond the New Zealand Army’s reach... more While the missile component of Multi-Domain Operations may be beyond the New Zealand Army’s reach, the cyber, space, communications, and integration component is vital. Australia and the United States are among our closest partners. So how should the New Zealand Army adapt?
New Zealand International Review, 2006
The UN Mission in Liberia, established in late 2003 to maintain the country’s fragile ceasefire f... more The UN Mission in Liberia, established in late 2003 to maintain the country’s fragile ceasefire following over a decade of civil war, and to support the rebuilding of government, has achieved many of its objectives. It has maintained the ceasefire, disarmed and dismantled the warring factions, facilitated much needed humanitarian aid and refugee return, and assisted in the fairest election in Liberia’s history. Ahead public institutions need to be put on a firm footing, and a framework established where the proceeds of natural resources flow to all Liberians, not a well-connected few. Long term international engagement will be required to guarantee the peace so much time and effort has won.
Global Observatory , 2019
Continuing Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) efforts to undermine the FMSs are destroying the s... more Continuing Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) efforts to undermine the FMSs are destroying the settlement between the central government and regions made in the 2012 Provisional Constitution. In doing so, the FGS has exposed how little it values winning the war against al-Shabaab, which has entrenched itself in the hinterland for over eight years. A strong partnership between Mogadishu and the regions is vital to a unified counterinsurgency effort. These gambits are also severely hampering the Daraawiish—the state-level paramilitary field forces—from engaging al-Shabaab most effectively. This matters, because in many cases the Daraawiish are more effective against al-Shabaab than the isolated, under-equipped, and somewhat publicly alienated, Somali National Army.
Defense and Security Analysis, 2019
To engage properly with the Somali National Army, to understand it in the hope of improving stabi... more To engage properly with the Somali National Army, to understand it in the hope of improving stability and the lives of over 12 million Somalis, good basic information on its composition and characteristics is necessary. Authoritative accounts on the subject have been scarce for over 25 years. This account seeks to detail the army’s dispositions across southern Somalia, and, more importantly, the brigades’ clan compositions and linkages. Clan ties supersede loyalties to the central government. The army as it stands is a collection of former militias which suffer from ill-discipline and commit crime along with greater atrocities. Estimates of numbers are unreliable, but there might be 13,000 or more fighters in six brigades in the Mogadishu area and five beyond.
This author wrote his doctorate thesis on post-conflict army reconstruction, submitting it in 201... more This author wrote his doctorate thesis on post-conflict army reconstruction, submitting it in 2011. Continued research on the subject in the intervening seven years indicates that his theoretical propositions can be refined and improved. This article examines refinements to the model, and then applies those refinements in detail to the Afghan case. In so doing, it shifts the focus from potentially altruistic state-building to a case that was driven by pure national-strategic interests. Issues surrounding the liberal peace ideology dominate recent army reconstruction in conflict-affected states. The liberal peace underpinning is of supreme importance, so much so that in many discussions, it is internalised and accepted virtually without thought. This paper will advance the body of knowledge by establishing, for the first time, a theoretical basis for the widespread failure of army reconstruction in Afghanistan. The empirical basis builds on extensive previous research by other scholars. The resulting model can also be applied to better explain outcomes in other similar cases.
Post-conflict Security, Peace and Development Perspectives from Africa, Latin America, Europe and New Zealand (Volume 13, Springer Briefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace (ESDP)), Chrissie Atieno and Colin Robinson, eds., 2018
Defence reform (DR) was one of the most important original components of security sector reform (... more Defence reform (DR) was one of the most important original components of security sector reform (SSR). It has innate contractions: between fundamental Western assumptions (such as the liberal peace project) and local values and the tension between major-power national strategic interests and local aims. From 1990, DR programmes have frequently focused on effectiveness, not accountability, based on Western major power interests. But DR processes are difficult and involve significant political challenges therefore quick results are virtually impossible. Taking the long view is important. Ahead, the best results for accountability, effectiveness and sustainability are likely to be via abandoning attempts to intervene for national strategic interests, and only initiating programmes slowly in short steps, when interveners’ and recipients’ values are already closely aligned.
New Zealand International Review, 2018
This article attempts to forecast what will be the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)’s most import... more This article attempts to forecast what will be the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)’s most important future operating environment from ten to twenty years in the future. There will be shifts in the operating environment, partially due to rising great power competition. For the vast majority of New Zealand’s history, culturally similar powers - Great Britain and then the United States – have dominated the oceans. With the rise of China, this situation is beginning to change, at the very least in the Western Pacific.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part highlights NZ’s initial focus on land expeditionary operations alongside other parts of the British Empire, which changed with the rapid advance of Japanese forces after the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Air and naval forces then also became vitally important. Then from the early 1990s there was a shift back in emphasis towards land operations, amid the repeated deployment of forces overseas to preserve the security guarantee from the United States. The second part discusses China’s rising air and naval power, and thus the potential need for the NZDF’s force structure to change in response. But managing relations diplomatically with both the United States and China may ease the need to build up new air and naval forces. The third part discusses the recent deployment of HMNZS Te Kaha with a U.S. carrier strike group to the South China Sea. As NZ needs to manage its relations with both the United States and China carefully, future such deployments in close association with the United States in contested waters need careful consideration.
Line of Defence, 2018
The Joint Support Enablers Project sought to integrate
single service logistics functions where t... more The Joint Support Enablers Project sought to integrate
single service logistics functions where the opportunity
existed and where there was sufficient commonality
that would enable efficiencies to be achieved without
compromising single-service specialisations. The new Joint
Support Component Command was to oversee the Defence
Munitions Management Group, the Joint Operational
Health Group, the Common Systems Group and the Joint
Movements and Joint Fuels projects.
There are two crucial points to consider about the Taji deployment. First, short-term “train and ... more There are two crucial points to consider about the Taji deployment. First, short-term “train and equip” efforts such as these in war-torn countries have virtually no lasting results; and secondly, New Zealand is mostly sending troops because it may help assure our own security, via military aid from the United States if it were ever needed.
This piece was published in the 'Dominion Post' on 24 April 2018.
Journal of Slavic Military Studies , 2017
In 1982 the Soviet defector ‘Viktor Suvorov’ tantalizingly added an additional type of reserve fo... more In 1982 the Soviet defector ‘Viktor Suvorov’ tantalizingly added an additional type of reserve formation to the Soviet Ground Forces’ three known categories of divisions. These ‘invisible’ divisions were to be established from the Ground Forces’ millions of reservists stiffened by a thin cadre of personnel joining from higher-category parent divisions. But beyond vague estimates in the IISS ‘Military Balance’ during the 1980s, there were very little more data. Now, with the publication of new works in Russian, and associated Russian forum discussions, a preliminary list of such divisions can now be translated into English. Many details are still unclear, but these data give us another window into the Ground Forces’ Cold War order of battle.
The search continues for methods to improve security for development in Sub-
Saharan Africa. One ... more The search continues for methods to improve security for development in Sub-
Saharan Africa. One of the important actors in this security arena is Sub-Saharan
African governments’ armies. Much of their capability to meet security challenge
depends on how militarily professional they are. The wave of democratic evolution
in Africa since 1990 also affected military professionalism. This article reviews three
models for assessing how democratisation might affect military professionalism
in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to post-conflict states. This should
make it possible to decide which analytical methods are most appropriate to
measure military professionalism in the particular circumstances of Sub-Saharan
African post-conflict democratisation. Depending upon the particular nation-state
in question, this decision on analytical methods may be useful for other Sub-
Saharan states as well.
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Papers by Colin D Robinson
which has been part of the West’s, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s)
approach toward many parts of the developing world, alongside moves made for more nakedly national interest
purposes. After the Second World War, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) burgeoned, intergovernmental
agencies grew, and individual charitable giving also increased. There was a surge in such activity, paired with an
expansion of peacekeeping operations and the like, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which seemed to
herald the possibility of a bright liberal future. September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks then swung the pendulum
back towards force applied for more purely national and strategic interests. Within a few years of the United
States’ invasion of Afghanistan, climate change was becoming more and more of a factor, diverting attention
from developing countries’ urgent needs. Refugees’ stress on Europe also diverted attention. But with the seismic shock of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the horrible atrocities committed there, much more Western attention swung away from developing countries. By the time the Russian and/or Chinese threat recedes, the combination of refugee stresses and climate change may leave little spare attention and resources for Western humanitarian action.
This paper will first trace the history of U.S. assistance to the then-Liberian Frontier Force from 1909 and the reasons why U.S. efforts to professionalise the army were often defeated or eroded by the nature of the Liberian state. Leon Trotsky said an army is “a copy of society, and suffers from all its diseases, usually at a higher temperature.” Therefore, it is extremely difficult to build a strong institution, such as an army, in a weak state.
Second, we will examine the reasons why the United States decided again to provide military assistance to Liberia from 2003 – not really in an effort to build an effective and accountable army, as security sector reform orthodoxy might assume, but part of the more limited aim of curbing Liberia’s potential for regional instability. Adherence to any SSR principles was very mixed. Third, a searching investigation of the results of the contractor-provided training in 2010-11 showed that the results were indifferent to negative. In summary, this negative result is apiece with the historical ineffectiveness of the Liberian army and the weaknesses of SSR as a concept.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part highlights NZ’s initial focus on land expeditionary operations alongside other parts of the British Empire, which changed with the rapid advance of Japanese forces after the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Air and naval forces then also became vitally important. Then from the early 1990s there was a shift back in emphasis towards land operations, amid the repeated deployment of forces overseas to preserve the security guarantee from the United States. The second part discusses China’s rising air and naval power, and thus the potential need for the NZDF’s force structure to change in response. But managing relations diplomatically with both the United States and China may ease the need to build up new air and naval forces. The third part discusses the recent deployment of HMNZS Te Kaha with a U.S. carrier strike group to the South China Sea. As NZ needs to manage its relations with both the United States and China carefully, future such deployments in close association with the United States in contested waters need careful consideration.
single service logistics functions where the opportunity
existed and where there was sufficient commonality
that would enable efficiencies to be achieved without
compromising single-service specialisations. The new Joint
Support Component Command was to oversee the Defence
Munitions Management Group, the Joint Operational
Health Group, the Common Systems Group and the Joint
Movements and Joint Fuels projects.
This piece was published in the 'Dominion Post' on 24 April 2018.
Saharan Africa. One of the important actors in this security arena is Sub-Saharan
African governments’ armies. Much of their capability to meet security challenge
depends on how militarily professional they are. The wave of democratic evolution
in Africa since 1990 also affected military professionalism. This article reviews three
models for assessing how democratisation might affect military professionalism
in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to post-conflict states. This should
make it possible to decide which analytical methods are most appropriate to
measure military professionalism in the particular circumstances of Sub-Saharan
African post-conflict democratisation. Depending upon the particular nation-state
in question, this decision on analytical methods may be useful for other Sub-
Saharan states as well.
which has been part of the West’s, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s)
approach toward many parts of the developing world, alongside moves made for more nakedly national interest
purposes. After the Second World War, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) burgeoned, intergovernmental
agencies grew, and individual charitable giving also increased. There was a surge in such activity, paired with an
expansion of peacekeeping operations and the like, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which seemed to
herald the possibility of a bright liberal future. September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks then swung the pendulum
back towards force applied for more purely national and strategic interests. Within a few years of the United
States’ invasion of Afghanistan, climate change was becoming more and more of a factor, diverting attention
from developing countries’ urgent needs. Refugees’ stress on Europe also diverted attention. But with the seismic shock of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the horrible atrocities committed there, much more Western attention swung away from developing countries. By the time the Russian and/or Chinese threat recedes, the combination of refugee stresses and climate change may leave little spare attention and resources for Western humanitarian action.
This paper will first trace the history of U.S. assistance to the then-Liberian Frontier Force from 1909 and the reasons why U.S. efforts to professionalise the army were often defeated or eroded by the nature of the Liberian state. Leon Trotsky said an army is “a copy of society, and suffers from all its diseases, usually at a higher temperature.” Therefore, it is extremely difficult to build a strong institution, such as an army, in a weak state.
Second, we will examine the reasons why the United States decided again to provide military assistance to Liberia from 2003 – not really in an effort to build an effective and accountable army, as security sector reform orthodoxy might assume, but part of the more limited aim of curbing Liberia’s potential for regional instability. Adherence to any SSR principles was very mixed. Third, a searching investigation of the results of the contractor-provided training in 2010-11 showed that the results were indifferent to negative. In summary, this negative result is apiece with the historical ineffectiveness of the Liberian army and the weaknesses of SSR as a concept.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part highlights NZ’s initial focus on land expeditionary operations alongside other parts of the British Empire, which changed with the rapid advance of Japanese forces after the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Air and naval forces then also became vitally important. Then from the early 1990s there was a shift back in emphasis towards land operations, amid the repeated deployment of forces overseas to preserve the security guarantee from the United States. The second part discusses China’s rising air and naval power, and thus the potential need for the NZDF’s force structure to change in response. But managing relations diplomatically with both the United States and China may ease the need to build up new air and naval forces. The third part discusses the recent deployment of HMNZS Te Kaha with a U.S. carrier strike group to the South China Sea. As NZ needs to manage its relations with both the United States and China carefully, future such deployments in close association with the United States in contested waters need careful consideration.
single service logistics functions where the opportunity
existed and where there was sufficient commonality
that would enable efficiencies to be achieved without
compromising single-service specialisations. The new Joint
Support Component Command was to oversee the Defence
Munitions Management Group, the Joint Operational
Health Group, the Common Systems Group and the Joint
Movements and Joint Fuels projects.
This piece was published in the 'Dominion Post' on 24 April 2018.
Saharan Africa. One of the important actors in this security arena is Sub-Saharan
African governments’ armies. Much of their capability to meet security challenge
depends on how militarily professional they are. The wave of democratic evolution
in Africa since 1990 also affected military professionalism. This article reviews three
models for assessing how democratisation might affect military professionalism
in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to post-conflict states. This should
make it possible to decide which analytical methods are most appropriate to
measure military professionalism in the particular circumstances of Sub-Saharan
African post-conflict democratisation. Depending upon the particular nation-state
in question, this decision on analytical methods may be useful for other Sub-
Saharan states as well.
Written version of
https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1389973156186705920
It covers a range of topics and presents a comprehensive picture of major issues in security sector reform. An introductory chapter outlines the debate and reflects on the University’s contribution to reform. The Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict Transformation (KAICT) at the University of Liberia is a nodal point in sharing, creating and disseminating knowledge on security sector reform, and the authors have engaged in joint reflection and discussion for many years. The book further analyzes developments in the core issue areas of the National Security Strategy, rebuilding of the armed forces, security sector legislation, civilian-security actor relations, reflecting on the state of reform, and progress and limits thereof.