Political Science

The interaction between Orthodoxy and Islam during the years of the Putin presidency was complex, dynamic and fraught with potential for conflict. Indeed a number of political, demographic and economic factors created conditions that were particularly hospitable for the eruption of religious-based conflict. This is particularly so given the ongoing problems of Islamic radicalism, which by the early Putin years had spread beyond Chechnya itself, and by the concomitant appearance and spread of xenophobia, racism and various strains of extremism. Nonetheless, despite rising tensions among communal groups, and also despite a general but unmistakable trend toward increasingly authoritarian tendencies by the central government, there was considerable evidence of the sort of leadership within both religious and governmental bodies that had the effect of mitigating or at least containing conflict. Such leadership at the national level may have been pivotal in containing tendencies toward conflict. While admirable and almost certainly driven more by prudential than idealistic motives, such leadership will necessarily need to develop a greater degree of accountability to the public than that which was in evidence as the Putin presidency completed its second term amid deepening concentration of power by the Kremlin.

Relations between Turkey and Russia have taken significant turns for the better in the past several years, culminating in the visit of Turkish Prime Min- ister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow in December 2004 and followed by Rus- sian President Vladimir Putin’s reciprocal trip to Ankara in January 2005. How can we begin to account for this rather sudden warming of relations between Turkey and Russia, and what does this mean for the region? These questions can perhaps best be approached from the perspective of the larger regional landscape of issues whose substance and potential resolution are of particular importance to Turkey and Russia. These can be conveniently parsed into matters of (1) mutu- al economic and financial advantage, (2) regional security concerns, and (3) domestic political considerations. The present improvement of relations between Russia and Turkey has unfolded in the context of Turkey and Russia’s simulta- neously complex and somewhat conflicted orientations toward the Western world in general, and post-Soviet increase in U.S. global influence in particular. In any case, the improvement of Turkish-Russian relations will significantly alter the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia for the foreseeable future.

Ethnic conflict to the point of violence and demands for separation from the USSR emerged as a principal political issue in the Soviet Union not long after Gorbachev's general program of radical reform was launched. Ethnic conflict is by nature complex, invariably multi-dimensional, multitiered, and involving a broad range of factors. This essay examines the religious dimension of such conflict in the USSR.

By the time of Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency of Russia in May 2012, the Russian–Turkish rapprochement that began over a decade earlier had become a significant fixture of the Eurasian landscape. Nonetheless, numerous questions remain about the nature of the relation, implications for the region of western Eurasia, and its likely future directions. Four general characteristics of the bilateral relation have emerged, and recognizing them enables a deeper understanding of the opportunities and limits likely to be afforded, for Russia, Turkey, and the region: (a) pragmatism, (b) a multivectored approach to the bilateral relation, (c) commonalities despite contradictions, and (d) durability even despite episodic antagonism. The Russian–Turkish rapprochement has become a defining feature of the Eurasian landscape, but remains an unequal one, on several counts: energy resources, geopolitical strength, military capability, and underlying demographics. Nonetheless, various factors make a deepening rapprochement likely: mutual desirability of increased trade, wariness toward the West, Turkey’s pursuit of a “no enemies” foreign policy, Russia’s interest in regional great-power status, and common interest in regional conflict resolution.

The Arab Spring, or “Arab Awakening,” that began in Tunisia in early 2011 has spawned numerous developments across the region, some of them surprising in nature and perhaps in scale. One such development has been a major re-alignment of regional power relations, resulting both in new patterns of relations among countries and in complications of longstanding disputes. The regional re-alignment engendered by the Arab Awakening has reshaped the contours of possible armed conflict in the South Caucasus over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and has also reshaped the contours of possible resolution. Among the newly emerging patterns, Russian steps towards diplomatic solution of the Syrian conflict, including forestalling a US-led military intervention, could work as an example of US-Russian cooperation in preventing an outbreak or escalation of other regional disputes. An agreement brokered largely by US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as a diplomatic de-escalation of the Syrian crisis might serve as a general template for de- escalating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In such a scenario, however, US-Russian
cooperation would almost certainly need to include direct and heavy Turkish involvement, and given currently evolving realities, would need to account for rising Iranian influence as well.

Relations between Turkey and Russia have taken significant turns for the better in the past several years, culminating in the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow in December 2004 and followed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's reciprocal trip to Ankara in January 2005. How can we begin to account for this rather sudden warming of relations between Turkey and Russia, and what does this mean for the region? These questions can perhaps best be approached from the perspective of the larger regional landscape of issues whose substance and potential resolution are of particular importance to Turkey and Russia. These can be conveniently parsed into matters of (1) mutual economic and financial advantage, (2) regional security concerns, and (3) domestic political considerations. The present improvement of relations between Russia and Turkey has unfolded in the context of Turkey and Russia's simultaneously complex and somewhat conflicted orientations toward the Western world in general, and post-Soviet increase in U.S. global influence in particular. In any case, the improvement of Turkish-Russian relations will significantly alter the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia for the foreseeable future.

The interaction between Orthodoxy and Islam during the years of the Putin presidency was complex, dynamic and fraught with potential for conflict. Indeed a number of political, demographic and economic factors created conditions that were particularly hospitable for the eruption of religious-based conflict. This is particularly so given the ongoing problems of Islamic radicalism, which by the early Putin years had spread beyond Chechnya itself, and by the concomitant appearance and spread of xenophobia, racism and various strains of extremism. Nonetheless, despite rising tensions among communal groups, and also despite a general but unmistakable trend toward increasingly authoritarian tendencies by the central government, there was considerable evidence of the sort of leadership within both religious and governmental bodies that had the effect of mitigating or at least containing conflict. Such leadership at the national level may have been pivotal in containing tendencies toward conflict. While admirable and almost certainly driven more by prudential than idealistic motives, such leadership will necessarily need to develop a greater degree of accountability to the public than that which was in evidence as the Putin presidency completed its second term amid deepening concentration of power by the Kremlin.

Two U.S. political scientists analyze the electoral geography of the 2000 Russian presidential election with a focus on the ethnic dimension of support for Vladimir Putin. In exploring the impact of ethnicity on voting patterns, the authors focus on the ethno-territorial line of division between Russia's ethnic and non-ethnic regions, as well as Putin's policies toward the ethnic regions. In an effort to determine the extent to which patterns from previous elections persisted into the 2000 election, the authors examine a range of socioeconomic correlates and compare support for Putin with support for Boris Yel'tsin in the 1996 presidential election. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H10, O50, Z10. 2 figures, 1 table, 35 references. In the 26 March 2000 presidential election, Vladimir Putin won a decisive first-round victory with over 53.4 percent of the vote, thus securing for himself by democratic means the seat that Boris Yel'tsin passed on to him upon his resignation on the New Year's Eve of the millennium. With voter turnout just below 69 percent, moreover, this seemingly was also a decision most citizens were interested in and supportive of. While turnout was consistently high from region to region, with all but four regions having between a 60 and 80 percent turnout, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria had turnout rates that greatly exceeded the national average, with 92.8 and 88.5 percent, respectively. Incidentally, these two regions also were among the most supportive of Putin, giving him 86.1 and 75.5 percent of their votes. Is it a mere coincidence that these regions, with exceptionally high levels of electoral participation, were also some of the most supportive of Putin's bid for the presidency? Moreover , is there something to the fact that these two regions happen to be " ethnic " regions, i.e., subjects of the Russian Federation with special legal standing based on the ethnic status of their titular nationalities? Given the highly complex and multi-faceted nature of ethnic identity in the Russian Federation; the persisting specter of ethnic disintegration hanging over the country; and the emergence of Putin's centralizing policies toward the regions (particularly the ethnic regions)—any discernible patterns between voting behavior, ethnic identity, and support for the president warrant further investigation. We provide evidence below that such connections are indeed discernible from close regional analysis of the March 26, 2000 presidential election.

By the time of Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency of Russia in May 2012, the Russian–Turkish rapprochement that began over a decade earlier had become a significant fixture of the Eurasian landscape. Nonetheless, numerous questions remain about the nature of the relation, implications for the region of western Eurasia, and its likely future directions. Four general characteristics of the bilateral relation have emerged, and recognizing them enables a deeper understanding of the opportunities and limits likely to be afforded, for Russia, Turkey, and the region: (a) pragmatism, (b) a multivectored approach to the bilateral relation, (c) commonalities despite contradictions, and (d) durability even despite episodic antagonism. The Russian–Turkish rapprochement has become a defining feature of the Eurasian landscape, but remains an unequal one, on several counts: energy resources, geopolitical strength, military capability, and underlying demographics. Nonetheless, various factors make a deepening rapprochement likely: mutual desirability of increased trade, wariness toward the West, Turkey’s pursuit of a “no enemies” foreign policy, Russia’s interest in regional great-power status, and common interest in regional conflict resolution.

The political landscape of the Caucasus region has changed dramatically since the initial eruption of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the late 1980s-early1990s. Among other changes, Turkey and Russia have experienced a rapprochement in the 2000s that places them in a strong position to influence both the political leadership and the mass publics of Azerbaijan and Armenia to open negotiations with a new willingness to consider hitherto unacceptable solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Because of the domestic political tension-ratcheting knot within both Armenia and Azerbaijan that make concessionary approaches to N-K politically suicidal, external influence is essential. It is precisely here that Turkey and Russia are now – unlike earlier-uniquely and fortuitously positioned: Turkey is arguably in as effectual a position to influence Azerbaijan as Russia is to influence Armenia. Again, the Russian-Turkish rapprochement has changed the calculus of prospective resolution decisively, if not inevitably. Savaş ve Barış: Rusya, Türkiye ve Kafkaslar Sorununun İç Siyaset Boyutu Özet Kafkasya bölgesinin siyasi ilişkileri Dağlık-Karabağ sorununun ortaya çıktığı 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başından günümüze büyük ölçüde değişmiştir. Bu değişimlerin arasında önemli bir yer ise 2000'li yılların başından giderek artan Türkiye ile Rusya arasındaki yakınlaşma politikasıdır. Türkiye ve Rusya'yı Dağlık-Karabağ sorununun çözümünde özellikli bir yere konumlandıran dinamikler ise bu iki ülkenin Azeri ve Ermeni siyasi liderliğini ve kamuoyunu Dağlık-Karabağ sorununun çözümü doğrultusunda etkileme güçleridir. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan'ın iç siyasetinin içerisinde bulunduğu kör düğüm ve Dağlık-Karabağ sorunu etrafında gelişen hassasiyet nedeniyle soruna uzlaşmacı bir çözüm yolunu dış ülkelerin müdahalesine muhtaç hale getirmektedir. Tam da bu noktada Türkiye ve Rusya'nın ilişkilerinin gelişmesi ve Rusya'nın Ermenistan Türkiye'nin ise Azerbaycan üzerindeki etkin rölü bu iki ülkeyi geçmişin aksine çözüm sürecinde biricik bir konuma yerleştirmiştir.