Books by Erik Weber
Papers on Causation by Erik Weber
Jonathan Schaffer has argued that a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in juridical contex... more Jonathan Schaffer has argued that a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in juridical contexts: lawyers and judges should treat the causal relation as a quaternary relation, not as binary one. In this paper we investigate to what extent a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in genetics and in physics. We conclude that it is beneficial in these scientific domains. We also point out that the nature of the benefit differs in the three context (law, genetics, physics) that we discuss.
In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficiënt causal
explanation in Newton’s Princip... more In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficiënt causal
explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that:
(1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the
phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau-
sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in-
terventionist one.
(2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe-
nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly-
ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani-
cist one.
In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal
reali... more In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal
realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the
general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the
debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective
for causation in everyday ... more In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective
for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some
instances of it, thereby adding some esh to the skeleton that Hall
has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective
also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the
fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall's proposal
is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive
analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation,
traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up.
However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive
conceptual analysis can be useful.
In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth
value of causal... more In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth
value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not
depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to
causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic,
counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly
present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds
for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare
the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out
whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect
to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all
causal claims would be equally warranted.
Papers on Scientific Explanation by Erik Weber
In this paper we identify six theses that constitute core results of philosophical investigation ... more In this paper we identify six theses that constitute core results of philosophical investigation into the nature of mechanisms, and of the role that the search for and identification of mechanisms play in the sciences. These theses represent the fruits of the body of research that is now often called New Mechanism. We concisely present the main arguments for these theses. In the literature, these arguments are scattered and often implicit. Our analysis can guide future research in many ways: it provides critics of New Mechanism with clear targets, it can reduce misunderstandings, it can clarify differences of opinion among New Mechanists and it helps to define a research agenda for New Mechanists.
If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possible
causal relations, ... more If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possible
causal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of
these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring to
a situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) by
referring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.
Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain
behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes a
disposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositional
explanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. The
dispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs.
This paper deals with the functions of intentional explanations of actions
(IEAs), i.e., explana... more This paper deals with the functions of intentional explanations of actions
(IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent.
IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that
enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific
formats, i.e. contrastive and descriptive, which will enable us to discuss the functions of
IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more
contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of
view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have.
We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format.
This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary
and that their functions are complementary
Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, ... more Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanation... more In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about microexplanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus value in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontological unification in the sense defined by Uskali Mäki. We argue that providing unificatory information may lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodward's concept of explanatory power for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations.
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This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl H... more This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
Papers in Social Epistemology by Erik Weber
Ethiek & Maatschappij, 2018
Statements about the importance of transcending disciplinary boundaries are common in mission sta... more Statements about the importance of transcending disciplinary boundaries are common in mission statements of universities, research councils and funding agencies. A closer look at these statements reveals some ambiguities. In order to remove these ambiguities, we propose-in the first part of this paper-a conceptual framework that differentiates between interdisciplinarity, multi-disciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. The term 'cross-disciplinarity' is proposed as overarching label for all discipline-transcending endeavours. In the second part of this paper we analyse and evaluate the scope of the existing funding channels for cross-disciplinary research in Flanders, as well as the selection criteria these channels use. In this way, we provide some tools for reflection on the proper functioning of such specific funding channels and formulate recommendations for improving them. The conceptual framework presented in the first part is used in this analysis. Inleiding Bruggen bouwen Het idee dat er 'bruggen moeten gebouwd worden tussen wetenschappelijke dis-ciplines' is alomtegenwoordig in visieteksten van wetenschappelijke verenigingen en universiteiten. In het rapport Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research van de Amerikaanse nationale wetenschappelijke academies lezen we bijvoorbeeld: Some of the most interesting scientific questions are found at the interfaces between disciplines and in the white spaces on organizational charts. Exploring such interfaces and interstices leads investiga-1. Erik Weber is gewoon hoogleraar wetenschapsfilosofie aan de UGent. Julie Mennes is als FWO Aspirant werkzaam aan de UGent. Beide zijn verbonden aan het Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science (CLPS).
– Why finance scientific research? An essay on the value of science, with case studies in sociolo... more – Why finance scientific research? An essay on the value of science, with case studies in sociology and criminology. In this article we discuss the question which benefits society might rightfully expect from scientific research projects that are being funded from public means. First, we distinguish between three possible benefits. Then we explain three principles that can be used by policy makers and that correspond to those three possible benefits. Finally, we illustrate our findings using recent discussions within the disciplines of sociology and criminology.
In the Netherlands and Flanders, a debate on the Dutch spelling has been raging between, on the o... more In the Netherlands and Flanders, a debate on the Dutch spelling has been raging between, on the one hand, the 'green spellers', who follow the official 'green spelling', and, on the other hand, the protesting 'white spellers', who espouse an alternative spelling. In the present article, this debate will be approached from a socio-epistemological perspective. Using the theory of Helen Longino, we highlight how the debate between the parties has been conducted, and explain why it failed to become a fruitful debate, based on a critical discourse and by which both parties strive for objective knowledge. We also draw a few lessons for the future.
Papers on Other Topics by Erik Weber
Ethiek & Maatschappij, 2019
The Scottish physician James Lind is famous for the experiments on potential cures of scurvy whic... more The Scottish physician James Lind is famous for the experiments on potential cures of scurvy which he performed in 1747 on board of the British navy vessel HMS Salisbury. In this paper we use Lind's experiments and their shortcomings to explain important contemporary methodological standards for bio-medical research and the rationale behind these standards. We also describe the genesis of these methodological standards. Inleiding De Schotse arts James Lind was een sleutelfiguur in het onderzoek naar de oorza-ken van, en remedies tegen, scheurbuik. Zijn bekendheid heeft hij vooral te dan-ken aan het experimenteel onderzoek dat hij in 1747 uitvoerde aan boord van het Britse marineschip HMS Salisbury. In dat onderzoek vergeleek hij de werking van zes-in die tijd populaire-behandelingen van scheurbuik. Over dit experimen-teel onderzoek en allerlei andere aspecten van scheurbuik (o.a. zijn theorieën over de oorzaak ervan) publiceerde Lind in 1753 het boek A Treatise of the Scurvy. Ter gelegenheid van de 200 ste verjaardag van de eerste publicatie werd het boek opnieuw uitgegeven onder de titel 'Lind's Treatise on Scurvy. A Bicentenary Volume Containing a Reprint of the First Edition of A Treatise of the Scurvy by James Lind' (Stewart & Guthrie 1953). Het onderzoek van Lind is om een aantal redenen een interessant onderwerp voor een gevalstudie. Ten eerste is het materiaal, dankzij de herdruk van het boek, nog steeds gemakkelijk beschikbaar. Ten tweede is het zo dat Lind zes biomedi-sche experimenten deed (één per onderzochte behandeling) met een basis-structuur zoals we die nu nog steeds zien in biomedische experimenten waarin de 1. Erik Weber is als gewoon hoogleraar verbonden aan het Centrum voor Logica en Wetenschapsfi-losofie van de Universiteit Gent. Leen De Vreese is postdoctoraal onderzoeker in hetzelfde centrum. De auteurs danken Roxan Degeyter voor het nalezen van deze tekst. Dit artikel is vrij beschikbaar onder de Creative Commons licentie CC-BY-NC-ND.
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Books by Erik Weber
Papers on Causation by Erik Weber
explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that:
(1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the
phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau-
sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in-
terventionist one.
(2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe-
nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly-
ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani-
cist one.
realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the
general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the
debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some
instances of it, thereby adding some esh to the skeleton that Hall
has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective
also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the
fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall's proposal
is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive
analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation,
traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up.
However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive
conceptual analysis can be useful.
value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not
depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to
causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic,
counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly
present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds
for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare
the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out
whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect
to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all
causal claims would be equally warranted.
Papers on Scientific Explanation by Erik Weber
causal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of
these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring to
a situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) by
referring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.
Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain
behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes a
disposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositional
explanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. The
dispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs.
(IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent.
IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that
enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific
formats, i.e. contrastive and descriptive, which will enable us to discuss the functions of
IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more
contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of
view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have.
We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format.
This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary
and that their functions are complementary
Papers in Social Epistemology by Erik Weber
Papers on Other Topics by Erik Weber
explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that:
(1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the
phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau-
sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in-
terventionist one.
(2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe-
nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly-
ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani-
cist one.
realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the
general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the
debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some
instances of it, thereby adding some esh to the skeleton that Hall
has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective
also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the
fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall's proposal
is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive
analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation,
traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up.
However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive
conceptual analysis can be useful.
value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not
depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to
causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic,
counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly
present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds
for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare
the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out
whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect
to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all
causal claims would be equally warranted.
causal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of
these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring to
a situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) by
referring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.
Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain
behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes a
disposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositional
explanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. The
dispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs.
(IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent.
IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that
enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific
formats, i.e. contrastive and descriptive, which will enable us to discuss the functions of
IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more
contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of
view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have.
We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format.
This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary
and that their functions are complementary
For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about
their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts
cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is:
is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does
it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing
them to analogous questions that have been investigated for
scientic explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been
proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unication, and (iii) explanatory
dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the
former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical
explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion
(in modifed format) holds of them.
that this standard view is too restrictive: the practical value of causal
knowledge is wider. In §3 we introduce the distinction between ‘manipulative policy’ and ‘selective policy’ as a theoretical framework to account for this wider practical value.