Generics express generalizations in the linguistic form «Ks are F», where K denotes a category or... more Generics express generalizations in the linguistic form «Ks are F», where K denotes a category or its members and F a property (for instance, «Tigers are striped» or «Women are emotional»). Generics seem to play a key role in fostering the belief that the members of certain categories share properties and dispositions due to a supposed common essence. It has then been argued that generics concerning discriminated social categories are especially insidious because they could favor prejudice on the same. However, it is still debated whether generics lead to essentialize more than quantified generalizations, such as «Most Ks are F». In this paper, we argue that we nonetheless have good reasons to consider generics as more problematic than quantified generalizations: if, on the one hand, there is no conclusive evidence that generics and quantified sentences lead to essentialize to a different extent, on the other hand, generics are particularly difficult to counter. Moreover, the properties predicated in generics are interpreted as widespread even though generics are also accepted based on limited evidence. This asymmetry in the interpretation of generics highlights a distinctive mechanism through which stereotypes can be transmitted and proliferate.
Generics (e.g., "Ravens are black") express generalizations about categories or their members. Pr... more Generics (e.g., "Ravens are black") express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, "social generics"). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth-Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth-Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.
In this paper, we argue that, although neglected so far, there is a strong link between generics ... more In this paper, we argue that, although neglected so far, there is a strong link between generics and testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice is a form of epistemic injustice that “occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007: 1). Generics are sentences that express generalizations about a category or about its members without specifying what proportion of the category members possess the predicated property. We argue that generics are especially suited to cause testimonial injustice for three reasons. First, generics elicit an “inferential asymmetry” (Cimpian et al. Cogn Sci 34(8):1452–1482, 2010). That is, generics are accepted even if only a few individuals possess the predicated property but are, nonetheless, taken to refer to almost all the members of the category. This peculiar combination makes generics particularly apt to cause testimonial injustice. High resistance to counter-evidence is a crucial feature of prejudice, the cause of testimonial injustice, and the more highly predictive a generalization the more it will be employed in concrete situations, leading to instances of testimonial injustice. Second, generics seem to play a key role in leading people to develop essentialist beliefs (Gelman et al. Cogn Psychol 61(3): 273–301, 2010; Rhodes et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci 109(34): 13526–13531, 2012). Subjects holding such beliefs treat categories as warranting strong generaliations over their members. Therefore, they will be more likely to rely on prejudice while dealing with the category members. Finally, generics are outstandingly common in everyday speech. Hence, their noxious effects are amplified by their diffusion and should not be underestimated.
Slurs are offensive expressions targeting individuals on the basis of their membership to certain... more Slurs are offensive expressions targeting individuals on the basis of their membership to certain social groups. Some authors have argued that the offensiveness of slurs is related to the semantic encoding of stereotypes in their meaning. As noticed by Robin Jeshion (2011, 2013a, 2013b), the stereotypical strategies do not seem to provide a satisfactory analysis of slurs' functional traits. Herein, I propose to modify her view by making a distinction between two offensive dimensions of slurs: a negative expressive component encoded in the semantic content and directed toward a certain group of individuals, and the social generics related to that group conveyed as conversational implicatures.
Generics express generalizations in the linguistic form «Ks are F», where K denotes a category or... more Generics express generalizations in the linguistic form «Ks are F», where K denotes a category or its members and F a property (for instance, «Tigers are striped» or «Women are emotional»). Generics seem to play a key role in fostering the belief that the members of certain categories share properties and dispositions due to a supposed common essence. It has then been argued that generics concerning discriminated social categories are especially insidious because they could favor prejudice on the same. However, it is still debated whether generics lead to essentialize more than quantified generalizations, such as «Most Ks are F». In this paper, we argue that we nonetheless have good reasons to consider generics as more problematic than quantified generalizations: if, on the one hand, there is no conclusive evidence that generics and quantified sentences lead to essentialize to a different extent, on the other hand, generics are particularly difficult to counter. Moreover, the properties predicated in generics are interpreted as widespread even though generics are also accepted based on limited evidence. This asymmetry in the interpretation of generics highlights a distinctive mechanism through which stereotypes can be transmitted and proliferate.
Generics (e.g., "Ravens are black") express generalizations about categories or their members. Pr... more Generics (e.g., "Ravens are black") express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, "social generics"). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth-Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth-Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.
In this paper, we argue that, although neglected so far, there is a strong link between generics ... more In this paper, we argue that, although neglected so far, there is a strong link between generics and testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice is a form of epistemic injustice that “occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007: 1). Generics are sentences that express generalizations about a category or about its members without specifying what proportion of the category members possess the predicated property. We argue that generics are especially suited to cause testimonial injustice for three reasons. First, generics elicit an “inferential asymmetry” (Cimpian et al. Cogn Sci 34(8):1452–1482, 2010). That is, generics are accepted even if only a few individuals possess the predicated property but are, nonetheless, taken to refer to almost all the members of the category. This peculiar combination makes generics particularly apt to cause testimonial injustice. High resistance to counter-evidence is a crucial feature of prejudice, the cause of testimonial injustice, and the more highly predictive a generalization the more it will be employed in concrete situations, leading to instances of testimonial injustice. Second, generics seem to play a key role in leading people to develop essentialist beliefs (Gelman et al. Cogn Psychol 61(3): 273–301, 2010; Rhodes et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci 109(34): 13526–13531, 2012). Subjects holding such beliefs treat categories as warranting strong generaliations over their members. Therefore, they will be more likely to rely on prejudice while dealing with the category members. Finally, generics are outstandingly common in everyday speech. Hence, their noxious effects are amplified by their diffusion and should not be underestimated.
Slurs are offensive expressions targeting individuals on the basis of their membership to certain... more Slurs are offensive expressions targeting individuals on the basis of their membership to certain social groups. Some authors have argued that the offensiveness of slurs is related to the semantic encoding of stereotypes in their meaning. As noticed by Robin Jeshion (2011, 2013a, 2013b), the stereotypical strategies do not seem to provide a satisfactory analysis of slurs' functional traits. Herein, I propose to modify her view by making a distinction between two offensive dimensions of slurs: a negative expressive component encoded in the semantic content and directed toward a certain group of individuals, and the social generics related to that group conveyed as conversational implicatures.
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Papers by Federico Cella