Salvador Barbera
Emeritus Professor in Economics at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and the Barcelona School of Economics. I am a member of the Board of the MOVE Foundation and the Barcelona School of Economics. I got my PhD from Northwestern University (1975). I taught at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (1975—77) and Universidad del País Vasco (1978—86), and have been visiting professor at Stanford University, California Institute of Technology, École Polytechnique and Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse. My research focuses on public economics, utility theory, game theory and incentives. More specifically, I am specialist in social choice theory, mechanism design and voting methods. I have co-edited a Handbook of Utility Theory, and my research articles have been published in Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Political Economy, the American Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and Social Choice and Welfare, among others. I am a Fellow of the Econometric Society, the Asociación Española de Economía, the Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, the Game Theory Society. I was a recipient of the Rey Juan Carlos Award in Economics (1996), the XVIII Prize from the Fundació Catalana per a la Recerca i la Innovació (FCRI) (2007), the Rey Jaume I Award (2008), the Spanish National Research Prize “Pascual Madoz” in Social Sciences and Economics (2010). I am Doctor Honoris Causa from the Universidad Pablo de Olavide (2007). I am past-president of the Social Choice and Welfare Society and of the Southern European Economics Association (ASSET). I served in the Council of different learned societies, including the Econometric Society, the Social Choice and Welfare Society and the Game Theory Society, and was director of the Spanish Economic Review, and a member of the board of different journals like Econometrica, Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Social Choice and Welfare, Mathematical Social Sciences, Journal of Public Economic Theory, and the Review of Economic Design.I served as General Secretary of Research and Technological Policies in the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (2004—2006). Prior to that, between 2000 and 2004, I was the first director of the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA). I was a member of the “Spanish Council of Universities”, by appointment of the Spanish Congress, (1984—88), and of the Spanish Goverment, (2004—06).
Address: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
FACULTAT ECONOMIA I EMPRESA- Edifici B
Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès)
Barcelona
Spain
Address: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
FACULTAT ECONOMIA I EMPRESA- Edifici B
Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès)
Barcelona
Spain
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English-Publications by Salvador Barbera
prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive
procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely
that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment
procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas.
Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas
allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It
turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles
for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the
simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation
once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority
voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about
agenda manipulation.
among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations
by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. Our main non-recursive
definition turns out to be equivalent, in our context, to the requirement that truthful preference revelation
should be a strong coalition-proof equilibrium, as recursively defined by Peleg and Sudhölter (1998, 1999).
We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules separating those that satisfy it from those that do not
for a large family of public good decision problems.
to appoint officers. One of the parties (the proposer) selects k candidates from a larger pool,
and then the other party (the chooser) selects the winner from this restricted list. We investigate
conditions under which the two parties could agree ex ante on the distributions of roles, one of
them preferring to be the chooser and the other preferring to be the proposer. We show that this
may not always be possible, and discuss what are the relevant characteristics of the environments
where agreement can be reached.
them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.
prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive
procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely
that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment
procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas.
Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas
allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It
turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles
for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the
simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation
once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority
voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about
agenda manipulation.
among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations
by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. Our main non-recursive
definition turns out to be equivalent, in our context, to the requirement that truthful preference revelation
should be a strong coalition-proof equilibrium, as recursively defined by Peleg and Sudhölter (1998, 1999).
We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules separating those that satisfy it from those that do not
for a large family of public good decision problems.
to appoint officers. One of the parties (the proposer) selects k candidates from a larger pool,
and then the other party (the chooser) selects the winner from this restricted list. We investigate
conditions under which the two parties could agree ex ante on the distributions of roles, one of
them preferring to be the chooser and the other preferring to be the proposer. We show that this
may not always be possible, and discuss what are the relevant characteristics of the environments
where agreement can be reached.
them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.