Papers by Elise Crull
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2024
In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's ... more In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett-Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straightforwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.
Zygon Journal of Religion and Science, 2023
It is shown that and why smaller fluctuations result from the super-position of quantized normal ... more It is shown that and why smaller fluctuations result from the super-position of quantized normal modes than those claimed by Einstein: Equation (II) and (III) compared to (IV). §1. In a discussion about the Einsteinian light quanta held about a year ago, Frau T. Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa made a remark that can be formulated as follows: Einstein had derived his equation for energy fluctuations of a volume element in the black radiation field from Planck's radiation formula and got this result: the magnitude of these fluctuations is incompatible with the conception of the radiation field as a superposition of light waves.
in *Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics*, 2021
Saturn's moon Hyperion is one of the solar system's strangest bodies. Described in Bokulich (2008... more Saturn's moon Hyperion is one of the solar system's strangest bodies. Described in Bokulich (2008, p. 23) as "approximately three times the size of the state of Massachusetts and... roughly the shape of a potato," its irregular shape when coupled with inhomogeneous gravitational forces from Saturn and surrounding moons should leave Hyperion in a spatial orientation that is a coherent superposition over 57 degrees (Zurek & Paz, 1997). But this is not what is observed. Hyperion appears to occupy definite orientations-not a superposition of positions-as it chaotically tumbles around Saturn. Or consider optical isomers like the sugar and ammonia molecules. Optical isomers have identical atomic composition and structure (therefore the same quantum state description) but dissimilar chirality (therefore different optical properties). In the ground state their position eigenstates are "left-handed" or "right-handed"; if these eigenstates are possible states, then coherent superpositions of left-and right-handedness are also possible states. However, while the ammonia molecule is typically observed in a superposition of chiral states, the sugar molecule is observed in a handed eigenstate. Why does nature act according to our expectations regarding the ammonia molecule's spatial position but contrary to our expectations in the case of sugar? Lastly, consider Bohr's planetary atomic model of 1913. In it, electrons occupy definite energy states and perform instantaneous quantum jumps to transition to higher or lower energy orbitals. This model successfully explained certain atomic spectra despite its incorrect assumption that electrons always occupy an energy eigenstate instead of superpositions of such states. These puzzles drawn from the macro-, meso-and microscopic domains, respectively, all find an explanation in decoherence. Below these explanations are provided, but first decoherence and relevant concepts are defined (§2). Then (§3) the most widely adopted
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2017
The celebrated Dreimännerarbeit by Born, Heisenberg and Jordan contains a matrix-mechanical deriv... more The celebrated Dreimännerarbeit by Born, Heisenberg and Jordan contains a matrix-mechanical derivation by Jordan of Einstein's formula for blackbody fluctuations. Jordan appears to have considered this to be one of his finest contributions to quantum theory, but the status of his derivation is puzzling. In our Dreimenschenarbeit, we show how to understand what Jordan was doing in the double context of a Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics and of the early 'statistical interpretation' of matrix mechanics.
Foundations of Physics, 2017
Recently I published an article in this journal entitled “Less interpretation and more decoherenc... more Recently I published an article in this journal entitled “Less interpretation and more decoherence in quantum gravity and inflationary cosmology” (Crull in Found Phys 45(9):1019–1045, 2015). This article generated responses from three pairs of authors: Vassallo and Esfeld (Found Phys 45(12):1533–1536, 2015), Okon and Sudarsky (Found Phys 46(7):852–879, 2016) and Fortin and Lombardi (Found Phys, 2017). In what follows, I reply to the criticisms raised by these authors.
Foundations of Physics, 2015
I argue that quantum decoherence—understood as a dynamical process entailed by the standard forma... more I argue that quantum decoherence—understood as a dynamical process entailed by the standard formalism alone—carries us beyond conceptual aspects of non-relativistic quantum mechanics deemed insurmountable by many contributors to the recent quantum gravity and cosmology literature. These aspects include various incarnations of the measurement problem and of the quantum-to-classical puzzle. Not only can such problems be largely bypassed or dissolved without default to a particular interpretation, but theoretical work in relativistic arenas stands to gain substantial physical and philosophical insight by incorporating decoherence phenomena.
I argue, as have others before me, that universal quantum entanglement entails the failure of par... more I argue, as have others before me, that universal quantum entanglement entails the failure of part-whole relations wherein at least one of the relata is meant to be a well-defined physical system. I then argue that the universal process of quantum decoherence explains the appearance of physical systems as well-defined when in fact they are highly entangled. Furthermore, the growing corpus of experimental confirmation of decoherence processes in wildly diverse situations indicates that nature is impervious to how we slice it.
Advocates of scientific realism typically respond to the challenge of the pessimistic meta-induct... more Advocates of scientific realism typically respond to the challenge of the pessimistic meta-induction by turning to the history of science. The episode most frequently discussed is the shift from Fresnel's wave theory of light to Maxwell's electromagnetism. This particular history is taken to represent one of the hardest problems for the realist, for while it exhibits continuity on the empirical level, it simultaneously represents a dramatic shift in ontology. Thus, various authors have proposed methods for defeating the pessimistic meta-induction based solely on consideration of the Fresnel-Maxwell case.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017
Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from... more Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from John Worrall’s “Structural Realism” in which he defends a position (since characterized “epistemic structural realism”) whose historical roots he attributes to Poincaré. In the renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincaré’s name associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincaré’s structuralism is deeply entwined with neo-Kantianism and the roles of convention and objectivity within science. In this article we explore the nature of these dependencies. What emerges is not only a clearer picture of Poincaré’s position regarding structuralism but also two arguments for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that of Worrall.
Books by Elise Crull
Ch. 10 in *Grete Hermann: Between Physics and Philosophy*, 2017
Those who are acquainted with Grete Hermann’s 1935 essay on the natural- philosophical foundation... more Those who are acquainted with Grete Hermann’s 1935 essay on the natural- philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics have, rightly, understood one of her main aims to be in line with that of many neo-Kantians: to preserve the law of causality in light of quantum mechanics’ apparent in- determinism. Because Hermann’s solution to the question of quantum mechanical indeterminism—and, relatedly, the question of quantum mechanical completeness—is uniquely posed and answered by appeal to retrodictive causality, what little philosophical scholarship has been done on Hermann’s 1935 essay has focused on this aspect of her work.
Historians, on the other hand, have tended to regard more closely the natural-philosophical tradition in their analysis of Hermann. The locus of their investigations has been to understand the extent to which this tradition’s specific interpretation of Kantian categories as analogies influences Hermann’s discussion of the physics, as a student in Nelson’s Friesian school.
It is clear Hermann’s 1935 paper yields riches for each discipline her analysis touches upon. What I aim to do in the following is suggest that while the above-mentioned investigations of her paper have gone a long way to showcase these riches, perhaps one of her most novel—and I argue, central— claims gets lost between the historical perspective (specifically neo-Kantian or natural-philosophical) and the philosophical one (specifically philosophy of physics). More plainly, one might be tempted to read Hermann’s investigation of quantum mechanics as a means to a premeditated end, namely the salvaging of causality. But one can discern in this work a far deeper claim: that what she calls the ‘most important lesson from quantum mechanics’— the relative context of observation—applies not just metaphorically and only to quantum mechanics, but to the full range of natural knowledge.
Book Reviews by Elise Crull
Philosophy of Science, 2023
Review of Heisenberg, "Ordering and Reality"
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Papers by Elise Crull
Books by Elise Crull
Historians, on the other hand, have tended to regard more closely the natural-philosophical tradition in their analysis of Hermann. The locus of their investigations has been to understand the extent to which this tradition’s specific interpretation of Kantian categories as analogies influences Hermann’s discussion of the physics, as a student in Nelson’s Friesian school.
It is clear Hermann’s 1935 paper yields riches for each discipline her analysis touches upon. What I aim to do in the following is suggest that while the above-mentioned investigations of her paper have gone a long way to showcase these riches, perhaps one of her most novel—and I argue, central— claims gets lost between the historical perspective (specifically neo-Kantian or natural-philosophical) and the philosophical one (specifically philosophy of physics). More plainly, one might be tempted to read Hermann’s investigation of quantum mechanics as a means to a premeditated end, namely the salvaging of causality. But one can discern in this work a far deeper claim: that what she calls the ‘most important lesson from quantum mechanics’— the relative context of observation—applies not just metaphorically and only to quantum mechanics, but to the full range of natural knowledge.
Book Reviews by Elise Crull
Historians, on the other hand, have tended to regard more closely the natural-philosophical tradition in their analysis of Hermann. The locus of their investigations has been to understand the extent to which this tradition’s specific interpretation of Kantian categories as analogies influences Hermann’s discussion of the physics, as a student in Nelson’s Friesian school.
It is clear Hermann’s 1935 paper yields riches for each discipline her analysis touches upon. What I aim to do in the following is suggest that while the above-mentioned investigations of her paper have gone a long way to showcase these riches, perhaps one of her most novel—and I argue, central— claims gets lost between the historical perspective (specifically neo-Kantian or natural-philosophical) and the philosophical one (specifically philosophy of physics). More plainly, one might be tempted to read Hermann’s investigation of quantum mechanics as a means to a premeditated end, namely the salvaging of causality. But one can discern in this work a far deeper claim: that what she calls the ‘most important lesson from quantum mechanics’— the relative context of observation—applies not just metaphorically and only to quantum mechanics, but to the full range of natural knowledge.