Papers by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Feb 23, 2018
In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relati... more In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relationships is desirable, one argument centers on the question whether this love pill would secure the final value we attribute to love. Sven Nyholm argues that it would not, because one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others feel for us. In a reply, Hichem Naar argues against Nyholm that a love pill does not need to be incompatible with the final value we attribute to love and that a love pill can have a facilitating role in the creation and sustainment of loving attachment. I think Naar is right but does not address Nyholm's worry completely. I will argue that Naar and Nyholm are speaking of different ends for which the love pill
DiGeSt. Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, May 16, 2021
Algemeen Nederlands tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte, Oct 1, 2020
Heb uw naasten lief!' Dat klinkt in de oren van de meesten toch op zijn minst wat droog of ouderw... more Heb uw naasten lief!' Dat klinkt in de oren van de meesten toch op zijn minst wat droog of ouderwets. De klank van een religieus gebod uit een tijd waarin zoiets nog invloed had op ons dagelijkse leven. Vandaag lijkt zo'n morele verplichting niet populair. We voelen ons bevrijd van door macht gedreven kerkelijke instituties en prijzen individualisme. Daarnaast zijn religies historisch gezien niet bepaald het schoolvoorbeeld van liefde voor de ander. Hedendaagse filosofen stellen bovendien: 'liefde valt buiten het morele domein', of: 'liefde is niet redelijk'. Maar hebben we niet juist behoefte aan zo'n verbinding tussen liefde en moraliteit? Hedendaagse maatschappelijke uitdagingen lijken zich te concentreren rondom zelfzuchtigheid, waarbij inderdaad liefdevolle aandacht voor de ander ontbreekt: polarisatie, segregatie, het zoeken van zwarte schapen, haat voor de ander, groepsuitsluiting, identiteitspolitiek en leven in onze zogenaamde bubbel. Wat met het idee dat liefhebben de morele houding is? Als liefhebben je een goed mens maakt?
Ethical Perspectives, 2022
What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social j... more What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social justice, we might be more inclined to say that cancel culture is morally good. However, one could argue that cancel culture has too harsh consequences or involves immoraleven hatefulbehaviour. We propose that cancel culture is used as an umbrella term for (at least) two different kinds of 'cancelling'. Cancelling is in the public debate often seen as punishment. Following Radzik's objections to social punishment we argue that this kind of cancelling is morally reprehensible. However, cancel culture as an umbrella term encapsules other kinds of cancelling, too. Many also refer to cancel culture as a phenomenon when someone is being called out or held accountable for their supposedly problematic behaviour. Such cancelling does not need to be punishment, but is often rather an attempt to remove privileged access to the public sphere. In this way, cancelling is used as a tool for redistributing attention: it can (re)claim attention and recognition for marginalized perspectives, by a radical attempt to deny a privileged person access to the public sphere. We conclude that cancel culture as a whole cannot be seen as either morally good or bad, because 'cancelling' can be used as a tool for both punishment and redistribution. Each have their own moral implications: cancelling as punishment is reprehensible, but cancelling to redistribute attention might be less of a problem.
The Moral Psychology of Love, 2022
In The right to be loved, Matthew Liao claims that children have a right to be loved (2015). He a... more In The right to be loved, Matthew Liao claims that children have a right to be loved (2015). He argues that children, as human beings, have rights to the primary essential conditions for a good life and that being loved as children is a primary essential condition for a good life: children need to be loved in order to be adequate, functioning individuals. Therefore, he claims, children have a right to be loved. Liao furthermore argues that all human beings have a moral duty to provide that love, addressing objections that there would be no appropriate obligation-holder if parents die while a child is young. This moral obligation to provide love is considered controversial. Could there be such a thing as a duty to love? Mhairi Cowden criticizes Liao by arguing that there might be a right to care, but not to love (2012). This raises questions about what 'love' entails. Whether love can be the object of an obligation might depend on what kind of love one has in mind. Some philosophers think of love as an emotion (
New Philosophical Essays in Love and Loving (edited by Cushing, S.). Palgrave Macmillan, 2021
Recent philosophical discussions about love often focus on reasons to love a particular person. S... more Recent philosophical discussions about love often focus on reasons to love a particular person. Some philosophers argue that we do not have reasons to love (Frankfurt 2009; Smuts 2013; Zangwill 2013), but rather that our love for that particular person gives us reasons. Harry Frankfurt argues that what we love is important to us just because we love it. Others argue that we do have reasons to love the particular people we love, but disagree on what these reasons consist in. For example, the reason for love is the properties of the object of our love (Abrahamson and Leite 2011; Jollimore 2011; Keller 2000), such as being funny, or having beautiful eyes, or our relationship with this person (Kolodny 2003). In these recent discussions philosophers of love seem to primarily focus on 'reasons to love person X'. But what about 'reasons to love, period'? Focusing on why we love and what love is in general, enables us to look at what we find meaningful in love, instead of what we find valuable in the beloved. Focusing on the lover instead of the beloved could improve the way we love in general, improving our relationships with all those particular X's. Focusing on the loving agent could help answer questions such as: 'what does it mean to love?' and 'how can we love better?'. Apart from describing what love is, one could independently argue about what kind of love would be more or less valuable. We could categorize better and worse forms of love. In this chapter this normative dimension of the concept 'love' is considered. Such a project is not trying to formulate the description of 'love', but is focusing on what would be better or worse forms of loving. Furthermore, this chapter is what Sally Haslanger has called an 'ameliorative' project (Haslanger 2012). Such a project involves trying to formulate a concept that best suits the point of having such a term. What is the purpose of talking about love? An ameliorative project requires actively making decisions about what to mean when using it. How can we change the world around us for the better and improve how we use the concept 'love'? In this sense, ameliorative projects can be important for social progress. What use of the word 'love' could improve the way we love and how could it impact society? 'All about love' by bell hooks is such an ameliorative project about love. Using personal anecdotes, psychological and philosophical ideas, she criticizes the way in which 'love' is used in today's societywhich is, according to her, 'without much meaning', for example when referring to how much we like our favorite food, color or sportsand instead argues that if we all came to the agreement that 'love' is a verb rather than a noun, then we would all be happier (hooks 2001, p. 4). hooks believes love is more of an interactive process, and clarifies why society needs to adopt this use of the word love. What should this particular 'verb' consist in? In line with hooks I argue that we would all love better if we think of love as a verb: love as an activity of attending to one another. Love as an ongoing practice, a process. I turn to two famous contemporary analytic philosophers, who have argued for different but related accounts of love. By comparing David Velleman's and Iris Murdoch's account of love I argue that Velleman's account is not suitable for the ameliorative project while Murdoch's account enables us to be better lovers. I argue that better love consists of an activity of loving, instead of a passive evaluation. While love can be understood in many ways, at least one aspect of it is captured in the slogan: 'love' is a verb. This slogan captures the idea that loving is an activity and furthermore a specific activity: loving means engaging in an ongoing practice of loving attention, a process that requires continuous work. I will argue that Murdochian love is not only valuable for philosophers or people who are concerned with being morally good-which is Murdoch's focusand that Murdochian love is particularly valuable to ordinary lovers, to people who want meaningful loving relationships. 2. Love, Value and Looking In 'Love as a Moral Emotion', Velleman attempts to assemble elements of both Murdoch and Kant into an account of love as a moral emotion (Velleman 1999). This famous contemporary account of love is meant to address and combat Frankfurt's position: love is not a response to reasons but is in fact the basis of all reasons. On Frankfurt's account, the lover cares for the beloved, desires their well-being, and, in doing so, comes to confer value upon the beloved. Against this bestowal view of love, Velleman argues for the appraisal view of love inspired by Iris Murdoch. Murdoch, Kant and Velleman all allow that value may be discerned or figuratively seen, as Tony Milligan has observed in his analysis of Velleman's use of Murdoch's account of love (2013, p. 113). Velleman adopts Murdoch's idea that this value may be seen by 'really looking' (Velleman 1999, p. 343). Murdoch's account of love and Kant's account of respect are taken by Velleman to be complementary ways in which we recognize the inherent value of persons. Velleman takes different features from both philosopher's work, and is not alone in placing Murdoch's ideas within a Kantian perspective. 1 Velleman, being a Kantian, argues that our value, our dignity as persons, consists in our rational nature. One important way in which we exercise our rational nature is to respond with respect to the dignity of other persons. We are aware of the incomparable value in a person as a rational being and this awareness arrests our motives of self-interest, and thereby prevents us from treating him as a means to our ends. This is what Velleman (and Kantians in general) call respect. Velleman argues that love is similarly a response to the dignity of persons, and as such it is the dignity of the object that justifies love. Velleman suggests that love, like respect, is an appreciation for the capacity to be "actuated by reasons" (p. 365), which means a capacity for "appreciating the value of ends, including self-existent ends such as persons". Velleman argues: "I find it plausible to say that what we respond to, in loving people, is their capacity to love" (p. 365). For Velleman, love and respect are responses to the same value, but they are different kinds of responses. Love arrests not our self-love, like respect does, but rather our emotional self-protection. Love disarms our emotional defenses, making us vulnerable, by responding to someone's dignity (p. 361). Velleman claims that: Many of our defenses against being emotionally affected by another person are ways of not seeing what is most affecting about him. This contrived blindness to the other person is among the defenses that are lifted by love, with the result that we really look at him, perhaps for the first time, and respond emotionally in a way that's indicative of having really seen him. (1999, p. 361). There is a clear parallel with Murdoch here. Velleman's view of love as arresting our selfprotective egocentricity helps to explain why love is an exercise in really looking, precisely as Murdoch claims. Velleman describes someone having "stopped loving his wife" as having "stopped really looking or listening" (p. 373). His account is clearly inspired by Murdoch, who claims that to love is to redirect our attention outside ourselves, to learn to perceive the 1 Although Murdoch regarded herself a Platonist, many philosophers have argued that her ideas are compatible with Kantian ideas, or have used her ideas within Kantian perspectives (cf.
Philosophy and Public Issues, 2020
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte, 2020
Heb uw naasten lief!' Dat klinkt in de oren van de meesten toch op zijn minst wat droog of ouderw... more Heb uw naasten lief!' Dat klinkt in de oren van de meesten toch op zijn minst wat droog of ouderwets. De klank van een religieus gebod uit een tijd waarin zoiets nog invloed had op ons dagelijkse leven. Vandaag lijkt zo'n morele verplichting niet populair. We voelen ons bevrijd van door macht gedreven kerkelijke instituties en prijzen individualisme. Daarnaast zijn religies historisch gezien niet bepaald het schoolvoorbeeld van liefde voor de ander. Hedendaagse filosofen stellen bovendien: 'liefde valt buiten het morele domein' , of: 'liefde is niet redelijk' .
In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relati... more In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relationships is desirable, one argument centres on the question whether this love pill would secure the final value we attribute to love. Sven Nyholm argues that it would not, because one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others feel for us. In a reply, Hichem Naar argues against Nyholm that a love pill does not need to be incompatible with the final value we attribute to love and that a love pill can have a facilitating role in the creation and sustainment of loving attachment. I think Naar is right but does not address Nyholm's worry completely. I will argue that Naar and Nyholm are speaking of different ends for which the love pill is used as a means, and that whether the love pill would fail or not fail to secure the final value we attribute to love, depends on this particular end.
Doctoral dissertation by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Doctoral dissertation, 2023
This doctoral dissertation is a collection of five published papers about a wide range of topics ... more This doctoral dissertation is a collection of five published papers about a wide range of topics (philosophy of love, feminism, cancel culture, biomedical enhancement). Love and morality are important concepts in all of them. More specifically: love and morality as inspired by philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch, who argues that loving is what makes us better human beings. I take Murdoch to debates where she is not a regular guest. In taking her to these different debates, this dissertation not only contributes to theoretical discussions, but also shows that Murdoch’s concept of love is relevant for the more practical and everyday questions we have today about loving, feminism and social justice.
An introductory chapter explains the overarching argument of the dissertation. I offer two new perspectives of Murdochian thought. In the first new perspective, I look at debates in contemporary analytical philosophy of love. Murdoch’s conception of love has been largely overlooked within this domain: contemporary discussions in analytical philosophy of love miss out on discussing love as moral. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love could offer additional insights about love and morality in these debates. If we open the debate up to conceptions of love that – like Murdoch’s – are (at least) compatible with morality, we could have discussions about how loving makes us better human beings. I furthermore argue that the contemporary analytical discussions that do view love as moral discuss a conception of love that leads to love involving egocentric fantasies. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love has advantages over these accounts, for viewing love as a liberation from (egocentric) fantasies.
While the first new Murdochian perspective brings Murdoch into existing contemporary debates, the second perspective is adding a contemporary perspective to Murdoch’s original theory. This second perspective takes as its central question: could Murdoch’s conception of love make our society a better place? I take Murdoch’s theory from her individualistic approach to a more social approach, focusing on socio-political structures. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love is relevant for contemporary fights for social justice. First, I argue that egocentric fantasies are particularly harmful, while focusing on social justice debates, such as feminism and anti-racism. Second, I suggest that Murdoch’s conception of love helps us move away from these egocentric fantasies. Through her concept of ‘love’ as moving from fantasy to reality, we can come to know the lived realities of others. This move takes Murdochian thought to a different level, incorporating contemporary insights from feminist philosophy, critical theory and social epistemology.
I demonstrate my argument with several publications in applied ethics. I consider the biomedical enhancement debate (‘the love pill’) and cancel culture (attention and diversity in the public sphere) as case studies and applications of what is argued for above.
Public philosophy by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
www.lottespreeuwenberg.com
Talks by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Sommige filosofen maken zich zorgen dat Iris Murdoch's concept van liefdevolle aandacht teveel pa... more Sommige filosofen maken zich zorgen dat Iris Murdoch's concept van liefdevolle aandacht teveel past in een ideologie van vrouwelijke ondergeschiktheid, vanwege haar idee van liefde als ‘onzelfzuchtig’ (Lovibond 2011). Deze zorgen zijn vergelijkbaar met feministische zorgen die zijn geuit tegen zorgethiek (Card 1990; Hampton 2006; Held 2006; Hoagland 1990; Houston 1990). Zowel de zorgethiek als Murdoch's concept van 'liefde' zouden de onderdrukking van vrouwen versterken door van hen een zichzelf wegcijferende praktijk te vragen.
Deze presentatie concentreert zich op drie belangrijke feministische kritieken op zorgethiek, die lijken te resoneren met de feministische zorgen aan Murdoch's adres. Ik beoog twee dingen: ten eerste worden zorgethiek en de moraaltheorie van Murdoch vergeleken middels de feministische kritieken die beiden hebben gekregen. Ten tweede wil ik een poging doen deze kritiek te beantwoorden vanuit een visie die is gebaseerd op Murdoch's ideeën en stellen dat het mogelijk is te komen tot een 'liefdesethiek' (in tegenstelling tot of beter gezegd een aanpassing of versterking van de zorgethiek) zonder de feministische zorgen over het hoofd te zien. Deze ‘liefdesethiek’ versterkt de onderdrukking van vrouwen niet en zou bovendien praktijken van onzelfzuchtigheid die schadelijk zijn actief tegen kunnen gaan.
Iris Murdoch's views on love and morality are original. This paper aims to make Murdoch's claims ... more Iris Murdoch's views on love and morality are original. This paper aims to make Murdoch's claims about love and morality more plausible, by anticipating some of her received critiques.
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Papers by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Doctoral dissertation by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
An introductory chapter explains the overarching argument of the dissertation. I offer two new perspectives of Murdochian thought. In the first new perspective, I look at debates in contemporary analytical philosophy of love. Murdoch’s conception of love has been largely overlooked within this domain: contemporary discussions in analytical philosophy of love miss out on discussing love as moral. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love could offer additional insights about love and morality in these debates. If we open the debate up to conceptions of love that – like Murdoch’s – are (at least) compatible with morality, we could have discussions about how loving makes us better human beings. I furthermore argue that the contemporary analytical discussions that do view love as moral discuss a conception of love that leads to love involving egocentric fantasies. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love has advantages over these accounts, for viewing love as a liberation from (egocentric) fantasies.
While the first new Murdochian perspective brings Murdoch into existing contemporary debates, the second perspective is adding a contemporary perspective to Murdoch’s original theory. This second perspective takes as its central question: could Murdoch’s conception of love make our society a better place? I take Murdoch’s theory from her individualistic approach to a more social approach, focusing on socio-political structures. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love is relevant for contemporary fights for social justice. First, I argue that egocentric fantasies are particularly harmful, while focusing on social justice debates, such as feminism and anti-racism. Second, I suggest that Murdoch’s conception of love helps us move away from these egocentric fantasies. Through her concept of ‘love’ as moving from fantasy to reality, we can come to know the lived realities of others. This move takes Murdochian thought to a different level, incorporating contemporary insights from feminist philosophy, critical theory and social epistemology.
I demonstrate my argument with several publications in applied ethics. I consider the biomedical enhancement debate (‘the love pill’) and cancel culture (attention and diversity in the public sphere) as case studies and applications of what is argued for above.
Public philosophy by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Talks by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Deze presentatie concentreert zich op drie belangrijke feministische kritieken op zorgethiek, die lijken te resoneren met de feministische zorgen aan Murdoch's adres. Ik beoog twee dingen: ten eerste worden zorgethiek en de moraaltheorie van Murdoch vergeleken middels de feministische kritieken die beiden hebben gekregen. Ten tweede wil ik een poging doen deze kritiek te beantwoorden vanuit een visie die is gebaseerd op Murdoch's ideeën en stellen dat het mogelijk is te komen tot een 'liefdesethiek' (in tegenstelling tot of beter gezegd een aanpassing of versterking van de zorgethiek) zonder de feministische zorgen over het hoofd te zien. Deze ‘liefdesethiek’ versterkt de onderdrukking van vrouwen niet en zou bovendien praktijken van onzelfzuchtigheid die schadelijk zijn actief tegen kunnen gaan.
An introductory chapter explains the overarching argument of the dissertation. I offer two new perspectives of Murdochian thought. In the first new perspective, I look at debates in contemporary analytical philosophy of love. Murdoch’s conception of love has been largely overlooked within this domain: contemporary discussions in analytical philosophy of love miss out on discussing love as moral. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love could offer additional insights about love and morality in these debates. If we open the debate up to conceptions of love that – like Murdoch’s – are (at least) compatible with morality, we could have discussions about how loving makes us better human beings. I furthermore argue that the contemporary analytical discussions that do view love as moral discuss a conception of love that leads to love involving egocentric fantasies. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love has advantages over these accounts, for viewing love as a liberation from (egocentric) fantasies.
While the first new Murdochian perspective brings Murdoch into existing contemporary debates, the second perspective is adding a contemporary perspective to Murdoch’s original theory. This second perspective takes as its central question: could Murdoch’s conception of love make our society a better place? I take Murdoch’s theory from her individualistic approach to a more social approach, focusing on socio-political structures. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love is relevant for contemporary fights for social justice. First, I argue that egocentric fantasies are particularly harmful, while focusing on social justice debates, such as feminism and anti-racism. Second, I suggest that Murdoch’s conception of love helps us move away from these egocentric fantasies. Through her concept of ‘love’ as moving from fantasy to reality, we can come to know the lived realities of others. This move takes Murdochian thought to a different level, incorporating contemporary insights from feminist philosophy, critical theory and social epistemology.
I demonstrate my argument with several publications in applied ethics. I consider the biomedical enhancement debate (‘the love pill’) and cancel culture (attention and diversity in the public sphere) as case studies and applications of what is argued for above.
Deze presentatie concentreert zich op drie belangrijke feministische kritieken op zorgethiek, die lijken te resoneren met de feministische zorgen aan Murdoch's adres. Ik beoog twee dingen: ten eerste worden zorgethiek en de moraaltheorie van Murdoch vergeleken middels de feministische kritieken die beiden hebben gekregen. Ten tweede wil ik een poging doen deze kritiek te beantwoorden vanuit een visie die is gebaseerd op Murdoch's ideeën en stellen dat het mogelijk is te komen tot een 'liefdesethiek' (in tegenstelling tot of beter gezegd een aanpassing of versterking van de zorgethiek) zonder de feministische zorgen over het hoofd te zien. Deze ‘liefdesethiek’ versterkt de onderdrukking van vrouwen niet en zou bovendien praktijken van onzelfzuchtigheid die schadelijk zijn actief tegen kunnen gaan.