Dušan Pavlović
Dušan Pavlović is political economist. He received his PhD from the Central European University in Budapest in October 2002. He is currently teaching political economy and public choice at the Faculty of political science, University of Belgrade. His areas of interes are political economy of democratic institutions, and rational and public choice theory. His latest book is about consolidation of democracy in Serbia after 2000 (2007), and Writings in Political Economy (2010).
less
InterestsView All (28)
Uploads
Papers by Dušan Pavlović
particularly on the period after 2000. Our main argument is that market fundamentalism,
which posits that the market is the most efficient solution for the postcommunist
transition, has failed to deliver on its promises. The expectation was that,
after a temporary transitional sacrifice, the worse-off would benefit equally with the
better-off by reaping the rewards of market economic reforms. The anticipated faster
growth was supposed to generate more quality jobs as the most effective means to
alleviate poverty. Unfortunately, growth has been sluggish, while inequalities in Serbia
have experienced rapid and persistent growth since 2000. We look into redistributive
reform measures to understand the reasons behind this outcome. Our approach
combines applied political philosophy with economic policy analysis – a unique intersection of two social science disciplines. Firstly, our research explores the implicit
and explicit normative foundations of postcommunist economic reforms. Secondly,
we identify and analyse a pivotal juncture of policy reform in the early 2000s. During
this period, the newly-adopted neoliberal taxation and social policies were combined
with class- and ethnic-based discriminatory approaches inherited from the pre-1990s
socialist era and the post-socialist 1990s, respectively. This combination resulted in distinct, notably pro-rich redistributive patterns in Serbia.
backdrop of two mass shootings in May, triggering a public outcry and widespread
protests that demanded increased security measures. Serbia’s political landscape,
characterized by a democratic façade but inherently unfair conditions for inter-party
competition, defined the elections’ outcome. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS),
led by President Vučić, was drawing on its incumbent advantage to realize its
predominance in media representation, misuse public funds, and manipulate voter
registers. The SNS secured an absolute majority with 46% of the votes. However,
allegations of electoral irregularities marred the elections. Instead of resolving societal
conflicts, the elections deepened existing tensions. Addressing these allegations
transparently and accountably will be crucial for restoring confidence and fostering
political stability in Serbia.
односно представљамо привредно стање у коме је Србија дочекала превремене изборе. У другом делу представљамо економске политике парламентарних странака и коалиција. У последњем делу износимо основне елементе економског дела програма владе (усвојеног 11. августа 2016. год) да би читаоци били у стању да упореде изборну понуду са владином економском политиком након избора.
We look into the electoral offer of the economic policies in Serbia during the 2016 campaign. We present the economic results of the Government of the Republic of Serbia during the past two years and describe the economic situation in which Serbia has welcomed the early elections. In the second part we present the economic policies of the parliamentary parties and coalitions. In the last section we present the basic elements of the economic part of the government’s program (adopted on August 11, 2016) so that readers were able to compare the election offer with the government’s economic policy after the elections.
i socijalnim procesima vidno se promenila. Diskusije iz
osamdesetih godina o superiornosti minimalne države
naspram države blagostanja dobile su nov oblik. Velika
finansijska kriza iz 2008. godine i kriza javnog duga iz 2009.
godine vratila je na velika vrata kejnzijanizam – državnu
intervenciju u privrednu aktivnost.
have changed the most. As empirical support, the author use the V-dem project data. The large number of this project’s sub-indices and indicators make it possible to determine more precisely which aspects of democratic institutions have experienced the greatest decline, but also to emphasize an important aspect of hybrid regimes—the fact that they have democratic institutions but a non-democratic practice.
the importance of state capture for other hybrid regimes’s critical areas such as elections and media. Although rigged elections and controlled media are important pillars of
hybrid regimes, they depend to a large extent on the public funds by which they can be financed. Extraction of public funds matters because these are used to pay both activists
who manipulate the electoral process in the field and the media that hide information on the basis of which citizens can decide how to vote. The issue of extraction has been understudied in the debates on the consolidation of democracy in Serbia after 2000 but also in the discussios on democratic decline.
institutionalization of the party system has been weakening. After more than a decade of stability, the year of 2012 marks a new cycle of turbulence in the Serbian party system. Eight years on, it resulted in the dominance of one party in the Serbian Parliament. Several parties from the 1990s and 2000s disappeared from the scene. I link institutionalization with clientelism, arguing that strong clientelism contributes significantly to weak institutionalization. To measure institutionalisation and clientelism, I use the V-dem index of institutionalization along with the sub-indices and indicators that make it up.
particularly on the period after 2000. Our main argument is that market fundamentalism,
which posits that the market is the most efficient solution for the postcommunist
transition, has failed to deliver on its promises. The expectation was that,
after a temporary transitional sacrifice, the worse-off would benefit equally with the
better-off by reaping the rewards of market economic reforms. The anticipated faster
growth was supposed to generate more quality jobs as the most effective means to
alleviate poverty. Unfortunately, growth has been sluggish, while inequalities in Serbia
have experienced rapid and persistent growth since 2000. We look into redistributive
reform measures to understand the reasons behind this outcome. Our approach
combines applied political philosophy with economic policy analysis – a unique intersection of two social science disciplines. Firstly, our research explores the implicit
and explicit normative foundations of postcommunist economic reforms. Secondly,
we identify and analyse a pivotal juncture of policy reform in the early 2000s. During
this period, the newly-adopted neoliberal taxation and social policies were combined
with class- and ethnic-based discriminatory approaches inherited from the pre-1990s
socialist era and the post-socialist 1990s, respectively. This combination resulted in distinct, notably pro-rich redistributive patterns in Serbia.
backdrop of two mass shootings in May, triggering a public outcry and widespread
protests that demanded increased security measures. Serbia’s political landscape,
characterized by a democratic façade but inherently unfair conditions for inter-party
competition, defined the elections’ outcome. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS),
led by President Vučić, was drawing on its incumbent advantage to realize its
predominance in media representation, misuse public funds, and manipulate voter
registers. The SNS secured an absolute majority with 46% of the votes. However,
allegations of electoral irregularities marred the elections. Instead of resolving societal
conflicts, the elections deepened existing tensions. Addressing these allegations
transparently and accountably will be crucial for restoring confidence and fostering
political stability in Serbia.
односно представљамо привредно стање у коме је Србија дочекала превремене изборе. У другом делу представљамо економске политике парламентарних странака и коалиција. У последњем делу износимо основне елементе економског дела програма владе (усвојеног 11. августа 2016. год) да би читаоци били у стању да упореде изборну понуду са владином економском политиком након избора.
We look into the electoral offer of the economic policies in Serbia during the 2016 campaign. We present the economic results of the Government of the Republic of Serbia during the past two years and describe the economic situation in which Serbia has welcomed the early elections. In the second part we present the economic policies of the parliamentary parties and coalitions. In the last section we present the basic elements of the economic part of the government’s program (adopted on August 11, 2016) so that readers were able to compare the election offer with the government’s economic policy after the elections.
i socijalnim procesima vidno se promenila. Diskusije iz
osamdesetih godina o superiornosti minimalne države
naspram države blagostanja dobile su nov oblik. Velika
finansijska kriza iz 2008. godine i kriza javnog duga iz 2009.
godine vratila je na velika vrata kejnzijanizam – državnu
intervenciju u privrednu aktivnost.
have changed the most. As empirical support, the author use the V-dem project data. The large number of this project’s sub-indices and indicators make it possible to determine more precisely which aspects of democratic institutions have experienced the greatest decline, but also to emphasize an important aspect of hybrid regimes—the fact that they have democratic institutions but a non-democratic practice.
the importance of state capture for other hybrid regimes’s critical areas such as elections and media. Although rigged elections and controlled media are important pillars of
hybrid regimes, they depend to a large extent on the public funds by which they can be financed. Extraction of public funds matters because these are used to pay both activists
who manipulate the electoral process in the field and the media that hide information on the basis of which citizens can decide how to vote. The issue of extraction has been understudied in the debates on the consolidation of democracy in Serbia after 2000 but also in the discussios on democratic decline.
institutionalization of the party system has been weakening. After more than a decade of stability, the year of 2012 marks a new cycle of turbulence in the Serbian party system. Eight years on, it resulted in the dominance of one party in the Serbian Parliament. Several parties from the 1990s and 2000s disappeared from the scene. I link institutionalization with clientelism, arguing that strong clientelism contributes significantly to weak institutionalization. To measure institutionalisation and clientelism, I use the V-dem index of institutionalization along with the sub-indices and indicators that make it up.
I will discuss this issue in the context of Central and Eastern Europe.
Samuel Huntington offered one of the first formulations of the democratic
consolidation thesis in 1991. He defined What he called the ‘two turnover
test’ for the process by which democracy becomes consolidated as a situation when, after the collapse of an undemocratic regime, two changes in government take place through the democratic process.1 This must specifically be a change in the sense that the old political elite who formed the government before the breakdown of the undemocratic regime should return to power andcontinue with the process of reform. If this kind of change takes place, then democratic change becomes irreversible and democratic institutions are consolidated. It is this formulation of the consolidation thesis that I will employ in the present chapter.
next to nothing when it comes to the behavior of political actors.
The thesis was embraced primarily by the actor theorists who held that the behavior of actors is institutions-resistant. Its major appeal lied in the fact that actors might be willing to set up democratic institutions, but they
do it as a façade, never respecting them. Theories of institutional
design, naturally enough, assume the opposite. But theorists of
institutional design concede that institutions matter only if there is
an undisputed will among actors to respect institutions at least
minimally, or if there is some external force that will make actors respect the institutions.