Papers by Jean-Jacques Degroof
thèse que nous sommes entrés, grâce à la convergence de nouvelles technologies, dans une ère d'in... more thèse que nous sommes entrés, grâce à la convergence de nouvelles technologies, dans une ère d'innovation de rupture dans laquelle il voit même une troisième révolution industrielle. Nous considérons souvent l'ère de l'informatique comme un autre saut qualitatif, mais Anderson estime qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une révolution « industrielle » tant qu'elle n'a pas eu un effet sur la production de biens. Or, c'est précisément ce qui est en train de se passer, selon l'auteur, et il s'agit d'une innovation de rupture aux conséquences et opportunités multiples.
Journal of Technology Transfer, volume 29, number 3/4, Jul 2004
"We discuss the characteristics of academic ‘‘spin-off policies’’ in environments outside of high... more "We discuss the characteristics of academic ‘‘spin-off policies’’ in environments outside of high tech clusters and where technology transfer and entrepreneurship infrastructures have been weak. We explore whether the policies could explain the lack of growth potential of spin-off ventures that have repeatedly observed. We studied the case of Belgium, gathering data from nine of spin-off policies in the eight largest academic institutions and in 47 firms. We propose that spin-off policies in academic institutions significantly affect the growth potential of ventures.
JEL Classification: D23, O31, O32"
Revue Entreprendre & Innover, Jan 2013
Dans les années 1990 en Europe, beaucoup d’espoirs furent mis dans l’essaimage de spin-offs par l... more Dans les années 1990 en Europe, beaucoup d’espoirs furent mis dans l’essaimage de spin-offs par les universités pour rattraper le retard dans les secteurs de haute technologie. Ce transfert de technologie par l’entrepreneuriat n’a pas eu l’effet transformateur escompté. Le présent article explore trois causes de cet échec relatif et propose des voies pour le surmonter.
Science Technology Industry Review, 26, 75-96 (an OECD publication), 2001
In the last decade, a number of studies have been carried out on new technology-based firms (NTBF... more In the last decade, a number of studies have been carried out on new technology-based firms (NTBFs). This body of research tends to conclude that European NTBFs fail to grow as large as their US counterparts, although few studies offer insights into to why this is so. In particular, the early-growth path of NTBFs remains a “a black box”. In this article, the authors analyse the early-growth paths of a sub-population of firms; namely, research-based spin-offs. Since the literature on the early-growth path of NTBFs is scarce, a “grounded theory design” was used to tackle the research question. It emerged that the early-growth period of research-based spin-offs mainly consists of a “learning” phase during which they build up different resources and capabilities. This learning phase comprises two components: combinatory (buy-in) and cumulative (experiential) learning. The entrepreneurial environment in which the firm is created largely determines the extent to which these learning processes are possible. Three types of environ- ment are defined: the unaware environment (in which cumulative learning is diffi- cult), the aware environment (where cumulative learning exists but combinatory learning is difficult) and the supportive environment (where both combinatory and cumulative learning are possible). The article concludes with the hypothesis that a balanced management of combinatory and cumulative learning optimises the period of incubation and increases the potential for exponential growth.
Books Chapter by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Policy papers by Jean-Jacques Degroof
European Commission, Entreprise Directorate-General., 2000
Report to the Belgian regional government of Wallonia (Belgium)., 2006
IWT Observatorium, No3, 2002
This book analyses how an entrepreneurical climate towards spin-offs has been developed in Belgiu... more This book analyses how an entrepreneurical climate towards spin-offs has been developed in Belgium since the mid-eighties. Three different periods are distinguished by the authors: In the first period – till 1990 – spin-offs are created despite the universities. These spin-offs have to experiment with start and growth capital; they have to search for complementary activities which can generate short term cash; they mostly live different lifes, bankrupt- cy never far away and are in general created by individu- als with substantial international experience. In the first half of the nineties (1990-1997), a second period is con- sidered. In this period, the attitude towards spin-offs changes. The authors hypothesize that this change in atti- tude is due to the ‘financial’ successes booked by the first generation of spin-offs in the first half of the nineties: sev- eral undertook succesfull private placements and the first introductions on the electronic stock markets such as eas- daq and nasdaq were very promising for high tech start- ups. In this period, the phenomenon research based spin- off gained thus attention and even interest within univer- sities and government. However, little changed in the field: there was still no support nor start capital available. From 1997, a new period emerges. In 1997, KUL installed the first start capital in Flanders. Subsequently, UG, LUC, UA, UCL and ULG created their own start cap- ital funds. In addition, the hausse on the electronic stock markets attracted a number of private initiatives also towards this risky high tech start capital business. The result was that we observe a blossoming of spin-offs and a new type of spin-offs emerges: the prospector or transi- tional starter. In contrast to a venture capital backed start- up, this company starts with much less capital and with- out a balanced founding team, but goes through a first incubation period in which the young start-up “learns” to do business and the rules of the market. In contrast to venture capital backed start-ups, this type of company has the time to wait until the market develops and to con- centrate itself on more service oriented activities in the meanwhile. Many of the current successes started as prospectors...
The authors identify three dimensions which characterise an entrepreneurial climate: start capital; incubation activi- ties and networking; In a developed entrepreneurial cli- mate, these three dimensions are available and three types of high tech start-ups form the population of spin-offs: Venture Capital backed ones (about 10%); prospectors (about 60%) and technological SMEs (about 30%). In Belgium, the entrepreneurial climate changed a lot in the late nineties and especially in the Leuven area many sup- porting activities have emerged which provide both man- agement support and networking possibilities.In the remaining parts of Belgium, especially management coaching and networking is lacking. However, the collapse of the stock market for high tech start-ups makes also the availability of start capital a problem. Even the model of university start capital funds becomes questionable...
Conference Presentations by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Spinning off ventures from academic institutions is one mode of technology transfer susceptible o... more Spinning off ventures from academic institutions is one mode of technology transfer susceptible of contributing to local economic development and to spreading technology innovation in a region. Experience shows, however, that it is particularly difficult to conduct in regions with weak entrepreneurial infrastructure and culture. Therefore, in this research, we tried to understand the process of spinning off new ventures from academic institutions in such an environment and how it affects models of ventures.
We examined these questions by studying the case of Belgium, a typical low to medium tech region with a weak entrepreneurial infrastructure. We identified the population of academic spin-off ventures of about one hundred firms, we interviewed forty-seven of them, as well as twenty-two representatives of academic institutions and policy organizations. In addition, we relied on numerous secondary and archival data.
Data suggest three archetypes of spin-off processes. The first occurs when the academic institutions have no proactive policy. In this case, the spin-off process relies exclusively on entrepreneurial researchers, who perceive and pursue commercial opportunities often while collaborating with industry on a project. The second type appears when academic institutions have a proactive policy consisting of encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives, but without providing much support, except in the form of some seed funding. The initiation of projects still relies exclusively on individual researchers and most concept testing of the commercial idea needs to be conducted by the founders after founding. The third involves a proactive and selective technology opportunity search phase, a concept-testing phase of twelve to eighteen months before ventures are founded, and continued start-up support after founding.
The types of spin-off process seem to influence the types of ventures.
In the two first types of processes, ventures were spun off by universities at a very early stage. As a result, their founders could only adopt a basic business model of contract-based work, often technical consulting. A large majority of these ventures adopted the dominant model of small business with no growth orientation. The few founders who tried to move beyond the small business format had to learn basic business and management skills largely by experimenting in isolation, given the poor entrepreneurial infrastructure. As a result, these ventures went through a transitory, or gestation period, before they could develop a viable business model with high potential and growth objectives. So, these two dominant spin-off policies might explain in part the common observation that the large majority of academic spin-off ventures remain “small boutiques.” Finally, the few ventures, spun off after an extensive spin off process involving high selectivity and high support were brought to market at a later stage when they had more proof of concept to attract venture capital and adopted a high-growth orientation right away. These venture projects exhibited the highest ambition, had the strongest management team, and raised the most start-up capital. This would support the argument that, in a weak entrepreneurial environment, spinning off new ventures from academic institutions that have a growth orientation requires that the university incubates the venture project in order to compensate for the lack of entrepreneurial community.
However, analysis of the resources necessary to conduct a proactive spin-off process involving high support and high selectivity suggests that few academic institutions are likely to have the necessary assets. This insight was supported by the fact that t institutions that had the most extensive spin-off policies were the best endowed and were umbrella organizations encompassing a number of university labs. Depending on their resources, universities could specialize in supporting one particular type of spin-off ventures (e.g. technical consulting firms), but entrepreneurial opportunities come in various forms requiring different types of firms and thus different types of resources. Indeed, resources necessary to select and support a technical consulting venture and those necessary select and support a venture capital backed venture with global ambitions are vastly different. This reinforces the view that the infrastructure to put in place by academic institutions in support of spin-off policies is complex. It suggests that, contrary to widespread practices, in most cases in such weak entrepreneurial environments, spin-off policies should not be conducted by individual academic institutions, but rather at a more aggregate level in a region.
Best Paper Proceedings of the conference., 1999
This paper shows that internal and external lenses are required to understand entrepreneurial tea... more This paper shows that internal and external lenses are required to understand entrepreneurial team performance. The findings indicate that high-performing entrepreneurial teams – as rated by external evaluators – gather a wide range of information from external contacts, and are efficient in doing so, i.e., using "weak" rather than "strong" ties. In addition, these teams have internal make-ups that are open to outside influences. The findings also show that while members know the benefit of engaging external contacts, they are less aware of the need for efficient information gathering.
Thesis by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 405-415).
In this thesis, I examine how spinning off new ventures from academic institutions works in an en... more In this thesis, I examine how spinning off new ventures from academic institutions works in an environment outside developed high tech clusters and how it affects models of ventures. I examine these questions by studying the case of Belgium. There seems to be two archetypes of spin-off processes depending on the academic institutions capabilities. The first, practiced by specialized research institutes, involves a proactive technology opportunity search phase and an extensive concept-testing phase before ventures are founded. It can be characterized as a high selectivity and high support policy. The second and most common type, practiced by universities, leaves the initiation of projects to individual researchers and provides limited support for concept testing before ventures are founded. Most concept testing needs to be conducted after founding. This type of spin-off process can be regarded as a low selectivity and low support policy. The few ventures, spun off by specialized research institutes could adopt a high-growth orientation right away, becoming "pure" venture capital-backed firms from the outset. Ventures spun off by universities at a very early stage could only adopt a basic business model of contract-based work, often technical consulting. About half of these ventures never intended to go beyond this business model and settled in a small business model of venture with no growth orientation. The founders of the other half tried to build a firm that was going to be more than a substitute for a job. For these founders, the initial, basic contract-based work represented a source of revenue, as well as their main source of knowledge building.(cont.) Indeed, given their lack of business experience, without incubation capabilities from their university or an entrepreneurial community to support them, these founders could not borrow much relevant business and entrepreneurial knowledge from their local environment. They had to learn basic business and management skills largely by experimenting. As a result, these ventures went through a transitory, or gestation period, before they could develop a viable business model with high potential and growth objectives. I label this model of venture "prospector." I argue that this may be the dominant type of growth-oriented venture emerging in environment outside advanced high tech clusters where the entrepreneurship infrastructure is not well developed.
Book Reviews by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Random House, 2012
If a country wants to remain economically vibrant, it needs to manufacture things. In recent year... more If a country wants to remain economically vibrant, it needs to manufacture things. In recent years, however, many nations have become obsessed with making money out of selling services, leaving the real business of manufacturing to others.
Makers is about how all that is being reversed. Over the past ten years, the internet has democratised publishing, broadcasting and communications, leading to a massive increase in the range of participation in everything digital - the world of bits. Now the same is happening to manufacturing - the world of things.
Chris Anderson, bestselling author of The Long Tail, explains how this is happening: how such technologies as 3D printing and electronics assembly are becoming available to everybody, and how people are building successful businesses as a result. Whereas once every aspiring entrepreneur needed the support of a major manufacturer, now anybody with a smart idea and a little expertise can make their ideas a reality. Just as Google, Facebook and others have created highly successful companies in the virtual world, so these new inventors and manufacturers are assuming positions of ever greater importance in the real world.
The next industrial revolution is on its way.
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2011
In what is often called the 'knowledge economy', two actors, universities and firms, play a leadi... more In what is often called the 'knowledge economy', two actors, universities and firms, play a leading role in creating new knowledge, products, services and jobs. Through efficient and smart partnering models, firms can now leverage their innovative capacity and access valuable knowledge and insights from Universities. Engaging in Knowledge and Technology Transfer activities has become a must for companies relying on innovation to develop and defend their market share.
Following on from Resolving the Innovation paradox, this book documents the good practices world-wide for managing the three main channels for knowledge and technology transfer from universities and public laboratories to firms: collaborative research, licensing and spinning out start up companies.
Beyond traditional partnerships models built around patents and technology, firms must source Universities' non technical knowledge, such as societal trends, business models, anthropological or geopolitical issues. Two additional transformational themes run across the book. First, massive innovation is required to move the world towards a more sustainable state. Second, China and India are fast emerging sources of innovations for the world.
Revue Entreprendre & Innover, Jan 2013
Uploads
Papers by Jean-Jacques Degroof
JEL Classification: D23, O31, O32"
Books Chapter by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Policy papers by Jean-Jacques Degroof
The authors identify three dimensions which characterise an entrepreneurial climate: start capital; incubation activi- ties and networking; In a developed entrepreneurial cli- mate, these three dimensions are available and three types of high tech start-ups form the population of spin-offs: Venture Capital backed ones (about 10%); prospectors (about 60%) and technological SMEs (about 30%). In Belgium, the entrepreneurial climate changed a lot in the late nineties and especially in the Leuven area many sup- porting activities have emerged which provide both man- agement support and networking possibilities.In the remaining parts of Belgium, especially management coaching and networking is lacking. However, the collapse of the stock market for high tech start-ups makes also the availability of start capital a problem. Even the model of university start capital funds becomes questionable...
Conference Presentations by Jean-Jacques Degroof
We examined these questions by studying the case of Belgium, a typical low to medium tech region with a weak entrepreneurial infrastructure. We identified the population of academic spin-off ventures of about one hundred firms, we interviewed forty-seven of them, as well as twenty-two representatives of academic institutions and policy organizations. In addition, we relied on numerous secondary and archival data.
Data suggest three archetypes of spin-off processes. The first occurs when the academic institutions have no proactive policy. In this case, the spin-off process relies exclusively on entrepreneurial researchers, who perceive and pursue commercial opportunities often while collaborating with industry on a project. The second type appears when academic institutions have a proactive policy consisting of encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives, but without providing much support, except in the form of some seed funding. The initiation of projects still relies exclusively on individual researchers and most concept testing of the commercial idea needs to be conducted by the founders after founding. The third involves a proactive and selective technology opportunity search phase, a concept-testing phase of twelve to eighteen months before ventures are founded, and continued start-up support after founding.
The types of spin-off process seem to influence the types of ventures.
In the two first types of processes, ventures were spun off by universities at a very early stage. As a result, their founders could only adopt a basic business model of contract-based work, often technical consulting. A large majority of these ventures adopted the dominant model of small business with no growth orientation. The few founders who tried to move beyond the small business format had to learn basic business and management skills largely by experimenting in isolation, given the poor entrepreneurial infrastructure. As a result, these ventures went through a transitory, or gestation period, before they could develop a viable business model with high potential and growth objectives. So, these two dominant spin-off policies might explain in part the common observation that the large majority of academic spin-off ventures remain “small boutiques.” Finally, the few ventures, spun off after an extensive spin off process involving high selectivity and high support were brought to market at a later stage when they had more proof of concept to attract venture capital and adopted a high-growth orientation right away. These venture projects exhibited the highest ambition, had the strongest management team, and raised the most start-up capital. This would support the argument that, in a weak entrepreneurial environment, spinning off new ventures from academic institutions that have a growth orientation requires that the university incubates the venture project in order to compensate for the lack of entrepreneurial community.
However, analysis of the resources necessary to conduct a proactive spin-off process involving high support and high selectivity suggests that few academic institutions are likely to have the necessary assets. This insight was supported by the fact that t institutions that had the most extensive spin-off policies were the best endowed and were umbrella organizations encompassing a number of university labs. Depending on their resources, universities could specialize in supporting one particular type of spin-off ventures (e.g. technical consulting firms), but entrepreneurial opportunities come in various forms requiring different types of firms and thus different types of resources. Indeed, resources necessary to select and support a technical consulting venture and those necessary select and support a venture capital backed venture with global ambitions are vastly different. This reinforces the view that the infrastructure to put in place by academic institutions in support of spin-off policies is complex. It suggests that, contrary to widespread practices, in most cases in such weak entrepreneurial environments, spin-off policies should not be conducted by individual academic institutions, but rather at a more aggregate level in a region.
Thesis by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Book Reviews by Jean-Jacques Degroof
Makers is about how all that is being reversed. Over the past ten years, the internet has democratised publishing, broadcasting and communications, leading to a massive increase in the range of participation in everything digital - the world of bits. Now the same is happening to manufacturing - the world of things.
Chris Anderson, bestselling author of The Long Tail, explains how this is happening: how such technologies as 3D printing and electronics assembly are becoming available to everybody, and how people are building successful businesses as a result. Whereas once every aspiring entrepreneur needed the support of a major manufacturer, now anybody with a smart idea and a little expertise can make their ideas a reality. Just as Google, Facebook and others have created highly successful companies in the virtual world, so these new inventors and manufacturers are assuming positions of ever greater importance in the real world.
The next industrial revolution is on its way.
Following on from Resolving the Innovation paradox, this book documents the good practices world-wide for managing the three main channels for knowledge and technology transfer from universities and public laboratories to firms: collaborative research, licensing and spinning out start up companies.
Beyond traditional partnerships models built around patents and technology, firms must source Universities' non technical knowledge, such as societal trends, business models, anthropological or geopolitical issues. Two additional transformational themes run across the book. First, massive innovation is required to move the world towards a more sustainable state. Second, China and India are fast emerging sources of innovations for the world.
JEL Classification: D23, O31, O32"
The authors identify three dimensions which characterise an entrepreneurial climate: start capital; incubation activi- ties and networking; In a developed entrepreneurial cli- mate, these three dimensions are available and three types of high tech start-ups form the population of spin-offs: Venture Capital backed ones (about 10%); prospectors (about 60%) and technological SMEs (about 30%). In Belgium, the entrepreneurial climate changed a lot in the late nineties and especially in the Leuven area many sup- porting activities have emerged which provide both man- agement support and networking possibilities.In the remaining parts of Belgium, especially management coaching and networking is lacking. However, the collapse of the stock market for high tech start-ups makes also the availability of start capital a problem. Even the model of university start capital funds becomes questionable...
We examined these questions by studying the case of Belgium, a typical low to medium tech region with a weak entrepreneurial infrastructure. We identified the population of academic spin-off ventures of about one hundred firms, we interviewed forty-seven of them, as well as twenty-two representatives of academic institutions and policy organizations. In addition, we relied on numerous secondary and archival data.
Data suggest three archetypes of spin-off processes. The first occurs when the academic institutions have no proactive policy. In this case, the spin-off process relies exclusively on entrepreneurial researchers, who perceive and pursue commercial opportunities often while collaborating with industry on a project. The second type appears when academic institutions have a proactive policy consisting of encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives, but without providing much support, except in the form of some seed funding. The initiation of projects still relies exclusively on individual researchers and most concept testing of the commercial idea needs to be conducted by the founders after founding. The third involves a proactive and selective technology opportunity search phase, a concept-testing phase of twelve to eighteen months before ventures are founded, and continued start-up support after founding.
The types of spin-off process seem to influence the types of ventures.
In the two first types of processes, ventures were spun off by universities at a very early stage. As a result, their founders could only adopt a basic business model of contract-based work, often technical consulting. A large majority of these ventures adopted the dominant model of small business with no growth orientation. The few founders who tried to move beyond the small business format had to learn basic business and management skills largely by experimenting in isolation, given the poor entrepreneurial infrastructure. As a result, these ventures went through a transitory, or gestation period, before they could develop a viable business model with high potential and growth objectives. So, these two dominant spin-off policies might explain in part the common observation that the large majority of academic spin-off ventures remain “small boutiques.” Finally, the few ventures, spun off after an extensive spin off process involving high selectivity and high support were brought to market at a later stage when they had more proof of concept to attract venture capital and adopted a high-growth orientation right away. These venture projects exhibited the highest ambition, had the strongest management team, and raised the most start-up capital. This would support the argument that, in a weak entrepreneurial environment, spinning off new ventures from academic institutions that have a growth orientation requires that the university incubates the venture project in order to compensate for the lack of entrepreneurial community.
However, analysis of the resources necessary to conduct a proactive spin-off process involving high support and high selectivity suggests that few academic institutions are likely to have the necessary assets. This insight was supported by the fact that t institutions that had the most extensive spin-off policies were the best endowed and were umbrella organizations encompassing a number of university labs. Depending on their resources, universities could specialize in supporting one particular type of spin-off ventures (e.g. technical consulting firms), but entrepreneurial opportunities come in various forms requiring different types of firms and thus different types of resources. Indeed, resources necessary to select and support a technical consulting venture and those necessary select and support a venture capital backed venture with global ambitions are vastly different. This reinforces the view that the infrastructure to put in place by academic institutions in support of spin-off policies is complex. It suggests that, contrary to widespread practices, in most cases in such weak entrepreneurial environments, spin-off policies should not be conducted by individual academic institutions, but rather at a more aggregate level in a region.
Makers is about how all that is being reversed. Over the past ten years, the internet has democratised publishing, broadcasting and communications, leading to a massive increase in the range of participation in everything digital - the world of bits. Now the same is happening to manufacturing - the world of things.
Chris Anderson, bestselling author of The Long Tail, explains how this is happening: how such technologies as 3D printing and electronics assembly are becoming available to everybody, and how people are building successful businesses as a result. Whereas once every aspiring entrepreneur needed the support of a major manufacturer, now anybody with a smart idea and a little expertise can make their ideas a reality. Just as Google, Facebook and others have created highly successful companies in the virtual world, so these new inventors and manufacturers are assuming positions of ever greater importance in the real world.
The next industrial revolution is on its way.
Following on from Resolving the Innovation paradox, this book documents the good practices world-wide for managing the three main channels for knowledge and technology transfer from universities and public laboratories to firms: collaborative research, licensing and spinning out start up companies.
Beyond traditional partnerships models built around patents and technology, firms must source Universities' non technical knowledge, such as societal trends, business models, anthropological or geopolitical issues. Two additional transformational themes run across the book. First, massive innovation is required to move the world towards a more sustainable state. Second, China and India are fast emerging sources of innovations for the world.
The success of precision medicine will be driven and determined to a great degree by the quality of the frameworks for the compilation and analysis of information. Unprecedented collaboration between technology and healthcare stakeholders will be required to improve healthcare by Big Data. New financing models for research as well as new business models and investment and investors’ strategies for start-ups will be needed. Innovations in drugs, tests, treatments, and prevention already impacted healthcare costs dramatically. Solutions and models which are creative, affordable, effective, and efficient are in high demand. This poses challenges but also opens up highly attractive social and financial opportunities for start-ups, corporate R&D departments, and governments.
In five consecutive sessions, each of them consisting of one keynote and a panel, sector leading scientists, entrepreneurs, tech-experts, and thought leaders will present and discuss with the audience their topnotch research, shed a spotlight on the present and the future opportunities and pitfalls, and highlight viable commercialization strategies within the various legal, ethical, and political frameworks. The sessions will be complimented by interactive round tables open to all attendees. All, speakers and attendees, will be invited to discuss moonshot data projects in medicine and life sciences. The Start-up Showcase will provide an unique platform for ”data” entrepreneurs to present their companies to investors, collaborators, and physicians from across Europe and the US (application required).
Degroof explains that, at first, the culture of entrepreneurship sprang from such extracurricular activities as forums, clubs, and competitions. Eventually, the Institute formally supported these activities, offering courses in entrepreneurship. Degroof describes why entrepreneurship is so uniquely aligned with MIT's culture: a history of bottom-up decision-making, a tradition of academic excellence, a keen interest in problem-solving, a belief in experimentation, and a tolerance for failure on the way to success. Entrepreneurship is the logical outcome of MIT's motto, Mens et Manus (mind and hand) ), translating theories and scientific discoveries into products and businesses—many of which have the goal of solving some of the world's most pressing problems. Degroof maps MIT's current entrepreneurial ecosystem of students, faculty, and researchers; considers the effectiveness of teaching entrepreneurship; and outlines ways that the MIT story could inspire conversations in other institutions about promoting entrepreneurship.