ABSTRACT Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision... more ABSTRACT Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective.1 In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set (or corpus, or theory, i.e. a set closed under deduction) K\underline{\textrm K} and (say) an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A\underline{\textrm A} , i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions (hence called K\underline{\textrm K} -questions) the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of K\underline{\textrm K} , hence are equivalent to well-behaved sets of alternative hypotheses.
Electronic proceedings in theoretical computer science, Jul 9, 2023
We argue that behavioral science models of online content-sharing overlook the role of strategic ... more We argue that behavioral science models of online content-sharing overlook the role of strategic interactions between users. Borrowing from accuracy-nudges studies decision-theoretic models, we propose a basic game model and explore special cases with idealized parameter settings to identify refinements necessary to capture real-world online social network behavior. Anticipating those refinements, we sketch a strategic analysis of content amplification and draw a connection between Keynes' "beauty contest" analogy and recent social-epistemological work on echo chambers. We conclude on the model's prospects from analytical and empirical perspectives.
We raise the question whether there is a rigorous argument favoring one jury system over another.... more We raise the question whether there is a rigorous argument favoring one jury system over another. We provide a Bayesian model of deliberating juries that allows for computer simulation for the purpose of studying the effect of jury size and required majority on the quality of jury decision making. We introduce the idea of jury value (J-value), a kind of epistemic value which takes into account the unique characteristics and asymmetries involved in jury voting. Our computer simulations indicate that requiring more than a >50% majority should be avoided. Moreover, while it is in principle always better to have a larger jury, given a >50% required majority, the value of having more than 12-15 jurors is likely to be negligible. Finally, we provide a formula for calculating the optimal jury size given the cost, economic or otherwise, of adding another juror.
claimed that their reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' can "serve as an ex... more claimed that their reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' can "serve as an explication for the link between intelligence and memory" (1983, p. 159). The claim is vindicated, first for the single-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing the content of a distributed and associative memory; then, for the multi-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing knowledge distributed in a community. Moreover, the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' allows to conceptualize those strategies as belonging to a continuum of behavioral strategies.
Journal of Logic, Language and Information, May 20, 2017
The Barth-Krabbe-Hintikka-Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom ... more The Barth-Krabbe-Hintikka-Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).
Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false inf... more Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information or from the intentional actions of fake news factory workers, but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake science can be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible than the retraction notice. We hypothesize that the reason for this lies in the popularitybased logic governing Google, in particular its foundational PageRank algorithm, in conjunction with a psychological law which we refer to as the "law of retraction": a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interesting and therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. We conduct an empirical study drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud (fabrication of data) in the Retraction Watch public database. The study tests the extent to which such retracted scientific articles are still highly ranked in Google-and more so than information about the retraction. We find, among other things, that both Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not ranked a link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted. Surprisingly, Google Scholar did not perform better in this regard than Google Search. We also found cases in which Google did not track the retraction of an article on the first result page at all. We conclude that both Google Search and Google Scholar run the risk of disseminating fake science through their ranking algorithms.
Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an episte... more Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=á</font >K,E,Añ</font >S=\langle{\underline{K},E,\underline{A}}\rangle, where A\underline{A} is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions
The distinction is standard in epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007); standard pra... more The distinction is standard in epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007); standard practice in game theory (following Aumann 1999) usually includes information about players' beliefs and goals in the description of the state of Nature (but Binmore and Shin 1992 raises algorithmic objections against it, see also n. 9 p. 7).
Instructions in Wason's Selection Task underdetermine empirical subjects' representation of the u... more Instructions in Wason's Selection Task underdetermine empirical subjects' representation of the underlying problem, and its admissible solutions. We model the Selection Task as an (ambiguous) interrogative learning problem, and reasoning to solutions as: (a) selection of a representation of the problem; and: (b) strategic planning from that representation. We argue that recovering Wason's 'normative' selection is possible only if both stages are constrained further than they are by Wason's formulation. We conclude comparing our model with other explanatory models, w.r.t. to empirical adequacy, and modeling of bounded rationality.
LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE VOLUME 8 Editors Shahid Rahman, University of Lille... more LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE VOLUME 8 Editors Shahid Rahman, University of Lille III, France John Symons, University of Texas at El Paso, USA Editorial Board Jean Paul van Bendegem, Free University of Brussels, Belgium Johan van ...
This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' pro... more This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' proposed jointly by M.B. Hintikka (1939-1987) and J. Hintikka (1929-2016) in the 1980s, and its successor, the interrogative model of inquiry (imi) developed by J. Hintikka and his collaborators in the 1990s. The Hintikkas' model explicitly used game theory in order to formalize a naturalistic approach to inquiry, but the imi abandoned both the game-theoretic formalism, and the naturalistic approach. It is argued that the latter better supports the claim that the imi provides a 'logic of discovery', and safeguards its empirical adequacy. Technical changes necessary to this interpretation are presented, and examples are discussed, both formal and informal, that are better analyzed when these changes are in place. The informal examples are borrowed from Conan Doyle's The Case of Silver Blaze, a favorite of M.B. and J. Hintikka.
Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false inf... more Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information orfrom the intentional actions of fake news factory workers,but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake sciencecan be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible thanthe retraction notice. We hypothesize that the reason for this lies in the popularity-based logic governing Google, in particular its foundational PageRank algorithm,in conjunction with a psychological law which we refer to as the “law of retraction”: a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interestingand therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. We conduct anempiricalstudy drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud (fabrication of data) in the Retraction Watch public database. The study tests the extent to which such retracted scientific articles are still highly ranked in Google –and more so than information about the retraction. We find, among other things, thatboth Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not rankeda link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted.Surprisingly, Google Scholar did not perform better in this regard than Google Search.We also foundcases in which Google didnot track the retraction of anarticle on the first result page at all.We conclude thatboth Google Search and Google Scholar runthe risk of disseminating fake science through theirranking algorithms. (Less)
A popular belief is that the process whereby search engines tailor their search results to indivi... more A popular belief is that the process whereby search engines tailor their search results to individual users, so-called personalization, leads to filter bubbles in the sense of ideologically segregated search results that would tend to reinforce the user's prior view (filter bubble hypothesis). Since filter bubbles are thought to be detrimental to society, there have been calls for further legal regulation of search engines beyond the so-called Right to be Forgotten Act (EU, C-131/12, 2014). However, the scientific evidence for the filter bubble hypothesis is surprisingly limited. Previous studies of personalization have focused on the extent to which different users get different results lists without taking the content on the webpages into account. Such methods are unsuitable for detecting filter bubbles as such. In this paper, we propose a methodology that takes content differences between webpages into account. In particular, the method involves studying the extent to which users with strong opposing views on an issue receive search results that are correlated content-wise with their personal view. Will users of with strong prior opinion that X is true on average have a larger share of (top) search results that are in favor of X than users with a strong prior opinion that X is false? We illustrate our methodology at work, but also the non-trivial challenges it faces, by a small-scale study of the extent to which Google Search leads to ideological segregation on the issue of man-made climate change.
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained... more Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
In Wason's Selection Task, subjects: (i) process information from the instructions and build ... more In Wason's Selection Task, subjects: (i) process information from the instructions and build a mental representation of the problem, then: (ii) select a course of action to solve the problem, under the constraints imposed by the instructions. We analyze both aspects as part of a constraint satisfaction problem without assuming Wason's 'logical' solution to be the correct one. We show that outcome of step (i) may induce mutually inconsistent constraints, causing subjects to select at step (ii) solutions that violate some of them. Our analysis explains why inconsistent constraints are less likely disrupt non-abstract (or "thematic") versions of the tasks, but unlike Bayesians does not posit di erent mechanisms in abstract and thematic variants. We then assess the logicality of the task, and conclude on cognitive tasks as coordination problems.
Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the follow... more Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage: “If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery, the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach, 1938, p. 36.) Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes.
General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply:... more General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
ABSTRACT Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision... more ABSTRACT Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective.1 In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set (or corpus, or theory, i.e. a set closed under deduction) K\underline{\textrm K} and (say) an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A\underline{\textrm A} , i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions (hence called K\underline{\textrm K} -questions) the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of K\underline{\textrm K} , hence are equivalent to well-behaved sets of alternative hypotheses.
Electronic proceedings in theoretical computer science, Jul 9, 2023
We argue that behavioral science models of online content-sharing overlook the role of strategic ... more We argue that behavioral science models of online content-sharing overlook the role of strategic interactions between users. Borrowing from accuracy-nudges studies decision-theoretic models, we propose a basic game model and explore special cases with idealized parameter settings to identify refinements necessary to capture real-world online social network behavior. Anticipating those refinements, we sketch a strategic analysis of content amplification and draw a connection between Keynes' "beauty contest" analogy and recent social-epistemological work on echo chambers. We conclude on the model's prospects from analytical and empirical perspectives.
We raise the question whether there is a rigorous argument favoring one jury system over another.... more We raise the question whether there is a rigorous argument favoring one jury system over another. We provide a Bayesian model of deliberating juries that allows for computer simulation for the purpose of studying the effect of jury size and required majority on the quality of jury decision making. We introduce the idea of jury value (J-value), a kind of epistemic value which takes into account the unique characteristics and asymmetries involved in jury voting. Our computer simulations indicate that requiring more than a >50% majority should be avoided. Moreover, while it is in principle always better to have a larger jury, given a >50% required majority, the value of having more than 12-15 jurors is likely to be negligible. Finally, we provide a formula for calculating the optimal jury size given the cost, economic or otherwise, of adding another juror.
claimed that their reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' can "serve as an ex... more claimed that their reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' can "serve as an explication for the link between intelligence and memory" (1983, p. 159). The claim is vindicated, first for the single-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing the content of a distributed and associative memory; then, for the multi-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing knowledge distributed in a community. Moreover, the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' allows to conceptualize those strategies as belonging to a continuum of behavioral strategies.
Journal of Logic, Language and Information, May 20, 2017
The Barth-Krabbe-Hintikka-Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom ... more The Barth-Krabbe-Hintikka-Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).
Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false inf... more Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information or from the intentional actions of fake news factory workers, but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake science can be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible than the retraction notice. We hypothesize that the reason for this lies in the popularitybased logic governing Google, in particular its foundational PageRank algorithm, in conjunction with a psychological law which we refer to as the "law of retraction": a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interesting and therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. We conduct an empirical study drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud (fabrication of data) in the Retraction Watch public database. The study tests the extent to which such retracted scientific articles are still highly ranked in Google-and more so than information about the retraction. We find, among other things, that both Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not ranked a link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted. Surprisingly, Google Scholar did not perform better in this regard than Google Search. We also found cases in which Google did not track the retraction of an article on the first result page at all. We conclude that both Google Search and Google Scholar run the risk of disseminating fake science through their ranking algorithms.
Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an episte... more Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=á</font >K,E,Añ</font >S=\langle{\underline{K},E,\underline{A}}\rangle, where A\underline{A} is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions
The distinction is standard in epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007); standard pra... more The distinction is standard in epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007); standard practice in game theory (following Aumann 1999) usually includes information about players' beliefs and goals in the description of the state of Nature (but Binmore and Shin 1992 raises algorithmic objections against it, see also n. 9 p. 7).
Instructions in Wason's Selection Task underdetermine empirical subjects' representation of the u... more Instructions in Wason's Selection Task underdetermine empirical subjects' representation of the underlying problem, and its admissible solutions. We model the Selection Task as an (ambiguous) interrogative learning problem, and reasoning to solutions as: (a) selection of a representation of the problem; and: (b) strategic planning from that representation. We argue that recovering Wason's 'normative' selection is possible only if both stages are constrained further than they are by Wason's formulation. We conclude comparing our model with other explanatory models, w.r.t. to empirical adequacy, and modeling of bounded rationality.
LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE VOLUME 8 Editors Shahid Rahman, University of Lille... more LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE VOLUME 8 Editors Shahid Rahman, University of Lille III, France John Symons, University of Texas at El Paso, USA Editorial Board Jean Paul van Bendegem, Free University of Brussels, Belgium Johan van ...
This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' pro... more This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' proposed jointly by M.B. Hintikka (1939-1987) and J. Hintikka (1929-2016) in the 1980s, and its successor, the interrogative model of inquiry (imi) developed by J. Hintikka and his collaborators in the 1990s. The Hintikkas' model explicitly used game theory in order to formalize a naturalistic approach to inquiry, but the imi abandoned both the game-theoretic formalism, and the naturalistic approach. It is argued that the latter better supports the claim that the imi provides a 'logic of discovery', and safeguards its empirical adequacy. Technical changes necessary to this interpretation are presented, and examples are discussed, both formal and informal, that are better analyzed when these changes are in place. The informal examples are borrowed from Conan Doyle's The Case of Silver Blaze, a favorite of M.B. and J. Hintikka.
Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false inf... more Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information orfrom the intentional actions of fake news factory workers,but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake sciencecan be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible thanthe retraction notice. We hypothesize that the reason for this lies in the popularity-based logic governing Google, in particular its foundational PageRank algorithm,in conjunction with a psychological law which we refer to as the “law of retraction”: a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interestingand therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. We conduct anempiricalstudy drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud (fabrication of data) in the Retraction Watch public database. The study tests the extent to which such retracted scientific articles are still highly ranked in Google –and more so than information about the retraction. We find, among other things, thatboth Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not rankeda link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted.Surprisingly, Google Scholar did not perform better in this regard than Google Search.We also foundcases in which Google didnot track the retraction of anarticle on the first result page at all.We conclude thatboth Google Search and Google Scholar runthe risk of disseminating fake science through theirranking algorithms. (Less)
A popular belief is that the process whereby search engines tailor their search results to indivi... more A popular belief is that the process whereby search engines tailor their search results to individual users, so-called personalization, leads to filter bubbles in the sense of ideologically segregated search results that would tend to reinforce the user's prior view (filter bubble hypothesis). Since filter bubbles are thought to be detrimental to society, there have been calls for further legal regulation of search engines beyond the so-called Right to be Forgotten Act (EU, C-131/12, 2014). However, the scientific evidence for the filter bubble hypothesis is surprisingly limited. Previous studies of personalization have focused on the extent to which different users get different results lists without taking the content on the webpages into account. Such methods are unsuitable for detecting filter bubbles as such. In this paper, we propose a methodology that takes content differences between webpages into account. In particular, the method involves studying the extent to which users with strong opposing views on an issue receive search results that are correlated content-wise with their personal view. Will users of with strong prior opinion that X is true on average have a larger share of (top) search results that are in favor of X than users with a strong prior opinion that X is false? We illustrate our methodology at work, but also the non-trivial challenges it faces, by a small-scale study of the extent to which Google Search leads to ideological segregation on the issue of man-made climate change.
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained... more Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
In Wason's Selection Task, subjects: (i) process information from the instructions and build ... more In Wason's Selection Task, subjects: (i) process information from the instructions and build a mental representation of the problem, then: (ii) select a course of action to solve the problem, under the constraints imposed by the instructions. We analyze both aspects as part of a constraint satisfaction problem without assuming Wason's 'logical' solution to be the correct one. We show that outcome of step (i) may induce mutually inconsistent constraints, causing subjects to select at step (ii) solutions that violate some of them. Our analysis explains why inconsistent constraints are less likely disrupt non-abstract (or "thematic") versions of the tasks, but unlike Bayesians does not posit di erent mechanisms in abstract and thematic variants. We then assess the logicality of the task, and conclude on cognitive tasks as coordination problems.
Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the follow... more Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage: “If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery, the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach, 1938, p. 36.) Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes.
General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply:... more General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in orde... more This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.
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