Papers by Julius Seidenader
Unter 30! Junge Visionen für Europa, 2022
Die Europäische Union steht inmitten einer Zeitenwende. Die russische Invasion der Ukraine lässt ... more Die Europäische Union steht inmitten einer Zeitenwende. Die russische Invasion der Ukraine lässt alte Gewissheiten schwinden und zwingt die EU, sich nach innen wie nach außen neu aufzustellen. Sie braucht überzeugende Antworten auf die Krisen unserer Zeit und muss grüner, digitaler, solidarischer und widerstandsfähiger werden.
Zukunftsweisende Entscheidungen dürfen dabei nicht ohne das Mitwirken jener getroffen werden, die ihre Folgen erleben und das Europa von morgen gestalten werden. In »Unter 30« skizzieren junge Europäerinnen und Europäer ihre vielfältigen Vorstellungen für die Zukunft der Europäischen Integration, ihre innovativen Ideen und neuen Ansätze für ein geeintes Europa. Dabei stellen sie sich der Frage: Wie geht es mit der Europäischen Union weiter?
OpenTTN Blog, 2021
This article examines the work of UNITAD and outlines several recommendations for the Austrian go... more This article examines the work of UNITAD and outlines several recommendations for the Austrian government to support the international investigative mechanism.
While scholarly attention on the CFSP sanctions targeting Russia and disinformation has sparked, ... more While scholarly attention on the CFSP sanctions targeting Russia and disinformation has sparked, only few authors examined the connection between "fake news" and sanctions. Constructivist theories slowly become more relevant in the sanctions literature and sanctions communication requires more research. This paper analyzes 82 cases of disinformation on sanctions from the East Stratcom database. Interestingly, the most frequent narratives found were claims that sanctions will be lifted by an actor in the EU. Economic narratives did also play a role but were not as common as expected.
A brief summary of MAC TV v Slovakia at the ECtHR and a Commentary by Mateusz Knuter on the defam... more A brief summary of MAC TV v Slovakia at the ECtHR and a Commentary by Mateusz Knuter on the defamation of the dead and its implications for Art 8 and Art 10 of the ECHR.
In the post-Lisbon era a fierce interinstitutional battle for more transparency, budgetary oversi... more In the post-Lisbon era a fierce interinstitutional battle for more transparency, budgetary oversight and supervision carried out between the Parliament and the High Representative for CFSP. Accountability has thus increased due to a number of factors. The High Representatives have gradually granted those powers through interinstitutional agreements, a declaration on political accountability and informal exchange with the Parliament and relevant committees. This paper looks at the agreements, case law and informal procedures and the attendance of the HR/VPs in the Parliament. At an early stage Catherine Ashton was primarily occupied with setting up the External Action Service, and thus had to engage with the parliament on procedures, budgetary oversight and certain means of supervision. This inevitably included touching questions of interinstitutional balance and democratic accountability. Her successor Federica Mogherini focused overall on increased coherence between all Commissioners working on external action, drafted a global security strategy, and favored a closer cooperation with the Parliament. Overall, the accountability of the High Representative vis-à-vis the Parliament has remarkably increased. In the question of access to documents in the realm of Foreign Policy the Court has clearly sided with the Parliament so far. In 2019, it remains to be seen how a new Commission and High Representative will keep up to Mogherini's interinstitutional political will and continue the "open arms approach" to the Parliament.
This paper reviews the use of the EU´s autonomous sanctions in its international relations. The u... more This paper reviews the use of the EU´s autonomous sanctions in its international relations. The underlying question focusses on the legal limits of EU law and International law to the capacity of the EU to adopt autonomous sanctions. First, the previous cases are examined, then the legal bases under EU law is discussed. Furthermore, the latest case law of the ECJ on autonomous sanctions in Rosneft and Bank Mellat reveals that the Council enjoys a broad discretion in designing sectoral embargoes. Subsequently, the framework of the law of responsibilities under ARISWA and ARIO is summarized. Moreover, the thesis also looks at sectoral embargoes under the IHL and the Geneva Conventions including the Additional Protocol. In the final chapter, a detailed analysis of the measures against Syria is presented and analyzed under the light of ARIO and ARISWA. In contrast to the countermeasures against Iran, the Oil Embargo against Syria is in full compliance with all procedural and substantive obligations arising from Chapter II of ARISWA.
This paper seeks to examine the sanctions regimes of the United States of America (US) and the Eu... more This paper seeks to examine the sanctions regimes of the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) and their respective humanitarian exemptions in the context of Syria from 2011-2019. While several studies on the economic impact of sanctions on the Government of Syria and its population have been published, there is a lack of research on their impact on humanitarian actors. Previous studies have documented a substantial withdrawal of international banks in conflict areas, for instance in Somalia, but further focus on the Syrian civil war is required. What are the differences in the humanitarian exemption schemes between the US and the EU sanctions on Syria? How do Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) cope with the sanctions imposed? What alternatives to traditional banking channels for humanitarian aid and remittances have arisen? To shed light on those questions, I conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with senior NGO staff, consultants and diplomats with deep knowledge of the Syrian conflict. The material provides unique qualitative insight on how NGOs navigate the sanctions regimes imposed by the EU and the US and the development of humanitarian exemptions. Key findings include that the US and certain EU member states coordinated not only the sanctions regime from early on in 2011 but also the humanitarian exemptions. Interestingly, NGO´s only rarely use exemptions in the EU but still fear US sanctions law and legal consequences due to secondary sanctions. While facing pressure by banks and logistics companies, NGO´s came up with innovative coping strategies. The widespread use of informal payment and procurement channels by NGO´s is one of such strategies. This paper examines the humanitarian 2 actors and their experiences with the measures in place in Syria from 2011 until 2019. Also the process of communication between foreign policy makers in the EU/US and humanitarian actors on sanctions exemptions is being explored in depth. The aim is to improve so called targeted sanctions as a foreign policy instrument and to mitigate unintended consequences.
Die Think-Tank-Landschaft Österreichs - Eine Umfrage TDHJ 2021/3, 2021
For the first time, this study systematically explores the types, working methods, financing and ... more For the first time, this study systematically explores the types, working methods, financing and personnel structure of the various foreign and security policy think-tanks in Austria. On the basis of a non-representative survey with 20 employees from foreign and security policy think-tanks, the self-assessment of the influence on political actors was surveyed. Austrian think-tanks are primarily publicly financed and cover a wide range of topics. Their expertise is particularly valued in the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Panel discussions, seminars and workshops are rated as particularly effective.
Several EU member states and hundreds of companies operating in the EU have been subject to cyber... more Several EU member states and hundreds of companies operating in the EU have been subject to cyber-attacks in the last years. Since 2004, 17 EU member states have been subject to election interference. In 2017, the ransomware WannaCry infected servers on an unprecedented scale in the EU and indicated some of the vulnerabilities of our digital age. Moreover, the Bundestag hack of 2016 and the attack on the Danish global shipping giant Maersk in 2017 are additional examples of recent attacks on European cyber infrastructure which resulted in calls for a new EU sanctions regime. Subsequently, the Council of the European Union has recently adopted a new horizontal autonomous regime of restrictive measures to target actors involved in malicious cyber activities. Under Council Regulation 2019/796, the scope of the new EU sanctions regime will entail a broad definition of listing criteria, including cyber-attacks on public infrastructure, hacking of financial institutions and the use of ransomware. Sanctions will include travel bans and the freezing of assets of listed entities and individuals within the EU. Attribution Of Attacks To Perpetrators The vexed question of such an instrument lies in the legal, technical and political attribution of cyber-attacks on public and private cyber infrastructure. Determining the origin of state sponsored and non-state actor attacks is complex and requires significant resources, such as forensic capabilities. Despite these efforts it might not always be conclusive. From a legal perspective, attribution is also one crucial element of the rules governing countermeasures and retorsions, triggering state responsibility under public international law. Furthermore, a sound evidentiary base for new listings under the cyber sanctions regime is decisive, since the Council has lost a number of cases in the European Court of Justice due to a lack of evidence provided by the Member States. Therefore, the Court could also play a role by shaping the listing criteria, consolidating the procedural law and setting evidentiary standards for cyber sanctions. However, in practice decisions of attribution will often be of a political nature inseparable from technical and legal aspects. Decisions to list individuals are highly delicate decisions on which consensus has to be found in the Council in the first place. Effectiveness Of Cyber Sanctions Moreover, the effectiveness of such a new regime also depends on the Council's ability of swift decision making, and clear objectives to add new natural and legal persons to the sanctions list. While the effectiveness of such a sanctions regime lies primarily in a signal and a deterrence component it will probably not coerce or constrain all sanctioned actors from continuing their malicious actions. Nevertheless, such a sanctions regime identifies actors and signals to the internal audience in the EU
Sanctions have become one of the most frequently used foreign policy tools in the 20 th century a... more Sanctions have become one of the most frequently used foreign policy tools in the 20 th century and have been reformed in the 1990ies to become 'smarter', more targeted and to avoid humanitarian suffering. The use of multilateral sanctions and diplomatic efforts to coerce Iran into negotiations of the 'Nuclear Agreement' has been dubbed one of the EU's greatest foreign policy achievements. Jean Claude Juncker stated in his State of the Union Speech: " If we want to be 'weltpolitikfähig', then we also need to simplify our decision-making processes ". Subsequently the Commission issued a document that specified Juncker's proposal to expand qualitative majority voting in foreign policy decisions at the Council of Ministers. While the Commission wants to abolish unanimity in three areas, civilian missions, unified positions in Human Rights fora and sanctions, I will focus on the latter. Currently the initial enactment of sanctions regimes requires unanimity, while non-substantial changes and the adding of new individuals for existing regimes can be achieved already under the qualitative voting procedure. What are the implications of the proposed change for EU sanctions? The legal bases for " restrictive measures " are Articles 75 and 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In addition, a vast amount of case law on sanctions has clarified the limits of judicial review of the Court of Justice of the EU on foreign policy. Many sanctions cases involve requests for annulment by individuals on the EU's sanctions lists and consequently brought decisive fundamental rights cases like Kadi I+II to the Courts. The imposition of sanctions by the EU spiked with the Arab Spring in 2011, leading to criticism that enacting sanctions takes too long albeit the urgency for speedy decision making. Hence, EU foreign policy reform has been neglected by its member states for too long. While no member state openly broke unanimity on sanctions in the Council yet, Greece, Austria and Hungary have previously announced to object in a number of cases such as measures against Russia and Syria. Clara Portela et al., found in a recent study, that member states connect the sanctions dossiers with completely different issues and that there is an active bargaining in the COREPER II, the body that prepares the texts for the Council meetings at ministerial level. This might be interesting for academics on EU integration, but clearly delays effective foreign policy making and prevents speedy decisions on urgent crises that demand quick action. Crucial partners like Canada, Japan and Turkey frequently align with EU sanctions. In addition, members of the European Free Trade Association, like Switzerland, and future accession countries like Serbia also align with the EU and thereby drastically increase the effectiveness of sanctions implementation. Majority voting in the Council on new sanction regimes will thus have a global impact and increase the importance of the EU and its partners substantially. The current rift in sanctions policy between the EU and the US regarding Iran, US sanctions are perceived to be more powerful, is another indicator to reform the current EU system. The friction with the US and attempts to shield EU companies from US sanctions in Iran could be a driver to convince Italy, Slovakia and Hungary, countries that already raised scepticism on Juncker's proposal. While Germany and France have no objections, the abovementioned argument could be used to embrace the " sceptics' " concerns and convince them that the EU needs to pull on one string in its sanctions policy.
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Papers by Julius Seidenader
Zukunftsweisende Entscheidungen dürfen dabei nicht ohne das Mitwirken jener getroffen werden, die ihre Folgen erleben und das Europa von morgen gestalten werden. In »Unter 30« skizzieren junge Europäerinnen und Europäer ihre vielfältigen Vorstellungen für die Zukunft der Europäischen Integration, ihre innovativen Ideen und neuen Ansätze für ein geeintes Europa. Dabei stellen sie sich der Frage: Wie geht es mit der Europäischen Union weiter?
Zukunftsweisende Entscheidungen dürfen dabei nicht ohne das Mitwirken jener getroffen werden, die ihre Folgen erleben und das Europa von morgen gestalten werden. In »Unter 30« skizzieren junge Europäerinnen und Europäer ihre vielfältigen Vorstellungen für die Zukunft der Europäischen Integration, ihre innovativen Ideen und neuen Ansätze für ein geeintes Europa. Dabei stellen sie sich der Frage: Wie geht es mit der Europäischen Union weiter?